@harperfast/harper-pro 5.0.30 → 5.1.0-beta.2

package/core/components/mcp/transport.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,517 @@
+/**
+ * MCP Streamable HTTP transport core — framework-agnostic.
+ *
+ * Takes a normalized request (method, headers, body, authenticated user,
+ * profile) and returns a normalized response (status, headers, optional
+ * JSON body or SSE iterable). The Fastify adapter (operations port) and
+ * Harper-HTTP adapter (application port) each translate to/from this shape.
+ *
+ * All spec MUSTs from MCP §basic/transports (rev 2025-06-18) live here:
+ *   - Origin validation
+ *   - Mcp-Session-Id lifecycle
+ *   - MCP-Protocol-Version enforcement
+ *   - HTTP status code mapping (200/202/400/403/404/405)
+ *   - JSON-RPC envelope parsing + standard error codes
+ */
+import * as env from '../../utility/environment/environmentManager.ts';
+import { CONFIG_PARAMS } from '../../utility/hdbTerms.ts';
+import harperLogger from '../../utility/logging/harper_logger.ts';
+import {
+	ERROR_CODES,
+	buildError,
+	buildSuccess,
+	isClientFireAndForget,
+	parseMessage,
+	type JsonRpcId,
+	type JsonRpcMessage,
+} from './jsonrpc.ts';
+import {
+	handleInitialize,
+	handleInitialized,
+	PROTOCOL_VERSION_BACKCOMPAT,
+	SUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS,
+} from './lifecycle.ts';
+import { emitAuditEntry } from './audit.ts';
+import { seedSessionSnapshot } from './listChanged.ts';
+import { tryAdmit } from './rateLimit.ts';
+import { deleteSession, loadSession, touchSession, type McpSessionRecord } from './session.ts';
+import { listResources, listResourceTemplates, readResource } from './resources.ts';
+import { registerSession, touchRegisteredSession } from './sessionRegistry.ts';
+import { getTool, listTools, type AuthedUser, type ToolResult } from './toolRegistry.ts';
+
+export type McpProfile = 'operations' | 'application';
+
+export interface NormRequest {
+	method: string;
+	/** Lowercased header name → value. Adapters normalize before calling. */
+	headers: Record<string, string | undefined>;
+	/**
+	 * The request body. May be a raw JSON string (Harper-HTTP adapter, which
+	 * reads from a stream) or an already-parsed value (Fastify adapter, which
+	 * receives parsed JSON via its preParsing pipeline). `parseMessage` handles
+	 * both — no JSON round-trip needed.
+	 */
+	body: string | unknown;
+	/** Authenticated username from upstream auth pipeline. Used for session binding. */
+	user: string;
+	/**
+	 * permission tree. Required for tools and resources RBAC enforcement.
+	 * Adapters populate from `request.hdb_user` (Fastify) / `request.user`
+	 * (Harper-HTTP). Tools/resources that gate on role return no matches
+	 * when the object is absent.
+	 */
+	userObject?: AuthedUser;
+	profile: McpProfile;
+}
+
+export interface NormResponse {
+	status: number;
+	headers: Record<string, string>;
+	jsonBody?: unknown;
+	sseIterable?: AsyncIterable<unknown>;
+}
+
+const SESSION_HEADER = 'mcp-session-id';
+const PROTOCOL_HEADER = 'mcp-protocol-version';
+const ORIGIN_HEADER = 'origin';
+
+/**
+ * Main entry. Adapters call this and map the returned shape to their
+ * native wire format. Any unhandled error from a downstream call (e.g., a
+ * RocksDB I/O failure on the session table) is caught and reported as a
+ * spec-conformant JSON-RPC Internal Error so clients see a structured
+ * error envelope instead of an opaque framework 500.
+ */
+export async function handleMcpRequest(request: NormRequest): Promise<NormResponse> {
+	try {
+		if (!isOriginAllowed(request)) {
+			return jsonResponse(403, { error: 'origin_not_allowed' });
+		}
+		if (request.method === 'POST') return await handlePost(request);
+		if (request.method === 'GET') return await handleGet(request);
+		if (request.method === 'DELETE') return await handleDelete(request);
+		return { status: 405, headers: { Allow: currentlyAllowedMethods() } };
+	} catch (err) {
+		harperLogger.error(`MCP transport internal error: ${(err as Error).stack ?? (err as Error).message}`);
+		return jsonRpcErrorResponse(500, null, ERROR_CODES.INTERNAL_ERROR, 'internal error');
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Per-profile Origin validation. Mirrors Harper's existing auth.ts pattern
+ * (security/auth.ts:65) for parity with how the operations + HTTP ports
+ * already handle CORS:
+ *   - CORS disabled in config ⇒ accept any Origin (don't gate on it at all).
