@guren/server 2.16.0 → 2.17.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/{McpServiceProvider-nNcbCIQX.js → McpServiceProvider-Zihx3Bjq.js} +24 -0
- package/dist/agent/approval-status.d.ts +56 -0
- package/dist/agent/events.d.ts +6 -4
- package/dist/agent/gate.d.ts +118 -0
- package/dist/agent/pipeline.d.ts +234 -0
- package/dist/agent/scopes.d.ts +32 -0
- package/dist/auth/AgentPrincipalGuard.d.ts +49 -0
- package/dist/auth/AuthManager.d.ts +5 -5
- package/dist/auth/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/{auth-CbdPH4Cd.js → auth-Gg54ppQi.js} +119 -26
- package/dist/http/Application.d.ts +18 -0
- package/dist/http/middleware/csrf.d.ts +14 -6
- package/dist/http/middleware/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts +9 -3
- package/dist/index.js +456 -13
- package/dist/internal/agent-principal.d.ts +32 -0
- package/dist/mcp/create-mcp-server.d.ts +17 -0
- package/dist/mcp/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/runtime/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/{vite-manifest-CTQp-SOo.js → vite-manifest-B_Iy5183.js} +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/index.js
CHANGED
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@@ -8,13 +8,13 @@ import { PATH_PARAM_PATTERN, extractPathParamNames } from "./internal/route-path
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import { a as getRegisteredJobs, c as setQueueDriver, d as getContainer, f as resolve, i as getQueueDriver, l as Container, n as clearJobRegistry, o as registerJob, p as setContainer, r as getJob, s as resolveJobName, t as Job, u as createContainer } from "./Job-DxQK8h3P.js";
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import { n as ProviderManager, r as ServiceProvider } from "./loopback-guard-DT9gHF0F.js";
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import { a as generateAppKey, c as parseAppKey, i as encodeDerivedKey, l as parsePreviousAppKeys, n as deriveAppKey, o as getAppKeyringFromEnv, r as deriveAppKeyring, s as normalizeAppKey, t as MessageSigner } from "./MessageSigner-Bd25ZJAV.js";
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-
import { A as verifyOAuthState, B as getApiToken, C as createGoogleOAuthProviderConfig, D as fetchOAuthUserProfile, E as exchangeOAuthCode, F as TokenGuard, G as readBearerToken, H as getUserApiTokens, I as API_TOKEN_KEY, J as tokenCan, K as revokeAllApiTokens, L as MemoryApiTokenStore, M as isAppRelativePath, N as normalizeRedirectTarget, O as parseOAuthRedirectUrl, P as AuthManager, Q as SessionGuard, R as createApiToken, S as createGitHubOAuthProviderConfig, T as createOAuthState, U as hasBearerHeader, V as getApiTokenOrFail, W as parseApiToken, X as tokenCanAny, Y as tokenCanAll, Z as verifyApiToken, _ as OAUTH_SESSION_BINDING_KEY, a as isEmailVerified, b as buildOAuthRedirectUrl, c as verifyEmailToken, ct as
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import { A as verifyOAuthState, B as getApiToken, C as createGoogleOAuthProviderConfig, D as fetchOAuthUserProfile, E as exchangeOAuthCode, F as TokenGuard, G as readBearerToken, H as getUserApiTokens, I as API_TOKEN_KEY, J as tokenCan, K as revokeAllApiTokens, L as MemoryApiTokenStore, M as isAppRelativePath, N as normalizeRedirectTarget, O as parseOAuthRedirectUrl, P as AuthManager, Q as SessionGuard, R as createApiToken, S as createGitHubOAuthProviderConfig, T as createOAuthState, U as hasBearerHeader, V as getApiTokenOrFail, W as parseApiToken, X as tokenCanAny, Y as tokenCanAll, Z as verifyApiToken, _ as OAUTH_SESSION_BINDING_KEY, a as isEmailVerified, b as buildOAuthRedirectUrl, c as verifyEmailToken, ct as NodeHasher, d as completePasswordReset, dt as BaseUserProvider, f as createPasswordResetToken, ft as installAgentPrincipal, g as MemoryOAuthStateStore, gt as getSessionFromContext, h as AuthenticatableModel, ht as createSessionMiddleware, i as createEmailVerificationToken, j as hostMatchesAllowlist, k as sanitizeOAuthRedirect, l as MemoryPasswordResetStore, lt as ScryptHasher, m as verifyPasswordResetToken, mt as MemorySessionStore, n as buildVerificationUrl, o as parseVerificationUrl, ot as ModelUserProvider, p as parsePasswordResetUrl, pt as readAgentPrincipal, q as revokeApiToken, r as completeEmailVerification, s as requireVerifiedEmail, st as DefaultHasher, t as MemoryEmailVerificationStore, u as buildPasswordResetUrl, ut as AuthenticationException, v as OAuthManager, w as createOAuthManager, x as createDiscordOAuthProviderConfig, y as buildOAuthAuthorizeUrl, z as createBearerTokenMiddleware } from "./auth-Gg54ppQi.js";
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import { a as md5, c as sha256, d as verifyPassword, i as hmac, l as sha512, n as hash, o as needsRehash, r as hashPassword, s as secureCompare, t as check, u as verifyHmac } from "./Hash-D2DFd8xX.js";
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import { n as getAuthContext, t as AUTH_CONTEXT_KEY } from "./context-CXk_umpT.js";
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import { r as isMcpEndpointEnabled } from "./endpoint-Dsw3Acvq.js";
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import { n as isHotReloadRuntime, r as matchingOpenParen, t as claimHotDisposable } from "./hot-disposables-B5BXqaIH.js";
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import { a as setI18n, c as tryGetI18n, d as getPluralizationRule, f as pluralizationRules, i as getI18n, l as JsonLoader, n as I18nManager, o as t, p as selectPluralForm, r as createI18n, s as tc, t as MemoryLoader, u as Translator } from "./i18n-Cg1aajRP.js";
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import { _ as parseImportMap, c as isViteProduction, d as startViteDevServer, g as DEFAULT_DEV_STYLES_ENTRY, h as logDevServerBanner, i as clientManifestCandidates, l as loadViteManifest, m as isWildcardHost, n as INJECTED_CLIENT_MANIFEST_SOURCE, o as getManifestFile, p as formatHostPort, r as PUBLIC_ASSETS_URL_PREFIX, s as injectedClientManifest, u as normalizeDevServerUrl } from "./vite-manifest-
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import { _ as parseImportMap, c as isViteProduction, d as startViteDevServer, g as DEFAULT_DEV_STYLES_ENTRY, h as logDevServerBanner, i as clientManifestCandidates, l as loadViteManifest, m as isWildcardHost, n as INJECTED_CLIENT_MANIFEST_SOURCE, o as getManifestFile, p as formatHostPort, r as PUBLIC_ASSETS_URL_PREFIX, s as injectedClientManifest, u as normalizeDevServerUrl } from "./vite-manifest-B_Iy5183.js";
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import { r as isDocsViewerEnabled } from "./endpoint-BXipU2Jj.js";
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import { t as jsx_runtime_exports } from "./jsx-runtime.js";
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import { readObjectSchema, toJsonSchema } from "./internal/zod-json-schema.js";
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@@ -889,6 +889,15 @@ function isMcpEndpointRequest(path) {
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return path === "/_guren/mcp" && isMcpEndpointEnabled();
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}
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/**
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* An endpoint that cannot authenticate from a session cookie has no ambient
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* authority for CSRF to defend, and verifying there only masks its own 401.
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* Exact path, never {@link matchesPattern}: a declaring endpoint mounts one
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* literal route, and a pattern here would be an escape hatch.
