@guren/server 2.13.0 → 2.15.0

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Files changed (68) hide show
  1. package/dist/{Hash-CzrwKeDp.js → Hash-C8aejmi8.js} +5 -0
  2. package/dist/{McpServiceProvider-D6D9nhgn.js → McpServiceProvider-BawsYjgN.js} +72 -0
  3. package/dist/agent/AgentApprovalRequested.d.ts +59 -0
  4. package/dist/agent/approval.d.ts +295 -0
  5. package/dist/agent/audit-emitter.d.ts +64 -0
  6. package/dist/agent/audit.d.ts +103 -0
  7. package/dist/agent/derive.d.ts +155 -0
  8. package/dist/agent/dispatch.d.ts +165 -0
  9. package/dist/agent/events.d.ts +80 -0
  10. package/dist/agent/meta-tools.d.ts +62 -0
  11. package/dist/agent/public.d.ts +33 -0
  12. package/dist/agent/public.js +2 -0
  13. package/dist/agent/redact.d.ts +55 -0
  14. package/dist/agent/scopes.d.ts +115 -0
  15. package/dist/auth/AuthManager.d.ts +64 -0
  16. package/dist/auth/RequestAuthContext.d.ts +3 -5
  17. package/dist/auth/TokenGuard.d.ts +61 -0
  18. package/dist/auth/api-token.d.ts +25 -5
  19. package/dist/auth/context.d.ts +24 -0
  20. package/dist/auth/index.d.ts +5 -2
  21. package/dist/auth/index.js +2 -2
  22. package/dist/auth/password/DefaultHasher.d.ts +18 -5
  23. package/dist/auth/password/PasswordHasher.d.ts +15 -0
  24. package/dist/auth/password/hash-format.d.ts +19 -0
  25. package/dist/auth/providers/UserProvider.d.ts +7 -0
  26. package/dist/auth/types.d.ts +6 -0
  27. package/dist/{auth-C7sVmYgc.js → auth-DkYoAPVn.js} +431 -151
  28. package/dist/authorization/index.js +1 -1
  29. package/dist/authorization/middleware.d.ts +28 -1
  30. package/dist/{authorization-Dbcuc5ZK.js → authorization-CdfbCj8J.js} +119 -12
  31. package/dist/broadcasting/index.js +1 -1
  32. package/dist/{broadcasting-Dw-FhyjN.js → broadcasting-BwodCA4q.js} +2 -45
  33. package/dist/container/bindings.d.ts +19 -0
  34. package/dist/context-DoD0c7J_.js +26 -0
  35. package/dist/dispatch-erOS9epZ.js +285 -0
  36. package/dist/encryption/index.js +2 -2
  37. package/dist/{encryption-DJtkkhiw.js → encryption-D99Vmls3.js} +4 -1
  38. package/dist/http/dev-assets.d.ts +16 -0
  39. package/dist/http/middleware/auth.d.ts +2 -2
  40. package/dist/http/middleware/capabilities.d.ts +57 -0
  41. package/dist/http/middleware/csrf.d.ts +3 -0
  42. package/dist/http/public-assets.d.ts +10 -0
  43. package/dist/http/request.d.ts +139 -3
  44. package/dist/http/static-documents.d.ts +31 -0
  45. package/dist/index.d.ts +21 -4
  46. package/dist/index.js +1302 -118
  47. package/dist/internal/agent-preflight.d.ts +28 -0
  48. package/dist/internal/request.d.ts +25 -0
  49. package/dist/internal/request.js +2 -0
  50. package/dist/internal/route-path.d.ts +28 -0
  51. package/dist/internal/route-path.js +33 -0
  52. package/dist/internal/zod-compat.d.ts +201 -0
  53. package/dist/internal/zod-compat.js +193 -0
  54. package/dist/internal/zod-json-schema.d.ts +102 -0
  55. package/dist/internal/zod-json-schema.js +461 -0
  56. package/dist/logging/channels/DailyFileChannel.d.ts +0 -2
  57. package/dist/logging/daily-file-path.d.ts +24 -0
  58. package/dist/logging/index.d.ts +1 -0
  59. package/dist/logging/index.js +2 -2
  60. package/dist/{logging-CPaRMuPP.js → logging-B-kngi3q.js} +61 -18
  61. package/dist/mcp/create-mcp-server.d.ts +29 -0
  62. package/dist/mcp/index.js +1 -1
  63. package/dist/mvc/Controller.d.ts +20 -0
  64. package/dist/mvc/Router.d.ts +53 -0
  65. package/dist/request-CVQwpu2J.js +129 -0
  66. package/dist/runtime/index.js +94 -15
  67. package/dist/{vite-manifest-gdONBsM3.js → vite-manifest-w_RSOvQW.js} +1 -1
  68. package/package.json +22 -2
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * Turns registered route definitions into agent tools (RFC 0016 §2).
