@harness-engineering/cli 1.15.0 → 1.17.0

package/dist/agents/skills/cursor/harness-security-review/SKILL.md

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+# Harness Security Review
+
+> Deep security audit combining mechanical scanning with AI-powered vulnerability analysis. OWASP baseline + stack-adaptive rules + optional threat modeling.
+
+## When to Use
+
+- Before a release or security-sensitive merge
+- After updating dependencies (supply chain risk)
+- When auditing a new or unfamiliar codebase
+- When `on_pr` triggers fire on security-sensitive paths
+- NOT for quick pre-commit checks (use harness-pre-commit-review for that)
+- NOT for general code review (use harness-code-review for that)
+
+## Scope Adaptation
+
+This skill adapts its behavior based on invocation context — standalone or as part of the code review pipeline.
+
+### Detection
+
+Check for `pipelineContext` in `.harness/handoff.json`. If present, run in **changed-files mode**. Otherwise, run in **full mode**.
+
+```bash
+# Check for pipeline context
+cat .harness/handoff.json 2>/dev/null | grep -q '"pipelineContext"'
+```
+
+### Changed-Files Mode (Code Review Pipeline)
+
+When invoked from the code review pipeline (Phase 4 fan-out, security slot):
+
+- **Phase 1 (SCAN): SKIPPED.** The mechanical security scan already ran in code review Phase 2. Read the mechanical findings from `PipelineContext.findings` where `domain === 'security'` instead of re-running `run_security_scan`.
+- **Phase 2 (REVIEW):** Run OWASP baseline + stack-adaptive analysis on **changed files only** plus their direct imports (for data flow tracing). The changed file list is provided in the context bundle from the pipeline.
+- **Phase 3 (THREAT-MODEL): SKIPPED** unless `--deep` flag was passed through from code review.
+- **Phase 4 (REPORT): SKIPPED.** Return findings as `ReviewFinding[]` to the pipeline. The pipeline handles output formatting (Phase 7).
+
+Findings returned in this mode **must** use the `ReviewFinding` schema with populated security fields (`cweId`, `owaspCategory`, `confidence`, `remediation`, `references`).
+
+### Full Mode (Standalone)
+
+When invoked directly (no PipelineContext):
+
+- All phases run as documented below (Phase 1 through Phase 4).
+- Output is the standalone security report format.
+- This is the existing behavior — no changes.
+
+## Principle: Layered Security
+
+This skill follows the Deterministic-vs-LLM Responsibility Split principle. The mechanical scanner runs first and catches what patterns can catch. The AI review then looks for semantic issues that patterns miss — user input flowing through multiple functions to a dangerous sink, missing authorization checks, logic flaws in authentication flows.
+
+## Process
+
+### Phase 1: SCAN — Mechanical Security Scanner (full mode only)
+
+> **Note:** This phase is skipped in changed-files mode. See [Scope Adaptation](#scope-adaptation) above.
+
+Run the built-in security scanner against the project.
+
+1. **Run the scanner.** Use the `harness check-security` CLI command:
+
+   ```bash
+   harness check-security
+   ```
+
+   For machine-readable output, add `--json`. For scanning only changed files, add `--changed-only`.
+
+2. **Review findings.** Categorize by severity:
+   - **Error (blocking):** Must fix before merge — secrets, injection, eval, weak crypto
+   - **Warning (review):** Should fix — CORS wildcards, disabled TLS, path traversal patterns
+   - **Info (note):** Consider — HTTP URLs, missing security headers
+
+3. **Report mechanical findings.** Present each finding with:
+   - Rule ID and name
+   - File, line number, matched code
+   - Remediation guidance
+   - CWE/OWASP reference
+
+### Phase 2: REVIEW — AI-Powered Security Analysis
+
+After mechanical scanning, perform deeper AI analysis.
+
+#### OWASP Baseline (always runs)
+
+Review the codebase against OWASP Top 10 and CWE Top 25:
+
+1. **Injection (CWE-89, CWE-78, CWE-79):** Look for user input flowing to SQL queries, shell commands, or HTML output without sanitization. Trace data flow across function boundaries — patterns only catch single-line issues.
+
+2. **Broken Authentication (CWE-287):** Check for weak session management, missing MFA enforcement, hardcoded credentials, predictable tokens.