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*/
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function isCookielessAuthEndpoint(path, declared) {
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return declared !== void 0 && declared().has(path);
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}
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/**
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* A bearer request carrying no cookies at all (RFC 0016 §3). CSRF defends
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* cookie ambient authority, so the raw `Cookie` header's absence is proof
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* wherever this sits relative to the session mount; a session-based predicate
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@@ -900,6 +909,16 @@ function isBearerRequestWithoutCookies(ctx) {
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return ctx.req.header("Cookie") === void 0;
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}
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/**
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* A request the pipeline installed an agent principal on (RFC 0017 §2), exempt
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* on the cookie-less bearer terms above: it carries no cookies **by
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* construction** and authenticates by an identity keyed on the object itself,
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* which no browser or network caller can attach to a request it did not build.
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* Verification-only, like every exemption here; issuance is unchanged.
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*/
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function isSeamPrincipalRequest(ctx) {
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return readAgentPrincipal(ctx.req.raw) !== void 0;
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}
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/**
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* The request's CSRF token: bound to the session when a stable one exists,
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* otherwise a stateless signed double-submit token. Nothing is stored
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* server-side. The per-request cache is keyed by the *mode* it was issued for,
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@@ -967,19 +986,20 @@ async function getTokenFromRequest(ctx) {
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} catch {}
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}
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/**
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* Issues a signed `XSRF-TOKEN` on safe requests and verifies it on
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*
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*
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*
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*
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* Issues a signed `XSRF-TOKEN` on safe requests and verifies it on state-changing
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* ones (`_token`, `X-CSRF-TOKEN` / `X-XSRF-TOKEN`), skipping cookie-less bearer
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* requests (RFC 0016) and seam-marked ones (RFC 0017). `cookie: false` suits
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* session flows only. **Mount directly inside the session middleware:** anything
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* between that mutates the session after `await next()` moves the id too late.
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*/
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function createCsrfMiddleware(options = {}) {
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function createCsrfMiddleware(options = {}, cookielessAuthEndpoints) {
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const { exclude = [], onError, methods = DEFAULT_PROTECTED_METHODS, cookie: enableCookie = true, cookieOptions = {} } = options;
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const protectedMethods = new Set(methods.map((m) => m.toUpperCase()));
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const settleCookie = (ctx) => {
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if (enableCookie) setXsrfCookie(ctx, getCsrfToken(ctx), cookieOptions);
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};
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return async (ctx, next) => {
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if (isSeamPrincipalRequest(ctx) && ctx.req.header("Cookie") !== void 0) return jsonResponse({ message: "A request carrying an installed agent principal must not carry cookies. Refused." }, 403);
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const method = ctx.req.method.toUpperCase();
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const path = new URL(ctx.req.url).pathname;
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if (!protectedMethods.has(method)) {
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@@ -987,7 +1007,7 @@ function createCsrfMiddleware(options = {}) {
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settleCookie(ctx);
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return;
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}
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if (isExcluded$1(path, exclude) || isMcpEndpointRequest(path) || isBearerRequestWithoutCookies(ctx)) {
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if (isExcluded$1(path, exclude) || isMcpEndpointRequest(path) || isCookielessAuthEndpoint(path, cookielessAuthEndpoints) || isBearerRequestWithoutCookies(ctx) || isSeamPrincipalRequest(ctx)) {
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await next();
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settleCookie(ctx);
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return;
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@@ -1774,7 +1794,7 @@ var AuthServiceProvider = class extends ServiceProvider {
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app.use("*", createCsrfMiddleware({
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cookieOptions: { secure: typeof process !== "undefined" ? process.env.NODE_ENV === "production" : true },
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...csrfOptions
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}));
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}, () => app.getCookielessAuthPaths()));
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}
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}
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app.use("*", attachAuthContext((ctx) => auth.createAuthContext(ctx)));
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@@ -2868,6 +2888,7 @@ var Application = class {
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*/
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disposeBunTeardown;
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autoSessionAttached = false;
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cookielessAuthPaths = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
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routesRegistered = false;
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bootPromise;
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constructor(options = {}) {
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hasAutoSessionAttached() {
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return this.autoSessionAttached;
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}
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/**
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* Asserts that `path` resolves its principal without ever reading a session
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* cookie, so it refuses on its own terms and CSRF has no ambient authority to
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* defend there. Only for an endpoint whose own code establishes that; an app
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* exempting a path it chose wants `csrfOptions.exclude`. Call from `boot`,
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* after `mountRoutes()` — at `register` the collision check sees no routes.
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*/
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declareCookielessAuthPath(path) {
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const collision = this.router.definitions().find((route) => route.path === path);
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if (collision) {
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console.warn(`[guren] Refusing to exempt "${path}" from CSRF verification: the application already routes ${collision.method} ${path}${collision.name ? ` (${collision.name})` : ""}, which is registered first and answers there. Mount the declaring endpoint on a path of its own — as it stands it is unreachable, and exempting the path would disarm CSRF for the route that does answer.`);
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return;
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}
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this.cookielessAuthPaths.add(path);
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}
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/** Matched by exact path — see {@link declareCookielessAuthPath}. */
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getCookielessAuthPaths() {
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return this.cookielessAuthPaths;
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}
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async mountRoutes() {
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if (!this.routesRegistered) {
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if (this.options.routes) await this.options.routes(this.router);
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@@ -2955,11 +2995,20 @@ var Application = class {
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throw error;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Resolves when the boot that is running — or has already run — completes,
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* and immediately when none was ever started. For a surface holding this
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* application from *inside* `boot`, whose hook runs while later providers are
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* unbooted. Never await it from a provider's own `boot`: it waits on itself.
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*/
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async booted() {
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await this.bootPromise;
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}
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async bootOnce() {
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await this.providerManager.registerAll();
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await this.options.boot?.(this.hono);
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await this.mountRoutes();
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await this.mountDevEndpoint(isMcpEndpointEnabled(), async () => (await import("./McpServiceProvider-
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await this.mountDevEndpoint(isMcpEndpointEnabled(), async () => (await import("./McpServiceProvider-Zihx3Bjq.js").then((n) => n.n)).McpServiceProvider, "GUREN_MCP=1 but the MCP endpoint could not load — is @modelcontextprotocol/sdk installed?");
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await this.mountDevEndpoint(isDocsViewerEnabled(), async () => (await import("./DocsViewerServiceProvider-D2cuVgtN.js")).DocsViewerServiceProvider, "GUREN_DOCS=1 but the docs viewer could not load — is @guren/cli resolvable from this app?");
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await this.providerManager.bootAll();
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}
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@@ -3827,6 +3876,34 @@ function parseToolScope(entry) {
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prefix
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};
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}
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/**
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* Judge one `scopes` entry of an agent registration.
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*
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* @param entry The scope as written in the config.
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*/
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function classifyRegistrationScope(entry) {
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const scope = parseToolScope(entry);
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if (scope?.kind === "tool" || scope?.kind === "read") return {
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allowed: true,
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scope
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};
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if (scope?.kind === "all") return {
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allowed: false,
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reason: "wildcard",
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message: `"${entry}" grants every tool the application has, including every tool it grows later. An unattended agent must not acquire consent to tools that did not exist when this was written. List the tools as tool:<name> entries, or use tools:read if the agent only reads.`
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};
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if (scope?.kind === "prefix") return {
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allowed: false,
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reason: "prefix",
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message: `"${entry}" grants every tool in the ${scope.prefix}.* family, including ones added later. An unattended agent must not acquire consent to tools that did not exist when this was written. List the tools it needs as tool:<name> entries.`
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};
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const suggestion = AGENT_TOOL_NAME_PATTERN.test(entry) ? ` Did you mean "tool:${entry}"?` : "";
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return {
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allowed: false,
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reason: "not-a-tool-scope",
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message: `"${entry}" is not a tool scope, so it grants nothing. The registration grammar is tool:<name> for one tool by exact name, or tools:read for every read-only tool.` + suggestion
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};
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}
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/** Whether one parsed scope covers a given tool. */
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function scopeAllowsTool(scope, tool) {
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switch (scope.kind) {
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@@ -4060,7 +4137,8 @@ const AGENT_SURFACES = {
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"mcp": true,
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"dev-mcp": true,
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"cli": true,
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"webmcp": true
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"webmcp": true,
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"durable": true
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};
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/** Every denial reason, as a value, total over the union for the same reason. */
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const DENIAL_REASONS = {
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@@ -4386,6 +4464,371 @@ function describePrincipal(request) {
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return `${principal.kind === "service" ? "Service" : "User"} ${String(principal.id)}`;
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}
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//#endregion
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//#region src/agent/gate.ts
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/**
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* The adapter-level checks a tool call passes before any HTTP request is
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* synthesized (RFC 0016 §5); what happens *inside* the dispatched request is
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* the application's verdict, reported as an invocation with its HTTP status and
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* never re-judged here. {@link gateToolCall} is synchronous and free of side
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* effects because `tools/list` calls it for every tool on every listing — an
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* approval check there would create a pending record and notify approvers once
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* per tool per client connect. The approval half is {@link gateApproval},
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* reached only from the call path.
