@guren/server 2.12.0 → 2.14.0

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Files changed (45) hide show
  1. package/dist/{McpServiceProvider-D6D9nhgn.js → McpServiceProvider-BawsYjgN.js} +72 -0
  2. package/dist/agent/derive.d.ts +155 -0
  3. package/dist/agent/dispatch.d.ts +123 -0
  4. package/dist/agent/events.d.ts +80 -0
  5. package/dist/agent/redact.d.ts +55 -0
  6. package/dist/agent/scopes.d.ts +115 -0
  7. package/dist/auth/AuthManager.d.ts +64 -0
  8. package/dist/auth/RequestAuthContext.d.ts +3 -5
  9. package/dist/auth/TokenGuard.d.ts +61 -0
  10. package/dist/auth/api-token.d.ts +25 -5
  11. package/dist/auth/context.d.ts +24 -0
  12. package/dist/auth/index.d.ts +5 -2
  13. package/dist/auth/index.js +2 -2
  14. package/dist/auth/providers/UserProvider.d.ts +7 -0
  15. package/dist/auth/types.d.ts +6 -0
  16. package/dist/{auth-C7sVmYgc.js → auth-BSUc14CD.js} +313 -122
  17. package/dist/authorization/index.js +1 -1
  18. package/dist/authorization/middleware.d.ts +28 -1
  19. package/dist/{authorization-Dbcuc5ZK.js → authorization-CdfbCj8J.js} +119 -12
  20. package/dist/broadcasting/index.js +1 -1
  21. package/dist/{broadcasting-Dw-FhyjN.js → broadcasting-BxU-LIfF.js} +2 -45
  22. package/dist/context-DoD0c7J_.js +26 -0
  23. package/dist/http/middleware/auth.d.ts +2 -2
  24. package/dist/http/middleware/capabilities.d.ts +57 -0
  25. package/dist/http/middleware/csrf.d.ts +3 -0
  26. package/dist/http/request.d.ts +51 -2
  27. package/dist/index.d.ts +12 -3
  28. package/dist/index.js +1015 -84
  29. package/dist/internal/agent-preflight.d.ts +28 -0
  30. package/dist/internal/request.d.ts +19 -0
  31. package/dist/internal/request.js +2 -0
  32. package/dist/internal/route-path.d.ts +28 -0
  33. package/dist/internal/route-path.js +33 -0
  34. package/dist/internal/zod-compat.d.ts +201 -0
  35. package/dist/internal/zod-compat.js +193 -0
  36. package/dist/internal/zod-json-schema.d.ts +102 -0
  37. package/dist/internal/zod-json-schema.js +461 -0
  38. package/dist/mcp/create-mcp-server.d.ts +29 -0
  39. package/dist/mcp/index.js +1 -1
  40. package/dist/mvc/Controller.d.ts +46 -0
  41. package/dist/mvc/Router.d.ts +53 -0
  42. package/dist/request-CRVuIiQr.js +78 -0
  43. package/dist/runtime/index.js +5 -2
  44. package/dist/{vite-manifest-BKuV1kfv.js → vite-manifest-BGfWbPYp.js} +1 -1
  45. package/package.json +17 -1
package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -1,25 +1,29 @@
1
- import { a as setBroadcastManager, c as PresenceChannel, d as flattenRequestQueries, f as formatValidationErrors, i as getBroadcastManager, l as PrivateChannel, n as BroadcastManager, o as RedisDriver, p as parseRequestPayload, r as createBroadcastManager, s as MemoryDriver, t as createTypedBroadcaster, u as Channel } from "./broadcasting-Dw-FhyjN.js";
1
+ import { a as parseRequestPayload, i as parseRequestBody, n as flattenRequestQueries, r as formatValidationErrors, t as asRecord } from "./request-CRVuIiQr.js";
2
2
  import { t as HttpException } from "./HttpException-BkS3euNG.js";
3
3
  import { n as ValidationException } from "./errors-BgeOl_DC.js";
4
+ import { _ as setGate, a as withAuthorization, b as mergeCapabilities, c as Gate, d as can, f as cannot, h as getGate, i as resourceAbilityForMethod, l as Response$1, m as defineGate, n as authorizeMiddleware, o as Policy, p as createGate, r as authorizeResourceMiddleware, s as definePolicy, t as authorizeAllMiddleware, u as authorize, v as AuthorizationException, x as stampCapabilities, y as capabilitiesOf } from "./authorization-CdfbCj8J.js";
4
5
  import { t as trimSlashes } from "./trim-slashes-ZJ_VsY5s.js";
6
+ import { PATH_PARAM_PATTERN, extractPathParamNames } from "./internal/route-path.js";
5
7
  import { a as getRegisteredJobs, c as setQueueDriver, d as getContainer, f as resolve, i as getQueueDriver, l as Container, n as clearJobRegistry, o as registerJob, p as setContainer, r as getJob, s as resolveJobName, t as Job, u as createContainer } from "./Job-BVT813DO.js";
6
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  import { n as ProviderManager, r as ServiceProvider } from "./loopback-guard-D0Kc7-xc.js";
7
9
  import { a as generateAppKey, c as parseAppKey, i as encodeDerivedKey, l as parsePreviousAppKeys, n as deriveAppKey, o as getAppKeyringFromEnv, r as deriveAppKeyring, s as normalizeAppKey, t as MessageSigner } from "./MessageSigner-Bd25ZJAV.js";
8
- import { A as sanitizeOAuthRedirect, B as revokeAllApiTokens, C as createGitHubOAuthProviderConfig, D as exchangeOAuthCode, E as createOAuthState, F as createBearerTokenMiddleware, G as verifyApiToken, H as tokenCan, I as getApiToken, J as normalizeRedirectTarget, K as hostMatchesAllowlist, L as getApiTokenOrFail, M as API_TOKEN_KEY, N as MemoryApiTokenStore, O as fetchOAuthUserProfile, P as createApiToken, R as getUserApiTokens, S as createDiscordOAuthProviderConfig, T as createOAuthManager, U as tokenCanAll, V as revokeApiToken, W as tokenCanAny, X as SessionGuard, Y as AuthManager, _ as MemoryOAuthStateStore, a as isEmailVerified, at as BaseUserProvider, b as buildOAuthAuthorizeUrl, c as verifyEmailToken, ct as MemorySessionStore, d as completePasswordReset, f as createPasswordResetToken, g as NodeHasher, h as AuthenticatableModel, i as createEmailVerificationToken, it as ModelUserProvider, j as verifyOAuthState, k as parseOAuthRedirectUrl, l as MemoryPasswordResetStore, lt as createSessionMiddleware, m as verifyPasswordResetToken, n as buildVerificationUrl, o as parseVerificationUrl, ot as ScryptHasher, p as parsePasswordResetUrl, q as isAppRelativePath, r as completeEmailVerification, s as requireVerifiedEmail, st as AuthenticationException, t as MemoryEmailVerificationStore, u as buildPasswordResetUrl, ut as getSessionFromContext, v as OAUTH_SESSION_BINDING_KEY, w as createGoogleOAuthProviderConfig, x as buildOAuthRedirectUrl, y as OAuthManager, z as parseApiToken } from "./auth-C7sVmYgc.js";
10
+ import { $ as SessionGuard, A as sanitizeOAuthRedirect, B as createBearerTokenMiddleware, C as createGitHubOAuthProviderConfig, D as exchangeOAuthCode, E as createOAuthState, F as AuthManager, G as parseApiToken, H as getApiTokenOrFail, I as TokenGuard, J as revokeApiToken, K as readBearerToken, L as API_TOKEN_KEY, M as hostMatchesAllowlist, N as isAppRelativePath, O as fetchOAuthUserProfile, P as normalizeRedirectTarget, Q as verifyApiToken, R as MemoryApiTokenStore, S as createDiscordOAuthProviderConfig, T as createOAuthManager, U as getUserApiTokens, V as getApiToken, W as hasBearerHeader, X as tokenCanAll, Y as tokenCan, Z as tokenCanAny, _ as MemoryOAuthStateStore, a as isEmailVerified, b as buildOAuthAuthorizeUrl, c as verifyEmailToken, ct as BaseUserProvider, d as completePasswordReset, dt as MemorySessionStore, f as createPasswordResetToken, ft as createSessionMiddleware, g as NodeHasher, h as AuthenticatableModel, i as createEmailVerificationToken, j as verifyOAuthState, k as parseOAuthRedirectUrl, l as MemoryPasswordResetStore, lt as ScryptHasher, m as verifyPasswordResetToken, n as buildVerificationUrl, o as parseVerificationUrl, p as parsePasswordResetUrl, pt as getSessionFromContext, q as revokeAllApiTokens, r as completeEmailVerification, s as requireVerifiedEmail, st as ModelUserProvider, t as MemoryEmailVerificationStore, u as buildPasswordResetUrl, ut as AuthenticationException, v as OAUTH_SESSION_BINDING_KEY, w as createGoogleOAuthProviderConfig, x as buildOAuthRedirectUrl, y as OAuthManager, z as createApiToken } from "./auth-BSUc14CD.js";
11
+ import { n as getAuthContext, t as AUTH_CONTEXT_KEY } from "./context-DoD0c7J_.js";
9
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  import { a as md5, c as sha256, d as verifyPassword, i as hmac, l as sha512, n as hash, o as needsRehash, r as hashPassword, s as secureCompare, t as check, u as verifyHmac } from "./Hash-CzrwKeDp.js";
10
13
  import { r as isMcpEndpointEnabled } from "./endpoint-D-20PiHY.js";
11
14
  import { n as isHotReloadRuntime, r as matchingOpenParen, t as claimHotDisposable } from "./hot-disposables-WsTX2ySN.js";
12
15
  import { a as setI18n, c as tryGetI18n, d as getPluralizationRule, f as pluralizationRules, i as getI18n, l as JsonLoader, n as I18nManager, o as t, p as selectPluralForm, r as createI18n, s as tc, t as MemoryLoader, u as Translator } from "./i18n-mcWi7LCd.js";
13
- import { _ as AuthorizationException, a as Policy, c as Response$1, d as cannot, f as createGate, g as setGate, i as withAuthorization, l as authorize, m as getGate, n as authorizeMiddleware, o as definePolicy, p as defineGate, r as authorizeResourceMiddleware, s as Gate, t as authorizeAllMiddleware, u as can } from "./authorization-Dbcuc5ZK.js";
14
- import { _ as parseImportMap, c as isViteProduction, d as startViteDevServer, g as DEFAULT_DEV_STYLES_ENTRY, h as logDevServerBanner, i as clientManifestCandidates, l as loadViteManifest, m as isWildcardHost, n as INJECTED_CLIENT_MANIFEST_SOURCE, o as getManifestFile, p as formatHostPort, r as PUBLIC_ASSETS_URL_PREFIX, s as injectedClientManifest, u as normalizeDevServerUrl } from "./vite-manifest-BKuV1kfv.js";
16
+ import { _ as parseImportMap, c as isViteProduction, d as startViteDevServer, g as DEFAULT_DEV_STYLES_ENTRY, h as logDevServerBanner, i as clientManifestCandidates, l as loadViteManifest, m as isWildcardHost, n as INJECTED_CLIENT_MANIFEST_SOURCE, o as getManifestFile, p as formatHostPort, r as PUBLIC_ASSETS_URL_PREFIX, s as injectedClientManifest, u as normalizeDevServerUrl } from "./vite-manifest-BGfWbPYp.js";
15
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  import { r as isDocsViewerEnabled } from "./endpoint-D6GIqOpe.js";
16
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  import { t as jsx_runtime_exports } from "./jsx-runtime.js";
19
+ import { readObjectSchema, toJsonSchema } from "./internal/zod-json-schema.js";
17
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  import { a as RequestFinished, c as UserLoggedOut, d as createEventManager, f as Event, i as JobProcessed, l as Listener, n as ApplicationStarted, o as RequestReceived, r as JobFailed, s as UserAuthenticated, t as ApplicationShutdown, u as EventManager } from "./events-aIH_bWRx.js";
18
21
  import { a as RedisStore, i as FileStore, n as createCacheManager, o as MemoryStore, r as TaggedCache, t as CacheManager } from "./cache-BYnZf2FR.js";
19
