@guren/server 2.14.0 → 2.15.0

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Files changed (38) hide show
  1. package/dist/{Hash-CzrwKeDp.js → Hash-C8aejmi8.js} +5 -0
  2. package/dist/agent/AgentApprovalRequested.d.ts +59 -0
  3. package/dist/agent/approval.d.ts +295 -0
  4. package/dist/agent/audit-emitter.d.ts +64 -0
  5. package/dist/agent/audit.d.ts +103 -0
  6. package/dist/agent/dispatch.d.ts +50 -8
  7. package/dist/agent/meta-tools.d.ts +62 -0
  8. package/dist/agent/public.d.ts +33 -0
  9. package/dist/agent/public.js +2 -0
  10. package/dist/auth/index.js +1 -1
  11. package/dist/auth/password/DefaultHasher.d.ts +18 -5
  12. package/dist/auth/password/PasswordHasher.d.ts +15 -0
  13. package/dist/auth/password/hash-format.d.ts +19 -0
  14. package/dist/{auth-BSUc14CD.js → auth-DkYoAPVn.js} +121 -32
  15. package/dist/broadcasting/index.js +1 -1
  16. package/dist/{broadcasting-BxU-LIfF.js → broadcasting-BwodCA4q.js} +1 -1
  17. package/dist/container/bindings.d.ts +19 -0
  18. package/dist/dispatch-erOS9epZ.js +285 -0
  19. package/dist/encryption/index.js +2 -2
  20. package/dist/{encryption-DJtkkhiw.js → encryption-D99Vmls3.js} +4 -1
  21. package/dist/http/dev-assets.d.ts +16 -0
  22. package/dist/http/public-assets.d.ts +10 -0
  23. package/dist/http/request.d.ts +88 -1
  24. package/dist/http/static-documents.d.ts +31 -0
  25. package/dist/index.d.ts +11 -3
  26. package/dist/index.js +586 -333
  27. package/dist/internal/request.d.ts +15 -9
  28. package/dist/internal/request.js +2 -2
  29. package/dist/logging/channels/DailyFileChannel.d.ts +0 -2
  30. package/dist/logging/daily-file-path.d.ts +24 -0
  31. package/dist/logging/index.d.ts +1 -0
  32. package/dist/logging/index.js +2 -2
  33. package/dist/{logging-CPaRMuPP.js → logging-B-kngi3q.js} +61 -18
  34. package/dist/mvc/Controller.d.ts +0 -26
  35. package/dist/{request-CRVuIiQr.js → request-CVQwpu2J.js} +56 -5
  36. package/dist/runtime/index.js +90 -14
  37. package/dist/{vite-manifest-BGfWbPYp.js → vite-manifest-w_RSOvQW.js} +1 -1
  38. package/package.json +6 -2
package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -1,31 +1,32 @@
1
- import { a as parseRequestPayload, i as parseRequestBody, n as flattenRequestQueries, r as formatValidationErrors, t as asRecord } from "./request-CRVuIiQr.js";
1
+ import { a as parseRequestPayload, i as parseRequestBody, n as flattenRequestQueries, o as parseRequestUploads, r as formatValidationErrors, t as asRecord } from "./request-CVQwpu2J.js";
2
2
  import { t as HttpException } from "./HttpException-BkS3euNG.js";
3
3
  import { n as ValidationException } from "./errors-BgeOl_DC.js";
4
4
  import { _ as setGate, a as withAuthorization, b as mergeCapabilities, c as Gate, d as can, f as cannot, h as getGate, i as resourceAbilityForMethod, l as Response$1, m as defineGate, n as authorizeMiddleware, o as Policy, p as createGate, r as authorizeResourceMiddleware, s as definePolicy, t as authorizeAllMiddleware, u as authorize, v as AuthorizationException, x as stampCapabilities, y as capabilitiesOf } from "./authorization-CdfbCj8J.js";
5
+ import { a as mapToolResponse, i as describeBuildFailure, n as advertisesStructuredOutput, r as buildToolRequest, s as AGENT_PREFLIGHT_VERDICT_HEADER, t as PREFLIGHT_ARGUMENT } from "./dispatch-erOS9epZ.js";
5
6
  import { t as trimSlashes } from "./trim-slashes-ZJ_VsY5s.js";
6
7
  import { PATH_PARAM_PATTERN, extractPathParamNames } from "./internal/route-path.js";
7
8
  import { a as getRegisteredJobs, c as setQueueDriver, d as getContainer, f as resolve, i as getQueueDriver, l as Container, n as clearJobRegistry, o as registerJob, p as setContainer, r as getJob, s as resolveJobName, t as Job, u as createContainer } from "./Job-BVT813DO.js";
8
9
  import { n as ProviderManager, r as ServiceProvider } from "./loopback-guard-D0Kc7-xc.js";
9
10
  import { a as generateAppKey, c as parseAppKey, i as encodeDerivedKey, l as parsePreviousAppKeys, n as deriveAppKey, o as getAppKeyringFromEnv, r as deriveAppKeyring, s as normalizeAppKey, t as MessageSigner } from "./MessageSigner-Bd25ZJAV.js";
10
- import { $ as SessionGuard, A as sanitizeOAuthRedirect, B as createBearerTokenMiddleware, C as createGitHubOAuthProviderConfig, D as exchangeOAuthCode, E as createOAuthState, F as AuthManager, G as parseApiToken, H as getApiTokenOrFail, I as TokenGuard, J as revokeApiToken, K as readBearerToken, L as API_TOKEN_KEY, M as hostMatchesAllowlist, N as isAppRelativePath, O as fetchOAuthUserProfile, P as normalizeRedirectTarget, Q as verifyApiToken, R as MemoryApiTokenStore, S as createDiscordOAuthProviderConfig, T as createOAuthManager, U as getUserApiTokens, V as getApiToken, W as hasBearerHeader, X as tokenCanAll, Y as tokenCan, Z as tokenCanAny, _ as MemoryOAuthStateStore, a as isEmailVerified, b as buildOAuthAuthorizeUrl, c as verifyEmailToken, ct as BaseUserProvider, d as completePasswordReset, dt as MemorySessionStore, f as createPasswordResetToken, ft as createSessionMiddleware, g as NodeHasher, h as AuthenticatableModel, i as createEmailVerificationToken, j as verifyOAuthState, k as parseOAuthRedirectUrl, l as MemoryPasswordResetStore, lt as ScryptHasher, m as verifyPasswordResetToken, n as buildVerificationUrl, o as parseVerificationUrl, p as parsePasswordResetUrl, pt as getSessionFromContext, q as revokeAllApiTokens, r as completeEmailVerification, s as requireVerifiedEmail, st as ModelUserProvider, t as MemoryEmailVerificationStore, u as buildPasswordResetUrl, ut as AuthenticationException, v as OAUTH_SESSION_BINDING_KEY, w as createGoogleOAuthProviderConfig, x as buildOAuthRedirectUrl, y as OAuthManager, z as createApiToken } from "./auth-BSUc14CD.js";
11
+ import { A as verifyOAuthState, B as getApiToken, C as createGoogleOAuthProviderConfig, D as fetchOAuthUserProfile, E as exchangeOAuthCode, F as TokenGuard, G as readBearerToken, H as getUserApiTokens, I as API_TOKEN_KEY, J as tokenCan, K as revokeAllApiTokens, L as MemoryApiTokenStore, M as isAppRelativePath, N as normalizeRedirectTarget, O as parseOAuthRedirectUrl, P as AuthManager, Q as SessionGuard, R as createApiToken, S as createGitHubOAuthProviderConfig, T as createOAuthState, U as hasBearerHeader, V as getApiTokenOrFail, W as parseApiToken, X as tokenCanAny, Y as tokenCanAll, Z as verifyApiToken, _ as OAUTH_SESSION_BINDING_KEY, a as isEmailVerified, b as buildOAuthRedirectUrl, c as verifyEmailToken, ct as DefaultHasher, d as completePasswordReset, dt as AuthenticationException, f as createPasswordResetToken, ft as MemorySessionStore, g as MemoryOAuthStateStore, h as AuthenticatableModel, i as createEmailVerificationToken, j as hostMatchesAllowlist, k as sanitizeOAuthRedirect, l as MemoryPasswordResetStore, lt as NodeHasher, m as verifyPasswordResetToken, mt as getSessionFromContext, n as buildVerificationUrl, o as parseVerificationUrl, ot as ModelUserProvider, p as parsePasswordResetUrl, pt as createSessionMiddleware, q as revokeApiToken, r as completeEmailVerification, s as requireVerifiedEmail, st as BaseUserProvider, t as MemoryEmailVerificationStore, u as buildPasswordResetUrl, ut as ScryptHasher, v as OAuthManager, w as createOAuthManager, x as createDiscordOAuthProviderConfig, y as buildOAuthAuthorizeUrl, z as createBearerTokenMiddleware } from "./auth-DkYoAPVn.js";
12
+ import { a as md5, c as sha256, d as verifyPassword, i as hmac, l as sha512, n as hash, o as needsRehash, r as hashPassword, s as secureCompare, t as check, u as verifyHmac } from "./Hash-C8aejmi8.js";
11
13
  import { n as getAuthContext, t as AUTH_CONTEXT_KEY } from "./context-DoD0c7J_.js";
12
- import { a as md5, c as sha256, d as verifyPassword, i as hmac, l as sha512, n as hash, o as needsRehash, r as hashPassword, s as secureCompare, t as check, u as verifyHmac } from "./Hash-CzrwKeDp.js";
13
14
  import { r as isMcpEndpointEnabled } from "./endpoint-D-20PiHY.js";
14
15
  import { n as isHotReloadRuntime, r as matchingOpenParen, t as claimHotDisposable } from "./hot-disposables-WsTX2ySN.js";
15
16
  import { a as setI18n, c as tryGetI18n, d as getPluralizationRule, f as pluralizationRules, i as getI18n, l as JsonLoader, n as I18nManager, o as t, p as selectPluralForm, r as createI18n, s as tc, t as MemoryLoader, u as Translator } from "./i18n-mcWi7LCd.js";
16
- import { _ as parseImportMap, c as isViteProduction, d as startViteDevServer, g as DEFAULT_DEV_STYLES_ENTRY, h as logDevServerBanner, i as clientManifestCandidates, l as loadViteManifest, m as isWildcardHost, n as INJECTED_CLIENT_MANIFEST_SOURCE, o as getManifestFile, p as formatHostPort, r as PUBLIC_ASSETS_URL_PREFIX, s as injectedClientManifest, u as normalizeDevServerUrl } from "./vite-manifest-BGfWbPYp.js";
17
+ import { _ as parseImportMap, c as isViteProduction, d as startViteDevServer, g as DEFAULT_DEV_STYLES_ENTRY, h as logDevServerBanner, i as clientManifestCandidates, l as loadViteManifest, m as isWildcardHost, n as INJECTED_CLIENT_MANIFEST_SOURCE, o as getManifestFile, p as formatHostPort, r as PUBLIC_ASSETS_URL_PREFIX, s as injectedClientManifest, u as normalizeDevServerUrl } from "./vite-manifest-w_RSOvQW.js";
