@happyvertical/smrt-users 0.40.70 → 0.42.0

package/dist/models/CliAuthRequest.d.ts

@@ -4,9 +4,19 @@ import { SmrtObject } from '@happyvertical/smrt-core';
  */
 export type CliAuthRequestStatus = 'pending' | 'approved' | 'expired';
 export declare class UsersCliAuthRequest extends SmrtObject {
-    /** Short, human-typeable code the user enters in the browser to approve the session. */
+    /**
+     * Short, human-typeable code the user enters in the browser to approve the session.
+     *
+     * Indexed: `findByUserCode()` looks requests up by this column (#2364,
+     * epic #2382 finding A3).
+     */
     userCode: string;
-    /** SHA-256 hash of the long device code the CLI keeps secret. */
+    /**
+     * SHA-256 hash of the long device code the CLI keeps secret.
+     *
+     * Indexed: `findByDeviceCodeHash()` — the CLI's poll loop — looks requests
+     * up by this column (#2364, epic #2382 finding A3).
+     */
     deviceCodeHash: string;
     /** Lifecycle state — `pending` → `approved` | `expired`. */
     status: CliAuthRequestStatus;
@@ -16,7 +26,12 @@ export declare class UsersCliAuthRequest extends SmrtObject {
     tenantId: string;
     /** Session id minted on approval — handed to the CLI as its bearer token. */
     sessionId: string;
-    /** When the pending request stops accepting approvals. */
+    /**
+     * When the pending request stops accepting approvals.
+     *
+     * Indexed: `deleteExpired()` — and the retention sweep that now schedules
+     * it (#2375) — scans this column on every pass.
+     */
     expiresAt: Date;
     /** When approval happened — null while the request is still pending. */
     approvedAt: Date | null;

package/dist/models/CliAuthRequest.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"CliAuthRequest.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/models/CliAuthRequest.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAS,UAAU,EAAQ,MAAM,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAEnE;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,oBAAoB,GAAG,SAAS,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;AAEtE,qBAMa,mBAAoB,SAAQ,UAAU;IACjD,wFAAwF;IAExF,QAAQ,SAAM;IAEd,iEAAiE;IAEjE,cAAc,SAAM;IAEpB,4DAA4D;IAE5D,MAAM,EAAE,oBAAoB,CAAa;IAEzC,uEAAuE;IAEvE,MAAM,SAAM;IAEZ,uEAAuE;IAEvE,QAAQ,SAAM;IAEd,6EAA6E;IAE7E,SAAS,SAAM;IAEf,0DAA0D;IAE1D,SAAS,OAAc;IAEvB,wEAAwE;IAExE,UAAU,EAAE,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,CAAQ;CAChC;AAED,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,IAAI,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"CliAuthRequest.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/models/CliAuthRequest.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAS,UAAU,EAAQ,MAAM,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAEnE;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,oBAAoB,GAAG,SAAS,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;AAEtE,qBAMa,mBAAoB,SAAQ,UAAU;IACjD;;;;;OAKG;IAEH,QAAQ,SAAM;IAEd;;;;;OAKG;IAEH,cAAc,SAAM;IAEpB,4DAA4D;IAE5D,MAAM,EAAE,oBAAoB,CAAa;IAEzC,uEAAuE;IAEvE,MAAM,SAAM;IAEZ,uEAAuE;IAEvE,QAAQ,SAAM;IAEd,6EAA6E;IAE7E,SAAS,SAAM;IAEf;;;;;OAKG;IAEH,SAAS,OAAc;IAEvB,wEAAwE;IAExE,UAAU,EAAE,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,CAAQ;CAChC;AAED,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,IAAI,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC"}

package/dist/models/MagicLinkToken.d.ts

@@ -20,7 +20,12 @@ export declare class UsersMagicLinkToken extends SmrtObject {
     email: string;
     /** Whether this token has been used */
     used: boolean;
-    /** When this token expires */
+    /**
+     * When this token expires.
+     *
+     * Indexed: `deleteExpired()` — and the retention sweep that now schedules
+     * it (#2375) — scans this column on every pass.
+     */
     expiresAt: Date;
     constructor(options?: MagicLinkTokenOptions);
     /** Check if the token has expired */

package/dist/models/MagicLinkToken.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"MagicLinkToken.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/models/MagicLinkToken.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;GAOG;AAEH,OAAO,EAEL,UAAU,EACV,KAAK,iBAAiB,EAEvB,MAAM,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAElC;;GAEG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,4BAA4B,QAAU,CAAC;AAEpD;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,qBAAsB,SAAQ,iBAAiB;IAC9D,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACf,mEAAmE;IACnE,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;CACpC;AAED,qBAOa,mBAAoB,SAAQ,UAAU;IACjD,8CAA8C;IAE9C,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAM;IAEnB,iDAAiD;IACjD,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAM;IAEnB,uCAAuC;IACvC,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,CAAS;IAEtB,8BAA8B;IAC9B,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,CAA8D;gBAEjE,OAAO,GAAE,qBAA0B;IAa/C,qCAAqC;IACrC,SAAS,IAAI,OAAO;IAIpB,iEAAiE;IACjE,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO;CAGnB;AAED,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,IAAI,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"MagicLinkToken.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/models/MagicLinkToken.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;GAOG;AAEH,OAAO,EAEL,UAAU,EACV,KAAK,iBAAiB,EAEvB,MAAM,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAElC;;GAEG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,4BAA4B,QAAU,CAAC;AAEpD;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,qBAAsB,SAAQ,iBAAiB;IAC9D,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACf,mEAAmE;IACnE,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;CACpC;AAED,qBAOa,mBAAoB,SAAQ,UAAU;IACjD,8CAA8C;IAE9C,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAM;IAEnB,iDAAiD;IACjD,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAM;IAEnB,uCAAuC;IACvC,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,CAAS;IAEtB;;;;;OAKG;IAEH,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,CAA8D;gBAEjE,OAAO,GAAE,qBAA0B;IAa/C,qCAAqC;IACrC,SAAS,IAAI,OAAO;IAIpB,iEAAiE;IACjE,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO;CAGnB;AAED,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,IAAI,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC"}

package/dist/models/Session.d.ts

@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@ export declare class Session extends SmrtObject {
     status: SessionStatus;
     /**
      * Session expiration time
+     *
+     * Indexed: `deleteExpired()` — and the retention sweep that now schedules it
+     * (#2375) — scans this column on every pass.
      */
     expiresAt: Date;
     /**

package/dist/models/Session.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/models/User.d.ts

@@ -44,7 +44,13 @@ export declare class User extends SmrtObject implements UserContract {
      */
     profileId: string;
     /**
-     * User's email address (unique, used for lookup)
+     * User's email address (unique, used for lookup).
+     *
+     * Indexed: `findByEmail()` filters on this raw column directly (#2364,
+     * epic #2382 finding A3). Distinct from `emailKey`'s unique index below —
+     * `emailKey` is a separately normalized column (`normalizeIdentityEmail()`)
+     * that arbitrates cross-connection uniqueness, and its index does not serve
+     * a read path that filters on `email` itself.
      */
     email: string;
     /** Durable normalized key for cross-connection email uniqueness. */

package/dist/models/User.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"User.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/models/User.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;GAGG;AAEH,OAAO,EAGL,UAAU,EACV,KAAK,iBAAiB,EAEvB,MAAM,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAElC,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,2BAA2B,CAAC;AACtE,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAE/C;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,WAAY,SAAQ,iBAAiB;IACpD,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACnB,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;IACpB,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;CAC3B;AAQD;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAgB,YAAY,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAGnD;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAgB,cAAc,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAGpD;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AACH,qBAOa,IAAK,SAAQ,UAAW,YAAW,YAAY;IAC1D;;OAEG;IAEH,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAM;IAEvB;;;;;;;;OAQG;IAEH,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAM;IAEnB,oEAAoE;IAEpE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAQ;IAE/B;;OAEG;IAEH,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,CAAqB;IAEvC;;OAEG;IACH,WAAW,EAAE,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,CAAQ;gBAEpB,OAAO,GAAE,WAAgB;IASrC;;;OAGG;IACH,aAAa,IAAI,OAAO;IAIxB;;OAEG;IACH,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO;IAInB;;OAEG;IACH,WAAW,IAAI,OAAO;IAItB;;OAEG;IACH,SAAS,IAAI,OAAO;IAIpB;;OAEG;IACH,WAAW,IAAI,IAAI;IAInB,sEAAsE;IACvD,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;CAKrC"}