+
+3. **Sensitive Data Exposure (CWE-200):** Look for PII logged to console/files, sensitive data in error messages, missing encryption for data at rest or in transit.
+
+4. **Broken Access Control (CWE-862):** Check for missing authorization on API endpoints, IDOR vulnerabilities, privilege escalation paths.
+
+5. **Security Misconfiguration (CWE-16):** Check for debug mode in production configs, default credentials, overly permissive CORS, missing security headers.
+
+#### Stack-Adaptive Review (based on detected tech)
+
+After the OWASP baseline, add stack-specific checks:
+
+- **Node.js:** Prototype pollution via `Object.assign` or spread on user input, `__proto__` injection, unhandled promise rejections exposing stack traces
+- **Express:** Missing helmet, rate limiting, CSRF protection, body parser limits
+- **React:** XSS via `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`, sensitive data in client state, insecure `postMessage` listeners
+- **Go:** Race conditions in concurrent handlers, `unsafe.Pointer` usage, format string injection
+
+#### Insecure Defaults Analysis
+
+For each configuration variable that controls a security feature (auth, encryption, TLS, CORS, rate limiting), verify:
+
+- Does the feature **fail-closed** (error/deny) when configuration is missing?
+- Or does it **fail-open** (degrade to permissive/disabled)?
+- Trace fallback chains: `config.x ?? env.Y ?? default` — is the final default secure?
+
+Patterns the mechanical `SEC-DEF-*` rules cannot catch (focus here):
+
+- Multi-line fallback chains where the insecure default is not adjacent to the security variable name
+- Conditional logic that enables security features only in specific environments (e.g., `if (isProd) enableTLS()`)
+- Error handlers that swallow failures in auth, session, or token validation code (multi-line `catch` blocks)
+- Silent type coercions that convert truthy env vars to falsy values
+
+**Rationalizations to reject** (adapted from Trail of Bits):
+
+- "The default is only used in development" — production deployments inherit defaults when config is missing
+- "The env var will always be set" — missing env vars are the #1 cause of fail-open in production
+- "The catch block will be filled in later" — empty auth catch blocks ship to production
+- "It's behind a feature flag" — feature flags can be inadvertently enabled or disabled
+
+### Phase 3: THREAT-MODEL (optional, `--deep` flag; full mode or explicit `--deep` in pipeline)
+
+When invoked with `--deep`, build a lightweight threat model:
+
+1. **Identify entry points.** Find all HTTP routes, API endpoints, message handlers, CLI commands, and file upload handlers.
+
+2. **Map trust boundaries.** Where does data cross from untrusted (user input, external APIs) to trusted (database queries, file system, internal services)?
+
+3. **Trace data flows.** For each entry point, trace how user-controlled data flows through the system. Use the knowledge graph if available (`query_graph`, `get_relationships`).
+
+4. **Identify threat scenarios.** For each trust boundary crossing, ask:
+   - What if this input is malicious?
+   - What is the worst-case impact?
+   - What controls are in place?
+
+5. **Report threat model.** Present as a table:
+   | Entry Point | Data Flow | Trust Boundary | Threats | Controls | Risk |
+   |-------------|-----------|----------------|---------|----------|------|
+
+### Phase 4: REPORT — Consolidated Findings
+
+Produce a unified security report:
+
+```
+Security Review: [PASS/WARN/FAIL]
+
+Mechanical Scanner:
+- Scanned: N files, M rules applied
+- Coverage: baseline/enhanced
+- Errors: N | Warnings: N | Info: N
+
+[List each finding with rule ID, file:line, severity, and remediation]
+
+AI Review:
+- OWASP Baseline: [findings or "No issues found"]
+- Stack-Adaptive ([detected stacks]): [findings or "No issues found"]
+
+[If --deep]
+Threat Model:
+- Entry points: N
+- Trust boundaries: N
+- High-risk flows: [list]
+```
+
+## Harness Integration
+
+- **`harness check-security`** — Run the mechanical scanner via CLI. Use `--json` for machine-readable output.