3
+ *
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+ * This is the *one* derivation. The runtime protocol adapters and the CLI's
5
+ * `.guren/agents.gen.ts` both call it, so a generated manifest and a live MCP
6
+ * server can differ only in description richness — never in schemas, names, or
7
+ * exposure. Nothing here is restated by hand: the input schema comes from the
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+ * route's own `params`/`query`/`body` contracts through the shared Zod → JSON
9
+ * Schema walker, the output schema from `output`, the ability from the
10
+ * authorization capability its middleware chain stamped.
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+ *
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+ * Two properties this function keeps deliberately:
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+ *
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+ * - **Total.** Nothing throws and nothing is silently dropped for being
15
+ * malformed. A contract this cannot express becomes a warning plus a
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+ * deterministic result, because the same call has to serve a dev server, a
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+ * codegen step, and a production adapter. `guren check` is what turns those
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+ * warnings into a failing build (PR-1c).
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+ * - **Opt-in.** A route becomes a tool only by declaring `.agent()` *and*
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+ * carrying a name. Auto-exposing endpoints is the anti-pattern RFC 0016
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+ * opens by rejecting.
22
+ */
23
+ import type { ResourceResponseShape, RouteDefinition } from '../mvc/Router.js';
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+ import { type JsonSchemaObject } from '../internal/zod-json-schema.js';
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+ /**
26
+ * A JSON Schema 2020-12 object as an agent tool advertises it. An alias of the
27
+ * shared walker's type rather than a second definition — OpenAPI 3.1's Schema
28
+ * Object is the same dialect, and `@guren/openapi` aliases it the same way, so
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+ * one definition serves every surface. The name exists so the internal module
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+ * is not the one a consumer has to import.
31
+ */
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+ export type AgentToolSchema = JsonSchemaObject;
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+ /**
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+ * MCP `ToolAnnotations`, resolved to explicit values — a consumer never has to
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+ * re-apply a default, and `guren check`'s annotation-honesty rule has one
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+ * concrete claim to check the controller against.
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+ *
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+ * These are hints for client UX, not enforcement. Authorization lives in
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+ * policies, scopes, and the approval queue.
40
+ */
41
+ export interface DerivedAgentToolAnnotations {
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+ /** The tool does not modify its environment. */
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+ readOnlyHint: boolean;
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+ /** The tool may perform destructive updates. Meaningful only when not read-only. */
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+ destructiveHint: boolean;
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+ /** Repeat calls with the same arguments have no additional effect. */
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+ idempotentHint: boolean;
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+ }
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+ /** Protocol surfaces a tool appears on. Both resolved; unset means exposed. */
50
+ export interface DerivedAgentToolExposure {
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+ mcp: boolean;
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+ webMcp: boolean;
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+ }
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+ export interface DerivedAgentTool {
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+ /** Tool identity: `agent.toolName` when given, otherwise the route name, verbatim. */
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+ toolName: string;
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+ /** The route name this tool was derived from. Equal to `toolName` unless overridden. */
58
+ routeName: string;
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+ /** Uppercased HTTP method the tool dispatches to. */
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+ method: string;
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+ /** Route path pattern, `:param` tokens intact. */
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+ path: string;
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+ /**
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+ * `agent.description`, else the route's OpenAPI `description`, else its
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+ * `summary`. Absent when the route declares none — nothing is invented here;
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+ * the CLI appends resource type text at codegen time, and `guren check`
67
+ * warns about a tool with no description at all.
68
+ */
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+ description?: string;
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+ /** Merged `params` + `query` + `body`, object root (MCP requires one). */
71
+ inputSchema: AgentToolSchema;
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+ /**
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+ * Which contract each advertised input property came from — the inverse of
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+ * the merge, for the adapter that has to take a flat tool call apart again
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+ * and rebuild the HTTP request: `params`/`path` substitute into the URL
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+ * path, `query` joins the query string, `body` lands in the JSON body. The
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+ * schema alone cannot answer this (the merge is flat by design), and an
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+ * adapter guessing by method would put a POST route's `query` keys in the
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+ * body, where `validateQuery` never looks.
