@haposoft/cafekit 0.18.0 → 0.18.2

package/src/omp/hooks/privacy-block.cjs

@@ -14,32 +14,23 @@
  * Exit: 0 (the JSON hook output carries the permission decision)
  */
 
-try {
-  const fs = require('fs');
-  const path = require('path');
-  const { commandAccess } = require('./lib/privacy-command-analysis.cjs');
+const EVALUATION_FAILURE = 'Sensitive access could not be evaluated safely.';
 
-  const RESTRICTED_PATTERNS = [
-    /^\.env(?:[.\[*?{]|$)/i,
-    /^credentials/i,
-    /secrets?\.(ya?ml|json)$/i,
-    /\.pem$/i,
-    /\.key$/i,
-    /\.p12$/i,
-    /\.pfx$/i,
-    /^id_(rsa|ed25519|ecdsa|dsa)$/i,
-    /\.netrc$/i,
-    /\.pgpass$/i,
-    /kubeconfig/i,
-    /\.keystore$/i,
-    /\.jks$/i,
-    /auth\.json$/i,
-    /token(s)?\.json$/i
-  ];
+function askForPermission(reason) {
+  process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({
+    hookSpecificOutput: {
+      hookEventName: 'PreToolUse',
+      // omp has no ask state on tool_call, so an ask under Claude becomes a denial here.
+      permissionDecision: 'deny',
+      permissionDecisionReason: reason
+    }
+  }) + '\n');
+}
 
-  const ALLOWED_EXEMPTIONS = [
-    /\.env\.(example|sample|template|test)$/i
-  ];
+try {
+  const fs = require('fs');
+  const { sensitivePaths, displayNames } = require('./lib/privacy-paths.cjs');
+  const { projectRoot: resolveProjectRoot } = require('./lib/project-root.cjs');
 
   const { runtimeDirName, runtimeDir, runtimePath } = require('./lib/runtime-dir.cjs');
   function readRuntime(cwd) {
@@ -51,200 +42,27 @@ try {
     }
   }
 