package/dist/retention.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/**
+ * Credential retention — expired sessions and tokens (issue #2375, finding F2).
+ *
+ * `SessionCollection.deleteExpired()`, `MagicLinkTokenCollection.deleteExpired()`
+ * and `CliAuthRequestCollection.deleteExpired()` all existed, and every one of
+ * them waited for an application to remember to call it. Expired credential
+ * rows are the worst kind of unbounded growth: they are worthless the moment
+ * they expire and they are exactly the rows an attacker would like to still
+ * find in the table.
+ *
+ * This module contributes them to the framework retention sweep, so
+ * `smrt db:prune` and the jobs `TaskRunner`'s periodic sweep reap them like
+ * every other framework-owned table.
+ *
+ * The package entry point registers all three on import (see `index.ts`), so
+ * any process that loaded `@happyvertical/smrt-users` contributes them.
+ * Registration is not scheduling: nothing is deleted until something runs a
+ * sweep, and a policy can turn any task off by name. Task names are prefixed
+ * with the owning package's short name, because the registry is one
+ * process-global namespace shared with every other package.
+ *
+ * @see https://github.com/happyvertical/smrt/issues/2375
+ * @packageDocumentation
+ */
+/** Retention task name for expired and revoked sessions. */
+export declare const SESSIONS_RETENTION_TASK = "users-sessions";
+/** Retention task name for expired magic-link tokens. */
+export declare const MAGIC_LINK_RETENTION_TASK = "users-magic-link-tokens";
+/** Retention task name for expired CLI device-code requests. */
+export declare const CLI_AUTH_RETENTION_TASK = "users-cli-auth-requests";
+/** Every task name {@link registerUserRetentionTasks} installs. */
+export declare const USER_RETENTION_TASKS: readonly ["users-sessions", "users-magic-link-tokens", "users-cli-auth-requests"];
+/**
+ * Register session and token expiry with the framework retention sweep.
+ *
+ * Idempotent: re-registering replaces the previous tasks.
+ *
+ * Each task deletes only rows that have already expired — there is no
+ * retention window to configure, because an expired credential has no value
+ * to retain. Applications that keep expired sessions for audit should opt the
+ * task out (`tasks: { 'users-sessions': false }`) and archive them
+ * themselves.
+ */
+export declare function registerUserRetentionTasks(): void;
+/** Remove the credential retention tasks from the framework sweep. */
+export declare function unregisterUserRetentionTasks(): void;
+//# sourceMappingURL=retention.d.ts.map

package/dist/retention.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/smrt-knowledge.json