+- **`harness validate`** — Standard project health check
+- **`query_graph` / `get_relationships`** — Used in threat modeling phase for data flow tracing
+- **`get_impact`** — Understand blast radius of security-sensitive changes
+
+## Gates
+
+- **Mechanical scanner must run before AI review.** The scanner catches what patterns can catch; AI reviews what remains.
+- **Error-severity findings are blocking.** The report must be FAIL if any error-severity finding exists.
+- **AI review must reference specific code.** No vague warnings like "consider improving security." Every finding must point to a file, line, and specific issue.
+- **Threat model is optional.** Only runs with `--deep`. Do not run it unless explicitly requested.
+
+## Success Criteria
+
+- Mechanical scanner ran and produced findings (or confirmed clean)
+- AI review covered OWASP Top 10 baseline
+- Stack-adaptive checks matched the detected technology
+- Every finding includes file, line, CWE reference, and remediation
+- Report follows the structured format
+- Error-severity findings result in FAIL status
+
+## Escalation
+
+- **Scanner finds secrets in committed code:** Flag immediately. Recommend rotating the compromised credentials. This is urgent regardless of other findings.
+- **AI review finds a critical vulnerability (RCE, SQLi, auth bypass):** Mark as blocking. Do not approve the PR. Provide exact remediation code.
+- **Conflict between scanner and AI review:** If the scanner flags something the AI thinks is a false positive, include both perspectives in the report. Let the human decide.
+- **Scope too large for meaningful review:** If the project has >1000 source files, recommend scoping the review to changed files or a specific subsystem.
+
+## Examples
+
+### Example: Clean Scan
+
+```
+Security Review: PASS
+
+Mechanical Scanner:
+- Scanned: 42 files, 22 rules applied
+- Coverage: baseline
+- Errors: 0 | Warnings: 0 | Info: 0
+
+AI Review:
+- OWASP Baseline: No issues found
+- Stack-Adaptive (node, express): No issues found
+```
+
+### Example: Findings Detected
+
+```
+Security Review: FAIL
+
+Mechanical Scanner:
+- Scanned: 42 files, 22 rules applied
+- Coverage: baseline
+- Errors: 2 | Warnings: 1 | Info: 0
+
+Findings:
+1. [SEC-SEC-002] ERROR src/config.ts:12 — Hardcoded API key or secret detected
+   Remediation: Use environment variables: process.env.API_KEY
+2. [SEC-INJ-002] ERROR src/db.ts:45 — SQL query built with string concatenation
+   Remediation: Use parameterized queries: query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1", [id])
+3. [SEC-NET-001] WARNING src/cors.ts:8 — CORS wildcard origin allows any website to make requests
+   Remediation: Restrict CORS to specific trusted origins
+
+AI Review:
+- OWASP Baseline: 1 finding — user input from req.params.id flows through formatQuery() to db.execute() without sanitization (confirms SEC-INJ-002 with data flow trace)
+- Stack-Adaptive (node, express): Missing helmet middleware, missing rate limiting on /api/* routes
+```
+
+### Example: Deep Audit with Threat Model
+
+```
+Security Review: WARN
+
+Mechanical Scanner:
+- Scanned: 120 files, 30 rules applied
+- Coverage: baseline
+- Errors: 0 | Warnings: 2 | Info: 3
+
+AI Review:
+- OWASP Baseline: No critical issues
+- Stack-Adaptive (node, react): localStorage used for session token (SEC-REACT-001)
+
+Threat Model:
+- Entry points: 12 (8 REST endpoints, 2 WebSocket handlers, 2 CLI commands)
+- Trust boundaries: 4 (client→API, API→database, API→external service, CLI→filesystem)
+- High-risk flows:
+  1. POST /api/upload → file stored to disk without size limit or type validation
+  2. WebSocket message handler passes user data to eval-like template engine
+```

package/dist/agents/skills/cursor/harness-security-review/skill.yaml

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+name: harness-security-review
+version: "1.0.0"
+description: Deep security audit with OWASP baseline and stack-adaptive analysis
+cognitive_mode: meticulous-implementer
+triggers:
+  - manual
+  - on_pr
+platforms:
+  - claude-code
+  - gemini-cli
+tools:
+  - Bash
+  - Read
+  - Write
+  - Edit
+  - Glob
+  - Grep
+cli:
+  command: harness skill run harness-security-review
+  args:
+    - name: path
+      description: Project root path
+      required: false
+    - name: deep
+      description: Enable threat modeling phase
+      required: false
+    - name: scope
+      description: "Scope mode: 'changed-files' or 'full'. Auto-detected from PipelineContext when omitted."
