@happyvertical/smrt-users 0.37.1 → 0.37.3

package/dist/smrt-knowledge.json

@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
 {
   "schemaVersion": 1,
-  "generatedAt": "2026-06-30T04:09:12.864Z",
+  "generatedAt": "2026-07-01T20:04:31.726Z",
   "packageName": "@happyvertical/smrt-users",
-  "packageVersion": "0.37.1",
+  "packageVersion": "0.37.3",
   "sourceManifestPath": "dist/manifest.json",
   "agentDocPath": "AGENTS.md",
   "sourceHashes": {
-    "manifest": "b0ced21be693bf01f11fb206f171ebb40444d75aa98c4cd39eacefcd6c79e0c4",
-    "packageJson": "cc8759f2964ac8f51688704e6adf66c51e876581b27b0ea4516c2115d816d1c2",
-    "agents": "2684404a1735fd4993d4383f2dfed5f9c0f4de68f0cbfcd996f7e94eb50ac9c8"
+    "manifest": "151bae33398ad16290ce7cee2f2f77770df2ac065eb6f4221f549042702237ec",
+    "packageJson": "f9351c7506a3421f47aacc48422de62da791beb9ea3a980b61923d18ee4886dd",
+    "agents": "7244609f8590febc0f58df6f139e22317a1489541071ac249a5c07557b95dee3"
   },
   "exports": [
     ".",
@@ -26,18 +26,18 @@
     "@happyvertical/smrt-tenancy": "workspace:*",
     "@happyvertical/smrt-types": "workspace:*",
     "@happyvertical/smrt-ui": "workspace:*",
-    "jose": "^6.1.3",
+    "jose": "^6.2.3",
     "@happyvertical/smrt-vitest": "workspace:*",
     "@happyvertical/sql": "catalog:",
-    "@sveltejs/package": "^2.5.7",
-    "@sveltejs/vite-plugin-svelte": "^6.2.4",
-    "@types/node": "25.0.9",
+    "@sveltejs/package": "^2.5.8",
+    "@sveltejs/vite-plugin-svelte": "^7.1.2",
+    "@types/node": "24.13.2",
     "fast-glob": "^3.3.3",
-    "svelte": "^5.46.4",
-    "svelte-check": "^4.3.5",
+    "svelte": "^5.56.4",
+    "svelte-check": "^4.7.1",
     "typescript": "^5.9.3",
-    "vite": "^7.3.6",
-    "vitest": "^4.0.17"
+    "vite": "^8.1.2",
+    "vitest": "^4.1.9"
   },
   "smrtDependencies": [
     "@happyvertical/smrt-config",
@@ -55,6 +55,28 @@
   "tags": [],
   "risks": [],
   "objects": [
+    {
+      "name": "AccessRequestCollection",
+      "qualifiedName": "@happyvertical/smrt-users:AccessRequestCollection",
+      "collection": "accessrequests",
+      "tableName": "access_requests",
+      "packageName": "@happyvertical/smrt-users",
+      "extends": "SmrtCollection",
+      "fields": [],
+      "relationships": [],
+      "methods": [
+        "findByEmail",
+        "findByStatus",
+        "findOpen",
+        "findOpenByEmail"
+      ],
+      "surfaces": [],
+      "relationshipFeatures": [
+        "uuidColumns"
+      ],
+      "tags": [],
+      "risks": []
+    },
     {
       "name": "UsersCliAuthRequestCollection",
       "qualifiedName": "@happyvertical/smrt-users:UsersCliAuthRequestCollection",
@@ -414,6 +436,98 @@
       "tags": [],
       "risks": []
     },
+    {
+      "name": "AccessRequest",
+      "qualifiedName": "@happyvertical/smrt-users:AccessRequest",
+      "collection": "accessrequests",
+      "tableName": "access_requests",
+      "packageName": "@happyvertical/smrt-users",
+      "extends": "SmrtObject",
+      "fields": [
+        {
+          "name": "email",
+          "type": "text",
+          "required": true,
+          "columnType": "TEXT"
+        },
+        {
+          "name": "name",
+          "type": "text",
+          "required": false,
+          "columnType": "TEXT"
+        },
+        {
+          "name": "status",
+          "type": "text",
+          "required": false,
+          "columnType": "TEXT"
+        },
+        {
+          "name": "source",
+          "type": "text",
+          "required": false,
+          "columnType": "TEXT"
+        },
+        {
+          "name": "requestContext",
+          "type": "text",
+          "required": false,
+          "columnType": "TEXT"
+        },
+        {
+          "name": "note",
+          "type": "text",
+          "required": false,
+          "columnType": "TEXT"
+        },
