@hasna/hooks 0.12.4 → 0.12.6
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +17 -2
- package/bin/hooks-mcp.js +2 -2
- package/bin/index.js +50 -10
- package/bin/native-safety-worker.cjs +1 -1
- package/bin/serve.js +2 -2
- package/dist/index.js +46 -10
- package/dist/lib/codex-safety-check.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/native-child-env.d.ts +56 -0
- package/hooks/hook-signed-link-guard/src/links.ts +61 -6
- package/hooks/hook-signed-link-output/README.md +43 -10
- package/hooks/hook-signed-link-output/src/hook.ts +5 -2
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -297,6 +297,13 @@ hooks safety install trash-guard --target sumi --expected-binding-sha256 CURRENT
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hooks safety verify --target sumi --execution
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```
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+
Hooks registered as `hooks run <hook>` do not go through the native worker, so
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re-registration does not cover them. When a release changes the script of such
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a hook, run `hooks trust <hook>` with the new CLI on every station after
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switching PATH to it, as "Trust model" under "Custom and remote hooks"
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describes. Until then, wherever an old pin exists, it refuses the new script
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and that hook exits 1 on every call.
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+
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`hooks safety provision --target sumi`, which the package's lifecycle script
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also runs, keeps a binding that still verifies, so it does not move Sumi to a
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worker installed in a different tree; the explicit install above does. That
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@@ -365,13 +372,19 @@ Codex is installed through npm, pass the platform package's native binary rather
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than its JavaScript launcher. Executable ownership, permissions, ancestry and
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bytes are checked. Supported protocol versions are 0.153.0, 0.154.0,
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0.154.0-alpha.6.1, 0.155.0, 0.155.1, 0.156.1, 0.157.0, 0.157.1, 0.158.0, 0.159.0, 0.159.2,
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-
0.159.3 and 0.160.
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0.159.3, 0.160.0 and 0.160.1;
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other versions refuse pending compatibility validation. Updating Codex can
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therefore require a compatible Hooks release before native safety verification
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and trust provisioning succeed. Keep existing hook definitions and trust intact
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when this check reports `native_unsupported`.
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The version probe has a five-second forced timeout and native discovery a
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fifteen-second lifetime budget. Neither step restarts an existing agent.
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Both run the native with an explicit environment allowlist: `PATH`, `USER`,
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`LOGNAME`, `LANG`, `LC_*`, `TMPDIR`, the XDG base directories and Codex's own
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`CODEX_*` variables, with `HOME`, `NO_COLOR` and `CODEX_HOME` set by Hooks.
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Dynamic-loader (`LD_*`, `DYLD_*`) and runtime-hook (`NODE_*`, `BUN_*`,
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`BASH_ENV`, `ENV`) variables never reach it, because only the executable's
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bytes are verified.
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Success reports `nativeDiscoveryVerified: true`, `guardVerified: true` and
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`nativeAdoptionVerified: false`. It does not enroll trust, change configuration,
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@@ -449,13 +462,15 @@ hooks install https://example.com/hooks/my-hook/manifest.json
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Custom hooks land in `~/.hasna/hooks/hooks/<name>/`. A custom hook with the same name as a bundled hook takes precedence (visible in `hooks info <name>`).
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-
**Trust model.** Every hook script is pinned by sha256 in `~/.hasna/hooks/hooks.lock` and the SQLite `hooks` table. `hooks run` verifies the script hash before executing; if the script changed, the run is refused:
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**Trust model.** Every hook script is pinned by sha256 in `hooks.lock` in the hooks data directory (`~/.hasna/hooks/hooks.lock` unless the data directory resolves elsewhere; `HASNA_HOOKS_LOCK_PATH`, or its alias `HOOKS_LOCK_PATH`, overrides the lock path) and, in local mode, in the SQLite `hooks` table, which is checked first. `hooks run` verifies the script hash before executing; if the script changed, the run is refused and exits 1:
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```bash
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hooks trust <name> # re-pin the current script content
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hooks update # re-register hooks and refresh pins
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```
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A hook's first run writes its pin, and so do `hooks sync` (in local mode it pins every bundled hook without running any of them), `hooks update`, `hooks install <name>@<version>`, `hooks update <name>@<version>` and `hooks trust`. A station can therefore hold a pin for a hook that has never run there. After any upgrade that changes the script of a hook registered as `hooks run <hook>`, run `hooks trust <hook>` with the new CLI on every station. Run it as the same user and with the same hooks environment that the harness's `hooks run` sees: the local opt-in or registry credential, and any data directory, DB or lock path override. Otherwise it can write a pin that `hooks run` does not read. Where the hook is not pinned yet, it pins the same sha256 that the first run would have pinned, so it is harmless there.
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+
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**Registry server.** `hooks serve` exposes the local store over HTTP — catalog, artifacts, and the published lock:
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```bash
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package/bin/hooks-mcp.js
CHANGED
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@@ -347,8 +347,8 @@ var init_registry = __esm(() => {
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{
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name: "signed-link-output",
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displayName: "Signed Link Output",
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description: "Claude PostToolUse backstop: replaces
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version: "0.1.
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description: "Claude PostToolUse backstop: replaces capability links in tool output \u2014 signature-class query or fragment parameters, and anchored path-borne provider classes such as the Stripe Connect onboarding link \u2014 with a redaction marker (updatedToolOutput, where the running Claude Code supports it) and tells the model not to repeat or store the link. Every string is walked, so nested metadata such as a browser result's `_meta.browser_use.url` is covered. It runs after the tool, so it cannot undo display or other persistence",
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version: "0.1.1",
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category: "Security",
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event: "PostToolUse",
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matcher: "^(Bash|WebFetch|mcp__.*)$",
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package/bin/index.js
CHANGED
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@@ -378,8 +378,8 @@ var init_registry = __esm(() => {
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{
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name: "signed-link-output",
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displayName: "Signed Link Output",
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description: "Claude PostToolUse backstop: replaces
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version: "0.1.
