@guren/server 2.15.0 → 2.17.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (302) hide show
  1. package/dist/{DocsViewerServiceProvider-qFCaeiUv.js → DocsViewerServiceProvider-D2cuVgtN.js} +7 -12
  2. package/dist/{Hash-C8aejmi8.js → Hash-D2DFd8xX.js} +7 -57
  3. package/dist/{HttpException-BkS3euNG.js → HttpException-BlQ2yEmT.js} +2 -79
  4. package/dist/{Job-BVT813DO.js → Job-DxQK8h3P.js} +24 -179
  5. package/dist/{McpServiceProvider-BawsYjgN.js → McpServiceProvider-Zihx3Bjq.js} +35 -20
  6. package/dist/{Random-DbIJ22KQ.js → Random-S0OvCuR8.js} +9 -106
  7. package/dist/agent/AgentApprovalRequested.d.ts +11 -39
  8. package/dist/agent/approval-status.d.ts +56 -0
  9. package/dist/agent/approval.d.ts +76 -187
  10. package/dist/agent/audit-emitter.d.ts +16 -44
  11. package/dist/agent/audit.d.ts +20 -56
  12. package/dist/agent/derive.d.ts +32 -66
  13. package/dist/agent/dispatch.d.ts +38 -90
  14. package/dist/agent/events.d.ts +17 -23
  15. package/dist/agent/gate.d.ts +118 -0
  16. package/dist/agent/meta-tools.d.ts +18 -46
  17. package/dist/agent/pipeline.d.ts +234 -0
  18. package/dist/agent/public.d.ts +6 -25
  19. package/dist/agent/public.js +1 -1
  20. package/dist/agent/redact.d.ts +16 -38
  21. package/dist/agent/scopes.d.ts +55 -69
  22. package/dist/auth/AgentPrincipalGuard.d.ts +49 -0
  23. package/dist/auth/AuthManager.d.ts +22 -43
  24. package/dist/auth/AuthenticatableModel.d.ts +2 -2
  25. package/dist/auth/SessionGuard.d.ts +0 -1
  26. package/dist/auth/TokenGuard.d.ts +6 -26
  27. package/dist/auth/api-token.d.ts +16 -148
  28. package/dist/auth/context.d.ts +5 -10
  29. package/dist/auth/email-verification.d.ts +29 -127
  30. package/dist/auth/index.js +1 -1
  31. package/dist/auth/oauth/index.d.ts +35 -57
  32. package/dist/auth/password/DefaultHasher.d.ts +5 -14
  33. package/dist/auth/password/PasswordHasher.d.ts +5 -13
  34. package/dist/auth/password/hash-format.d.ts +5 -13
  35. package/dist/auth/password-reset.d.ts +16 -42
  36. package/dist/auth/providers/ModelUserProvider.d.ts +3 -4
  37. package/dist/auth/providers/UserProvider.d.ts +4 -4
  38. package/dist/auth/signed-token.d.ts +18 -0
  39. package/dist/auth/types.d.ts +9 -32
  40. package/dist/auth/utils.d.ts +6 -27
  41. package/dist/{auth-DkYoAPVn.js → auth-Gg54ppQi.js} +279 -519
  42. package/dist/authorization/Gate.d.ts +9 -145
  43. package/dist/authorization/Policy.d.ts +6 -53
  44. package/dist/authorization/index.js +1 -1
  45. package/dist/authorization/middleware.d.ts +16 -62
  46. package/dist/authorization/types.d.ts +8 -64
  47. package/dist/{authorization-CdfbCj8J.js → authorization-CdEWZZw3.js} +44 -309
  48. package/dist/broadcasting/BroadcastManager.d.ts +29 -149
  49. package/dist/broadcasting/channels/Channel.d.ts +1 -19
  50. package/dist/broadcasting/channels/PresenceChannel.d.ts +1 -55
  51. package/dist/broadcasting/channels/PrivateChannel.d.ts +1 -23
  52. package/dist/broadcasting/drivers/MemoryDriver.d.ts +18 -70
  53. package/dist/broadcasting/drivers/RedisDriver.d.ts +3 -80
  54. package/dist/broadcasting/drivers/index.d.ts +1 -1
  55. package/dist/broadcasting/index.d.ts +1 -1
  56. package/dist/broadcasting/index.js +1 -1
  57. package/dist/broadcasting/types.d.ts +7 -88
  58. package/dist/{broadcasting-BwodCA4q.js → broadcasting-B5RzB0A2.js} +87 -414
  59. package/dist/cache/CacheManager.d.ts +8 -62
  60. package/dist/cache/TaggedCache.d.ts +2 -35
  61. package/dist/cache/index.js +1 -1
  62. package/dist/cache/stores/FileStore.d.ts +2 -36
  63. package/dist/cache/stores/MemoryStore.d.ts +2 -26
  64. package/dist/cache/stores/RedisStore.d.ts +1 -29
  65. package/dist/cache/types.d.ts +21 -128
  66. package/dist/{cache-BYnZf2FR.js → cache-BOOIr324.js} +19 -198
  67. package/dist/client-C4TEr_Dd.js +9 -0
  68. package/dist/console/Command.d.ts +17 -126
  69. package/dist/console/ConsoleKernel.d.ts +2 -74
  70. package/dist/console/Input.d.ts +5 -113
  71. package/dist/console/Output.d.ts +3 -99
  72. package/dist/console/types.d.ts +3 -33
  73. package/dist/container/Container.d.ts +12 -103
  74. package/dist/container/ServiceProvider.d.ts +17 -61
  75. package/dist/container/bindings.d.ts +5 -26
  76. package/dist/container/defineModule.d.ts +16 -54
  77. package/dist/container/definePlugin.d.ts +12 -45
  78. package/dist/container/types.d.ts +2 -34
  79. package/dist/context-CXk_umpT.js +21 -0
  80. package/dist/database/Factory.d.ts +4 -57
  81. package/dist/database/Seeder.d.ts +8 -46
  82. package/dist/database/SeederRunner.d.ts +3 -33
  83. package/dist/database/types.d.ts +3 -24
  84. package/dist/discovery/AutoDiscovery.d.ts +10 -82
  85. package/dist/{dispatch-erOS9epZ.js → dispatch-BAwzftws.js} +32 -79
  86. package/dist/docs-viewer/DocsViewerServiceProvider.d.ts +2 -5
  87. package/dist/docs-viewer/endpoint.d.ts +5 -11
  88. package/dist/encryption/Encrypter.d.ts +5 -71
  89. package/dist/encryption/Hash.d.ts +7 -57
  90. package/dist/encryption/Random.d.ts +6 -99
  91. package/dist/encryption/index.js +3 -3
  92. package/dist/encryption/types.d.ts +10 -72
  93. package/dist/{encryption-D99Vmls3.js → encryption-uwP3Di4D.js} +9 -78
  94. package/dist/{endpoint-D6GIqOpe.js → endpoint-BXipU2Jj.js} +6 -12
  95. package/dist/endpoint-Dsw3Acvq.js +26 -0
  96. package/dist/errors/ExceptionHandler.d.ts +3 -90
  97. package/dist/errors/HttpException.d.ts +2 -79
  98. package/dist/errors/debug-page.d.ts +3 -17
  99. package/dist/errors/error-page.d.ts +1 -0
  100. package/dist/errors/exceptions/AuthenticationException.d.ts +2 -24
  101. package/dist/errors/exceptions/AuthorizationException.d.ts +1 -24
  102. package/dist/errors/exceptions/MethodNotAllowedException.d.ts +1 -23
  103. package/dist/errors/exceptions/NotFoundHttpException.d.ts +1 -27
  104. package/dist/errors/exceptions/ValidationException.d.ts +2 -43
  105. package/dist/errors/types.d.ts +1 -25
  106. package/dist/{errors-BgeOl_DC.js → errors-JpkcCjjn.js} +3 -41
  107. package/dist/events/Event.d.ts +1 -28
  108. package/dist/events/EventManager.d.ts +5 -107
  109. package/dist/events/Listener.d.ts +7 -55
  110. package/dist/events/builtin.d.ts +0 -24
  111. package/dist/events/index.js +1 -1
  112. package/dist/events/types.d.ts +4 -22
  113. package/dist/{events-aIH_bWRx.js → events-DOmAHDeP.js} +11 -191
  114. package/dist/facades/index.d.ts +2 -14
  115. package/dist/health/HealthCheck.d.ts +0 -24
  116. package/dist/health/HealthManager.d.ts +0 -36
  117. package/dist/health/checks/CacheCheck.d.ts +2 -17
  118. package/dist/health/checks/CustomCheck.d.ts +0 -9
  119. package/dist/health/checks/DatabaseCheck.d.ts +2 -17
  120. package/dist/health/checks/MemoryCheck.d.ts +3 -12
  121. package/dist/health/checks/RedisCheck.d.ts +1 -13
  122. package/dist/health/checks/StorageCheck.d.ts +2 -17
  123. package/dist/health/index.js +1 -1
  124. package/dist/health/types.d.ts +4 -24
  125. package/dist/{health-VWdWXRwh.js → health-DQSvUplL.js} +1 -76
  126. package/dist/hot-disposables-B5BXqaIH.js +167 -0
  127. package/dist/hot-reload/hot-disposables.d.ts +22 -74
  128. package/dist/hot-reload/testing.d.ts +4 -9
  129. package/dist/http/Application.d.ts +77 -205
  130. package/dist/http/FormRequest.d.ts +4 -55
  131. package/dist/http/dev-assets.d.ts +13 -31
  132. package/dist/http/dev-banner.d.ts +2 -5
  133. package/dist/http/inertia-assets.d.ts +3 -6
  134. package/dist/http/middleware/capabilities.d.ts +27 -50
  135. package/dist/http/middleware/cors.d.ts +4 -29
  136. package/dist/http/middleware/csp.d.ts +2 -25
  137. package/dist/http/middleware/csrf.d.ts +28 -95
  138. package/dist/http/middleware/detect-locale.d.ts +7 -27
  139. package/dist/http/middleware/force-https.d.ts +6 -24
  140. package/dist/http/middleware/host-authorization.d.ts +2 -12
  141. package/dist/http/middleware/index.d.ts +1 -1
  142. package/dist/http/middleware/loopback-guard.d.ts +15 -33
  143. package/dist/http/middleware/rate-limit.d.ts +29 -126
  144. package/dist/http/middleware/redirect-safety.d.ts +2 -20
  145. package/dist/http/middleware/request-id.d.ts +1 -14
  146. package/dist/http/middleware/request-logging.d.ts +2 -13
  147. package/dist/http/middleware/response-headers.d.ts +5 -13
  148. package/dist/http/middleware/security-headers.d.ts +2 -16
  149. package/dist/http/middleware/session.d.ts +15 -34
  150. package/dist/http/middleware/validation-errors-cookie.d.ts +7 -18
  151. package/dist/http/middleware/validation.d.ts +8 -63
  152. package/dist/http/public-assets.d.ts +11 -7
  153. package/dist/http/request.d.ts +32 -118
  154. package/dist/http/resources/CursorPaginator.d.ts +5 -64
  155. package/dist/http/resources/Paginator.d.ts +7 -84
  156. package/dist/http/resources/Resource.d.ts +9 -65
  157. package/dist/http/resources/ResourceCollection.d.ts +5 -39
  158. package/dist/http/resources/types.d.ts +10 -30
  159. package/dist/http/static-documents.d.ts +10 -20
  160. package/dist/http/validation/Validator.d.ts +25 -85
