@harness-engineering/cli 1.13.0 → 1.14.0

package/dist/agents/skills/claude-code/harness-secrets/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+# Harness Secrets
+
+> Secret detection, credential hygiene, and vault integration. Find exposed secrets, classify risk, and enforce externalization before they reach production.
+
+## When to Use
+
+- When scanning source code for hardcoded secrets, API keys, or credentials
+- When auditing environment variable hygiene and `.env` file management
+- On PRs that modify configuration files or add new service integrations
+- NOT for general application security review (use harness-security-review)
+- NOT for infrastructure credential management (use harness-infrastructure-as-code)
+- NOT for CI/CD secret injection (use harness-deployment)
+
+## Process
+
+### Phase 1: SCAN -- Detect Secrets in Source Code
+
+1. **Scan source files for secret patterns.** Search for common secret formats:
+   - **API keys:** Patterns matching `sk-`, `pk_`, `AKIA`, `AIza`, `ghp_`, `glpat-`, `xoxb-`
+   - **Connection strings:** Database URIs with embedded credentials (`postgres://user:pass@`)
+   - **Private keys:** `-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----`, `-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----`
+   - **JWT tokens:** Base64-encoded strings matching `eyJ` header pattern
+   - **Generic secrets:** Variables named `password`, `secret`, `token`, `api_key` with literal string values
+
+2. **Scan configuration files.** Check files that commonly contain secrets:
+   - `.env`, `.env.local`, `.env.production` (should be gitignored)
+   - `config/*.json`, `config/*.yaml` with credential fields
+   - `docker-compose.yml` with inline environment values
+   - `application.properties`, `appsettings.json` with connection strings
+   - CI/CD pipeline files with hardcoded values
+
+3. **Check `.gitignore` coverage.** Verify that sensitive files are excluded from version control:
+   - `.env*` files (except `.env.example`)
+   - `*.pem`, `*.key` private key files
+   - `credentials/`, `secrets/` directories
+   - Service account JSON files (`*-credentials.json`)
+   - IDE-specific files that may cache environment variables
+
+4. **Scan git history for leaked secrets.** Check recent commits:
+   - Run `git log --diff-filter=A --name-only` for recently added files
+   - Check if any `.env` or credential files were committed and later removed
+   - Flag files that appear in git history but are now gitignored (the secret is still in history)
+
+5. **Present scan results:**
+
+   ```
+   Secret Scan: 7 findings in 5 files
+
+   CRITICAL (2):
+     src/config/database.ts:8 -- Hardcoded PostgreSQL connection string with password
+     src/services/stripe.ts:3 -- Stripe secret key (sk_live_...)
+
+   HIGH (3):
+     docker-compose.yml:15 -- MySQL root password in plaintext
+     src/config/aws.ts:12 -- AWS access key pattern (AKIA...)
+     .env.production:1 -- File committed to git (should be gitignored)
+
+   MEDIUM (2):
+     src/utils/auth.ts:45 -- JWT secret as string literal
+     config/app.json:22 -- Generic "apiKey" field with literal value
+   ```
+
+---
+
+### Phase 2: CLASSIFY -- Categorize by Risk and Type
+
+1. **Assign severity levels.** Classify each finding:
+   - **CRITICAL:** Live production credentials, private keys, cloud provider access keys. Immediate rotation required.
+   - **HIGH:** Secrets in committed files, database passwords, service API keys. Rotation strongly recommended.
+   - **MEDIUM:** Development-only secrets in source, JWT signing keys, generic tokens. Should be externalized.
+   - **LOW:** Example values that look like secrets but are placeholders (`YOUR_API_KEY_HERE`), test-only credentials in test fixtures.
+
+2. **Identify secret type.** Categorize each finding:
+   - Cloud provider credentials (AWS, GCP, Azure)
+   - Database credentials (connection strings, passwords)
+   - Third-party API keys (Stripe, SendGrid, Twilio)
+   - Authentication secrets (JWT keys, OAuth client secrets)
+   - Encryption keys (symmetric keys, private keys)
+   - Internal service tokens (inter-service auth)
+
+3. **Assess blast radius.** For each CRITICAL and HIGH finding:
+   - What systems does this credential access?
+   - Is the credential scoped (read-only, limited permissions) or broad (admin)?
+   - Is the credential shared across environments?
+   - When was the credential last rotated?
+
+4. **Check for false positives.** Verify findings are actual secrets:
+   - Example/placeholder values in documentation
+   - Test fixtures with fake credentials
+   - Base64-encoded non-secret data matching JWT patterns