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description: "Claude PostToolUse backstop: replaces capability links in tool output \u2014 signature-class query or fragment parameters, and anchored path-borne provider classes such as the Stripe Connect onboarding link \u2014 with a redaction marker (updatedToolOutput, where the running Claude Code supports it) and tells the model not to repeat or store the link. Every string is walked, so nested metadata such as a browser result's `_meta.browser_use.url` is covered. It runs after the tool, so it cannot undo display or other persistence",
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version: "0.1.1",
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category: "Security",
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event: "PostToolUse",
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matcher: "^(Bash|WebFetch|mcp__.*)$",
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@@ -36319,6 +36319,51 @@ var init_native_safety_registration = __esm(() => {
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};
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});
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// src/lib/native-child-env.ts
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function isRefusedNativeChildEnvName(name) {
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return REFUSED.has(name) || REFUSED_PREFIXES.some((prefix3) => name.startsWith(prefix3));
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}
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function codexInherited(name) {
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return name.startsWith("CODEX_") && name !== "CODEX_HOME" && name !== "CODEX_APPLY_GIT_CFG" && !name.startsWith("CODEX_NETWORK_PROXY_SNAPSHOT_");
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}
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function nativeChildEnv(source, explicit = {}, inherit = () => false) {
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const env = {};
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for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(source)) {
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if (typeof value !== "string" || isRefusedNativeChildEnvName(name))
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continue;
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if (INHERITED.has(name) || /^LC_[A-Z]+$/.test(name) || inherit(name))
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env[name] = value;
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}
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for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(explicit)) {
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if (isRefusedNativeChildEnvName(name))
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throw new Error(`A native child environment cannot set ${name}.`);
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if (value === undefined)
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delete env[name];
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else
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env[name] = value;
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}
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return env;
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}
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var INHERITED, REFUSED_PREFIXES, REFUSED;
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var init_native_child_env = __esm(() => {
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INHERITED = new Set([
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"PATH",
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"USER",
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"LOGNAME",
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"LANG",
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"TMPDIR",
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"XDG_CONFIG_HOME",
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"XDG_CONFIG_DIRS",
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"XDG_DATA_HOME",
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"XDG_DATA_DIRS",
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"XDG_CACHE_HOME",
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"XDG_STATE_HOME",
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"XDG_RUNTIME_DIR"
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]);
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REFUSED_PREFIXES = ["LD_", "DYLD_", "NODE_", "BUN_", "BASH_FUNC_"];
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REFUSED = new Set(["BASH_ENV", "ENV", "GLIBC_TUNABLES", "GCONV_PATH", "LOCPATH"]);
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});
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// src/lib/codex-safety-check.ts
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import { spawn as spawn2, execFile as execFile2 } from "child_process";
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import { createHash as createHash23 } from "crypto";
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@@ -36373,13 +36418,7 @@ function executable(command) {
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}
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async function connectCodexSafety(options) {
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const command = options.command ?? "codex", before = executable(command);
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const env =
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for (const key of ["NODE_OPTIONS", "NODE_PATH", "BUN_OPTIONS", "BASH_ENV", "ENV", "DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES", "LD_PRELOAD"])
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delete env[key];
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delete env.CODEX_HOME;
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else
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env.CODEX_HOME = options.codexHome;
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const env = nativeChildEnv(process.env, { HOME: options.home, NO_COLOR: "1", CODEX_HOME: options.codexHome }, codexInherited);
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let version2;
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try {
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version2 = (await promisify(execFile2)(before.path, ["--version"], { env, cwd: options.home, timeout: 5000, killSignal: "SIGKILL", maxBuffer: 4096 })).stdout.trim();
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var init_codex_safety_check = __esm(() => {
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init_native_safety();
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init_native_readiness_command();
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init_native_child_env();
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init_native_safety2();
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init_native_readiness();
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-
SUPPORTED_CODEX_SAFETY_VERSIONS = ["codex-cli 0.153.0", "codex-cli 0.154.0", "codex-cli 0.154.0-alpha.6.1", "codex-cli 0.155.0", "codex-cli 0.155.1", "codex-cli 0.156.1", "codex-cli 0.157.0", "codex-cli 0.157.1", "codex-cli 0.158.0", "codex-cli 0.159.0", "codex-cli 0.159.2", "codex-cli 0.159.3", "codex-cli 0.160.0"];
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SUPPORTED_CODEX_SAFETY_VERSIONS = ["codex-cli 0.153.0", "codex-cli 0.154.0", "codex-cli 0.154.0-alpha.6.1", "codex-cli 0.155.0", "codex-cli 0.155.1", "codex-cli 0.156.1", "codex-cli 0.157.0", "codex-cli 0.157.1", "codex-cli 0.158.0", "codex-cli 0.159.0", "codex-cli 0.159.2", "codex-cli 0.159.3", "codex-cli 0.160.0", "codex-cli 0.160.1"];
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versions = new Set(SUPPORTED_CODEX_SAFETY_VERSIONS);
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CodexSafetyError = class CodexSafetyError extends Error {
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code;
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@@ -17,4 +17,4 @@ var{defineProperty:fZ,getOwnPropertyNames:t0,getOwnPropertyDescriptor:e0}=Object
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`).replace(/%s/g,()=>G[K++]?.value??"")+(K<G.length?" "+G.slice(K).map((H)=>H.value).join(" "):"")}if(z==="cat"){let Y=Z.indexOf("<<");if(Y<0)return null;let G=JZ(Z,Y),K=Z.indexOf(`
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18