+        {
+          "name": "requestedAt",
+          "type": "datetime",
+          "required": false,
+          "columnType": "TIMESTAMP"
+        },
+        {
+          "name": "decidedAt",
+          "type": "datetime",
+          "required": false,
+          "columnType": "TIMESTAMP"
+        },
+        {
+          "name": "decidedBy",
+          "type": "text",
+          "required": false,
+          "columnType": "TEXT"
+        },
+        {
+          "name": "resultingUserId",
+          "type": "text",
+          "required": false,
+          "columnType": "TEXT"
+        },
+        {
+          "name": "tenantHint",
+          "type": "text",
+          "required": false,
+          "columnType": "TEXT"
+        }
+      ],
+      "relationships": [],
+      "methods": [
+        "getRequestContext",
+        "getTenantHint",
+        "isApproved",
+        "isOpen",
+        "isTerminal",
+        "setRequestContext",
+        "setTenantHint"
+      ],
+      "surfaces": [],
+      "relationshipFeatures": [
+        "uuidColumns"
+      ],
+      "tags": [],
+      "risks": []
+    },
     {
       "name": "UsersCliAuthRequest",
       "qualifiedName": "@happyvertical/smrt-users:UsersCliAuthRequest",
@@ -2739,7 +2853,7 @@
     "junctionCollections": 0,
     "hierarchicalObjects": 0,
     "polymorphicAssociations": 0,
-    "uuidColumns": 47
+    "uuidColumns": 49
   },
-  "agentDoc": "# @happyvertical/smrt-users\n\nMulti-tenant user management with RBAC, hierarchical tenants, session handling, and SvelteKit integration.\n\n## Models (13)\n\n| Model | Key Pattern |\n|-------|-------------|\n| User | Auth identity. `profileId` is plain string (not FK) to smrt-profiles. Email auto-lowercased. |\n| Tenant | **STI** + hierarchical parent-child. `hierarchyPath` (materialized path), `hierarchyLevel`. Max depth 10. |\n| Session | Server-side. Secure UUID. TTL in **seconds** (not ms). Status auto-updates to EXPIRED on access. |\n| MagicLinkToken | Single-use email login token. Backed by `MagicLinkService`. |\n| Role | `tenantId = null` → system role (available to all tenants). `isSystem: true` blocks deletion. |\n| Permission | Slug format: `resource.action`. Parsed by PermissionResolver. |\n| Membership | User + Tenant + Role junction. UNIQUE(userId, tenantId). |\n| Group | Team within a tenant. Multiple roles via GroupRole. |\n| GroupMember, GroupRole, RolePermission | Join tables. |\n| MembershipOverride | Per-user permission grant/deny. **DENY always wins.** |\n| TenantPermissionOverride | Tenant-level cascade overrides. Effect: INHERIT/GRANT/DENY. |\n\n## Permission Resolution — Precedence (broad → specific, most-specific wins)\n\n`PermissionResolver.resolvePermissions` builds the effective set in this order;\neach later layer overrides earlier ones:\n\n1. **Tenant-inherited** — walk ancestors, apply each `TenantPermissionOverride`\n   down the cascade (GRANT adds, DENY removes within the hierarchy)\n2. **Membership role** — base permissions from the user's role in the tenant\n3. **Group roles** — permissions from all groups the user belongs to **in that tenant**\n4. **Tenant-level DENY** *(removes; overrides role/group grants, tenant-wide)* — a\n   `TenantPermissionOverride` with effect `DENY` is a HARD, tenant-wide block: it\n   subtracts the DENY'd slug even if a role or group granted it (steps 2–3). It\n   sits just **above** the per-user membership overrides and **below** role/group.\n5. **Membership GRANT override** *(re-adds; most specific)* — a per-user GRANT can\n   re-add a slug a tenant DENY'd in step 4, because it is more specific.\n6. **Membership DENY override** *(absolute; always wins)* — a per-user DENY removes\n   the slug last and is never overridden.