17
18
  import { r as isDocsViewerEnabled } from "./endpoint-D6GIqOpe.js";
18
19
  import { t as jsx_runtime_exports } from "./jsx-runtime.js";
19
20
  import { readObjectSchema, toJsonSchema } from "./internal/zod-json-schema.js";
20
21
  import { a as RequestFinished, c as UserLoggedOut, d as createEventManager, f as Event, i as JobProcessed, l as Listener, n as ApplicationStarted, o as RequestReceived, r as JobFailed, s as UserAuthenticated, t as ApplicationShutdown, u as EventManager } from "./events-aIH_bWRx.js";
22
+ import { a as NotificationManager, c as setNotificationManager, d as getNotification, f as registerNotification, i as MailChannel, l as resolveNotifiableType, n as SlackChannel, o as createNotificationManager, p as Notification, r as DatabaseChannel, s as getNotificationManager, t as MemoryChannel, u as clearNotificationRegistry } from "./notifications-BGqmUNZ8.js";
21
23
  import { a as RedisStore, i as FileStore, n as createCacheManager, o as MemoryStore, r as TaggedCache, t as CacheManager } from "./cache-BYnZf2FR.js";
22
24
  import { a as processJob, c as RedisDriver$1, i as Worker, l as SyncDriver, n as createQueueManager, o as SqsDriver, r as FailedJobReporter, s as createSqsAdapter, t as QueueManager, u as MemoryDriver$1 } from "./queue-CXrRK85G.js";
23
25
  import { a as MailManager, c as MemoryTransport, i as setMailManager, l as ResendTransport, n as getMailManager, o as createMailManager, r as mail, s as LogTransport, t as Mail, u as SmtpTransport } from "./mail-DfEfSQEr.js";
24
- import { a as DailyFileChannel, c as Logger, i as setLogManager, l as filterSensitiveData, n as createLogManager, o as FileChannel, r as getLogManager, s as ConsoleChannel, t as LogManager, u as LOG_LEVEL_PRIORITY } from "./logging-CPaRMuPP.js";
25
- import { a as NotificationManager, c as setNotificationManager, d as getNotification, f as registerNotification, i as MailChannel, l as resolveNotifiableType, n as SlackChannel, o as createNotificationManager, p as Notification, r as DatabaseChannel, s as getNotificationManager, t as MemoryChannel, u as clearNotificationRegistry } from "./notifications-BGqmUNZ8.js";
26
- import { a as setBroadcastManager, c as PresenceChannel, i as getBroadcastManager, l as PrivateChannel, n as BroadcastManager, o as RedisDriver, r as createBroadcastManager, s as MemoryDriver, t as createTypedBroadcaster, u as Channel } from "./broadcasting-BxU-LIfF.js";
26
+ import { a as DailyFileChannel, c as matchDailyFileDate, d as Logger, f as filterSensitiveData, i as setLogManager, l as FileChannel, n as createLogManager, o as dailyFileDateStamp, p as LOG_LEVEL_PRIORITY, r as getLogManager, s as dailyFilePath, t as LogManager, u as ConsoleChannel } from "./logging-B-kngi3q.js";
27
+ import { a as setBroadcastManager, c as PresenceChannel, i as getBroadcastManager, l as PrivateChannel, n as BroadcastManager, o as RedisDriver, r as createBroadcastManager, s as MemoryDriver, t as createTypedBroadcaster, u as Channel } from "./broadcasting-BwodCA4q.js";
27
28
  import { a as random, c as randomHex, d as sample, f as shuffle, i as pick, l as randomInt, m as uuid, n as generatePassword, o as randomBase64, p as urlSafeToken, r as generateSlug, s as randomBase64Url, t as generateOtp, u as randomString } from "./Random-DbIJ22KQ.js";
28
- import { a as decrypt, c as getEncrypter, i as createEncrypter, l as setEncrypter, n as verifySignedUrl, o as encrypt, r as Encrypter, s as generateKey, t as signUrl } from "./encryption-DJtkkhiw.js";
29
+ import { a as decrypt, c as getEncrypter, i as createEncrypter, l as setEncrypter, n as verifySignedUrl, o as encrypt, r as Encrypter, s as generateKey, t as signUrl } from "./encryption-D99Vmls3.js";
29
30
  import { a as LocalDriver, i as S3Driver, n as createStorageManager, o as warnOnce, r as MemoryDriver$2, t as StorageManager } from "./storage-TLD9t0Q2.js";
30
31
  import { a as CacheCheck, c as HealthManager, i as StorageCheck, l as createHealthManager, n as customCheck, o as RedisCheck, r as MemoryCheck, s as DatabaseCheck, t as CustomCheck, u as HealthCheck } from "./health-VWdWXRwh.js";
31
32
  import { a as ScheduledTask, c as isDue, d as parseCron, f as toTimezone, i as Schedule, l as isDueInTimezone, n as createScheduler, o as getNextOccurrence, r as PendingSchedule, s as getNextOccurrences, t as Scheduler, u as matchesCron } from "./scheduling-CPiEdtQd.js";
@@ -108,36 +109,6 @@ function mountRoute(app, method, path, ...handlers) {
108
109
  app.on(method, path, ...handlers);
109
110
  }
110
111
  //#endregion
111
- //#region src/internal/agent-preflight.ts
112
- /**
113
- * The wire protocol of an agent preflight (RFC 0016 §5.4), in a leaf module
114
- * so the two halves can share it without depending on each other.
115
- *
116
- * `Router` mounts the seam that answers a preflight; `agent/dispatch` builds
117
- * the request that asks for one and reads the answer back. Putting the names
118
- * in either of those would make one import the other — today only
119
- * `dispatch → Router` exists, and the day `Router` needs anything from
120
- * `agent/` that becomes a cycle.
121
- *
122
- * Not exported from the package index: an external dispatcher asks for a
123
- * preflight through `BuildToolRequestOptions.preflight`, and the header
124
- * spelling is this seam's business, not published API.
125
- */
126
- /** Request header asking the route for a verdict instead of an execution. */
127
- const AGENT_PREFLIGHT_HEADER = "X-Guren-Agent-Preflight";
128
- /**
129
- * Response header marking a body as a preflight verdict rather than the
130
- * route's own output.
131
- *
132
- * Load-bearing in two places that would otherwise mistake one for the other:
133
- * a route's `output` schema validation (which would reject the verdict and
134
- * turn it into a 500) and the MCP response mapping (which would advertise the
135
- * verdict as the tool's `structuredContent`, so an SDK client validates it
136
- * against the tool's output schema and throws). Both are answering the same
137
- * question — "is this the route's result?" — so both read the same marker.
138
- */
139
- const AGENT_PREFLIGHT_VERDICT_HEADER = "X-Guren-Agent-Preflight-Verdict";
140
- //#endregion
141
112
  //#region src/mvc/Router.ts
142
113
  function normalizeModelBinding(binding) {
143
114
  if (Array.isArray(binding)) {
@@ -692,7 +663,7 @@ function createAgentPreflightMiddleware(route, capabilities) {
692
663
  route: route.name,
693
664
  validated,
694
665
  unverified,
695
- message: "Preflight only: the request passed this route's middleware" + (validated.length > 0 ? ` and its ${validated.join(", ")} schema${validated.length > 1 ? "s" : ""}` : "") + ". The handler did not run, so nothing was created, changed, or deleted." + (unverified.length > 0 ? " No authorization middleware was found on this route, so any check inside the handler itself was not evaluated." : "")
666
+ message: "Preflight only: the request passed this route's middleware" + (validated.length > 0 ? ` and its ${validated.join(", ")} schema${validated.length > 1 ? "s" : ""}` : "") + ". The handler did not run. The route's own middleware did run, so any effect a middleware on this route has of its own has already happened." + (unverified.length > 0 ? " No authorization middleware was found on this route, so any check inside the handler itself was not evaluated." : "")
696
667
  });
697
668
  };
698
669
  }
@@ -2450,7 +2421,7 @@ var ExceptionHandler = class {
2450
2421
  */
2451
2422
  async reportException(error) {
2452
2423
  if (this.shouldNotReport(error)) return;
2453
- if (this.reporters.length === 0) console.error("Unhandled exception:", error);
2424
+ if (this.reporters.length === 0 && resolveExceptionStatus(error) >= 500) console.error("Unhandled exception:", error);
2454
2425
  for (const reporter of this.reporters) try {
2455
2426
  await reporter(error);
2456
2427
  } catch (reporterError) {
@@ -2481,12 +2452,12 @@ var ExceptionHandler = class {
2481
2452
  */
2482
2453
  renderDefaultException(error, ctx) {
2483
2454
  const debug = this.shouldShowDetails();
2455
+ const statusCode = resolveExceptionStatus(error);
2484
2456
  if (HttpException.isHttpException(error)) {
2485
- const { status, body } = error.toResponse(debug);
2486
- if (this.wantsHtmlResponse(ctx) && !debug) return ctx.html(renderErrorPage(status, body.message), status);
2487
- return ctx.json(body, status);
2457
+ const { body } = error.toResponse(debug);
2458
+ if (this.wantsHtmlResponse(ctx) && !debug) return ctx.html(renderErrorPage(statusCode, body.message), statusCode);
2459
+ return ctx.json(body, statusCode);
2488
2460
  }
2489
- const statusCode = "statusCode" in error && typeof error.statusCode === "number" ? error.statusCode : 500;
2490
2461
  const body = { message: statusCode < 500 || debug ? error.message : "Internal Server Error" };
2491
2462
  if (debug) {
2492
2463
  body.exception = error.name;
@@ -2521,6 +2492,26 @@ var ExceptionHandler = class {
2521
2492
  }
2522
2493
  };
2523
2494
  /**
2495
+ * The HTTP status an exception carries, or 500 when it names none.