  161. package/dist/http/validation/rules.d.ts +48 -147
  162. package/dist/http/validation/types.d.ts +16 -61
  163. package/dist/http/vite-assets.d.ts +5 -28
  164. package/dist/http/vite-dev-server.d.ts +6 -9
  165. package/dist/http/vite-manifest.d.ts +19 -33
  166. package/dist/i18n/I18nManager.d.ts +12 -78
  167. package/dist/i18n/Translator.d.ts +3 -54
  168. package/dist/i18n/index.js +1 -1
  169. package/dist/i18n/loaders/JsonLoader.d.ts +4 -31
  170. package/dist/i18n/loaders/MemoryLoader.d.ts +1 -21
  171. package/dist/i18n/pluralization.d.ts +4 -13
  172. package/dist/i18n/types.d.ts +17 -69
  173. package/dist/{i18n-mcWi7LCd.js → i18n-Cg1aajRP.js} +31 -225
  174. package/dist/index.d.ts +11 -4
  175. package/dist/index.js +1186 -3040
  176. package/dist/internal/agent-preflight.d.ts +9 -21
  177. package/dist/internal/agent-principal.d.ts +32 -0
  178. package/dist/internal/request.d.ts +6 -19
  179. package/dist/internal/request.js +1 -1
  180. package/dist/internal/route-path.d.ts +9 -21
  181. package/dist/internal/route-path.js +9 -21
  182. package/dist/internal/zod-compat.d.ts +55 -122
  183. package/dist/internal/zod-compat.js +39 -70
  184. package/dist/internal/zod-json-schema.d.ts +18 -54
  185. package/dist/internal/zod-json-schema.js +46 -123
  186. package/dist/jsx-runtime.d.ts +3 -8
  187. package/dist/lambda/index.d.ts +17 -79
  188. package/dist/lambda/index.js +11 -59
  189. package/dist/logging/LogManager.d.ts +1 -51
  190. package/dist/logging/Logger.d.ts +8 -47
  191. package/dist/logging/channels/ConsoleChannel.d.ts +1 -3
  192. package/dist/logging/channels/DailyFileChannel.d.ts +1 -3
  193. package/dist/logging/channels/FileChannel.d.ts +1 -3
  194. package/dist/logging/daily-file-path.d.ts +7 -16
  195. package/dist/logging/index.js +1 -1
  196. package/dist/logging/types.d.ts +13 -45
  197. package/dist/{logging-B-kngi3q.js → logging-zOY1XCtq.js} +52 -141
  198. package/dist/{loopback-guard-D0Kc7-xc.js → loopback-guard-DT9gHF0F.js} +41 -92
  199. package/dist/mail/Mail.d.ts +10 -106
  200. package/dist/mail/MailManager.d.ts +2 -60
  201. package/dist/mail/index.js +1 -1
  202. package/dist/mail/transports/LogTransport.d.ts +1 -4
  203. package/dist/mail/transports/MemoryTransport.d.ts +1 -63
  204. package/dist/mail/transports/ResendTransport.d.ts +1 -23
  205. package/dist/mail/transports/SmtpTransport.d.ts +1 -31
  206. package/dist/mail/types.d.ts +28 -150
  207. package/dist/{mail-DfEfSQEr.js → mail-76DWy9lj.js} +31 -289
  208. package/dist/mcp/McpServiceProvider.d.ts +4 -10
  209. package/dist/mcp/create-mcp-server.d.ts +42 -57
  210. package/dist/mcp/endpoint.d.ts +12 -36
  211. package/dist/mcp/index.js +1 -1
  212. package/dist/mvc/Controller.d.ts +46 -227
  213. package/dist/mvc/Router.d.ts +50 -129
  214. package/dist/mvc/inertia/InertiaEngine.d.ts +18 -48
  215. package/dist/mvc/inertia/shared.d.ts +6 -19
  216. package/dist/mvc/mount-route.d.ts +2 -6
  217. package/dist/mvc/view.d.ts +1 -2
  218. package/dist/notifications/Notification.d.ts +8 -75
  219. package/dist/notifications/NotificationManager.d.ts +15 -88
  220. package/dist/notifications/channels/DatabaseChannel.d.ts +1 -41
  221. package/dist/notifications/channels/MailChannel.d.ts +2 -31
  222. package/dist/notifications/channels/MemoryChannel.d.ts +2 -62
  223. package/dist/notifications/channels/SlackChannel.d.ts +3 -48
  224. package/dist/notifications/index.js +1 -1
  225. package/dist/notifications/notifiable-type.d.ts +3 -6
  226. package/dist/notifications/registry.d.ts +8 -27
  227. package/dist/notifications/types.d.ts +16 -53
  228. package/dist/{notifications-BGqmUNZ8.js → notifications-okWFs9ly.js} +37 -335
  229. package/dist/providers/AuthServiceProvider.d.ts +1 -3
  230. package/dist/providers/AuthorizationServiceProvider.d.ts +2 -3
  231. package/dist/providers/BroadcastServiceProvider.d.ts +1 -3
  232. package/dist/providers/CacheServiceProvider.d.ts +1 -3
  233. package/dist/providers/EncryptionServiceProvider.d.ts +1 -3
  234. package/dist/providers/ErrorServiceProvider.d.ts +1 -4
  235. package/dist/providers/EventServiceProvider.d.ts +1 -3
  236. package/dist/providers/HealthServiceProvider.d.ts +1 -3
  237. package/dist/providers/I18nServiceProvider.d.ts +6 -10
  238. package/dist/providers/InertiaServiceProvider.d.ts +1 -4
  239. package/dist/providers/LogServiceProvider.d.ts +1 -3
  240. package/dist/providers/MailServiceProvider.d.ts +1 -3
  241. package/dist/providers/NotificationServiceProvider.d.ts +1 -3
  242. package/dist/providers/OAuthServiceProvider.d.ts +1 -3
  243. package/dist/providers/QueueServiceProvider.d.ts +1 -3
  244. package/dist/providers/SchedulingServiceProvider.d.ts +1 -3
  245. package/dist/providers/StorageServiceProvider.d.ts +1 -3
  246. package/dist/queue/FailedJobReporter.d.ts +1 -24
  247. package/dist/queue/Job.d.ts +12 -99
  248. package/dist/queue/QueueManager.d.ts +6 -57
  249. package/dist/queue/Worker.d.ts +4 -65
  250. package/dist/queue/drivers/MemoryDriver.d.ts +3 -44
  251. package/dist/queue/drivers/RedisDriver.d.ts +7 -65
  252. package/dist/queue/drivers/SqsDriver.d.ts +6 -57
  253. package/dist/queue/drivers/SyncDriver.d.ts +10 -13
  254. package/dist/queue/index.js +2 -2
  255. package/dist/queue/types.d.ts +10 -92
  256. package/dist/{queue-CXrRK85G.js → queue-CcXCjuJI.js} +32 -260
  257. package/dist/redis/RedisApiTokenStore.d.ts +4 -56
  258. package/dist/redis/RedisEmailVerificationStore.d.ts +4 -37
  259. package/dist/redis/RedisOAuthStateStore.d.ts +2 -10
  260. package/dist/redis/RedisPasswordResetStore.d.ts +4 -37
  261. package/dist/redis/RedisRateLimitStore.d.ts +16 -49
  262. package/dist/redis/RedisSessionStore.d.ts +3 -44
  263. package/dist/redis/client.d.ts +2 -32
  264. package/dist/redis/index.js +47 -232
  265. package/dist/redis/redis-values.d.ts +6 -12
  266. package/dist/redis/scan-keys.d.ts +1 -4
  267. package/dist/request-CLOYytGP.js +68 -0
  268. package/dist/runtime/index.d.ts +2 -0
  269. package/dist/runtime/index.js +50 -92
  270. package/dist/scheduling/CronParser.d.ts +0 -29
  271. package/dist/scheduling/Schedule.d.ts +1 -153
  272. package/dist/scheduling/ScheduledTask.d.ts +0 -31
  273. package/dist/scheduling/Scheduler.d.ts +0 -70
  274. package/dist/scheduling/index.js +1 -1
  275. package/dist/scheduling/types.d.ts +4 -65
  276. package/dist/{scheduling-CPiEdtQd.js → scheduling-C6tcOtUl.js} +2 -287
  277. package/dist/storage/StorageManager.d.ts +0 -48
  278. package/dist/storage/drivers/LocalDriver.d.ts +1 -25
  279. package/dist/storage/drivers/MemoryDriver.d.ts +5 -35
  280. package/dist/storage/drivers/S3Driver.d.ts +6 -36
  281. package/dist/storage/drivers/s3-acl.d.ts +5 -10
  282. package/dist/storage/index.js +1 -1
  283. package/dist/storage/types.d.ts +27 -265
  284. package/dist/{storage-TLD9t0Q2.js → storage-BB59f07j.js} +17 -157
  285. package/dist/support/contained-path.d.ts +10 -20
  286. package/dist/support/error-polyfill.d.ts +4 -6
  287. package/dist/support/expiry.d.ts +17 -33
  288. package/dist/support/expiry.js +17 -33
  289. package/dist/support/import-map.d.ts +3 -7
  290. package/dist/support/inertia-defaults.d.ts +5 -10
  291. package/dist/support/redirect-target.d.ts +4 -6
  292. package/dist/support/stack-frames.d.ts +11 -50
  293. package/dist/support/trim-slashes.d.ts +4 -7
  294. package/dist/support/warn-once.d.ts +2 -6
  295. package/dist/{trim-slashes-ZJ_VsY5s.js → trim-slashes-BLY9hKAa.js} +4 -7
  296. package/dist/{vite-manifest-w_RSOvQW.js → vite-manifest-B_Iy5183.js} +34 -58
  297. package/package.json +2 -2
  298. package/dist/client-Dd7vLcqp.js +0 -27
  299. package/dist/context-DoD0c7J_.js +0 -26
  300. package/dist/endpoint-D-20PiHY.js +0 -46
  301. package/dist/hot-disposables-WsTX2ySN.js +0 -281
  302. package/dist/request-CVQwpu2J.js +0 -129
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
1
- import { t as HttpException } from "./HttpException-BkS3euNG.js";
1
+ import { t as HttpException } from "./HttpException-BlQ2yEmT.js";
2
2
  import { o as getAppKeyringFromEnv, r as deriveAppKeyring, t as MessageSigner } from "./MessageSigner-Bd25ZJAV.js";
3
- import { d as verifyPassword, o as needsRehash, r as hashPassword } from "./Hash-C8aejmi8.js";
3
+ import { d as verifyPassword, o as needsRehash, r as hashPassword } from "./Hash-D2DFd8xX.js";
4
4
  import { isExpired, isOptionalExpiryPast } from "./support/expiry.js";
5
- import { n as getAuthContext } from "./context-DoD0c7J_.js";
5
+ import { n as getAuthContext } from "./context-CXk_umpT.js";
6
6
  import { deleteCookie, getCookie, setCookie } from "hono/cookie";
7
7
  import { createHash, createHmac, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
8
8
  import { Model } from "@guren/orm";
@@ -121,10 +121,9 @@ var SessionImpl = class {
121
121
  this.dirty = true;
122
122
  }
123
123
  /**
124
- * Age flash data: move `new` → `old`, clear previous `old`.