|
`,Y);if(!G||K<0)return null;let H=LZ(Z,K,[G]);if(H<0)return null;let B=Z.slice(K+1,H);return B.slice(0,B.lastIndexOf(G.delimiter)).replace(/\n$/,"")}return null}function rZ(Z,J,$){for(let X of tZ(Z).bodies){let z=Z0(X);if(z===null)continue;let Q=m(z,J+1,$.debug);if(Q.refused)return Q}return q}function m(Z,J=0,$=!1){if(typeof Z!=="string"||!Z.trim())return q;if(J>r3)return EZ.test(Z)?F("unclassifiable"):q;let{segments:X,trustworthy:z}=K0(Z);if(!z)return EZ.test(Z)?F("unclassifiable"):q;let Q=$,Y=(G)=>m(G,J+1,Q);for(let G of e3(Z)){if(G.runsBody){let K=Y(G.body);if(K.refused)return K}if(!G.quoted){let K=tZ(G.body,"heredoc");if(!K.complete&&EZ.test(G.body))return F("unclassifiable");for(let H of K.bodies){let B=Y(H);if(B.refused)return B}}}for(let G=0;G<X.length;G++){let K=X[G];for(let L of K.words){let v=tZ(L.text);if(!v.complete&&EZ.test(L.text))return F("unclassifiable");for(let k of v.bodies){let w=Y(k);if(w.refused)return w}}let H=l(K),B=K.words.map((L,v)=>({word:XZ(L.text),redirect:K.redirects.has(v)})),U=B.slice(0,H<0?B.length:H).map((L)=>L.word),V=H>=0?o(B[H].word.value):"";if(H<0||["export","declare","typeset","readonly","local"].includes(V)){if(Q=m0([...U,...B.slice(H+1).map((L)=>L.word)],Q),H<0)continue}let C=m0(U,Q),_=B.slice(H+1).filter((L)=>!L.redirect).map((L)=>L.word),O=B.slice(H+1).filter((L)=>L.redirect).map((L)=>L.word),M=B[H].word,j=o(M.value),c={depth:J,appendsArgs:!1,debug:C};if(H>0&&B[H-1].word.value==="function"){let L=_.filter((k)=>!["{","()","(",")"].includes(k.value)),v=$0(L,c);if(v.refused)return v;continue}if(G>0&&d0(K.sepBefore)&&eZ(j,_)){let L=X[G-1],v=o3(Z,L),k=v===null?null:Z0(v);if(k!==null){let w=m(k,J+1,C);if(w.refused)return w}}let p=X[G+1];if(p&&/<\(\s*$/.test(p.sepBefore)&&(yZ.has(j)||j==="source"||j===".")){let L=p.words[0].start-p.sepBefore.length+p.sepBefore.lastIndexOf("("),v=qZ(Z,L),k=v<0?null:Z0(Z.slice(L+1,v-1));if(k!==null){let w=m(k,J+1,C);if(w.refused)return w}}let a=i0(j,M,_,O,K.words.slice(0,H+1),c);if(a.refused)return a}return q}function o3(Z,J){let $=J.words[0],X=J.words[J.words.length-1];return $&&X?Z.slice($.start,X.end):null}function t3(Z){let J=o(Z.value);return/[$`]/.test(J)||J===""?void 0:J}function i0(Z,J,$,X,z,Q){let Y=Q.depth,G=(K)=>m(K,Y+1,Q.debug);if(J.opaque){let K=t3(J);if(K===void 0){let H=$.find((U)=>!U.value.startsWith("-")),B=RZ($,Q);if(!B.refused)return q;return B.rule!=="unclassifiable"||H!==void 0&&!H.opaque&&A3.has(H.value)?B:q}Z=K}if(Z==="gh")return RZ($,Q);if(yZ.has(Z)){let K=Q0($);if(K){let H=G(K.value);if(H.refused||!K.opaque)return H;return rZ(K.raw,Y,Q)}for(let H of X){let B=G(H.value);if(B.refused)return B;if(H.opaque){let U=rZ(H.raw,Y,Q);if(U.refused)return U}}return q}if(p3.has(Z)){let K=$.findIndex((B)=>B.value==="-c"||B.value==="--command"||/^-[A-Za-z]*c$/.test(B.value)),H=K>=0?$[K+1]:void 0;return H?G(H.value):oZ($,Q)}if(Z==="eval"||Z==="watch"){let K=$;if(Z==="watch"){let B=0;while(B<$.length&&$[B].value.startsWith("-")){if($[B].value==="--"){B++;break}if(["-n","--interval","-q","--equexit"].includes($[B].value))B++;B++}K=$.slice(B)}let H=G(K.map((B)=>B.value).join(" "));if(H.refused)return H;for(let B of K){let U=rZ(B.raw,Y,Q);if(U.refused)return U}return q}if(Z==="env")return G(FZ([...z.map((K)=>XZ(K.text).value),...$.map((K)=>K.value)]));if(Z==="ssh"){let K=0;for(;K<$.length;K++){let U=$[K].value;if(!U.startsWith("-"))break;if(a3.has(U))K++}let H=$.slice(K+1);if(H[0]?.value==="--")H.shift();let B=H.map((U)=>U.value).join(" ");return B?G(B):q}if(Z==="xargs"){let K=0,H=!1;for(;K<$.length;K++){let B=$[K].value;if(B==="--"){K++;break}if(!B.startsWith("-"))break;if(/^-I|^-i|^--replace/.test(B))H=!0;if(s3.has(B))K++}return $0($.slice(K),{depth:Y,appendsArgs:!H,debug:Q.debug})}if(Z==="find"){for(let K=0;K<$.length;K++){if(!["-exec","-execdir","-ok","-okdir"].includes($[K].value))continue;let H=K+1;while(H<$.length&&$[H].value!==";"&&$[H].value!=="+")H++;let B=$0($.slice(K+1,H),Q);if(B.refused)return B;K=H}return q}if(d3.has(Z))return oZ($,Q);if(i3.get(Z)?.includes($[0]?.value??""))return oZ($.slice(1),Q);return q}function $0(Z,J){if(Z.length===0)return q;let $=o(Z[0].value);if($==="gh")return RZ(Z.slice(1),J);if(yZ.has($)){let X=Q0(Z.slice(1));return X?m(X.value,J.depth+1,J.debug):q}return i0($,Z[0],Z.slice(1),[],[],J)}function oZ(Z,J){let $=Z.findIndex((X)=>!X.opaque&&o(X.value)==="gh"&&(X.value==="gh"||X.value.includes("/")));return $>=0?RZ(Z.slice($+1),J):q}function Q0(Z){for(let J=0;J<Z.length;J++){let $=Z[J].value;if($==="--")return;if(!$.startsWith("-")&&!$.startsWith("+"))return;if($==="-c"||/^-[A-Za-z]+$/.test($)&&$.includes("c"))return Z.slice(J+1).find((X)=>!X.value.startsWith("-")||X.value==="-");if(/^[-+][A-Za-z]*[oO]$/.test($))J++}return}function e3(Z){let J=[],$=0;for(;;){let X=Z.indexOf("<<",$);if(X<0)break;if($=X+2,Z[X+2]==="<"||X>0&&Z[X-1]==="<"){$=X+3;continue}let z=JZ(Z,X);if(!z)continue;let Q=Z.lastIndexOf(`
|
|
19
19
|
`,X)+1,Y=Z.indexOf(`
|
|
20
|
-
`,X);if(Y<0)continue;let G=LZ(Z,Y,[z]),K=G<0?Z.slice(Y+1):Z.slice(Y+1,G),H=G<0?K:K.slice(0,Math.max(0,K.lastIndexOf(z.delimiter))).replace(/\n$/,""),B=Z.slice(Q,X)+" HEREDOC_OPERATOR "+Z.slice(z.end,Y);J.push({body:H,runsBody:Z4(B),quoted:z.quoted})}return J}function Z4(Z){let{segments:J}=K0(Z),$=J.findIndex((G)=>G.words.some((K)=>K.text==="HEREDOC_OPERATOR"));if($<0)return!1;let X=(G)=>{let K=l(G);if(K<0)return{verb:"",args:[]};let H=G.words.slice(K+1).filter((B)=>B.text!=="HEREDOC_OPERATOR").map((B)=>XZ(B.text));return{verb:o(XZ(G.words[K].text).value),args:H}},{verb:z,args:Q}=X(J[$]);if(z==="ssh"||eZ(z,Q))return!0;if((z==="source"||z===".")&&["/dev/stdin","/dev/fd/0","/proc/self/fd/0"].includes(Q[0]?.value??""))return!0;let Y=J[$+1];if(z==="cat"&&Y&&d0(Y.sepBefore)){let G=X(Y);return G.verb==="ssh"||eZ(G.verb,G.args)}return!1}var $4=/(?:^|[^A-Za-z0-9_.-])gh(?:$|[^A-Za-z0-9_.-])/;function s0(){return{hookSpecificOutput:{hookEventName:"PreToolUse",permissionDecision:"deny",permissionDecisionReason:J0}}}var J4=new Set(["Bash","Monitor"]);function a0(Z){if(Z?.hook_event_name!=="PreToolUse"||!J4.has(Z.tool_name??""))return{continue:!0};let J=$Z(Z);if(!J.trim())return{continue:!0};try{return m(J).refused?s0():{continue:!0}}catch{return $4.test(J)?s0():{continue:!0}}}function X4(Z){if(Z!=="trash-guard"&&Z!=="workspace-repos-guard")throw Error("Invalid safety capability")}function n0(Z,J){X4(Z);let $=Z,X=JSON.parse(J);if(!X||Array.isArray(X)||X.hook_event_name!=="PreToolUse"||typeof X.tool_name!=="string"||!X.tool_input||typeof X.tool_input!=="object"||Array.isArray(X.tool_input)||typeof X.cwd!=="string"||!Y0.isAbsolute(X.cwd))throw Error("Invalid safety input");if(X.tool_name==="Bash"&&typeof X.tool_input.command!=="string")throw Error("Invalid shell input");if(X.tool_name==="Monitor"&&X.tool_input.command!==void 0&&typeof X.tool_input.command!=="string")throw Error("Invalid monitor input");let z=X.hasna_execution;if(z!==void 0&&(!z||Object.keys(z).sort().join()!=="agent,schema"||z.schema!=="hasna.hooks.execution.v1"||typeof z.agent!=="string"||!/^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:@-]{0,127}$/.test(z.agent)))throw Error("Invalid execution capability");let Q=z===void 0?void 0:{runtime:process.execPath,home:SZ.homedir(),path:process.env.PATH,agent:z.agent};if(Q&&(!Y0.isAbsolute(Q.runtime)||!Q.path))throw Error("Invalid bound execution context");if(["apply_patch","ApplyPatch","functions.apply_patch"].includes(X.tool_name)){if(X.tool_input.command!==void 0&&X.tool_input.patch!==void 0&&X.tool_input.command!==X.tool_input.patch)throw Error("Conflicting patch aliases");let O=X.tool_input.command??X.tool_input.patch;if(typeof O!=="string")throw Error("Invalid patch input");X.tool_input={...X.tool_input,command:O,patch:O}}let Y=X.tool_name==="Monitor",G=X.tool_name==="Bash"||Y&&typeof X.tool_input.command==="string",K=Y&&G?{...X,tool_name:"Bash"}:X,H=(O)=>({hookSpecificOutput:{hookEventName:"PreToolUse",permissionDecision:"deny",permissionDecisionReason:O}}),B=y0(K).output,U=a0(K),V=G&&NZ(K.tool_input.command,{home:SZ.homedir(),cwd:X.cwd}).handoffHits.length>0,C=$==="trash-guard"&&(!Y||G)?I0(K,{home:SZ.homedir(),cwd:X.cwd,findTrash:DZ,inspectTrash:BZ,execution:Q}):{continue:!0};if(Y&&C.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision==="allow")C=H("[trash-guard] A deletion inside a Monitor command is refused; run it with the Bash tool, where it is redirected into trash.");let _=B.decision==="block"?H(B.reason):U.hookSpecificOutput?U:V?H("[workspace-repos-guard] Deletion under a protected repository checkout is refused."):C;return JSON.stringify({verdict:"continue"in _?null:_})}var z4=2,K4="0.12.