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*/
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/**
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* How an unconfigured approval queue is described when no surface says it
|
|
4480
|
+
* better. The pipeline cannot know whether it was reached over MCP, from a
|
|
4481
|
+
* durable agent or from a test harness, and naming one surface's configuration
|
|
4482
|
+
* call would send most readers to a package they do not install. A surface that
|
|
4483
|
+
* knows says so through {@link ScopeGateOptions.configureHint}.
|
|
4484
|
+
*/
|
|
4485
|
+
const DEFAULT_APPROVAL_CONFIGURE_HINT = "an approval queue on the invocation pipeline (approvals: { store, notify })";
|
|
4486
|
+
/**
|
|
4487
|
+
* Whose scopes a refusal names when no surface says it better. Neutral because
|
|
4488
|
+
* a scope denial is not always about a token: a durable agent's principal is
|
|
4489
|
+
* minted from its registration and holds no credential, so naming "the token's
|
|
4490
|
+
* scopes" would send its operator looking for a token to widen.
|
|
4491
|
+
*/
|
|
4492
|
+
const DEFAULT_SCOPE_SUBJECT = "The caller's scopes";
|
|
4493
|
+
/**
|
|
4494
|
+
* Wrap the application's `notify` so a failure can neither fail the tool call nor
|
|
4495
|
+
* lose the record: it is already persisted when this runs, so a dead channel costs
|
|
4496
|
+
* an approver an email, not a request. The failure is warned about with the request
|
|
4497
|
+
* id, which is what finds the record sitting there unannounced. Both shapes are
|
|
4498
|
+
* caught — a synchronous throw and a rejected promise.
|
|
4499
|
+
*/
|
|
4500
|
+
function notifyApprovers(notify) {
|
|
4501
|
+
return (request) => {
|
|
4502
|
+
try {
|
|
4503
|
+
Promise.resolve(notify(request)).catch((error) => warnNotifyFailure(request, error));
|
|
4504
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
4505
|
+
warnNotifyFailure(request, error);
|
|
4506
|
+
}
|
|
4507
|
+
};
|
|
4508
|
+
}
|
|
4509
|
+
function warnNotifyFailure(request, error) {
|
|
4510
|
+
console.warn(`[guren] approval notification failed for request ${request.id} (${request.tool}); the request is recorded and pending, but nobody was told: ${String(error)}`);
|
|
4511
|
+
}
|
|
4512
|
+
/**
|
|
4513
|
+
* Scope and approval, in that order — a caller learns a tool needs approval only
|
|
4514
|
+
* once its token could invoke it, so an unauthorized probe cannot map which
|
|
4515
|
+
* tools are approval-gated. `approvalsConfigured` is synchronous because
|
|
4516
|
+
* `tools/list` asks it: with a queue an approval-gated tool *is* callable (the
|
|
4517
|
+
* call queues) and belongs in the catalogue; without one, listing it invites a refusal.
|
|
4518
|
+
*/
|
|
4519
|
+
function gateToolCall(tool, abilities, options = {}) {
|
|
4520
|
+
const scope = gatePreflight(tool, abilities, options);
|
|
4521
|
+
if (!scope.allowed) return scope;
|
|
4522
|
+
if (tool.approval === "required" && !options.approvalsConfigured) return {
|
|
4523
|
+
allowed: false,
|
|
4524
|
+
reason: "approval",
|
|
4525
|
+
message: `The tool "${tool.toolName}" requires server-side approval, and this server has no approval queue configured. Nothing was executed. Configure one with ${options.configureHint ?? "an approval queue on the invocation pipeline (approvals: { store, notify })"}.`
|
|
4526
|
+
};
|
|
4527
|
+
return { allowed: true };
|
|
4528
|
+
}
|
|
4529
|
+
/**
|
|
4530
|
+
* The approval half (RFC 0016 §5.4 item 4). One lookup on tool + *raw* arguments'
|
|
4531
|
+
* fingerprint + principal: a pending or rejected match refuses without a second
|
|
4532
|
+
* record or notification (polling by re-calling would page approvers per poll);
|
|
4533
|
+
* a rejection blocks only while its record is live. Consumed *before* dispatch,
|
|
4534
|
+
* one attempt not one success: else concurrent calls pass and a crash is replayable.
|
|
4535
|
+
*/
|
|
4536
|
+
async function gateApproval(tool, args, context) {
|
|
4537
|
+
if (context.principal === null) return {
|
|
4538
|
+
allowed: false,
|
|
4539
|
+
reason: "approval",
|
|
4540
|
+
message: `The tool "${tool.toolName}" requires approval, and this request carries no identified caller. An approval is granted to a principal and spent by one, so it cannot be bound to an anonymous call. Nothing was executed and no request was recorded.`
|
|
4541
|
+
};
|
|
4542
|
+
const fingerprint = await agentApprovalFingerprint(args);
|
|
4543
|
+
const principalKey = agentApprovalPrincipalKey(context.principal);
|
|
4544
|
+
const now = context.now();
|
|
4545
|
+
const existing = await context.store.findMatch({
|
|
4546
|
+
tool: tool.toolName,
|
|
4547
|
+
fingerprint,
|
|
4548
|
+
principalKey
|
|
4549
|
+
});
|
|
4550
|
+
if (existing) {
|
|
4551
|
+
if (agentApprovalUsableAt(existing, now)) {
|
|
4552
|
+
if (await context.store.consume(existing.id)) return { allowed: true };
|
|
4553
|
+
return spentVerdict(tool, existing);
|
|
4554
|
+
}
|
|
4555
|
+
const status = agentApprovalStatusAt(existing, now);
|
|
4556
|
+
if (status === "pending") return pendingVerdict(tool, existing, "pending");
|
|
4557
|
+
if (status === "rejected" && !agentApprovalExpiredAt(existing, now)) return rejectedVerdict(tool, existing);
|
|
4558
|
+
}
|
|
4559
|
+
const request = buildAgentApprovalRequest({
|
|
4560
|
+
tool: tool.toolName,
|
|
4561
|
+
input: context.redact(args),
|
|
4562
|
+
fingerprint,
|
|
4563
|
+
principal: context.principal,
|
|
4564
|
+
ttlMs: context.ttlMs
|
|
4565
|
+
}, now);
|
|
4566
|
+
await context.store.create(request);
|
|
4567
|
+
context.notify(request);
|
|
4568
|
+
return pendingVerdict(tool, request, "created");
|
|
4569
|
+
}
|
|
4570
|
+
/**
|
|
4571
|
+
* One builder for the three refusals, so the fields an agent parses cannot come
|
|
4572
|
+
* to differ between them. Every refusal states that nothing was executed in the
|
|
4573
|
+
* message *and* the body: an error plus a tool name is exactly the shape an
|
|
4574
|
+
* agent retries.
