@hassangameryt/freeflow 0.7.3 → 0.9.0

package/skills/evaluate-behavior/scripts/lib/shell.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,560 @@
+// The shell tier: a body group may give its subject `bash` only through a declared isolation extension, and the
+// evaluator never trusts the declaration. Before an arm's first subject it checks the isolation's prerequisites and
+// runs the subject's own Pi, with the arm's extensions and a local scripted model, through probes that a confined
+// shell must fail. Any probe that does not hold makes the group invalid. The evaluator picks no sandbox itself.
+
+import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
+import { access, constants, mkdir, readFile, rm, stat, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import http from "node:http";
+import os from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
+import { promisify } from "node:util";
+
+import { SHELL_TOOLS } from "../guard-rules.mjs";
+import { containerShell, containerTarget, missingContainerPrerequisites, startContainer } from "./container.mjs";
+import { hostAdapter } from "./hosts/index.mjs";
+
+const run = promisify(execFile);
+const PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
+const OUTPUT_TAIL = 2000;
+// Planted in Pi's own environment; a confined shell must not see it.
+export const PROBE_VARIABLE = "CONFINEMENT_PROBE";
+const PUBLIC_URL_VARIABLE = "SKILL_EVAL_PROBE_PUBLIC_URL";
+const DEFAULT_PUBLIC_URL = "https://example.com/";
+
+/**
+ * Prerequisites an isolation may name in `shell.requires`. Each is a program on PATH (any of `programs`), or a
+ * minimum Node version for the `node` Pi runs on.
+ */
+const PREREQUISITES = {
+  qemu: {
+    name: "QEMU",
+    programs: ["qemu-system-x86_64", "qemu-system-aarch64"],
+    install: {
+      macos: "brew install qemu",
+      apt: process.arch === "arm64" ? "sudo apt-get install qemu-system-arm" : "sudo apt-get install qemu-system-x86",
+      dnf: process.arch === "arm64" ? "sudo dnf install qemu-system-aarch64" : "sudo dnf install qemu-system-x86",
+    },
+  },
+  "node-23.6": {
+    name: "Node.js 23.6 or newer",
+    node: "23.6.0",
+    install: {
+      macos: "brew install node",
+      apt: "install Node.js 23.6 or newer from https://nodejs.org (distribution packages are usually older), or with nvm: nvm install 24",
+      dnf: "install Node.js 23.6 or newer from https://nodejs.org (distribution packages are usually older), or with nvm: nvm install 24",
+    },
+  },
+};
+
+/** Named sets of prerequisites, for isolations the evaluator knows. */
+const PROFILES = {
+  gondolin: {
+    requires: ["qemu", "node-23.6"],
+    reason: "Gondolin runs each shell command in a local QEMU micro-VM, and its host library needs Node.js 23.6+",
+    download: "Gondolin downloads its guest image on first start (size not verified)",
+  },
+};
+
+function isPlainObject(value) {
+  return value !== null && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validates a configuration's `shell`: `{ isolation, network: "none", workspace?, requires? }`.
+ *
+ * @param {any} value
+ * @param {string} label
+ * @param {(code: string, message: string) => never} fail
+ */
+export function validateShell(value, label, fail) {
+  if (!isPlainObject(value)) fail("invalid-definition", `${label} must be an object`);
+  for (const key of Object.keys(value)) {
+    if (!["isolation", "network", "workspace", "requires"].includes(key)) {
+      fail("invalid-definition", `${label} contains unsupported field ${key}`);
+    }
+  }
+  if (typeof value.isolation !== "string" || value.isolation.trim() === "") {
+    fail("invalid-definition", `${label}.isolation must name one of the arm's host.extensions`);
+  }
+  if (value.network !== "none") fail("invalid-definition", `${label}.network must be "none"`);
+  if (Object.hasOwn(value, "workspace")) {
+    const workspace = value.workspace;
+    if (
+      typeof workspace !== "string" ||
+      !workspace.startsWith("/") ||
+      workspace === "/" ||
+      workspace.endsWith("/") ||
+      workspace
+        .split("/")
+        .slice(1)
+        .some((part) => part === "" || part === "." || part === "..")