+   - Hash values that match key patterns but are not keys
+
+5. **Generate classification report:**
+
+   ```
+   Classification:
+     CRITICAL: 2 (require immediate rotation)
+     HIGH: 3 (require rotation within 24 hours)
+     MEDIUM: 2 (require externalization)
+     LOW: 0
+     False positives: 1 (removed from findings)
+
+   Affected systems:
+     - PostgreSQL database (production)
+     - Stripe payment processing
+     - AWS S3 storage
+   ```
+
+---
+
+### Phase 3: REMEDIATE -- Extract and Secure Secrets
+
+1. **Recommend secret externalization.** For each finding, provide the remediation:
+   - Replace hardcoded value with environment variable reference
+   - Add the variable to `.env.example` with a placeholder value
+   - Add the actual value to the deployment secret store
+   - Verify `.gitignore` includes the actual `.env` file
+
+2. **Recommend secret management integration.** Based on the project's infrastructure:
+   - **HashiCorp Vault:** Dynamic secrets, lease-based rotation, transit encryption
+   - **AWS Secrets Manager:** Native AWS integration, automatic rotation for RDS
+   - **Google Secret Manager:** GCP-native, IAM-based access control
+   - **Azure Key Vault:** Azure-native, HSM-backed key storage
+   - **dotenv + CI secrets:** Minimum viable approach for smaller projects
+
+3. **Recommend rotation procedure.** For each CRITICAL and HIGH finding:
+   - Generate a new credential in the source system
+   - Update the secret store with the new value
+   - Deploy the updated configuration
+   - Verify the service works with the new credential
+   - Revoke the old credential
+   - Confirm no systems depend on the old credential
+
+4. **Provide code transformation examples.** Show before/after for each finding:
+
+   ```typescript
+   // BEFORE (hardcoded)
+   const stripe = new Stripe('sk_live_abc123...');
+
+   // AFTER (externalized)
+   const stripe = new Stripe(process.env.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY!);
+   ```
+
+5. **If `--fix` flag is set,** apply automatic transformations:
+   - Extract hardcoded values to environment variables
+   - Add `.env.example` entries with placeholder values
+   - Update `.gitignore` if `.env` files are not excluded
+   - Present the diff for review before committing
+
+---
+
+### Phase 4: VALIDATE -- Verify Remediation Completeness
+
+1. **Re-scan after remediation.** Run the same scan from Phase 1 to verify:
+   - All CRITICAL and HIGH findings are resolved
+   - No new secrets were introduced during remediation
+   - Environment variable references resolve correctly
+
+2. **Verify `.gitignore` coverage.** Confirm:
+   - All `.env` files (except `.env.example`) are gitignored
+   - Private key files are gitignored
+   - The gitignore patterns are specific enough (not overly broad)
+
+3. **Verify `.env.example` completeness.** Check that:
+   - Every environment variable referenced in code has an entry
+   - Values are placeholders, not actual secrets
+   - Each entry has a comment describing the variable's purpose
+   - Required vs. optional variables are clearly marked
+
+4. **Check git history for residual exposure.** If secrets were previously committed:
+   - Warn that the secret exists in git history even after removal
+   - Recommend `git filter-repo` or BFG Repo-Cleaner for history rewriting
+   - Emphasize that rotation is required regardless of history cleanup
+   - Note that force-push to remote may be required after history rewrite
+
+5. **Generate validation report:**
+
+   ```
+   Secret Validation: [PASS/WARN/FAIL]
+
+   Rescan: PASS (0 CRITICAL, 0 HIGH findings)
+   .gitignore: PASS (all sensitive patterns covered)
+   .env.example: WARN (missing STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET entry)
+   Git history: WARN (2 secrets exist in history -- rotation required)
+
+   Actions remaining:
+     1. Add STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET to .env.example
+     2. Rotate PostgreSQL password (exposed in commit abc1234)
+     3. Rotate Stripe key (exposed in commit def5678)
+     4. Consider git history rewrite after rotation
+   ```
+
+---
+
+## Harness Integration
+
+- **`harness skill run harness-secrets`** -- Primary invocation for secret scanning and remediation.
+- **`harness validate`** -- Run after remediation to verify project health.
+- **`harness check-security`** -- Complementary mechanical security scan that includes basic secret detection.
+- **`emit_interaction`** -- Present findings and gather decisions on remediation approach.
+
+## Success Criteria
+
+- All source files are scanned for secret patterns