@@ -3,13 +3,14 @@
   "sensitiveFieldsExcluded": true,
   "generatedAt": "1970-01-01T00:00:00.000Z",
   "packageName": "@happyvertical/smrt-users",
-  "packageVersion": "0.40.70",
+  "packageVersion": "0.42.0",
   "sourceManifestPath": "dist/manifest.json",
   "agentDocPath": "AGENTS.md",
   "sourceHashes": {
-    "manifest": "cc7ab04e910e329e38a800a94f5bb3cfc940bdf4102535b46e4679d68ca0438f",
-    "packageJson": "8fb27a99ddd26368f40520e3c74a55bad6c88e3d7cdb878eba59ed2e49dc5074",
-    "agents": "5c3b69f116e6e2b18c98181beb1e96d65f5fc3e45ac5942873906be086083b41"
+    "manifest": "59c5b2483bf29b0b142307c155b865574195fda90f2be26ce40856cbddff9090",
+    "packageJson": "ca4107324dc0c7cbf7328f339338f2b5300532baf2bd395cdfbb91500e571694",
+    "agents": "6ec265b8af7cdfa9fea1a3f128af9bf25cbcdb1353c34a81a7fc5b0d2e4a8f2b",
+    "moduleDoc:agents/retention.md": "455e7e9d36e8410b5deb62aa274421c50c8f2037d04bf770145d2fc71b79030f"
   },
   "exports": [
     ".",
@@ -130,6 +131,9 @@
         {
           "name": "deleteExpired",
           "async": true,
+          "params": [
+            "options?: object"
+          ],
           "returns": "Promise<number>"
         },
         {
@@ -386,6 +390,9 @@
         {
           "name": "deleteExpired",
           "async": true,
+          "params": [
+            "options?: object"
+          ],
           "returns": "Promise<number>"
         },
         {
@@ -876,6 +883,9 @@
         {
           "name": "deleteExpired",
           "async": true,
+          "params": [
+            "options?: object"
+          ],
           "returns": "Promise<number>"
         },
         {
@@ -4653,5 +4663,12 @@
     "polymorphicAssociations": 0,
     "uuidColumns": 52
   },
-  "agentDoc": "# @happyvertical/smrt-users\n\nMulti-tenant user management with RBAC, hierarchical tenants, session handling, and SvelteKit integration.\n\n## Models (14)\n\n| Model | Key Pattern |\n|-------|-------------|\n| User | Auth identity. `profileId` is a unique cross-package reference to smrt-profiles (one User per non-null Profile). Email auto-lowercased; readonly nullable unique `emailKey` is derived on save for durable normalized uniqueness. |\n| AccessRequest | \"Request access / waitlist\" record captured before a `User` exists. CLOSED generated surface (`api`/`mcp`/`cli` = `[]`) — all access via `AccessRequestService`. Email normalized + indexed; JSON `requestContext` (NOT `context` — reserved for slug scoping). |\n| Tenant | **STI** + hierarchical parent-child. `hierarchyPath` (materialized path), `hierarchyLevel`. Max depth 10. |\n| Session | Server-side. Secure UUID. TTL in **seconds** (not ms). Status auto-updates to EXPIRED on access. |\n| MagicLinkToken | Single-use email login token. Backed by `MagicLinkService`. |\n| Role | `tenantId = null` → system role (available to all tenants). `isSystem: true` blocks deletion. `inheritsToDescendants: true` (default false) opts the role's membership authority into descendant tenants. |\n| Permission | Slug format: `resource.action`. Parsed by PermissionResolver. |\n| Membership | User + Tenant + Role junction. UNIQUE(userId, tenantId). |\n| Group | Team within a tenant. Multiple roles via GroupRole. |\n| GroupMember, GroupRole, RolePermission | Join tables. |\n| MembershipOverride | Per-user permission grant/deny. **DENY always wins.** |\n| TenantPermissionOverride | Tenant-level cascade overrides. Effect: INHERIT/GRANT/DENY. |\n\n## Permission Resolution — Precedence (broad → specific, most-specific wins)\n\n`PermissionResolver.resolvePermissions` builds the effective set in this order;\neach later layer overrides earlier ones:\n\n1. **Tenant-inherited** — walk ancestors, apply each `TenantPermissionOverride`\n   down the cascade (GRANT adds, DENY removes within the hierarchy)\n2. **Membership role** — base permissions from the user's role in the tenant\n3. **Group roles** — permissions from all groups the user belongs to **in that tenant**\n4. **Tenant-level DENY** *(removes; overrides role/group grants, tenant-wide)* — a\n   `TenantPermissionOverride` with effect `DENY` is a HARD, tenant-wide block: it\n   subtracts the DENY'd slug even if a role or group granted it (steps 2–3). It\n   sits just **above** the per-user membership overrides and **below** role/group.\n5. **Membership GRANT override** *(re-adds; most specific)* — a per-user GRANT can\n   re-add a slug a tenant DENY'd in step 4, because it is more specific.\n6. **Membership DENY override** *(absolute; always wins)* — a per-user DENY removes\n   the slug last and is never overridden.\n\nSo a permission a role grants but the tenant DENYs is **removed**, unless that\nexact user also has a membership-GRANT override for it. A membership-DENY always\nwins. Tenant-DENY of an inherited/cascade grant still blocks it (unchanged).\nThe hard block reflects the tenant cascade's **net** resolution, not an\nunconditional union of every DENY in the chain — so a more-specific tenant GRANT\n(e.g. a child sub-tenant re-granting a permission its parent DENYs) still wins.\n\n### Membership selection — hierarchical inheritance (opt-in, #1866)\n\nWhich membership feeds step 2 above:\n\n1. **A direct membership row in the target tenant always pins resolution to\n   itself** — active rows resolve normally; an inactive (pending/suspended)\n   row resolves to the **empty set**. A direct row therefore *attenuates*\n   rather than unions: \"viewer here, despite being network admin\" gives\n   viewer, and a suspension in the child is effective even for users holding\n   inheritable authority on an ancestor.\n2. **No direct row** → the resolver walks the tenant's ancestors (nearest\n   first, from `hierarchyPath`) and resolves through the **nearest ACTIVE\n   ancestor membership whose role has `inheritsToDescendants: true`**.\n   Unflagged or inactive ancestor memberships are skipped (they neither confer\n   nor block); there is **no union across the chain** — the nearest flagged\n   membership alone is used. To attenuate a specific descendant, create a\n   direct membership there or use a tenant-level DENY.\n3. **No qualifying ancestor** → empty set (byte-identical to the\n   pre-inheritance resolver; with no role flagged, nothing changes).\n\nAll later layers run unchanged against the **target** tenant: the tenant\ncascade and tenant-DENY hard block come from the target tenant (a child can\ncarve authority out of an inherited role), group roles stay exact-tenant (only\ntarget-tenant groups contribute; ancestor groups never flow down), and\nmembership GRANT/DENY overrides travel with the ancestor membership used.\n`PermissionResolutionResult.inheritedFromTenantId` reports the ancestor tenant\nwhen inheritance was used (`null` for direct resolution).\n\nSafety: resolution is bounded by `MAX_TENANT_HIERARCHY_DEPTH`; malformed\n`hierarchyPath` values fail closed to the empty set — too deep,\nself-referential, duplicate ancestors, or inconsistent with the actual\n`parentTenantId` chain (the path is verified link-by-link against the loaded\nancestor rows before it is trusted as an authorization source). Tenant `status` is not consulted (parity with direct\nresolution). Caching: a long-lived `(user, tenant)` permission cache must also\ninvalidate on ancestor-membership changes and on `Role.inheritsToDescendants`\nflips — request-scoped caches (the common pattern) are unaffected.\n\nFlag roles at seed time with\n`seedSystemRoles({ inheritsToDescendants: ['owner', 'admin'] })` (additive:\nlisted slugs are flagged, omitted slugs are never unflagged; unknown slugs\nthrow). The default seed leaves every role exact-tenant.\n\n## Operation Permission Guards\n\nSMRT derives a fine-grained, per-`<collection>.<action>` permission catalog **from the\nmanifest** (`PermissionCatalogService`, including custom `@smrt` actions — not just CRUD)\nand enforces it two ways: app-side via `assertOperationPermission()` / `PermissionResolver`,\nand at the database via generated **Postgres RLS** policies\n(`generatePostgresPermissionSql()` / `applyPostgresPermissionPolicies()`) that read the\nsession-injected `smrt.permissions` / `smrt.tenant_id` (set by `withSessionPermissionContext`\nvia `set_config`). Because the RLS teeth are at the data layer, enforcement is door-agnostic\n— REST, MCP, and in-process callers are all bounded once the principal's context is set.\nSetup: README → *Manifest-derived permission catalog* and *Postgres RLS enforcement*.\n\n- Use `assertOperationPermission()` for hand-written mutations in SvelteKit form\n  actions, custom endpoints, CLI scripts, and jobs. It derives the same\n  `<collection>.<action>` slugs as `PermissionCatalogService` (`list`/`get` →\n  `read`), requires the slug to exist in the catalog, then resolves permissions\n  through `PermissionResolver`.\n- `assertOperationPermission()` throws fail-closed by default. Use\n  `{ onDeny: 'return' }`, `checkOperationPermission()`, or\n  `hasOperationPermission()` when a structured/boolean result is needed.\n- **Resource-tenant calling convention**: for resource-anchored authorization,\n  pass the **resource's** tenant id — `tenantId: resourceTenantId` — not the\n  session's current tenant. With `Role.inheritsToDescendants` flagged, a\n  root-tenant admin then passes for any descendant resource with no app-side\n  authority logic (and no membership fan-out), while per-child delegation and\n  DENY precedence keep working. Do NOT pass a session-scoped `membership`\n  alongside a different resource `tenantId` — a membership/tenant mismatch\n  fails closed by design; omit `membership` and let the resolver look it up.\n- System context and super-admin bypass context are honored for parity with\n  Postgres RLS. Pass `{ allowSuperAdminBypass: false }` on money-class or\n  separation-of-duties operations that must require an explicit permission grant.\n- **Postgres RLS and membership inheritance**: RLS policies check the\n  session-injected `smrt.permissions` list (resolved app-side by\n  `PermissionResolver`), so a session whose `smrt.tenant_id` IS the child\n  tenant gets inherited authority in RLS automatically. But RLS row filtering\n  stays bound to the session's tenant setting — a root-tenant session acting\n  on child-tenant rows is authorized by the app-level guard (resource-tenant\n  convention above), not by RLS. This is a documented divergence, mirroring\n  how #1829 handled bypass parity.\n- Seed role mappings with `RolePermissionCollection.seedRolePermissions()` or\n  `RoleCollection.seedSystemRoles({ seedPermissions: true })`. The default\n  matrix maps owner/admin to all catalog permissions, member to read/create for\n  ordinary app resources, and viewer to read-only. Member create grants\n  intentionally exclude users/RBAC authority and security resources (`users`,\n  `tenants`, `roles`, `permissions`, memberships, groups, sessions, magic-link\n  tokens, and related join/override tables). Re-seeding is additive and\n  idempotent; pruning stale mappings requires `{ prune: true }`. When a\n  contributing package registers a new built-in self-personalization\n  permission after system roles already exist, call the explicit,\n  idempotent `RolePermissionCollection.seedDefaultRolePersonalizationPermissions()`\n  upgrade helper; it targets owner/admin/member/viewer only and never grants\n  custom roles.\n\n**Critical**: `getGroupIdsForTenant(userId, tenantId)` (joins with groups table to scope by tenant). Never use `getGroupIds()` — it's cross-tenant.\n\n## Hierarchical Tenants\n\n- `TenantCollection.createChild()` auto-calculates hierarchy fields, enforces depth limit\n- `moveToParent()` updates tenant + ALL descendants' paths/levels\n- `cascadePermissions` (parent pushes down) + `inheritPermissions` (child accepts) — both must be true\n- `getTree(rootId?)` returns nested structure for UI\n- Two independent downward flows: the `TenantPermissionOverride` **cascade**\n  (tenant-level permission config, flags above) and **membership-role\n  inheritance** (`Role.inheritsToDescendants`, per-role opt-in — see\n  \"Membership selection\" above). The cascade flags do not gate membership\n  inheritance.