80
+ */
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+ inputSources: Record<string, AgentToolInputSource>;
82
+ /**
83
+ * True when the route's `body` schema was not an object and therefore nests
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+ * under a single `body` property (see {@link buildInputSchema}). The
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+ * dispatching adapter must then send `arguments.body` *as* the HTTP body,
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+ * not an object wrapping it — the flat reconstruction would post
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+ * `{ body: [...] }` to a route that validates an array.
88
+ */
89
+ inputBodyNested: boolean;
90
+ /** Present only when the route binds an `output` schema — the one shape validated at runtime. */
91
+ outputSchema?: AgentToolSchema;
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+ /**
93
+ * The route's `resource` response hint, as class names — RFC 0016's second
94
+ * output rung, carried rather than resolved. `definitions()` has only the
95
+ * names; the payload type behind them exists solely in the CLI's AST
96
+ * extraction, which is why codegen enriches the description from this and
97
+ * the runtime does not.
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+ *
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+ * Absent when the route declares no hint — and, deliberately, whenever the
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+ * route *declares* an `output` schema, whether or not the walker could
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+ * render it. The declaration is what the runtime validates against, so it
102
+ * outranks the hint; carrying both would leave two descriptions of one
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+ * response with nothing keeping them in agreement, and a route whose
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+ * `output` the walker cannot express would advertise the *unvalidated* one
105
+ * while the enforced contract silently vanished.
106
+ */
107
+ resource?: ResourceResponseShape;
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+ annotations: DerivedAgentToolAnnotations;
109
+ /**
110
+ * The policy ability guarding this route, when its middleware chain stamped
111
+ * one unambiguously. Absent means "not statically derivable", never "not
112
+ * authorized" — a check reads the absence, it does not assume a verdict.
113
+ */
114
+ authorization?: {
115
+ ability: string;
116
+ };
117
+ /** Declared verbatim: invocations require server-side approval. */
118
+ approval?: 'required';
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+ /** Declared verbatim: argument fields masked in agent audit logs. */
120
+ redact?: string[];
121
+ expose: DerivedAgentToolExposure;
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+ /**
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+ * What could not be expressed while deriving *this* tool, unprefixed. The
124
+ * same lines appear in {@link DeriveAgentToolsResult.warnings} prefixed with
125
+ * the tool name; that aggregate is for printing, this field is for anything
126
+ * that needs to know which tool a warning belongs to. Attributing by parsing
127
+ * the prefix back off would couple every consumer to a message format
128
+ * nothing states. Empty for a tool that derived cleanly.
129
+ */
130
+ warnings: string[];
131
+ }
132
+ export interface DeriveAgentToolsResult {
133
+ tools: DerivedAgentTool[];
134
+ /**
135
+ * Everything the derivation could not express, one line each, prefixed with
136
+ * the tool (or the route, for a route that could not become one). Non-fatal
137
+ * by construction — see the module header. Per-tool lines are also on the
138
+ * tool itself ({@link DerivedAgentTool.warnings}), which is what a consumer
139
+ * needing attribution should read.
140
+ */
141
+ warnings: string[];
142
+ }
143
+ /**
144
+ * Where a merged input property came from — collision reporting inside the
145
+ * merge, request reconstruction outside it ({@link DerivedAgentTool.inputSources}).
146
+ * `params` and `path` both mean URL substitution to an adapter; they stay
147
+ * distinct because a warning should name the schema the author actually wrote.
148
+ */
149
+ export type AgentToolInputSource = 'params' | 'path' | 'query' | 'body';
150
+ /**
151
+ * Derive the agent tools a set of route definitions exposes.
152
+ *
153
+ * @param definitions Registered routes, as `Router.definitions()` hands them out.
154
+ */
155
+ export declare function deriveAgentTools(definitions: RouteDefinition[]): DeriveAgentToolsResult;
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * The dispatch contract (RFC 0016 §3): a tool call re-enters the application
3
+ * as a real HTTP request, so validation, policies, and middleware run exactly
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+ * once, in the app — never re-implemented here.
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+ *
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+ * This module is pure request/response plumbing: it rebuilds an HTTP request
7
+ * from a flat tool call and maps the app's response onto an MCP tool result.
8
+ * It never validates arguments (the route does, and the MCP client already
9
+ * saw the JSON Schema) and never decides authorization (the gate and the
10
+ * app's policies do).