2496
+ *
2497
+ * Duck-typed on `statusCode` rather than on `instanceof HttpException`, which
2498
+ * is what lets a foreign exception (`ModelNotFoundException` from
2499
+ * `@guren/orm`, crossing a package boundary) render as its own 404 rather than
2500
+ * a 500. `HttpException.isHttpException()` treats the same property as the
2501
+ * authority, so this reads what that check already required.
2502
+ *
2503
+ * One rule, read by both halves of the handler: what an exception is delivered
2504
+ * as and whether the fallback logger treats it as a server failure must be the
2505
+ * same number, or an exception could be sent as a 422 and reported as a crash.
2506
+ * That is why `renderDefaultException` takes the status from here rather than
2507
+ * from `toResponse()`, whose `status` a duck-typed implementation could spell
2508
+ * differently from its own `statusCode`.
2509
+ */
2510
+ function resolveExceptionStatus(error) {
2511
+ const statusCode = error?.statusCode;
2512
+ return typeof statusCode === "number" ? statusCode : 500;
2513
+ }
2514
+ /**
2524
2515
  * Create an exception handler.
2525
2516
  */
2526
2517
  function createExceptionHandler(options) {
@@ -4111,7 +4102,7 @@ var Controller = class {
4111
4102
  * ```
4112
4103
  */
4113
4104
  async file(name) {
4114
- const value = (await this.parseUploads())[name];
4105
+ const value = (await parseRequestUploads(this.ctx))[name];
4115
4106
  const candidate = Array.isArray(value) ? value[0] : value;
4116
4107
  return candidate instanceof File && candidate.size > 0 ? candidate : null;
4117
4108
  }
@@ -4120,41 +4111,9 @@ var Controller = class {
4120
4111
  * Returns an empty array when none were uploaded.
4121
4112
  */
4122
4113
  async files(name) {
4123
- const value = (await this.parseUploads())[name];
4114
+ const value = (await parseRequestUploads(this.ctx))[name];
4124
4115
  return (Array.isArray(value) ? value : value !== void 0 ? [value] : []).filter((item) => item instanceof File && item.size > 0);
4125
4116
  }
4126
- /**
4127
- * The one multipart read behind {@link file} and {@link files}, guarded so a
4128
- * body the parser cannot decode carries no files rather than crashing the
4129
- * request: it reads as `{}`, which is the same answer both helpers already
4130
- * give for a field that is simply absent — `null` and `[]`. Left to throw,
4131
- * the parser's `TypeError` escaped as a 500 reporting the exception and a
4132
- * stack, the defect {@link parseRequestBody} fixes for the validation paths.
4133
- *
4134
- * Deliberately *not* routed through `parseRequestBody()`, which looks like
4135
- * the same rule and is not: it parses without `{ all: true }` and flattens a
4136
- * repeated field to its first value, so sharing it would silently reduce
4137
- * `files()` to one file per field. `{ all: true }` is the contract here, and
4138
- * a malformed-body test cannot see its loss — hence the separate helper.
4139
- *
4140
- * try/catch rather than `.catch()`, for the reason given on the shared
4141
- * fallback: `parseBody` may throw synchronously as well as reject, and only
4142
- * one of those two shapes reaches a `.catch()`.
4143
- *
4144
- * It fails open in one direction, deliberately and for the same reason
4145
- * {@link parseRequestBody} does: a body already consumed upstream reads as
4146
- * "no upload" rather than throwing, so a middleware-ordering bug loses the
4147
- * 500 that used to announce it. Telling that apart from a client's malformed
4148
- * body means matching runtime-specific error codes, which answer differently
4149
- * on Bun, Node and Workers.
4150
- */
4151
- async parseUploads() {
4152
- try {
4153
- return await this.ctx.req.parseBody({ all: true });
4154
- } catch {
4155
- return {};
4156
- }
4157
- }
4158
4117
  get auth() {
4159
4118
  const auth = getAuthContext(this.ctx);
4160
4119
  if (!auth) throw new Error("Controller auth helper requires the auth middleware. Make sure AuthServiceProvider is registered.");
@@ -4775,241 +4734,70 @@ function deriveAuthorization(definition, method) {
4775
4734
  if (authorization.abilities.length === 1 && authorization.mode === "all") return { ability: authorization.abilities[0] };
4776
4735
  }
4777
4736
  //#endregion
4778
- //#region src/agent/dispatch.ts
4779
- /** How many characters of a non-JSON response body survive into the result. */
4780
- const TEXT_RESPONSE_CAP = 5e4;
4781
- /**
4782
- * The argument-level spelling of a preflight request (RFC 0016 §5.4), for a
4783
- * surface whose callers pass flat arguments rather than dispatch options.
4784
- *
4785
- * No adapter strips it today: MCP does not offer preflight at all (see
4786
- * `mapToolResponse` and the plugin), and the surfaces that do reach the seam
4787
- * ask through `BuildToolRequestOptions.preflight`. A surface that adopts this
4788
- * key owns the stripping — it is an instruction to the adapter, not a field of
4789
- * any route's contract, and forwarding it would fail the very validation the
4790
- * caller asked to rehearse.
4791
- */
4792
- const PREFLIGHT_ARGUMENT = "_preflight";
4793
- /**
4794
- * Rebuild the HTTP request a tool call describes.
4795
- *
4796
- * The flat argument object is taken apart along `tool.inputSources` — the
4797
- * derivation's own record of which contract each property came from — so a
4798
- * POST route's `query` keys land in the query string where `validateQuery`
4799
- * reads them, not in the body. Keys the derivation never advertised are
4800
- * forwarded anyway (body for body-carrying methods, query otherwise): the
4801
- * route's validator is the one place that rejects them, and dropping them
4802
- * here would make this a second, quieter validator.
4803
- *
4804
- * GET and HEAD force everything into the query string whatever its source —
4805
- * `Request` refuses a body on those methods, and a `body` schema on a GET
4806
- * route is a contract defect this adapter cannot repair.
4807
- */
4808
- function buildToolRequest(tool, args, options = {}) {
4809
- const origin = options.origin ?? "http://localhost";
4810
- const missing = [];
4811
- const invalidPath = [];
4812
- const pathOnly = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
4813
- const path = tool.path.replace(PATH_PARAM_PATTERN, (_match, lead, name) => {
4814
- const value = args[name];
4815
- if (value === void 0) {
4816
- missing.push(name);
4817
- return `${lead}:${name}`;
4818
- }
4819
- const stringified = String(value);
4820
- if (stringified === "." || stringified === "..") {
4821
- invalidPath.push(name);
4822
- return `${lead}:${name}`;
4823
- }
4824
- const source = sourceOf(tool, name);
4825
- if (source === void 0 || source === "params" || source === "path") pathOnly.add(name);
4826
- return `${lead}${encodeURIComponent(stringified)}`;
4827
- });
4828
- if (missing.length > 0) return { missing };
4829
- if (invalidPath.length > 0) return { invalidPath };
4830
- const method = tool.method;
4831
- const bodyless = method === "GET" || method === "HEAD";
4832
- const query = new URLSearchParams();
4833
- const bodyEntries = [];
4834
- for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(args)) {
4835
- if (pathOnly.has(key) || value === void 0) continue;
4836
- const source = sourceOf(tool, key);
4837
- if (bodyless || source === "query" || source === "params" || source === "path" || tool.inputBodyNested && key !== "body") appendQueryValue(query, key, value);
4838
- else bodyEntries.push([key, value]);
4839
- }
4840
- const headers = new Headers({
4841
- Accept: "application/json",
4842
- "X-Guren-Agent-Surface": "mcp"
4843
- });
4844
- if (options.authorization) headers.set("Authorization", options.authorization);
4845
- if (options.preflight) headers.set(AGENT_PREFLIGHT_HEADER, "1");
4846
- let body;
4847
- if (!bodyless) {
4848
- if (tool.inputBodyNested) {
4849
- if (Object.hasOwn(args, "body")) body = JSON.stringify(args.body);
4850
- } else if (bodyEntries.length > 0) body = JSON.stringify(accumulate(bodyEntries));
4851
- }
4852
- if (body !== void 0) headers.set("Content-Type", "application/json");
4853
- const qs = query.toString();
4854
- const url = `${origin}${path}${qs ? `?${qs}` : ""}`;
4855
- return { request: new Request(url, {
4856
- method,
4857
- headers,
4858
- body
4859
- }) };
4860
- }
4861
- /**
4862
- * The contract a property was declared under, or undefined if the derivation
4863
- * never advertised it. `Object.hasOwn` rather than a plain read: a JSON
4864
- * argument may legally be named `__proto__`, and `inputSources['__proto__']`
4865
- * would otherwise resolve to `Object.prototype`, not undefined.
4866
- */
4867
- function sourceOf(tool, name) {
4868
- return Object.hasOwn(tool.inputSources, name) ? tool.inputSources[name] : void 0;
4869
- }
4870
- /** Primitives stringify; anything structured rides as JSON text. */
4871
- function appendQueryValue(query, key, value) {
4872
- if (Array.isArray(value)) {
4873
- for (const element of value) query.append(key, serializeQueryScalar(element));
4874
- return;
4875
- }
4876
- query.append(key, serializeQueryScalar(value));
4877
- }
4878
- function serializeQueryScalar(value) {
4879
- if (value === null || typeof value !== "object") return String(value);
4880
- return JSON.stringify(value);
4881
- }
4882
- /**
4883
- * Null-prototype accumulator, spread back to plain: a JSON argument may
4884
- * legally be named `__proto__`, and assigning that key on `{}` invokes the
4885
- * prototype setter instead of defining the property — the same rule the
4886
- * derivation and the redaction walk apply.
4887
- */
4888
- function accumulate(entries) {
4889
- const record = Object.create(null);
4890
- for (const [key, value] of entries) record[key] = value;
4891
- return { ...record };
4892
- }
4893
- /**
4894
- * Whether the tool advertises an object output schema — the only kind MCP
4895
- * lists, and therefore the only kind that obliges a success result to carry
4896
- * `structuredContent`. A route whose `output` is an array or primitive is not
4897
- * advertised as structured (MCP `outputSchema` must be an object), so its
4898
- * results ride as text. `describeTool` and `mapToolResponse` must agree on
4899
- * this exact predicate, or one advertises a schema the other cannot satisfy.
4900
- */
4901
- function advertisesStructuredOutput(tool) {
4902
- return tool.outputSchema?.type === "object";
4903
- }
4904
- /**
4905
- * Map the application's response onto an MCP tool result (RFC 0016 §3.4).