\n\n## SvelteKit Integration\n\n```typescript\n// hooks.server.ts\nexport const handle = createSessionHandler({ db, ttl: 604800, skipPaths: ['/api/public'] });\n// Populates event.locals: { user, membership, permissions: string[], tenantId, sessionId }\n\n// +page.server.ts\nawait createSessionCookie(event, userId, tenantId, { db });\nawait destroySessionCookie(event, { db });\nawait switchSessionTenant(event, tenantId, { db });\n```\n\n## Mobile `/api/mobile` Handlers (ADR 0001 Phase 3.5, #1748)\n\n`createMobileAuthHandlers(options)` (from `/sveltekit`) returns the mountable\nserver side of the KMP mobile contract: `authStart` (`POST auth/start`,\nserver-brokered PKCE via `OidcLoginService`), `authComplete`\n(`POST auth/complete`, code + echoed `state`/`codeVerifier` → bearer\nsession), `session.GET`/`session.DELETE` (bootstrap/logout), and\n`guard`/`withSession` — the bearer middleware for app-owned mobile routes.\nCore logic lives in `MobileAuthService` (framework-agnostic; exported from\nthe package root).\n\n- **Bearer = session id** (same convention as `TerminalAuthService`); 401\n  bodies are `{ error, code }` and drive the mobile client's re-auth flow.\n- **Stateless handshake**: the OAuth `state` is an HMAC-signed token\n  (secret: `stateSecret` ?? provider `clientSecret`) carrying\n  nonce/provider/createdAt — full ID-token nonce verification with no\n  server-side pending state. The `codeVerifier` never enters a URL: it is\n  client-held per the frozen contract.\n- **Wire DTOs** come from `@happyvertical/smrt-mobile-contract`\n  (`MobileAuthStartRequest` etc.) — one owning package for the Kotlin,\n  Swift, and TypeScript shapes (compile-checked descriptors + parity test).\n- **Tenant options** honor `Role.inheritsToDescendants` (#1867): direct\n  ACTIVE memberships plus descendants of flagged memberships (nearest\n  flagged ancestor labels the option; any direct row pins; inactive direct\n  rows exclude). Session binding defaults to the first DIRECT tenant —\n  override with `resolveTenantId`.\n- **Hooks**: `resolveUser` (invite-gating; default provisions via\n  `getOrCreateFromOidc`), `resolveTenantId`, `buildExtras` (bootstrap\n  `extras`; model JSON must use `toPublicJSON({ permissions })` — #1822).\n  `buildExtras` is the only app-domain bootstrap extension point. Never emit\n  app fields such as `dashboard` at the response top level: they are outside\n  `MobileSessionBootstrap` and the Kotlin decoder ignores them.\n- **Guard** wraps `withSessionPermissionContext`, so\n  `assertOperationPermission`, tenancy context, and Postgres RLS all see the\n  bearer caller; `OperationPermissionError` maps to 403 with a\n  machine-readable `reason`.\n- **Uploads**: `resolveMobileUploadDedupKey` + the documented contract in\n  `docs/content/architecture/mobile-upload-contract.md` (`clientCaptureId`\n  field, `Idempotency-Key` header fallback); domain ingestion stays\n  app-side. Framework-model writes ride `sync/apply`, not this path.\n- Configure `redirectUris` in production — RFC 8252 scheme rules always\n  apply, but the allow list is the defense against redirecting authorization\n  responses to attacker-controlled URIs.\n\n## Security (S5 #1400)\n\n- **Generated REST/MCP surface is READ-ONLY for every RBAC/identity model.**\n  User, Tenant, Group, Membership, MembershipOverride, Role, Permission,\n  RolePermission, GroupRole, GroupMember, and TenantPermissionOverride generate\n  `list`/`get` only — `create`/`update`/`delete` are intentionally NOT\n  generated. The merged `requireRouteAuth` gate (#1540) enforces *authentication*,\n  not *authorization*, and these models are not `@TenantScoped`, so an\n  auto-generated mutating route would let any authenticated user self-grant a\n  role/permission, flip a tenant's cascade flags, or change another user's auth\n  identity. Mutate them through the permission-gated services (`TenantService`,\n  collection helpers) or consumer-owned, permission-checked handlers. A\n  structural regression test (`security-audit-1400.test.ts`) enumerates the\n  registry to assert no authority model exposes a mutating op. (`cli` stays\n  enabled — local-operator surface, outside the network/agent threat model.)\n- **`switchTenant` is fail-closed AND rotates the session id.**\n  `SessionService.switchTenant` / `switchSessionTenant` verify the session's user\n  has an ACTIVE membership in the target tenant before any write (the tenant id\n  is the isolation key for every `@TenantScoped` query). A non-member/unknown-\n  session switch returns `{ switched: false, sessionId: null, ... }` and mutates\n  nothing. On a successful switch into a NON-null tenant the session id is\n  ROTATED: a fresh `Session` (new secure id, fresh TTL, same user, new tenant,\n  device context carried over) is minted and the old session is REVOKED — so a\n  captured pre-switch id immediately stops validating, shrinking the blast radius\n  of a leaked id across a tenant boundary. `switchTenant` returns a\n  `SwitchTenantResult` (`{ switched, sessionId, session, rotated }`); callers MUST\n  persist the returned `sessionId`. `switchSessionTenant` does this for you by\n  re-setting the session cookie (preserving httpOnly/secure/sameSite) to the new\n  id. A `null` clear stays in place (no rotation, no cookie change). The\n  low-level `SessionCollection.setSessionTenant` is the UNGUARDED primitive (used\n  for the null-clear path) — never call it with an untrusted tenant id.\n- **OIDC `email_verified` is enforced.** `UserCollection.getOrCreateFromOidc`\n  refuses to provision a user when the IdP explicitly returns\n  `email_verified: false` (opt out with `{ allowUnverifiedEmail: true }`). An\n  absent claim makes no assertion and is not enforced.\n- **RFC 9207 response issuer is exact.** OIDC callbacks validate a supplied\n  `iss` against discovered metadata with exact string comparison before trusting\n  a code or error. If metadata advertises issuer-response support, `iss` is\n  required.\n- **Verified-email Profile reuse is fail-closed.** The typed canonical scenarios\n  live in\n  `packages/profiles/src/testing/oidcProvisioningDecisionMatrix.ts`; both\n  package suites execute that matrix and public docs reference it rather than\n  maintaining another behavioral table. Default provisioning reuses only one\n  unowned, global `Person`. Tenant-scoped, non-Person, duplicate-email,\n  and already-owned matches fail before User/session creation. An existing\n  issuer/subject link without a User must still be the unique global Person for\n  the current verified claim email; once owned, the stable issuer/subject link\n  reuses its canonical Person and owner.\n  Issuer and subject are opaque, case-sensitive identifiers; preserve their\n  exact value and use trim only to reject blank claims.\n- **`resolveProfile` is the application reconciliation boundary.** The\n  SvelteKit handlers, `OidcLoginService`, and `getOrCreateFromOidc` accept the\n  same hook inside the provisioning transaction. The service/handler path\n  supplies protocol-validated claims; direct collection callers must validate\n  and trust their claim source before calling `getOrCreateFromOidc`.\n  Token/userinfo merging keeps `email` and `email_verified` paired to the same\n  claim source; verification is never borrowed across sources.\n  Resolver reads/writes use the supplied `db`, and the hook must be idempotent\n  because a concurrent unique-key conflict can retry it. `undefined` chooses\n  the secure default and `null` rejects, including exact issuer/subject reuse.\n  For a new identity, a supplied Profile is still validated as the unique,\n  unowned global Person for the verified email. For an exact existing identity,\n  it must be the already-linked Profile and cannot rebind identity authority;\n  stable-link owner and canonical-Person checks still apply. The hook receives a\n  separate frozen claims snapshot; internal retry and persistence state is not\n  exposed for mutation.\n- **Owned first binding requires `authorizeProfileOwner`.** An invitation or\n  approval workflow may explicitly return both its pre-provisioned canonical\n  global `Person` and existing approved `User` from this transaction-bound\n  hook. `undefined` keeps the secure `profile_owned` default and `null`\n  rejects. SMRT treats only the selected IDs as input, reloads them in the\n  provisioning transaction, and requires `email_verified === true`, the unique\n  canonical global Person for the normalized claim email, exactly one owner,\n  that owner as the selected User, and the same normalized User email. The\n  hook runs before identity/User/session creation and may be retried, so use\n  only its supplied `db` and `users` handles and keep application authorization\n  idempotent. Never authorize from email matching alone. Existing exact\n  identities cannot be rebound; when `resolveProfile` is also present both\n  hooks must select the same Profile.\n- **OIDC first login is atomic.** The Profile, `OidcIdentity`, and User are one\n  transaction. The database arbiters are `OidcIdentity.identityKey`,\n  private `oidc_profile_email_reservations.email_key`, `User.emailKey`, and the\n  unique `User.profileId`; local callbacks acquire exact issuer/subject and normalized\n  email locks in deterministic order so changed email claims also serialize.\n  SQLite and DuckDB callbacks additionally serialize every root-handle statement\n  the coordinator owns per database URL — `_smrt_backfills` initialization, the\n  transaction, and the post-commit rebind — because one adapter multiplexes a\n  single native connection and cannot safely overlap unrelated root\n  transactions. Never overlap two statements on one such handle, inside a\n  transaction or not: rebind and owner/email candidate reads are sequential,\n  never `Promise.all`. Owner-authorized DuckDB callbacks use that same\n  root-handle serialization;\n  PostgreSQL deadlock and serialization errors use a bounded transaction retry.\n  Newly provisioned Profiles use non-semantic per-profile slugs so equal IdP\n  display names cannot trigger a natural-key upsert;\n  run\n  `smrt db:status`, `smrt db:migrate`, then `smrt db:status` before deployment.\n  Stop or upgrade old writers first. Before migration, group\n  non-null `users.profile_id` values, then reconcile duplicates. After\n  migration, run public `backfillProfileEmailKeys(db)` followed by\n  `backfillUserEmailKeys(db)` from one deploy process. Both use the shared\n  TypeScript `normalizeIdentityEmail()` implementation transactionally and are\n  idempotent; the User backfill fails before writes if normalized duplicates\n  remain. Every OIDC path requires the Profile email-key readiness marker;\n  creating a User or checking User email uniqueness additionally requires the\n  User marker. A stable issuer/subject with an existing owning User skips only\n  the User email-key lookup and marker. Full scans remain in the explicit deploy\n  step; guarded runtime paths use indexed keys and validate only returned\n  candidates. Multiple null links remain valid.\n  Legacy race keys backfill only after canonical validation. Pass a root\n  database on adapters such as DuckDB that cannot create nested savepoints.\n  Root adapters must expose `beginTransaction`; transaction-only handles are\n  ambiguous and fail closed before provisioning writes. Caller-owned\n  transactions never run `_smrt_backfills` DDL and require that table to\n  already exist; use the root database when initialization or recovery is\n  needed.\n\n## Gotchas\n\n- **seedSystemRoles() required**: call `RoleCollection.seedSystemRoles()` at app init (creates owner/admin/member/viewer)\n- **PermissionResolver casts `as any`**: collections have protected constructors — known framework limitation\n- **Session TTL in seconds**: `DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60` (not milliseconds)\n- **Users are cross-tenant**: one user, many tenants via Membership. Email globally unique.\n- **Batch permission queries**: resolver fetches all permission IDs in one query, then maps to slugs (avoids N+1)\n"
