@hamzaabili/opencode-integrity 0.0.0-stage → 0.1.1

package/CHANGELOG.md

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+# Changelog
+
+## 0.1.1
+
+- First npm-published build. 0.1.0 was superseded before publication because
+  npm 9 created an unapprovable staged placeholder during the initial release.
+- No functional changes from 0.1.0.
+
+## 0.1.0
+
+First release.
+
+- Audit, lock, check, diff and policy CLI with JSON and SARIF output.
+- Lockfile (`opencode.lock.json`) for plugins, MCP configuration, MCP tool
+  descriptors and skills.
+- Runtime capture of live MCP tool descriptions and input schemas, including
+  remote servers and Code Mode.
+- Warn/enforce modes: disable changed MCP servers, remove changed skills, deny
+  changed MCP tools and skills before execution.
+- Plugin content hashing, detected capabilities and version/source pinning.
+- Deterministic suspicious-content checks (zero-width, bidi, HTML comments,
+  hidden instructions, exfiltration language).
+- `integrity_status` and `integrity_lock` tools plus `/integrity` command.
+- V1 static audit adapter; V2 full runtime adapter.
+- Zero runtime dependencies; local only; no telemetry.

package/LICENSE

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+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2026 Hamza-Abili
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.

package/README.md

@@ -1,3 +1,190 @@
-# Temporary Holding Version
+# opencode-integrity
 
-This version is a temporary placeholder for this package. An operational version to replace this has been submitted for review and is awaiting a staged release.
+[![CI](https://github.com/Hamza-Abili/opencode-integrity/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/Hamza-Abili/opencode-integrity/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
+[![npm](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/%40hamzaabili%2Fopencode-integrity)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@hamzaabili/opencode-integrity)
+[![npm downloads](https://img.shields.io/npm/dt/%40hamzaabili%2Fopencode-integrity)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@hamzaabili/opencode-integrity)
+[![GitHub stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/Hamza-Abili/opencode-integrity?style=social)](https://github.com/Hamza-Abili/opencode-integrity/stargazers)
+[![license](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue)](LICENSE)
+
+**The tool you approved is not the tool you are running.**
+
+`opencode-integrity` locks what OpenCode can load — plugin content, MCP tool
+descriptions and schemas, and skill files — and detects when any of them
+change. No proxy, no config rewrite, no cloud. Local, zero runtime
+dependencies, OpenCode V1 and V2.
+
+```text
+audit  → see plugins, MCP tools and skills with capabilities and hashes
+lock   → write opencode.lock.json (commit it)
+check  → fail CI when anything drifts
+runtime→ warn or deny changed MCP tools and skills during a session
+```
+
+## Why
+
+An MCP tool description is not inert data: it is instructions the model reads.
+A server can serve one toolset today and a different one tomorrow. Skills are
+Markdown files that can be edited after review. Plugins are npm/Git code that
+runs in the OpenCode server with the agent's privileges. OpenCode policies
+(`plugin.use`, `mcp.use`, `skill.use`) only match names; they do not verify
+content.
+
+Existing MCP scanners are on-demand CLIs, and the strongest pinning tool
+(`mcp-pin`) is a stdio proxy for other clients. This is the OpenCode-native
+layer: it sees what OpenCode actually loaded, including remote MCP servers and
+Code Mode, and covers plugins and skills too.
+
+## Install (OpenCode V2)
+
+```jsonc
+{
+  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
+  "plugins": [
+    {
+      "package": "@hamzaabili/opencode-integrity",
+      "options": { "mode": "warn" }
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+## Install (OpenCode V1)
+
+```jsonc
+{
+  "plugin": [
+    ["@hamzaabili/opencode-integrity", { "mode": "warn" }]
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+V1 can hash project plugins, MCP configuration and skills, and in `enforce`
+mode it blocks changed MCP configuration and skills. The V1 API does not expose
+live MCP tool descriptors, so tool-level drift is V2-only.
+
+## Quick start
+
+```sh
+# 1. See what is loaded, without a lockfile
+npx @hamzaabili/opencode-integrity audit
+
+# 2. Inside OpenCode, capture the live MCP tool definitions
+/integrity lock
+
+# 3. Commit the lockfile
+git add opencode.lock.json
+
+# 4. In CI
+npx @hamzaabili/opencode-integrity check --format sarif
+```
+
+`/integrity lock` is important: only the running OpenCode instance can see the
+tool descriptions and schemas returned by MCP servers (local and remote, with
+or without Code Mode). The CLI locks project plugins, MCP configuration and