+    ) {
+      fail("invalid-definition", `${label}.workspace must be an absolute path such as /workspace`);
+    }
+  }
+  if (Object.hasOwn(value, "requires")) {
+    if (!Array.isArray(value.requires)) fail("invalid-definition", `${label}.requires must be an array`);
+    for (const [index, entry] of value.requires.entries()) {
+      if (typeof entry === "string") {
+        if (!Object.hasOwn(PROFILES, entry) && !Object.hasOwn(PREREQUISITES, entry)) {
+          fail(
+            "invalid-definition",
+            `${label}.requires[${index}] names an unknown prerequisite ${entry}; known: ${[...Object.keys(PROFILES), ...Object.keys(PREREQUISITES)].join(", ")}`,
+          );
+        }
+        continue;
+      }
+      validateCustomPrerequisite(entry, `${label}.requires[${index}]`, fail);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+function validateCustomPrerequisite(entry, label, fail) {
+  if (!isPlainObject(entry)) fail("invalid-definition", `${label} must be a known name or an object`);
+  for (const key of Object.keys(entry)) {
+    if (!["name", "programs", "reason", "install", "download"].includes(key)) {
+      fail("invalid-definition", `${label} contains unsupported field ${key}`);
+    }
+  }
+  if (typeof entry.name !== "string" || entry.name === "") fail("invalid-definition", `${label}.name must be a string`);
+  if (
+    !Array.isArray(entry.programs) ||
+    entry.programs.length === 0 ||
+    !entry.programs.every((program) => typeof program === "string" && /^[A-Za-z0-9._+-]+$/.test(program))
+  ) {
+    fail("invalid-definition", `${label}.programs must list program names, any one of which satisfies it`);
+  }
+  for (const key of ["reason", "download"]) {
+    if (Object.hasOwn(entry, key) && typeof entry[key] !== "string") {
+      fail("invalid-definition", `${label}.${key} must be a string`);
+    }
+  }
+  if (Object.hasOwn(entry, "install")) {
+    if (!isPlainObject(entry.install)) fail("invalid-definition", `${label}.install must be an object`);
+    for (const [key, command] of Object.entries(entry.install)) {
+      if (!["macos", "apt", "dnf"].includes(key) || typeof command !== "string") {
+        fail("invalid-definition", `${label}.install may give macos, apt and dnf commands as strings`);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/** A host extension entry as `shell.isolation` names it: the package name, or the source or working-tree path. */
+export function isolationLabel(entry) {
+  if (typeof entry?.package === "string") return entry.package;
+  if (isPlainObject(entry?.source)) return entry.source.path;
+  return entry?.path;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Group-level rules once any arm declares `shell`: `bash` in the tools, a body group, and every arm's shell isolated
+ * by one of that arm's host extensions. A group that declares no shell keeps the run-time refusal of `bash`.
+ *
+ * @param {{ group: any, names: string[], configurations: Record<string, any>, fail: (code: string, message: string) => never }} options
+ */
+export function validateShellGroup({ group, names, configurations, fail }) {
+  for (const arm of names) {
+    if (configurations[arm].shell !== undefined && configurations[arm].environment !== undefined) {
+      fail(
+        "invalid-definition",
+        `arm ${arm} declares both shell and a container environment, which provides the shell`,
+      );
+    }
+  }
+  const containers = names.filter((arm) => configurations[arm].environment !== undefined);
+  if (containers.length > 0 && group.type !== "body") {
+    fail("invalid-definition", "a container environment is supported only in body groups");
+  }
+  const declared = names.filter((arm) => configurations[arm].shell !== undefined);
+  if (declared.length === 0 && !(group.tools.includes("bash") && containers.length > 0)) return;
+  if (!group.tools.includes("bash")) {
+    fail("invalid-definition", `arm ${declared[0]} declares shell, so group.tools must include bash`);
+  }
+  if (group.type !== "body") fail("invalid-definition", "bash is supported only in body groups");
+  for (const arm of names) {
+    const shell = configurations[arm].shell ?? containerShell(configurations[arm].environment);
+    if (shell === undefined) {
+      fail(
+        "invalid-definition",
+        `bash needs a confined shell: arm ${arm} must declare configuration.shell with an isolation extension, or a container environment`,
+      );
+    }
+    if (shell.container !== undefined) continue;
+    const labels = (configurations[arm].host.extensions ?? []).map(isolationLabel);
+    if (!labels.includes(shell.isolation)) {
+      fail(
+        "invalid-definition",
+        `arm ${arm}'s shell.isolation ${shell.isolation} is not among its host.extensions (${labels.join(", ") || "none"})`,
+      );
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/** The prerequisites a shell declares, expanded from profiles, with the reasons and downloads they carry. */
+function declaredPrerequisites(shell) {
+  const entries = [];
+  for (const entry of shell.requires ?? []) {
+    if (typeof entry !== "string") {
+      entries.push({ ...entry, reason: entry.reason ?? null, download: entry.download ?? null });
+      continue;
+    }
+    const profile = PROFILES[entry];
+    const names = profile === undefined ? [entry] : profile.requires;
+    for (const name of names) {
+      entries.push({ ...PREREQUISITES[name], reason: profile?.reason ?? null, download: profile?.download ?? null });
+    }
+  }
+  return entries;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The declared prerequisites that are missing on this machine, each with why it is needed and how to install it on
+ * this operating system.