+  "agentDoc": "# @happyvertical/smrt-users\n\nMulti-tenant user management with RBAC, hierarchical tenants, session handling, and SvelteKit integration.\n\n## Modules\n\n| Module | Scope | Module doc |\n|---|---|---|\n| `src/retention.ts` | expired session/token/CLI-auth reaping and its wiring into the framework retention sweep | [agents/retention.md](agents/retention.md) |\n\n## Models (14)\n\n| Model | Key Pattern |\n|-------|-------------|\n| User | Auth identity. `profileId` is a unique cross-package reference to smrt-profiles (one User per non-null Profile). Email auto-lowercased; readonly nullable unique `emailKey` is derived on save for durable normalized uniqueness. |\n| AccessRequest | \"Request access / waitlist\" record captured before a `User` exists. CLOSED generated surface (`api`/`mcp`/`cli` = `[]`) — all access via `AccessRequestService`. Email normalized + indexed; JSON `requestContext` (NOT `context` — reserved for slug scoping). |\n| Tenant | **STI** + hierarchical parent-child. `hierarchyPath` (materialized path), `hierarchyLevel`. Max depth 10. |\n| Session | Server-side. Secure UUID. TTL in **seconds** (not ms). Status auto-updates to EXPIRED on access. |\n| MagicLinkToken | Single-use email login token. Backed by `MagicLinkService`. |\n| Role | `tenantId = null` → system role (available to all tenants). `isSystem: true` blocks deletion. `inheritsToDescendants: true` (default false) opts the role's membership authority into descendant tenants. |\n| Permission | Slug format: `resource.action`. Parsed by PermissionResolver. |\n| Membership | User + Tenant + Role junction. UNIQUE(userId, tenantId). |\n| Group | Team within a tenant. Multiple roles via GroupRole. |\n| GroupMember, GroupRole, RolePermission | Join tables. |\n| MembershipOverride | Per-user permission grant/deny. **DENY always wins.** |\n| TenantPermissionOverride | Tenant-level cascade overrides. Effect: INHERIT/GRANT/DENY. |\n\n## Permission Resolution — Precedence (broad → specific, most-specific wins)\n\n`PermissionResolver.resolvePermissions` builds the effective set in this order;\neach later layer overrides earlier ones:\n\n1. **Tenant-inherited** — walk ancestors, apply each `TenantPermissionOverride`\n   down the cascade (GRANT adds, DENY removes within the hierarchy)\n2. **Membership role** — base permissions from the user's role in the tenant\n3. **Group roles** — permissions from all groups the user belongs to **in that tenant**\n4. **Tenant-level DENY** *(removes; overrides role/group grants, tenant-wide)* — a\n   `TenantPermissionOverride` with effect `DENY` is a HARD, tenant-wide block: it\n   subtracts the DENY'd slug even if a role or group granted it (steps 2–3). It\n   sits just **above** the per-user membership overrides and **below** role/group.\n5. **Membership GRANT override** *(re-adds; most specific)* — a per-user GRANT can\n   re-add a slug a tenant DENY'd in step 4, because it is more specific.\n6. **Membership DENY override** *(absolute; always wins)* — a per-user DENY removes\n   the slug last and is never overridden.\n\nSo a permission a role grants but the tenant DENYs is **removed**, unless that\nexact user also has a membership-GRANT override for it. A membership-DENY always\nwins. Tenant-DENY of an inherited/cascade grant still blocks it (unchanged).\nThe hard block reflects the tenant cascade's **net** resolution, not an\nunconditional union of every DENY in the chain — so a more-specific tenant GRANT\n(e.g. a child sub-tenant re-granting a permission its parent DENYs) still wins.\n\n### Membership selection — hierarchical inheritance (opt-in, #1866)\n\nWhich membership feeds step 2 above:\n\n1. **A direct membership row in the target tenant always pins resolution to\n   itself** — active rows resolve normally; an inactive (pending/suspended)\n   row resolves to the **empty set**. A direct row therefore *attenuates*\n   rather than unions: \"viewer here, despite being network admin\" gives\n   viewer, and a suspension in the child is effective even for users holding\n   inheritable authority on an ancestor.\n2. **No direct row** → the resolver walks the tenant's ancestors (nearest\n   first, from `hierarchyPath`) and resolves through the **nearest ACTIVE\n   ancestor membership whose role has `inheritsToDescendants: true`**.\n   Unflagged or inactive ancestor memberships are skipped (they neither confer\n   nor block); there is **no union across the chain** — the nearest flagged\n   membership alone is used. To attenuate a specific descendant, create a\n   direct membership there or use a tenant-level DENY.\n3. **No qualifying ancestor** → empty set (byte-identical to the\n   pre-inheritance resolver; with no role flagged, nothing changes).\n\nAll later layers run unchanged against the **target** tenant: the tenant\ncascade and tenant-DENY hard block come from the target tenant (a child can\ncarve authority out of an inherited role), group roles stay exact-tenant (only\ntarget-tenant groups contribute; ancestor groups never flow down), and\nmembership GRANT/DENY overrides travel with the ancestor membership used.\n`PermissionResolutionResult.inheritedFromTenantId` reports the ancestor tenant\nwhen inheritance was used (`null` for direct resolution).\n\nSafety: resolution is bounded by `MAX_TENANT_HIERARCHY_DEPTH`; malformed\n`hierarchyPath` values fail closed to the empty set — too deep,\nself-referential, duplicate ancestors, or inconsistent with the actual\n`parentTenantId` chain (the path is verified link-by-link against the loaded\nancestor rows before it is trusted as an authorization source). Tenant `status` is not consulted (parity with direct\nresolution). Caching: a long-lived `(user, tenant)` permission cache must also\ninvalidate on ancestor-membership changes and on `Role.inheritsToDescendants`\nflips — request-scoped caches (the common pattern) are unaffected.\n\nFlag roles at seed time with\n`seedSystemRoles({ inheritsToDescendants: ['owner', 'admin'] })` (additive:\nlisted slugs are flagged, omitted slugs are never unflagged; unknown slugs\nthrow). The default seed leaves every role exact-tenant.\n\n## Operation Permission Guards\n\nSMRT derives a fine-grained, per-`<collection>.<action>` permission catalog **from the\nmanifest** (`PermissionCatalogService`, including custom `@smrt` actions — not just CRUD)\nand enforces it two ways: app-side via `assertOperationPermission()` / `PermissionResolver`,\nand at the database via generated **Postgres RLS** policies\n(`generatePostgresPermissionSql()` / `applyPostgresPermissionPolicies()`) that read the\nsession-injected `smrt.permissions` / `smrt.tenant_id` (set by `withSessionPermissionContext`\nvia `set_config`). Because the RLS teeth are at the data layer, enforcement is door-agnostic\n— REST, MCP, and in-process callers are all bounded once the principal's context is set.\nSetup: README → *Manifest-derived permission catalog* and *Postgres RLS enforcement*.\n\n- Use `assertOperationPermission()` for hand-written mutations in SvelteKit form\n  actions, custom endpoints, CLI scripts, and jobs. It derives the same\n  `<collection>.<action>` slugs as `PermissionCatalogService` (`list`/`get` →\n  `read`), requires the slug to exist in the catalog, then resolves permissions\n  through `PermissionResolver`.\n- `assertOperationPermission()` throws fail-closed by default. Use\n  `{ onDeny: 'return' }`, `checkOperationPermission()`, or\n  `hasOperationPermission()` when a structured/boolean result is needed.\n- **Resource-tenant calling convention**: for resource-anchored authorization,\n  pass the **resource's** tenant id — `tenantId: resourceTenantId` — not the\n  session's current tenant. With `Role.inheritsToDescendants` flagged, a\n  root-tenant admin then passes for any descendant resource with no app-side\n  authority logic (and no membership fan-out), while per-child delegation and\n  DENY precedence keep working. Do NOT pass a session-scoped `membership`\n  alongside a different resource `tenantId` — a membership/tenant mismatch\n  fails closed by design; omit `membership` and let the resolver look it up.\n- System context and super-admin bypass context are honored for parity with\n  Postgres RLS. Pass `{ allowSuperAdminBypass: false }` on money-class or\n  separation-of-duties operations that must require an explicit permission grant.\n- **Postgres RLS and membership inheritance**: RLS policies check the\n  session-injected `smrt.permissions` list (resolved app-side by\n  `PermissionResolver`), so a session whose `smrt.tenant_id` IS the child\n  tenant gets inherited authority in RLS automatically. But RLS row filtering\n  stays bound to the session's tenant setting — a root-tenant session acting\n  on child-tenant rows is authorized by the app-level guard (resource-tenant\n  convention above), not by RLS. This is a documented divergence, mirroring\n  how #1829 handled bypass parity.\n- Seed role mappings with `RolePermissionCollection.seedRolePermissions()` or\n  `RoleCollection.seedSystemRoles({ seedPermissions: true })`. The default\n  matrix maps owner/admin to all catalog permissions, member to read/create for\n  ordinary app resources, and viewer to read-only. Member create grants\n  intentionally exclude users/RBAC authority and security resources (`users`,\n  `tenants`, `roles`, `permissions`, memberships, groups, sessions, magic-link\n  tokens, and related join/override tables). Re-seeding is additive and\n  idempotent; pruning stale mappings requires `{ prune: true }`. When a\n  contributing package registers a new built-in self-personalization\n  permission after system roles already exist, call the explicit,\n  idempotent `RolePermissionCollection.seedDefaultRolePersonalizationPermissions()`\n  upgrade helper; it targets owner/admin/member/viewer only and never grants\n  custom roles.\n\n**Critical**: `getGroupIdsForTenant(userId, tenantId)` (joins with groups table to scope by tenant). Never use `getGroupIds()` — it's cross-tenant.\n\n## Hierarchical Tenants\n\n- `TenantCollection.createChild()` auto-calculates hierarchy fields, enforces depth limit\n- `moveToParent()` updates tenant + ALL descendants' paths/levels\n- `cascadePermissions` (parent pushes down) + `inheritPermissions` (child accepts) — both must be true\n- `getTree(rootId?)` returns nested structure for UI\n- Two independent downward flows: the `TenantPermissionOverride` **cascade**\n  (tenant-level permission config, flags above) and **membership-role\n  inheritance** (`Role.inheritsToDescendants`, per-role opt-in — see\n  \"Membership selection\" above). The cascade flags do not gate membership\n  inheritance.\n\n## SvelteKit Integration\n\n```typescript\n// hooks.server.ts\nexport const handle = createSessionHandler({ db, ttl: 604800, skipPaths: ['/api/public'] });\n// Populates event.locals: { user, membership, permissions: string[], tenantId, sessionId }\n\n// +page.server.ts\nawait createSessionCookie(event, userId, tenantId, { db });\nawait destroySessionCookie(event, { db });\nawait switchSessionTenant(event, tenantId, { db });\n```\n\n## Mobile `/api/mobile` Handlers (ADR 0001 Phase 3.5, #1748)\n\n`createMobileAuthHandlers(options)` (from `/sveltekit`) returns the mountable\nserver side of the KMP mobile contract: `authStart` (`POST auth/start`,\nserver-brokered PKCE via `OidcLoginService`), `authComplete`\n(`POST auth/complete`, code + echoed `state`/`codeVerifier` → bearer\nsession), `session.GET`/`session.DELETE` (bootstrap/logout), and\n`guard`/`withSession` — the bearer middleware for app-owned mobile routes.\nCore logic lives in `MobileAuthService` (framework-agnostic; exported from\nthe package root).\n\n- **Bearer = session id** (same convention as `TerminalAuthService`); 401\n  bodies are `{ error, code }` and drive the mobile client's re-auth flow.\n- **Stateless handshake**: the OAuth `state` is an HMAC-signed token\n  (secret: `stateSecret` ?? provider `clientSecret`) carrying\n  nonce/provider/createdAt — full ID-token nonce verification with no\n  server-side pending state. The `codeVerifier` never enters a URL: it is\n  client-held per the frozen contract.\n- **Wire DTOs** come from `@happyvertical/smrt-mobile-contract`\n  (`MobileAuthStartRequest` etc.) — one owning package for the Kotlin,\n  Swift, and TypeScript shapes (compile-checked descriptors + parity test).\n- **Tenant options** honor `Role.inheritsToDescendants` (#1867): direct\n  ACTIVE memberships plus descendants of flagged memberships (nearest\n  flagged ancestor labels the option; any direct row pins; inactive direct\n  rows exclude). Session binding defaults to the first DIRECT tenant —\n  override with `resolveTenantId`.\n- **Hooks**: `resolveUser` (invite-gating; default provisions via\n  `getOrCreateFromOidc`), `resolveTenantId`, `buildExtras` (bootstrap\n  `extras`; model JSON must use `toPublicJSON({ permissions })` — #1822).\n  `buildExtras` is the only app-domain bootstrap extension point. Never emit\n  app fields such as `dashboard` at the response top level: they are outside\n  `MobileSessionBootstrap` and the Kotlin decoder ignores them.