+- Findings are classified by severity with accurate false-positive filtering
+- CRITICAL and HIGH findings have specific rotation recommendations
+- Environment variable externalization is verified
+- `.gitignore` covers all sensitive file patterns
+- `.env.example` is complete with placeholder values
+- Git history exposure is flagged with rotation guidance
+
+## Examples
+
+### Example: Express.js API with Hardcoded Stripe Keys
+
+```
+Phase 1: SCAN
+  Scanned: 86 files
+  Findings: 4
+
+  CRITICAL: src/payments/stripe.ts:5 -- sk_live_EXAMPLE_KEY_REDACTED_0000
+  HIGH: docker-compose.yml:22 -- POSTGRES_PASSWORD=supersecret
+  MEDIUM: src/config/jwt.ts:3 -- JWT_SECRET = "my-jwt-secret-key"
+  LOW: tests/fixtures/auth.ts:8 -- fake-api-key-for-testing (false positive)
+
+Phase 2: CLASSIFY
+  CRITICAL: 1 (Stripe production secret key -- full payment access)
+  HIGH: 1 (PostgreSQL password -- database access)
+  MEDIUM: 1 (JWT secret -- token forgery risk)
+  False positives: 1 (test fixture removed from findings)
+
+Phase 3: REMEDIATE
+  1. Stripe key -> process.env.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY
+  2. Postgres password -> ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD} in compose, actual value in .env
+  3. JWT secret -> process.env.JWT_SECRET
+  Added 3 entries to .env.example
+  Updated .gitignore with .env* pattern
+
+Phase 4: VALIDATE
+  Rescan: PASS (0 findings)
+  .gitignore: PASS
+  .env.example: PASS (all 3 variables documented)
+  Git history: WARN (Stripe key in commit history)
+  Result: WARN -- secrets externalized, rotation required for Stripe and Postgres
+```
+
+### Example: Django Application with AWS Credentials
+
+```
+Phase 1: SCAN
+  Scanned: 124 files
+  Findings: 5
+
+  CRITICAL: settings/production.py:45 -- AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID = "AKIA..."
+  CRITICAL: settings/production.py:46 -- AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY = "wJal..."
+  HIGH: .env.production committed to git (12 secrets inside)
+  MEDIUM: settings/base.py:88 -- SECRET_KEY = "django-insecure-..."
+  MEDIUM: settings/base.py:92 -- DATABASE_URL with embedded password
+
+Phase 2: CLASSIFY
+  CRITICAL: 2 (AWS IAM credentials -- full account access)
+  HIGH: 1 (.env.production in git -- 12 leaked values)
+  MEDIUM: 2 (Django secret key and database URL)
+
+Phase 3: REMEDIATE
+  1. AWS credentials -> boto3 credential chain (env vars or IAM role)
+  2. Remove .env.production from git, add to .gitignore
+  3. Django SECRET_KEY -> os.environ["DJANGO_SECRET_KEY"]
+  4. DATABASE_URL -> os.environ["DATABASE_URL"]
+  Recommend: Switch to django-environ for all settings
+  Recommend: Use IAM roles instead of access keys for production
+
+Phase 4: VALIDATE
+  Rescan: PASS
+  .gitignore: PASS
+  .env.example: PASS
+  Git history: CRITICAL (AWS keys and .env.production in history)
+  Result: FAIL -- rotation required before deployment, history rewrite recommended
+```
+
+## Gates
+
+- **No CRITICAL findings may remain unaddressed.** Production credentials exposed in source code are blocking. Execution halts until the credential is rotated and the code is remediated.
+- **No `.env` files with actual secrets committed to git.** A committed `.env` file containing real credentials is a blocking finding, even if the file is later gitignored.
+- **No secrets in git history without rotation.** If a secret was previously committed, it must be rotated regardless of whether it was removed from the current tree.
+- **No remediation without verification.** The `--fix` flag must be followed by a rescan to confirm all findings are resolved.
+
+## Escalation
+
+- **When a production credential is exposed in a public repository:** This is an emergency. Immediately recommend rotating the credential, then address code remediation. Do not wait for a PR review cycle -- rotation must happen within minutes.
+- **When git history contains secrets and the repo is public:** Recommend making the repo private temporarily, rotating all exposed credentials, running BFG Repo-Cleaner, and force-pushing. Note that GitHub caches may retain the data -- contact GitHub support if needed.
+- **When the team has no secret management infrastructure:** Recommend starting with CI/CD platform secrets (GitHub Secrets, GitLab CI variables) as a minimum viable approach. Design a migration path to a dedicated secret manager for later.
+- **When false positive rate is high:** Adjust scan patterns for the project's domain. Add a `.harness/secret-scan-ignore` file with documented exceptions for known false positives (test fixtures, example values, hash constants).