125
- * Called at the start of each request by the session middleware.
126
- * Only dirties the session when there was flash data to age — otherwise
127
- * every request carrying a session would persist unconditionally.
124
+ * Called at the start of each request by the session middleware. Only dirties
125
+ * the session when there was flash data to age, or every request carrying a
126
+ * session would persist unconditionally.
128
127
  */
129
128
  ageFlashData() {
130
129
  const hadFlash = this.hasFlash();
@@ -245,9 +244,7 @@ function createSessionMiddleware(options = {}) {
245
244
  sameSite: cookieSameSite,
246
245
  httpOnly: cookieHttpOnly
247
246
  });
248
- return;
249
- }
250
- if (!session.shouldPersist()) {
247
+ } else if (!session.shouldPersist()) {
251
248
  if (existingId) {
252
249
  if (store.touch) await store.touch(existingId, ttlSeconds);
253
250
  else await store.write(existingId, session.snapshot(), ttlSeconds);
@@ -260,19 +257,19 @@ function createSessionMiddleware(options = {}) {
260
257
  maxAge: cookieMaxAgeSeconds ?? ttlSeconds
261
258
  });
262
259
  }
263
- return;
260
+ } else {
261
+ const nextId = session.id;
262
+ await store.write(nextId, session.snapshot(), ttlSeconds);
263
+ if (session.wasRegenerated() && session.originalSessionId() !== nextId) await store.destroy(session.originalSessionId());
264
+ setCookie(ctx, cookieName, signer.sign(nextId), {
265
+ path: cookiePath,
266
+ domain: cookieDomain,
267
+ secure: cookieSecure,
268
+ sameSite: cookieSameSite,
269
+ httpOnly: cookieHttpOnly,
270
+ maxAge: cookieMaxAgeSeconds ?? ttlSeconds
271
+ });
264
272
  }
265
- const nextId = session.id;
266
- await store.write(nextId, session.snapshot(), ttlSeconds);
267
- if (session.wasRegenerated() && session.originalSessionId() !== nextId) await store.destroy(session.originalSessionId());
268
- setCookie(ctx, cookieName, signer.sign(nextId), {
269
- path: cookiePath,
270
- domain: cookieDomain,
271
- secure: cookieSecure,
272
- sameSite: cookieSameSite,
273
- httpOnly: cookieHttpOnly,
274
- maxAge: cookieMaxAgeSeconds ?? ttlSeconds
275
- });
276
273
  }
277
274
  };
278
275
  }
@@ -280,27 +277,108 @@ function getSessionFromContext(ctx) {
280
277
  return ctx.get(SESSION_CONTEXT_KEY);
281
278
  }
282
279
  //#endregion
283
- //#region src/errors/exceptions/AuthenticationException.ts
280
+ //#region src/internal/agent-principal.ts
281
+ const installed = /* @__PURE__ */ new WeakMap();
284
282
  /**
285
- * Authentication exception.
286
- *
287
- * Thrown when a user is not authenticated or credentials are invalid.
288
- *
289
- * @example
290
- * ```typescript
291
- * throw new AuthenticationException()
292
- * throw new AuthenticationException('Invalid token')
293
- * throw new AuthenticationException('Session expired', 'login')
294
- * ```
283
+ * Mark `request` as carrying `principal`, returning that same object — a copy
284
+ * would key the map on something the auth context never sees. Returning it is
285
+ * what makes the identity requirement hard to get wrong at a call site:
286
+ * `app.fetch(installAgentPrincipal(request, installed), env, ctx)`. Callers
287
+ * reach this through the pipeline's `handoff: 'seam'`, and the reader not at all.
295
288
  */
296
- var AuthenticationException = class AuthenticationException extends HttpException {
289
+ function installAgentPrincipal(request, value) {
290
+ installed.set(request, value);
291
+ return request;
292
+ }
293
+ /** The principal installed on this exact request object, or `undefined`. */
294
+ function readAgentPrincipal(request) {
295
+ return installed.get(request);
296
+ }
297
+ //#endregion
298
+ //#region src/auth/providers/UserProvider.ts
299
+ /**
300
+ * Run a user record through the provider's optional `sanitize` before it leaves
301
+ * the auth layer. Every guard must call this on anything it returns from
302
+ * `user()` — a guard that forgets the ternary leaks password hashes, so the
303
+ * ternary lives here, once.
304
+ */
305
+ function sanitizeUser(provider, user) {
306
+ return provider.sanitize ? provider.sanitize(user) : user;
307
+ }
308
+ var BaseUserProvider = class {
309
+ async setRememberToken(user, token) {
310
+ if (typeof user.setRememberToken === "function") await user.setRememberToken(token);
311
+ }
312
+ async getRememberToken(user) {
313
+ if (typeof user.getRememberToken === "function") return await user.getRememberToken() ?? null;
314
+ return null;
315
+ }
316
+ };
317
+ //#endregion
318
+ //#region src/auth/AgentPrincipalGuard.ts
319
+ /**
320
+ * The guard answering for a principal the pipeline installed (RFC 0017 §2), for
321
+ * an **unqualified** lookup on a seam-marked request; explicit `guard('web')` /
322
+ * `guard('token')` is untouched, and `guardNames()` never lists this one. It
323
+ * satisfies `requireAuthenticated()`, `Controller.auth` and `Gate`, but not
324
+ * `createBearerTokenMiddleware` / `tokenCan*`, which judge an `ApiToken`.
325
+ */
326
+ var AgentPrincipalGuard = class {
327
+ installed;
328
+ provider;
329
+ resolvedUser;
330
+ constructor(options) {
331
+ this.installed = options.installed;
332
+ this.provider = options.provider;
333
+ }
297
334
  /**
298
- * The guard that threw the exception.
335
+ * `user() !== null`, the predicate `TokenGuard` answers `check()` with: true
336
+ * in every case but one, a `kind: 'user'` principal a configured provider
337
+ * cannot resolve. Answering true there would admit a request whose
338
+ * `Controller.auth.userOrFail()` then throws.
299
339
  */
300
- guard;
340
+ async check() {
341
+ return await this.user() !== null;
342
+ }
343
+ async guest() {
344
+ return !await this.check();
345
+ }
301
346
  /**
302
- * URL to redirect to for authentication.
347
+ * `kind: 'service'` is always the minimal `{ id }`: a service principal names
348
+ * no user, so a lookup would resolve an id in a table it does not belong to.
349
+ * `kind: 'user'` goes through the provider when one is configured.
303
350
  */
351
+ user() {
352
+ if (!this.resolvedUser) this.resolvedUser = (async () => {
353
+ const { principal } = this.installed;
354
+ if (principal.kind !== "user" || !this.provider) return { id: principal.id };
355
+ const record = await this.provider.retrieveById(principal.id);
356
+ return record ? sanitizeUser(this.provider, record) : null;
357
+ })();
358
+ return this.resolvedUser;
359
+ }
360
+ async id() {
361
+ return this.installed.principal.id;
362
+ }
363
+ async login() {
364
+ throw new Error("The agent principal guard does not support login(); the principal is installed by the invocation pipeline for one request.");
365
+ }
366
+ async attempt(_credentials, _remember) {
367
+ throw new Error("The agent principal guard does not support attempt(); an installed principal is not credential-based.");
368
+ }
369
+ async validate(_credentials) {
370
+ throw new Error("The agent principal guard does not support validate(); an installed principal is not credential-based.");
371
+ }
372
+ /** Nothing to end: no session, and no stored credential to revoke. */
373
+ async logout() {}
374
+ session() {}
375
+ };
376
+ //#endregion
377
+ //#region src/errors/exceptions/AuthenticationException.ts
378
+ /** 401: the user is not authenticated, or the credentials were invalid. */
379
+ var AuthenticationException = class AuthenticationException extends HttpException {
380
+ /** The guard that threw. */
381
+ guard;
304
382
  redirectTo;
305
383
  constructor(message = "Unauthenticated.", guard, redirectTo) {
306
384
  super(401, message);
@@ -308,15 +386,9 @@ var AuthenticationException = class AuthenticationException extends HttpExceptio
308
386
  this.guard = guard;
309
387
  this.redirectTo = redirectTo;
310
388
  }
311
- /**
312
- * Create exception with redirect URL.
313
- */
314
389
  static withRedirect(redirectTo, message) {
315
390
  return new AuthenticationException(message, void 0, redirectTo);
316
391
  }
317
- /**
318
- * Create exception for a specific guard.
319
- */
320
392
  static forGuard(guard, message) {
321
393
  return new AuthenticationException(message, guard);
322
394
  }
@@ -372,16 +444,10 @@ var RequestAuthContext = class {
372
444
  };
373
445
  /**
374
446
  * Prefixes of every hash format the built-in hashers produce: Bun's argon2
375
- * family (`$argon2id$`, `$argon2i$`, `$argon2d$`), bcrypt (`$2a$`, `$2b$`,
376
- * `$2y$`), and the Node fallback's scrypt.
377
- *
378
- * This is a *shape* test, not a validity test. It answers "could this string
379
- * be a password hash at all", which is all the argument-order check below
380
- * needs; whether the hash is well-formed stays the implementation's job.
381
- *
382
- * Full prefixes rather than the `$argon2` / `$2` stems they share: a password
383
- * of `$2fast4u` is not bcrypt, and treating it as one turns a correct call
384
- * against a non-hash credential column into a false accusation.