+      required: false
+mcp:
+  tool: run_skill
+  input:
+    skill: harness-security-review
+    path: string
+type: rigid
+tier: 3
+phases:
+  - name: scan
+    description: Run mechanical security scanner (skipped in changed-files mode)
+    required: false
+  - name: review
+    description: AI-powered security review (OWASP + stack-adaptive)
+    required: true
+  - name: threat-model
+    description: Lightweight threat model from codebase graph
+    required: false
+  - name: report
+    description: Generate findings report with remediation guidance (skipped in pipeline mode)
+    required: false
+state:
+  persistent: false
+  files: []
+depends_on: []

package/dist/agents/skills/cursor/harness-security-scan/SKILL.md

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+# Harness Security Scan
+
+> Lightweight mechanical security scan. Fast triage, not deep review.
+
+## When to Use
+
+- As part of the codebase-health-analyst sweep
+- For quick security triage on a project or changed files
+- On scheduled cron runs for continuous security coverage
+- NOT for deep security review (use harness-security-review)
+- NOT for threat modeling (use harness-security-review --deep)
+
+## Process
+
+### Phase 1: SCAN — Run Mechanical Scanner
+
+1. **Resolve project root.** Use provided path or cwd.
+
+2. **Load security config.** Read `harness.config.json` and extract `security`
+   section. Fall back to defaults if absent.
+
+3. **Determine file scope.**
+   - If `--changed-only` or triggered by PR: run `git diff --name-only HEAD~1`
+     to get changed files. Filter to source files only (exclude node_modules,
+     dist, test files per config).
+   - Otherwise: scan all source files in the project.
+
+4. **Run SecurityScanner.** Call `SecurityScanner.scanFiles()` from
+   `@harness-engineering/core`.
+
+5. **Filter by severity threshold.** Remove findings below the configured
+   threshold:
+   - `error`: only errors
+   - `warning`: errors and warnings (default)
+   - `info`: all findings
+
+6. **Output report.** Present findings grouped by severity:
+
+   ```
+   Security Scan: [PASS/FAIL]
+   Scanned: N files, M rules applied
+   Errors: N | Warnings: N | Info: N
+
+   [List findings with rule ID, file:line, severity, message, remediation]
+   ```
+
+## Gates
+
+- **Error-severity findings are blocking.** Report is FAIL if any error-severity
+  finding exists after filtering.
+- **No AI review.** This skill is mechanical only. Do not perform OWASP analysis
+  or threat modeling.
+
+## Harness Integration
+
+- **`harness check-security`** — CLI command that invokes this skill's scanner.
+- **`SecurityScanner`** — Core class from `@harness-engineering/core` that executes the rule engine.
+- **`harness.config.json`** — Security section configures severity threshold and file exclusions.
+- **codebase-health-analyst persona** — Invokes this skill as part of its sweep.
+
+## Evidence Requirements
+
+When this skill makes claims about existing code, architecture, or behavior,
+it MUST cite evidence using one of:
+
+1. **File reference:** `file:line` format (e.g., `src/auth.ts:42`)
+2. **Code pattern reference:** `file` with description (e.g., `src/utils/hash.ts` —
+   "existing bcrypt wrapper")
+3. **Test/command output:** Inline or referenced output from a test run or CLI command
+4. **Session evidence:** Write to the `evidence` session section via `manage_state`
+
+**Uncited claims:** Technical assertions without citations MUST be prefixed with
+`[UNVERIFIED]`. Example: `[UNVERIFIED] The auth middleware supports refresh tokens`.
+
+## Red Flags
+
+### Universal
+
+These apply to ALL skills. If you catch yourself doing any of these, STOP.
+
+- **"I believe the codebase does X"** — Stop. Read the code and cite a file:line
+  reference. Belief is not evidence.
+- **"Let me recommend [pattern] for this"** without checking existing patterns — Stop.
+  Search the codebase first. The project may already have a convention.
+- **"While we're here, we should also [unrelated improvement]"** — Stop. Flag the idea
+  but do not expand scope beyond the stated task.