\n- **Guard** wraps `withSessionPermissionContext`, so\n  `assertOperationPermission`, tenancy context, and Postgres RLS all see the\n  bearer caller; `OperationPermissionError` maps to 403 with a\n  machine-readable `reason`.\n- **Uploads**: `resolveMobileUploadDedupKey` + the documented contract in\n  `docs/content/architecture/mobile-upload-contract.md` (`clientCaptureId`\n  field, `Idempotency-Key` header fallback); domain ingestion stays\n  app-side. Framework-model writes ride `sync/apply`, not this path.\n- Configure `redirectUris` in production — RFC 8252 scheme rules always\n  apply, but the allow list is the defense against redirecting authorization\n  responses to attacker-controlled URIs.\n\n## Security (S5 #1400)\n\n- **Generated REST/MCP surface is READ-ONLY for every RBAC/identity model.**\n  User, Tenant, Group, Membership, MembershipOverride, Role, Permission,\n  RolePermission, GroupRole, GroupMember, and TenantPermissionOverride generate\n  `list`/`get` only — `create`/`update`/`delete` are intentionally NOT\n  generated. The merged `requireRouteAuth` gate (#1540) enforces *authentication*,\n  not *authorization*, and these models are not `@TenantScoped`, so an\n  auto-generated mutating route would let any authenticated user self-grant a\n  role/permission, flip a tenant's cascade flags, or change another user's auth\n  identity. Mutate them through the permission-gated services (`TenantService`,\n  collection helpers) or consumer-owned, permission-checked handlers. A\n  structural regression test (`security-audit-1400.test.ts`) enumerates the\n  registry to assert no authority model exposes a mutating op. (`cli` stays\n  enabled — local-operator surface, outside the network/agent threat model.)\n- **`switchTenant` is fail-closed AND rotates the session id.**\n  `SessionService.switchTenant` / `switchSessionTenant` verify the session's user\n  has an ACTIVE membership in the target tenant before any write (the tenant id\n  is the isolation key for every `@TenantScoped` query). A non-member/unknown-\n  session switch returns `{ switched: false, sessionId: null, ... }` and mutates\n  nothing. On a successful switch into a NON-null tenant the session id is\n  ROTATED: a fresh `Session` (new secure id, fresh TTL, same user, new tenant,\n  device context carried over) is minted and the old session is REVOKED — so a\n  captured pre-switch id immediately stops validating, shrinking the blast radius\n  of a leaked id across a tenant boundary. `switchTenant` returns a\n  `SwitchTenantResult` (`{ switched, sessionId, session, rotated }`); callers MUST\n  persist the returned `sessionId`. `switchSessionTenant` does this for you by\n  re-setting the session cookie (preserving httpOnly/secure/sameSite) to the new\n  id. A `null` clear stays in place (no rotation, no cookie change). The\n  low-level `SessionCollection.setSessionTenant` is the UNGUARDED primitive (used\n  for the null-clear path) — never call it with an untrusted tenant id.\n- **OIDC `email_verified` is enforced.** `UserCollection.getOrCreateFromOidc`\n  refuses to provision a user when the IdP explicitly returns\n  `email_verified: false` (opt out with `{ allowUnverifiedEmail: true }`). An\n  absent claim makes no assertion and is not enforced.\n- **RFC 9207 response issuer is exact.** OIDC callbacks validate a supplied\n  `iss` against discovered metadata with exact string comparison before trusting\n  a code or error. If metadata advertises issuer-response support, `iss` is\n  required.\n- **Verified-email Profile reuse is fail-closed.** The typed canonical scenarios\n  live in\n  `packages/profiles/src/testing/oidcProvisioningDecisionMatrix.ts`; both\n  package suites execute that matrix and public docs reference it rather than\n  maintaining another behavioral table. Default provisioning reuses only one\n  unowned, global `Person`. Tenant-scoped, non-Person, duplicate-email,\n  and already-owned matches fail before User/session creation. An existing\n  issuer/subject link without a User must still be the unique global Person for\n  the current verified claim email; once owned, the stable issuer/subject link\n  reuses its canonical Person and owner.\n  Issuer and subject are opaque, case-sensitive identifiers; preserve their\n  exact value and use trim only to reject blank claims.\n- **`resolveProfile` is the application reconciliation boundary.** The\n  SvelteKit handlers, `OidcLoginService`, and `getOrCreateFromOidc` accept the\n  same hook inside the provisioning transaction. The service/handler path\n  supplies protocol-validated claims; direct collection callers must validate\n  and trust their claim source before calling `getOrCreateFromOidc`.\n  Token/userinfo merging keeps `email` and `email_verified` paired to the same\n  claim source; verification is never borrowed across sources.\n  Resolver reads/writes use the supplied `db`, and the hook must be idempotent\n  because a concurrent unique-key conflict can retry it. `undefined` chooses\n  the secure default and `null` rejects, including exact issuer/subject reuse.\n  For a new identity, a supplied Profile is still validated as the unique,\n  unowned global Person for the verified email. For an exact existing identity,\n  it must be the already-linked Profile and cannot rebind identity authority;\n  stable-link owner and canonical-Person checks still apply. The hook receives a\n  separate frozen claims snapshot; internal retry and persistence state is not\n  exposed for mutation.\n- **Owned first binding requires `authorizeProfileOwner`.** An invitation or\n  approval workflow may explicitly return both its pre-provisioned canonical\n  global `Person` and existing approved `User` from this transaction-bound\n  hook. `undefined` keeps the secure `profile_owned` default and `null`\n  rejects. SMRT treats only the selected IDs as input, reloads them in the\n  provisioning transaction, and requires `email_verified === true`, the unique\n  canonical global Person for the normalized claim email, exactly one owner,\n  that owner as the selected User, and the same normalized User email. The\n  hook runs before identity/User/session creation and may be retried, so use\n  only its supplied `db` and `users` handles and keep application authorization\n  idempotent. Never authorize from email matching alone. Existing exact\n  identities cannot be rebound; when `resolveProfile` is also present both\n  hooks must select the same Profile.\n- **OIDC first login is atomic.** The Profile, `OidcIdentity`, and User are one\n  transaction. The database arbiters are `OidcIdentity.identityKey`,\n  private `oidc_profile_email_reservations.email_key`, `User.emailKey`, and the\n  unique `User.profileId`; local callbacks acquire exact issuer/subject and normalized\n  email locks in deterministic order so changed email claims also serialize.\n  SQLite and DuckDB callbacks additionally serialize every root-handle statement\n  the coordinator owns per database URL — `_smrt_backfills` initialization, the\n  transaction, and the post-commit rebind — because one adapter multiplexes a\n  single native connection and cannot safely overlap unrelated root\n  transactions. Never overlap two statements on one such handle, inside a\n  transaction or not: rebind and owner/email candidate reads are sequential,\n  never `Promise.all`. Owner-authorized DuckDB callbacks use that same\n  root-handle serialization;\n  PostgreSQL deadlock and serialization errors use a bounded transaction retry.\n  Newly provisioned Profiles use non-semantic per-profile slugs so equal IdP\n  display names cannot trigger a natural-key upsert;\n  run\n  `smrt db:status`, `smrt db:migrate`, then `smrt db:status` before deployment.\n  Stop or upgrade old writers first. Before migration, group\n  non-null `users.profile_id` values, then reconcile duplicates. After\n  migration, run public `backfillProfileEmailKeys(db)` followed by\n  `backfillUserEmailKeys(db)` from one deploy process. Both use the shared\n  TypeScript `normalizeIdentityEmail()` implementation transactionally and are\n  idempotent; the User backfill fails before writes if normalized duplicates\n  remain. Every OIDC path requires the Profile email-key readiness marker;\n  creating a User or checking User email uniqueness additionally requires the\n  User marker. A stable issuer/subject with an existing owning User skips only\n  the User email-key lookup and marker. Full scans remain in the explicit deploy\n  step; guarded runtime paths use indexed keys and validate only returned\n  candidates. Multiple null links remain valid.\n  Legacy race keys backfill only after canonical validation. Pass a root\n  database on adapters such as DuckDB that cannot create nested savepoints.\n  Root adapters must expose `beginTransaction`; transaction-only handles are\n  ambiguous and fail closed before provisioning writes. Caller-owned\n  transactions never run `_smrt_backfills` DDL and require that table to\n  already exist; use the root database when initialization or recovery is\n  needed.\n\n## Gotchas\n\n- **seedSystemRoles() required**: call `RoleCollection.seedSystemRoles()` at app init (creates owner/admin/member/viewer)\n- **PermissionResolver casts `as any`**: collections have protected constructors — known framework limitation\n- **Session TTL in seconds**: `DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60` (not milliseconds)\n- **Users are cross-tenant**: one user, many tenants via Membership. Email globally unique.\n- **Batch permission queries**: resolver fetches all permission IDs in one query, then maps to slugs (avoids N+1)\n",
+  "moduleDocs": [
+    {
+      "path": "agents/retention.md",
+      "module": "retention",
+      "content": "# smrt-users/credential retention\n\nModule semantics for `src/retention.ts` and the three `deleteExpired()` paths\nit drives. Package orientation, the permission model, and the security rules\nthat apply before editing anything live in [../AGENTS.md](../AGENTS.md) — read\nthat first.\n\n## Credential retention (#2375)\n\n`SessionCollection.deleteExpired()`,\n`UsersMagicLinkTokenCollection.deleteExpired()` and\n`UsersCliAuthRequestCollection.deleteExpired()` all existed, and all waited for\nan application to remember to call them. Expired credential rows are the worst\nkind of unbounded growth: worthless the moment they expire, and exactly the\nrows an attacker would like to still find in the table.\n\n`src/retention.ts` contributes the three to the framework retention sweep in\n`@happyvertical/smrt-core`, so `smrt db:prune` and a running jobs `TaskRunner`\nreap them.\n\n- **The entry point registers on import.** `src/index.ts` calls\n  `registerUserRetentionTasks()`, so any process that loaded this package\n  contributes the tasks — including `smrt db:prune`, which imports the package\n  optionally for exactly that reason. Registering is not scheduling: nothing is\n  deleted until something runs a sweep.\n- **Task names** are `users-sessions`, `users-magic-link-tokens`,\n  `users-cli-auth-requests` — prefixed with the package's short name because\n  the retention registry is one process-global namespace. Opt one out with\n  `runRetentionSweep(db, { tasks: { 'users-sessions': false } })` or\n  `smrt db:prune --skip users-sessions`; `unregisterUserRetentionTasks()`\n  removes all three.\n- **There is no retention window to configure.** An expired credential has\n  nothing worth retaining, so each task deletes only already-expired rows. An\n  application that keeps expired sessions for audit should opt the task out and\n  archive them itself.\n- **All three are a single counted DELETE**, not a hydrate-and-delete loop.\n  They now run unattended on a timer, and a per-row delete that throws part-way\n  leaves the rest of the expired rows un-reaped — the #1400 reasoning that\n  already applied to sessions, now applied to the other two. Counting first\n  also gives a usable figure where `rowCount` is not populated, and is what\n  makes `{ dryRun }` preview the same predicate rather than an estimate. The\n  count and the delete are not one transaction, so the figure is approximate\n  under concurrent writers.\n- **`expiresAt` is `@field({ indexed: true })`** on `Session`,\n  `UsersMagicLinkToken` and `UsersCliAuthRequest`: the prune predicate scans\n  that column on every pass.\n"
+    }
+  ]
 }