11
+ */
12
+ import type { DerivedAgentTool } from './derive.js';
13
+ import type { AgentSurface } from './events.js';
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+ export interface BuildToolRequestOptions {
15
+ /**
16
+ * Origin the synthesized URL is built on. Never leaves the process — the
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+ * request goes straight into `app.fetch` — but host-authorization
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+ * middleware still reads its `Host`, so the default stays on the one name
19
+ * every dev allowlist admits.
20
+ */
21
+ origin?: string;
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+ /**
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+ * `Authorization` header to forward verbatim, so the app's own token guard
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+ * authenticates the same principal the adapter verified. Absent for a
25
+ * surface that authenticates some other way.
26
+ */
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+ authorization?: string;
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+ /**
29
+ * Ask for a verdict instead of an execution (RFC 0016 §5.4): the request
30
+ * runs the route's middleware and validates the advertised contract, then
31
+ * stops before the handler. Only routes declaring `.agent()` honour it.
32
+ */
33
+ preflight?: boolean;
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+ /**
35
+ * Which protocol surface the call arrived on, announced to the application
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+ * as `X-Guren-Agent-Surface`. Defaults to `'mcp'`, the surface that was the
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+ * only one when this header was introduced, so every existing caller keeps
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+ * sending exactly what it sent before.
39
+ *
40
+ * The header is informational and, in the framework, write-only: nothing
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+ * here reads it back. It is there for an *application* that wants to tell
42
+ * an in-browser session call from a bearer-token one, and it borrows the
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+ * audit trail's vocabulary ({@link AgentSurface}) so the two agree — but
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+ * the trail's own `surface` comes from the adapter that recorded it, not
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+ * from this header. Nothing must ever authorize on it: any client sets any
46
+ * header it likes, so a surface can never relax a check.
47
+ */
48
+ surface?: AgentSurface;
49
+ }
50
+ /**
51
+ * The argument-level spelling of a preflight request (RFC 0016 §5.4), for a
52
+ * surface whose callers pass flat arguments rather than dispatch options.
53
+ *
54
+ * No adapter strips it today, because none accepts it. Every surface that
55
+ * reaches the seam asks through `BuildToolRequestOptions.preflight` instead:
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+ * `guren tool:call` and `@guren/testing` from their own flags, and MCP from
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+ * the `guren.preflight` companion tool, which takes the target tool's name
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+ * and arguments rather than smuggling a directive through them (RFC 0016
59
+ * §5.4 — a verdict conforms to no route's output schema, so it needs a tool
60
+ * of its own). A surface that adopts this key owns the stripping — it is an
61
+ * instruction to the adapter, not a field of any route's contract, and
62
+ * forwarding it would fail the very validation the caller asked to rehearse.
63
+ */
64
+ export declare const PREFLIGHT_ARGUMENT = "_preflight";
65
+ export type BuiltToolRequest = {
66
+ request: Request;
67
+ } | ToolRequestBuildFailure;
68
+ /** The ways `buildToolRequest` refuses to build — no HTTP has happened. */
69
+ export type ToolRequestBuildFailure =
70
+ /** Path parameters the call did not supply — the URL cannot be built. */
71
+ {
72
+ missing: string[];
73
+ }
74
+ /**
75
+ * Path parameter values that are URL dot-segments (`.` / `..`). Rejected,
76
+ * never substituted: `encodeURIComponent` leaves a dot untouched, and the
77
+ * `Request` URL parser then collapses the segment — so `{ name: '..' }` on
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+ * `/files/:name/meta` would reach `/meta`, a route the scope check never
79
+ * saw. The only ASCII segments the WHATWG parser normalizes are `.` and
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+ * `..`; every other separator (`/`, `\`) survives `encodeURIComponent`
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+ * percent-encoded, so this is the complete set.
82
+ */
83
+ | {
84
+ invalidPath: string[];
85
+ };
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+ /**
87
+ * The agent-facing diagnosis of a {@link ToolRequestBuildFailure}.
88
+ *
89
+ * One function rather than a string per adapter: the same tool is reachable
90
+ * from several surfaces (App MCP, WebMCP, `guren tool:call`), and an agent
91
+ * that reads a different diagnosis depending on which one it reached would
92
+ * be debugging the client instead of its own call.
93
+ */
94
+ export declare function describeBuildFailure(failure: ToolRequestBuildFailure): string;
95
+ /**
96
+ * Rebuild the HTTP request a tool call describes.