-  function isSafe(filePath) {
-    const base = path.basename(filePath);
-    return ALLOWED_EXEMPTIONS.some((rule) => rule.test(base) || rule.test(filePath));
-  }
-
-  function isSensitive(filePath) {
-    const base = path.basename(filePath);
-    return RESTRICTED_PATTERNS.some((rule) => rule.test(base) || rule.test(filePath));
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Resolve a symlink to its real target so a harmless-looking name that points
-   * at a sensitive file cannot slip through the basename check. Returns null
-   * when the path cannot be resolved (missing file, broken link) — fail-open to
-   * the original-path check in that case. See isSymlinkToSensitive for dangling handling.
-   */
-  function resolveTarget(filePath, cwd) {
-    try {
-      const requested = path.isAbsolute(filePath) ? filePath : path.resolve(cwd, filePath);
-      return fs.realpathSync(requested);
-    } catch {
-      return null;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * When realpath fails, check whether the requested path is a symlink (or chain)
-   * whose lexical target is sensitive. Dangling link to protected target -> true (fail-closed ask);
-   * dangling benign link or link to allowed example/template -> false (allow).
-   * Limit hops to avoid loops; malformed/looping -> fail closed.
-   * TOCTOU note: check and use are not atomic; target could be swapped between this check and the actual read.
-   * This is a best-effort guardrail, not an arbitrary-shell security boundary. For strong isolation use OS sandbox.
-   */
-  function isSymlinkToSensitive(filePath, cwd) {
-    try {
-      const requested = path.isAbsolute(filePath) ? filePath : path.resolve(cwd, filePath);
-      let current = requested;
-      let hops = 0;
-      const MAX_HOPS = 8;
-      while (hops < MAX_HOPS) {
-        let stat;
-        try {
-          stat = fs.lstatSync(current);
-        } catch {
-          return false;
-        }
-        if (!stat.isSymbolicLink()) return false;
-        let linkTarget;
-        try {
-          linkTarget = fs.readlinkSync(current);
-        } catch {
-          return true;
-        }
-        if (isSensitive(linkTarget) && !isSafe(linkTarget)) return true;
-        if (isSafe(linkTarget)) return false;
-        const next = path.isAbsolute(linkTarget) ? linkTarget : path.resolve(path.dirname(current), linkTarget);
-        if (next === current) return true;
-        try {
-          const real = fs.realpathSync(next);
-          if (isSensitive(real) && !isSafe(real)) return true;
-          if (isSafe(real)) return false;
-          return false;
-        } catch {
-          current = next;
-          hops += 1;
-          continue;
-        }
-      }
-      return true;
-    } catch {
-      return true;
-    }
-  }
-
-  function extractBashPaths(command) {
-    // The analyzer parses the command and returns the operands of every reading
-    // command it recognises, nested shells and `find -exec` included. Treating
-    // every unresolved expansion as sensitive, as this did before, asked on
-    // `cat $FILE`, `wc -l *.cjs` and `cat ~/.zshrc` alike. Noise is what trains
-    // people to click through the prompt that matters.
-    // A heredoc whose delimiter is quoted (<<'BODY') is inert: the shell
-    // expands nothing inside it, so no word in the body is ever read. The
-    // analyzer has no notion of heredocs and parses the body as shell, so prose
-    // that quotes a command -- a PR body carrying `cat .env` in backticks --
-    // came back as a real command substitution. Blank those bodies out first.
-    // An unquoted delimiter (<<BODY) does expand, so it is left to the
-    // analyzer.
-    const scrubbed = String(command).replace(
-      /(<<-?[ \t]*)(['"])([A-Za-z_]\w*)\2[^\n]*\n[\s\S]*?\n[ \t]*\3\b/g,
-      '$1$2$3$2'
-    );
-
-    const paths = new Set(commandAccess(scrubbed).paths);
-
-    // Two shapes the analyzer cannot return. It drops any word carrying an
-    // expansion, so `~/.ssh/id_rsa` and `certs/*.pem` still have to be matched
-    // by name. And it only walks commands it recognises, so an unknown tool
-    // handed a secret through a file-shaped option, such as
-    // `docker compose --env-file .env`, is invisible to it.
-    const FILE_OPTION = /^--?[\w-]*(?:file|config|key|cert|identity)$/i;
-    const tokens = scrubbed.split(/[\s|;&<>"'()`]+/);
-    for (let index = 0; index < tokens.length; index += 1) {
-      const token = tokens[index];
-      const shaped = /^~|[*?[{]/.test(token);
-      const optionFed = index > 0 && FILE_OPTION.test(tokens[index - 1]);
-      if (!shaped && !optionFed) continue;
-      const value = token.replace(/^~/, '').replace(/^["'()`]+|["'(),]+$/g, '');
-      if (value && isSensitive(value) && !isSafe(value)) paths.add(value);
-    }
-
-    return [...paths];
-  }
-
-  function extractPaths(toolName, input) {
-    const paths = [];
-    if (!input) return paths;
-
-    for (const key of ['file_path', 'path']) {
-      if (typeof input[key] === 'string' && input[key].trim()) {
-        paths.push(input[key].trim());
-      }
-    }
-
-    for (const key of ['paths', 'search_paths']) {
-      if (Array.isArray(input[key])) {
-        paths.push(...input[key].filter(Boolean));
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (toolName === 'Bash' && typeof input.command === 'string') {
-      paths.push(...extractBashPaths(input.command));
-    }
-
-    return paths.filter(Boolean);
-  }
-
-  function askForPermission(filePath) {
-    const basename = path.basename(filePath);
-    process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({
-      hookSpecificOutput: {
-        hookEventName: 'PreToolUse',
-        // omp has no ask state on tool_call, so an ask under Claude becomes a denial here.
-        permissionDecision: 'deny',
-        permissionDecisionReason: `Sensitive file access requires approval: ${basename}`
-      }
-    }) + '\n');
-  }
-
   const stdin = fs.readFileSync(0, 'utf8').trim();
-  if (!stdin) process.exit(0);
+  if (!stdin) {
+    askForPermission(EVALUATION_FAILURE);
+    process.exit(0);
+  }
 
   const { normalizeHookPayload } = require('./lib/hook-payload.cjs');
   const data = normalizeHookPayload(JSON.parse(stdin));
   const toolName = data.tool_name || '';
   const toolInput = data.tool_input || {};
   const cwd = typeof data.cwd === 'string' && data.cwd.trim() ? data.cwd : process.cwd();
-  const runtime = readRuntime(cwd);
+  const projectRoot = resolveProjectRoot(data);
+  const runtime = readRuntime(projectRoot);
 
   if (runtime.privacyBlock === false) process.exit(0);
 
-  const paths = extractPaths(toolName, toolInput);
-  if (!paths.length) process.exit(0);
-
-  for (const filePath of paths) {
-    const target = resolveTarget(filePath, cwd);
-
-    // The real target is authoritative: an exempt-looking alias must not hide
-    // a sensitive target, while a real .env.example target remains safe.
-    if (target) {
-      if (isSensitive(target) && !isSafe(target)) {
-        askForPermission(filePath);
-        process.exit(0);
-      }
-      if (isSafe(target)) continue;
-    } else {
-      if (isSymlinkToSensitive(filePath, cwd)) {
-        askForPermission(filePath);
-        process.exit(0);
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (isSafe(filePath) || !isSensitive(filePath)) continue;
-    askForPermission(filePath);
-    process.exit(0);
-  }
+  const paths = sensitivePaths(toolName, toolInput, cwd);
+  if (paths.length) askForPermission(`Sensitive file access requires approval: ${displayNames(paths)}`);
 
   process.exit(0);
 } catch (_) {
-  process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({
-    hookSpecificOutput: {
-      hookEventName: 'PreToolUse',
-      permissionDecision: 'deny',
-      permissionDecisionReason: 'Sensitive access could not be evaluated safely.'
-    }
-  }) + '\n');
+  askForPermission(EVALUATION_FAILURE);
   process.exit(0);
 }