|
|
20
|
+
`,X);if(Y<0)continue;let G=LZ(Z,Y,[z]),K=G<0?Z.slice(Y+1):Z.slice(Y+1,G),H=G<0?K:K.slice(0,Math.max(0,K.lastIndexOf(z.delimiter))).replace(/\n$/,""),B=Z.slice(Q,X)+" HEREDOC_OPERATOR "+Z.slice(z.end,Y);J.push({body:H,runsBody:Z4(B),quoted:z.quoted})}return J}function Z4(Z){let{segments:J}=K0(Z),$=J.findIndex((G)=>G.words.some((K)=>K.text==="HEREDOC_OPERATOR"));if($<0)return!1;let X=(G)=>{let K=l(G);if(K<0)return{verb:"",args:[]};let H=G.words.slice(K+1).filter((B)=>B.text!=="HEREDOC_OPERATOR").map((B)=>XZ(B.text));return{verb:o(XZ(G.words[K].text).value),args:H}},{verb:z,args:Q}=X(J[$]);if(z==="ssh"||eZ(z,Q))return!0;if((z==="source"||z===".")&&["/dev/stdin","/dev/fd/0","/proc/self/fd/0"].includes(Q[0]?.value??""))return!0;let Y=J[$+1];if(z==="cat"&&Y&&d0(Y.sepBefore)){let G=X(Y);return G.verb==="ssh"||eZ(G.verb,G.args)}return!1}var $4=/(?:^|[^A-Za-z0-9_.-])gh(?:$|[^A-Za-z0-9_.-])/;function s0(){return{hookSpecificOutput:{hookEventName:"PreToolUse",permissionDecision:"deny",permissionDecisionReason:J0}}}var J4=new Set(["Bash","Monitor"]);function a0(Z){if(Z?.hook_event_name!=="PreToolUse"||!J4.has(Z.tool_name??""))return{continue:!0};let J=$Z(Z);if(!J.trim())return{continue:!0};try{return m(J).refused?s0():{continue:!0}}catch{return $4.test(J)?s0():{continue:!0}}}function X4(Z){if(Z!=="trash-guard"&&Z!=="workspace-repos-guard")throw Error("Invalid safety capability")}function n0(Z,J){X4(Z);let $=Z,X=JSON.parse(J);if(!X||Array.isArray(X)||X.hook_event_name!=="PreToolUse"||typeof X.tool_name!=="string"||!X.tool_input||typeof X.tool_input!=="object"||Array.isArray(X.tool_input)||typeof X.cwd!=="string"||!Y0.isAbsolute(X.cwd))throw Error("Invalid safety input");if(X.tool_name==="Bash"&&typeof X.tool_input.command!=="string")throw Error("Invalid shell input");if(X.tool_name==="Monitor"&&X.tool_input.command!==void 0&&typeof X.tool_input.command!=="string")throw Error("Invalid monitor input");let z=X.hasna_execution;if(z!==void 0&&(!z||Object.keys(z).sort().join()!=="agent,schema"||z.schema!=="hasna.hooks.execution.v1"||typeof z.agent!=="string"||!/^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:@-]{0,127}$/.test(z.agent)))throw Error("Invalid execution capability");let Q=z===void 0?void 0:{runtime:process.execPath,home:SZ.homedir(),path:process.env.PATH,agent:z.agent};if(Q&&(!Y0.isAbsolute(Q.runtime)||!Q.path))throw Error("Invalid bound execution context");if(["apply_patch","ApplyPatch","functions.apply_patch"].includes(X.tool_name)){if(X.tool_input.command!==void 0&&X.tool_input.patch!==void 0&&X.tool_input.command!==X.tool_input.patch)throw Error("Conflicting patch aliases");let O=X.tool_input.command??X.tool_input.patch;if(typeof O!=="string")throw Error("Invalid patch input");X.tool_input={...X.tool_input,command:O,patch:O}}let Y=X.tool_name==="Monitor",G=X.tool_name==="Bash"||Y&&typeof X.tool_input.command==="string",K=Y&&G?{...X,tool_name:"Bash"}:X,H=(O)=>({hookSpecificOutput:{hookEventName:"PreToolUse",permissionDecision:"deny",permissionDecisionReason:O}}),B=y0(K).output,U=a0(K),V=G&&NZ(K.tool_input.command,{home:SZ.homedir(),cwd:X.cwd}).handoffHits.length>0,C=$==="trash-guard"&&(!Y||G)?I0(K,{home:SZ.homedir(),cwd:X.cwd,findTrash:DZ,inspectTrash:BZ,execution:Q}):{continue:!0};if(Y&&C.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision==="allow")C=H("[trash-guard] A deletion inside a Monitor command is refused; run it with the Bash tool, where it is redirected into trash.");let _=B.decision==="block"?H(B.reason):U.hookSpecificOutput?U:V?H("[workspace-repos-guard] Deletion under a protected repository checkout is refused."):C;return JSON.stringify({verdict:"continue"in _?null:_})}var z4=2,K4="0.12.6";function Q4(Z,J){return n0(Z,J)}
|
package/bin/serve.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -314,8 +314,8 @@ var HOOKS = [
|
|
|
314
314
|
{
|
|
315
315
|
name: "signed-link-output",
|
|
316
316
|
displayName: "Signed Link Output",
|
|
317
|
-
description: "Claude PostToolUse backstop: replaces
|
|
318
|
-
version: "0.1.