97
+ *
98
+ * The flat argument object is taken apart along `tool.inputSources` — the
99
+ * derivation's own record of which contract each property came from — so a
100
+ * POST route's `query` keys land in the query string where `validateQuery`
101
+ * reads them, not in the body. Keys the derivation never advertised are
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+ * forwarded anyway (body for body-carrying methods, query otherwise): the
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+ * route's validator is the one place that rejects them, and dropping them
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+ * here would make this a second, quieter validator.
105
+ *
106
+ * GET and HEAD force everything into the query string whatever its source —
107
+ * `Request` refuses a body on those methods, and a `body` schema on a GET
108
+ * route is a contract defect this adapter cannot repair.
109
+ */
110
+ export declare function buildToolRequest(tool: DerivedAgentTool, args: Record<string, unknown>, options?: BuildToolRequestOptions): BuiltToolRequest;
111
+ /** An MCP tool result, shaped for the SDK's CallToolResult. */
112
+ export interface ToolCallOutcome {
113
+ content: Array<{
114
+ type: 'text';
115
+ text: string;
116
+ }>;
117
+ structuredContent?: Record<string, unknown>;
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+ isError?: boolean;
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+ /** The HTTP status the dispatch resolved to, for the audit event. */
120
+ status: number;
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+ /**
122
+ * The response carried the preflight verdict header, so this is the seam's
123
+ * answer and not the route's own output.
124
+ *
125
+ * Carried here because `mapToolResponse` is the only place that sees the
126
+ * header — an outcome has no headers — and the fact is otherwise lost. A
127
+ * caller that re-derived it by looking for a `preflight` field in the body
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+ * would read an ordinary route whose output happens to carry that field as a
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+ * rehearsal that never ran, which is the exact confusion the header was
130
+ * introduced to prevent.
131
+ */
132
+ preflightVerdict?: boolean;
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * Whether the tool advertises an object output schema — the only kind MCP
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+ * lists, and therefore the only kind that obliges a success result to carry
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+ * `structuredContent`. A route whose `output` is an array or primitive is not
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+ * advertised as structured (MCP `outputSchema` must be an object), so its
139
+ * results ride as text. `describeTool` and `mapToolResponse` must agree on
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+ * this exact predicate, or one advertises a schema the other cannot satisfy.
141
+ */
142
+ export declare function advertisesStructuredOutput(tool: DerivedAgentTool): boolean;
143
+ /**
144
+ * Map the application's response onto an MCP tool result (RFC 0016 §3.4).
145
+ *
146
+ * - 2xx JSON object → serialized text, plus `structuredContent` when the tool
147
+ * advertises an object `outputSchema` (the one shape the route validated).
148
+ * - 2xx Inertia page JSON → unwrapped to `page.props`, only for a tool with
149
+ * no `outputSchema` — unwrap and schema are mutually exclusive by
150
+ * derivation, so the advertised shape can never disagree with the result.
151
+ * - 204 / 3xx → a status line naming the Location; not an error.
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+ * - 4xx / 5xx → `isError: true` carrying the exception handler's JSON body:
153
+ * a 422's `{ message, errors }` is an application-level failure the agent
154
+ * should read, not a protocol error.
155
+ * - non-JSON → capped text.
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+ *
157
+ * One MCP invariant overrides the table: a *non-error* result for a tool that
158
+ * advertises an object `outputSchema` must carry `structuredContent`, or the
159
+ * SDK client rejects it after the route has already run. A success response
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+ * that yields no object to put there (204, 3xx, non-JSON, a non-object body)
161
+ * contradicts the route's own declared output, so it becomes an `isError`
162
+ * result naming the mismatch — which the SDK exempts from the rule — rather
163
+ * than a protocol fault the agent cannot interpret.
164
+ */
165
+ export declare function mapToolResponse(tool: DerivedAgentTool, response: Response): Promise<ToolCallOutcome>;
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
1
+ /**
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+ * The audit trail of the agent surface (RFC 0016 §5.2): every tool invocation
3
+ * and every denial, as framework events, so an application forwards them
4
+ * wherever it already forwards events instead of learning a second logging
5
+ * API.