+ *
+ * @returns {Promise<Array<{ name: string, need: string, found: string | null, reason: string | null, install: string | null, download: string | null }>>}
+ */
+export async function missingPrerequisites(shell, { environment = process.env } = {}) {
+  const missing = [];
+  const manager = await packageManager(environment);
+  for (const prerequisite of declaredPrerequisites(shell)) {
+    let need;
+    let found = null;
+    let satisfied;
+    if (prerequisite.node !== undefined) {
+      need = `node ${prerequisite.node} or newer on PATH`;
+      found = await nodeVersion(environment);
+      satisfied = found !== null && compareVersions(found, prerequisite.node) >= 0;
+      if (found !== null) found = `node ${found}`;
+    } else {
+      need = `${prerequisite.programs.join(" or ")} on PATH`;
+      satisfied = (await Promise.all(prerequisite.programs.map((program) => onPath(program, environment)))).some(
+        Boolean,
+      );
+    }
+    if (satisfied) continue;
+    missing.push({
+      name: prerequisite.name,
+      need,
+      found,
+      reason: prerequisite.reason,
+      install: manager === null ? null : (prerequisite.install?.[manager] ?? null),
+      download: prerequisite.download,
+    });
+  }
+  return missing;
+}
+
+/** The refusal the agent relays to the user: what is missing, why, how to install it, and that it should ask first. */
+export function prerequisiteRefusal(groupId, arm, shell, missing) {
+  const what =
+    shell.container === undefined
+      ? `declares a shell isolated by ${shell.isolation}`
+      : `runs in the container image ${shell.container.image}`;
+  const lines = [`group ${groupId} cannot run: arm ${arm} ${what}, and this machine is missing:`];
+  for (const entry of missing) {
+    lines.push(`- ${entry.name}: needs ${entry.need}${entry.found ? ` (found ${entry.found})` : " (not found)"}.`);
+    if (entry.reason) lines.push(`  Why: ${entry.reason}.`);
+    lines.push(
+      `  Install: ${entry.install ?? "no install command is known for this system; see the isolation's documentation"}`,
+    );
+    if (entry.download) lines.push(`  Download: ${entry.download}.`);
+  }
+  lines.push("Ask the user before installing anything, then run again.");
+  return lines.join("\n");
+}
+
+export async function packageManager(environment) {
+  if (process.platform === "darwin") return "macos";
+  if (process.platform !== "linux") return null;
+  if (await onPath("apt-get", environment)) return "apt";
+  if (await onPath("dnf", environment)) return "dnf";
+  return null;
+}
+
+async function onPath(program, environment) {
+  for (const directory of (environment.PATH ?? "").split(path.delimiter).filter(Boolean)) {
+    try {
+      await access(path.join(directory, program), constants.X_OK);
+      return true;
+    } catch {
+      // Not in this directory.
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+async function nodeVersion(environment) {
+  try {
+    const { stdout } = await run("node", ["--version"], { env: environment, timeout: 10000 });
+    return stdout.trim().replace(/^v/, "");
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+function compareVersions(left, right) {
+  const parse = (value) => value.split(".").map((part) => Number.parseInt(part, 10) || 0);
+  const [a, b] = [parse(left), parse(right)];
+  for (let index = 0; index < 3; index += 1) {
+    if ((a[index] ?? 0) !== (b[index] ?? 0)) return (a[index] ?? 0) - (b[index] ?? 0);
+  }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/** A failure that makes a group invalid, with structured details for its runs' evidence. */
+export class ShellError extends Error {
+  constructor(message, details) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = "ShellError";
+    this.details = details;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Checks prerequisites and verifies confinement for every selected arm that declares a shell, before any subject
+ * starts. Returns each verified arm's confinement record; throws a ShellError when a prerequisite is missing or a
+ * probe does not hold.