|
|
4575
|
+
*/
|
|
4576
|
+
function approvalRefusal(status, message, request, extra = {}) {
|
|
4577
|
+
return {
|
|
4578
|
+
allowed: false,
|
|
4579
|
+
reason: "approval",
|
|
4580
|
+
message,
|
|
4581
|
+
body: {
|
|
4582
|
+
status,
|
|
4583
|
+
requestId: request.id,
|
|
4584
|
+
tool: request.tool,
|
|
4585
|
+
requestedAt: request.requestedAt,
|
|
4586
|
+
expiresAt: request.expiresAt,
|
|
4587
|
+
executed: false,
|
|
4588
|
+
...extra
|
|
4589
|
+
}
|
|
4590
|
+
};
|
|
4591
|
+
}
|
|
4592
|
+
/**
|
|
4593
|
+
* The refusal for a call that is waiting on a human. `pollWith` rides only
|
|
4594
|
+
* here: this is the one answer a caller should come back to, where a rejection
|
|
4595
|
+
* is told not to poll and a spent approval to ask again.
|
|
4596
|
+
*/
|
|
4597
|
+
function pendingVerdict(tool, request, origin) {
|
|
4598
|
+
return approvalRefusal("pending", `The tool "${tool.toolName}" requires approval. Nothing was executed. ` + (origin === "created" ? "A request was created and the approvers have been notified. " : "A request for this exact call is already waiting. ") + `Check it with ${APPROVAL_STATUS_TOOL_NAME} using requestId "${request.id}". Once it is approved, repeat this call with the same arguments to perform it.`, request, { pollWith: APPROVAL_STATUS_TOOL_NAME });
|
|
4599
|
+
}
|
|
4600
|
+
/** A call a human answered "no" to, reported distinctly from a pending wait. */
|
|
4601
|
+
function rejectedVerdict(tool, request) {
|
|
4602
|
+
return approvalRefusal("rejected", `The tool "${tool.toolName}" requires approval, and this exact call was rejected. Nothing was executed, and polling will not change that. Do not repeat the call with these arguments.`, request, request.resolvedAt ? { resolvedAt: request.resolvedAt } : {});
|
|
4603
|
+
}
|
|
4604
|
+
/**
|
|
4605
|
+
* An approval another call spent first — its own answer rather than a fresh
|
|
4606
|
+
* request: the loser of the race was not refused for want of approval, so
|
|
4607
|
+
* telling it to ask again is right, filing a request and paging a human is not.
|
|
4608
|
+
*/
|
|
4609
|
+
function spentVerdict(tool, request) {
|
|
4610
|
+
return approvalRefusal("spent", `The tool "${tool.toolName}" requires approval, and the approval for this exact call was already used by another call. Nothing was executed. Ask again to request a new one.`, request);
|
|
4611
|
+
}
|
|
4612
|
+
/**
|
|
4613
|
+
* The scope half alone — what `guren.preflight` checks before rehearsing a call
|
|
4614
|
+
* (RFC 0016 §5.4). Checking requires the *same* scope as calling, or the
|
|
4615
|
+
* companion becomes a probe of tools the token cannot call. Approval is not
|
|
4616
|
+
* applied: a rehearsal executes nothing, and approval gates an ability rather
|
|
4617
|
+
* than knowledge; never reaching {@link gateApproval}, it files and pages nothing.
|
|
4618
|
+
*/
|
|
4619
|
+
function gatePreflight(tool, abilities, options = {}) {
|
|
4620
|
+
if (!scopesAllowTool(abilities, scopedShape(tool))) return {
|
|
4621
|
+
allowed: false,
|
|
4622
|
+
reason: "scope",
|
|
4623
|
+
message: `${options.scopeSubject ?? "The caller's scopes"} do not grant the tool "${tool.toolName}".`
|
|
4624
|
+
};
|
|
4625
|
+
return { allowed: true };
|
|
4626
|
+
}
|
|
4627
|
+
/** The two fields the scope grammar judges a tool by. */
|
|
4628
|
+
function scopedShape(tool) {
|
|
4629
|
+
return {
|
|
4630
|
+
name: tool.toolName,
|
|
4631
|
+
readOnly: tool.annotations.readOnlyHint
|
|
4632
|
+
};
|
|
4633
|
+
}
|
|
4634
|
+
//#endregion
|
|
4635
|
+
//#region src/agent/pipeline.ts
|
|
4636
|
+
/**
|
|
4637
|
+
* Build {@link AgentInvocationOptions.approvals} for one caller.
|
|
4638
|
+
*
|
|
4639
|
+
* The TTL default, the redaction rules and the `notify` wrapping are invariants
|
|
4640
|
+
* of an approval record rather than of a protocol. Per caller, because an
|
|
4641
|
+
* approval binds to the principal that asked; `undefined` means no queue.
|
|
4642
|
+
*/
|
|
4643
|
+
function createAgentApprovalContext(config, principal) {
|
|
4644
|
+
if (!config) return void 0;
|
|
4645
|
+
return {
|
|
4646
|
+
store: config.store,
|
|
4647
|
+
principal,
|
|
4648
|
+
now: () => /* @__PURE__ */ new Date(),
|
|
4649
|
+
ttlMs: config.ttlMs ?? 36e5,
|
|
4650
|
+
redact: (tool, args) => redactAgentArguments(args, tool.redact),
|
|
4651
|
+
notify: notifyApprovers(config.notify)
|
|
4652
|
+
};
|
|
4653
|
+
}
|
|
4654
|
+
/**
|
|
4655
|
+
* How a call is written down: principal, surface, and argument masking.
|
|
4656
|
+
*
|
|
4657
|
+
* Exported because a durable agent's approval-status check reaches the store
|
|
4658
|
+
* without dispatching a tool (RFC 0017 §5), and a second copy of this rule is
|
|
4659
|
+
* how one surface records an argument the other masks.
|
|
4660
|
+
*/
|
|
4661
|
+
function createAgentAuditRecorder(options) {
|
|
4662
|
+
return {
|
|
4663
|
+
invoked(audited, args, status, durationMs) {
|
|
4664
|
+
options.audit?.(new AgentToolInvoked(options.principal, audited.toolName, redactAgentArguments(args, audited.redact), status, durationMs, options.surface));
|
|
4665
|
+
},
|
|
4666
|
+
denied(audited, args, reason) {
|
|
4667
|
+
options.audit?.(new AgentToolDenied(options.principal, audited.toolName, redactAgentArguments(args, audited.redact), reason, options.surface));
|
|
4668
|
+
}
|
|
4669
|
+
};
|
|
4670
|
+
}
|
|
4671
|
+
/**
|
|
4672
|
+
* Build the pipeline for one caller. A factory because everything in
|
|
4673
|
+
* {@link AgentInvocationOptions} is settled per caller and read per call — the
|
|
4674
|
+
* principal an approval binds to, the abilities the gate judges by, the surface
|
|
4675
|
+
* the trail records — and hoisting any of it would carry whichever caller
|
|
4676
|
+
* arrived first.