6
+ *
7
+ * Declarations only. Nothing here emits — the dispatch path does, once, at
8
+ * the one place that knows the verdict — and nothing here redacts:
9
+ * {@link AgentToolInvoked.arguments} is a *contract* that the emitter has
10
+ * already run the arguments through `redactAgentArguments`. An event class
11
+ * that redacted on construction would give a second, quieter redaction rule
12
+ * beside the real one, and a listener has no way to tell a masked payload
13
+ * from an unmasked one.
14
+ */
15
+ import { Event } from '../events/Event.js';
16
+ /**
17
+ * Who invoked a tool (RFC 0016 §4). `kind: 'service'` is an App MCP bearer
18
+ * token with no `userId`; `'user'` is a session (WebMCP) or a user-owned
19
+ * token. `abilities` are the token's, carried for the audit record — the
20
+ * scope verdict itself was already taken by the dispatcher.
21
+ */
22
+ export interface AgentPrincipal {
23
+ kind: 'user' | 'service';
24
+ id: string | number;
25
+ abilities?: string[];
26
+ }
27
+ /**
28
+ * The protocol surface an invocation arrived on. `'mcp'` is the application's
29
+ * own MCP endpoint, `'dev-mcp'` the development one, `'cli'` a
30
+ * `guren tool:call`, `'webmcp'` an in-browser session-authenticated call.
31
+ */
32
+ export type AgentSurface = 'mcp' | 'dev-mcp' | 'cli' | 'webmcp';
33
+ /**
34
+ * Emitted when an agent tool invocation completed — successfully or not.
35
+ * `status` carries the HTTP status the dispatch resolved to, so an error
36
+ * response is one of these rather than a separate event; a call that never
37
+ * reached the handler is an {@link AgentToolDenied} instead.
38
+ */
39
+ export declare class AgentToolInvoked extends Event {
40
+ readonly principal: AgentPrincipal | null;
41
+ readonly tool: string;
42
+ readonly status: number;
43
+ readonly durationMs: number;
44
+ readonly surface: AgentSurface;
45
+ /**
46
+ * The invocation arguments **already redacted** by the emitter (see the
47
+ * module header). Assigned in the body rather than declared as a
48
+ * constructor parameter property: `arguments` is not a legal binding
49
+ * identifier in strict mode, which every ES module is, though it is a
50
+ * perfectly legal property name.
51
+ */
52
+ readonly arguments: Record<string, unknown>;
53
+ constructor(principal: AgentPrincipal | null, tool: string, redactedArguments: Record<string, unknown>, status: number, durationMs: number, surface: AgentSurface);
54
+ }
55
+ /**
56
+ * Why a tool invocation was refused before it reached the route handler.
57
+ *
58
+ * Deliberately no `'policy'`: `Gate` policies evaluate *inside* the
59
+ * dispatched request, so a policy denial is an execution that returned 403 —
60
+ * an {@link AgentToolInvoked} with that status — not an adapter-level
61
+ * refusal. The reasons here are exactly the checks the adapter runs before
62
+ * synthesizing the request, which is also why a denial carries no HTTP
63
+ * status: no HTTP happened.
64
+ */
65
+ export type AgentToolDenialReason = 'auth' | 'scope' | 'approval' | 'rate-limit';
66
+ /**
67
+ * Emitted when an agent tool invocation was refused. Carries no status or
68
+ * duration: nothing ran, and {@link AgentToolDenialReason} is the finding.
69
+ * `'approval'` covers a tool declaring `approval: 'required'` whose call
70
+ * became a pending record instead of an execution.
71
+ */
72
+ export declare class AgentToolDenied extends Event {
73
+ readonly principal: AgentPrincipal | null;
74
+ readonly tool: string;
75
+ readonly reason: AgentToolDenialReason;
76
+ readonly surface: AgentSurface;
77
+ /** Redacted by the emitter, exactly as on {@link AgentToolInvoked}. */
78
+ readonly arguments: Record<string, unknown>;
79
+ constructor(principal: AgentPrincipal | null, tool: string, redactedArguments: Record<string, unknown>, reason: AgentToolDenialReason, surface: AgentSurface);
80
+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * The names a protocol adapter may add to an application's tool catalogue on
3
+ * its own, and which an application route therefore may not claim (RFC 0016
4
+ * §5.4).
5
+ *
6
+ * This is the one rule, with two readers. `@guren/plugin-mcp` adds
7
+ * `guren.preflight` to the catalogue it serves; `guren check` fails a route
8
+ * whose `.agent()` tool name would collide with it. Restating the string in
9
+ * either place is how the two drift: the check would keep passing a route
10
+ * whose tool the endpoint has already shadowed, and `tools/list` would carry
11
+ * two tools with one name — which an MCP client rejects wholesale, so the
12
+ * collision costs the *entire* catalogue, not the one tool.