4906
- *
4907
- * - 2xx JSON object → serialized text, plus `structuredContent` when the tool
4908
- * advertises an object `outputSchema` (the one shape the route validated).
4909
- * - 2xx Inertia page JSON → unwrapped to `page.props`, only for a tool with
4910
- * no `outputSchema` — unwrap and schema are mutually exclusive by
4911
- * derivation, so the advertised shape can never disagree with the result.
4912
- * - 204 / 3xx → a status line naming the Location; not an error.
4913
- * - 4xx / 5xx → `isError: true` carrying the exception handler's JSON body:
4914
- * a 422's `{ message, errors }` is an application-level failure the agent
4915
- * should read, not a protocol error.
4916
- * - non-JSON → capped text.
4917
- *
4918
- * One MCP invariant overrides the table: a *non-error* result for a tool that
4919
- * advertises an object `outputSchema` must carry `structuredContent`, or the
4920
- * SDK client rejects it after the route has already run. A success response
4921
- * that yields no object to put there (204, 3xx, non-JSON, a non-object body)
4922
- * contradicts the route's own declared output, so it becomes an `isError`
4923
- * result naming the mismatch — which the SDK exempts from the rule — rather
4924
- * than a protocol fault the agent cannot interpret.
4925
- */
4926
- async function mapToolResponse(tool, response) {
4927
- const status = response.status;
4928
- const structured = advertisesStructuredOutput(tool);
4929
- if (status === 204 || status >= 300 && status < 400) {
4930
- const location = response.headers.get("Location");
4931
- const text = location ? `HTTP ${status} (Location: ${location})` : `HTTP ${status}`;
4932
- if (structured) return inconsistentOutput(tool, text, status);
4933
- return {
4934
- content: [{
4935
- type: "text",
4936
- text
4937
- }],
4938
- status
4939
- };
4940
- }
4941
- const raw = await response.text();
4942
- if (status >= 400) return {
4943
- content: [{
4944
- type: "text",
4945
- text: raw || `HTTP ${status}`
4946
- }],
4947
- isError: true,
4948
- status
4949
- };
4950
- const parsed = parseJsonBody(response, raw);
4951
- if (parsed === void 0) {
4952
- const text = raw.length > TEXT_RESPONSE_CAP ? `${raw.slice(0, TEXT_RESPONSE_CAP)}… [truncated ${raw.length - TEXT_RESPONSE_CAP} characters]` : raw;
4953
- if (structured) return inconsistentOutput(tool, `a non-JSON body (${text.slice(0, 200)})`, status);
4954
- return {
4955
- content: [{
4956
- type: "text",
4957
- text
4958
- }],
4959
- status
4960
- };
4961
- }
4962
- if (response.headers.get("X-Guren-Agent-Preflight-Verdict") !== null) return {
4963
- content: [{
4964
- type: "text",
4965
- text: JSON.stringify(parsed)
4966
- }],
4967
- status
4968
- };
4969
- const payload = unwrapInertiaProps(tool, response, parsed);
4970
- if (structured && !isRecord(payload)) return inconsistentOutput(tool, `a ${Array.isArray(payload) ? "JSON array" : typeof payload} body`, status);
4971
- const outcome = {
4972
- content: [{
4973
- type: "text",
4974
- text: JSON.stringify(payload)
4975
- }],
4976
- status
4977
- };
4978
- if (structured && isRecord(payload)) outcome.structuredContent = payload;
4979
- return outcome;
4980
- }
4737
+ //#region src/agent/meta-tools.ts
4981
4738
  /**
4982
- * A success response that cannot satisfy the tool's advertised object output
4983
- * schema. Returned as an error result — the honest signal that the route and
4984
- * its declared `output` disagree — which also sidesteps the SDK's
4985
- * structuredContent requirement (errors are exempt).
4739
+ * The names a protocol adapter may add to an application's tool catalogue on
4740
+ * its own, and which an application route therefore may not claim (RFC 0016
4741
+ * §5.4).
4742
+ *
4743
+ * This is the one rule, with two readers. `@guren/plugin-mcp` adds
4744
+ * `guren.preflight` to the catalogue it serves; `guren check` fails a route
4745
+ * whose `.agent()` tool name would collide with it. Restating the string in
4746
+ * either place is how the two drift: the check would keep passing a route
4747
+ * whose tool the endpoint has already shadowed, and `tools/list` would carry
4748
+ * two tools with one name — which an MCP client rejects wholesale, so the
4749
+ * collision costs the *entire* catalogue, not the one tool.
4750
+ *
4751
+ * It lives beside the derivation rather than in the plugin because the check
4752
+ * cannot import the plugin (the CLI does not depend on it, and an app that
4753
+ * never installs App MCP is still checked), and the plugin must not restate a
4754
+ * name the check is enforcing.
4755
+ *
4756
+ * The list stays deliberately short. Every entry is a name taken away from
4757
+ * applications, and the `guren.` prefix is not reserved wholesale for the
4758
+ * same reason: reserving a namespace nothing occupies fails routes over a
4759
+ * collision that does not exist.
4986
4760
  */
4987
- function inconsistentOutput(tool, detail, status) {
4988
- return {
4989
- content: [{
4990
- type: "text",
4991
- text: `The tool "${tool.toolName}" advertises an output schema, but the route returned ${detail} (HTTP ${status}) — no structured result could be produced.`
4992
- }],
4993
- isError: true,
4994
- status
4995
- };
4996
- }
4997
- function parseJsonBody(response, raw) {
4998
- if (!(response.headers.get("Content-Type") ?? "").includes("json") || raw === "") return void 0;
4999
- try {
5000
- return JSON.parse(raw);
5001
- } catch {
5002
- return;
5003
- }
5004
- }
5005
- function unwrapInertiaProps(tool, response, parsed) {
5006
- if (tool.outputSchema) return parsed;
5007
- if (response.headers.get("X-Inertia") !== "true") return parsed;
5008
- if (!isRecord(parsed) || !("props" in parsed)) return parsed;
5009
- return parsed.props;
5010
- }
5011
- function isRecord(value) {
5012
- return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
4761
+ /**
4762
+ * The preflight companion tool (RFC 0016 §5.4).
4763
+ *
4764
+ * Preflight cannot be an *argument* of the tool being checked on MCP: a tool
4765
+ * advertising an `outputSchema` must answer with `structuredContent`
4766
+ * conforming to it unless the result is an error, and a verdict conforms to
4767
+ * no route's output. So the verdict needs a tool of its own, with its own
4768
+ * output schema — one meta-tool for the whole catalogue, not one companion
4769
+ * per tool, which would double the catalogue against §5.5's own
4770
+ * catalogue-quality rule.
4771
+ */
4772
+ const PREFLIGHT_TOOL_NAME = "guren.preflight";
4773
+ /**
4774
+ * The approval-status companion tool (RFC 0016 §5.4 item 4).
4775
+ *
4776
+ * A tool declaring `approval: 'required'` answers its first call with a
4777
+ * pending record rather than an execution, and the caller is handed a request
4778
+ * id. Something has to be able to say what became of that id, and it cannot be
4779
+ * the gated tool itself for the reason preflight cannot be an argument of one:
4780
+ * a status is not that route's output, and a tool advertising an `outputSchema`
4781
+ * may not answer with a different shape of success.
4782
+ *
4783
+ * A second meta-tool rather than a mode of the first: `guren.preflight`
4784
+ * rehearses a call and answers a verdict, this reads a record and answers its
4785
+ * state. Folding both under one name would mean one tool whose output schema
4786
+ * is the union of two unrelated shapes, which is the thing a schema is for
4787
+ * preventing.
4788
+ */
4789
+ const APPROVAL_STATUS_TOOL_NAME = "guren.approval_status";
4790
+ /** Every meta-tool name an adapter may occupy. */
4791
+ const RESERVED_AGENT_TOOL_NAMES = [PREFLIGHT_TOOL_NAME, APPROVAL_STATUS_TOOL_NAME];
4792
+ /**
4793
+ * Whether a tool name belongs to the framework rather than the application.
4794
+ *
4795
+ * Case-sensitive, like every other comparison the tool-name grammar makes:
4796
+ * MCP tool names are matched literally, so `Guren.Preflight` is a different
4797
+ * tool and reserving it would take a name away for nothing.
4798
+ */
4799
+ function isReservedAgentToolName(name) {
4800
+ return RESERVED_AGENT_TOOL_NAMES.includes(name);
5013
4801
  }
5014
4802
  //#endregion
5015
4803
  //#region src/agent/scopes.ts
@@ -5279,7 +5067,10 @@ const DEFAULT_SENSITIVE_KEY_FRAGMENTS = [
5279
5067
  "authorization",
5280
5068
  "credential",
5281
5069
  "cookie",
5282
- "session"
5070
+ "session",
5071
+ "privatekey",
5072
+ "pwd",
5073
+ "jwt"
5283
5074
  ];
5284
5075
  /**
5285
5076
  * The form keys and fragments are compared in: lowercased, with separator
@@ -5367,6 +5158,488 @@ function isWalkable(value) {
5367
5158
  return prototype === null || prototype === Object.prototype;
5368
5159
  }
5369
5160
  //#endregion
5161
+ //#region src/agent/audit.ts
5162
+ /**
5163
+ * Where an application's audit trail is written by default, relative to the
5164
+ * app root. `storage/logs/` is the convention `LogManager`'s own examples
5165
+ * already use, so an audit trail lands beside the application log rather than
5166
+ * inventing a second place to look.
5167
+ */
5168
+ const DEFAULT_AGENT_AUDIT_PATH = "storage/logs/agent-audit.log";
5169
+ /**
5170
+ * Every surface, as a value. Written as a total map of the union so that
5171
+ * adding a surface to {@link AgentSurface} fails to compile here rather than
5172
+ * making {@link parseAuditRecord} silently reject records from it.
5173
+ */
5174
+ const AGENT_SURFACES = {
5175
+ "mcp": true,
5176
+ "dev-mcp": true,
5177
+ "cli": true,
5178
+ "webmcp": true
5179
+ };
5180
+ /** Every denial reason, as a value, total over the union for the same reason. */
5181
+ const DENIAL_REASONS = {
5182
+ "auth": true,
5183
+ "scope": true,
5184
+ "approval": true,
5185
+ "rate-limit": true
5186
+ };
5187
+ /**
5188
+ * Derive the record for one audit event.