|
|
4677
|
+
*/
|
|
4678
|
+
function createAgentInvocationPipeline(options) {
|
|
4679
|
+
if (options.handoff === "seam" && options.authorization !== void 0) throw new Error("createAgentInvocationPipeline: `authorization` and `handoff: 'seam'` are mutually exclusive. A surface either presents a credential the application verifies, or hands over a principal the application trusts — never both.");
|
|
4680
|
+
const scopeGateOptions = {
|
|
4681
|
+
approvalsConfigured: options.approvals !== void 0,
|
|
4682
|
+
...options.approvalConfigureHint !== void 0 ? { configureHint: options.approvalConfigureHint } : {},
|
|
4683
|
+
...options.scopeSubject !== void 0 ? { scopeSubject: options.scopeSubject } : {}
|
|
4684
|
+
};
|
|
4685
|
+
const record = createAgentAuditRecorder({
|
|
4686
|
+
...options.audit ? { audit: options.audit } : {},
|
|
4687
|
+
principal: options.principal,
|
|
4688
|
+
surface: options.surface
|
|
4689
|
+
});
|
|
4690
|
+
return { async invoke(call) {
|
|
4691
|
+
const { tool, args } = call;
|
|
4692
|
+
const preflight = call.preflight === true;
|
|
4693
|
+
const audited = call.audited ?? tool;
|
|
4694
|
+
const auditArgs = call.auditedArguments ?? args;
|
|
4695
|
+
const deny = (denial) => {
|
|
4696
|
+
record.denied(audited, auditArgs, denial.reason);
|
|
4697
|
+
return {
|
|
4698
|
+
status: "denied",
|
|
4699
|
+
denial
|
|
4700
|
+
};
|
|
4701
|
+
};
|
|
4702
|
+
const scope = preflight ? gatePreflight(tool, options.abilities, scopeGateOptions) : gateToolCall(tool, options.abilities, scopeGateOptions);
|
|
4703
|
+
if (!scope.allowed) return deny(toDenial(scope));
|
|
4704
|
+
if (options.interpose) {
|
|
4705
|
+
const interposed = await options.interpose({
|
|
4706
|
+
tool,
|
|
4707
|
+
args,
|
|
4708
|
+
preflight
|
|
4709
|
+
});
|
|
4710
|
+
if (interposed) return deny(interposed);
|
|
4711
|
+
}
|
|
4712
|
+
if (!preflight && tool.approval === "required" && options.approvals) {
|
|
4713
|
+
const { approvals } = options;
|
|
4714
|
+
let verdict;
|
|
4715
|
+
try {
|
|
4716
|
+
verdict = await gateApproval(tool, args, {
|
|
4717
|
+
...approvals,
|
|
4718
|
+
redact: (callArgs) => approvals.redact(tool, callArgs)
|
|
4719
|
+
});
|
|
4720
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
4721
|
+
return deny({
|
|
4722
|
+
reason: "approval",
|
|
4723
|
+
message: `The approval queue could not be reached, so "${tool.toolName}" was not run and no request was recorded: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`
|
|
4724
|
+
});
|
|
4725
|
+
}
|
|
4726
|
+
if (!verdict.allowed) return deny(toDenial(verdict));
|
|
4727
|
+
}
|
|
4728
|
+
const startedAt = performance.now();
|
|
4729
|
+
try {
|
|
4730
|
+
const built = buildToolRequest(tool, args, {
|
|
4731
|
+
origin: options.origin,
|
|
4732
|
+
authorization: options.authorization,
|
|
4733
|
+
preflight,
|
|
4734
|
+
surface: options.surface
|
|
4735
|
+
});
|
|
4736
|
+
if (!("request" in built)) {
|
|
4737
|
+
const outcome = {
|
|
4738
|
+
content: [{
|
|
4739
|
+
type: "text",
|
|
4740
|
+
text: describeBuildFailure(built)
|
|
4741
|
+
}],
|
|
4742
|
+
isError: true,
|
|
4743
|
+
status: 400
|
|
4744
|
+
};
|
|
4745
|
+
record.invoked(audited, auditArgs, outcome.status, elapsed(startedAt));
|
|
4746
|
+
return {
|
|
4747
|
+
status: "executed",
|
|
4748
|
+
outcome
|
|
4749
|
+
};
|
|
4750
|
+
}
|
|
4751
|
+
const request = options.handoff === "seam" && options.principal ? installAgentPrincipal(built.request, {
|
|
4752
|
+
principal: options.principal,
|
|
4753
|
+
abilities: options.abilities
|
|
4754
|
+
}) : built.request;
|
|
4755
|
+
const outcome = await mapToolResponse(tool, await options.app.fetch(request, options.env, options.executionCtx));
|
|
4756
|
+
record.invoked(audited, auditArgs, outcome.status, elapsed(startedAt));
|
|
4757
|
+
return {
|
|
4758
|
+
status: "executed",
|
|
4759
|
+
outcome
|
|
4760
|
+
};
|
|
4761
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
4762
|
+
record.invoked(audited, auditArgs, 500, elapsed(startedAt));
|
|
4763
|
+
return {
|
|
4764
|
+
status: "failed",
|
|
4765
|
+
message: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)
|
|
4766
|
+
};
|
|
4767
|
+
}
|
|
4768
|
+
} };
|
|
4769
|
+
}
|
|
4770
|
+
/**
|
|
4771
|
+
* A refused gate verdict, in the one shape every surface renders.
|
|
4772
|
+
*
|
|
4773
|
+
* `body` is spread conditionally rather than assigned: `body: verdict.body`
|
|
4774
|
+
* leaves the key present holding `undefined`, which is not the same object
|
|
4775
|
+
* under strict comparison or serialization as one that never carried a body.
|
|
4776
|
+
*/
|
|
4777
|
+
function toDenial(verdict) {
|
|
4778
|
+
return {
|
|
4779
|
+
reason: verdict.reason,
|
|
4780
|
+
message: verdict.message,
|
|
4781
|
+
...verdict.body ? { body: verdict.body } : {}
|
|
4782
|
+
};
|
|
4783
|
+
}
|
|
4784
|
+
function elapsed(startedAt) {
|
|
4785
|
+
return Math.round(performance.now() - startedAt);
|
|
4786
|
+
}
|
|
4787
|
+
//#endregion
|
|
4788
|
+
//#region src/agent/approval-status.ts
|
|
4789
|
+
/**
|
|
4790
|
+
* Reading one approval record as an answer for the caller that asked
|
|
4791
|
+
* (RFC 0016 §5.4 item 4). Pure derivation, like `approval.ts`: no store, no
|
|
4792
|
+
* clock, no protocol.
|
|
4793
|
+
*
|
|
4794
|
+
* Here rather than in an adapter because two surfaces answer this question —
|
|
4795
|
+
* `guren.approval_status` over MCP and a durable agent's own status check
|
|
4796
|
+
* (RFC 0017 §5) — and a record one of them calls "approved" must not be one
|
|
4797
|
+
* the other hides.
|
|
4798
|
+
*/
|
|
4799
|
+
/**
|
|
4800
|
+
* The one message for "there is no such request *for you*". One function for
|
|
4801
|
+
* both branches because an unknown id and another principal's id must be the
|
|
4802
|
+
* same answer byte for byte: any difference turns the check into a way to
|
|
4803
|
+
* enumerate other principals' pending actions. The audit trail is where the
|
|
4804
|
+
* distinction is kept, for the operator.
|
|
4805
|
+
*/
|
|
4806
|
+
function approvalStatusNotFoundMessage(requestId) {
|
|
4807
|
+
return `No approval request with id "${requestId}" was made by this caller.`;
|
|
4808
|
+
}
|
|
4809
|
+
/**
|
|
4810
|
+
* Read a stored record as an answer for `principal` at `now`. `record === null`
|
|
4811
|
+
* and "not visible to this principal" converge here rather than at two call
|
|
4812
|
+
* sites, so their sameness is structural.