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  import { a as processJob, c as RedisDriver$1, i as Worker, l as SyncDriver, n as createQueueManager, o as SqsDriver, r as FailedJobReporter, s as createSqsAdapter, t as QueueManager, u as MemoryDriver$1 } from "./queue-CXrRK85G.js";
20
23
  import { a as MailManager, c as MemoryTransport, i as setMailManager, l as ResendTransport, n as getMailManager, o as createMailManager, r as mail, s as LogTransport, t as Mail, u as SmtpTransport } from "./mail-DfEfSQEr.js";
21
24
  import { a as DailyFileChannel, c as Logger, i as setLogManager, l as filterSensitiveData, n as createLogManager, o as FileChannel, r as getLogManager, s as ConsoleChannel, t as LogManager, u as LOG_LEVEL_PRIORITY } from "./logging-CPaRMuPP.js";
22
25
  import { a as NotificationManager, c as setNotificationManager, d as getNotification, f as registerNotification, i as MailChannel, l as resolveNotifiableType, n as SlackChannel, o as createNotificationManager, p as Notification, r as DatabaseChannel, s as getNotificationManager, t as MemoryChannel, u as clearNotificationRegistry } from "./notifications-BGqmUNZ8.js";
26
+ import { a as setBroadcastManager, c as PresenceChannel, i as getBroadcastManager, l as PrivateChannel, n as BroadcastManager, o as RedisDriver, r as createBroadcastManager, s as MemoryDriver, t as createTypedBroadcaster, u as Channel } from "./broadcasting-BxU-LIfF.js";
23
27
  import { a as random, c as randomHex, d as sample, f as shuffle, i as pick, l as randomInt, m as uuid, n as generatePassword, o as randomBase64, p as urlSafeToken, r as generateSlug, s as randomBase64Url, t as generateOtp, u as randomString } from "./Random-DbIJ22KQ.js";
24
28
  import { a as decrypt, c as getEncrypter, i as createEncrypter, l as setEncrypter, n as verifySignedUrl, o as encrypt, r as Encrypter, s as generateKey, t as signUrl } from "./encryption-DJtkkhiw.js";
25
29
  import { a as LocalDriver, i as S3Driver, n as createStorageManager, o as warnOnce, r as MemoryDriver$2, t as StorageManager } from "./storage-TLD9t0Q2.js";
@@ -104,32 +108,35 @@ function mountRoute(app, method, path, ...handlers) {
104
108
  app.on(method, path, ...handlers);
105
109
  }
106
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  //#endregion
107
- //#region src/http/middleware/capabilities.ts
111
+ //#region src/internal/agent-preflight.ts
108
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  /**
109
- * Internal security-capability marker (RFC 0007).
113
+ * The wire protocol of an agent preflight (RFC 0016 §5.4), in a leaf module
114
+ * so the two halves can share it without depending on each other.
110
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  *
111
- * Built-in middleware factories stamp the handlers they return so tooling
112
- * that holds the real function objects (the router registry, `guren audit`
113
- * via route loading) can recognize what a handler enforces without name
114
- * heuristics. `Symbol.for()` keeps the key identical across duplicated
115
- * `@guren/server` copies in one process.
116
+ * `Router` mounts the seam that answers a preflight; `agent/dispatch` builds
117
+ * the request that asks for one and reads the answer back. Putting the names
118
+ * in either of those would make one import the other — today only
119
+ * `dispatch → Router` exists, and the day `Router` needs anything from
120
+ * `agent/` that becomes a cycle.
116
121
  *
117
- * Deliberately not part of the public API: nothing here is exported from
118
- * the package root, and the shape may change in any release. A public
119
- * `defineMiddleware` integration is future work in RFC 0007.
122
+ * Not exported from the package index: an external dispatcher asks for a
123
+ * preflight through `BuildToolRequestOptions.preflight`, and the header
124
+ * spelling is this seam's business, not published API.
120
125
  */
121
- const CAPABILITIES = Symbol.for("guren.capabilities");
122
- function stampCapabilities(handler, capabilities) {
123
- Object.defineProperty(handler, CAPABILITIES, {
124
- value: capabilities,
125
- enumerable: false
126
- });
127
- return handler;
128
- }
129
- function capabilitiesOf(handler) {
130
- if (typeof handler !== "function") return void 0;
131
- return handler[CAPABILITIES];
132
- }
126
+ /** Request header asking the route for a verdict instead of an execution. */
127
+ const AGENT_PREFLIGHT_HEADER = "X-Guren-Agent-Preflight";
128
+ /**
129
+ * Response header marking a body as a preflight verdict rather than the
130
+ * route's own output.
131
+ *
132
+ * Load-bearing in two places that would otherwise mistake one for the other:
133
+ * a route's `output` schema validation (which would reject the verdict and
134
+ * turn it into a 500) and the MCP response mapping (which would advertise the
135
+ * verdict as the tool's `structuredContent`, so an SDK client validates it
136
+ * against the tool's output schema and throws). Both are answering the same
137
+ * question — "is this the route's result?" — so both read the same marker.
138
+ */
139
+ const AGENT_PREFLIGHT_VERDICT_HEADER = "X-Guren-Agent-Preflight-Verdict";
133
140
  //#endregion
134
141
  //#region src/mvc/Router.ts
135
142
  function normalizeModelBinding(binding) {
@@ -146,6 +153,19 @@ async function resolveModelBinding({ model, key }, value) {
146
153
  return key === void 0 ? model.findOrFail(value) : model.findOrFail(value, key);
147
154
  }
148
155
  /**
156
+ * One immutable snapshot of agent metadata, taken when the metadata is
157
+ * attached and again when `definitions()` hands it out — so neither a caller
158
+ * mutating its options object after registration nor a consumer mutating a
159
+ * definition can change the agent metadata the router actually holds. The
160
+ * claim is scoped to this field: other definition fields (`schemas`, the
161
+ * spread OpenAPI metadata) alias the registry. Plain data end to end, so
162
+ * `structuredClone` keeps future nested fields covered without a
163
+ * hand-maintained field list.
164
+ */
165
+ function cloneAgentMetadata(metadata) {
166
+ return structuredClone(metadata);
167
+ }
168
+ /**
149
169
  * Group scopes are unwound synchronously, so an `async` callback registers its
150
170
  * routes after the scope has already been popped — silently dropping the
151
171
  * prefix or middleware the group was opened with. The callback type says
@@ -297,12 +317,23 @@ var Router = class {
297
317
  resource(path, controller, options = {}) {
298
318
  const baseName = options.name ?? path.replace(/^\//u, "").replace(/\//gu, ".");
299
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  const paramName = options.param ?? "id";
300
- const { only, except } = options;
301
- for (const { method, suffix, httpMethod } of RESOURCE_ACTIONS) {
320
+ const { only, except, agent } = options;
321
+ const registrable = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
322
+ for (const { method } of RESOURCE_ACTIONS) {
302
323
  if (only && !only.includes(method)) continue;
303
324
  if (except?.includes(method)) continue;
325
+ if (typeof controller.prototype[method] === "function") registrable.add(method);
326
+ }
327
+ if (agent) {
328
+ const orphaned = Object.keys(agent).filter((action) => agent[action] !== void 0 && !registrable.has(action));
329
+ if (orphaned.length > 0) throw new Error(`Router.resource('${path}'): agent metadata declared for ${orphaned.map((a) => `"${a}"`).join(", ")}, but no such route was registered (excluded via only/except, or missing from the controller). Agent metadata for a tool that cannot exist is a wiring mistake.`);
330
+ }
331
+ for (const { method, suffix, httpMethod } of RESOURCE_ACTIONS) {
332
+ if (!registrable.has(method)) continue;
304
333
  const routePath = path + suffix.replace(":param", `:${paramName}`);
305
- if (typeof controller.prototype[method] === "function") this[httpMethod](routePath, [controller, method]).name(`${baseName}.${method}`);
334
+ const builder = this[httpMethod](routePath, [controller, method]).name(`${baseName}.${method}`);
335
+ const agentMetadata = agent?.[method];
336
+ if (agentMetadata) builder.agent(agentMetadata);
306
337
  }
307
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  return this;
308
339
  }
@@ -312,17 +343,12 @@ var Router = class {
312
343
  const handler = resolveHandler(route.handler, this.modelBindings, options.container, route.bindings, route.path);
313
344
  const contractMiddleware = createContractValidationMiddleware(route);
314
345
  const inlineMiddlewares = [...route.scopedMiddlewares, ...route.middlewares];
315
- const allMiddlewares = contractMiddleware ? [
316
- ...resolvedMiddlewares,
317
- ...inlineMiddlewares,
318
- contractMiddleware,
319
- handler
320
- ] : [
321
- ...resolvedMiddlewares,
322
- ...inlineMiddlewares,
323
- handler
324
- ];
325
- mountRoute(app, route.method, route.path, ...allMiddlewares);
346
+ const preflightMiddleware = createAgentPreflightMiddleware(route, () => this.aggregateCapabilities(route.routeMiddlewareNames, inlineMiddlewares));
347
+ const chain = [...resolvedMiddlewares, ...inlineMiddlewares];
348
+ if (contractMiddleware) chain.push(contractMiddleware);
349
+ if (preflightMiddleware) chain.push(preflightMiddleware);
350
+ chain.push(handler);
351
+ mountRoute(app, route.method, route.path, ...chain);
326
352
  }
327
353
  }
328
354
  clear() {
@@ -337,12 +363,13 @@ var Router = class {
337
363
  this.modelBindings.clear();
338
364
  }
339
365
  definitions() {
340
- return this.registry.map(({ method, path, name, schemas, resource, openapi, routeMiddlewareNames, middlewares, scopedMiddlewares, handler, bindings }) => ({
366
+ return this.registry.map(({ method, path, name, schemas, resource, openapi, routeMiddlewareNames, middlewares, scopedMiddlewares, handler, bindings, agent }) => ({
341
367
  method,
342
368
  path,
343
369
  name,
344
370
  schemas,
345
371
  resource: serializeResourceHint(resource),
372
+ agent: agent ? cloneAgentMetadata(agent) : void 0,
346
373
  middlewareNames: [...routeMiddlewareNames],
347
374
  hasInlineMiddleware: middlewares.length > 0,
348
375
  capabilities: this.aggregateCapabilities(routeMiddlewareNames, [...scopedMiddlewares, ...middlewares]),
@@ -405,26 +432,30 @@ var Router = class {
405
432
  * thrown: `definitions()` must stay side-effect-free for introspection of
406
433
  * routers that never mount (audit, codegen), and an unresolvable alias
407
434
  * simply contributes no capabilities.
