@haven_ai/connect 0.2.0-alpha.0 → 0.3.0-alpha.0

package/README.md

@@ -101,6 +101,13 @@ one agent and sign as another, and it fails hard. This is the half of that
 hazard a local tool can know — the doctor still cannot see inside an
 already-running host, which is why the restart guidance below matters.
 
+The hosted MCP `tools/list` row is an endpoint-reachability handshake, not a
+credential-authentication result. When doctor classifies a superseded
+directory, it uses the same authenticated, read-only identity endpoint: a
+401/403 means the stored key is already revoked; a successful identity read
+means it remains spend-capable; and network or malformed responses remain
+unverifiable.
+
 ## Retiring an old agent directory
 
 Re-running setup without `--replace` creates a NEW agent and retires nothing

package/dist/cli.cjs

@@ -557,9 +557,9 @@ var init_runtime_manifest = __esm({
       mcpPackage: "@haven_ai/mcp",
       mcpVersion: mcp.MCP_VERSION,
       sdkPackage: "@haven_ai/sdk",
-      sdkVersion: "0.2.0-alpha.0",
+      sdkVersion: "0.3.0-alpha.0",
       signerPackage: "@haven_ai/signer",
-      signerVersion: "0.2.0-alpha.0",
+      signerVersion: "0.3.0-alpha.0",
       // Sourced from the SDK, never a literal (#1161). This field read '20.0.0'
       // while every package's `engines` said `>=24` and the docs said `>=24.0.0`,
       // so the guard that was supposed to enforce the floor waved Node v23 through
@@ -1447,7 +1447,7 @@ async function buildLocalMcpConsentInput(identityPath, signerPath) {
       apiKey: credentials.apiKey,
       apiUrl: credentials.apiUrl,
       agentId: credentials.agentId,
-      safeAddress: credentials.accountAddress ?? credentials.safeAddress,
+      accountAddress: credentials.accountAddress,
       delegateAddress: credentials.delegateAddress,
       chainId: credentials.chainId,
       allowanceSummary: credentials.allowanceSummary
@@ -2489,7 +2489,7 @@ async function buildSignerConsentInput(signerPath) {
   });
   return {
     delegateAddress: signer$1.delegateAddress,
-    safeAddress: credentials.accountAddress ?? credentials.safeAddress,
+    accountAddress: credentials.accountAddress,
     agentId: credentials.agentId,
     chainId: credentials.chainId,
     network: credentials.network,
@@ -2665,7 +2665,7 @@ async function installRuntime(input, deps = {}) {
   (signerProbe === void 0 || signerProbe.status === "ok");
   const restartRequired = configResult.restartRequired || restartRequiredForRuntime(runtime, deps.env);
   const errorCode = configResult.errorCode ?? (configResult.runtimeMcpMode === "local_stdio" ? localMcpErrorCode(signerCredentialReady, localMcpConsent, localMcpProbe?.status) : hostedMcpErrorCode(configResult.hostedConfigured, hostedProbe.status) ?? signerConsentErrorCode(signerCredentialReady, signerConsent) ?? signerProbeErrorCode(signerProbe));
-  const hostedProbeMessages = configResult.hostedConfigured && hostedProbe.status !== "ok" ? [`Hosted Haven MCP probe failed: ${hostedProbe.status}.`] : configResult.hostedConfigured ? ["Verified hosted Haven MCP tools with a read-only handshake."] : [];
+  const hostedProbeMessages = configResult.hostedConfigured && hostedProbe.status !== "ok" ? [`Hosted Haven MCP probe failed: ${hostedProbe.status}.`] : configResult.hostedConfigured ? ["Verified that the hosted Haven MCP tools endpoint responds to a read-only handshake."] : [];
   const signerProbeMessages = signerProbe ? signerProbe.status === "ok" ? ["Verified local Haven signer with a stdio handshake."] : [
     `Local Haven signer handshake failed: ${signerProbe.status}.`,
     `Re-run \`${sdk.connectorRerunCommand()}\` to repair the signer setup.`
@@ -3327,9 +3327,10 @@ async function finishRekey(options, deps = {}) {
     apiKey: options.newApiKey,
     delegateKey: pending.new_delegate_key,
     delegateAddress: pending.new_delegate_address,
-    // #2908: the stored value (already new-name-first) wins; the hosted
-    // identity's `account_address` twin before its deprecated `safe_address`.
-    accountAddress: stored.accountAddress ?? identity.account_address ?? identity.safe_address ?? void 0,
+    // The stored value (already new-name-first, from the credential-FILE
+    // permanent fallback) wins; the hosted identity's `account_address` is a
+    // LIVE server read, which as of #2914 emits only that name.
+    accountAddress: stored.accountAddress ?? identity.account_address ?? void 0,