|
|
4813
|
+
*/
|
|
4814
|
+
function toApprovalStatusReport(requestId, record, principal, now) {
|
|
4815
|
+
if (!record || !agentApprovalVisibleTo(record, principal)) return {
|
|
4816
|
+
notFound: approvalStatusNotFoundMessage(requestId),
|
|
4817
|
+
foreign: record !== null
|
|
4818
|
+
};
|
|
4819
|
+
return { report: {
|
|
4820
|
+
requestId: record.id,
|
|
4821
|
+
status: agentApprovalStatusAt(record, now),
|
|
4822
|
+
tool: record.tool,
|
|
4823
|
+
requestedAt: record.requestedAt,
|
|
4824
|
+
expiresAt: record.expiresAt,
|
|
4825
|
+
executed: false,
|
|
4826
|
+
...record.resolvedAt ? { resolvedAt: record.resolvedAt } : {},
|
|
4827
|
+
...record.resolvedBy ? { resolvedBy: record.resolvedBy } : {},
|
|
4828
|
+
...record.consumedAt ? { consumedAt: record.consumedAt } : {}
|
|
4829
|
+
} };
|
|
4830
|
+
}
|
|
4831
|
+
//#endregion
|
|
4389
4832
|
//#region src/providers/OAuthServiceProvider.ts
|
|
4390
4833
|
/** Binds OAuthManager as a singleton in the container. */
|
|
4391
4834
|
var OAuthServiceProvider = class extends ServiceProvider {
|
|
@@ -7060,4 +7503,4 @@ function renderEnvironmentSection() {
|
|
|
7060
7503
|
//#region src/index.ts
|
|
7061
7504
|
ensureErrorStackTracePolyfill();
|
|
7062
7505
|
//#endregion
|
|
7063
|
-
export { AGENT_APPROVAL_CONFIG_KEY, AGENT_AUDIT_BINDING, AGENT_REDACTED, AGENT_TOOL_NAME_PATTERN, API_TOKEN_KEY, APPROVAL_STATUS_TOOL_NAME, AUTH_CONTEXT_KEY, AgentApprovalRequested, AgentToolDenied, AgentToolInvoked, Application, ApplicationShutdown, ApplicationStarted, AuthManager, Response$1 as AuthResponse, AuthServiceProvider, AuthenticatableModel, AuthenticationException, AuthorizationException, AuthorizationServiceProvider, AutoDiscovery, BaseFactory, BaseFactory as Factory, BaseSeeder, BaseSeeder as Seeder, BaseUserProvider, BroadcastManager, BroadcastServiceProvider, BufferedOutput, CSP_NONCE_KEY, CSRF_FORM_FIELD, CSRF_HEADER_NAME, CSRF_TOKEN_KEY, CacheCheck, CacheManager, CacheServiceProvider, Channel, Command, ConsoleChannel, ConsoleKernel, Container, Controller, CursorPaginator, CustomCheck, DEFAULT_AGENT_APPROVAL_TTL_MS, DEFAULT_AGENT_AUDIT_PATH, DailyFileChannel, DatabaseChannel, DatabaseCheck, DefaultHasher, DefaultHasher as Hash, Encrypter, EncryptionServiceProvider, ErrorServiceProvider, Event, EventManager, EventServiceProvider, ExceptionHandler, FailedJobReporter, FieldValidator, FileStore as FileCacheStore, FileChannel, FormRequest, Gate, HealthCheck, HealthManager, HealthServiceProvider, HttpException, I18nManager, I18nServiceProvider, InertiaServiceProvider, Input, Job, JobFailed, JobProcessed, JsonLoader, JsonResource, LOCALE_CONTEXT_KEY, LOG_LEVEL_PRIORITY, Listener, LocalDriver as LocalStorageDriver, LogManager, LogServiceProvider, LogTransport, Logger, Mail, MailChannel, MailManager, MailServiceProvider, MemoryApiTokenStore, MemoryDriver as MemoryBroadcastDriver, MemoryStore as MemoryCacheStore, MemoryChannel, MemoryCheck, MemoryDriver$1 as MemoryDriver, MemoryDriver$1 as MemoryQueueDriver, MemoryEmailVerificationStore, MemoryLoader, MemoryOAuthStateStore, MemoryPasswordResetStore, MemoryRateLimitStore, MemorySessionStore, MemoryDriver$2 as MemoryStorageDriver, MemoryTransport, MessageSigner, MethodNotAllowedException, ModelUserProvider, NodeHasher, NotFoundHttpException, Notification, NotificationManager, NotificationServiceProvider, OAUTH_SESSION_BINDING_KEY, OAuthManager, OAuthServiceProvider, Output, PREFLIGHT_ARGUMENT, PREFLIGHT_TOOL_NAME, Paginator, PendingSchedule, Policy, PresenceChannel, PrivateChannel, ProviderManager, QueueManager, QueueServiceProvider, RESERVED_AGENT_TOOL_NAMES, RedisDriver as RedisBroadcastDriver, RedisStore as RedisCacheStore, RedisCheck, RedisDriver$1 as RedisDriver, RedisDriver$1 as RedisQueueDriver, RequestFinished, RequestReceived, ResendTransport, Resource, ResourceCollection, Router, S3Driver, Schedule, ScheduledTask, Scheduler, SchedulingServiceProvider, ScryptHasher, SeederRunner, ServiceProvider, SessionGuard, SlackChannel, SlidingWindowRateLimitStore, SmtpTransport, SqsDriver, StorageCheck, StorageManager, StorageServiceProvider, SyncDriver, SyncDriver as SyncQueueDriver, TaggedCache, TokenGuard, Translator, UserAuthenticated, UserLoggedOut, VALIDATED_DATA_KEY, ValidationException, Validator, ViewEngine, Worker, abort, abortIf, abortUnless, advertisesStructuredOutput, after, afterOrEqual, agentApprovalExpiredAt, agentApprovalFingerprint, agentApprovalPrincipalKey, agentApprovalStatusAt, agentApprovalUsableAt, agentApprovalVisibleTo, alpha, alphaDash, alphaNum, array as arrayRule, attachAuthContext, authorize as authorizeAbility, authorizeAllMiddleware, authorizeMiddleware, authorizeResourceMiddleware, before, beforeOrEqual, between, boolean as booleanRule, buildAgentApprovalRequest, buildOAuthAuthorizeUrl, buildOAuthRedirectUrl, buildPasswordResetUrl, buildToolRequest, buildVerificationUrl, can, cannot, canonicalizeAgentApprovalInput, check as checkHash, clearJobRegistry, clearNotificationRegistry, collect, completeEmailVerification, completePasswordReset, confirmed, createApiToken, createApp, createAuditEmitter, createBearerTokenMiddleware, createBroadcastManager, createCacheManager, createConsoleKernel, createContainer, createCorsMiddleware, createCspMiddleware, createCsrfMiddleware, createDiscordOAuthProviderConfig, createEmailVerificationToken, createEncrypter, createEventManager, createExceptionHandler, createFacade, createFacades, createForceHttpsMiddleware, createGate, createGitHubOAuthProviderConfig, createGoogleOAuthProviderConfig, createHealthManager, createHostAuthorizationMiddleware, createI18n, createLogManager, createMailManager, createNotificationManager, createOAuthManager, createOAuthState, createPasswordResetToken, createQueueManager, createRateLimitMiddleware, createRedirectSafetyMiddleware, createRedisClient, createScheduler, createSecurityHeaders, createSeederRunner, createSessionMiddleware, createSqsAdapter, createStorageManager, createTypedBroadcaster, createValidator, csrfField, cursorPaginate, custom, customCheck, dailyFileDateStamp, dailyFilePath, dateFormat, date as dateRule, debugErrorMiddleware, decodeCursor, decrypt, defineFactory, defineGate, defineMiddleware, defineModule, definePlugin, definePolicy, deriveAgentTools, deriveAppKey, deriveAppKeyring, describeBuildFailure, detectLocaleMiddleware, different, email as emailRule, encodeCursor, encrypt, endsWith, exchangeOAuthCode, exists, expandToolScopes, fetchOAuthUserProfile, file as