\n\nSo a permission a role grants but the tenant DENYs is **removed**, unless that\nexact user also has a membership-GRANT override for it. A membership-DENY always\nwins. Tenant-DENY of an inherited/cascade grant still blocks it (unchanged).\nThe hard block reflects the tenant cascade's **net** resolution, not an\nunconditional union of every DENY in the chain — so a more-specific tenant GRANT\n(e.g. a child sub-tenant re-granting a permission its parent DENYs) still wins.\n\n**Critical**: `getGroupIdsForTenant(userId, tenantId)` (joins with groups table to scope by tenant). Never use `getGroupIds()` — it's cross-tenant.\n\n## Hierarchical Tenants\n\n- `TenantCollection.createChild()` auto-calculates hierarchy fields, enforces depth limit\n- `moveToParent()` updates tenant + ALL descendants' paths/levels\n- `cascadePermissions` (parent pushes down) + `inheritPermissions` (child accepts) — both must be true\n- `getTree(rootId?)` returns nested structure for UI\n\n## SvelteKit Integration\n\n```typescript\n// hooks.server.ts\nexport const handle = createSessionHandler({ db, ttl: 604800, skipPaths: ['/api/public'] });\n// Populates event.locals: { user, membership, permissions: string[], tenantId, sessionId }\n\n// +page.server.ts\nawait createSessionCookie(event, userId, tenantId, { db });\nawait destroySessionCookie(event, { db });\nawait switchSessionTenant(event, tenantId, { db });\n```\n\n## Security (S5 #1400)\n\n- **Generated REST/MCP surface is READ-ONLY for every RBAC/identity model.**\n  User, Tenant, Group, Membership, MembershipOverride, Role, Permission,\n  RolePermission, GroupRole, GroupMember, and TenantPermissionOverride generate\n  `list`/`get` only — `create`/`update`/`delete` are intentionally NOT\n  generated. The merged `requireRouteAuth` gate (#1540) enforces *authentication*,\n  not *authorization*, and these models are not `@TenantScoped`, so an\n  auto-generated mutating route would let any authenticated user self-grant a\n  role/permission, flip a tenant's cascade flags, or change another user's auth\n  identity. Mutate them through the permission-gated services (`TenantService`,\n  collection helpers) or consumer-owned, permission-checked handlers. A\n  structural regression test (`security-audit-1400.test.ts`) enumerates the\n  registry to assert no authority model exposes a mutating op. (`cli` stays\n  enabled — local-operator surface, outside the network/agent threat model.)\n- **`switchTenant` is fail-closed AND rotates the session id.**\n  `SessionService.switchTenant` / `switchSessionTenant` verify the session's user\n  has an ACTIVE membership in the target tenant before any write (the tenant id\n  is the isolation key for every `@TenantScoped` query). A non-member/unknown-\n  session switch returns `{ switched: false, sessionId: null, ... }` and mutates\n  nothing. On a successful switch into a NON-null tenant the session id is\n  ROTATED: a fresh `Session` (new secure id, fresh TTL, same user, new tenant,\n  device context carried over) is minted and the old session is REVOKED — so a\n  captured pre-switch id immediately stops validating, shrinking the blast radius\n  of a leaked id across a tenant boundary. `switchTenant` returns a\n  `SwitchTenantResult` (`{ switched, sessionId, session, rotated }`); callers MUST\n  persist the returned `sessionId`. `switchSessionTenant` does this for you by\n  re-setting the session cookie (preserving httpOnly/secure/sameSite) to the new\n  id. A `null` clear stays in place (no rotation, no cookie change). The\n  low-level `SessionCollection.setSessionTenant` is the UNGUARDED primitive (used\n  for the null-clear path) — never call it with an untrusted tenant id.\n- **OIDC `email_verified` is enforced.** `UserCollection.getOrCreateFromOidc`\n  refuses to provision a user when the IdP explicitly returns\n  `email_verified: false` (opt out with `{ allowUnverifiedEmail: true }`). An\n  absent claim makes no assertion and is not enforced.\n\n## Gotchas\n\n- **seedSystemRoles() required**: call `RoleCollection.seedSystemRoles()` at app init (creates owner/admin/member/viewer)\n- **PermissionResolver casts `as any`**: collections have protected constructors — known framework limitation\n- **Session TTL in seconds**: `DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60` (not milliseconds)\n- **Users are cross-tenant**: one user, many tenants via Membership. Email globally unique.\n- **Batch permission queries**: resolver fetches all permission IDs in one query, then maps to slugs (avoids N+1)\n"