|
|
317
|
+
description: "Claude PostToolUse backstop: replaces capability links in tool output \u2014 signature-class query or fragment parameters, and anchored path-borne provider classes such as the Stripe Connect onboarding link \u2014 with a redaction marker (updatedToolOutput, where the running Claude Code supports it) and tells the model not to repeat or store the link. Every string is walked, so nested metadata such as a browser result's `_meta.browser_use.url` is covered. It runs after the tool, so it cannot undo display or other persistence",
|
|
318
|
+
version: "0.1.1",
|
|
319
319
|
category: "Security",
|
|
320
320
|
event: "PostToolUse",
|
|
321
321
|
matcher: "^(Bash|WebFetch|mcp__.*)$",
|
package/dist/index.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -7177,8 +7177,8 @@ var HOOKS = [
|
|
|
7177
7177
|
{
|
|
7178
7178
|
name: "signed-link-output",
|
|
7179
7179
|
displayName: "Signed Link Output",
|
|
7180
|
-
description: "Claude PostToolUse backstop: replaces
|
|
7181
|
-
version: "0.1.
|
|
7180
|
+
description: "Claude PostToolUse backstop: replaces capability links in tool output \u2014 signature-class query or fragment parameters, and anchored path-borne provider classes such as the Stripe Connect onboarding link \u2014 with a redaction marker (updatedToolOutput, where the running Claude Code supports it) and tells the model not to repeat or store the link. Every string is walked, so nested metadata such as a browser result's `_meta.browser_use.url` is covered. It runs after the tool, so it cannot undo display or other persistence",
|
|
7181
|
+
version: "0.1.1",
|
|
7182
7182
|
category: "Security",
|
|
7183
7183
|
event: "PostToolUse",
|
|
7184
7184
|
matcher: "^(Bash|WebFetch|mcp__.*)$",
|
|
@@ -42479,6 +42479,48 @@ import { constants as constants12, openSync as openSync15, closeSync as closeSyn
|
|
|
42479
42479
|
import { dirname as dirname21, isAbsolute as isAbsolute17, resolve as resolve19 } from "path";
|
|
42480
42480
|
import { promisify } from "util";
|
|
42481
42481
|
|
|
42482
|
+
// src/lib/native-child-env.ts
|
|
42483
|
+
var INHERITED = new Set([
|
|
42484
|
+
"PATH",
|
|
42485
|
+
"USER",
|
|
42486
|
+
"LOGNAME",
|
|
42487
|
+
"LANG",
|
|
42488
|
+
"TMPDIR",
|
|
42489
|
+
"XDG_CONFIG_HOME",
|
|
42490
|
+
"XDG_CONFIG_DIRS",
|
|
42491
|
+
"XDG_DATA_HOME",
|
|
42492
|
+
"XDG_DATA_DIRS",
|
|
42493
|
+
"XDG_CACHE_HOME",
|
|
42494
|
+
"XDG_STATE_HOME",
|
|
42495
|
+
"XDG_RUNTIME_DIR"
|
|
42496
|
+
]);
|
|
42497
|
+
var REFUSED_PREFIXES = ["LD_", "DYLD_", "NODE_", "BUN_", "BASH_FUNC_"];
|
|
42498
|
+
var REFUSED = new Set(["BASH_ENV", "ENV", "GLIBC_TUNABLES", "GCONV_PATH", "LOCPATH"]);
|
|
42499
|
+
function isRefusedNativeChildEnvName(name) {
|
|
42500
|
+
return REFUSED.has(name) || REFUSED_PREFIXES.some((prefix3) => name.startsWith(prefix3));
|
|
42501
|
+
}
|
|
42502
|
+
function codexInherited(name) {
|
|
42503
|
+
return name.startsWith("CODEX_") && name !== "CODEX_HOME" && name !== "CODEX_APPLY_GIT_CFG" && !name.startsWith("CODEX_NETWORK_PROXY_SNAPSHOT_");
|
|
42504
|
+
}
|
|
42505
|
+
function nativeChildEnv(source, explicit = {}, inherit = () => false) {
|
|
42506
|
+
const env = {};
|
|
42507
|
+
for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(source)) {
|
|
42508
|
+
if (typeof value !== "string" || isRefusedNativeChildEnvName(name))
|
|
42509
|
+
continue;
|
|
42510
|
+
if (INHERITED.has(name) || /^LC_[A-Z]+$/.test(name) || inherit(name))
|
|
42511
|
+
env[name] = value;
|
|
42512
|
+
}
|
|
42513
|
+
for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(explicit)) {
|
|
42514
|
+
if (isRefusedNativeChildEnvName(name))
|
|
42515
|
+
throw new Error(`A native child environment cannot set ${name}.`);
|
|
42516
|
+
if (value === undefined)
|
|
42517
|
+
delete env[name];
|
|
42518
|
+
else
|
|
42519
|
+
env[name] = value;
|
|
42520
|
+
}
|
|
42521
|
+
return env;
|
|
42522
|
+
}
|
|
42523
|
+
|
|
42482
42524
|
// src/native-safety.ts
|
|
42483
42525
|
import { execFile } from "child_process";
|
|
42484
42526
|
import { closeSync as closeSync13, constants as constants4, existsSync as existsSync15, fstatSync as fstatSync5, fsyncSync, linkSync as linkSync3, lstatSync as lstatSync10, mkdirSync as mkdirSync12, openSync as openSync13, readFileSync as readFileSync16, realpathSync as realpathSync11, renameSync as renameSync3, unlinkSync as unlinkSync5, writeFileSync as writeFileSync10 } from "fs";
|
|
@@ -42562,7 +42604,7 @@ async function verifyNativeSafetyCommand(command, home = homedir8()) {
|
|
|
42562
42604
|
}
|
|
42563
42605
|
|
|
42564
42606
|
// src/lib/codex-safety-check.ts
|
|
42565
|
-
var SUPPORTED_CODEX_SAFETY_VERSIONS = ["codex-cli 0.153.0", "codex-cli 0.154.0", "codex-cli 0.154.0-alpha.6.1", "codex-cli 0.155.0", "codex-cli 0.155.1", "codex-cli 0.156.1", "codex-cli 0.157.0", "codex-cli 0.157.1", "codex-cli 0.158.0", "codex-cli 0.159.0", "codex-cli 0.159.2", "codex-cli 0.159.3", "codex-cli 0.160.0"];
|
|
42607
|
+
var SUPPORTED_CODEX_SAFETY_VERSIONS = ["codex-cli 0.153.0", "codex-cli 0.154.0", "codex-cli 0.154.0-alpha.6.1", "codex-cli 0.155.0", "codex-cli 0.155.1", "codex-cli 0.156.1", "codex-cli 0.157.0", "codex-cli 0.157.1", "codex-cli 0.158.0", "codex-cli 0.159.0", "codex-cli 0.159.2", "codex-cli 0.159.3", "codex-cli 0.160.0", "codex-cli 0.160.1"];
|
|
42566
42608
|
var versions = new Set(SUPPORTED_CODEX_SAFETY_VERSIONS);
|
|
42567
42609
|
var matcher = "^(Bash|apply_patch|ApplyPatch|functions\\.apply_patch)$";
|
|
42568
42610
|
|
|
@@ -42622,13 +42664,7 @@ function executable(command) {
|
|
|
42622
42664
|
}
|
|
42623
42665
|
async function connectCodexSafety(options) {
|
|
42624
42666
|
const command = options.command ?? "codex", before = executable(command);
|
|
42625
|
-
const env =