fileRule, filterSensitiveData, formatValidationErrors, generateAppKey, generateKey, generateOtp, generatePassword, generateSlug, getApiToken, getApiTokenOrFail, getAppKeyringFromEnv, getBroadcastManager, getContainer, getCspNonce, getCsrfToken, getEncrypter, getExceptionHandler, getGate, getI18n, getInertiaSharedPropsResolver, getJob, getLogManager, getMailManager, getNextOccurrence, getNextOccurrences, getNotification, getNotificationManager, getPluralizationRule, getQueueDriver, getRateLimitInfo, getRegisteredJobs, getRequestLocale, getRequestTranslator, getSessionFromContext, getUserApiTokens, getValidatedData, hash, hashPassword, hmac, image as imageRule, inValues, inertia, integer, ip, ipv4, ipv6, isDue, isDueInTimezone, isEmailVerified, isReservedAgentToolName, isSafeRedirectUrl, jsonResponse, json as jsonRule, mail, mapToolResponse, matchDailyFileDate, matchesCron, max, maxFileSize, md5, mimes, min, minFileSize, mountModuleRoutes, needsRehash, normalizeAppKey, notIn, nullable, numeric, object as objectRule, paginate, parseApiToken, parseAppKey, parseAuditRecord, parseCron, parseOAuthRedirectUrl, parsePasswordResetUrl, parsePreviousAppKeys, parseRequestPayload, parseSignature, parseToolScope, parseVerificationUrl, pick, pluralizationRules, processJob, quickValidate, quickValidateOrThrow, random, randomBase64, randomBase64Url, randomHex, randomInt, randomString, readBearerToken, redactAgentArguments, regex, registerJob, registerNotification, renderDebugPage, renderDocument, renderErrorPage, requestIdMiddleware, requestLoggingMiddleware, requireAuthenticated, requireGuest, requireVerifiedEmail, required, requiredIf, requiredUnless, requiredWith, requiredWithout, resetCalledSeeders, resetRateLimit, resolve, resolveJobName, resolveNotifiableType, revokeAllApiTokens, revokeApiToken, same, sample, sanitizeOAuthRedirect, scopesAllowTool, secureCompare, selectPluralForm, setBroadcastManager, setContainer, setEncrypter, setExceptionHandler, setGate, setI18n, setInertiaDocument, setInertiaSharedProps, setInertiaSsrRenderer, setLogManager, setMailManager, setNotificationManager, setQueueDriver, sha256, sha512, shareInertiaProps, shuffle, signUrl, size, startsWith, string as stringRule, t, tc, toAuditRecord, toTimezone, tokenCan, tokenCanAll, tokenCanAny, tryGetI18n, unique, url as urlRule, urlSafeToken, uuid, uuid$1 as uuidRule, validate, validateRequest, validateRequestWith, validateSafe, verifyApiToken, verifyCsrfToken, verifyEmailToken, verifyHmac, verifyOAuthState, verifyPassword, verifyPasswordResetToken, verifySignedUrl, viteAsset, withAuthorization };
|
|
7506
|
+
export { AGENT_APPROVAL_CONFIG_KEY, AGENT_AUDIT_BINDING, AGENT_REDACTED, AGENT_TOOL_NAME_PATTERN, API_TOKEN_KEY, APPROVAL_STATUS_TOOL_NAME, AUTH_CONTEXT_KEY, AgentApprovalRequested, AgentToolDenied, AgentToolInvoked, Application, ApplicationShutdown, ApplicationStarted, AuthManager, Response$1 as AuthResponse, AuthServiceProvider, AuthenticatableModel, AuthenticationException, AuthorizationException, AuthorizationServiceProvider, AutoDiscovery, BaseFactory, BaseFactory as Factory, BaseSeeder, BaseSeeder as Seeder, BaseUserProvider, BroadcastManager, BroadcastServiceProvider, BufferedOutput, CSP_NONCE_KEY, CSRF_FORM_FIELD, CSRF_HEADER_NAME, CSRF_TOKEN_KEY, CacheCheck, CacheManager, CacheServiceProvider, Channel, Command, ConsoleChannel, ConsoleKernel, Container, Controller, CursorPaginator, CustomCheck, DEFAULT_AGENT_APPROVAL_TTL_MS, DEFAULT_AGENT_AUDIT_PATH, DEFAULT_APPROVAL_CONFIGURE_HINT, DEFAULT_SCOPE_SUBJECT, DailyFileChannel, DatabaseChannel, DatabaseCheck, DefaultHasher, DefaultHasher as Hash, Encrypter, EncryptionServiceProvider, ErrorServiceProvider, Event, EventManager, EventServiceProvider, ExceptionHandler, FailedJobReporter, FieldValidator, FileStore as FileCacheStore, FileChannel, FormRequest, Gate, HealthCheck, HealthManager, HealthServiceProvider, HttpException, I18nManager, I18nServiceProvider, InertiaServiceProvider, Input, Job, JobFailed, JobProcessed, JsonLoader, JsonResource, LOCALE_CONTEXT_KEY, LOG_LEVEL_PRIORITY, Listener, LocalDriver as LocalStorageDriver, LogManager, LogServiceProvider, LogTransport, Logger, Mail, MailChannel, MailManager, MailServiceProvider, MemoryApiTokenStore, MemoryDriver as MemoryBroadcastDriver, MemoryStore as MemoryCacheStore, MemoryChannel, MemoryCheck, MemoryDriver$1 as MemoryDriver, MemoryDriver$1 as MemoryQueueDriver, MemoryEmailVerificationStore, MemoryLoader, MemoryOAuthStateStore, MemoryPasswordResetStore, MemoryRateLimitStore, MemorySessionStore, MemoryDriver$2 as MemoryStorageDriver, MemoryTransport, MessageSigner, MethodNotAllowedException, ModelUserProvider, NodeHasher, NotFoundHttpException, Notification, NotificationManager, NotificationServiceProvider, OAUTH_SESSION_BINDING_KEY, OAuthManager, OAuthServiceProvider, Output, PREFLIGHT_ARGUMENT, PREFLIGHT_TOOL_NAME, Paginator, PendingSchedule, Policy, PresenceChannel, PrivateChannel, ProviderManager, QueueManager, QueueServiceProvider, RESERVED_AGENT_TOOL_NAMES, RedisDriver as RedisBroadcastDriver, RedisStore as RedisCacheStore, RedisCheck, RedisDriver$1 as RedisDriver, RedisDriver$1 as RedisQueueDriver, RequestFinished, RequestReceived, ResendTransport, Resource, ResourceCollection, Router, S3Driver, Schedule, ScheduledTask, Scheduler, SchedulingServiceProvider, ScryptHasher, SeederRunner, ServiceProvider, SessionGuard, SlackChannel, SlidingWindowRateLimitStore, SmtpTransport, SqsDriver, StorageCheck, StorageManager, StorageServiceProvider, SyncDriver, SyncDriver as SyncQueueDriver, TaggedCache, TokenGuard, Translator, UserAuthenticated, UserLoggedOut, VALIDATED_DATA_KEY, ValidationException, Validator, ViewEngine, Worker, abort, abortIf, abortUnless, advertisesStructuredOutput, after, afterOrEqual, agentApprovalExpiredAt, agentApprovalFingerprint, agentApprovalPrincipalKey, agentApprovalStatusAt, agentApprovalUsableAt, agentApprovalVisibleTo, alpha, alphaDash, alphaNum, approvalStatusNotFoundMessage, array as arrayRule, attachAuthContext, authorize as authorizeAbility, authorizeAllMiddleware, authorizeMiddleware, authorizeResourceMiddleware, before, beforeOrEqual, between, boolean as booleanRule, buildAgentApprovalRequest, buildOAuthAuthorizeUrl, buildOAuthRedirectUrl, buildPasswordResetUrl, buildToolRequest, buildVerificationUrl, can, cannot, canonicalizeAgentApprovalInput, check as