@hanzo/event 0.3.8 → 0.3.10

package/dist/{core-B1XEdWLd.d.cts → core-BCEdNp8H.d.cts}

@@ -100,14 +100,26 @@ interface AnalyticsConfig {
     /** Bearer token provider for token-auth apps. Omit for cookie/session apps
      *  (the client then relies on same-origin credentials). */
     getToken?: () => string | undefined | null;
-    /** Publishable ingest key (pk_…). When set, the client authenticates to the ONE
-     *  front door `/v1/event` with this key instead of a bearer/cookie: it rides
-     *  Authorization: Bearer pk_… on fetch and ?ingest_key=pk_… on a headerless
-     *  page-unload beacon, so anonymous traffic is accepted and unload beacons work
-     *  without a bearer. The key is write-only (cannot read) and safe to ship in a
-     *  bundle; mint one per org via POST /v1/ingest/keys. This authenticates the
-     *  EVENT STREAM only — the error plane authenticates independently with `dsn`,
-     *  and one does not stand in for the other. */
+    /** Publishable ingest key (pk-…). When set, the client attributes writes to the
+     *  ONE front door `/v1/event` with this key instead of a bearer/cookie: it rides
+     *  Authorization: Bearer pk-… on fetch and ?ingest_key=pk-… on a headerless
+     *  page-unload beacon, so ANONYMOUS traffic is attributed and unload beacons work
+     *  without a bearer. The key is write-only — it attributes a write and never mints
+     *  a reading principal — so it is safe to ship in a bundle. Mint one per org with
+     *  POST /v1/keys {"type":"publishable"}.
+     *
+     *  Omit it and the client reads NEXT_PUBLIC_HANZO_EVENT_KEY, then HANZO_EVENT_KEY,
+     *  from the inlined build env — the same resolution `dsn` uses, so a surface
+     *  declares BOTH planes the same way and neither needs code to switch on.
+     *
+     *  A surface with no key at all still reports for whoever is SIGNED IN (the
+     *  session credential attributes them), and drops every logged-out visitor: the
+     *  door refuses an unattributable write rather than filing it where its owner
+     *  cannot read it. That failure is invisible from the page, which is why the key
+     *  belongs in the env next to the DSN and not in a checklist.
+     *
+     *  This attributes the EVENT STREAM only — the error plane authenticates
+     *  independently with `dsn`, and one does not stand in for the other. */
     ingestKey?: string;
     /** Max events buffered before an automatic flush. */
     batchSize?: number;

package/dist/{core-B1XEdWLd.d.ts → core-BCEdNp8H.d.ts}

@@ -100,14 +100,26 @@ interface AnalyticsConfig {
     /** Bearer token provider for token-auth apps. Omit for cookie/session apps
      *  (the client then relies on same-origin credentials). */
     getToken?: () => string | undefined | null;
-    /** Publishable ingest key (pk_…). When set, the client authenticates to the ONE
-     *  front door `/v1/event` with this key instead of a bearer/cookie: it rides
-     *  Authorization: Bearer pk_… on fetch and ?ingest_key=pk_… on a headerless
-     *  page-unload beacon, so anonymous traffic is accepted and unload beacons work
-     *  without a bearer. The key is write-only (cannot read) and safe to ship in a
-     *  bundle; mint one per org via POST /v1/ingest/keys. This authenticates the
-     *  EVENT STREAM only — the error plane authenticates independently with `dsn`,
-     *  and one does not stand in for the other. */
+    /** Publishable ingest key (pk-…). When set, the client attributes writes to the
+     *  ONE front door `/v1/event` with this key instead of a bearer/cookie: it rides
+     *  Authorization: Bearer pk-… on fetch and ?ingest_key=pk-… on a headerless
+     *  page-unload beacon, so ANONYMOUS traffic is attributed and unload beacons work
+     *  without a bearer. The key is write-only — it attributes a write and never mints
+     *  a reading principal — so it is safe to ship in a bundle. Mint one per org with
+     *  POST /v1/keys {"type":"publishable"}.
+     *
+     *  Omit it and the client reads NEXT_PUBLIC_HANZO_EVENT_KEY, then HANZO_EVENT_KEY,
+     *  from the inlined build env — the same resolution `dsn` uses, so a surface
+     *  declares BOTH planes the same way and neither needs code to switch on.
+     *
+     *  A surface with no key at all still reports for whoever is SIGNED IN (the
+     *  session credential attributes them), and drops every logged-out visitor: the
+     *  door refuses an unattributable write rather than filing it where its owner
+     *  cannot read it. That failure is invisible from the page, which is why the key
+     *  belongs in the env next to the DSN and not in a checklist.
+     *
+     *  This attributes the EVENT STREAM only — the error plane authenticates
+     *  independently with `dsn`, and one does not stand in for the other. */
     ingestKey?: string;
     /** Max events buffered before an automatic flush. */
     batchSize?: number;

package/dist/index.cjs

@@ -219,8 +219,34 @@ function scrubText(s2, capturePII = false) {
   return s2;
 }
 