+ *
+ * @param {{ group: any, variants: Record<string, string>, hostExtensions: Record<string, any[]>, groupDirectory: string, signal?: AbortSignal }} options
+ */
+export async function prepareShell({ group, variants, hostExtensions, groupDirectory, signal }) {
+  const confinement = {};
+  for (const [arm, state] of Object.entries(variants)) {
+    const shell = group.variants[arm]?.shell;
+    if (state !== "selected" || shell === undefined) continue;
+    const missing =
+      shell.container === undefined
+        ? await missingPrerequisites(shell)
+        : await missingContainerPrerequisites(shell.container, await packageManager(process.env), groupDirectory);
+    if (missing.length > 0) {
+      throw new ShellError(prerequisiteRefusal(group.id, arm, shell, missing), {
+        kind: "shell-prerequisites",
+        arm,
+        isolation: shell.isolation,
+        missing,
+      });
+    }
+    // A container without a shell tool (bash, or Freeflow's background commands, which run in the same shell) gives the
+    // subject no shell to probe: it hosts only declared commands and graders.
+    if (shell.container !== undefined && !group.tools.some((tool) => SHELL_TOOLS.has(tool))) continue;
+    confinement[arm] = await verifyConfinement({
+      arm,
+      host: group.host ?? "pi",
+      shell,
+      extensions: hostExtensions[arm] ?? [],
+      directory: path.join(groupDirectory, "confinement", arm),
+      groupDirectory,
+      signal,
+    });
+    if (!confinement[arm].verified) {
+      const failed = confinement[arm].probes.filter((probe) => !probe.held).map((probe) => probe.id);
+      throw new ShellError(
+        `arm ${arm}'s shell isolated by ${shell.isolation} is not confined: ${failed.join(", ")} did not hold (see confinement in the run evidence)`,
+        { kind: "shell-confinement", arm, confinement },
+      );
+    }
+  }
+  return confinement;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Runs the probes for one arm through its own host and extensions, with a local scripted model, and judges each by
+ * what the host can observe: files on the host, connections to a host listener, and the probe output.
+ */
+export async function verifyConfinement({ arm, host = "pi", shell, extensions, directory, groupDirectory, signal }) {
+  await rm(directory, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  const workspace = path.join(directory, "workspace");
+  const outside = path.join(directory, "outside");
+  await mkdir(workspace, { recursive: true });
+  await mkdir(outside, { recursive: true });
+  const nonce = randomBytes(12).toString("hex");
+  const adapter = hostAdapter(host);
+  const isolation = await adapter.prepareIsolation(directory, null, { settings: adapter.effectiveSettings({}) });
+  // The isolated HOME's parent holds a marker the shell must not read, and so does the directory where the host keeps
+  // its login: a shell that can read there could read a subject's copied login.
+  const marker = path.join(isolation.evidence.root, "probe-marker");
+  await writeFile(marker, `${nonce}\n`);
+  const loginMarker = path.join(isolation.loginDirectory ?? isolation.evidence.root, "probe-login-marker");
+  await writeFile(loginMarker, `${nonce}\n`);
+  const written = path.join(outside, `written-${nonce}`);
+
+  const listener = await startListener(nonce);
+  const publicUrl = Object.hasOwn(process.env, PUBLIC_URL_VARIABLE)
+    ? process.env[PUBLIC_URL_VARIABLE]
+    : DEFAULT_PUBLIC_URL;
+  const urls = [listener.url, ...(publicUrl ? [publicUrl] : [])];
+  const probes = [
+    {
+      id: "workspace-write",
+      purpose: "control: the shell runs and writes inside the workspace",
+      command: `printf '%s' ${nonce} > confinement-control && cat confinement-control`,
+    },
+    {
+      id: "write-outside",
+      purpose: "writing a host file outside the workspace must fail",
+      command: `printf '%s' ${nonce} > ${quote(written)}; echo "exit=$?"`,
+    },
+    {
+      id: "read-home-parent",
+      purpose: "reading a marker beside the isolated home must fail",
+      command: `cat ${quote(marker)}; echo "exit=$?"`,
+    },
+    {
+      id: "network",
+      purpose: "reaching the network must fail",
+      command: networkCommand(urls),
+    },
+    {
+      id: "environment",
+      purpose: `the ${PROBE_VARIABLE} variable planted in ${adapter.label}'s environment must be absent`,
+      command: `printenv ${PROBE_VARIABLE} || echo unset`,
+    },
+    {
+      id: "read-login",
+      purpose: `reading a marker in ${adapter.label}'s login directory must fail`,
+      command: `cat ${quote(loginMarker)}; echo "exit=$?"`,
+    },
+  ];
+
+  // A container shell is probed in its own container, started on the probe workspace like a subject's.