447
+ * family, bcrypt, and the Node fallback's scrypt. A *shape* test, not a
448
+ * validity test. Full prefixes rather than the shared `$argon2` / `$2` stems:
449
+ * a password of `$2fast4u` is not bcrypt, and treating it as one turns a
450
+ * correct call into a false accusation.
385
451
  */
386
452
  const HASH_PREFIXES = [
387
453
  "$argon2id$",
@@ -396,19 +462,11 @@ function looksLikePasswordHash(value) {
396
462
  return HASH_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => value.startsWith(prefix));
397
463
  }
398
464
  /**
399
- * Throws when `verify()` was called as `verify(plain, hashed)`.
400
- *
401
- * Two-sided on purpose: it fires only when the second argument looks like a
402
- * hash *and* the first does not. A one-sided "the first argument must look
403
- * like a hash" precondition would misdiagnose a legitimate non-hash
404
- * credential column - `passwordHash: 'oauth:...'`, the sentinel this repo
405
- * documents for OAuth-only accounts - as a caller mistake. Those keep falling
406
- * through to the implementation, which rejects them as before.
407
- *
408
- * Neither argument is included in the message: one of them is a plaintext
409
- * password, and this throw is reached on a live login attempt.
410
- *
411
- * See `PasswordHasher.verify` for why the order is easy to get wrong.
465
+ * Throws when `verify()` was called as `verify(plain, hashed)`. Two-sided on
466
+ * purpose: fires only when the second argument looks like a hash *and* the
467
+ * first does not, so a legitimate non-hash credential column
468
+ * (`passwordHash: 'oauth:...'`) is not misdiagnosed as a caller mistake.
469
+ * Neither argument is in the message: one is a plaintext password on a live login.
412
470
  */
413
471
  function assertVerifyArgumentOrder(hashed, plain) {
414
472
  if (!looksLikePasswordHash(hashed) && looksLikePasswordHash(plain)) throw new TypeError("PasswordHasher.verify(hashed, plain) received its arguments in the wrong order: the second argument looks like a password hash and the first does not. Note this order is the inverse of Bun.password.verify(plain, hashed) and of verifyPassword(plain, hashed).");
@@ -496,20 +554,11 @@ var NodeHasher = class {
496
554
  //#endregion
497
555
  //#region src/auth/password/DefaultHasher.ts
498
556
  /**
499
- * Runtime-detecting password hasher: hashes with `Bun.password` when running
500
- * on Bun (Argon2id by default, despite `ScryptHasher`'s name) and with Node's
501
- * `crypto.scrypt` otherwise (e.g. AWS Lambda or Cloudflare Workers). This is
502
- * the hasher behind the `Hash` export, and the default for
503
- * `AuthenticatableModel` and `ModelUserProvider`.
504
- *
505
- * **Verification routes on the stored hash, not on the runtime.** The two
506
- * delegates write different formats, and neither can read the other's, so
507
- * picking a delegate by runtime alone would 500 on every login for an app
508
- * whose password column was written elsewhere - a seeder run on Bun against a
509
- * database a Node deploy then serves. Bun implements `node:crypto`, so a
510
- * `$scrypt$` hash verifies on either runtime; an Argon2id or bcrypt hash needs
511
- * `Bun.password` and cannot be read off Bun at all, which this reports as
512
- * itself rather than as an opaque parse failure.
557
+ * Runtime-detecting password hasher behind `Hash`, the default for
558
+ * `AuthenticatableModel` and `ModelUserProvider`: `Bun.password` on Bun (Argon2id,
559
+ * despite `ScryptHasher`'s name), `crypto.scrypt` otherwise. **Verification routes
560
+ * on the stored hash, not the runtime**, or a column written elsewhere would 500 on
561
+ * every login; `$scrypt$` verifies anywhere, Argon2id/bcrypt needs `Bun.password`.
513
562
  */
514
563
  var DefaultHasher = class {
515
564
  bun;
@@ -538,26 +587,6 @@ var DefaultHasher = class {
538
587
  }
539
588
  };
540
589
  //#endregion
541
- //#region src/auth/providers/UserProvider.ts
542
- /**
543
- * Run a user record through the provider's optional `sanitize` before it
544
- * leaves the auth layer. Every guard must call this on anything it returns
545
- * from `user()` — a guard that forgets the optional-chaining ternary leaks
546
- * password hashes, so the ternary lives here, once.
547
- */
548
- function sanitizeUser(provider, user) {
549
- return provider.sanitize ? provider.sanitize(user) : user;
550
- }
551
- var BaseUserProvider = class {
552
- async setRememberToken(user, token) {
553
- if (typeof user.setRememberToken === "function") await user.setRememberToken(token);
554
- }
555
- async getRememberToken(user) {
556
- if (typeof user.getRememberToken === "function") return await user.getRememberToken() ?? null;
557
- return null;
558
- }
559
- };
560
- //#endregion
561
590
  //#region src/auth/providers/ModelUserProvider.ts
562
591
  /**
563
592
  * Capability check, not `instanceof AuthenticatableModel`: a nominal check
@@ -622,10 +651,9 @@ var ModelUserProvider = class extends BaseUserProvider {
622
651
  return user[this.idColumn];
623
652
  }
624
653
  /**
625
- * Strip the password hash, remember token, and the model's `hidden`
626
- * fields before the record leaves the auth layer. Credential
627
- * validation happens on the raw record before sanitizing, so this
628
- * never affects login — only what `auth.user()` exposes.
654
+ * Strip the password hash, remember token, and the model's `hidden` fields
655
+ * before the record leaves the auth layer. Credential validation runs on the
656
+ * raw record first, so this never affects login — only `auth.user()`.
629
657
  */
630
658
  sanitize(user) {
631
659
  const authModel = credentialColumnSource(this.model);
@@ -653,33 +681,21 @@ var ModelUserProvider = class extends BaseUserProvider {
653
681
  };
654
682
  //#endregion
655
683
  //#region src/auth/utils.ts
656
- /**
657
- * Hash a token using SHA-256 or SHA-512.
658
- */
659
684
  function hashToken(token, algorithm = "sha256") {
660
685
  return createHash(algorithm).update(token).digest("hex");
661
686
  }
662
- /**
663
- * Generate a secure random token.
664
- */
665
687
  function generateToken(length = 32) {
666
688
  return randomBytes(length).toString("hex");
667
689
  }
668
- /**
669
- * Generate a random ID (16 bytes = 32 hex chars).
670
- */
690
+ /** Generate a random ID (16 bytes = 32 hex chars). */
671
691
  function generateId() {
672
692
  return randomBytes(16).toString("hex");
673
693
  }
674
694
  /**
675
- * Securely compare two hex strings using timing-safe comparison.
676
- *
677
- * Input that is not strict, even-length hex is rejected rather than compared:
678
- * `Buffer.from(value, 'hex')` stops at the first invalid pair, so 'zzzz' and
679
- * 'yyyy' both decode to nothing — and 'abcz' and 'abdz' both decode to the
680
- * one byte they share — and would compare equal. A short decode is how the
681
- * decoder reports that, which beats restating its grammar in a regex here.
682
- * Use `secureStringCompare` for values that are not hex.
695
+ * Timing-safe comparison of two hex strings. Non-hex or odd-length input is
696
+ * rejected rather than compared: `Buffer.from(x, 'hex')` stops at the first
697
+ * invalid pair, so 'zzzz' and 'yyyy' would both decode to nothing and compare
698
+ * equal. Use `secureStringCompare` for values that are not hex.
683
699
  */
684
700
  function secureCompare(a, b) {
685
701
  if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
@@ -688,28 +704,19 @@ function secureCompare(a, b) {
688
704
  if (bufA.length !== a.length / 2 || bufB.length !== b.length / 2) return false;
689
705
  return timingSafeEqual(bufA, bufB);
690
706
  }
691
- /**
692
- * Securely compare two arbitrary strings using timing-safe comparison.
693
- * Unlike secureCompare, this works with any string encoding (UUIDs, tokens, etc.).
694
- */
707
+ /** Timing-safe comparison for arbitrary strings — unlike secureCompare, not hex-only. */
695
708
  function secureStringCompare(a, b) {
696
709
  const bufA = Buffer.from(a, "utf8");
697
710
  const bufB = Buffer.from(b, "utf8");
698
711
  if (bufA.length !== bufB.length) return false;
699
712
  return timingSafeEqual(bufA, bufB);
700
713
  }
701
- /**
702
- * Build a URL with token and optional email parameters.
703
- */
704
714
  function buildTokenUrl(baseUrl, token, email) {
705
715
  const url = new URL(baseUrl);
706
716
  url.searchParams.set("token", token);
707
717
  if (email) url.searchParams.set("email", email);
708
718
  return url.toString();
709
719
  }
710
- /**
711
- * Parse a URL to extract token and email parameters.
712
- */
713
720
  function parseTokenUrl(url) {
714
721
  try {
715
722
  const parsed = new URL(url);
@@ -765,7 +772,6 @@ var SessionGuard = class {
765
772
  this.cachedUser = sanitized;
766
773
  return sanitized;
767
774
  }
768
- /** Strip auth-internal fields before a record is cached or exposed. */
769
775
  sanitizeUser(user) {
770
776
  return sanitizeUser(this.provider, user);
771
777
  }
@@ -889,35 +895,16 @@ var MemoryApiTokenStore = class {
889
895
  const token = this.tokens.get(id);
890
896
  if (token) token.lastUsedAt = timestamp;
891
897
  }
892
- /**
893
- * Clear all tokens (useful for testing).
894
- */
895
898
  clear() {
896
899
  this.tokens.clear();
897
900
  this.byHash.clear();
898
901
  }
899
- /**
900
- * Get the number of stored tokens.
901
- */
902
902
  get size() {
903
903
  return this.tokens.size;
904
904
  }
905
905
  };
906
906
  /**
907
907
  * Create a new API token.
908
- *
909
- * @example
910
- * ```ts
911
- * const { plainTextToken, token } = await createApiToken(store, {
912
- * name: 'My App Token',
913
- * userId: user.id,
914
- * abilities: ['read', 'write'],
915
- * expiresIn: 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000, // 30 days
916
- * })
917
- *
918
- * // Return plainTextToken to user - this is the only time it's available
919
- * return ctx.json({ token: plainTextToken })
920
- * ```
921
908
  */
922
909
  async function createApiToken(store, options) {
923
910
  const { name, userId, abilities = ["*"], expiresIn = null, tokenLength = 32 } = options;
@@ -955,39 +942,27 @@ function parseApiToken(plainTextToken) {
955
942
  };
956
943
  }
957
944
  /**
958
- * Extract the bearer token from an Authorization header value. The one
959
- * parsing rule shared by `createBearerTokenMiddleware`, `TokenGuard`, and
960
- * `hasBearerHeader` below — three readers of the same header must not
961
- * disagree about what a bearer request is.