435
+ *
436
+ * This walks the chain; the rules for combining what it finds live with the
437
+ * capability type, in `mergeCapabilities`.
408
438
  */
409
- aggregateCapabilities(names, inline, seen) {
439
+ aggregateCapabilities(names, inline, seen, seenStamps) {
410
440
  const aggregated = {};
411
441
  const visited = seen ?? /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
412
- const absorb = (capabilities) => {
413
- const auth = capabilities?.authentication;
414
- if (!auth) return;
415
- if (!aggregated.authentication || auth.mode === "required") aggregated.authentication = auth;
442
+ const merged = seenStamps ?? /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
443
+ const absorbStamp = (stamp) => {
444
+ if (!stamp || merged.has(stamp)) return;
445
+ merged.add(stamp);
446
+ mergeCapabilities(aggregated, stamp);
416
447
  };
417
448
  for (const name of names) {
418
449
  if (visited.has(name)) continue;
419
450
  visited.add(name);
420
451
  const groupNames = this.middlewareGroups.get(name);
421
452
  if (groupNames) {
422
- absorb(this.aggregateCapabilities(groupNames, [], visited));
453
+ mergeCapabilities(aggregated, this.aggregateCapabilities(groupNames, [], visited, merged));
423
454
  continue;
424
455
  }
425
- absorb(capabilitiesOf(this.middlewareAliases.get(name)));
456
+ absorbStamp(capabilitiesOf(this.middlewareAliases.get(name)));
426
457
  }
427
- for (const handler of inline) absorb(capabilitiesOf(handler));
458
+ for (const handler of inline) absorbStamp(capabilitiesOf(handler));
428
459
  return aggregated;
429
460
  }
430
461
  resolveMiddlewareNames(names, seen) {
@@ -465,6 +496,7 @@ function applyRouteContract(route, options) {
465
496
  deprecated: options.deprecated
466
497
  };
467
498
  if (options.bind) route.bindings = new Map(Object.entries(options.bind).map(([param, binding]) => [param, normalizeModelBinding(binding)]));
499
+ if (options.agent) route.agent = cloneAgentMetadata(options.agent);
468
500
  }
469
501
  var RouterMiddlewareGroupBuilder = class {
470
502
  router;
@@ -513,14 +545,14 @@ function createRouteBuilder(route, namedRoutes) {
513
545
  route.routeMiddlewareNames.push(...names);
514
546
  route.middlewares.push(...handlers);
515
547
  return this;
548
+ },
549
+ agent(metadata) {
550
+ if (route.agent) throw new Error(`Route ${route.method} ${route.path} already carries agent metadata (declared via route options or an earlier .agent() call). Declare it once.`);
551
+ route.agent = cloneAgentMetadata(metadata);
552
+ return this;
516
553
  }
517
554
  };
518
555
  }
519
- const PATH_PARAM_PATTERN = /(^|\/):([A-Za-z0-9_-]+\*?)(?:\{[^{}]*\{[^{}]*\}[^{}]*\}|\{[^{}]*\})?\??/gu;
520
- /** Param labels in path order, with constraints and modifiers dropped. */
521
- function extractPathParamNames(path) {
522
- return Array.from(path.matchAll(PATH_PARAM_PATTERN), (match) => match[2]);
523
- }
524
556
  function substituteParams(path, params) {
525
557
  return path.replace(PATH_PARAM_PATTERN, (match, prefix, key) => {
526
558
  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(params, key)) return match;
@@ -533,7 +565,7 @@ function createContractHandler(path, options, handler) {
533
565
  if (params instanceof Response) return params;
534
566
  const query = parseRouteSegment(options.query, flattenRequestQueries(ctx), 422);
535
567
  if (query instanceof Response) return query;
536
- const payload = options.body ? await parseRequestPayload(ctx) : {};
568
+ const payload = options.body ? await parseRequestBody(ctx) : {};
537
569
  const body = parseRouteSegment(options.body, payload, 422);
538
570
  if (body instanceof Response) return body;
539
571
  const result = await handler({
@@ -603,6 +635,67 @@ function throwOnInvalid(schema, data) {
603
635
  const result = schema.safeParse(data);
604
636
  if (!result.success) throw ValidationException.withMessages(formatValidationErrors(result.error));
605
637
  }
638
+ /**
639
+ * The preflight seam: everything a request must pass before the handler runs,
640
+ * reported instead of executed.
641
+ *
642
+ * Mounted last, so the whole chain in front of it has already run — an
643
+ * unauthenticated call is a 401 and an unauthorized one a 403 from the real
644
+ * middleware, not from a second copy of the rule here. Reaching this point is
645
+ * itself the positive half of the verdict; what it adds is validating the
646
+ * contract the *tool advertised* and then stopping, so an agent can ask "would
647
+ * this be allowed" without the write happening.
648
+ *
649
+ * **Only routes declaring `.agent()` honour the header.** A non-agent route
650
+ * ignores it completely, so no ordinary endpoint changes behaviour on a header
651
+ * an arbitrary client can set; the surface is exactly what RFC 0016 defines.
652
+ *
653
+ * Body validation happens *here* rather than being left to the controller's
654
+ * `validateBody()`: the chain stops before the controller by construction, so
655
+ * the alternative is a verdict that silently never checked the body — the
656
+ * shape of the request an agent is most likely to get wrong. Reading the body
657
+ * is safe precisely because this branch does not call `next()`, so nothing
658
+ * downstream reads the stream after it.
659
+ *
660
+ * What it cannot check, it says. A route may authorize inside its action
661
+ * (`await this.authorize(...)`), which `guren check` accepts as satisfying the
662
+ * agent-route authorization rule — and which this seam structurally cannot
663
+ * reach, because the action never runs. So `allowed: true` means "passed
664
+ * everything that runs before the handler", and `unverified` names what a real
665
+ * call would still evaluate. Reporting a bare `allowed: true` for a route
666
+ * whose only authorization lives in its body would be the verdict claiming a
667
+ * check it never made.
668
+ */
669
+ function createAgentPreflightMiddleware(route, capabilities) {
670
+ if (!route.agent) return null;
671
+ const schemas = route.schemas;
672
+ const unverified = capabilities().authorization === void 0 ? ["authorization"] : [];
673
+ return async (c, next) => {
674
+ if (c.req.header("X-Guren-Agent-Preflight") === void 0) return next();
675
+ const validated = [];
676
+ if (schemas?.params) {
677
+ throwOnInvalid(schemas.params, c.req.param());
678
+ validated.push("params");
679
+ }
680
+ if (schemas?.query) {
681
+ throwOnInvalid(schemas.query, flattenRequestQueries(c));
682
+ validated.push("query");
683
+ }
684
+ if (schemas?.body) {
685
+ throwOnInvalid(schemas.body, await parseRequestBody(c));
686
+ validated.push("body");
687
+ }
688
+ c.header(AGENT_PREFLIGHT_VERDICT_HEADER, "1");
689
+ return c.json({
690
+ preflight: true,
691
+ allowed: true,
692
+ route: route.name,
693
+ validated,
694
+ unverified,
695
+ message: "Preflight only: the request passed this route's middleware" + (validated.length > 0 ? ` and its ${validated.join(", ")} schema${validated.length > 1 ? "s" : ""}` : "") + ". The handler did not run, so nothing was created, changed, or deleted." + (unverified.length > 0 ? " No authorization middleware was found on this route, so any check inside the handler itself was not evaluated." : "")
696
+ });
697
+ };
698
+ }
606
699
  function createContractValidationMiddleware(route) {
607
700
  if (!isControllerAction(route.handler)) return null;
608
701
  const schemas = route.schemas;
@@ -611,7 +704,8 @@ function createContractValidationMiddleware(route) {
611
704
  if (schemas.params) throwOnInvalid(schemas.params, c.req.param());
612
705
  if (schemas.query) throwOnInvalid(schemas.query, flattenRequestQueries(c));
613
706
  await next();
614
- if (schemas.output && c.res) {
707
+ const isSuccess = c.res !== void 0 && c.res.status >= 200 && c.res.status < 300;
708
+ if (schemas.output && isSuccess && c.res.headers.get("X-Guren-Agent-Preflight-Verdict") === null) {
615
709
  let sourceBody;
616
710
  let parsedBody;
617
711
  try {
@@ -731,10 +825,13 @@ function serializeBindings(path, routeBindings, routerBindings) {
731
825
  function serializeResourceHint(hint) {
732
826
  if (hint === void 0) return;
733
827
  if (typeof hint === "function") return hint.name || void 0;
828
+ if (typeof hint !== "object" || hint === null) return;
734
829
  if (Array.isArray(hint)) {
735
830
  const inner = serializeResourceHint(hint[0]);
736
831
  return inner === void 0 ? void 0 : [inner];
737
832
  }
833
+ const proto = Object.getPrototypeOf(hint);
834
+ if (proto !== Object.prototype && proto !== null) return;
738
835
  const entries = [];
739
836
  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(hint)) {
740
837
  const serialized = serializeResourceHint(value);
@@ -748,7 +845,7 @@ function isControllerAction(action) {
748
845
  }
749
846
  function isRouteContractOptions(value) {
750
847
  if (!value || typeof value !== "object" || Array.isArray(value)) return false;
751
- return "params" in value || "query" in value || "body" in value || "output" in value || "resource" in value || "bind" in value || "name" in value || "middlewares" in value || "summary" in value || "description" in value || "tags" in value || "operationId" in value || "deprecated" in value;
848
+ return "params" in value || "query" in value || "body" in value || "output" in value || "resource" in value || "bind" in value || "name" in value || "middlewares" in value || "agent" in value || "summary" in value || "description" in value || "tags" in value || "operationId" in value || "deprecated" in value;
752
849
  }
753
850
  function joinPaths(prefixStack, path) {
754
851
  const segments = [...prefixStack, path].filter(Boolean).map(trimSlashes).filter(Boolean);
@@ -942,6 +1039,36 @@ function isMcpEndpointRequest(path) {
942
1039
  return path === "/_guren/mcp" && isMcpEndpointEnabled();
943
1040
  }
944
1041
  /**
1042
+ * A bearer-authenticated request that carries no cookies at all (RFC 0016
1043
+ * §3). CSRF defends cookie ambient authority — a browser attaching the
1044
+ * victim's cookies to a request the victim never made. A request that
1045
+ * authenticates by `Authorization: Bearer` and sends no `Cookie` header has
1046
+ * none to attach: the token is the client's own credential, deliberately
1047
+ * presented, and a browser cannot strip its cookies from a cross-site
1048
+ * request. Agent tool dispatch is the intended caller — it synthesizes
1049
+ * cookie-less bearer requests by construction.
1050
+ *
1051
+ * The predicate is the raw `Cookie` header, deliberately not the loaded
1052
+ * session. Ambient authority *requires a cookie*, so the header's absence is
1053
+ * proof by itself — independent of where this middleware sits relative to
1054
+ * the session mount. A session-based predicate reads as more precise and is
1055
+ * weaker on both edges: mounted before the session middleware it sees no
1056
+ * session and fails open for a cookie-carrying victim browser, and an
1057
+ * intermediate middleware that writes one value into a fresh session turns a
1058
+ * genuinely cookie-less client into a 403. Any cookie — even one this app
1059
+ * never reads — therefore keeps verification on; a bearer client that wants
1060
+ * the skip sends none, which is what every non-browser client does.