13
+ *
14
+ * It lives beside the derivation rather than in the plugin because the check
15
+ * cannot import the plugin (the CLI does not depend on it, and an app that
16
+ * never installs App MCP is still checked), and the plugin must not restate a
17
+ * name the check is enforcing.
18
+ *
19
+ * The list stays deliberately short. Every entry is a name taken away from
20
+ * applications, and the `guren.` prefix is not reserved wholesale for the
21
+ * same reason: reserving a namespace nothing occupies fails routes over a
22
+ * collision that does not exist.
23
+ */
24
+ /**
25
+ * The preflight companion tool (RFC 0016 §5.4).
26
+ *
27
+ * Preflight cannot be an *argument* of the tool being checked on MCP: a tool
28
+ * advertising an `outputSchema` must answer with `structuredContent`
29
+ * conforming to it unless the result is an error, and a verdict conforms to
30
+ * no route's output. So the verdict needs a tool of its own, with its own
31
+ * output schema — one meta-tool for the whole catalogue, not one companion
32
+ * per tool, which would double the catalogue against §5.5's own
33
+ * catalogue-quality rule.
34
+ */
35
+ export declare const PREFLIGHT_TOOL_NAME = "guren.preflight";
36
+ /**
37
+ * The approval-status companion tool (RFC 0016 §5.4 item 4).
38
+ *
39
+ * A tool declaring `approval: 'required'` answers its first call with a
40
+ * pending record rather than an execution, and the caller is handed a request
41
+ * id. Something has to be able to say what became of that id, and it cannot be
42
+ * the gated tool itself for the reason preflight cannot be an argument of one:
43
+ * a status is not that route's output, and a tool advertising an `outputSchema`
44
+ * may not answer with a different shape of success.
45
+ *
46
+ * A second meta-tool rather than a mode of the first: `guren.preflight`
47
+ * rehearses a call and answers a verdict, this reads a record and answers its
48
+ * state. Folding both under one name would mean one tool whose output schema
49
+ * is the union of two unrelated shapes, which is the thing a schema is for
50
+ * preventing.
51
+ */
52
+ export declare const APPROVAL_STATUS_TOOL_NAME = "guren.approval_status";
53
+ /** Every meta-tool name an adapter may occupy. */
54
+ export declare const RESERVED_AGENT_TOOL_NAMES: readonly string[];
55
+ /**
56
+ * Whether a tool name belongs to the framework rather than the application.
57
+ *
58
+ * Case-sensitive, like every other comparison the tool-name grammar makes:
59
+ * MCP tool names are matched literally, so `Guren.Preflight` is a different
60
+ * tool and reserving it would take a name away for nothing.
61
+ */
62
+ export declare function isReservedAgentToolName(name: string): boolean;
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * The published entry of `@guren/server/agent` (mirrored as
3
+ * `@guren/core/agent`): the half of the agent surface an *out-of-process*
4
+ * dispatcher needs — a browser tab running WebMCP, a CLI, a test harness —
5
+ * as opposed to the half that only makes sense inside a running application.
6
+ *
7
+ * Everything else under `src/agent/` stays internal and is reached through
8
+ * the package index: the audit events, the approval queue, the scope grammar
9
+ * and `deriveAgentTools` itself all import from the application (`Event`, the
10
+ * container, `Router`), which is exactly what a client bundle must not pull
11
+ * in. This module is the one place that promises otherwise, so the promise is
12
+ * stated here rather than left to whoever next adds a re-export:
13
+ *
14
+ * - **Pure Web API.** `Request` / `Response` / `Headers` / `URLSearchParams`
15
+ * and nothing else. No `node:` import, no Bun global, no DOM access — the
16
+ * module must be importable under SSR as well as in a browser. Its two
17
+ * transitive imports (`../internal/route-path`, `../internal/agent-preflight`)
18
+ * are string and regex constants for that reason.
19
+ * - **Types only from `./derive`.** `dispatch.ts` imports `DerivedAgentTool`
20
+ * with `import type`, so the derivation — which reaches `Router` and the
21
+ * authorization middleware — never enters the graph. Re-exporting a *value*
22
+ * from `./derive` here would undo that silently: the bundle would grow the
23
+ * whole route layer and nothing would fail.