+ *   - CORS enabled with empty/unset allow-list ⇒ accept any.
+ *   - CORS enabled with allow-list ⇒ match exactly OR honor a `'*'` wildcard.
+ *   - Missing Origin header ⇒ accept (curl, server-to-server, no DNS-rebinding
+ *     vector exists when the request isn't browser-initiated).
+ */
+function isOriginAllowed(request: NormRequest): boolean {
+	const origin = request.headers[ORIGIN_HEADER];
+	if (!origin) return true;
+	const corsEnabled =
+		request.profile === 'operations'
+			? env.get(CONFIG_PARAMS.OPERATIONSAPI_NETWORK_CORS)
+			: env.get(CONFIG_PARAMS.HTTP_CORS);
+	if (!corsEnabled) return true;
+	const list =
+		request.profile === 'operations'
+			? env.get(CONFIG_PARAMS.OPERATIONSAPI_NETWORK_CORSACCESSLIST)
+			: env.get(CONFIG_PARAMS.HTTP_CORSACCESSLIST);
+	if (!Array.isArray(list) || list.length === 0) return true;
+	return list.includes(origin) || list.includes('*');
+}
+
+async function handlePost(request: NormRequest): Promise<NormResponse> {
+	const parsed = parseMessage(request.body);
+	if (parsed.ok !== true) {
+		// Explicit cast: tsconfig has `strict: false`, so TS can't narrow
+		// discriminated unions from `parsed.ok !== true`. Without the cast it
+		// errors TS2339 on `parsed.code` / `parsed.reason`. (Verified during
+		// review; the alternative — enabling strict mode — is repo-wide.)
+		const fail = parsed as { ok: false; code: number; reason: string };
+		return jsonRpcErrorResponse(400, null, fail.code, fail.reason);
+	}
+	const message = parsed.message;
+	const messageId: JsonRpcId = 'id' in message ? message.id : null;
+	const method = 'method' in message ? message.method : undefined;
+
+	if (method === 'initialize') return dispatchInitialize(request, message, messageId);
+
+	const sessionId = request.headers[SESSION_HEADER];
+	if (!sessionId) {
+		return jsonRpcErrorResponse(400, messageId, ERROR_CODES.INVALID_REQUEST, 'missing Mcp-Session-Id header');
+	}
+	const session = await loadSession(sessionId);
+	if (!session) {
+		// Terminated, expired, or never existed. Spec mandates 404 so the
+		// client knows to drop the id and re-initialize.
+		return { status: 404, headers: {} };
+	}
+
+	const protocolCheck = validateProtocolHeader(request.headers[PROTOCOL_HEADER], session.protocolVersion);
+	if (protocolCheck.ok !== true) {
+		const fail = protocolCheck as { ok: false; reason: string };
+		return jsonRpcErrorResponse(400, messageId, ERROR_CODES.INVALID_REQUEST, fail.reason);
+	}
+
+	if (session.user !== request.user) {
+		// Defense-in-depth against session-id leaks: id was created for a
+		// different user. Mask the session id in logs — even though it's not
+		// a credential in MCP, leaking it to an attacker with log access would
+		// enable session-jacking once paired with a valid token.
+		harperLogger.warn(
+			`MCP session ${maskSessionId(sessionId)} presented by user ${request.user} but bound to ${session.user}`
+		);
+		return { status: 403, headers: {} };
+	}
+
+	// Sliding-window idle reset. Awaited (not fire-and-forget) so a concurrent
+	// DELETE that arrives mid-request can't be resurrected by a late put.
+	await touchSession(session);
+
+	// Fire-and-forget frames (notifications + client responses) always 202.
+	if (isClientFireAndForget(message)) {
+		if (method === 'notifications/initialized') {
+			await handleInitialized(session);
+		}
+		return { status: 202, headers: {} };
+	}
+
+	// Request with id + method (and not 'initialize'): route to the known
+	// method handlers below. Anything we don't handle yet returns a
+	// spec-conformant Method-not-found error.