1061
+ *
1062
+ * Bearer detection is `hasBearerHeader`, the same predicate
1063
+ * `AuthManager.resolveGuardName` routes a request to the token guard by, so
1064
+ * this rule and token authentication cannot disagree about what a bearer
1065
+ * request is.
1066
+ */
1067
+ function isBearerRequestWithoutCookies(ctx) {
1068
+ if (!hasBearerHeader(ctx)) return false;
1069
+ return ctx.req.header("Cookie") === void 0;
1070
+ }
1071
+ /**
945
1072
  * Get the request's CSRF token.
946
1073
  *
947
1074
  * Signed token bound to the session when a stable one exists, otherwise a
@@ -1049,6 +1176,9 @@ async function getTokenFromRequest(ctx) {
1049
1176
  * those sessions expire
1050
1177
  * - Exempts the dev-only MCP endpoint while it is mounted, since agent
1051
1178
  * clients cannot fetch a token first (it guards local-only access instead)
1179
+ * - Skips verification for `Authorization: Bearer` requests that carry no
1180
+ * cookies (RFC 0016) — token clients authenticate per request and hold no
1181
+ * cookie ambient authority for CSRF to defend
1052
1182
  *
1053
1183
  * `cookie: false` disables the `XSRF-TOKEN` cookie for apps that deliver the
1054
1184
  * token themselves (meta tag / form field). Session-bound tokens still
@@ -1087,7 +1217,7 @@ function createCsrfMiddleware(options = {}) {
1087
1217
  settleCookie(ctx);
1088
1218
  return;
1089
1219
  }
1090
- if (isExcluded$1(path, exclude) || isMcpEndpointRequest(path)) {
1220
+ if (isExcluded$1(path, exclude) || isMcpEndpointRequest(path) || isBearerRequestWithoutCookies(ctx)) {
1091
1221
  await next();
1092
1222
  settleCookie(ctx);
1093
1223
  return;
@@ -1137,7 +1267,7 @@ function getValidatedData(ctx) {
1137
1267
  function validateRequest(schema, options = {}) {
1138
1268
  const { onError, status = 422, fallbackMessage = "The provided data is invalid." } = options;
1139
1269
  return async (ctx, next) => {
1140
- const payload = await parseRequestPayload(ctx);
1270
+ const payload = await parseRequestBody(ctx);
1141
1271
  const result = schema.safeParse(payload);
1142
1272
  if (!result.success) {
1143
1273
  const errors = formatValidationErrors(result.error, fallbackMessage);
@@ -1164,7 +1294,7 @@ function validateRequestWith(schemaFactory, options = {}) {
1164
1294
  const { onError, status = 422, fallbackMessage = "The provided data is invalid." } = options;
1165
1295
  return async (ctx, next) => {
1166
1296
  const schema = schemaFactory(ctx);
1167
- const payload = await parseRequestPayload(ctx);
1297
+ const payload = await parseRequestBody(ctx);
1168
1298
  const result = schema.safeParse(payload);
1169
1299
  if (!result.success) {
1170
1300
  const errors = formatValidationErrors(result.error, fallbackMessage);
@@ -2040,7 +2170,6 @@ function jsonResponse(data, status = 200) {
2040
2170
  }
2041
2171
  //#endregion
2042
2172
  //#region src/http/middleware/auth.ts
2043
- const AUTH_CONTEXT_KEY = "guren:auth";
2044
2173
  const TESTING_USER_HEADER = "x-testing-user";
2045
2174
  function resolveTestingUser(ctx) {
2046
2175
  if (!process.env.GUREN_TESTING) return null;
@@ -2081,13 +2210,10 @@ function attachAuthContext(contextFactory) {
2081
2210
  await next();
2082
2211
  };
2083
2212
  }
2084
- function resolveAuth(ctx) {
2085
- return ctx.get(AUTH_CONTEXT_KEY);
2086
- }
2087
2213
  function requireAuthenticated(options = {}) {
2088
2214
  const { redirectTo, status = 401, responseFactory } = options;
2089
2215
  return stampCapabilities(async (ctx, next) => {
2090
- const auth = resolveAuth(ctx);
2216
+ const auth = getAuthContext(ctx);
2091
2217
  if (!auth) throw new Error("Auth context has not been attached. Did you register the auth middleware?");
2092
2218
  if (!await auth.check()) {
2093
2219
  if (redirectTo) return ctx.redirect(redirectTo);
@@ -2100,7 +2226,7 @@ function requireAuthenticated(options = {}) {
2100
2226
  function requireGuest(options = {}) {
2101
2227
  const { redirectTo, status = 403, responseFactory } = options;
2102
2228
  return stampCapabilities(async (ctx, next) => {
2103
- const auth = resolveAuth(ctx);
2229
+ const auth = getAuthContext(ctx);
2104
2230
  if (!auth) throw new Error("Auth context has not been attached. Did you register the auth middleware?");
2105
2231
  if (!await auth.guest()) {
2106
2232
  if (redirectTo) return ctx.redirect(redirectTo);
@@ -3578,7 +3704,7 @@ var Application = class {
3578
3704
  await this.providerManager.registerAll();
3579
3705
  await this.options.boot?.(this.hono);
3580
3706
  await this.mountRoutes();
3581
- await this.mountDevEndpoint(isMcpEndpointEnabled(), async () => (await import("./McpServiceProvider-D6D9nhgn.js").then((n) => n.n)).McpServiceProvider, "GUREN_MCP=1 but the MCP endpoint could not load — is @modelcontextprotocol/sdk installed?");
3707
+ await this.mountDevEndpoint(isMcpEndpointEnabled(), async () => (await import("./McpServiceProvider-BawsYjgN.js").then((n) => n.n)).McpServiceProvider, "GUREN_MCP=1 but the MCP endpoint could not load — is @modelcontextprotocol/sdk installed?");
3582
3708
  await this.mountDevEndpoint(isDocsViewerEnabled(), async () => (await import("./DocsViewerServiceProvider-qFCaeiUv.js")).DocsViewerServiceProvider, "GUREN_DOCS=1 but the docs viewer could not load — is @guren/cli resolvable from this app?");
3583
3709
  await this.providerManager.bootAll();
3584
3710
  }
@@ -3985,7 +4111,7 @@ var Controller = class {
3985
4111
  * ```
3986
4112
  */
3987
4113
  async file(name) {
3988
- const value = (await this.ctx.req.parseBody({ all: true }))[name];
4114
+ const value = (await this.parseUploads())[name];
3989
4115
  const candidate = Array.isArray(value) ? value[0] : value;
3990
4116
  return candidate instanceof File && candidate.size > 0 ? candidate : null;
3991
4117
  }
@@ -3994,11 +4120,43 @@ var Controller = class {
3994
4120
  * Returns an empty array when none were uploaded.
3995
4121
  */
3996
4122
  async files(name) {
3997
- const value = (await this.ctx.req.parseBody({ all: true }))[name];
4123
+ const value = (await this.parseUploads())[name];
3998
4124
  return (Array.isArray(value) ? value : value !== void 0 ? [value] : []).filter((item) => item instanceof File && item.size > 0);
3999
4125
  }
4126
+ /**
4127
+ * The one multipart read behind {@link file} and {@link files}, guarded so a
4128
+ * body the parser cannot decode carries no files rather than crashing the
4129
+ * request: it reads as `{}`, which is the same answer both helpers already
4130
+ * give for a field that is simply absent — `null` and `[]`. Left to throw,
4131
+ * the parser's `TypeError` escaped as a 500 reporting the exception and a
4132
+ * stack, the defect {@link parseRequestBody} fixes for the validation paths.
4133
+ *
4134
+ * Deliberately *not* routed through `parseRequestBody()`, which looks like
4135
+ * the same rule and is not: it parses without `{ all: true }` and flattens a
4136
+ * repeated field to its first value, so sharing it would silently reduce
4137
+ * `files()` to one file per field. `{ all: true }` is the contract here, and
4138
+ * a malformed-body test cannot see its loss — hence the separate helper.
4139
+ *
4140
+ * try/catch rather than `.catch()`, for the reason given on the shared
4141
+ * fallback: `parseBody` may throw synchronously as well as reject, and only
4142
+ * one of those two shapes reaches a `.catch()`.
4143
+ *
4144
+ * It fails open in one direction, deliberately and for the same reason
4145
+ * {@link parseRequestBody} does: a body already consumed upstream reads as
4146
+ * "no upload" rather than throwing, so a middleware-ordering bug loses the
4147
+ * 500 that used to announce it. Telling that apart from a client's malformed
4148
+ * body means matching runtime-specific error codes, which answer differently
4149
+ * on Bun, Node and Workers.
4150
+ */
4151
+ async parseUploads() {
4152
+ try {
4153
+ return await this.ctx.req.parseBody({ all: true });
4154
+ } catch {
4155
+ return {};
4156
+ }
4157
+ }
4000
4158
  get auth() {
4001
- const auth = this.ctx.get(AUTH_CONTEXT_KEY);
4159
+ const auth = getAuthContext(this.ctx);
4002
4160
  if (!auth) throw new Error("Controller auth helper requires the auth middleware. Make sure AuthServiceProvider is registered.");
4003
4161
  return auth;
4004
4162
  }
@@ -4057,7 +4215,7 @@ var Controller = class {
4057
4215
  return getGate().forUser(await this.gateUser()).allows(ability, ...args);
4058
4216
  }
4059
4217
  async gateUser() {
4060
- const auth = this.ctx.get(AUTH_CONTEXT_KEY);
4218
+ const auth = getAuthContext(this.ctx);
4061
4219
  if (!auth) return null;
4062
4220
  return await auth.user();
4063
4221
  }
@@ -4271,8 +4429,7 @@ var Controller = class {
4271
4429
  * ```
4272
4430
  */
4273
4431
  async validateBody(schema) {
4274
- const body = await this.getBody();
4275
- return this.runValidation(schema, body);
4432
+ return this.runValidation(schema, await this.getRawBody());
4276
4433
  }
4277
4434
  /**
4278
4435
  * Validate query parameters against a Zod-like schema.
@@ -4313,8 +4470,7 @@ var Controller = class {
4313
4470
  * ```
4314
4471
  */
4315
4472
  async validateBodySafe(schema) {
4316
- const body = await this.getBody();
4317
- return this.runValidationSafe(schema, body);
4473
+ return this.runValidationSafe(schema, await this.getRawBody());
4318
4474
  }
4319
4475
  /**
4320
4476
  * Validate query parameters against a Zod-like schema without throwing.
@@ -4352,14 +4508,32 @@ var Controller = class {
4352
4508
  errors
4353
4509
  };
4354
4510
  }
4511
+ /**
4512
+ * The parsed body as sent: an array stays an array, a string stays a string.
4513
+ * Only validation reads it — a schema is what decides whether the shape is
4514
+ * acceptable, so narrowing first would make a non-object contract
4515
+ * unreachable.
4516
+ *
4517
+ * Memoized in a box rather than by truthiness: a body of `null`, `''`, `0`
4518
+ * or `false` is a parsed body, and re-reading the request would find the
4519
+ * stream consumed.
4520
+ *
4521
+ * No fallback of its own: an unparseable body already arrives here as `{}`
4522
+ * from {@link parseRequestBody}, which is what gives every dispatch path the
4523
+ * same answer. A second fallback here could only diverge from that one.