package/dist/sveltekit.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { C as decodeOidcTransaction, E as resolveOidcProviderConfig, S as OidcLoginService, T as getUsersOidcConfig, _ as readMobileBearerToken, a as TerminalAuthRateLimitError, g as MobileAuthService, h as MobileAuthError, i as TerminalAuthError, m as withSessionPermissionContext, o as TerminalAuthService, s as OperationPermissionError, v as validateMobileRedirectUri, w as encodeOidcTransaction, x as OidcLoginError, y as SessionService } from "./chunks/TerminalAuthService-C1PVcd6q.js";
+import { C as decodeOidcTransaction, E as resolveOidcProviderConfig, S as OidcLoginService, T as getUsersOidcConfig, _ as readMobileBearerToken, a as TerminalAuthRateLimitError, g as MobileAuthService, h as MobileAuthError, i as TerminalAuthError, m as withSessionPermissionContext, o as TerminalAuthService, s as OperationPermissionError, v as validateMobileRedirectUri, w as encodeOidcTransaction, x as OidcLoginError, y as SessionService } from "./chunks/TerminalAuthService-BfX2Ujqe.js";
 import { DiscoveryArtifactValidationError, SMRT_APP_RESULT_CONTRACT, SMRT_APP_RESULT_SCHEMA, SMRT_APP_RESULT_VERSION, SMRT_DISCOVERY_CONFORMANCE_ARTIFACT_SCHEMA, SMRT_DISCOVERY_CONFORMANCE_SCHEMA, SMRT_DISCOVERY_CONFORMANCE_VERSION, SMRT_MCP_RESULT_METADATA_KEY, canonicalizeDiscoveryArtifact, createDiscoveryConformanceArtifact, deriveCommandRequirements, validateDiscoveryConformanceArtifact } from "./app-contract.js";
 import { ObjectRegistry } from "@happyvertical/smrt-core";
 import { createLogger } from "@happyvertical/logger";