5189
+ *
5190
+ * `now` is a parameter rather than a `Date.now()` inside: the sink writing
5191
+ * this record also picks the dated file it lands in, and two clock reads can
5192
+ * disagree across a midnight boundary — a record stamped just before it,
5193
+ * filed just after. One read, used for both.
5194
+ *
5195
+ * The two events are told apart structurally, not with `instanceof`. The event
5196
+ * classes cross a package boundary that this repo resolves twice — `@guren/cli`
5197
+ * and the plugins reach `@guren/server` through its `dist`, a test inside
5198
+ * `packages/server` through `src` — so an `instanceof` here would answer
5199
+ * `false` for a genuine event constructed on the other side of that seam, and
5200
+ * would do it by mislabelling the record rather than by failing.
5201
+ */
5202
+ function toAuditRecord(event, now) {
5203
+ const base = {
5204
+ ts: now.toISOString(),
5205
+ surface: event.surface,
5206
+ tool: event.tool,
5207
+ principal: event.principal,
5208
+ arguments: event.arguments
5209
+ };
5210
+ return "reason" in event ? {
5211
+ ...base,
5212
+ outcome: "denied",
5213
+ reason: event.reason
5214
+ } : {
5215
+ ...base,
5216
+ outcome: "invoked",
5217
+ status: event.status,
5218
+ durationMs: event.durationMs
5219
+ };
5220
+ }
5221
+ /**
5222
+ * Read one line of an audit file back, or `null` if it is not a record.
5223
+ *
5224
+ * The one parser on the read side. A caller that hand-rolled a second would be
5225
+ * the reader half of the drift this whole feature is built to avoid, and would
5226
+ * be the half that fails silently: a record it stops recognising reads as an
5227
+ * empty trail.
5228
+ *
5229
+ * Returning `null` rather than throwing is what makes the reader usable
5230
+ * against a file that is being appended to right now. The last line of such a
5231
+ * file is routinely a *partial* record — an append is not atomic — and a blank
5232
+ * line is what a file ends with. Neither is corruption, and neither should
5233
+ * take down a command whose whole job is to show what the earlier lines say.
5234
+ *
5235
+ * Extra keys are ignored, deliberately: the file sink writes through
5236
+ * `DailyFileChannel`, whose JSON format wraps the record in a log envelope
5237
+ * (`timestamp`, `level`, `message`). Tolerating that envelope is what lets the
5238
+ * sink reuse the channel's rotation and retention instead of reimplementing
5239
+ * both, and the record's own fields are unambiguous beside it.
5240
+ */
5241
+ function parseAuditRecord(line) {
5242
+ if (line.trim() === "") return null;
5243
+ let parsed;
5244
+ try {
5245
+ parsed = JSON.parse(line);
5246
+ } catch {
5247
+ return null;
5248
+ }
5249
+ if (parsed === null || typeof parsed !== "object" || Array.isArray(parsed)) return null;
5250
+ const candidate = parsed;
5251
+ const ts = candidate.ts;
5252
+ const tool = candidate.tool;
5253
+ const surface = candidate.surface;
5254
+ if (typeof ts !== "string" || typeof tool !== "string") return null;
5255
+ if (typeof surface !== "string" || !Object.hasOwn(AGENT_SURFACES, surface)) return null;
5256
+ const base = {
5257
+ ts,
5258
+ tool,
5259
+ surface,
5260
+ principal: readPrincipal(candidate.principal),
5261
+ arguments: isRecord(candidate.arguments) ? candidate.arguments : {}
5262
+ };
5263
+ if (candidate.outcome === "invoked") {
5264
+ const { status, durationMs } = candidate;
5265
+ if (typeof status !== "number" || typeof durationMs !== "number") return null;
5266
+ return {
5267
+ ...base,
5268
+ outcome: "invoked",
5269
+ status,
5270
+ durationMs
5271
+ };
5272
+ }
5273
+ if (candidate.outcome === "denied") {
5274
+ const reason = candidate.reason;
5275
+ if (typeof reason !== "string" || !Object.hasOwn(DENIAL_REASONS, reason)) return null;
5276
+ return {
5277
+ ...base,
5278
+ outcome: "denied",
5279
+ reason
5280
+ };
5281
+ }
5282
+ return null;
5283
+ }
5284
+ /**
5285
+ * The principal of a record, or `null`.
5286
+ *
5287
+ * An unreadable principal is `null` rather than a rejected record: who made a
5288
+ * call is the field most likely to change shape over the life of a log, and
5289
+ * losing the whole line — the tool, the arguments, the outcome — to recover
5290
+ * nothing is the wrong trade for an audit trail.
5291
+ */
5292
+ function readPrincipal(value) {
5293
+ if (!isRecord(value)) return null;
5294
+ const { kind, id, abilities } = value;
5295
+ if (kind !== "user" && kind !== "service") return null;
5296
+ if (typeof id !== "string" && typeof id !== "number") return null;
5297
+ const principal = {
5298
+ kind,
5299
+ id
5300
+ };
5301
+ if (Array.isArray(abilities)) principal.abilities = abilities.filter((ability) => typeof ability === "string");
5302
+ return principal;
5303
+ }
5304
+ function isRecord(value) {
5305
+ return value !== null && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value);
5306
+ }
5307
+ //#endregion
5308
+ //#region src/agent/audit-emitter.ts
5309
+ /**
5310
+ * The container service an application's audit emitter is published under
5311
+ * (`ServiceBindings['agent.audit']`).
5312
+ *
5313
+ * A constant rather than a literal at each site, because this is the first
5314
+ * binding written by one package and read by another that cannot import it:
5315
+ * `@guren/plugin-mcp` binds it, `@guren/cli` resolves it, and neither depends
5316
+ * on the other. Two literals that drifted would break the wiring *silently* —
5317
+ * the CLI would resolve nothing and record nothing, which reads exactly like
5318
+ * an application that configured no trail. That is the one failure this
5319
+ * feature exists to prevent, so it may not be spelled twice.
5320
+ */
5321
+ const AGENT_AUDIT_BINDING = "agent.audit";
5322
+ /**
5323
+ * Build the function a surface calls for every invocation and denial.
5324
+ *
5325
+ * **The sink is called directly, not subscribed as a listener**, and that is
5326
+ * the whole reason this function exists rather than an `events.on(...)` pair.
5327
+ * `EventManager.emit` awaits its listeners in priority order inside a bare
5328
+ * `for` loop, so the first one to throw ends the loop and every listener after
5329
+ * it never runs. An unrelated application listener registered at a higher
5330
+ * priority would then silence the audit trail, and the only evidence an
5331
+ * operator would have of that is an empty file. A record of what agents did
5332
+ * cannot be contingent on what else the application happens to listen for.
5333
+ *
5334
+ * The events are still emitted, unchanged, for every consumer that
5335
+ * legitimately is a listener — RFC 0016 §5.2's "forward them wherever you
5336
+ * already forward events" is untouched.
5337
+ *
5338
+ * Neither half may fail the tool call it is recording, so both are caught. The
5339
+ * sink's failure is *warned* rather than swallowed: an audit sink dropping
5340
+ * records in silence is precisely the failure this feature exists to prevent.
5341
+ */
5342
+ function createAuditEmitter(sink, events, now = () => /* @__PURE__ */ new Date()) {
5343
+ return (event) => {
5344
+ if (sink) try {
5345
+ Promise.resolve(sink(toAuditRecord(event, now()))).catch(warnSinkFailure);
5346
+ } catch (error) {
5347
+ warnSinkFailure(error);
5348
+ }
5349
+ events?.emit(event).catch((error) => {
5350
+ console.warn(`[guren] audit event listener failed: ${String(error)}`);
5351
+ });
5352
+ };
5353
+ }
5354
+ function warnSinkFailure(error) {
5355
+ console.warn(`[guren] agent audit sink failed, record dropped: ${String(error)}`);
5356
+ }
5357
+ //#endregion
5358
+ //#region src/agent/approval.ts
5359
+ /**
5360
+ * How long a pending request stays answerable by default: one hour.
5361
+ *
5362
+ * An approval is permission for one call *now*, not a standing grant. The
5363
+ * default is short for the reason the single-use rule exists — an approval
5364
+ * granted last month must not let a call through today — and an application
5365
+ * that wants longer says so.
5366
+ */
5367
+ const DEFAULT_AGENT_APPROVAL_TTL_MS = 36e5;
5368
+ /**
5369
+ * The configuration key an adapter reads the queue out of, as a value.
5370
+ *
5371
+ * `guren check` fails a route declaring `approval: 'required'` in an app whose
5372
+ * `mcpPlugin({ … })` call carries no queue, and it finds that call by looking
5373
+ * for this key. The CLI cannot import `@guren/plugin-mcp` — it does not depend
5374
+ * on it, and an app that never installs App MCP is still checked — so without
5375
+ * this constant the check would restate the string and the two would drift:
5376
+ * renaming the option would leave the check passing every app, silently. Same
5377
+ * rule, two readers, as {@link file://./meta-tools.ts}.
5378
+ */
5379
+ const AGENT_APPROVAL_CONFIG_KEY = "approvals";
5380
+ /**
5381
+ * A stable key for "the same caller".
5382
+ *
5383
+ * Kind and id only: a token's *abilities* are not part of the identity,
5384
+ * because a token rotated or re-scoped between the approval and the call is
5385
+ * still the same principal, and an approval a human granted should not
5386
+ * evaporate because an unrelated ability was added. The scope gate has already
5387
+ * run by the time this key is used, so the call's own authority is checked
5388
+ * regardless.
5389
+ *
5390
+ * The id's type is part of the key. `id: 5` and `id: '5'` are different
5391
+ * principals to every store that distinguishes them, and collapsing the two
5392
+ * here would let a service token named `"5"` spend a user 5 approval.
5393
+ */
5394
+ function agentApprovalPrincipalKey(principal) {
5395
+ if (!principal) return "anonymous";
5396
+ return `${principal.kind}:${typeof principal.id === "number" ? "n" : "s"}:${principal.id}`;
5397
+ }
5398
+ /**
5399
+ * The canonical text of one call's arguments — the *only* rule for deciding
5400
+ * that two calls are the same call.
5401
+ *
5402
+ * One function, two readers: {@link agentApprovalFingerprint} hashes it when a
5403
+ * record is created and again when a call looks one up. A second
5404
+ * serialization is how approving `posts.destroy {id: 5}` comes to authorize
5405
+ * `{id: 9}` — the failure this whole binding exists to prevent — and it would
5406
+ * do it silently, because both sides would still produce *a* string.