4524
+ */
4525
+ async getRawBody() {
4526
+ if (this.parsedBody) return this.parsedBody.value;
4527
+ this.parsedBody = { value: await parseRequestBody(this.ctx) };
4528
+ return this.parsedBody.value;
4529
+ }
4530
+ /**
4531
+ * The record view of {@link getRawBody}, for the field-by-field helpers
4532
+ * (`input`, `only`, `except`, `has`). A non-object body has no field to
4533
+ * read, so it reads as `{}`.
4534
+ */
4355
4535
  async getBody() {
4356
- if (this.parsedBody) return this.parsedBody;
4357
- try {
4358
- this.parsedBody = await parseRequestPayload(this.ctx);
4359
- } catch {
4360
- this.parsedBody = {};
4361
- }
4362
- return this.parsedBody;
4536
+ return asRecord(await this.getRawBody());
4363
4537
  }
4364
4538
  };
4365
4539
  //#endregion
@@ -4436,6 +4610,763 @@ function viteAsset(entry, options = {}) {
4436
4610
  return manifestAssetUrl(manifest, normalizedEntry);
4437
4611
  }
4438
4612
  //#endregion
4613
+ //#region src/agent/derive.ts
4614
+ /** HTTP methods whose semantics are read-only, per the MCP annotation defaults. */
4615
+ const READ_ONLY_METHODS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["GET", "QUERY"]);
4616
+ /** HTTP methods that are idempotent whether or not they are read-only. */
4617
+ const IDEMPOTENT_METHODS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
4618
+ "GET",
4619
+ "QUERY",
4620
+ "PUT",
4621
+ "DELETE"
4622
+ ]);
4623
+ /**
4624
+ * Derive the agent tools a set of route definitions exposes.
4625
+ *
4626
+ * @param definitions Registered routes, as `Router.definitions()` hands them out.
4627
+ */
4628
+ function deriveAgentTools(definitions) {
4629
+ const tools = [];
4630
+ const warnings = [];
4631
+ const claimed = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
4632
+ for (const definition of definitions) {
4633
+ const agent = definition.agent;
4634
+ if (!agent) continue;
4635
+ const method = definition.method.toUpperCase();
4636
+ const where = `${method} ${definition.path}`;
4637
+ if (!definition.name) {
4638
+ warnings.push(`${where}: declares agent metadata but has no route name, so it is not exposed as a tool. Chain .name() on the route — the tool name is its identity.`);
4639
+ continue;
4640
+ }
4641
+ const routeName = definition.name;
4642
+ const toolName = agent.toolName ?? routeName;
4643
+ const existing = claimed.get(toolName);
4644
+ if (existing) {
4645
+ warnings.push(`${toolName}: ${where} (route "${routeName}") claims a tool name already derived from ${existing.method} ${existing.path} (route "${existing.routeName}") — the later route is not exposed. Give one of them a distinct agent toolName.`);
4646
+ continue;
4647
+ }
4648
+ const toolWarnings = [];
4649
+ const readOnlyHint = agent.readOnlyHint ?? READ_ONLY_METHODS.has(method);
4650
+ const input = buildInputSchema(definition, method, toolWarnings);
4651
+ const tool = {
4652
+ toolName,
4653
+ routeName,
4654
+ method,
4655
+ path: definition.path,
4656
+ description: agent.description ?? definition.description ?? definition.summary,
4657
+ inputSchema: input.schema,
4658
+ inputSources: input.sources,
4659
+ inputBodyNested: input.nestedBody,
4660
+ outputSchema: buildOutputSchema(definition, method, toolWarnings),
4661
+ resource: definition.schemas?.output ? void 0 : definition.resource,
4662
+ annotations: {
4663
+ readOnlyHint,
4664
+ destructiveHint: agent.destructiveHint ?? !readOnlyHint,
4665
+ idempotentHint: agent.idempotentHint ?? IDEMPOTENT_METHODS.has(method)
4666
+ },
4667
+ authorization: deriveAuthorization(definition, method),
4668
+ approval: agent.approval,
4669
+ redact: agent.redact ? [...agent.redact] : void 0,
4670
+ expose: {
4671
+ mcp: agent.expose?.mcp ?? true,
4672
+ webMcp: agent.expose?.webMcp ?? true
4673
+ },
4674
+ warnings: toolWarnings
4675
+ };
4676
+ claimed.set(toolName, tool);
4677
+ tools.push(tool);
4678
+ for (const warning of toolWarnings) warnings.push(`${toolName}: ${warning}`);
4679
+ }
4680
+ return {
4681
+ tools,
4682
+ warnings
4683
+ };
4684
+ }
4685
+ function buildInputSchema(definition, method, warnings) {
4686
+ const label = `${method} ${definition.path}`;
4687
+ const merged = {
4688
+ properties: Object.create(null),
4689
+ required: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(),
4690
+ owner: /* @__PURE__ */ new Map()
4691
+ };
4692
+ const pathParamNames = extractPathParamNames(definition.path);
4693
+ const paramsDetails = definition.schemas?.params ? readObjectSchema(definition.schemas.params, warnings, `${label} params`, "input") : void 0;
4694
+ if (paramsDetails) mergeProperties(merged, paramsDetails.properties, paramsDetails.required, "params", warnings);
4695
+ const supplements = Object.create(null);
4696
+ const supplementRequired = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
4697
+ for (const name of pathParamNames) {
4698
+ if (merged.owner.has(name)) continue;
4699
+ supplements[name] = { type: "string" };
4700
+ supplementRequired.add(name);
4701
+ }
4702
+ mergeProperties(merged, supplements, supplementRequired, "path", warnings);
4703
+ const queryDetails = definition.schemas?.query ? readObjectSchema(definition.schemas.query, warnings, `${label} query`, "input") : void 0;
4704
+ if (queryDetails) mergeProperties(merged, queryDetails.properties, queryDetails.required, "query", warnings);
4705
+ let nestedBody = false;
4706
+ const body = definition.schemas?.body ? toJsonSchema(definition.schemas.body, warnings, `${label} body`, "input") : void 0;
4707
+ if (body) {
4708
+ if (body.type === "object" && body.properties) mergeProperties(merged, body.properties, new Set(body.required ?? []), "body", warnings);
4709
+ else {
4710
+ mergeProperties(merged, { body }, /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["body"]), "body", warnings);
4711
+ nestedBody = true;
4712
+ }
4713
+ }
4714
+ for (const name of pathParamNames) if (name in merged.properties) merged.required.add(name);
4715
+ const required = Array.from(merged.required);
4716
+ const sources = Object.create(null);
4717
+ for (const [name, source] of merged.owner) sources[name] = source;
4718
+ return {
4719
+ schema: {
4720
+ type: "object",
4721
+ properties: { ...merged.properties },
4722
+ ...required.length > 0 ? { required } : {}
4723
+ },
4724
+ sources: { ...sources },
4725
+ nestedBody
4726
+ };
4727
+ }
4728
+ /**
4729
+ * Fold one source's properties into the merge. A collision replaces both the
4730
+ * property *and* its required-ness — carrying a losing source's `required`
4731
+ * forward would demand a key the advertised schema no longer describes.
4732
+ */
4733
+ function mergeProperties(merged, properties, required, source, warnings) {
4734
+ for (const [name, schema] of Object.entries(properties)) {
4735
+ const previous = merged.owner.get(name);
4736
+ if (previous) warnings.push(`input key "${name}" is declared by both the ${previous} and the ${source} schema; the ${source} definition wins. Rename one — merged tool input has one namespace.`);
4737
+ merged.properties[name] = schema;
4738
+ merged.owner.set(name, source);
4739
+ merged.required.delete(name);
4740
+ if (required.has(name)) merged.required.add(name);
4741
+ }
4742
+ }
4743
+ /**
4744
+ * The route's `output` schema, which is the only response shape validated at
4745
+ * runtime — so advertising it costs no new machinery. A `resource` hint is the
4746
+ * next rung of RFC 0016's ladder and is CLI-only: `definitions()` carries
4747
+ * class names, and the type text behind them exists solely in the CLI's AST
4748
+ * extraction.
4749
+ */
4750
+ function buildOutputSchema(definition, method, warnings) {
4751
+ const output = definition.schemas?.output;
4752
+ if (!output) return void 0;
4753
+ return toJsonSchema(output, warnings, `${method} ${definition.path} response`, "output");
4754
+ }
4755
+ /**
4756
+ * The ability a route's middleware chain checks, when the stamped capability
4757
+ * says so unambiguously (RFC 0007's `MiddlewareCapabilities.authorization`).
4758
+ *
4759
+ * Everything else is omitted rather than guessed — `'any'`/`'mixed'`, several
4760
+ * abilities, an `abilityFor` callback that overrides the verb map, a custom
4761
+ * verb the map refuses, or a definition from a server old enough to carry no
4762
+ * capabilities at all. Absence means "undetermined", which is what lets
4763
+ * `guren check`'s "authn is not authz" rule fail closed on it instead of
4764
+ * reading a name that was never checked.
4765
+ */
4766
+ function deriveAuthorization(definition, method) {
4767
+ const authorization = definition.capabilities?.authorization;
4768
+ if (!authorization) return void 0;
4769
+ if (authorization.resource) {
4770
+ if (!authorization.resource.fromMethodMap) return void 0;
4771
+ if (authorization.abilities.length > 0 || authorization.mode !== "all") return void 0;
4772
+ const ability = resourceAbilityForMethod(method);
4773
+ return ability ? { ability } : void 0;
4774
+ }
4775
+ if (authorization.abilities.length === 1 && authorization.mode === "all") return { ability: authorization.abilities[0] };
4776
+ }
4777
+ //#endregion
4778
+ //#region src/agent/dispatch.ts
4779
+ /** How many characters of a non-JSON response body survive into the result. */
4780
+ const TEXT_RESPONSE_CAP = 5e4;
4781
+ /**
4782
+ * The argument-level spelling of a preflight request (RFC 0016 §5.4), for a
4783
+ * surface whose callers pass flat arguments rather than dispatch options.
4784
+ *
4785
+ * No adapter strips it today: MCP does not offer preflight at all (see
4786
+ * `mapToolResponse` and the plugin), and the surfaces that do reach the seam
4787
+ * ask through `BuildToolRequestOptions.preflight`. A surface that adopts this
4788
+ * key owns the stripping — it is an instruction to the adapter, not a field of
4789
+ * any route's contract, and forwarding it would fail the very validation the
4790
+ * caller asked to rehearse.
4791
+ */
4792
+ const PREFLIGHT_ARGUMENT = "_preflight";
4793
+ /**
4794
+ * Rebuild the HTTP request a tool call describes.
4795
+ *
4796
+ * The flat argument object is taken apart along `tool.inputSources` — the
4797
+ * derivation's own record of which contract each property came from — so a
4798
+ * POST route's `query` keys land in the query string where `validateQuery`
4799
+ * reads them, not in the body. Keys the derivation never advertised are
4800
+ * forwarded anyway (body for body-carrying methods, query otherwise): the
4801
+ * route's validator is the one place that rejects them, and dropping them
4802
+ * here would make this a second, quieter validator.
4803
+ *
4804
+ * GET and HEAD force everything into the query string whatever its source —
4805
+ * `Request` refuses a body on those methods, and a `body` schema on a GET
4806
+ * route is a contract defect this adapter cannot repair.