|
|
42626
|
-
for (const key of ["NODE_OPTIONS", "NODE_PATH", "BUN_OPTIONS", "BASH_ENV", "ENV", "DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES", "LD_PRELOAD"])
|
|
42627
|
-
delete env[key];
|
|
42628
|
-
if (options.codexHome === undefined)
|
|
42629
|
-
delete env.CODEX_HOME;
|
|
42630
|
-
else
|
|
42631
|
-
env.CODEX_HOME = options.codexHome;
|
|
42667
|
+
const env = nativeChildEnv(process.env, { HOME: options.home, NO_COLOR: "1", CODEX_HOME: options.codexHome }, codexInherited);
|
|
42632
42668
|
let version2;
|
|
42633
42669
|
try {
|
|
42634
42670
|
version2 = (await promisify(execFile2)(before.path, ["--version"], { env, cwd: options.home, timeout: 5000, killSignal: "SIGKILL", maxBuffer: 4096 })).stdout.trim();
|
|
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { verifyNativeSafetyCommand } from "../native-safety.js";
|
|
2
2
|
/** Exact `codex --version` outputs whose app-server protocol was measured
|
|
3
3
|
* against the real native binary. Anything else refuses as native_unsupported. */
|
|
4
|
-
export declare const SUPPORTED_CODEX_SAFETY_VERSIONS: readonly ["codex-cli 0.153.0", "codex-cli 0.154.0", "codex-cli 0.154.0-alpha.6.1", "codex-cli 0.155.0", "codex-cli 0.155.1", "codex-cli 0.156.1", "codex-cli 0.157.0", "codex-cli 0.157.1", "codex-cli 0.158.0", "codex-cli 0.159.0", "codex-cli 0.159.2", "codex-cli 0.159.3", "codex-cli 0.160.0"];
|
|
4
|
+
export declare const SUPPORTED_CODEX_SAFETY_VERSIONS: readonly ["codex-cli 0.153.0", "codex-cli 0.154.0", "codex-cli 0.154.0-alpha.6.1", "codex-cli 0.155.0", "codex-cli 0.155.1", "codex-cli 0.156.1", "codex-cli 0.157.0", "codex-cli 0.157.1", "codex-cli 0.158.0", "codex-cli 0.159.0", "codex-cli 0.159.2", "codex-cli 0.159.3", "codex-cli 0.160.0", "codex-cli 0.160.1"];
|
|
5
5
|
export type CodexSafetyCode = "native_unavailable" | "native_unsafe_executable" | "native_executable_required" | "native_unsupported" | "native_failed" | "native_discovery_failed" | "hooks_disabled" | "guard_missing" | "guard_ambiguous" | "guard_definition_invalid" | "guard_disabled" | "guard_untrusted" | "guard_changed" | "guard_failed";
|
|
6
6
|
export declare class CodexSafetyError extends Error {
|
|
7
7
|
readonly code: CodexSafetyCode;
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
/**
|
|
2
|
+
* Environment for a native executable that Hooks verifies and then runs, such
|
|
3
|
+
* as the Codex app-server used by `hooks safety verify|trust --target codex`.
|
|
4
|
+
*
|
|
5
|
+
* Hooks pins only the native's main executable bytes. Dynamic-loader and
|
|
6
|
+
* runtime-hook variables would load code that the pin never covered: a glibc
|
|
7
|
+
* build honours LD_AUDIT, LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH before main() runs,
|
|
8
|
+
* so the native's own pre-main scrubbing is too late. The child therefore gets
|
|
9
|
+
* an explicit allowlist, never the parent's environment minus a denylist.
|
|
10
|
+
*
|
|
11
|
+
* Inherited from the parent, by exact name unless noted:
|
|
12
|
+
* - PATH: the native resolves its helper executables through it.
|
|
13
|
+
* - USER, LOGNAME: the user identity some native paths read.
|
|
14
|
+
* - LANG and every LC_* name: locale selection only (LOCPATH and GCONV_PATH,
|
|
15
|
+
* which load locale and iconv modules from a directory, are refused).
|
|
16
|
+
* - TMPDIR: Codex derives the temporary writable roots in its permission
|
|
17
|
+
* profiles from it, so a different value changes what config/read reports.
|
|
18
|
+
* - The XDG base directories, so a native that resolves configuration, data,
|
|
19
|
+
* cache, state or its runtime directory (and the default session bus under
|
|
20
|
+
* XDG_RUNTIME_DIR) through them sees the same paths as the agent session.
|
|
21
|
+
* - Whatever a caller's `inherit` predicate admits (Codex: `codexInherited`).
|
|
22
|
+
*
|
|
23
|
+
* Not inherited, deliberately:
|
|
24
|
+
* - Proxy and TLS-trust settings outside the caller's namespace (HTTP_PROXY,
|
|
25
|
+
* HTTPS_PROXY, ALL_PROXY, NO_PROXY, SSL_CERT_FILE, SSL_CERT_DIR). The Codex
|
|
26
|
+
* app-server still reads local configuration and may make its plugin-sync
|
|
27
|
+
* network call; CODEX_* names, such as CODEX_CA_CERTIFICATE, are inherited.
|
|
28
|
+
* - Credentials outside the native's own namespace, logging and backtrace
|
|
29
|
+
* switches (RUST_LOG would grow stderr toward the child's byte budget),
|
|
30
|
+
* SHELL, TERM and DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS (a D-Bus address may name an
|
|
31
|
+
* executable transport; XDG_RUNTIME_DIR still locates the default bus).
|
|
32
|
+
*
|
|
33
|
+
* Refused unconditionally, whether inherited or passed in `explicit`:
|
|
34
|
+
* every LD_* and DYLD_* name, every NODE_* and BUN_* name, BASH_ENV, ENV,
|
|
35
|
+
* BASH_FUNC_* exported functions, GLIBC_TUNABLES, GCONV_PATH and LOCPATH.
|
|
36
|
+
* An explicit refused name is a programming error and throws.
|
|
37
|
+
*/
|
|
38
|
+
/** True for a name that must never reach a verified native child. */
|
|
39
|
+
export declare function isRefusedNativeChildEnvName(name: string): boolean;
|
|
40
|
+
/**
|
|
41
|
+
* Codex's own namespace is inherited so the app-server resolves the same
|
|
42
|
+
* configuration, state and auth home as the agent session (for example
|
|
43
|
+
* CODEX_SQLITE_HOME). CODEX_HOME is never inherited here: the caller sets or
|
|
44
|
+
* removes it explicitly. Two kinds of CODEX_* name are dropped because they
|
|
45
|
+
* make Codex run code it was not asked to run:
|
|
46
|
+
* - CODEX_NETWORK_PROXY_SNAPSHOT_*: Codex's carriers that restore BASH_ENV,
|
|
47
|
+
* ENV, ZDOTDIR and brokered variables inside its tool shells, which would
|
|
48
|
+
* re-import names this module refuses.