945
+ * Extract the bearer token from an Authorization header. The one parsing rule
946
+ * shared by `createBearerTokenMiddleware`, `TokenGuard` and `hasBearerHeader`.
947
+ * `\S` keeps the match linear — `\s+(.+)` backtracks quadratically when a
948
+ * trailing newline makes `$` unreachable, on a pre-authentication header — and
949
+ * makes an all-whitespace token "not a bearer request", so CSRF is not skipped.
962
950
  */
963
951
  function readBearerToken(header) {
964
952
  if (!header) return null;
965
- const match = header.match(/^Bearer\s+(.+)$/i);
953
+ const match = header.match(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/i);
966
954
  return match ? match[1] : null;
967
955
  }
968
956
  /**
969
- * The one answer to "is this request bearer-authenticated?" — the parsing
970
- * rule above applied to the header it is read from. Shared by guard selection
971
- * (`AuthManager.resolveGuardName`) and the CSRF skip for cookie-less bearer
972
- * requests: both must classify a request identically, and a second copy of
973
- * the header name is how they would drift apart.
957
+ * The one answer to "is this request bearer-authenticated?", shared by
958
+ * `AuthManager.resolveGuardName` and the CSRF skip for cookie-less bearer
959
+ * requests, which must classify a request identically.
974
960
  */
975
961
  function hasBearerHeader(ctx) {
976
962
  return readBearerToken(ctx.req.header("Authorization")) !== null;
977
963
  }
978
964
  /**
979
965
  * Verify an API token and return the associated user ID.
980
- *
981
- * @example
982
- * ```ts
983
- * const result = await verifyApiToken(plainTextToken, store)
984
- *
985
- * if (!result) {
986
- * return ctx.json({ error: 'Invalid token' }, 401)
987
- * }
988
- *
989
- * console.log(`User ${result.userId} authenticated with abilities:`, result.abilities)
990
- * ```
991
966
  */
992
967
  async function verifyApiToken(plainTextToken, store, options = {}) {
993
968
  const { updateLastUsed = true } = options;
@@ -1029,35 +1004,18 @@ function tokenCanAny(token, abilities) {
1029
1004
  }
1030
1005
  /**
1031
1006
  * Revoke (delete) an API token.
1032
- *
1033
- * @example
1034
- * ```ts
1035
- * await revokeApiToken(tokenId, store)
1036
- * ```
1037
1007
  */
1038
1008
  async function revokeApiToken(id, store) {
1039
1009
  await store.delete(id);
1040
1010
  }
1041
1011
  /**
1042
1012
  * Revoke all API tokens for a user.
1043
- *
1044
- * @example
1045
- * ```ts
1046
- * // Revoke all tokens when user changes password
1047
- * await revokeAllApiTokens(user.id, store)
1048
- * ```
1049
1013
  */
1050
1014
  async function revokeAllApiTokens(userId, store) {
1051
1015
  await store.deleteForUser(userId);
1052
1016
  }
1053
1017
  /**
1054
1018
  * Get all API tokens for a user.
1055
- *
1056
- * @example
1057
- * ```ts
1058
- * const tokens = await getUserApiTokens(user.id, store)
1059
- * // Returns tokens without the plain text (only metadata)
1060
- * ```
1061
1019
  */
1062
1020
  async function getUserApiTokens(userId, store) {
1063
1021
  return store.findByUserId(userId);
@@ -1068,25 +1026,9 @@ async function getUserApiTokens(userId, store) {
1068
1026
  const API_TOKEN_KEY = "guren:api-token";
1069
1027
  /**
1070
1028
  * Create middleware that authenticates requests using Bearer tokens.
1071
- *
1072
1029
  * @example
1073
1030
  * ```ts
1074
- * // Basic usage
1075
- * app.use('/api/*', createBearerTokenMiddleware({ store }))
1076
- *
1077
- * // With ability requirement
1078
- * router.delete('/api/posts/:id', [PostController, 'destroy'],
1079
- * createBearerTokenMiddleware({
1080
- * store,
1081
- * abilities: ['posts:delete'],
1082
- * })
1083
- * )
1084
- *
1085
- * // With user loading
1086
- * app.use('/api/*', createBearerTokenMiddleware({
1087
- * store,
1088
- * loadUser: async (userId) => User.find(userId),
1089
- * }))
1031
+ * app.use('/api/*', createBearerTokenMiddleware({ store, abilities: ['posts:delete'] }))
1090
1032
  * ```
1091
1033
  */
1092
1034
  function createBearerTokenMiddleware(options) {
@@ -1126,14 +1068,6 @@ function createBearerTokenMiddleware(options) {
1126
1068
  }
1127
1069
  /**
1128
1070
  * Get the authenticated API token from the request context.
1129
- *
1130
- * @example
1131
- * ```ts
1132
- * router.get('/api/me', async (ctx) => {
1133
- * const { token, userId, abilities } = getApiToken(ctx)!
1134
- * return ctx.json({ userId, tokenName: token.name, abilities })
1135
- * })
1136
- * ```
1137
1071
  */
1138
1072
  function getApiToken(ctx) {
1139
1073
  return ctx.get(API_TOKEN_KEY);
@@ -1142,14 +1076,6 @@ function getApiToken(ctx) {
1142
1076
  * Get the authenticated API token from the request context, or throw.
1143
1077
  *
1144
1078
  * @throws {AuthenticationException} When no token is present in the context.
1145
- *
1146
- * @example
1147
- * ```ts
1148
- * router.get('/api/me', async (ctx) => {
1149
- * const { token, userId, abilities } = getApiTokenOrFail(ctx)
1150
- * return ctx.json({ userId, tokenName: token.name, abilities })
1151
- * })
1152
- * ```
1153
1079
  */
1154
1080
  function getApiTokenOrFail(ctx) {
1155
1081
  const result = getApiToken(ctx);
@@ -1159,28 +1085,10 @@ function getApiTokenOrFail(ctx) {
1159
1085
  //#endregion
1160
1086
  //#region src/auth/TokenGuard.ts
1161
1087
  /**
1162
- * Bearer-token implementation of the Guard contract (RFC 0016 Phase 0).
1163
- *
1164
- * Reads `Authorization: Bearer <token>`, verifies it against the configured
1165
- * ApiTokenStore, and exposes the result through the same Guard surface the
1166
- * SessionGuard implements — so `requireAuthenticated()`, `Controller.auth`,
1167
- * and Gate resolution treat session- and token-authenticated requests
1168
- * identically. On successful verification the result is also written to
1169
- * `ctx[API_TOKEN_KEY]`, keeping `getApiToken(ctx)` and `tokenCan*` working
1170
- * exactly as they do behind `createBearerTokenMiddleware` — and when that
1171
- * middleware already verified this request's token, the guard reuses its
1172
- * result instead of paying a second store read and lastUsedAt write.
1173
- *
1174
- * Credential flows do not apply to bearer tokens: `attempt()`, `login()` and
1175
- * `validate()` throw. `logout()` is not a no-op — it revokes the presented
1176
- * token, the closest meaningful analogue to ending a session. On a request
1177
- * that carries a session cookie *and* a Bearer header, only the token is
1178
- * revoked; end the session explicitly via `auth.guard('web').logout()`.
1179
- *
1180
- * This guard answers authentication only. Token *abilities* are not
1181
- * consulted here or by Gate/policies — enforce them where the operation is
1182
- * dispatched (`tokenCan*`, `createBearerTokenMiddleware({ abilities })`, or
1183
- * the RFC 0016 scope gate), per the RFC's scope-before-policy layering.
1088
+ * Bearer-token Guard (RFC 0016 Phase 0). Credential flows (`attempt`,
1089
+ * `login`, `validate`) throw; `logout()` revokes the presented token and
1090
+ * leaves a co-present session alone. Answers authentication only — token
1091
+ * abilities are enforced elsewhere (`tokenCan*`, the RFC 0016 scope gate).
1184
1092
  */
1185
1093
  var TokenGuard = class {
1186
1094
  ctx;
@@ -1248,6 +1156,14 @@ var TokenGuard = class {
1248
1156
  //#endregion
1249
1157
  //#region src/auth/AuthManager.ts
1250
1158
  const DEFAULT_GUARD = "web";
1159
+ /**
1160
+ * The guard name an unqualified lookup resolves to on a request the pipeline
1161
+ * installed a principal on (RFC 0017 §2). Deliberately **not** registered:
1162
+ * registering it would publish a name an application could select, default to,
1163
+ * or shadow. Namespaced so it cannot collide, and `createGuard` refuses it for
1164
+ * a request carrying no principal, so naming it explicitly buys nothing.
1165
+ */
1166
+ const AGENT_PRINCIPAL_GUARD = "guren.agent-principal";
1251
1167
  var AuthManager = class {
1252
1168
  guards = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
1253
1169
  providers = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
@@ -1274,6 +1190,13 @@ var AuthManager = class {
1274
1190
  return entry.instance;
1275
1191
  }
1276
1192
  createGuard(name, context) {
1193
+ if (name === AGENT_PRINCIPAL_GUARD) {
1194
+ const installed = readAgentPrincipal(context.ctx.req.raw);
1195
+ if (installed) return new AgentPrincipalGuard({
1196
+ installed,
1197
+ ...this.apiTokenOptions.provider ? { provider: this.getProvider(this.apiTokenOptions.provider) } : {}
1198
+ });
1199
+ }
1277
1200
  const entry = this.guards.get(name);
1278
1201
  if (!entry) throw new Error(`AuthManager: guard "${name}" has not been registered.`);
1279
1202
  return entry.factory(context);
@@ -1289,15 +1212,15 @@ var AuthManager = class {
1289
1212
  return this.defaultGuard;
1290
1213
  }
1291
1214
  /**
1292
- * The guard name an unqualified `auth.guard()` / `auth.user()` call resolves
1293
- * to for this request. Explicit names always win; otherwise a registered
1294
- * token guard is selected when the request carries a Bearer Authorization
1295
- * header, falling back to the default (session) guard. This is the
1296
- * composite-guard rule from RFC 0016: session- and token-authenticated
1297
- * requests flow through the same auth surface without configuration.
1215
+ * The guard an unqualified `auth.guard()` / `auth.user()` resolves to.
1216
+ * Explicit names win; otherwise a principal the pipeline installed on this
1217
+ * exact request answers first, then a token guard for a Bearer header, then
1218
+ * the default — RFC 0016's composite rule with RFC 0017 §2's seam in front,
1219
+ * so a header cannot win over an identity the framework itself established.