     chainId: stored.chainId ?? identity.chain_id ?? void 0,
     network: stored.network,
     agentBudget: stored.agentBudget,
@@ -3715,14 +3716,17 @@ async function checksForAgent(entry, input, deps) {
       ...matches ? {} : { repair: `Run: ${RERUN} --doctor --repair --runtime ${input.runtime} with the same HAVEN_*_SPEC variables set.` }
     });
   } else {
-    const matches = await installedRuntimeMatches(sidecar.runtime_directory, sidecar.cli_path);
+    const intact = await installedRuntimeMatchesVersions(sidecar.runtime_directory, sidecar.cli_path, {
+      signerVersion: sidecar.signer_version,
+      sdkVersion: sidecar.sdk_version
+    });
     const versionOk = sidecar.signer_version === MCP_RUNTIME_MANIFEST.signerVersion;
-    const ok = matches && versionOk;
+    const ok = intact && versionOk;
     checks.push({
       id: "signer_runtime",
       label: "Signer runtime (preinstalled wrapper)",
       ok,
-      detail: ok ? `Installed ${sidecar.signer_package}@${sidecar.signer_version} at ${sidecar.runtime_directory}` : matches ? `Installed version ${sidecar.signer_version} does not match the connector's pinned ${MCP_RUNTIME_MANIFEST.signerVersion}.` : `Runtime directory is stale or empty (${sidecar.runtime_directory}) \u2014 the CLI or package versions are missing.`,
+      detail: ok ? `Installed ${sidecar.signer_package}@${sidecar.signer_version} at ${sidecar.runtime_directory}` : intact ? `Installed version ${sidecar.signer_version} does not match the connector's pinned ${MCP_RUNTIME_MANIFEST.signerVersion} \u2014 intact, but outdated.` : `Runtime directory is stale or empty (${sidecar.runtime_directory}) \u2014 the CLI or package versions are missing.`,
       ...ok ? {} : { repair: `Run: ${RERUN} --doctor --repair --runtime ${input.runtime}` }
     });
   }
@@ -3735,9 +3739,9 @@ async function checksForAgent(entry, input, deps) {
       id: "hosted_mcp",
       label: "Hosted Haven MCP",
       ok: probe.status === "ok",
-      detail: probe.status === "ok" ? `Reachable and authorized (${hostedUrl}).` : `Probe failed: ${probe.status} (${hostedUrl}).`,
+      detail: probe.status === "ok" ? `MCP tools endpoint is reachable (${hostedUrl}).` : `MCP tools endpoint probe failed: ${probe.status} (${hostedUrl}).`,
       ...probe.status === "ok" ? {} : {
-        repair: probe.status === "unauthorized" ? `The stored API key was rejected \u2014 re-run the full setup with a fresh token: ${RERUN} --setup <token>.` : "Check network access to the hosted MCP URL, then re-run --doctor."
+        repair: "Check network access and runtime configuration for the hosted MCP URL, then re-run --doctor."
       }
     });
   } else {
@@ -3971,14 +3975,17 @@ async function runDoctor(input, deps = {}) {
       const identity = await readIdentity(entry.directory);
       const tombstone = await readAgentTombstone(entry.directory);
       const otherAgent = entry.agentId ?? path.basename(entry.directory);
-      const otherUrl = identity?.hosted_mcp_url ?? (identity?.api_url ? `${identity.api_url}/mcp` : void 0);
-      if (!identity?.api_key || !otherUrl) {
+      if (!identity?.api_key || !identity.api_url) {
         if (tombstone) retired.push(`${otherAgent} (retired ${tombstone.retired_at})`);
-        else unverifiable.push(`${otherAgent} (no stored key/URL to probe)`);
+        else unverifiable.push(`${otherAgent} (no stored key/API URL to probe)`);
         continue;
       }
       const suffix = tombstone ? " [tombstoned \u2014 key material still present]" : "";
-      const probe = await (deps.probeHosted ?? probeHostedMcpTools)(identity.api_key, otherUrl, deps.fetch);
+      const probe = await (deps.probeHostedIdentity ?? probeHostedAgentIdentity)(
+        identity.api_key,
+        identity.api_url,
+        deps.fetch
+      );
       if (probe.status === "ok") live.push({ label: `${otherAgent}${suffix}`, entry });
       else if (probe.status === "unauthorized") revoked.push(`${otherAgent}${suffix}`);
       else unverifiable.push(`${otherAgent} (${probe.status})${suffix}`);
@@ -4422,7 +4429,7 @@ async function pathExists2(path) {
 init_unwire();
 init_local_mcp_runtime();
 init_runtime_manifest();
-var CONNECTOR_VERSION = "0.2.0-alpha.0";
+var CONNECTOR_VERSION = "0.3.0-alpha.0";
 var CONNECT_OUTCOME_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1;
 var failureOutcomesByError = /* @__PURE__ */ new WeakMap();
 function failureOutcomeFor(runtimeHint, error) {