4807
+ */
4808
+ function buildToolRequest(tool, args, options = {}) {
4809
+ const origin = options.origin ?? "http://localhost";
4810
+ const missing = [];
4811
+ const invalidPath = [];
4812
+ const pathOnly = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
4813
+ const path = tool.path.replace(PATH_PARAM_PATTERN, (_match, lead, name) => {
4814
+ const value = args[name];
4815
+ if (value === void 0) {
4816
+ missing.push(name);
4817
+ return `${lead}:${name}`;
4818
+ }
4819
+ const stringified = String(value);
4820
+ if (stringified === "." || stringified === "..") {
4821
+ invalidPath.push(name);
4822
+ return `${lead}:${name}`;
4823
+ }
4824
+ const source = sourceOf(tool, name);
4825
+ if (source === void 0 || source === "params" || source === "path") pathOnly.add(name);
4826
+ return `${lead}${encodeURIComponent(stringified)}`;
4827
+ });
4828
+ if (missing.length > 0) return { missing };
4829
+ if (invalidPath.length > 0) return { invalidPath };
4830
+ const method = tool.method;
4831
+ const bodyless = method === "GET" || method === "HEAD";
4832
+ const query = new URLSearchParams();
4833
+ const bodyEntries = [];
4834
+ for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(args)) {
4835
+ if (pathOnly.has(key) || value === void 0) continue;
4836
+ const source = sourceOf(tool, key);
4837
+ if (bodyless || source === "query" || source === "params" || source === "path" || tool.inputBodyNested && key !== "body") appendQueryValue(query, key, value);
4838
+ else bodyEntries.push([key, value]);
4839
+ }
4840
+ const headers = new Headers({
4841
+ Accept: "application/json",
4842
+ "X-Guren-Agent-Surface": "mcp"
4843
+ });
4844
+ if (options.authorization) headers.set("Authorization", options.authorization);
4845
+ if (options.preflight) headers.set(AGENT_PREFLIGHT_HEADER, "1");
4846
+ let body;
4847
+ if (!bodyless) {
4848
+ if (tool.inputBodyNested) {
4849
+ if (Object.hasOwn(args, "body")) body = JSON.stringify(args.body);
4850
+ } else if (bodyEntries.length > 0) body = JSON.stringify(accumulate(bodyEntries));
4851
+ }
4852
+ if (body !== void 0) headers.set("Content-Type", "application/json");
4853
+ const qs = query.toString();
4854
+ const url = `${origin}${path}${qs ? `?${qs}` : ""}`;
4855
+ return { request: new Request(url, {
4856
+ method,
4857
+ headers,
4858
+ body
4859
+ }) };
4860
+ }
4861
+ /**
4862
+ * The contract a property was declared under, or undefined if the derivation
4863
+ * never advertised it. `Object.hasOwn` rather than a plain read: a JSON
4864
+ * argument may legally be named `__proto__`, and `inputSources['__proto__']`
4865
+ * would otherwise resolve to `Object.prototype`, not undefined.
4866
+ */
4867
+ function sourceOf(tool, name) {
4868
+ return Object.hasOwn(tool.inputSources, name) ? tool.inputSources[name] : void 0;
4869
+ }
4870
+ /** Primitives stringify; anything structured rides as JSON text. */
4871
+ function appendQueryValue(query, key, value) {
4872
+ if (Array.isArray(value)) {
4873
+ for (const element of value) query.append(key, serializeQueryScalar(element));
4874
+ return;
4875
+ }
4876
+ query.append(key, serializeQueryScalar(value));
4877
+ }
4878
+ function serializeQueryScalar(value) {
4879
+ if (value === null || typeof value !== "object") return String(value);
4880
+ return JSON.stringify(value);
4881
+ }
4882
+ /**
4883
+ * Null-prototype accumulator, spread back to plain: a JSON argument may
4884
+ * legally be named `__proto__`, and assigning that key on `{}` invokes the
4885
+ * prototype setter instead of defining the property — the same rule the
4886
+ * derivation and the redaction walk apply.
4887
+ */
4888
+ function accumulate(entries) {
4889
+ const record = Object.create(null);
4890
+ for (const [key, value] of entries) record[key] = value;
4891
+ return { ...record };
4892
+ }
4893
+ /**
4894
+ * Whether the tool advertises an object output schema — the only kind MCP
4895
+ * lists, and therefore the only kind that obliges a success result to carry
4896
+ * `structuredContent`. A route whose `output` is an array or primitive is not
4897
+ * advertised as structured (MCP `outputSchema` must be an object), so its
4898
+ * results ride as text. `describeTool` and `mapToolResponse` must agree on
4899
+ * this exact predicate, or one advertises a schema the other cannot satisfy.
4900
+ */
4901
+ function advertisesStructuredOutput(tool) {
4902
+ return tool.outputSchema?.type === "object";
4903
+ }
4904
+ /**
4905
+ * Map the application's response onto an MCP tool result (RFC 0016 §3.4).
4906
+ *
4907
+ * - 2xx JSON object → serialized text, plus `structuredContent` when the tool
4908
+ * advertises an object `outputSchema` (the one shape the route validated).
4909
+ * - 2xx Inertia page JSON → unwrapped to `page.props`, only for a tool with
4910
+ * no `outputSchema` — unwrap and schema are mutually exclusive by
4911
+ * derivation, so the advertised shape can never disagree with the result.
4912
+ * - 204 / 3xx → a status line naming the Location; not an error.
4913
+ * - 4xx / 5xx → `isError: true` carrying the exception handler's JSON body:
4914
+ * a 422's `{ message, errors }` is an application-level failure the agent
4915
+ * should read, not a protocol error.
4916
+ * - non-JSON → capped text.
4917
+ *
4918
+ * One MCP invariant overrides the table: a *non-error* result for a tool that
4919
+ * advertises an object `outputSchema` must carry `structuredContent`, or the
4920
+ * SDK client rejects it after the route has already run. A success response
4921
+ * that yields no object to put there (204, 3xx, non-JSON, a non-object body)
4922
+ * contradicts the route's own declared output, so it becomes an `isError`
4923
+ * result naming the mismatch — which the SDK exempts from the rule — rather
4924
+ * than a protocol fault the agent cannot interpret.
4925
+ */
4926
+ async function mapToolResponse(tool, response) {
4927
+ const status = response.status;
4928
+ const structured = advertisesStructuredOutput(tool);
4929
+ if (status === 204 || status >= 300 && status < 400) {
4930
+ const location = response.headers.get("Location");
4931
+ const text = location ? `HTTP ${status} (Location: ${location})` : `HTTP ${status}`;
4932
+ if (structured) return inconsistentOutput(tool, text, status);
4933
+ return {
4934
+ content: [{
4935
+ type: "text",
4936
+ text
4937
+ }],
4938
+ status
4939
+ };
4940
+ }
4941
+ const raw = await response.text();
4942
+ if (status >= 400) return {
4943
+ content: [{
4944
+ type: "text",
4945
+ text: raw || `HTTP ${status}`
4946
+ }],
4947
+ isError: true,
4948
+ status
4949
+ };
4950
+ const parsed = parseJsonBody(response, raw);
4951
+ if (parsed === void 0) {
4952
+ const text = raw.length > TEXT_RESPONSE_CAP ? `${raw.slice(0, TEXT_RESPONSE_CAP)}… [truncated ${raw.length - TEXT_RESPONSE_CAP} characters]` : raw;
4953
+ if (structured) return inconsistentOutput(tool, `a non-JSON body (${text.slice(0, 200)})`, status);
4954
+ return {
4955
+ content: [{
4956
+ type: "text",
4957
+ text
4958
+ }],
4959
+ status
4960
+ };
4961
+ }
4962
+ if (response.headers.get("X-Guren-Agent-Preflight-Verdict") !== null) return {
4963
+ content: [{
4964
+ type: "text",
4965
+ text: JSON.stringify(parsed)
4966
+ }],
4967
+ status
4968
+ };
4969
+ const payload = unwrapInertiaProps(tool, response, parsed);
4970
+ if (structured && !isRecord(payload)) return inconsistentOutput(tool, `a ${Array.isArray(payload) ? "JSON array" : typeof payload} body`, status);
4971
+ const outcome = {
4972
+ content: [{
4973
+ type: "text",
4974
+ text: JSON.stringify(payload)
4975
+ }],
4976
+ status
4977
+ };
4978
+ if (structured && isRecord(payload)) outcome.structuredContent = payload;
4979
+ return outcome;
4980
+ }
4981
+ /**
4982
+ * A success response that cannot satisfy the tool's advertised object output
4983
+ * schema. Returned as an error result — the honest signal that the route and
4984
+ * its declared `output` disagree — which also sidesteps the SDK's
4985
+ * structuredContent requirement (errors are exempt).
4986
+ */
4987
+ function inconsistentOutput(tool, detail, status) {
4988
+ return {
4989
+ content: [{
4990
+ type: "text",
4991
+ text: `The tool "${tool.toolName}" advertises an output schema, but the route returned ${detail} (HTTP ${status}) — no structured result could be produced.`
4992
+ }],
4993
+ isError: true,
4994
+ status
4995
+ };
4996
+ }
4997
+ function parseJsonBody(response, raw) {
4998
+ if (!(response.headers.get("Content-Type") ?? "").includes("json") || raw === "") return void 0;
4999
+ try {
5000
+ return JSON.parse(raw);
5001
+ } catch {
5002
+ return;
5003
+ }
5004
+ }
5005
+ function unwrapInertiaProps(tool, response, parsed) {
5006
+ if (tool.outputSchema) return parsed;
5007
+ if (response.headers.get("X-Inertia") !== "true") return parsed;
5008
+ if (!isRecord(parsed) || !("props" in parsed)) return parsed;
5009
+ return parsed.props;
5010
+ }
5011
+ function isRecord(value) {
5012
+ return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
5013
+ }
5014
+ //#endregion
5015
+ //#region src/agent/scopes.ts
5016
+ /**
5017
+ * The scope grammar an API token's `abilities` use to reach agent tools
5018
+ * (RFC 0016 §5.1).
5019
+ *
5020
+ * Four forms, and deliberately no more — a grammar an agent-facing consent
5021
+ * screen has to render is only useful if a human can read a scope and say
5022
+ * which tools it grants:
5023
+ *
5024
+ * - `tool:<name>` one tool, by exact name
5025
+ * - `tools:read` every tool whose resolved `readOnlyHint` is true
5026
+ * - `tools:*` every tool
5027
+ * - `tools:<prefix>.*` every tool named `<prefix>.…`
5028
+ *
5029
+ * **Only `tool:` / `tools:` entries are considered.** Every other ability an
5030
+ * `ApiToken` carries — including the store's default `['*']` — is ignored, so
5031
+ * it matches nothing. This is the fail-closed half of a deliberate split:
5032
+ *
5033
+ * - A token issued before agent tools existed, for an app's own API, holds
5034
+ * `['*']`. Reading that as "all agent tools" would silently hand every
5035
+ * already-issued token the whole agent surface the moment an app declares
5036
+ * its first `.agent()` route. Access to the agent surface is granted by an
5037
+ * explicit tool scope or not at all (default deny, RFC §5.1); `tools:*` is
5038
+ * the explicit way to say "everything".