+	if (method === 'tools/list') return dispatchToolsList(request, session, message, messageId);
+	if (method === 'tools/call') return dispatchToolsCall(request, session, message, messageId);
+	if (method === 'resources/list') return dispatchResourcesList(request, message, messageId);
+	if (method === 'resources/templates/list') return dispatchResourceTemplatesList(request, messageId);
+	if (method === 'resources/read') return dispatchResourcesRead(request, message, messageId);
+	return jsonResponse(
+		200,
+		buildError(messageId, ERROR_CODES.METHOD_NOT_FOUND, `Method not found: ${method ?? '<missing>'}`)
+	);
+}
+
+async function dispatchInitialize(
+	request: NormRequest,
+	message: JsonRpcMessage,
+	messageId: JsonRpcId
+): Promise<NormResponse> {
+	const params = 'params' in message ? (message.params as { protocolVersion?: unknown } | undefined) : undefined;
+	const outcome = await handleInitialize(params, request.user);
+	if (outcome.ok !== true) {
+		const fail = outcome as { ok: false; reason: string; supportedVersions: readonly string[] };
+		return jsonRpcErrorResponse(400, messageId, ERROR_CODES.INVALID_PARAMS, fail.reason, {
+			supportedVersions: fail.supportedVersions,
+		});
+	}
+	return {
+		status: 200,
+		headers: { 'Mcp-Session-Id': outcome.session.id },
+		jsonBody: buildSuccess(messageId, outcome.result),
+	};
+}
+
+async function handleGet(request: NormRequest): Promise<NormResponse> {
+	// Server-push channel for `notifications/{tools,resources}/list_changed`
+	// (#619). The client opens GET /mcp after `initialize`; we keep the SSE
+	// connection alive for the lifetime of the session and push frames as
+	// role/schema events fire. Per the spec, idle sessions get HTTP 404 on
+	// the next POST after eviction — the GET stream itself just closes when
+	// the session record is deleted (via unregisterSession).
+	const sessionId = request.headers[SESSION_HEADER];
+	if (!sessionId) {
+		return { status: 400, headers: {} };
+	}
+	const session = await loadSession(sessionId);
+	if (!session) {
+		return { status: 404, headers: {} };
+	}
+	if (session.user !== request.user) {
+		return { status: 403, headers: {} };
+	}
+	const protocolCheck = validateProtocolHeader(request.headers[PROTOCOL_HEADER], session.protocolVersion);
+	if (protocolCheck.ok !== true) {
+		const fail = protocolCheck as { ok: false; reason: string };
+		return {
+			status: 400,
+			headers: {},
+			jsonBody: { error: { message: fail.reason } },
+		};
+	}
+	const record = registerSession(sessionId, request.profile, effectiveUser(request));
+	seedSessionSnapshot(sessionId);
+	return {
+		status: 200,
+		headers: { 'Content-Type': 'text/event-stream', 'Cache-Control': 'no-store' },
+		sseIterable: record.queue,
+	};
+}
+
+const DEFAULT_MAX_TOOLS = 200;
+const DEFAULT_RESOURCE_PAGE_LIMIT = 200;
+
+function profileMaxTools(profile: McpProfile): number {
+	const key = profile === 'operations' ? CONFIG_PARAMS.MCP_OPERATIONS_MAXTOOLS : CONFIG_PARAMS.MCP_APPLICATION_MAXTOOLS;
+	const value = env.get(key);
+	return typeof value === 'number' && value > 0 ? value : DEFAULT_MAX_TOOLS;
+}
+
+function effectiveUser(request: NormRequest): AuthedUser {
+	return request.userObject ?? { username: request.user };
+}
+
+function dispatchToolsList(
+	request: NormRequest,
+	session: McpSessionRecord,
+	message: JsonRpcMessage,
+	messageId: JsonRpcId
+): NormResponse {
+	const params = 'params' in message ? (message.params as { cursor?: unknown } | undefined) : undefined;
+	const cursor = typeof params?.cursor === 'string' ? params.cursor : undefined;
+	const limit = profileMaxTools(request.profile);
+	const { tools, nextCursor } = listTools({
+		user: effectiveUser(request),
+		profile: request.profile,
+		sessionId: session.id,
+		cursor,
+		limit,
+	});
+	const result: { tools: unknown[]; nextCursor?: string } = { tools };
+	if (nextCursor) result.nextCursor = nextCursor;
+	return jsonResponse(200, buildSuccess(messageId, result));
+}
+
+async function dispatchToolsCall(
+	request: NormRequest,
+	session: McpSessionRecord,
+	message: JsonRpcMessage,
+	messageId: JsonRpcId
+): Promise<NormResponse> {
+	const params =
+		'params' in message ? (message.params as { name?: unknown; arguments?: unknown } | undefined) : undefined;
+	const name = typeof params?.name === 'string' ? params.name : undefined;
+	if (!name) {
+		return jsonResponse(200, buildError(messageId, ERROR_CODES.INVALID_PARAMS, 'tools/call requires params.name'));
+	}
+	const tool = getTool(name);
+	if (!tool || tool.profile !== request.profile) {
+		return jsonResponse(200, buildError(messageId, ERROR_CODES.METHOD_NOT_FOUND, `Unknown tool: ${name}`));
+	}
+
+	const args = params?.arguments ?? {};
+	const callStartedAt = Date.now();
+	const user = effectiveUser(request);
+	// Keep the SSE registry's idle-prune from sweeping this session: tools/call
+	// activity counts as "alive" even if the GET stream is dormant between
+	// listChanged events.