24
+ *
25
+ * A consumer holding a `.guren/agents.gen.ts` manifest therefore has
26
+ * everything needed to turn a flat tool call into the HTTP request the route
27
+ * validates, and the route's response back into an MCP tool result — the one
28
+ * dispatch contract (RFC 0016 §3), not a second one written per surface.
29
+ */
30
+ export { advertisesStructuredOutput, buildToolRequest, describeBuildFailure, mapToolResponse, PREFLIGHT_ARGUMENT, } from './dispatch.js';
31
+ export type { BuildToolRequestOptions, BuiltToolRequest, ToolCallOutcome, ToolRequestBuildFailure, } from './dispatch.js';
32
+ export type { AgentToolInputSource, AgentToolSchema, DerivedAgentTool, DerivedAgentToolAnnotations, DerivedAgentToolExposure, } from './derive.js';
33
+ export type { AgentSurface } from './events.js';
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
1
+ import { a as mapToolResponse, i as describeBuildFailure, n as advertisesStructuredOutput, r as buildToolRequest, t as PREFLIGHT_ARGUMENT } from "../dispatch-erOS9epZ.js";
2
+ export { PREFLIGHT_ARGUMENT, advertisesStructuredOutput, buildToolRequest, describeBuildFailure, mapToolResponse };
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * Argument masking for the agent audit trail (RFC 0016 §5.2).
3
+ *
4
+ * Agent tool arguments are logged by default, which is only safe if the
5
+ * logging path masks the fields that must not be written down. Two sources,
6
+ * unioned: a fixed list of sensitive key *fragments* every application gets
7
+ * without asking, and the route's own `.agent({ redact })` metadata.
8
+ *
9
+ * The rule is deliberately blunt — a key matches when its lowercased name
10
+ * *contains* a fragment, and that applies to the declared `redact` entries
11
+ * too, not just the built-ins. So `redact: ['id']` also masks `userId`, and
12
+ * the built-in `session` masks `sessionCount`. Over-redaction is the safe
13
+ * direction for a log: a masked field that did not need masking costs a
14
+ * debugging round trip, an unmasked credential costs a rotation.
15
+ *
16
+ * The walk is total for the same reason the derivation is: it runs while
17
+ * *recording* what happened, including a denial taken before the route's own
18
+ * validation, so it must not be the thing that throws. A cycle and a payload
19
+ * nested past {@link MAX_DEPTH} both terminate with a marker.
20
+ */
21
+ /**
22
+ * The replacement written in place of a masked value. A string, so a redacted
23
+ * record still serializes as JSON and reads the same in every sink.
24
+ */
25
+ export declare const AGENT_REDACTED = "[REDACTED]";
26
+ /**
27
+ * Written in place of a value that closes a cycle, so a self-referencing
28
+ * argument object produces a finite record instead of throwing or hanging.
29
+ * Distinct from {@link AGENT_REDACTED} on purpose: one says "we would not show
30
+ * you", the other "there is nothing further here to show".
31
+ */
32
+ export declare const AGENT_CIRCULAR = "[Circular]";
33
+ /**
34
+ * Written in place of a value nested deeper than {@link MAX_DEPTH}.
35
+ */
36
+ export declare const AGENT_TRUNCATED = "[Truncated]";
37
+ /**
38
+ * Mask the sensitive fields of an agent tool's arguments.
39
+ *
40
+ * Returns a deep copy: the input is never mutated, and a caller may keep
41
+ * holding the unredacted original. The copy is deep only through the
42
+ * structures this walks — plain objects and arrays. Anything else (a `Date`,
43
+ * a `Map`, a `Set`, a class instance) is carried across as the *same
44
+ * reference*, because copying it would need a rule per type and would still
45
+ * get the exotic cases wrong; nothing below such a value is inspected, so a
46
+ * credential hidden inside a class instance is masked only if the key holding
47
+ * that instance matches. Tool arguments arrive as parsed JSON on every
48
+ * surface, where this case does not occur; a caller synthesizing arguments in
49
+ * process is the one that can hit it.
50
+ *
51
+ * @param args The invocation arguments. Walked as a record whatever its
52
+ * prototype, so the return is always a fresh plain object.
53
+ * @param redact Extra key fragments from the route's `.agent({ redact })`.
54
+ */
55
+ export declare function redactAgentArguments(args: Record<string, unknown>, redact?: readonly string[]): Record<string, unknown>;