5039
+ * - A malformed entry is likewise ignored here rather than throwing: this
5040
+ * module judges an already-issued token, and a token that cannot be parsed
5041
+ * must grant less, never more. Rejecting a bad scope belongs to the
5042
+ * *issuer* (`token:issue`, a later PR), which runs {@link parseToolScope}
5043
+ * over what it was asked for and refuses a `null`.
5044
+ *
5045
+ * Matching is case-sensitive and entries are not trimmed. A stored ability
5046
+ * with stray whitespace is an issuance bug; normalizing it here would make
5047
+ * the judge more permissive than the issuer, which is the wrong direction.
5048
+ */
5049
+ /**
5050
+ * The MCP tool-name grammar (SEP-986), which a `tool:` scope names and a
5051
+ * `tools:<prefix>.*` scope has to stay inside — a scope that could not
5052
+ * possibly name a legal tool is not a scope.
5053
+ *
5054
+ * `packages/cli/src/agent-route-check.ts` holds the same pattern for the
5055
+ * check that fails a build over an illegal tool name. Collapsing the two onto
5056
+ * this export is a later change, not this one: the CLI reaches `@guren/server`
5057
+ * through `dist/`, so the collapse needs a built server and belongs with the
5058
+ * PR that does the build-order work.
5059
+ *
5060
+ * Note what the charset gives for free: `*` is not in it, so `tool:posts.*`
5061
+ * fails the test and needs no special case to be rejected.
5062
+ */
5063
+ const AGENT_TOOL_NAME_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,128}$/;
5064
+ /** `tool:` scope prefix, including the separator. */
5065
+ const SINGLE_PREFIX = "tool:";
5066
+ /** `tools:` scope prefix, including the separator. */
5067
+ const SET_PREFIX = "tools:";
5068
+ /** The reserved `tools:` word granting every read-only tool. */
5069
+ const READ_KEYWORD = "read";
5070
+ /** The reserved `tools:` word granting every tool. */
5071
+ const ALL_KEYWORD = "*";
5072
+ /** Wildcard suffix of a prefix scope, dot included. */
5073
+ const PREFIX_SUFFIX = ".*";
5074
+ /**
5075
+ * Parse one `abilities` entry.
5076
+ *
5077
+ * @returns The scope it denotes, or `null` for an entry that is not a tool
5078
+ * scope at all (`'*'`, an app's own ability name) and for one that is
5079
+ * malformed (`tools:`, `tools:.*`, `tools:*.store`, a prefix outside the
5080
+ * tool-name grammar). Callers cannot tell those apart on purpose: both mean
5081
+ * "grants no tool", and a judge that distinguished them would be inventing
5082
+ * a third answer for a two-valued question.
5083
+ *
5084
+ * Note the two reserved `tools:` words are matched before the wildcard form,
5085
+ * so a tool family literally named `read.…` is still reachable as
5086
+ * `tools:read.*`, while a tool named exactly `read` is reachable only as
5087
+ * `tool:read` — the reserved word wins its own spelling.
5088
+ */
5089
+ function parseToolScope(entry) {
5090
+ if (entry.startsWith(SINGLE_PREFIX)) {
5091
+ const name = entry.slice(5);
5092
+ return AGENT_TOOL_NAME_PATTERN.test(name) ? {
5093
+ kind: "tool",
5094
+ name
5095
+ } : null;
5096
+ }
5097
+ if (!entry.startsWith(SET_PREFIX)) return null;
5098
+ const rest = entry.slice(6);
5099
+ if (rest === READ_KEYWORD) return { kind: "read" };
5100
+ if (rest === ALL_KEYWORD) return { kind: "all" };
5101
+ if (!rest.endsWith(PREFIX_SUFFIX)) return null;
5102
+ const prefix = rest.slice(0, -2);
5103
+ if (!AGENT_TOOL_NAME_PATTERN.test(prefix)) return null;
5104
+ return {
5105
+ kind: "prefix",
5106
+ prefix
5107
+ };
5108
+ }
5109
+ /** Whether one parsed scope covers a given tool. */
5110
+ function scopeAllowsTool(scope, tool) {
5111
+ switch (scope.kind) {
5112
+ case "tool": return scope.name === tool.name;
5113
+ case "read": return tool.readOnly;
5114
+ case "all": return true;
5115
+ case "prefix": return tool.name.startsWith(`${scope.prefix}.`);
5116
+ default: return scope;
5117
+ }
5118
+ }
5119
+ /**
5120
+ * Whether a token's abilities grant a tool. Any one entry suffices — scopes
5121
+ * are additive, and there is no deny form.
5122
+ */
5123
+ function scopesAllowTool(abilities, tool) {
5124
+ for (const entry of abilities) {
5125
+ const scope = parseToolScope(entry);
5126
+ if (scope && scopeAllowsTool(scope, tool)) return true;
5127
+ }
5128
+ return false;
5129
+ }
5130
+ /**
5131
+ * The concrete tool names a token's abilities grant, for the surfaces that
5132
+ * have to show a human what a scope means: the OAuth consent screen, the
5133
+ * `token:issue` confirmation, and the issuance-time lint.
5134
+ *
5135
+ * Literally a filter over {@link scopesAllowTool}, and it must stay one. A
5136
+ * second matcher that walked entries and accumulated names is how a consent
5137
+ * screen comes to list a tool the dispatcher then denies — the two answers
5138
+ * have to be the same answer, not two implementations of one rule.
5139
+ *
5140
+ * @returns Names in the order the tools were given, so a caller controls the
5141
+ * display order by ordering its input.
5142
+ */
5143
+ function expandToolScopes(abilities, tools) {
5144
+ return tools.filter((tool) => scopesAllowTool(abilities, tool)).map((tool) => tool.name);
5145
+ }
5146
+ //#endregion
5147
+ //#region src/agent/events.ts
5148
+ /**
5149
+ * The audit trail of the agent surface (RFC 0016 §5.2): every tool invocation
5150
+ * and every denial, as framework events, so an application forwards them
5151
+ * wherever it already forwards events instead of learning a second logging
5152
+ * API.
5153
+ *
5154
+ * Declarations only. Nothing here emits — the dispatch path does, once, at
5155
+ * the one place that knows the verdict — and nothing here redacts:
5156
+ * {@link AgentToolInvoked.arguments} is a *contract* that the emitter has
5157
+ * already run the arguments through `redactAgentArguments`. An event class
5158
+ * that redacted on construction would give a second, quieter redaction rule
5159
+ * beside the real one, and a listener has no way to tell a masked payload
5160
+ * from an unmasked one.
5161
+ */
5162
+ /**
5163
+ * Emitted when an agent tool invocation completed — successfully or not.
5164
+ * `status` carries the HTTP status the dispatch resolved to, so an error
5165
+ * response is one of these rather than a separate event; a call that never
5166
+ * reached the handler is an {@link AgentToolDenied} instead.
5167
+ */
5168
+ var AgentToolInvoked = class extends Event {
5169
+ principal;
5170
+ tool;
5171
+ status;
5172
+ durationMs;
5173
+ surface;
5174
+ /**
5175
+ * The invocation arguments **already redacted** by the emitter (see the
5176
+ * module header). Assigned in the body rather than declared as a
5177
+ * constructor parameter property: `arguments` is not a legal binding
5178
+ * identifier in strict mode, which every ES module is, though it is a
5179
+ * perfectly legal property name.
5180
+ */
5181
+ arguments;
5182
+ constructor(principal, tool, redactedArguments, status, durationMs, surface) {
5183
+ super();
5184
+ this.principal = principal;
5185
+ this.tool = tool;
5186
+ this.status = status;
5187
+ this.durationMs = durationMs;
5188
+ this.surface = surface;
5189
+ this.arguments = redactedArguments;
5190
+ }
5191
+ };
5192
+ /**
5193
+ * Emitted when an agent tool invocation was refused. Carries no status or
5194
+ * duration: nothing ran, and {@link AgentToolDenialReason} is the finding.
5195
+ * `'approval'` covers a tool declaring `approval: 'required'` whose call
5196
+ * became a pending record instead of an execution.
5197
+ */
5198
+ var AgentToolDenied = class extends Event {
5199
+ principal;
5200
+ tool;
5201
+ reason;
5202
+ surface;
5203
+ /** Redacted by the emitter, exactly as on {@link AgentToolInvoked}. */
5204
+ arguments;
5205
+ constructor(principal, tool, redactedArguments, reason, surface) {
5206
+ super();
5207
+ this.principal = principal;
5208
+ this.tool = tool;
5209
+ this.reason = reason;
5210
+ this.surface = surface;
5211
+ this.arguments = redactedArguments;
5212
+ }
5213
+ };
5214
+ //#endregion
5215
+ //#region src/agent/redact.ts
5216
+ /**
5217
+ * Argument masking for the agent audit trail (RFC 0016 §5.2).
5218
+ *
5219
+ * Agent tool arguments are logged by default, which is only safe if the
5220
+ * logging path masks the fields that must not be written down. Two sources,
5221
+ * unioned: a fixed list of sensitive key *fragments* every application gets
5222
+ * without asking, and the route's own `.agent({ redact })` metadata.
5223
+ *
5224
+ * The rule is deliberately blunt — a key matches when its lowercased name
5225
+ * *contains* a fragment, and that applies to the declared `redact` entries
5226
+ * too, not just the built-ins. So `redact: ['id']` also masks `userId`, and
5227
+ * the built-in `session` masks `sessionCount`. Over-redaction is the safe
5228
+ * direction for a log: a masked field that did not need masking costs a
5229
+ * debugging round trip, an unmasked credential costs a rotation.
5230
+ *
5231
+ * The walk is total for the same reason the derivation is: it runs while
5232
+ * *recording* what happened, including a denial taken before the route's own
5233
+ * validation, so it must not be the thing that throws. A cycle and a payload
5234
+ * nested past {@link MAX_DEPTH} both terminate with a marker.
5235
+ */
5236
+ /**
5237
+ * The replacement written in place of a masked value. A string, so a redacted
5238
+ * record still serializes as JSON and reads the same in every sink.
5239
+ */
5240
+ const AGENT_REDACTED = "[REDACTED]";
5241
+ /**
5242
+ * Written in place of a value that closes a cycle, so a self-referencing
5243
+ * argument object produces a finite record instead of throwing or hanging.
5244
+ * Distinct from {@link AGENT_REDACTED} on purpose: one says "we would not show
5245
+ * you", the other "there is nothing further here to show".
5246
+ */
5247
+ const AGENT_CIRCULAR = "[Circular]";
5248
+ /**
5249
+ * Written in place of a value nested deeper than {@link MAX_DEPTH}.
5250
+ */
5251
+ const AGENT_TRUNCATED = "[Truncated]";
5252
+ /**
5253
+ * How deep the walk goes before it stops descending.
5254
+ *
5255
+ * A cycle is not the only way an argument record ends recursion badly: a
5256
+ * deeply nested one ends it with a `RangeError`. That matters here more than
5257
+ * in an ordinary utility, because this is the *audit* path and a denial is
5258
+ * recorded before the route's own schema validation has run — an argument
5259
+ * payload that overflows the stack would throw inside the code writing the
5260
+ * record about it, suppressing the very `AgentToolDenied` that says a
5261
+ * hostile call arrived. Truncating keeps the record.
5262
+ *
5263
+ * Far past anything a tool input schema describes; a record this deep is
5264
+ * already unreadable in a log.