+skills; it preserves runtime tool hashes when the server configuration did not
+change.
+
+## What is hashed
+
+| Asset | Fields |
+| --- | --- |
+| Plugin | package.json, every package file (capped at 5000 files / 50 MiB), version, source, detected capabilities |
+| MCP server | transport, command, URL, cwd, environment/header **names** and redacted values, codemode |
+| MCP tool | name, description, input/output schema, annotations, suspicious-instruction scan |
+| Skill | full `SKILL.md` content, size, suspicious-instruction scan |
+
+Secret-looking environment values and headers (`TOKEN`, `KEY`, `SECRET`,
+`PASSWORD`, `AUTHORIZATION`, `COOKIE`, `CREDENTIAL`) are replaced with
+`[redacted]` before hashing, so rotating a token does not create drift. Their
+names still change the hash.
+
+## Runtime modes
+
+| Mode | Behavior |
+| --- | --- |
+| `warn` (default) | Inject a drift report into the session and log it; nothing is blocked. |
+| `enforce` | Disable MCP servers whose configuration changed, remove changed skills, and deny changed MCP tools and skills before execution. |
+
+`enforce` is fail-closed for **asset drift**, not a sandbox. A plugin that is
+already loaded cannot be unloaded by a plugin hook; review plugin changes with
+the lock diff and restart OpenCode. MCP and skill transforms are applied at
+startup, so after `/integrity lock` in an existing session, reload to re-enable
+previously quarantined assets.
+
+## CLI
+
+```sh
+npx @hamzaabili/opencode-integrity audit [--json] [--strict]
+npx @hamzaabili/opencode-integrity lock
+npx @hamzaabili/opencode-integrity check [--format text|json|sarif]
+npx @hamzaabili/opencode-integrity diff
+npx @hamzaabili/opencode-integrity policy
+```
+
+- `check` exits `1` on drift or when no lockfile exists.
+- CLI `check` verifies project files/configuration; live MCP tool descriptors are
+  only verifiable by the running V2 adapter. Use `/integrity check` or the
+  `integrity_status` tool inside OpenCode for the full check.
+- `audit --strict` exits `1` on drift or an unlocked project.
+- `policy` emits native OpenCode `mcp.use`, `skill.use` and `plugin.use`
+  allow statements from the lockfile. It is an allowlist, not a hash check;
+  pair it with `check`/runtime enforcement.
+
+## Options
+
+| Option | Default | Meaning |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `lockfile` | `<project>/opencode.lock.json` | Lockfile path. |
+| `mode` | `"warn"` | `warn` or `enforce`. |
+| `include` | `["plugins","mcp","skills"]` | Asset classes to inspect. |
+| `ignore` | `[]` | Asset ids or globs to ignore, e.g. `mcp:local-dev`, `skill:experimental-*`. |
+| `includeGlobal` | `false` | Include global MCP config and, at runtime, global plugins/skills. Project-scoped assets are the default so a committed lock stays portable. |
+| `trace` | unset | Reserved for redacted diagnostics. |
+
+## Capabilities and suspicious content
+
+`audit` reports heuristic capabilities found in plugin entry code (`network`,
+`filesystem`, `process`, `environment`, `dynamic-code`) and flags zero-width
+characters, bidi controls, HTML comments, “ignore previous instructions”,
+“do not tell”, and exfiltration language in tool descriptions and skills.
+
+These are **signals**, not proof. They are deliberately deterministic and
+offline; a clean scan does not make a plugin safe.
+
+## Differences from other tools
+
+| | opencode-integrity | mcp-pin | mcp-scan / Cisco | Socket/npm audit |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| OpenCode-native runtime | yes | no (proxy) | no (on-demand) | no |
+| MCP tool descriptor pinning | yes | yes (stdio only) | scan only | no |
+| Remote MCP | yes | no | yes | no |
+| Plugins and skills | yes | no | no | packages only |
+| Runtime deny/quarantine | yes | proxy block | no | no |
+| Policy/SARIF output | yes | no | partial | no |
+| Zero runtime deps | yes | yes | varies | varies |
+
+## Security model
+
+The lockfile is a review artifact, not a signature. It catches changes between
+the version you reviewed and the version that runs; it does not prove that the
+reviewed version was safe. Use it with code review, OpenCode permissions,
+`opencode-sandbox`, and least-privilege MCP servers.
+
+Read [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) before enabling `enforce` on a shared machine.
+
+## Support
+
+- Bugs: [open an issue](https://github.com/Hamza-Abili/opencode-integrity/issues/new/choose)
+  with `audit --json` and the relevant lock diff (redact secrets).
+- Questions: [Discussions](https://github.com/Hamza-Abili/opencode-integrity/discussions).
+- Security: [private advisory](https://github.com/Hamza-Abili/opencode-integrity/security/advisories/new),
+  never a public issue.
+
+## Development
+
+```sh
+bun install
+bun run ci        # biome + tsc + tests + build + smoke
+```
+
+MIT. Zero runtime dependencies.