+  let container = null;
+  if (shell.container !== undefined) {
+    try {
+      container = await startContainer({ container: shell.container, workspace, purpose: "probe" });
+    } catch (error) {
+      await listener.close();
+      throw error;
+    }
+  }
+  // The guard's contract, as for a subject: only bash, confined to the probe workspace.
+  const guard = {
+    PWD: workspace,
+    SKILL_EVAL_ALLOWED_ROOTS: JSON.stringify([workspace]),
+    SKILL_EVAL_WRITABLE_ROOT: workspace,
+    SKILL_EVAL_ALLOWED_TOOLS: JSON.stringify(["bash"]),
+    SKILL_EVAL_CONTEXT_MANIFEST: "",
+    SKILL_EVAL_HOST: host,
+    SKILL_EVAL_PROMPT_MODE: "isolated",
+    SKILL_EVAL_SHELL: JSON.stringify(shell),
+    [PROBE_VARIABLE]: nonce,
+    ...(container === null ? {} : { SKILL_EVAL_CONTAINER: containerTarget(container) }),
+  };
+  const timeout = AbortSignal.timeout(PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS);
+  const eventsFile = path.join(directory, "events.jsonl");
+  const stderrFile = path.join(directory, "stderr.log");
+  let probed = { observation: null, launchError: null, results: new Map() };
+  let launchError = null;
+  try {
+    probed = await adapter.probeShell({
+      probes,
+      workspace,
+      isolation,
+      extensions,
+      guard,
+      eventsFile,
+      stderrFile,
+      signal: signal ? AbortSignal.any([signal, timeout]) : timeout,
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    launchError = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
+  } finally {
+    await Promise.all([listener.close(), container?.remove()]);
+  }
+
+  const { observation, results } = probed;
+  launchError ??= probed.launchError;
+  const judged = probes.map((probe) => ({ ...probe, ...results.get(probe.id) }));
+  const control = await readFile(path.join(workspace, "confinement-control"), "utf8").catch(() => null);
+  const leakedWrite = await stat(written).then(
+    () => true,
+    () => false,
+  );
+  const held = {
+    "workspace-write": control === nonce,
+    "write-outside": !leakedWrite,
+    "read-home-parent": !includes(judged[2], nonce),
+    network: listener.connections === 0 && !/REACHED:(?!000)\S+/.test(judged[3].output ?? ""),
+    environment: !includes(judged[4], nonce),
+    "read-login": !includes(judged[5], nonce),
+  };
+  const record = {
+    verified: false,
+    isolation: shell.isolation,
+    network: shell.network,
+    directory: path.relative(groupDirectory, directory).split(path.sep).join("/"),
+    probes: judged.map((probe) => ({
+      id: probe.id,
+      purpose: probe.purpose,
+      command: probe.command,
+      ran: probe.ran === true,
+      held: probe.ran === true && held[probe.id],
+      isError: probe.isError ?? null,
+      output: (probe.output ?? "").slice(-OUTPUT_TAIL),
+    })),
+    networkConnections: listener.connections,
+    // The host process that ran the probes, recorded under the host's name.