+	touchRegisteredSession(session.id);
+
+	// Rate limit check — admit-or-deny BEFORE invoking the handler. Failures
+	// surface as `isError: true` with `kind: 'rate_limited'` (NOT a JSON-RPC
+	// error) so the LLM sees and can back off / try later.
+	const decision = tryAdmit(session.id, name, request.profile);
+	if (!decision.allowed) {
+		// Non-strict tsconfig doesn't narrow the discriminated union here.
+		const denied = decision as { allowed: false; reason: string };
+		const toolResult: ToolResult = {
+			isError: true,
+			content: [
+				{
+					type: 'text',
+					text: JSON.stringify({
+						kind: 'rate_limited',
+						scope: denied.reason,
+						tool: name,
+						message: `MCP ${denied.reason} rate limit reached; back off and try again`,
+					}),
+				},
+			],
+		};
+		emitAuditEntry({
+			timestamp: new Date(callStartedAt).toISOString(),
+			profile: request.profile,
+			sessionId: session.id,
+			tool: name,
+			user: user.username ?? request.user,
+			args: args as object,
+			status: 'rate_limited',
+			durationMs: 0,
+		});
+		return jsonResponse(200, buildSuccess(messageId, toolResult));
+	}
+
+	let toolResult: ToolResult;
+	let status: 'ok' | 'isError' = 'ok';
+	let errorMessage: string | undefined;
+	try {
+		toolResult = await tool.handler(args, {
+			user,
+			profile: request.profile,
+			sessionId: session.id,
+		});
+		if (toolResult?.isError) status = 'isError';
+	} catch (err) {
+		// Per MCP §server/tools → Error Handling: tool-execution errors come
+		// back as a successful JSON-RPC result with isError:true so the LLM
+		// can see and adapt. Stack traces stay in the server log; only the
+		// message goes to the wire (Harper-style hygiene).
+		const errMsg = (err as Error).message ?? 'tool execution failed';
+		harperLogger.warn(`MCP tools/call ${name} threw: ${(err as Error).stack ?? errMsg}`);
+		errorMessage = errMsg;
+		status = 'isError';
+		toolResult = {
+			isError: true,
+			content: [
+				{
+					type: 'text',
+					text: JSON.stringify({ kind: 'harper_error', message: errMsg }),
+				},
+			],
+		};
+	} finally {
+		decision.release();
+	}
+	emitAuditEntry({
+		timestamp: new Date(callStartedAt).toISOString(),
+		profile: request.profile,
+		sessionId: session.id,
+		tool: name,
+		user: user.username ?? request.user,
+		args: args as object,
+		status,
+		durationMs: Date.now() - callStartedAt,
+		...(errorMessage ? { errorMessage } : {}),
+	});
+	return jsonResponse(200, buildSuccess(messageId, toolResult));
+}
+
+function dispatchResourcesList(request: NormRequest, message: JsonRpcMessage, messageId: JsonRpcId): NormResponse {
+	const params = 'params' in message ? (message.params as { cursor?: unknown } | undefined) : undefined;
+	const cursor = typeof params?.cursor === 'string' ? params.cursor : undefined;
+	const result = listResources({
+		user: effectiveUser(request),
+		profile: request.profile,
+		cursor,
+		limit: DEFAULT_RESOURCE_PAGE_LIMIT,
+	});
+	const body: { resources: unknown[]; nextCursor?: string } = { resources: result.resources };
+	if (result.nextCursor) body.nextCursor = result.nextCursor;
+	return jsonResponse(200, buildSuccess(messageId, body));
+}
+
+function dispatchResourceTemplatesList(request: NormRequest, messageId: JsonRpcId): NormResponse {
+	const templates = listResourceTemplates(request.profile);
+	return jsonResponse(200, buildSuccess(messageId, { resourceTemplates: templates }));
+}
+
+async function dispatchResourcesRead(
+	request: NormRequest,
+	message: JsonRpcMessage,
+	messageId: JsonRpcId
+): Promise<NormResponse> {
+	const params = 'params' in message ? (message.params as { uri?: unknown } | undefined) : undefined;
+	const uri = typeof params?.uri === 'string' ? params.uri : undefined;
+	if (!uri) {
+		return jsonResponse(200, buildError(messageId, ERROR_CODES.INVALID_PARAMS, 'resources/read requires params.uri'));
+	}
+	const outcome = await readResource({ uri, user: effectiveUser(request), profile: request.profile });
+	if (outcome.ok !== true) {
+		const fail = outcome as { ok: false; reason: string };
+		// Per MCP §server/resources, "resource not found" and access-control
+		// failures are protocol errors, not isError tool results — resources/*
+		// returns JSON-RPC errors rather than success-with-isError. We pick
+		// -32602 (Invalid params) for bad inputs and -32601 (Method not found)
+		// for unknown resources, matching the spec's mapping for analogous
+		// situations and the precedent already in place for tools/call.