package/dist/agents/skills/claude-code/harness-secrets/skill.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+name: harness-secrets
+version: "1.0.0"
+description: Vault integration, credential rotation, and environment variable hygiene
+cognitive_mode: meticulous-verifier
+tier: 3
+internal: false
+keywords:
+  - secrets
+  - vault
+  - credentials
+  - env
+  - environment variables
+  - rotation
+  - HashiCorp
+  - AWS Secrets Manager
+  - dotenv
+  - encryption
+  - API keys
+stack_signals:
+  - ".env*"
+  - "vault.hcl"
+  - "src/**/secrets/**"
+  - "src/**/config/**"
+  - ".sops.yaml"
+  - "secrets/"
+  - "credentials/"
+triggers:
+  - manual
+  - on_pr
+  - on_commit
+platforms:
+  - claude-code
+  - gemini-cli
+tools:
+  - Bash
+  - Read
+  - Glob
+  - Grep
+  - emit_interaction
+cli:
+  command: harness skill run harness-secrets
+  args:
+    - name: path
+      description: Project root path
+      required: false
+    - name: changed-only
+      description: Only scan git-changed files
+      type: boolean
+      required: false
+    - name: fix
+      description: Auto-remediate by extracting secrets to env vars
+      type: boolean
+      required: false
+mcp:
+  tool: run_skill
+  input:
+    skill: harness-secrets
+    path: string
+type: rigid
+phases:
+  - name: scan
+    description: Detect secrets, credentials, and sensitive values in source code
+    required: true
+  - name: classify
+    description: Categorize findings by severity and secret type
+    required: true
+  - name: remediate
+    description: Recommend or apply secret extraction and rotation strategies
+    required: true
+  - name: validate
+    description: Verify secrets are properly externalized and gitignored
+    required: true
+state:
+  persistent: false
+  files: []
+depends_on: []

package/dist/agents/skills/claude-code/harness-security-review/skill.yaml

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ mcp:
     skill: harness-security-review
     path: string
 type: rigid
+tier: 3
 phases:
   - name: scan
     description: Run mechanical security scanner (skipped in changed-files mode)

package/dist/agents/skills/claude-code/harness-security-scan/skill.yaml

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ mcp:
     skill: harness-security-scan
     path: string
 type: rigid
+tier: 2
 phases:
   - name: scan
     description: Run SecurityScanner and filter by severity threshold

package/dist/agents/skills/claude-code/harness-skill-authoring/skill.yaml

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ mcp:
     skill: harness-skill-authoring
     path: string
 type: flexible
+tier: 1
 state:
   persistent: false
   files: []

package/dist/agents/skills/claude-code/harness-soundness-review/skill.yaml

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ mcp:
     skill: harness-soundness-review
     path: string
 type: rigid
+tier: 2
 phases:
   - name: check
     description: Run all checks for the current mode and classify findings