1298
1220
  */
1299
1221
  resolveGuardName(ctx, name) {
1300
1222
  if (name) return name;
1223
+ if (readAgentPrincipal(ctx.req.raw)) return AGENT_PRINCIPAL_GUARD;
1301
1224
  if (this.tokenGuard && hasBearerHeader(ctx)) return this.tokenGuard;
1302
1225
  return this.defaultGuard;
1303
1226
  }
@@ -1317,13 +1240,11 @@ var AuthManager = class {
1317
1240
  return this.createAuthContext(ctx, { guard: name }).guard(name).attempt(credentials, remember);
1318
1241
  }
1319
1242
  /**
1320
- * Shorthand method to register a model-based authentication provider and session guard.
1321
- * This simplifies the common case of authenticating users via a database model.
1243
+ * Register a model-based authentication provider and session guard — the
1244
+ * common case of authenticating users via a database model.
1322
1245
  *
1323
- * @param model - The model class to use for user authentication
1324
- * @param options - Options for the ModelUserProvider (partial, with defaults)
1325
- * @param providerName - Name for the provider (defaults to 'users')
1326
- * @param guardName - Name for the guard (defaults to 'web')
1246
+ * @param providerName - Defaults to 'users'
1247
+ * @param guardName - Defaults to 'web'
1327
1248
  */
1328
1249
  useModel(model, options = {}, providerName = "users", guardName = "web") {
1329
1250
  const defaultOptions = {
@@ -1344,15 +1265,9 @@ var AuthManager = class {
1344
1265
  /**
1345
1266
  * Register a bearer-token guard backed by an ApiTokenStore and enable
1346
1267
  * header-based guard selection: requests carrying `Authorization: Bearer`
1347
- * resolve to this guard, everything else keeps the default (session)
1348
- * guard. The default guard itself is unchanged — session apps keep
1349
- * working exactly as before.
1350
- *
1351
- * @param store - Where issued tokens live (see createApiToken)
1352
- * @param options.provider - Registered provider name used to load the full
1353
- * user record from the token's userId. Without it, `auth.user()` resolves
1354
- * to a minimal `{ id }` record (enough for Gate/policy evaluation).
1355
- * @param options.guardName - Guard registry name (defaults to 'token')
1268
+ * resolve to this guard, everything else keeps the default (session) guard.
1269
+ * Without `options.provider`, `auth.user()` resolves to a minimal `{ id }`
1270
+ * record (enough for Gate/policy evaluation).
1356
1271
  */
1357
1272
  useTokens(store, options = {}) {
1358
1273
  const guardName = options.guardName ?? "token";
@@ -1370,33 +1285,21 @@ var AuthManager = class {
1370
1285
  this.apiTokenOptions = { ...options };
1371
1286
  }
1372
1287
  /**
1373
- * The options the last `useTokens()` call configured its guard with.
1374
- *
1375
- * Read by machinery that has to *replace* the store without changing
1376
- * anything else about how tokens authenticate — `guren tool:dev` installs an
1377
- * ephemeral store over the app's, and doing that with a bare `useTokens(store)`
1288
+ * The options the last `useTokens()` call configured its guard with. Read by
1289
+ * machinery that has to *replace* the store without changing anything else —
1290
+ * `guren tool:dev` installs an ephemeral store, and a bare `useTokens(store)`
1378
1291
  * silently dropped the app's `provider`, so a token resolved to a bare
1379
- * `{ id }` instead of the real user record and every policy reading a user
1380
- * field behaved differently for no stated reason.
1292
+ * `{ id }` and every policy reading a user field behaved differently.
1381
1293
  */
1382
1294
  getApiTokenOptions() {
1383
1295
  return { ...this.apiTokenOptions };
1384
1296
  }
1385
1297
  /**
1386
- * The token store {@link useTokens} was configured with, or `undefined`
1387
- * when this app never called it.
1388
- *
1389
- * This is the one path by which out-of-request machinery — `guren
1390
- * token:issue`, the App MCP adapter's principal lookup — reaches the same
1391
- * store the guard verifies against. `useTokens` otherwise closes over
1392
- * `store` inside the guard factory, where nothing outside a live request
1393
- * can see it, so an issuance command could only write tokens into a store
1394
- * of its own making, which no running app would ever read.
1395
- *
1396
- * Deliberately on this class rather than on `AuthManagerContract`: the
1397
- * contract describes what a *request* needs from auth, and handing out the
1398
- * raw store is not part of that. Callers reach it through the concrete
1399
- * manager (`Application.auth`).
1298
+ * The token store {@link useTokens} was configured with, or `undefined`. The
1299
+ * one path by which out-of-request machinery (`guren token:issue`, the App MCP
1300
+ * adapter's principal lookup) reaches the store the guard verifies against —
1301
+ * otherwise `store` is closed over inside the guard factory. On this class
1302
+ * rather than `AuthManagerContract`, which describes what a *request* needs.
1400
1303
  */
1401
1304
  getApiTokenStore() {
1402
1305
  return this.apiTokenStore ?? void 0;
@@ -1405,19 +1308,17 @@ var AuthManager = class {
1405
1308
  //#endregion
1406
1309
  //#region src/support/redirect-target.ts
1407
1310
  /**
1408
- * Shared open-redirect classification primitives, used by both the
1409
- * redirect-safety middleware and the OAuth `redirectTo` sanitizer. Keep every
1410
- * hardening fix here so the two layers cannot drift.
1311
+ * Open-redirect classification shared by the redirect-safety middleware and the
1312
+ * OAuth `redirectTo` sanitizer. Every hardening fix belongs here so the two
1313
+ * layers cannot drift.
1411
1314
  */
1412
- /** Normalize backslash tricks (e.g. `/\evil.com`) before classifying. */
1315
+ /** Defuses backslash tricks such as `/\evil.com`. */
1413
1316
  function normalizeRedirectTarget(value) {
1414
1317
  return value.replace(/\\/g, "/");
1415
1318
  }
1416
- /** App-relative paths (`/path`, but not protocol-relative `//host`) are always safe. */
1417
1319
  function isAppRelativePath(value) {
1418
1320
  return value.startsWith("/") && !value.startsWith("//");
1419
1321
  }
1420
- /** Match a URL's host against an allowlist supporting `*.example.com` wildcards. */
1421
1322
  function hostMatchesAllowlist(target, allowedHosts) {
1422
1323
  const hostname = target.hostname.toLowerCase();
1423
1324
  const host = target.host.toLowerCase();
@@ -1432,20 +1333,16 @@ function hostMatchesAllowlist(target, allowedHosts) {
1432
1333
  /** Session key holding the per-browser bindings between authorize and callback. */
1433
1334
  const OAUTH_SESSION_BINDING_KEY = "guren:oauth.bindings";
1434
1335
  /**
1435
- * How many unfinished flows one browser may have bindings for.
1436
- *
1437
- * Every `authorize()` parks one entry, and an abandoned flow leaves it behind
1438
- * until it expires, so the list is capped. Beyond the cap the oldest entry is
1439
- * dropped — that flow's callback then fails, which is the same outcome it had
1440
- * before any of this existed.
1336
+ * How many unfinished flows one browser may have bindings for. An abandoned
1337
+ * flow leaves an entry behind until it expires, so the list is capped; beyond
1338
+ * it the oldest is dropped and that flow's callback fails.
1441
1339
  */
1442
1340
  const MAX_PENDING_SESSION_BINDINGS = 5;
1443
1341
  let warnedAboutUnboundState = false;
1444
1342
  /**
1445
1343
  * An unbound `state` is transferable between browsers, which is exactly the
1446
- * attack `state` exists to stop. Verification stays permissive so apps written
1447
- * against the previous API keep working, so this is the only thing that tells
1448
- * them they are exposed.
1344
+ * attack `state` exists to stop. Verification stays permissive so older apps
1345
+ * keep working, so this warning is the only thing telling them they are exposed.
1449
1346
  */
1450
1347
  function warnOnceAboutUnboundState() {
1451
1348
  if (warnedAboutUnboundState) return;
@@ -1474,11 +1371,9 @@ function issueSessionBinding(session) {
1474
1371
  return generateToken(DEFAULT_STATE_LENGTH);
1475
1372
  }
1476
1373
  /**
1477
- * Park a minted binding against the state it belongs to.
1478
- *
1479
- * Keyed by state rather than kept in one slot, so a browser can have several
1480
- * flows in flight — two tabs, or a visitor who picks a different provider —
1481
- * without each `authorize()` invalidating the one before it.
1374
+ * Park a minted binding against the state it belongs to. Keyed by state rather
1375
+ * than kept in one slot, so a browser can have several flows in flight without
1376
+ * each `authorize()` invalidating the one before it.
1482
1377
  */
1483
1378
  function rememberSessionBinding(session, stateHash, binding, expiresAt) {
1484
1379
  const pending = readPendingBindings(session);
@@ -1490,11 +1385,9 @@ function rememberSessionBinding(session, stateHash, binding, expiresAt) {
1490
1385
  session.set(OAUTH_SESSION_BINDING_KEY, pending.slice(Math.max(0, pending.length - MAX_PENDING_SESSION_BINDINGS)));
1491
1386
  }
1492
1387
  /**
1493
- * Take the binding belonging to this callback's state, leaving the rest.
1494
- *
1495
- * Only the matching entry is removed: a forged callback carrying an unknown
1496
- * state must not be able to strip a real flow's binding and lock the visitor
1497
- * out of the login they actually started.
1388
+ * Take the binding belonging to this callback's state, leaving the rest. Only
1389
+ * the matching entry is removed: a forged callback carrying an unknown state
1390
+ * must not be able to strip a real flow's binding and lock the visitor out.
1498
1391
  */
1499
1392
  function consumeSessionBinding(session, stateHash) {
1500
1393
  if (!session) return void 0;
@@ -1594,10 +1487,9 @@ var OAuthManager = class {
1594
1487
  return profile;
1595
1488
  }
1596
1489
  /**
1597
- * Verify the callback and return the user profile together with the
1598
- * sanitized `redirectTo` stored at authorize time. `redirectTo` is safe to
1599
- * pass to a redirect response: app-relative paths and allowlisted hosts
1600
- * only.
1490
+ * Verify the callback and return the user profile together with the sanitized
1491
+ * `redirectTo` stored at authorize time — app-relative paths and allowlisted
1492
+ * hosts only, so it is safe to pass to a redirect response.
1601
1493
  */
1602
1494
  async handleCallback(providerName, payload) {
1603
1495
  const provider = this.getProvider(providerName);
@@ -1642,11 +1534,9 @@ async function verifyOAuthState(state, provider, store, config = {}, bindTo) {
1642
1534
  }
1643
1535
  /**
1644
1536
  * Whether the presented value matches the binding recorded at authorize time.
1645
- *
1646
1537
  * A state created without a binding still verifies, so an app that has not
1647
- * adopted `bindTo` keeps working. A state created *with* one is useless to a
1648
- * browser that cannot present it, which is the whole point — so a missing or
1649
- * wrong value fails.