+  "agentDoc": "# @happyvertical/smrt-users\n\nMulti-tenant user management with RBAC, hierarchical tenants, session handling, and SvelteKit integration.\n\n## Models (14)\n\n| Model | Key Pattern |\n|-------|-------------|\n| User | Auth identity. `profileId` is plain string (not FK) to smrt-profiles. Email auto-lowercased. |\n| AccessRequest | \"Request access / waitlist\" record captured before a `User` exists. CLOSED generated surface (`api`/`mcp`/`cli` = `[]`) — all access via `AccessRequestService`. Email normalized + indexed; JSON `requestContext` (NOT `context` — reserved for slug scoping). |\n| Tenant | **STI** + hierarchical parent-child. `hierarchyPath` (materialized path), `hierarchyLevel`. Max depth 10. |\n| Session | Server-side. Secure UUID. TTL in **seconds** (not ms). Status auto-updates to EXPIRED on access. |\n| MagicLinkToken | Single-use email login token. Backed by `MagicLinkService`. |\n| Role | `tenantId = null` → system role (available to all tenants). `isSystem: true` blocks deletion. |\n| Permission | Slug format: `resource.action`. Parsed by PermissionResolver. |\n| Membership | User + Tenant + Role junction. UNIQUE(userId, tenantId). |\n| Group | Team within a tenant. Multiple roles via GroupRole. |\n| GroupMember, GroupRole, RolePermission | Join tables. |\n| MembershipOverride | Per-user permission grant/deny. **DENY always wins.** |\n| TenantPermissionOverride | Tenant-level cascade overrides. Effect: INHERIT/GRANT/DENY. |\n\n## Permission Resolution — Precedence (broad → specific, most-specific wins)\n\n`PermissionResolver.resolvePermissions` builds the effective set in this order;\neach later layer overrides earlier ones:\n\n1. **Tenant-inherited** — walk ancestors, apply each `TenantPermissionOverride`\n   down the cascade (GRANT adds, DENY removes within the hierarchy)\n2. **Membership role** — base permissions from the user's role in the tenant\n3. **Group roles** — permissions from all groups the user belongs to **in that tenant**\n4. **Tenant-level DENY** *(removes; overrides role/group grants, tenant-wide)* — a\n   `TenantPermissionOverride` with effect `DENY` is a HARD, tenant-wide block: it\n   subtracts the DENY'd slug even if a role or group granted it (steps 2–3). It\n   sits just **above** the per-user membership overrides and **below** role/group.\n5. **Membership GRANT override** *(re-adds; most specific)* — a per-user GRANT can\n   re-add a slug a tenant DENY'd in step 4, because it is more specific.\n6. **Membership DENY override** *(absolute; always wins)* — a per-user DENY removes\n   the slug last and is never overridden.\n\nSo a permission a role grants but the tenant DENYs is **removed**, unless that\nexact user also has a membership-GRANT override for it. A membership-DENY always\nwins. Tenant-DENY of an inherited/cascade grant still blocks it (unchanged).\nThe hard block reflects the tenant cascade's **net** resolution, not an\nunconditional union of every DENY in the chain — so a more-specific tenant GRANT\n(e.g. a child sub-tenant re-granting a permission its parent DENYs) still wins.\n\n**Critical**: `getGroupIdsForTenant(userId, tenantId)` (joins with groups table to scope by tenant). Never use `getGroupIds()` — it's cross-tenant.