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@happyvertical/smrt-users",
-  "version": "0.40.70",
+  "version": "0.42.0",
   "description": "Multi-tenant user management for the SMRT framework - users, tenants, roles, permissions, groups",
   "type": "module",
   "smrtRawPrimitives": "strict",
@@ -48,13 +48,13 @@
     "@happyvertical/logger": "^0.88.0",
     "@happyvertical/sql": "^0.88.0",
     "jose": "^6.2.3",
-    "@happyvertical/smrt-config": "0.40.70",
-    "@happyvertical/smrt-core": "0.40.70",
-    "@happyvertical/smrt-mobile-contract": "0.40.70",
-    "@happyvertical/smrt-tenancy": "0.40.70",
-    "@happyvertical/smrt-types": "0.40.70",
-    "@happyvertical/smrt-profiles": "0.40.70",
-    "@happyvertical/smrt-ui": "0.40.70"
+    "@happyvertical/smrt-config": "0.42.0",
+    "@happyvertical/smrt-core": "0.42.0",
+    "@happyvertical/smrt-profiles": "0.42.0",
+    "@happyvertical/smrt-tenancy": "0.42.0",
+    "@happyvertical/smrt-mobile-contract": "0.42.0",
+    "@happyvertical/smrt-types": "0.42.0",
+    "@happyvertical/smrt-ui": "0.42.0"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@sveltejs/package": "^2.5.8",
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
     "typescript": "5.9.3",
     "vite": "8.1.4",
     "vitest": "4.1.10",
-    "@happyvertical/smrt-vitest": "0.40.70"
+    "@happyvertical/smrt-vitest": "0.42.0"
   },
   "keywords": [
     "smrt",