|
|
49
|
+
* - CODEX_APPLY_GIT_CFG: inline `git -c` settings, which can name commands.
|
|
50
|
+
*/
|
|
51
|
+
export declare function codexInherited(name: string): boolean;
|
|
52
|
+
/**
|
|
53
|
+
* Build a native child's environment from `source` (normally process.env).
|
|
54
|
+
* `explicit` is applied last: a string sets the name, `undefined` removes it.
|
|
55
|
+
*/
|
|
56
|
+
export declare function nativeChildEnv(source: Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>>, explicit?: Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>>, inherit?: (name: string) => boolean): Record<string, string>;
|
|
@@ -2,10 +2,12 @@
|
|
|
2
2
|
* Signed-link shapes in text.
|
|
3
3
|
*
|
|
4
4
|
* The same shape the in-process harness redaction uses for this class: an
|
|
5
|
-
* absolute http(s) URL
|
|
6
|
-
* parameter
|
|
7
|
-
*
|
|
8
|
-
*
|
|
5
|
+
* absolute http(s) URL that carries a capability — a capability-class query or
|
|
6
|
+
* fragment parameter, or a capability carried in the path of a measured
|
|
7
|
+
* provider class. The measured signed action links carry `expires`,
|
|
8
|
+
* `pr_number`, `repository`, `return_to` and `signature`; `signature` is the
|
|
9
|
+
* discriminating parameter, and the other capability names below are the same
|
|
10
|
+
* class.
|
|
9
11
|
*
|
|
10
12
|
* A match is replaced by the URL's origin plus `/[redacted signed link]`, so a
|
|
11
13
|
* reader keeps the host for diagnosis and nothing else. The matched text is
|
|
@@ -23,6 +25,31 @@ export const SIGNED_LINK_PARAMS: readonly string[] = [
|
|
|
23
25
|
"token",
|
|
24
26
|
];
|
|
25
27
|
|
|
28
|
+
/**
|
|
29
|
+
* Anchored, provider-scoped path-borne capability classes.
|
|
30
|
+
*
|
|
31
|
+
* Some providers put the whole proof in the URL path, so a parameter scan
|
|
32
|
+
* reports their capability links clean (HP659: a Stripe Connect account
|
|
33
|
+
* onboarding link reached a transcript through browser tool-result metadata).
|
|
34
|
+
* Each entry names one measured provider class: the exact host plus the path
|
|
35
|
+
* shape that carries the token. A generic "long path" heuristic would flag
|
|
36
|
+
* ordinary links, so extend this table only with a class that was measured.
|
|
37
|
+
* Do not fetch a link to test it.
|
|
38
|
+
*
|
|
39
|
+
* This mirrors the scanner's table in @hasna/secrets (`signed-urls.ts`), so a
|
|
40
|
+
* link one Hasna component redacts is a link the other recognizes.
|
|
41
|
+
*/
|
|
42
|
+
export const PATH_CAPABILITY_CLASSES: ReadonlyArray<{ hostname: string; path: RegExp }> = [
|
|
43
|
+
{
|
|
44
|
+
// Stripe Connect account-onboarding links: /setup/<letter>/<token> and the
|
|
45
|
+
// documented /setup/c/acct_<id>/<token> form. The onboarding token is the
|
|
46
|
+
// capability and the link is the account's entry point; nothing in the
|
|
47
|
+
// query marks it.
|
|
48
|
+
hostname: "connect.stripe.com",
|
|
49
|
+
path: /^\/setup\/[a-z]\/(?:acct_[A-Za-z0-9]+\/)?[^/?#]+\/?$/i,
|
|
50
|
+
},
|
|
51
|
+
];
|
|
52
|
+
|
|
26
53
|
/** Cheap pre-filter: any absolute URL. (A keyword pre-filter would miss percent- or entity-encoded names.) */
|
|
27
54
|
const HINT = /https?:\/\//i;
|
|
28
55
|
|
|
@@ -75,13 +102,41 @@ export function hasSignatureParameter(url: string): boolean {
|
|
|
75
102
|
return false;
|
|
76
103
|
}
|
|
77
104
|
|
|
105
|
+
/**
|
|
106
|
+
* True when a URL's path carries a capability of an anchored, provider-scoped
|
|
107
|
+
* class (see `PATH_CAPABILITY_CLASSES`). The host and path shape are the whole
|
|
108
|
+
* rule: an ordinary URL, the bare provider origin, a host that merely ends with
|
|
109
|
+
* the provider name, and the same path shape on another host are all untouched.
|
|
110
|
+
* Separators are decoded first, exactly as the parameter check does, so a JSON
|
|
111
|
+
* `\u003f` (`?`) or `\u0026` (`&`) straight after the token cannot push the
|
|
112
|
+
* token out of the matched path segment.
|
|
113
|
+
*/
|
|
114
|
+
export function hasPathBorneCapability(url: string): boolean {
|
|
115
|
+
let parsed: URL;
|
|
116
|
+
try { parsed = new URL(decodeSeparators(url)); } catch { return false; }
|
|
117
|
+
const hostname = parsed.hostname.replace(/\.$/, "").toLowerCase();
|
|
118
|
+
for (const klass of PATH_CAPABILITY_CLASSES) {
|
|
119
|
+
if (hostname === klass.hostname && klass.path.test(parsed.pathname)) return true;
|
|
120
|
+
}
|
|
121
|
+
return false;
|
|
122
|
+
}
|
|
123
|
+
|
|
124
|
+
/**
|
|
125
|
+
* True when a URL carries a capability: a signature-class query or fragment
|
|
126
|
+
* parameter, or an anchored path-borne class. The count and the redaction share
|
|
127
|
+
* this predicate, so the two cannot disagree.
|
|
128
|
+
*/
|
|
129
|
+
export function carriesCapability(url: string): boolean {
|
|
130
|
+
return hasSignatureParameter(url) || hasPathBorneCapability(url);
|
|
131
|
+
}
|
|
132
|
+
|
|
78
133
|
/** Number of signed-link URLs in `text`. */
|
|
79
134
|
export function countSignedLinks(text: string): number {
|
|
80
135
|
if (typeof text !== "string" || !text || !HINT.test(text)) return 0;
|
|
81
136
|
let count = 0;
|
|
82
137
|
for (const match of text.matchAll(URL_PATTERN)) {
|
|
83
138
|
const url = match[0].replace(TRAILING_PUNCTUATION, "");
|
|
84
|
-
if (
|
|
139
|
+
if (carriesCapability(url)) count++;
|
|
85
140
|
}
|
|
86
141
|
return count;
|
|
87
142
|
}
|
|
@@ -92,7 +147,7 @@ export function redactSignedLinks(text: string): string {
|
|
|
92
147
|
return text.replace(URL_PATTERN, (match) => {
|
|
93
148
|
const trailing = match.match(TRAILING_PUNCTUATION)?.[0] ?? "";
|
|
94
149
|
const url = trailing ? match.slice(0, -trailing.length) : match;
|
|
95
|
-
if (!