5407
+ *
5408
+ * What it normalizes: object key order, at every depth. `{a: 1, b: 2}` and
5409
+ * `{b: 2, a: 1}` are the same call, nested or not.
5410
+ *
5411
+ * What it deliberately does **not** normalize, because each would make two
5412
+ * genuinely different calls match:
5413
+ *
5414
+ * - **Types.** `{id: 5}` and `{id: '5'}` are different calls. A route that
5415
+ * coerces them to the same value is coercing *after* the gate; the approver
5416
+ * saw one of the two written down.
5417
+ * - **Array order.** Order is meaning in a JSON array (`ids: [1, 2]` vs
5418
+ * `[2, 1]` may be the same call to one route and not to another) and the
5419
+ * framework cannot know which.
5420
+ * - **Absent vs. explicitly null.** A dropped key and `null` are different
5421
+ * inputs to a schema with a default.
5422
+ * - Unicode form, number spelling beyond what JSON already fixes, or
5423
+ * whitespace inside strings.
5424
+ *
5425
+ * Total over JSON, and deliberately *not* total over everything else: a value
5426
+ * JSON cannot carry throws rather than serializing to a placeholder. A
5427
+ * placeholder would make two distinct inputs canonicalize identically, which
5428
+ * is the one failure mode worse than refusing — and refusing is safe here,
5429
+ * because the gate turns a throw into a fail-closed refusal. Arguments reach
5430
+ * this function parsed from JSON-RPC, so no such value can occur in practice;
5431
+ * the rule is written down for the surface that one day passes one.
5432
+ */
5433
+ function canonicalizeAgentApprovalInput(input) {
5434
+ return canonicalize(input);
5435
+ }
5436
+ function canonicalize(value) {
5437
+ if (value === null) return "null";
5438
+ switch (typeof value) {
5439
+ case "boolean": return value ? "true" : "false";
5440
+ case "number":
5441
+ if (!Number.isFinite(value)) throw new TypeError(`Agent approval arguments must be JSON: ${String(value)} is not a finite number.`);
5442
+ return JSON.stringify(value);
5443
+ case "string": return JSON.stringify(value);
5444
+ case "object": {
5445
+ if (Array.isArray(value)) return `[${value.map((entry) => canonicalize(entry)).join(",")}]`;
5446
+ const record = value;
5447
+ return `{${Object.keys(record).filter((key) => record[key] !== void 0).sort().map((key) => `${JSON.stringify(key)}:${canonicalize(record[key])}`).join(",")}}`;
5448
+ }
5449
+ default: throw new TypeError(`Agent approval arguments must be JSON: a value of type ${typeof value} cannot be fingerprinted, so no approval could be bound to it.`);
5450
+ }
5451
+ }
5452
+ /**
5453
+ * The fingerprint an approval is bound to: SHA-256 of
5454
+ * {@link canonicalizeAgentApprovalInput}, hex.
5455
+ *
5456
+ * Hashed rather than stored verbatim because the record persists and is shown
5457
+ * to a human, while these are the **raw** arguments — the ones the record's
5458
+ * own `input` field is redacted precisely to keep out of storage. The hash
5459
+ * binds the approval without keeping the secret.
5460
+ *
5461
+ * Async because `crypto.subtle` is: it is the one digest available unchanged
5462
+ * on every runtime the framework targets (Bun, Node, Workers), and the gate is
5463
+ * async already.
5464
+ */
5465
+ async function agentApprovalFingerprint(input) {
5466
+ const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(canonicalizeAgentApprovalInput(input));
5467
+ const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", bytes);
5468
+ return Array.from(new Uint8Array(digest), (byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
5469
+ }
5470
+ /**
5471
+ * Derive a new pending record.
5472
+ *
5473
+ * `now` is a parameter for the reason `toAuditRecord`'s is: the caller that
5474
+ * creates a record also decides whether an existing one has expired, and two
5475
+ * clock reads can disagree — a record stamped a millisecond after the instant
5476
+ * its own expiry was measured against.
5477
+ *
5478
+ * The id comes from `crypto.randomUUID()` rather than a parameter, which is
5479
+ * not the same compromise: an id needs no seam to be testable, since the
5480
+ * caller reads it straight off the returned record, and threading one in from
5481
+ * every call site would invite two of them to generate ids differently.
5482
+ */
5483
+ function buildAgentApprovalRequest(request, now) {
5484
+ const ttlMs = request.ttlMs ?? 36e5;
5485
+ return {
5486
+ id: crypto.randomUUID(),
5487
+ tool: request.tool,
5488
+ input: request.input,
5489
+ fingerprint: request.fingerprint,
5490
+ principal: request.principal,
5491
+ principalKey: agentApprovalPrincipalKey(request.principal),
5492
+ requestedAt: now.toISOString(),
5493
+ expiresAt: new Date(now.getTime() + ttlMs).toISOString(),
5494
+ status: "pending"
5495
+ };
5496
+ }
5497
+ /**
5498
+ * Whether a record has passed its expiry at `now`.
5499
+ *
5500
+ * An unparseable `expiresAt` counts as expired. The alternative — treating a
5501
+ * date the framework cannot read as "not expired yet" — is a store bug that
5502
+ * fails open into a permanent approval, and this is the one direction of error
5503
+ * that cannot be noticed from the outside.
5504
+ */
5505
+ function agentApprovalExpiredAt(request, now) {
5506
+ const expiresAt = Date.parse(request.expiresAt);
5507
+ return Number.isNaN(expiresAt) || expiresAt <= now.getTime();
5508
+ }
5509
+ /**
5510
+ * The record's status as of `now`, with expiry applied.
5511
+ *
5512
+ * Expiry is derived here rather than filtered by the store on purpose: a store
5513
+ * that judged it would be a second copy of the rule, and the copy that fails
5514
+ * open — a store that forgets to compare, or compares in local time, hands out
5515
+ * an approval granted last month and nothing anywhere reports it. A resolved
5516
+ * record keeps its resolution: a rejection does not become an expiry, and an
5517
+ * approval that was already spent is reported by `consumedAt`, not by this.
5518
+ */
5519
+ function agentApprovalStatusAt(request, now) {
5520
+ if (request.status === "rejected") return "rejected";
5521
+ if (agentApprovalExpiredAt(request, now)) return "expired";
5522
+ return request.status;
5523
+ }
5524
+ /**
5525
+ * Whether this record authorizes a call at `now`: approved, unexpired, and
5526
+ * not already spent.
5527
+ *
5528
+ * All three are checked here, in framework code, rather than trusted to the
5529
+ * store's query — see {@link AgentApprovalStore.findMatch}. `consumedAt` is
5530
+ * checked even though `findMatch` promises unconsumed records, because the
5531
+ * single-use guarantee must not rest on an application's SQL: the *atomic*
5532
+ * half of it is `consume`'s compare-and-set, and this is the cheap half.
5533
+ */
5534
+ function agentApprovalUsableAt(request, now) {
5535
+ if (request.status !== "approved") return false;
5536
+ if (request.consumedAt !== void 0) return false;
5537
+ return !agentApprovalExpiredAt(request, now);
5538
+ }
5539
+ /**
5540
+ * Whether `principal` may be told anything at all about `request`.
5541
+ *
5542
+ * The scope rule of `guren.approval_status` (RFC 0016 §5.4): a caller reads
5543
+ * the status only of a request it created. Without it the tool is a way to
5544
+ * enumerate other principals' pending actions — an agent could walk ids and
5545
+ * learn what a colleague is waiting to have approved, which is both the
5546
+ * content of the request and the fact that it exists.
5547
+ *
5548
+ * A record this returns `false` for must be answered *exactly* as an unknown
5549
+ * id is. Any difference between the two answers — a distinct message, a
5550
+ * different error shape, a slower path — is the enumeration the rule forbids,
5551
+ * reintroduced.
5552
+ */
5553
+ function agentApprovalVisibleTo(request, principal) {
5554
+ return request.principalKey === agentApprovalPrincipalKey(principal);
5555
+ }
5556
+ //#endregion
5557
+ //#region src/agent/AgentApprovalRequested.ts
5558
+ /**
5559
+ * The notification an application sends its approvers when an agent tool call
5560
+ * becomes a pending approval request (RFC 0016 §5.4 item 4).
5561
+ *
5562
+ * A ready-made {@link Notification} rather than a message the adapter composes,
5563
+ * so "notify approvers through the existing notifications system" is one line
5564
+ * in an application's configuration:
5565
+ *
5566
+ * ```typescript
5567
+ * mcpPlugin({
5568
+ * approvals: {
5569
+ * store,
5570
+ * notify: (request) => notifications.sendToMany(admins, new AgentApprovalRequested(request)),
5571
+ * },
5572
+ * })
5573
+ * ```
5574
+ *
5575
+ * **Who the approvers are is never the framework's decision**, which is why
5576
+ * this class takes a request and not a recipient. The plugin hands the request
5577
+ * over; the application picks who hears about it, over which channels, with
5578
+ * whatever escalation it already has. An adapter that chose recipients would be
5579
+ * choosing them from a list it cannot see.
5580
+ *
5581
+ * Deliberately in its own module, and deliberately not imported by
5582
+ * `approval.ts`: the store interface and its derivations stay declaration-only
5583
+ * and free of the notifications subsystem, so a runtime that never notifies
5584
+ * never pulls it into the graph.
5585
+ *
5586
+ * Not queued (`shouldQueue` stays false). An approval request is answered by a
5587
+ * human in the next few minutes or it expires, and a queue worker that is
5588
+ * behind — or absent, which is the common case in the small deployments this
5589
+ * endpoint targets — turns "notify approvers" into "notify approvers
5590
+ * eventually", after the window closed.
5591
+ */
5592
+ var AgentApprovalRequested = class extends Notification {
5593
+ request;
5594
+ constructor(request) {
5595
+ super();
5596
+ this.request = request;
5597
+ }
5598
+ /**
5599
+ * Mail and database by default — the two channels an application configures
5600
+ * first, and the pair that covers "tell someone now" and "there is a list of
5601
+ * things waiting". An application overrides by subclassing, exactly as it
5602
+ * would for any other notification.