1538
+ * adopted `bindTo` keeps working; a state created *with* one is useless to a
1539
+ * browser that cannot present it, so a missing or wrong value fails.
1650
1540
  */
1651
1541
  function bindingMatches(stored, presented, hashAlgorithm) {
1652
1542
  if (!stored) {
@@ -1663,11 +1553,10 @@ async function findAndDeleteState(store, stateHash) {
1663
1553
  return payload;
1664
1554
  }
1665
1555
  /**
1666
- * Reduce a `redirectTo` value to a safe target: app-relative paths always
1667
- * pass; absolute http(s) URLs pass only when their host is in the allowlist
1668
- * (supports `*.example.com` wildcards). Everything else — protocol-relative
1669
- * URLs, backslash tricks, `javascript:` and other schemes — returns
1670
- * `undefined`.
1556
+ * Reduce a `redirectTo` value to a safe target: app-relative paths always pass;
1557
+ * absolute http(s) URLs pass only when their host is in the allowlist (with
1558
+ * `*.example.com` wildcards). Everything else — protocol-relative URLs,
1559
+ * backslash tricks, `javascript:` and other schemes — returns `undefined`.
1671
1560
  */
1672
1561
  function sanitizeOAuthRedirect(redirectTo, allowedHosts = []) {
1673
1562
  const value = redirectTo?.trim();
@@ -1845,8 +1734,8 @@ var AuthenticatableModel = class extends Model {
1845
1734
  * Credential columns can never be mass-assigned: the resolved password-hash
1846
1735
  * column (unless the model hashes in place into the password field itself)
1847
1736
  * and the remember-token column. Resolved at call time so a renamed column
1848
- * stays covered. Use `forceCreate()`/`forceUpdate()` for trusted
1849
- * server-side values such as `passwordHash: 'oauth:...'`.
1737
+ * stays covered. Use `forceCreate()`/`forceUpdate()` for trusted server-side
1738
+ * values such as `passwordHash: 'oauth:...'`.
1850
1739
  */
1851
1740
  static deniedFields() {
1852
1741
  const denied = [...super.deniedFields()];
@@ -1874,10 +1763,30 @@ var AuthenticatableModel = class extends Model {
1874
1763
  }
1875
1764
  };
1876
1765
  //#endregion
1877
- //#region src/auth/password-reset.ts
1766
+ //#region src/auth/signed-token.ts
1878
1767
  /**
1879
- * In-memory token store for testing and development.
1768
+ * Read the claims of a signed one-time token, deciding expiry from the `exp`
1769
+ * claim signed into it rather than from the store's copy.
1770
+ *
1771
+ * The signature is checked before anything is deleted, so the housekeeping
1772
+ * `store.delete` only ever runs for an id this app issued.
1880
1773
  */
1774
+ async function readSignedTokenClaims(signer, token, purpose, store) {
1775
+ const claims = signer.verify(token, { purpose });
1776
+ if (claims?.id && claims.email) return {
1777
+ id: claims.id,
1778
+ email: claims.email
1779
+ };
1780
+ const expired = signer.verify(token, {
1781
+ purpose,
1782
+ allowExpired: true
1783
+ });
1784
+ if (expired?.id) await store.delete(expired.id);
1785
+ return null;
1786
+ }
1787
+ //#endregion
1788
+ //#region src/auth/password-reset.ts
1789
+ /** In-memory token store for testing and development. */
1881
1790
  var MemoryPasswordResetStore = class {
1882
1791
  tokens = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
1883
1792
  async store(tokenId, email, expiresAt) {
@@ -1912,14 +1821,7 @@ const PASSWORD_RESET_PURPOSE = "password-reset";
1912
1821
  function createPasswordResetSigner() {
1913
1822
  return new MessageSigner(deriveAppKeyring(getAppKeyringFromEnv(), "password-reset-signing"));
1914
1823
  }
1915
- /**
1916
- * Create a password reset token for a user.
1917
- *
1918
- * @param email - The user's email address
1919
- * @param store - The token storage implementation
1920
- * @param config - Optional configuration
1921
- * @returns The token result containing plain token and hash
1922
- */
1824
+ /** Create a password reset token for a user. */
1923
1825
  async function createPasswordResetToken(email, store, config = {}) {
1924
1826
  const expiresIn = config.expiresIn ?? DEFAULT_EXPIRES_IN;
1925
1827
  const tokenLength = config.tokenLength ?? DEFAULT_TOKEN_LENGTH;
@@ -1941,75 +1843,40 @@ async function createPasswordResetToken(email, store, config = {}) {
1941
1843
  expiresAt
1942
1844
  };
1943
1845
  }
1944
- /**
1945
- * Verify a password reset token.
1946
- *
1947
- * @param token - The plain-text token from the reset URL
1948
- * @param store - The token storage implementation
1949
- * @param config - Optional configuration (must match createPasswordResetToken config)
1950
- * @returns The email if token is valid, null otherwise
1951
- */
1952
- async function verifyPasswordResetToken(token, store, _config = {}) {
1953
- const payload = createPasswordResetSigner().verify(token, {
1954
- purpose: PASSWORD_RESET_PURPOSE,
1955
- allowExpired: true
1956
- });
1957
- if (!payload?.id || !payload.email) return null;
1958
- if (typeof payload.exp === "number" && payload.exp < Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3)) {
1959
- await store.delete(payload.id);
1960
- return null;
1961
- }
1962
- const record = await store.find(payload.id);
1846
+ /** Verify a password reset token, returning the email it was issued for. */
1847
+ async function verifyPasswordResetToken(token, store) {
1848
+ const claims = await readSignedTokenClaims(createPasswordResetSigner(), token, PASSWORD_RESET_PURPOSE, store);
1849
+ if (!claims) return null;
1850
+ const record = await store.find(claims.id);
1963
1851
  if (!record) return null;
1964
- return record.email.toLowerCase() === payload.email.toLowerCase() ? record.email : null;
1852
+ return record.email.toLowerCase() === claims.email.toLowerCase() ? record.email : null;
1965
1853
  }
1966
1854
  /**
1967
- * Complete a password reset by updating the user's password and invalidating the token.
1968
- *
1969
- * @param token - The plain-text token from the reset URL
1970
- * @param newPassword - The new password (should be validated by caller)
1971
- * @param store - The token storage implementation
1972
- * @param provider - The user provider to look up and update the user
1973
- * @param updatePassword - Function to update the user's password
1974
- * @param config - Optional configuration
1975
- * @returns The user if reset was successful, null if token is invalid
1855
+ * Complete a password reset: update the user's password and invalidate the
1856
+ * token. Returns the user, or `null` when the token is invalid.
1976
1857
  */
1977
- async function completePasswordReset(token, newPassword, store, provider, updatePassword, _config = {}) {
1978
- const payload = createPasswordResetSigner().verify(token, {
1979
- purpose: PASSWORD_RESET_PURPOSE,
1980
- allowExpired: true
1981
- });
1982
- if (!payload?.id || !payload.email) return null;
1983
- if (typeof payload.exp === "number" && payload.exp < Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3)) {
1984
- await store.delete(payload.id);
1985
- return null;
1986
- }
1987
- const record = await store.find(payload.id);
1858
+ async function completePasswordReset(token, newPassword, store, provider, updatePassword) {
1859
+ const claims = await readSignedTokenClaims(createPasswordResetSigner(), token, PASSWORD_RESET_PURPOSE, store);
1860
+ if (!claims) return null;
1861
+ const record = await store.find(claims.id);
1988
1862
  if (!record) return null;
1989
- if (record.email.toLowerCase() !== payload.email.toLowerCase()) return null;
1863
+ if (record.email.toLowerCase() !== claims.email.toLowerCase()) return null;
1990
1864
  const user = await provider.retrieveByCredentials({ email: record.email });
1991
1865
  if (!user) {
1992
- await store.delete(payload.id);
1866
+ await store.delete(claims.id);
1993
1867
  return null;
1994
1868
  }
1995
1869
  await updatePassword(user, newPassword);
1996
- await store.delete(payload.id);
1870
+ await store.delete(claims.id);
1997
1871
  return user;
1998
1872
  }
1999
- /**
2000
- * Build a password reset URL from a base URL and token.
2001
- */
1873
+ /** Build a password reset URL from a base URL and token. */
2002
1874
  const buildPasswordResetUrl = buildTokenUrl;
2003
- /**
2004
- * Parse a password reset URL to extract the token and optional email.
2005
- */
1875
+ /** Parse a password reset URL to extract the token and optional email. */
2006
1876
  const parsePasswordResetUrl = parseTokenUrl;
2007
1877
  //#endregion
2008
1878
  //#region src/auth/email-verification.ts
2009
- /**
2010
- * In-memory store for testing purposes.
2011
- * Do NOT use in production - tokens will be lost on restart.
2012
- */
1879
+ /** In-memory store for testing. Tokens are lost on restart. */
2013
1880
  var MemoryEmailVerificationStore = class {
2014
1881
  tokens = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
2015
1882
  async store(token) {
@@ -2025,15 +1892,11 @@ var MemoryEmailVerificationStore = class {
2025
1892
  const normalizedEmail = email.toLowerCase();
2026
1893
  for (const [key, token] of this.tokens.entries()) if (token.email.toLowerCase() === normalizedEmail) this.tokens.delete(key);
2027
1894
  }
2028
- /**
2029
- * Clear all tokens (useful for testing).
2030
- */
1895
+ /** Clear all tokens (useful for testing). */
2031
1896
  clear() {
2032
1897
  this.tokens.clear();
2033
1898
  }
2034
- /**
2035
- * Get the count of stored tokens (useful for testing).
2036
- */
1899
+ /** Count of stored tokens (useful for testing). */
2037
1900
  get size() {
2038
1901
  return this.tokens.size;
2039
1902
  }
@@ -2047,27 +1910,8 @@ function createEmailVerificationSigner() {
2047
1910
  return new MessageSigner(deriveAppKeyring(getAppKeyringFromEnv(), "email-verification-signing"));
2048
1911
  }
2049
1912
  /**
2050
- * Create a new email verification token.
2051
- *
2052
- * @param email - The email address to verify
2053
- * @param store - Token store implementation
2054
- * @param config - Optional configuration
2055
- * @returns The raw token to send via email
2056
- *
2057
- * @example
2058
- * ```ts
2059
- * const { token, expiresAt } = await createEmailVerificationToken(
2060
- * user.email,
2061
- * verificationStore
2062
- * )
2063
- *
2064
- * // Send email with verification link
2065
- * await sendEmail({
2066
- * to: user.email,
2067
- * subject: 'Verify your email',
2068
- * html: `<a href="${buildVerificationUrl(baseUrl, token)}">Verify Email</a>`,
2069
- * })
2070
- * ```
1913
+ * Create a new email verification token; the raw token is returned to send by
1914
+ * email and is never stored.