+    [host]: {
+      exitCode: observation?.exitCode ?? null,
+      terminationReason: observation?.terminationReason ?? (timeout.aborted ? "timeout" : null),
+      error: launchError,
+      stderr: (await readFile(stderrFile, "utf8").catch(() => "")).slice(-OUTPUT_TAIL),
+    },
+  };
+  record.verified = record.probes.every((probe) => probe.held);
+  await writeFile(path.join(directory, "confinement.json"), `${JSON.stringify(record, null, 2)}\n`);
+  return record;
+}
+
+function includes(probe, nonce) {
+  return (probe.output ?? "").includes(nonce);
+}
+
+function quote(value) {
+  return `'${String(value).replaceAll("'", `'\\''`)}'`;
+}
+
+/** Tries each URL with whichever HTTP client the shell has, printing REACHED:<status> only on a response. */
+function networkCommand(urls) {
+  const lines = urls.map(
+    (url) =>
+      `if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then curl -sS -m 8 -o /dev/null -w 'REACHED:%{http_code}\\n' ${quote(url)}; ` +
+      `elif command -v wget >/dev/null 2>&1; then wget -q -T 8 -O /dev/null ${quote(url)} && echo REACHED:ok; ` +
+      `else echo NO-HTTP-CLIENT; fi`,
+  );
+  return lines.join("; ");
+}
+
+/** An HTTP listener on every interface, reached through the host's first external IPv4 address when it has one. */
+function startListener(nonce) {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const state = { connections: 0 };
+    const server = http.createServer((request, response) => {
+      response.end(nonce);
+    });
+    server.on("connection", () => {
+      state.connections += 1;
+    });
+    server.once("error", reject);
+    server.listen(0, "0.0.0.0", () => {
+      const address = externalAddress() ?? "127.0.0.1";
+      resolve({
+        url: `http://${address}:${server.address().port}/${nonce}`,
+        get connections() {
+          return state.connections;
+        },
+        close: () => new Promise((done) => server.close(() => done())),
+      });
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+function externalAddress() {
+  for (const entries of Object.values(os.networkInterfaces())) {
+    for (const entry of entries ?? []) {
+      if (entry.family === "IPv4" && !entry.internal) return entry.address;
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}

package/skills/evaluate-behavior/scripts/lib/source-override.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+// `--source <arm>=<commit>`: for one run only, every Git source ref an arm declares (its subject source, its
+// Freeflow source, and its source-built host extensions) is replaced by a commit. The definition files never
+// change; the override is recorded in invocation.json and on each run, and it reaches the run's recorded source
+// identity and its reuse key, because both read the effective configuration. An arm with no Git source refuses it.
+
+import { ARM_NAME } from "./arms.mjs";
+
+const COMMIT = /^[0-9a-f]{7,64}$/;
+
+/**
+ * Parses `<arm>=<commit>` values into `{ <arm>: <commit> }`.
+ *
+ * @param {string[]} values
+ */
+export function parseSourceOverrides(values) {
+  const sources = {};
+  for (const value of values) {
+    const match = /^([^=]+)=(.+)$/.exec(value);
+    if (match === null || !ARM_NAME.test(match[1]) || !COMMIT.test(match[2])) {
+      throw new Error(`--source must be <arm>=<commit SHA>, such as candidate=3415a8a2: ${value}`);
+    }
+    if (Object.hasOwn(sources, match[1])) throw new Error(`--source ${match[1]} may be supplied only once`);
+    sources[match[1]] = match[2];
+  }
+  return sources;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Applies source overrides to a selection's groups in place, before anything runs. Every overridden arm must be
+ * an arm of each selected group and declare at least one Git source there.
+ *
+ * @param {{groups: Array<{group: any}>}} selection
+ * @param {Record<string, string> | null | undefined} sources
+ */
+export function applySourceOverrides(selection, sources) {
+  if (!sources || Object.keys(sources).length === 0) return;
+  for (const [arm, commit] of Object.entries(sources)) {
+    for (const { group } of selection.groups) {
+      const variant = group.variants?.[arm];
+      if (variant === undefined) throw new Error(`--source ${arm}: ${arm} is not an arm of group ${group.id}`);
+      const configuration = group.configurations?.[arm];
+      let replaced = 0;
+      if (variant.source?.kind === "git") {
+        variant.source = { ...variant.source, ref: commit };
+        if (configuration?.subject?.source?.kind === "git") configuration.subject.source.ref = commit;
+        replaced += 1;
+      }
+      if (variant.freeflow?.source?.kind === "git") {
+        variant.freeflow = { ...variant.freeflow, source: { ...variant.freeflow.source, ref: commit } };
+        if (configuration?.freeflow?.source) configuration.freeflow.source.ref = commit;
+        replaced += 1;
+      }
+      variant.hostExtensions = (variant.hostExtensions ?? []).map((extension) => {
+        if (extension?.source?.kind !== "git") return extension;
+        replaced += 1;
+        return { ...extension, source: { ...extension.source, ref: commit } };
+      });
+      if (configuration?.host?.extensions) configuration.host.extensions = variant.hostExtensions;
+      if (replaced === 0) {
+        throw new Error(`--source ${arm}: arm ${arm} of group ${group.id} declares no Git source to override`);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}