checkHash, classifyRegistrationScope, clearJobRegistry, clearNotificationRegistry, collect, completeEmailVerification, completePasswordReset, confirmed, createAgentApprovalContext, createAgentAuditRecorder, createAgentInvocationPipeline, createApiToken, createApp, createAuditEmitter, createBearerTokenMiddleware, createBroadcastManager, createCacheManager, createConsoleKernel, createContainer, createCorsMiddleware, createCspMiddleware, createCsrfMiddleware, createDiscordOAuthProviderConfig, createEmailVerificationToken, createEncrypter, createEventManager, createExceptionHandler, createFacade, createFacades, createForceHttpsMiddleware, createGate, createGitHubOAuthProviderConfig, createGoogleOAuthProviderConfig, createHealthManager, createHostAuthorizationMiddleware, createI18n, createLogManager, createMailManager, createNotificationManager, createOAuthManager, createOAuthState, createPasswordResetToken, createQueueManager, createRateLimitMiddleware, createRedirectSafetyMiddleware, createRedisClient, createScheduler, createSecurityHeaders, createSeederRunner, createSessionMiddleware, createSqsAdapter, createStorageManager, createTypedBroadcaster, createValidator, csrfField, cursorPaginate, custom, customCheck, dailyFileDateStamp, dailyFilePath, dateFormat, date as dateRule, debugErrorMiddleware, decodeCursor, decrypt, defineFactory, defineGate, defineMiddleware, defineModule, definePlugin, definePolicy, deriveAgentTools, deriveAppKey, deriveAppKeyring, describeBuildFailure, detectLocaleMiddleware, different, email as emailRule, encodeCursor, encrypt, endsWith, exchangeOAuthCode, exists, expandToolScopes, fetchOAuthUserProfile, file as fileRule, filterSensitiveData, formatValidationErrors, gateApproval, gatePreflight, gateToolCall, generateAppKey, generateKey, generateOtp, generatePassword, generateSlug, getApiToken, getApiTokenOrFail, getAppKeyringFromEnv, getBroadcastManager, getContainer, getCspNonce, getCsrfToken, getEncrypter, getExceptionHandler, getGate, getI18n, getInertiaSharedPropsResolver, getJob, getLogManager, getMailManager, getNextOccurrence, getNextOccurrences, getNotification, getNotificationManager, getPluralizationRule, getQueueDriver, getRateLimitInfo, getRegisteredJobs, getRequestLocale, getRequestTranslator, getSessionFromContext, getUserApiTokens, getValidatedData, hash, hashPassword, hmac, image as imageRule, inValues, inertia, integer, ip, ipv4, ipv6, isDue, isDueInTimezone, isEmailVerified, isReservedAgentToolName, isSafeRedirectUrl, jsonResponse, json as jsonRule, mail, mapToolResponse, matchDailyFileDate, matchesCron, max, maxFileSize, md5, mimes, min, minFileSize, mountModuleRoutes, needsRehash, normalizeAppKey, notIn, notifyApprovers, nullable, numeric, object as objectRule, paginate, parseApiToken, parseAppKey, parseAuditRecord, parseCron, parseOAuthRedirectUrl, parsePasswordResetUrl, parsePreviousAppKeys, parseRequestPayload, parseSignature, parseToolScope, parseVerificationUrl, pick, pluralizationRules, processJob, quickValidate, quickValidateOrThrow, random, randomBase64, randomBase64Url, randomHex, randomInt, randomString, readBearerToken, redactAgentArguments, regex, registerJob, registerNotification, renderDebugPage, renderDocument, renderErrorPage, requestIdMiddleware, requestLoggingMiddleware, requireAuthenticated, requireGuest, requireVerifiedEmail, required, requiredIf, requiredUnless, requiredWith, requiredWithout, resetCalledSeeders, resetRateLimit, resolve, resolveJobName, resolveNotifiableType, revokeAllApiTokens, revokeApiToken, same, sample, sanitizeOAuthRedirect, scopedShape, scopesAllowTool, secureCompare, selectPluralForm, setBroadcastManager, setContainer, setEncrypter, setExceptionHandler, setGate, setI18n, setInertiaDocument, setInertiaSharedProps, setInertiaSsrRenderer, setLogManager, setMailManager, setNotificationManager, setQueueDriver, sha256, sha512, shareInertiaProps, shuffle, signUrl, size, startsWith, string as stringRule, t, tc, toApprovalStatusReport, toAuditRecord, toTimezone, tokenCan, tokenCanAll, tokenCanAny, tryGetI18n, unique, url as urlRule, urlSafeToken, uuid, uuid$1 as uuidRule, validate, validateRequest, validateRequestWith, validateSafe, verifyApiToken, verifyCsrfToken, verifyEmailToken, verifyHmac, verifyOAuthState, verifyPassword, verifyPasswordResetToken, verifySignedUrl, viteAsset, withAuthorization };
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
/**
|
|
2
|
+
* The principal handoff seam (RFC 0017 §2), a leaf module the pipeline writes
|
|
3
|
+
* and the auth context reads — in either of them, one would import the other's
|
|
4
|
+
* whole layer. Keyed on the **object identity** of the `Request` handed to
|
|
5
|
+
* `app.fetch`, so it has no wire representation to forge, needs no
|
|
6
|
+
* `AsyncLocalStorage` (identical on workerd and Bun), and is collected with the
|
|
7
|
+
* request. `new Request(original)` and `clone()` carry nothing: that is the
|
|
8
|
+
* security property. Not exported from the package index — see the writer.
|
|
9
|
+
*/
|
|
10
|
+
import type { AgentPrincipal } from '../agent/events.js';
|
|
11
|
+
/** What an installed principal answers for, for the life of one request. */
|
|
12
|
+
export interface InstalledAgentPrincipal {
|
|
13
|
+
/** Who the pipeline resolved before it built the request. */
|
|
14
|
+
principal: AgentPrincipal;
|
|
15
|
+
/**
|
|
16
|
+
* The scopes the pipeline gated the call with, carried for completeness.
|
|
17
|
+
* Nothing in the auth context consults them: scopes are the *pipeline's*
|
|
18
|
+
* verdict, taken before dispatch, and re-judging them inside the request
|
|
19
|
+
* would be a second, quieter scope rule beside the real one.
|
|
20
|
+
*/
|
|
21
|
+
abilities: readonly string[];
|
|
22
|
+
}
|
|
23
|
+
/**
|
|
24
|
+
* Mark `request` as carrying `principal`, returning that same object — a copy
|
|
25
|
+
* would key the map on something the auth context never sees. Returning it is
|
|
26
|
+
* what makes the identity requirement hard to get wrong at a call site:
|
|
27
|
+
* `app.fetch(installAgentPrincipal(request, installed), env, ctx)`. Callers
|
|
28
|
+
* reach this through the pipeline's `handoff: 'seam'`, and the reader not at all.
|
|
29
|
+
*/
|
|
30
|
+
export declare function installAgentPrincipal(request: Request, value: InstalledAgentPrincipal): Request;
|
|
31
|
+
/** The principal installed on this exact request object, or `undefined`. */
|
|
32
|
+
export declare function readAgentPrincipal(request: Request): InstalledAgentPrincipal | undefined;
|
|
@@ -76,6 +76,23 @@ export interface GurenCliApi {
|
|
|
76
76
|
warnCount: number;
|
|
77
77
|
failCount: number;
|
|
78
78
|
}>;
|
|
79
|
+
/** Absent on a @guren/cli older than `guren gate`; the tool says so instead of throwing. */
|
|
80
|
+
runGate?(opts: {
|
|
81
|
+
cwd: string;
|
|
82
|
+
changed?: boolean;
|
|
83
|
+
deps?: boolean;
|
|
84
|
+
}): Promise<{
|
|
85
|
+
cwd: string;
|
|
86
|
+
ok: boolean;
|
|
87
|
+
changed: boolean;
|
|
88
|
+
stages: Array<{
|
|
89
|
+
name: string;
|
|
90
|
+
status: string;
|
|
91
|
+
durationMs: number;
|
|
92
|
+
findings: string[];
|
|
93
|
+
reason?: string;
|
|
94
|
+
}>;
|
|
95
|
+
}>;
|
|
79
96
|
listModels(opts: {
|
|
80
97
|
appRoot: string;
|
|
81
98
|
}): Promise<Array<{
|