2071
1915
  */
2072
1916
  async function createEmailVerificationToken(email, store, config = {}) {
2073
1917
  const { expiresIn, tokenLength } = {
@@ -2098,127 +1942,43 @@ async function createEmailVerificationToken(email, store, config = {}) {
2098
1942
  };
2099
1943
  }
2100
1944
  /**
2101
- * Verify an email verification token.
2102
- *
2103
- * @param token - The raw token from the verification link
2104
- * @param store - Token store implementation
2105
- * @param config - Optional configuration (not currently used, reserved for future)
2106
- * @returns The email address if valid, null if invalid or expired
2107
- *
2108
- * @example
2109
- * ```ts
2110
- * const email = await verifyEmailToken(token, verificationStore)
2111
- *
2112
- * if (!email) {
2113
- * return ctx.json({ error: 'Invalid or expired token' }, 400)
2114
- * }
2115
- *
2116
- * // Mark user as verified
2117
- * await User.update({ email }, { emailVerifiedAt: new Date() })
2118
- * ```
1945
+ * Verify an email verification token, returning the email address it was
1946
+ * issued for or `null` when it is invalid or expired.
2119
1947
  */
2120
- async function verifyEmailToken(token, store, _config = {}) {
2121
- const payload = createEmailVerificationSigner().verify(token, {
2122
- purpose: EMAIL_VERIFICATION_PURPOSE,
2123
- allowExpired: true
2124
- });
2125
- if (!payload?.id || !payload.email) return null;
2126
- if (typeof payload.exp === "number" && payload.exp < Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3)) {
2127
- await store.delete(payload.id);
2128
- return null;
2129
- }
2130
- const storedToken = await store.findByTokenId(payload.id);
1948
+ async function verifyEmailToken(token, store) {
1949
+ const claims = await readSignedTokenClaims(createEmailVerificationSigner(), token, EMAIL_VERIFICATION_PURPOSE, store);
1950
+ if (!claims) return null;
1951
+ const storedToken = await store.findByTokenId(claims.id);
2131
1952
  if (!storedToken) return null;
2132
- if (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date() > storedToken.expiresAt) {
2133
- await store.delete(payload.id);
2134
- return null;
2135
- }
2136
- return storedToken.email.toLowerCase() === payload.email.toLowerCase() ? storedToken.email : null;
1953
+ return storedToken.email.toLowerCase() === claims.email.toLowerCase() ? storedToken.email : null;
2137
1954
  }
2138
1955
  /**
2139
- * Complete email verification by consuming the token.
2140
- *
2141
- * @param token - The raw token from the verification link
2142
- * @param store - Token store implementation
2143
- * @param markVerified - Function to mark the user as verified
2144
- * @returns The result of markVerified if successful, null if token invalid
2145
- *
2146
- * @example
2147
- * ```ts
2148
- * const result = await completeEmailVerification(
2149
- * token,
2150
- * verificationStore,
2151
- * async (email) => {
2152
- * await User.update({ email }, { emailVerifiedAt: new Date() })
2153
- * return User.findByEmail(email)
2154
- * }
2155
- * )
2156
- *
2157
- * if (!result) {
2158
- * return ctx.json({ error: 'Invalid or expired token' }, 400)
2159
- * }
2160
- *
2161
- * return ctx.redirect('/dashboard')
2162
- * ```
1956
+ * Complete email verification by consuming the token. Returns the result of
1957
+ * `markVerified`, or `null` when the token is invalid.
2163
1958
  */
2164
1959
  async function completeEmailVerification(token, store, markVerified) {
2165
- const payload = createEmailVerificationSigner().verify(token, {
2166
- purpose: EMAIL_VERIFICATION_PURPOSE,
2167
- allowExpired: true
2168
- });
2169
- if (!payload?.id || !payload.email) return null;
2170
- if (typeof payload.exp === "number" && payload.exp < Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3)) {
2171
- await store.delete(payload.id);
2172
- return null;
2173
- }
2174
- const storedToken = await store.findByTokenId(payload.id);
1960
+ const claims = await readSignedTokenClaims(createEmailVerificationSigner(), token, EMAIL_VERIFICATION_PURPOSE, store);
1961
+ if (!claims) return null;
1962
+ const storedToken = await store.findByTokenId(claims.id);
2175
1963
  if (!storedToken) return null;
2176
- if (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date() > storedToken.expiresAt) {
2177
- await store.delete(payload.id);
2178
- return null;
2179
- }
2180
- if (storedToken.email.toLowerCase() !== payload.email.toLowerCase()) return null;
1964
+ if (storedToken.email.toLowerCase() !== claims.email.toLowerCase()) return null;
2181
1965
  const result = await markVerified(storedToken.email);
2182
- await store.delete(payload.id);
1966
+ await store.delete(claims.id);
2183
1967
  return result;
2184
1968
  }
2185
- /**
2186
- * Build a verification URL.
2187
- */
1969
+ /** Build a verification URL. */
2188
1970
  const buildVerificationUrl = buildTokenUrl;
2189
- /**
2190
- * Parse a verification URL to extract token and email.
2191
- */
1971
+ /** Parse a verification URL to extract token and email. */
2192
1972
  const parseVerificationUrl = parseTokenUrl;
2193
- /**
2194
- * Check if a user's email is verified.
2195
- * Helper function for use with User models.
2196
- *
2197
- * @param user - User object with emailVerifiedAt field
2198
- * @returns true if verified, false otherwise
2199
- *
2200
- * @example
2201
- * ```ts
2202
- * if (!isEmailVerified(user)) {
2203
- * return ctx.redirect('/verify-email')
2204
- * }
2205
- * ```
2206
- */
1973
+ /** Whether a user's `emailVerifiedAt` is set. */
2207
1974
  function isEmailVerified(user) {
2208
1975
  return user?.emailVerifiedAt != null;
2209
1976
  }
2210
1977
  /**
2211
1978
  * Middleware factory to require verified email.
2212
- *
2213
- * @param options - Configuration options
2214
- * @returns Middleware function
2215
- *
2216
1979
  * @example
2217
1980
  * ```ts
2218
- * router.get('/dashboard', [DashboardController, 'index'],
2219
- * requireAuthenticated(),
2220
- * requireVerifiedEmail({ redirectTo: '/verify-email' })
2221
- * )
1981
+ * requireVerifiedEmail({ redirectTo: '/verify-email' })
2222
1982
  * ```
2223
1983
  */
2224
1984
  function requireVerifiedEmail(options = {}) {
@@ -2231,4 +1991,4 @@ function requireVerifiedEmail(options = {}) {
2231
1991
  };
2232
1992
  }
2233
1993
  //#endregion
2234
- export { buildTokenUrl as $, verifyOAuthState as A, getApiToken as B, createGoogleOAuthProviderConfig as C, fetchOAuthUserProfile as D, exchangeOAuthCode as E, TokenGuard as F, readBearerToken as G, getUserApiTokens as H, API_TOKEN_KEY as I, tokenCan as J, revokeAllApiTokens as K, MemoryApiTokenStore as L, isAppRelativePath as M, normalizeRedirectTarget as N, parseOAuthRedirectUrl as O, AuthManager as P, SessionGuard as Q, createApiToken as R, createGitHubOAuthProviderConfig as S, createOAuthState as T, hasBearerHeader as U, getApiTokenOrFail as V, parseApiToken as W, tokenCanAny as X, tokenCanAll as Y, verifyApiToken as Z, OAUTH_SESSION_BINDING_KEY as _, isEmailVerified as a, secureStringCompare as at, buildOAuthRedirectUrl as b, verifyEmailToken as c, DefaultHasher as ct, completePasswordReset as d, AuthenticationException as dt, generateId as et, createPasswordResetToken as f, MemorySessionStore as ft, MemoryOAuthStateStore as g, AuthenticatableModel as h, createEmailVerificationToken as i, secureCompare as it, hostMatchesAllowlist as j, sanitizeOAuthRedirect as k, MemoryPasswordResetStore as l, NodeHasher as lt, verifyPasswordResetToken as m, getSessionFromContext as mt, buildVerificationUrl as n, hashToken as nt, parseVerificationUrl as o, ModelUserProvider as ot, parsePasswordResetUrl as p, createSessionMiddleware as pt, revokeApiToken as q, completeEmailVerification as r, parseTokenUrl as rt, requireVerifiedEmail as s, BaseUserProvider as st, MemoryEmailVerificationStore as t, generateToken as tt, buildPasswordResetUrl as u, ScryptHasher as ut, OAuthManager as v, createOAuthManager as w, createDiscordOAuthProviderConfig as x, buildOAuthAuthorizeUrl as y, createBearerTokenMiddleware as z };
1994
+ export { buildTokenUrl as $, verifyOAuthState as A, getApiToken as B, createGoogleOAuthProviderConfig as C, fetchOAuthUserProfile as D, exchangeOAuthCode as E, TokenGuard as F, readBearerToken as G, getUserApiTokens as H, API_TOKEN_KEY as I, tokenCan as J, revokeAllApiTokens as K, MemoryApiTokenStore as L, isAppRelativePath as M, normalizeRedirectTarget as N, parseOAuthRedirectUrl as O, AuthManager as P, SessionGuard as Q, createApiToken as R, createGitHubOAuthProviderConfig as S, createOAuthState as T, hasBearerHeader as U, getApiTokenOrFail as V, parseApiToken as W, tokenCanAny as X, tokenCanAll as Y, verifyApiToken as Z, OAUTH_SESSION_BINDING_KEY as _, isEmailVerified as a, secureStringCompare as at, buildOAuthRedirectUrl as b, verifyEmailToken as c, NodeHasher as ct, completePasswordReset as d, BaseUserProvider as dt, generateId as et, createPasswordResetToken as f, installAgentPrincipal as ft, MemoryOAuthStateStore as g, getSessionFromContext as gt, AuthenticatableModel as h, createSessionMiddleware as ht, createEmailVerificationToken as i, secureCompare as it, hostMatchesAllowlist as j, sanitizeOAuthRedirect as k, MemoryPasswordResetStore as l, ScryptHasher as lt, verifyPasswordResetToken as m, MemorySessionStore as mt, buildVerificationUrl as n, hashToken as nt, parseVerificationUrl as o, ModelUserProvider as ot, parsePasswordResetUrl as p, readAgentPrincipal as pt, revokeApiToken as q, completeEmailVerification as r, parseTokenUrl as rt, requireVerifiedEmail as s, DefaultHasher as st, MemoryEmailVerificationStore as t, generateToken as tt, buildPasswordResetUrl as u, AuthenticationException as ut, OAuthManager as v, createOAuthManager as w, createDiscordOAuthProviderConfig as x, buildOAuthAuthorizeUrl as y, createBearerTokenMiddleware as z };