+// src/uid.ts
+var HEX = Array.from({ length: 256 }, (_, i) => (i + 256).toString(16).slice(1));
+function fill(b) {
+  const c = typeof crypto !== "undefined" ? crypto : void 0;
+  if (c && typeof c.getRandomValues === "function") {
+    c.getRandomValues(b);
+    return b;
+  }
+  for (let i = 0; i < b.length; i++) b[i] = Math.random() * 256 | 0;
+  return b;
+}
+function uuidv7(now = Date.now()) {
+  const b = fill(new Uint8Array(16));
+  let t = Math.floor(now);
+  for (let i = 5; i >= 0; i--) {
+    b[i] = t % 256;
+    t = Math.floor(t / 256);
+  }
+  b[6] = 112 | b[6] & 15;
+  b[8] = 128 | b[8] & 63;
+  return HEX[b[0]] + HEX[b[1]] + HEX[b[2]] + HEX[b[3]] + "-" + HEX[b[4]] + HEX[b[5]] + "-" + HEX[b[6]] + HEX[b[7]] + "-" + HEX[b[8]] + HEX[b[9]] + "-" + HEX[b[10]] + HEX[b[11]] + HEX[b[12]] + HEX[b[13]] + HEX[b[14]] + HEX[b[15]];
+}
+function uuidv7Time(id) {
+  return parseInt(id.slice(0, 8) + id.slice(9, 13), 16);
+}
+
 // src/version.ts
-var VERSION = "0.3.8";
+var VERSION = "0.3.9";
 
 // src/sentry.ts
 var MAX_FRAMES = 50;
@@ -229,11 +255,7 @@ var MAX_LINE_LEN = 2048;
 var MAX_TAG_LEN = 1024;
 var MAX_TAGS = 50;
 function eventId() {
-  const c = typeof crypto !== "undefined" ? crypto : void 0;
-  if (c && "randomUUID" in c) return c.randomUUID().replace(/-/g, "");
-  let s2 = "";
-  for (let i = 0; i < 32; i++) s2 += Math.floor(Math.random() * 16).toString(16);
-  return s2;
+  return uuidv7().replace(/-/g, "");
 }
 function byteLen(s2) {
   if (typeof TextEncoder !== "undefined") return new TextEncoder().encode(s2).length;
@@ -433,17 +455,12 @@ function ls() {
     return void 0;
   }
 }
-function uid() {
-  const c = typeof crypto !== "undefined" ? crypto : void 0;
-  if (c && "randomUUID" in c) return c.randomUUID();
-  return "a-" + Date.now().toString(36) + Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10);
-}
 function anonId() {
   const s2 = ls();
   if (!s2) return void 0;
   let v = s2.getItem(KEY.anon);
   if (!v) {
-    v = uid();
+    v = uuidv7();
     s2.setItem(KEY.anon, v);
   }
   return v;
@@ -458,7 +475,7 @@ function sessionId(now = Date.now()) {
     state = null;
   }
   if (!state || now - state.last > SESSION_TTL_MS) {
-    state = { id: uid(), last: now };
+    state = { id: uuidv7(now), last: now };
   } else {
     state.last = now;
   }
@@ -527,11 +544,6 @@ function readEnv(name) {
 function appendQuery(url, key, value) {
   return url + (url.includes("?") ? "&" : "?") + key + "=" + encodeURIComponent(value);
 }
-function uid2() {
-  const c = typeof crypto !== "undefined" ? crypto : void 0;
-  if (c && "randomUUID" in c) return c.randomUUID();
-  return "m-" + Date.now().toString(36) + Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10);
-}
 function normalizeError2(err) {
   const n = normalizeError(err);
   return { type: n.name, message: n.message, stack: n.stack };
@@ -604,7 +616,15 @@ var Analytics = class {
       flushIntervalMs: 5e3,
       enabled: true,
       captureErrors: true,
-      ...config
+      ...config,
+      // The publishable key resolves the SAME way the DSN below does: an explicit
+      // config wins, else the inlined build-time env. Without this the key was the
+      // one piece of wiring a surface could not declare the way it declares every
+      // other piece, so every surface that shipped without passing it in code sent
+      // its beacons unattributed — and an unattributed write is refused (401
+      // ingest_key_required), which is silent in the page and invisible until you
+      // read the warehouse and find the host missing entirely.
+      ingestKey: config.ingestKey ?? readEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_HANZO_EVENT_KEY") ?? readEnv("HANZO_EVENT_KEY")
     };
     this.transport = config.transport ?? new DefaultTransport();
     this.dsn = parseDsn(config.dsn ?? readEnvDsn() ?? dsnForProduct(this.cfg.product));
@@ -783,7 +803,7 @@ var Analytics = class {
   build(kind, event, extra) {
     const anon = anonId();
     const wire = {
-      messageId: uid2(),
+      messageId: uuidv7(),
       type: kind,
       event,
       timestamp: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(),
@@ -1006,5 +1026,7 @@ exports.parseDsn = parseDsn;
 exports.redactSecrets = redactSecrets;
 exports.scrubPII = scrubPII;
 exports.scrubText = scrubText;
+exports.uuidv7 = uuidv7;
+exports.uuidv7Time = uuidv7Time;
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.cjs.map
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.cjs.map