package/SECURITY.md

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+# Security
+
+## What this tool is
+
+`opencode-integrity` records SHA-256 hashes of OpenCode plugin content, MCP
+server configuration, MCP tool descriptors and skill files, then compares them
+with the running environment. It is a **drift detector**, not a malware
+scanner, sandbox, signature verifier or proof of safety.
+
+A lockfile catches the classic rug pull: the plugin/MCP/skill you reviewed is
+not the one now loaded. It cannot tell whether the reviewed version was
+malicious.
+
+## Trust model
+
+- `opencode.lock.json` is committed and reviewed like code. Anyone who can
+  change both the lockfile and the asset can approve the change.
+- The model-callable `integrity_lock` tool is exposed only when an evaluate
+  hook can force the dedicated `integrity_lock` action to `ask`; the
+  user-invoked `/integrity lock` command asks for the same permission.
+- `warn` mode never blocks; `enforce` mode blocks **changed** assets only.
+- Runtime enforcement covers MCP tools and skills that the plugin can observe.
+  A plugin that is already executing cannot be unloaded by a plugin hook.
+- V1 enforces static MCP configuration and skill drift, but cannot verify live
+  MCP tool descriptors; tool-level enforcement is V2-only.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Config hashes replace values of secret-looking keys (`TOKEN`, `SECRET`,
+`PASSWORD`, `API_KEY`, `AUTHORIZATION`, `COOKIE`, `CREDENTIAL`) with
+`[redacted]`. The keys still affect the hash; rotating a token does not.
+
+The lockfile contains hashes, paths, versions, capability labels and
+suspicious-content labels. It never stores tool descriptions, skill bodies or
+environment values.
+
+## Capability and poisoning heuristics
+
+Capability detection and suspicious-instruction labels are deterministic text
+heuristics. They produce false positives and false negatives. A clean report is
+not a safety guarantee; a suspicious label is a reason to review, not proof of
+malice.
+
+## Limitations
+
+- MCP tool descriptors are only visible at runtime. A CLI `check` verifies
+  configuration and files, not what a server returns today.
+- A server can change behavior without changing names, descriptions or schemas.
+- A tool can be malicious while its descriptor is clean.
+- `enforce` disables changed MCP servers and skills at load time; a changed
+  plugin is reported but cannot be unloaded by a hook.
+- The lockfile is not signed. Protect the repository and review lockfile diffs.
+- Windows is not tested. Use WSL.
+
+## Reporting
+
+Open a private advisory:
+<https://github.com/Hamza-Abili/opencode-integrity/security/advisories/new>
+
+Do not include live tokens, private MCP URLs or full environment dumps. A
+minimal reproduction with fake values is enough.