5603
+ */
5604
+ via(_notifiable) {
5605
+ return ["mail", "database"];
5606
+ }
5607
+ toMail(_notifiable) {
5608
+ const who = describePrincipal(this.request);
5609
+ return {
5610
+ subject: `Approval needed: ${this.request.tool}`,
5611
+ text: `${who} asked to run the agent tool "${this.request.tool}". Nothing has been executed.\n\nRequest id: ${this.request.id}\nRequested at: ${this.request.requestedAt}\nExpires at: ${this.request.expiresAt}\n\nArguments (sensitive fields masked):\n${JSON.stringify(this.request.input, null, 2)}\n`
5612
+ };
5613
+ }
5614
+ /**
5615
+ * The record's own fields, minus the fingerprint.
5616
+ *
5617
+ * The fingerprint is a hash of the *raw* arguments (see `approval.ts`), and
5618
+ * a database notification is read by more people, and kept longer, than the
5619
+ * approval store itself. It decides nothing an approver looks at: the
5620
+ * arguments they judge are `input`, already masked.
5621
+ */
5622
+ toDatabase(_notifiable) {
5623
+ return {
5624
+ requestId: this.request.id,
5625
+ tool: this.request.tool,
5626
+ input: this.request.input,
5627
+ principal: this.request.principal,
5628
+ requestedAt: this.request.requestedAt,
5629
+ expiresAt: this.request.expiresAt
5630
+ };
5631
+ }
5632
+ toSlack(_notifiable) {
5633
+ return { text: `Approval needed: *${this.request.tool}* requested by ${describePrincipal(this.request)}. Nothing was executed. Request \`${this.request.id}\` expires at ${this.request.expiresAt}.` };
5634
+ }
5635
+ };
5636
+ /** The requester, in the vocabulary an approver reads rather than a key. */
5637
+ function describePrincipal(request) {
5638
+ const { principal } = request;
5639
+ if (!principal) return "An unidentified caller";
5640
+ return `${principal.kind === "service" ? "Service" : "User"} ${String(principal.id)}`;
5641
+ }
5642
+ //#endregion
5370
5643
  //#region src/providers/OAuthServiceProvider.ts
5371
5644
  /**
5372
5645
  * Binds OAuthManager as a singleton in the container.
@@ -9081,27 +9354,7 @@ function renderEnvironmentSection() {
9081
9354
  </section>`;
9082
9355
  }
9083
9356
  //#endregion
9084
- //#region src/auth/password/DefaultHasher.ts
9085
- /**
9086
- * Runtime-detecting password hasher: uses Bun's native scrypt implementation
9087
- * when running on Bun, and the Node.js crypto implementation otherwise
9088
- * (e.g. AWS Lambda on the Node runtime). This is the hasher behind the
9089
- * `Hash` export, so code written against `Hash` runs on both runtimes.
9090
- */
9091
- var DefaultHasher = class {
9092
- delegate;
9093
- constructor() {
9094
- this.delegate = typeof Bun !== "undefined" ? new ScryptHasher() : new NodeHasher();
9095
- }
9096
- hash(plain) {
9097
- return this.delegate.hash(plain);
9098
- }
9099
- verify(hashed, plain) {
9100
- return this.delegate.verify(hashed, plain);
9101
- }
9102
- };
9103
- //#endregion
9104
9357
  //#region src/index.ts
9105
9358
  ensureErrorStackTracePolyfill();
9106
9359
  //#endregion
9107
- export { AGENT_REDACTED, AGENT_TOOL_NAME_PATTERN, API_TOKEN_KEY, AUTH_CONTEXT_KEY, AgentToolDenied, AgentToolInvoked, Application, ApplicationShutdown, ApplicationStarted, AuthManager, Response$1 as AuthResponse, AuthServiceProvider, AuthenticatableModel, AuthenticationException, AuthorizationException, AuthorizationServiceProvider, AutoDiscovery, BaseFactory, BaseFactory as Factory, BaseSeeder, BaseSeeder as Seeder, BaseUserProvider, BroadcastManager, BroadcastServiceProvider, BufferedOutput, CSP_NONCE_KEY, CSRF_FORM_FIELD, CSRF_HEADER_NAME, CSRF_TOKEN_KEY, CacheCheck, CacheManager, CacheServiceProvider, Channel, Command, ConsoleChannel, ConsoleKernel, Container, Controller, CursorPaginator, CustomCheck, DailyFileChannel, DatabaseChannel, DatabaseCheck, DefaultHasher, DefaultHasher as Hash, Encrypter, EncryptionServiceProvider, ErrorServiceProvider, Event, EventManager, EventServiceProvider, ExceptionHandler, FailedJobReporter, FieldValidator, FileStore as FileCacheStore, FileChannel, FormRequest, Gate, HealthCheck, HealthManager, HealthServiceProvider, HttpException, I18nManager, I18nServiceProvider, InertiaServiceProvider, Input, Job, JobFailed, JobProcessed, JsonLoader, JsonResource, LOCALE_CONTEXT_KEY, LOG_LEVEL_PRIORITY, Listener, LocalDriver as LocalStorageDriver, LogManager, LogServiceProvider, LogTransport, Logger, Mail, MailChannel, MailManager, MailServiceProvider, MemoryApiTokenStore, MemoryDriver as MemoryBroadcastDriver, MemoryStore as MemoryCacheStore, MemoryChannel, MemoryCheck, MemoryDriver$1 as MemoryDriver, MemoryDriver$1 as MemoryQueueDriver, MemoryEmailVerificationStore, MemoryLoader, MemoryOAuthStateStore, MemoryPasswordResetStore, MemoryRateLimitStore, MemorySessionStore, MemoryDriver$2 as MemoryStorageDriver, MemoryTransport, MessageSigner, MethodNotAllowedException, ModelUserProvider, NodeHasher, NotFoundHttpException, Notification, NotificationManager, NotificationServiceProvider, OAUTH_SESSION_BINDING_KEY, OAuthManager, OAuthServiceProvider, Output, PREFLIGHT_ARGUMENT, Paginator, PendingSchedule, Policy, PresenceChannel, PrivateChannel, ProviderManager, QueueManager, QueueServiceProvider, RedisDriver as RedisBroadcastDriver, RedisStore as RedisCacheStore, RedisCheck, RedisDriver$1 as RedisDriver, RedisDriver$1 as RedisQueueDriver, RequestFinished, RequestReceived, ResendTransport, Resource, ResourceCollection, Router, S3Driver, Schedule, ScheduledTask, Scheduler, SchedulingServiceProvider, ScryptHasher, SeederRunner, ServiceProvider, SessionGuard, SlackChannel, SlidingWindowRateLimitStore, SmtpTransport, SqsDriver, StorageCheck, StorageManager, StorageServiceProvider, SyncDriver, SyncDriver as SyncQueueDriver, TaggedCache, TokenGuard, Translator, UserAuthenticated, UserLoggedOut, VALIDATED_DATA_KEY, ValidationException, Validator, ViewEngine, Worker, abort, abortIf, abortUnless, advertisesStructuredOutput, after, afterOrEqual, alpha, alphaDash, alphaNum, array as arrayRule, attachAuthContext, authorize as authorizeAbility, authorizeAllMiddleware, authorizeMiddleware, authorizeResourceMiddleware, before, beforeOrEqual, between, boolean as booleanRule, buildOAuthAuthorizeUrl, buildOAuthRedirectUrl, buildPasswordResetUrl, buildToolRequest, buildVerificationUrl, can, cannot, check as checkHash, clearJobRegistry, clearNotificationRegistry, collect, completeEmailVerification, completePasswordReset, confirmed, createApiToken, createApp, createBearerTokenMiddleware, createBroadcastManager, createCacheManager, createConsoleKernel, createContainer, createCorsMiddleware, createCspMiddleware, createCsrfMiddleware, createDiscordOAuthProviderConfig, createEmailVerificationToken, createEncrypter, createEventManager, createExceptionHandler, createFacade, createFacades, createForceHttpsMiddleware, createGate, createGitHubOAuthProviderConfig, createGoogleOAuthProviderConfig, createHealthManager, createHostAuthorizationMiddleware, createI18n, createLogManager, createMailManager, createNotificationManager, createOAuthManager, createOAuthState, createPasswordResetToken, createQueueManager, createRateLimitMiddleware, createRedirectSafetyMiddleware, createRedisClient, createScheduler, createSecurityHeaders, createSeederRunner, createSessionMiddleware, createSqsAdapter, createStorageManager, createTypedBroadcaster, createValidator, csrfField, cursorPaginate, custom, customCheck, dateFormat, date as dateRule, debugErrorMiddleware, decodeCursor, decrypt, defineFactory, defineGate, defineMiddleware, defineModule, definePlugin, definePolicy, deriveAgentTools, deriveAppKey, deriveAppKeyring, detectLocaleMiddleware, different, email as emailRule, encodeCursor, encrypt, endsWith, exchangeOAuthCode, exists, expandToolScopes, fetchOAuthUserProfile, file as fileRule, filterSensitiveData, formatValidationErrors, generateAppKey, generateKey, generateOtp, generatePassword, generateSlug, getApiToken, getApiTokenOrFail, getAppKeyringFromEnv, getBroadcastManager, getContainer, getCspNonce, getCsrfToken, getEncrypter, getExceptionHandler, getGate, getI18n, getInertiaSharedPropsResolver, getJob, getLogManager, getMailManager, getNextOccurrence, getNextOccurrences, getNotification, getNotificationManager, getPluralizationRule, getQueueDriver, getRateLimitInfo, getRegisteredJobs, getRequestLocale, getRequestTranslator, getSessionFromContext, getUserApiTokens, getValidatedData, hash, hashPassword, hmac, image as imageRule, inValues, inertia, integer, ip, ipv4, ipv6, isDue, isDueInTimezone, isEmailVerified, isSafeRedirectUrl, jsonResponse, json as jsonRule, mail, mapToolResponse, matchesCron, max, maxFileSize, md5, mimes, min, minFileSize, mountModuleRoutes, needsRehash, normalizeAppKey, notIn, nullable, numeric, object as objectRule, paginate, parseApiToken, parseAppKey, parseCron, parseOAuthRedirectUrl, parsePasswordResetUrl, parsePreviousAppKeys, parseRequestPayload, parseSignature, parseToolScope, parseVerificationUrl, pick, pluralizationRules, processJob, quickValidate, quickValidateOrThrow, random, randomBase64, randomBase64Url, randomHex, randomInt, randomString, readBearerToken, redactAgentArguments, regex, registerJob, registerNotification, renderDebugPage, renderDocument, renderErrorPage, requestIdMiddleware, requestLoggingMiddleware, requireAuthenticated, requireGuest, requireVerifiedEmail, required, requiredIf, requiredUnless, requiredWith, requiredWithout, resetCalledSeeders, resetRateLimit, resolve, resolveJobName, resolveNotifiableType, revokeAllApiTokens, revokeApiToken, same, sample, sanitizeOAuthRedirect, scopesAllowTool, secureCompare, selectPluralForm, setBroadcastManager, setContainer, setEncrypter, setExceptionHandler, setGate, setI18n, setInertiaDocument, setInertiaSharedProps, setInertiaSsrRenderer, setLogManager, setMailManager, setNotificationManager, setQueueDriver, sha256, sha512, shareInertiaProps, shuffle, signUrl, size, startsWith, string as stringRule, t, tc, toTimezone, tokenCan, tokenCanAll, tokenCanAny, tryGetI18n, unique, url as urlRule, urlSafeToken, uuid, uuid$1 as uuidRule, validate, validateRequest, validateRequestWith, validateSafe, verifyApiToken, verifyCsrfToken, verifyEmailToken, verifyHmac, verifyOAuthState, verifyPassword, verifyPasswordResetToken, verifySignedUrl, viteAsset, withAuthorization };