|
|
150
|
+
if (!carriesCapability(url)) return match;
|
|
96
151
|
const origin = url.match(/^https?:\/\/[^/?#]+/i)?.[0];
|
|
97
152
|
return origin ? `${origin}/${REDACTION_MARKER}${trailing}` : `${REDACTION_MARKER}${trailing}`;
|
|
98
153
|
});
|
|
@@ -4,13 +4,26 @@ Claude Code PostToolUse hook, installed as `hooks run signed-link-output`
|
|
|
4
4
|
(matcher `Bash`, `WebFetch` and MCP tools). It is the backstop behind the
|
|
5
5
|
`signed-link-guard` PreToolUse guard.
|
|
6
6
|
|
|
7
|
-
When a tool result contains a
|
|
8
|
-
|
|
9
|
-
|
|
10
|
-
|
|
11
|
-
|
|
12
|
-
|
|
13
|
-
|
|
7
|
+
When a tool result contains a capability link it returns the two fields below.
|
|
8
|
+
Two shapes are recognised:
|
|
9
|
+
|
|
10
|
+
- an absolute `http(s)` URL whose query or fragment carries `signature`, `sig`,
|
|
11
|
+
`x-amz-signature`, `x-goog-signature`, `x-ms-signature`, `hmac` or `token`;
|
|
12
|
+
separators are recognised in their encoded forms too: `&` (also repeated,
|
|
13
|
+
`&amp;`), `&`, `&`, the JSON escape `\u0026` and percent-encoded
|
|
14
|
+
parameter names.
|
|
15
|
+
- an absolute `http(s)` URL of an anchored, provider-scoped path-borne class:
|
|
16
|
+
the exact provider host plus the measured path shape that carries the token.
|
|
17
|
+
The measured class is the Stripe Connect account-onboarding link
|
|
18
|
+
(`connect.stripe.com/setup/<letter>/<token>`, including the documented
|
|
19
|
+
`connect.stripe.com/setup/c/acct_<id>/<token>` form), the shape that reached
|
|
20
|
+
a transcript through browser tool-result metadata in HP659. The table mirrors
|
|
21
|
+
the scanner's in `@hasna/secrets` (`signed-urls.ts`).
|
|
22
|
+
|
|
23
|
+
Every string of the tool result is walked, so a capability in nested metadata —
|
|
24
|
+
for example a browser tool result's `_meta.browser_use.url` — is redacted like
|
|
25
|
+
one in ordinary output text. A result with no such link gets no output at all,
|
|
26
|
+
however large it is.
|
|
14
27
|
|
|
15
28
|
- `hookSpecificOutput.updatedToolOutput`: the same tool result with each such
|
|
16
29
|
URL replaced by `<origin>/[redacted signed link]`. Keys, order and
|
|
@@ -23,10 +36,26 @@ It never blocks, and it never prints, logs or stores a matched URL.
|
|
|
23
36
|
|
|
24
37
|
## What it can and cannot do
|
|
25
38
|
|
|
26
|
-
- Output replacement depends on the running Claude Code
|
|
39
|
+
- Output replacement depends on the running harness. Claude Code's 2.1.285
|
|
27
40
|
build accepts `updatedToolOutput` on PostToolUse for every tool, checks it
|
|
28
41
|
against the tool's output schema, and uses the original output (with a hook
|
|
29
42
|
error) when the check fails. Older builds may ignore or reject the field.
|
|
43
|
+
- Codex has no output rewrite: that is a native capability limit on Codex, not
|
|
44
|
+
a configuration toggle. Stock Codex 0.160.0, stable 0.160.1 and shipped Hoshi
|
|
45
|
+
0.5.2 share the same relevant hook schema, parser, event and core consumers.
|
|
46
|
+
The rewrite field this hook emits, `updatedToolOutput`, is not in Codex's
|
|
47
|
+
PostToolUse output schema, so Codex rejects that response as unknown and the
|
|
48
|
+
hook fails open: the redaction does not apply and the notice sent with it is
|
|
49
|
+
dropped. Codex's own rewrite field, `updatedMCPToolOutput`, is parsed but
|
|
50
|
+
explicitly unsupported (the hook run is marked Failed, `should_block` stays
|
|
51
|
+
false, and `additionalContext` is dropped); an async hook preserves the
|
|
52
|
+
context only. A notice-only response (`additionalContext` without a rewrite
|
|
53
|
+
field, as this hook returns when the copy bound prevents a rewrite) is
|
|
54
|
+
accepted, so the notice can still reach the model on Codex; the link is never
|
|
55
|
+
rewritten there. The controls Codex does support are `decision: block` with a
|
|
56
|
+
non-empty reason, or exit 2 — they reject the model-facing result after
|
|
57
|
+
execution, but they do not rewrite the payload and do not remove prior
|
|
58
|
+
transcript exposure. Codex-side wiring is a harness-owned follow-up.
|
|
30
59
|
- It runs after the tool has run. The command already executed, the terminal
|
|
31
60
|
may already have shown the output, and files the command or the harness
|
|
32
61
|
wrote (including a spill file for large output) keep the link. Whether the
|
|
@@ -34,8 +63,12 @@ It never blocks, and it never prints, logs or stores a matched URL.
|
|
|
34
63
|
- PostToolUse hooks run in parallel on the original output and the last
|
|
35
64
|
rewrite wins, so another rewriting hook can undo this one. This hook returns
|
|
36
65
|
a rewrite only when it changed something.
|
|
37
|
-
- A
|
|
38
|
-
|
|
66
|
+
- A path-borne capability is recognised only for the anchored, measured
|
|
67
|
+
provider classes in `PATH_CAPABILITY_CLASSES` (currently
|
|
68
|
+
`connect.stripe.com` with `^/setup/<letter>/(acct_<id>/)?<token>/?$`). A
|
|
69
|
+
token in the path of an unmeasured provider class is not recognised until
|
|
70
|
+
that class is measured and added; a generic "long path" heuristic would flag
|
|
71
|
+
ordinary links.
|
|
39
72
|
- Output larger than its copy bound (1,000,000 JSON nodes or 2,000 levels
|
|
40
73
|
deep) is still scanned for links; when one is found the notice is added but
|
|
41
74
|
the output is not rewritten, because a partial copy would change the
|
|
@@ -4,8 +4,11 @@
|
|
|
4
4
|
* PostToolUse hook: signed-link-output (Claude Code)
|
|
5
5
|
*
|
|
6
6
|
* The second layer behind signed-link-guard. When a tool result contains a
|
|
7
|
-
*
|
|
8
|
-
* capability-class parameter such as `signature
|
|
7
|
+
* capability link — an absolute URL whose query or fragment carries a
|
|
8
|
+
* capability-class parameter such as `signature`, or a URL of an anchored,
|
|
9
|
+
* provider-scoped path-borne class such as the Stripe Connect onboarding link
|
|
10
|
+
* (`connect.stripe.com/setup/<letter>/<token>`, including the documented
|
|
11
|
+
* `connect.stripe.com/setup/c/acct_<id>/<token>` form) — this hook:
|
|
9
12
|
*
|
|
10
13
|
* 1. returns `hookSpecificOutput.updatedToolOutput`: the same tool result
|
|
11
14
|
* with each such URL replaced by `<origin>/[redacted signed link]`, and
|
package/package.json
CHANGED