\n\n## Hierarchical Tenants\n\n- `TenantCollection.createChild()` auto-calculates hierarchy fields, enforces depth limit\n- `moveToParent()` updates tenant + ALL descendants' paths/levels\n- `cascadePermissions` (parent pushes down) + `inheritPermissions` (child accepts) — both must be true\n- `getTree(rootId?)` returns nested structure for UI\n\n## SvelteKit Integration\n\n```typescript\n// hooks.server.ts\nexport const handle = createSessionHandler({ db, ttl: 604800, skipPaths: ['/api/public'] });\n// Populates event.locals: { user, membership, permissions: string[], tenantId, sessionId }\n\n// +page.server.ts\nawait createSessionCookie(event, userId, tenantId, { db });\nawait destroySessionCookie(event, { db });\nawait switchSessionTenant(event, tenantId, { db });\n```\n\n## Security (S5 #1400)\n\n- **Generated REST/MCP surface is READ-ONLY for every RBAC/identity model.**\n  User, Tenant, Group, Membership, MembershipOverride, Role, Permission,\n  RolePermission, GroupRole, GroupMember, and TenantPermissionOverride generate\n  `list`/`get` only — `create`/`update`/`delete` are intentionally NOT\n  generated. The merged `requireRouteAuth` gate (#1540) enforces *authentication*,\n  not *authorization*, and these models are not `@TenantScoped`, so an\n  auto-generated mutating route would let any authenticated user self-grant a\n  role/permission, flip a tenant's cascade flags, or change another user's auth\n  identity. Mutate them through the permission-gated services (`TenantService`,\n  collection helpers) or consumer-owned, permission-checked handlers. A\n  structural regression test (`security-audit-1400.test.ts`) enumerates the\n  registry to assert no authority model exposes a mutating op. (`cli` stays\n  enabled — local-operator surface, outside the network/agent threat model.)\n- **`switchTenant` is fail-closed AND rotates the session id.**\n  `SessionService.switchTenant` / `switchSessionTenant` verify the session's user\n  has an ACTIVE membership in the target tenant before any write (the tenant id\n  is the isolation key for every `@TenantScoped` query). A non-member/unknown-\n  session switch returns `{ switched: false, sessionId: null, ... }` and mutates\n  nothing. On a successful switch into a NON-null tenant the session id is\n  ROTATED: a fresh `Session` (new secure id, fresh TTL, same user, new tenant,\n  device context carried over) is minted and the old session is REVOKED — so a\n  captured pre-switch id immediately stops validating, shrinking the blast radius\n  of a leaked id across a tenant boundary. `switchTenant` returns a\n  `SwitchTenantResult` (`{ switched, sessionId, session, rotated }`); callers MUST\n  persist the returned `sessionId`. `switchSessionTenant` does this for you by\n  re-setting the session cookie (preserving httpOnly/secure/sameSite) to the new\n  id. A `null` clear stays in place (no rotation, no cookie change). The\n  low-level `SessionCollection.setSessionTenant` is the UNGUARDED primitive (used\n  for the null-clear path) — never call it with an untrusted tenant id.\n- **OIDC `email_verified` is enforced.** `UserCollection.getOrCreateFromOidc`\n  refuses to provision a user when the IdP explicitly returns\n  `email_verified: false` (opt out with `{ allowUnverifiedEmail: true }`). An\n  absent claim makes no assertion and is not enforced.\n\n## Gotchas\n\n- **seedSystemRoles() required**: call `RoleCollection.seedSystemRoles()` at app init (creates owner/admin/member/viewer)\n- **PermissionResolver casts `as any`**: collections have protected constructors — known framework limitation\n- **Session TTL in seconds**: `DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60` (not milliseconds)\n- **Users are cross-tenant**: one user, many tenants via Membership. Email globally unique.\n- **Batch permission queries**: resolver fetches all permission IDs in one query, then maps to slugs (avoids N+1)\n"
 }