9360
+ export { AGENT_APPROVAL_CONFIG_KEY, AGENT_AUDIT_BINDING, AGENT_REDACTED, AGENT_TOOL_NAME_PATTERN, API_TOKEN_KEY, APPROVAL_STATUS_TOOL_NAME, AUTH_CONTEXT_KEY, AgentApprovalRequested, AgentToolDenied, AgentToolInvoked, Application, ApplicationShutdown, ApplicationStarted, AuthManager, Response$1 as AuthResponse, AuthServiceProvider, AuthenticatableModel, AuthenticationException, AuthorizationException, AuthorizationServiceProvider, AutoDiscovery, BaseFactory, BaseFactory as Factory, BaseSeeder, BaseSeeder as Seeder, BaseUserProvider, BroadcastManager, BroadcastServiceProvider, BufferedOutput, CSP_NONCE_KEY, CSRF_FORM_FIELD, CSRF_HEADER_NAME, CSRF_TOKEN_KEY, CacheCheck, CacheManager, CacheServiceProvider, Channel, Command, ConsoleChannel, ConsoleKernel, Container, Controller, CursorPaginator, CustomCheck, DEFAULT_AGENT_APPROVAL_TTL_MS, DEFAULT_AGENT_AUDIT_PATH, DailyFileChannel, DatabaseChannel, DatabaseCheck, DefaultHasher, DefaultHasher as Hash, Encrypter, EncryptionServiceProvider, ErrorServiceProvider, Event, EventManager, EventServiceProvider, ExceptionHandler, FailedJobReporter, FieldValidator, FileStore as FileCacheStore, FileChannel, FormRequest, Gate, HealthCheck, HealthManager, HealthServiceProvider, HttpException, I18nManager, I18nServiceProvider, InertiaServiceProvider, Input, Job, JobFailed, JobProcessed, JsonLoader, JsonResource, LOCALE_CONTEXT_KEY, LOG_LEVEL_PRIORITY, Listener, LocalDriver as LocalStorageDriver, LogManager, LogServiceProvider, LogTransport, Logger, Mail, MailChannel, MailManager, MailServiceProvider, MemoryApiTokenStore, MemoryDriver as MemoryBroadcastDriver, MemoryStore as MemoryCacheStore, MemoryChannel, MemoryCheck, MemoryDriver$1 as MemoryDriver, MemoryDriver$1 as MemoryQueueDriver, MemoryEmailVerificationStore, MemoryLoader, MemoryOAuthStateStore, MemoryPasswordResetStore, MemoryRateLimitStore, MemorySessionStore, MemoryDriver$2 as MemoryStorageDriver, MemoryTransport, MessageSigner, MethodNotAllowedException, ModelUserProvider, NodeHasher, NotFoundHttpException, Notification, NotificationManager, NotificationServiceProvider, OAUTH_SESSION_BINDING_KEY, OAuthManager, OAuthServiceProvider, Output, PREFLIGHT_ARGUMENT, PREFLIGHT_TOOL_NAME, Paginator, PendingSchedule, Policy, PresenceChannel, PrivateChannel, ProviderManager, QueueManager, QueueServiceProvider, RESERVED_AGENT_TOOL_NAMES, RedisDriver as RedisBroadcastDriver, RedisStore as RedisCacheStore, RedisCheck, RedisDriver$1 as RedisDriver, RedisDriver$1 as RedisQueueDriver, RequestFinished, RequestReceived, ResendTransport, Resource, ResourceCollection, Router, S3Driver, Schedule, ScheduledTask, Scheduler, SchedulingServiceProvider, ScryptHasher, SeederRunner, ServiceProvider, SessionGuard, SlackChannel, SlidingWindowRateLimitStore, SmtpTransport, SqsDriver, StorageCheck, StorageManager, StorageServiceProvider, SyncDriver, SyncDriver as SyncQueueDriver, TaggedCache, TokenGuard, Translator, UserAuthenticated, UserLoggedOut, VALIDATED_DATA_KEY, ValidationException, Validator, ViewEngine, Worker, abort, abortIf, abortUnless, advertisesStructuredOutput, after, afterOrEqual, agentApprovalExpiredAt, agentApprovalFingerprint, agentApprovalPrincipalKey, agentApprovalStatusAt, agentApprovalUsableAt, agentApprovalVisibleTo, alpha, alphaDash, alphaNum, array as arrayRule, attachAuthContext, authorize as authorizeAbility, authorizeAllMiddleware, authorizeMiddleware, authorizeResourceMiddleware, before, beforeOrEqual, between, boolean as booleanRule, buildAgentApprovalRequest, buildOAuthAuthorizeUrl, buildOAuthRedirectUrl, buildPasswordResetUrl, buildToolRequest, buildVerificationUrl, can, cannot, canonicalizeAgentApprovalInput, check as checkHash, clearJobRegistry, clearNotificationRegistry, collect, completeEmailVerification, completePasswordReset, confirmed, createApiToken, createApp, createAuditEmitter, createBearerTokenMiddleware, createBroadcastManager, createCacheManager, createConsoleKernel, createContainer, createCorsMiddleware, createCspMiddleware, createCsrfMiddleware, createDiscordOAuthProviderConfig, createEmailVerificationToken, createEncrypter, createEventManager, createExceptionHandler, createFacade, createFacades, createForceHttpsMiddleware, createGate, createGitHubOAuthProviderConfig, createGoogleOAuthProviderConfig, createHealthManager, createHostAuthorizationMiddleware, createI18n, createLogManager, createMailManager, createNotificationManager, createOAuthManager, createOAuthState, createPasswordResetToken, createQueueManager, createRateLimitMiddleware, createRedirectSafetyMiddleware, createRedisClient, createScheduler, createSecurityHeaders, createSeederRunner, createSessionMiddleware, createSqsAdapter, createStorageManager, createTypedBroadcaster, createValidator, csrfField, cursorPaginate, custom, customCheck, dailyFileDateStamp, dailyFilePath, dateFormat, date as dateRule, debugErrorMiddleware, decodeCursor, decrypt, defineFactory, defineGate, defineMiddleware, defineModule, definePlugin, definePolicy, deriveAgentTools, deriveAppKey, deriveAppKeyring, describeBuildFailure, detectLocaleMiddleware, different, email as emailRule, encodeCursor, encrypt, endsWith, exchangeOAuthCode, exists, expandToolScopes, fetchOAuthUserProfile, file as fileRule, filterSensitiveData, formatValidationErrors, generateAppKey, generateKey, generateOtp, generatePassword, generateSlug, getApiToken, getApiTokenOrFail, getAppKeyringFromEnv, getBroadcastManager, getContainer, getCspNonce, getCsrfToken, getEncrypter, getExceptionHandler, getGate, getI18n, getInertiaSharedPropsResolver, getJob, getLogManager, getMailManager, getNextOccurrence, getNextOccurrences, getNotification, getNotificationManager, getPluralizationRule, getQueueDriver, getRateLimitInfo, getRegisteredJobs, getRequestLocale, getRequestTranslator, getSessionFromContext, getUserApiTokens, getValidatedData, hash, hashPassword, hmac, image as imageRule, inValues, inertia, integer, ip, ipv4, ipv6, isDue, isDueInTimezone, isEmailVerified, isReservedAgentToolName, isSafeRedirectUrl, jsonResponse, json as jsonRule, mail, mapToolResponse, matchDailyFileDate, matchesCron, max, maxFileSize, md5, mimes, min, minFileSize, mountModuleRoutes, needsRehash, normalizeAppKey, notIn, nullable, numeric, object as objectRule, paginate, parseApiToken, parseAppKey, parseAuditRecord, parseCron, parseOAuthRedirectUrl, parsePasswordResetUrl, parsePreviousAppKeys, parseRequestPayload, parseSignature, parseToolScope, parseVerificationUrl, pick, pluralizationRules, processJob, quickValidate, quickValidateOrThrow, random, randomBase64, randomBase64Url, randomHex, randomInt, randomString, readBearerToken, redactAgentArguments, regex, registerJob, registerNotification, renderDebugPage, renderDocument, renderErrorPage, requestIdMiddleware, requestLoggingMiddleware, requireAuthenticated, requireGuest, requireVerifiedEmail, required, requiredIf, requiredUnless, requiredWith, requiredWithout, resetCalledSeeders, resetRateLimit, resolve, resolveJobName, resolveNotifiableType, revokeAllApiTokens, revokeApiToken, same, sample, sanitizeOAuthRedirect, scopesAllowTool, secureCompare, selectPluralForm, setBroadcastManager, setContainer, setEncrypter, setExceptionHandler, setGate, setI18n, setInertiaDocument, setInertiaSharedProps, setInertiaSsrRenderer, setLogManager, setMailManager, setNotificationManager, setQueueDriver, sha256, sha512, shareInertiaProps, shuffle, signUrl, size, startsWith, string as stringRule, t, tc, toAuditRecord, toTimezone, tokenCan, tokenCanAll, tokenCanAny, tryGetI18n, unique, url as urlRule, urlSafeToken, uuid, uuid$1 as uuidRule, validate, validateRequest, validateRequestWith, validateSafe, verifyApiToken, verifyCsrfToken, verifyEmailToken, verifyHmac, verifyOAuthState, verifyPassword, verifyPasswordResetToken, verifySignedUrl, viteAsset, withAuthorization };