+
+### Domain-Specific
+
+- **"This finding is in test code, so it's not a real issue"** — Stop. Test code can leak secrets, establish bad patterns, and be copy-pasted to production.
+- **"This dependency is widely used, so it's safe"** — Stop. Popularity is not a security guarantee. Check CVE databases and advisory feeds.
+- **"This is a low-severity finding, skipping"** — Stop. Low-severity findings compound. Document why you are deprioritizing, do not silently skip.
+- **"The scanner didn't flag it, so it's clean"** — Stop. Scanners have false negatives. A clean scan is not proof of security — it is absence of evidence.
+
+## Rationalizations to Reject
+
+### Universal
+
+These reasoning patterns sound plausible but lead to bad outcomes. Reject them.
+
+- **"It's probably fine"** — "Probably" is not evidence. Verify before asserting.
+- **"This is best practice"** — Best practice in what context? Cite the source and
+  confirm it applies to this codebase.
+- **"We can fix it later"** — If it is worth flagging, it is worth documenting now
+  with a concrete follow-up plan.
+
+### Domain-Specific
+
+- **"No attacker would find this"** — Security by obscurity. If the code is wrong, flag it regardless of discoverability.
+- **"We're behind a firewall"** — Network boundaries change. Code should be secure at every layer regardless of deployment topology.
+- **"The framework handles this for us"** — Verify the framework's actual behavior. Misuse of a secure framework is still insecure.
+
+## Escalation
+
+- **When error-severity findings are disputed:** The scanner is mechanical — it may flag false positives. If a finding is a false positive, add a `// harness-ignore SEC-XXX` comment on the line and document the rationale. Do not suppress without explanation.
+- **When the scanner misses a known vulnerability:** This skill runs pattern-based rules only. For semantic analysis (taint tracking, control flow), use `/harness:security-review` instead.
+- **When scan is too slow on large codebases:** Use `--changed-only` to scope to recently changed files. Full scans can run on a scheduled cron instead.
+
+## Success Criteria
+
+- Scanner ran and produced findings (or confirmed clean)
+- Findings are filtered by the configured severity threshold
+- Report follows the structured format
+- Exit code reflects pass/fail status
+
+## Examples
+
+### Example: Clean Scan
+
+```
+Security Scan: PASS
+Scanned: 42 files, 12 rules applied
+Errors: 0 | Warnings: 0 | Info: 0
+```
+
+### Example: Findings Detected
+
+```
+Security Scan: FAIL
+Scanned: 42 files, 12 rules applied
+Errors: 1 | Warnings: 2 | Info: 0
+
+[SEC-SECRET-001] src/config.ts:15 (error)
+  Hardcoded API key detected: `const API_KEY = "sk-..."`
+  Remediation: Move to environment variable, use dotenv or secrets manager.
+
+[SEC-NET-001] src/cors.ts:5 (warning)
+  CORS wildcard origin: `origin: "*"`
+  Remediation: Restrict to specific allowed origins.
+
+[SEC-CRYPTO-001] src/auth.ts:22 (warning)
+  Weak hash algorithm: `crypto.createHash("md5")`
+  Remediation: Use SHA-256 or stronger.
+```

package/dist/agents/skills/cursor/harness-security-scan/skill.yaml

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+name: harness-security-scan
+version: "1.0.0"
+description: Lightweight mechanical security scan for health checks
+cognitive_mode: meticulous-implementer
+triggers:
+  - manual
+  - on_milestone
+platforms:
+  - claude-code
+  - gemini-cli
+tools:
+  - Bash
+  - Read
+  - Glob
+  - Grep
+cli:
+  command: harness skill run harness-security-scan
+  args:
+    - name: path
+      description: Project root path
+      required: false
+    - name: severity
+      description: Minimum severity threshold (error, warning, info)
+      required: false
+    - name: changed-only
+      description: Only scan git-changed files
+      required: false
+mcp:
+  tool: run_skill
+  input:
+    skill: harness-security-scan
+    path: string
+type: rigid
+tier: 2
+phases:
+  - name: scan
+    description: Run SecurityScanner and filter by severity threshold
+    required: true
+state:
+  persistent: false
+  files: []
+depends_on: []