+		const code = /not found|no resource matches/.test(fail.reason)
+			? ERROR_CODES.METHOD_NOT_FOUND
+			: ERROR_CODES.INVALID_PARAMS;
+		return jsonResponse(200, buildError(messageId, code, fail.reason));
+	}
+	return jsonResponse(200, buildSuccess(messageId, { contents: outcome.contents }));
+}
+
+async function handleDelete(request: NormRequest): Promise<NormResponse> {
+	const allow = env.get(CONFIG_PARAMS.MCP_SESSION_ALLOWCLIENTDELETE);
+	if (allow !== true) {
+		return { status: 405, headers: { Allow: currentlyAllowedMethods() } };
+	}
+	const sessionId = request.headers[SESSION_HEADER];
+	if (!sessionId) {
+		return { status: 400, headers: {} };
+	}
+	const session = await loadSession(sessionId);
+	if (!session) {
+		return { status: 404, headers: {} };
+	}
+	if (session.user !== request.user) {
+		return { status: 403, headers: {} };
+	}
+	await deleteSession(sessionId);
+	return { status: 204, headers: {} };
+}
+
+function validateProtocolHeader(
+	headerValue: string | undefined,
+	sessionVersion: string
+): { ok: true } | { ok: false; reason: string } {
+	// Per spec compatibility rule: missing header is treated as 2025-03-26.
+	const effective = headerValue ?? PROTOCOL_VERSION_BACKCOMPAT;
+	if (!SUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS.includes(effective as (typeof SUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS)[number])) {
+		return { ok: false, reason: `unsupported MCP-Protocol-Version: ${effective}` };
+	}
+	if (effective !== sessionVersion) {
+		return {
+			ok: false,
+			reason: `MCP-Protocol-Version mismatch: session negotiated ${sessionVersion}, request sent ${effective}`,
+		};
+	}
+	return { ok: true };
+}
+
+function jsonResponse(status: number, body: unknown): NormResponse {
+	return {
+		status,
+		headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+		jsonBody: body,
+	};
+}
+
+function jsonRpcErrorResponse(
+	status: number,
+	id: JsonRpcId,
+	code: number,
+	message: string,
+	data?: unknown
+): NormResponse {
+	return {
+		status,
+		headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+		jsonBody: buildError(id, code, message, data),
+	};
+}
+
+/**
+ * Mask an MCP session id for log output. Sessions aren't credentials in the
+ * strict sense, but a leaked id paired with a stolen token enables session
+ * jacking, so we don't print the full value in routine logs.
+ */
+function maskSessionId(id: string): string {
+	if (id.length <= 8) return '***';
+	return `${id.slice(0, 8)}…`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build the `Allow` header value for a 405 response. Per RFC 9110 §9.1 the
+ * server MUST list only currently-supported methods. In v1, POST is always
+ * supported; GET opens the server-push SSE channel for
+ * `notifications/{tools,resources}/list_changed`; DELETE is conditional on
+ * `mcp.session.allowClientDelete`.
+ */
+function currentlyAllowedMethods(): string {
+	const allow = ['POST', 'GET'];
+	if (env.get(CONFIG_PARAMS.MCP_SESSION_ALLOWCLIENTDELETE) === true) allow.push('DELETE');
+	return allow.join(', ');
+}