5265
+ */
5266
+ const MAX_DEPTH = 64;
5267
+ /**
5268
+ * Key-name fragments masked in every application. Spelled in the normalized
5269
+ * form {@link normalizeKeyText} produces — lowercase, no separators — so
5270
+ * `Authorization`, `apiKey`, `API_KEY` and `x-api-key` are all covered by
5271
+ * their one entry.
5272
+ */
5273
+ const DEFAULT_SENSITIVE_KEY_FRAGMENTS = [
5274
+ "password",
5275
+ "passphrase",
5276
+ "secret",
5277
+ "token",
5278
+ "apikey",
5279
+ "authorization",
5280
+ "credential",
5281
+ "cookie",
5282
+ "session"
5283
+ ];
5284
+ /**
5285
+ * The form keys and fragments are compared in: lowercased, with separator
5286
+ * characters removed. `apiKey`, `api_key`, `api-key` and `X-Api-Key` are the
5287
+ * same name to a human reading a log, so they must be the same name to the
5288
+ * mask — a literal substring test lets the hyphenated spelling of a fragment
5289
+ * through, and header-shaped argument names (`x-api-key`) are exactly where
5290
+ * credentials live. Applied to declared `redact` entries too, so a route
5291
+ * author writes any spelling.
5292
+ */
5293
+ function normalizeKeyText(text) {
5294
+ return text.toLowerCase().replace(/[-_\s]/gu, "");
5295
+ }
5296
+ /**
5297
+ * Mask the sensitive fields of an agent tool's arguments.
5298
+ *
5299
+ * Returns a deep copy: the input is never mutated, and a caller may keep
5300
+ * holding the unredacted original. The copy is deep only through the
5301
+ * structures this walks — plain objects and arrays. Anything else (a `Date`,
5302
+ * a `Map`, a `Set`, a class instance) is carried across as the *same
5303
+ * reference*, because copying it would need a rule per type and would still
5304
+ * get the exotic cases wrong; nothing below such a value is inspected, so a
5305
+ * credential hidden inside a class instance is masked only if the key holding
5306
+ * that instance matches. Tool arguments arrive as parsed JSON on every
5307
+ * surface, where this case does not occur; a caller synthesizing arguments in
5308
+ * process is the one that can hit it.
5309
+ *
5310
+ * @param args The invocation arguments. Walked as a record whatever its
5311
+ * prototype, so the return is always a fresh plain object.
5312
+ * @param redact Extra key fragments from the route's `.agent({ redact })`.
5313
+ */
5314
+ function redactAgentArguments(args, redact) {
5315
+ if (args === null || typeof args !== "object") return {};
5316
+ const fragments = [...DEFAULT_SENSITIVE_KEY_FRAGMENTS];
5317
+ for (const entry of redact ?? []) {
5318
+ const fragment = normalizeKeyText(entry);
5319
+ if (fragment.length > 0) fragments.push(fragment);
5320
+ }
5321
+ return redactRecord(args, fragments, new WeakSet([args]), 0);
5322
+ }
5323
+ /** Whether a key name should have its value masked. */
5324
+ function isSensitiveKey(key, fragments) {
5325
+ const normalized = normalizeKeyText(key);
5326
+ return fragments.some((fragment) => normalized.includes(fragment));
5327
+ }
5328
+ /**
5329
+ * Copy one object's entries, masking sensitive keys.
5330
+ *
5331
+ * Accumulates on a null-prototype object: an argument named `__proto__`
5332
+ * survives `JSON.parse` as an own property, and assigning that key on a
5333
+ * plain `{}` invokes the prototype setter instead of defining a property —
5334
+ * the value would vanish from the record, and a crafted payload would be
5335
+ * reaching the prototype chain from inside the logging path. The result is
5336
+ * then spread onto a normal object so a consumer calling `hasOwnProperty` on
5337
+ * it works; spread *defines* own properties (`Object.assign` would assign
5338
+ * them, putting the `__proto__` hazard straight back).
5339
+ */
5340
+ function redactRecord(source, fragments, ancestors, depth) {
5341
+ const accumulator = Object.create(null);
5342
+ for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(source)) accumulator[key] = isSensitiveKey(key, fragments) ? AGENT_REDACTED : redactValue(value, fragments, ancestors, depth + 1);
5343
+ return { ...accumulator };
5344
+ }
5345
+ /** Copy one value, masking the sensitive keys anywhere beneath it. */
5346
+ function redactValue(value, fragments, ancestors, depth) {
5347
+ if (value === null || typeof value !== "object") return value;
5348
+ if (!isWalkable(value)) return value;
5349
+ if (depth > MAX_DEPTH) return AGENT_TRUNCATED;
5350
+ if (ancestors.has(value)) return AGENT_CIRCULAR;
5351
+ ancestors.add(value);
5352
+ try {
5353
+ if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map((element) => redactValue(element, fragments, ancestors, depth + 1));
5354
+ return redactRecord(value, fragments, ancestors, depth);
5355
+ } finally {
5356
+ ancestors.delete(value);
5357
+ }
5358
+ }
5359
+ /**
5360
+ * Whether a value is a structure this walks: an array, or an object with no
5361
+ * prototype or the plain one. Everything else is carried across by reference
5362
+ * (see {@link redactAgentArguments}).
5363
+ */
5364
+ function isWalkable(value) {
5365
+ if (Array.isArray(value)) return true;
5366
+ const prototype = Object.getPrototypeOf(value);
5367
+ return prototype === null || prototype === Object.prototype;
5368
+ }
5369
+ //#endregion
4439
5370
  //#region src/providers/OAuthServiceProvider.ts
4440
5371
  /**
4441
5372
  * Binds OAuthManager as a singleton in the container.
@@ -4877,7 +5808,7 @@ var FormRequest = class {
4877
5808
  * true, because an unawaited call is a pending promise.
4878
5809
  */
4879
5810
  async user() {
4880
- return await this.ctx.get("guren:auth")?.user() ?? null;
5811
+ return await getAuthContext(this.ctx)?.user() ?? null;
4881
5812
  }
4882
5813
  /**
4883
5814
  * Handle the form request: authorize, parse body, validate, return typed data.
@@ -8173,4 +9104,4 @@ var DefaultHasher = class {
8173
9104
  //#region src/index.ts
8174
9105
  ensureErrorStackTracePolyfill();
8175
9106
  //#endregion
8176
- export { API_TOKEN_KEY, AUTH_CONTEXT_KEY, Application, ApplicationShutdown, ApplicationStarted, AuthManager, Response$1 as AuthResponse, AuthServiceProvider, AuthenticatableModel, AuthenticationException, AuthorizationException, AuthorizationServiceProvider, AutoDiscovery, BaseFactory, BaseFactory as Factory, BaseSeeder, BaseSeeder as Seeder, BaseUserProvider, BroadcastManager, BroadcastServiceProvider, BufferedOutput, CSP_NONCE_KEY, CSRF_FORM_FIELD, CSRF_HEADER_NAME, CSRF_TOKEN_KEY, CacheCheck, CacheManager, CacheServiceProvider, Channel, Command, ConsoleChannel, ConsoleKernel, Container, Controller, CursorPaginator, CustomCheck, DailyFileChannel, DatabaseChannel, DatabaseCheck, DefaultHasher, DefaultHasher as Hash, Encrypter, EncryptionServiceProvider, ErrorServiceProvider, Event, EventManager, EventServiceProvider, ExceptionHandler, FailedJobReporter, FieldValidator, FileStore as FileCacheStore, FileChannel, FormRequest, Gate, HealthCheck, HealthManager, HealthServiceProvider, HttpException, I18nManager, I18nServiceProvider, InertiaServiceProvider, Input, Job, JobFailed, JobProcessed, JsonLoader, JsonResource, LOCALE_CONTEXT_KEY, LOG_LEVEL_PRIORITY, Listener, LocalDriver as LocalStorageDriver, LogManager, LogServiceProvider, LogTransport, Logger, Mail, MailChannel, MailManager, MailServiceProvider, MemoryApiTokenStore, MemoryDriver as MemoryBroadcastDriver, MemoryStore as MemoryCacheStore, MemoryChannel, MemoryCheck, MemoryDriver$1 as MemoryDriver, MemoryDriver$1 as MemoryQueueDriver, MemoryEmailVerificationStore, MemoryLoader, MemoryOAuthStateStore, MemoryPasswordResetStore, MemoryRateLimitStore, MemorySessionStore, MemoryDriver$2 as MemoryStorageDriver, MemoryTransport, MessageSigner, MethodNotAllowedException, ModelUserProvider, NodeHasher, NotFoundHttpException, Notification, NotificationManager, NotificationServiceProvider, OAUTH_SESSION_BINDING_KEY, OAuthManager, OAuthServiceProvider, Output, Paginator, PendingSchedule, Policy, PresenceChannel, PrivateChannel, ProviderManager, QueueManager, QueueServiceProvider, RedisDriver as RedisBroadcastDriver, RedisStore as RedisCacheStore, RedisCheck, RedisDriver$1 as RedisDriver, RedisDriver$1 as RedisQueueDriver, RequestFinished, RequestReceived, ResendTransport, Resource, ResourceCollection, Router, S3Driver, Schedule, ScheduledTask, Scheduler, SchedulingServiceProvider, ScryptHasher, SeederRunner, ServiceProvider, SessionGuard, SlackChannel, SlidingWindowRateLimitStore, SmtpTransport, SqsDriver, StorageCheck, StorageManager, StorageServiceProvider, SyncDriver, SyncDriver as SyncQueueDriver, TaggedCache, Translator, UserAuthenticated, UserLoggedOut, VALIDATED_DATA_KEY, ValidationException, Validator, ViewEngine, Worker, abort, abortIf, abortUnless, after, afterOrEqual, alpha, alphaDash, alphaNum, array as arrayRule, attachAuthContext, authorize as authorizeAbility, authorizeAllMiddleware, authorizeMiddleware, authorizeResourceMiddleware, before, beforeOrEqual, between, boolean as booleanRule, buildOAuthAuthorizeUrl, buildOAuthRedirectUrl, buildPasswordResetUrl, buildVerificationUrl, can, cannot, check as checkHash, clearJobRegistry, clearNotificationRegistry, collect, completeEmailVerification, completePasswordReset, confirmed, createApiToken, createApp, createBearerTokenMiddleware, createBroadcastManager, createCacheManager, createConsoleKernel, createContainer, createCorsMiddleware, createCspMiddleware, createCsrfMiddleware, createDiscordOAuthProviderConfig, createEmailVerificationToken, createEncrypter, createEventManager, createExceptionHandler, createFacade, createFacades, createForceHttpsMiddleware, createGate, createGitHubOAuthProviderConfig, createGoogleOAuthProviderConfig, createHealthManager, createHostAuthorizationMiddleware, createI18n, createLogManager, createMailManager, createNotificationManager, createOAuthManager, createOAuthState, createPasswordResetToken, createQueueManager, createRateLimitMiddleware, createRedirectSafetyMiddleware, createRedisClient, createScheduler, createSecurityHeaders, createSeederRunner, createSessionMiddleware, createSqsAdapter, createStorageManager, createTypedBroadcaster, createValidator, csrfField, cursorPaginate, custom, customCheck, dateFormat, date as dateRule, debugErrorMiddleware, decodeCursor, decrypt, defineFactory, defineGate, defineMiddleware, defineModule, definePlugin, definePolicy, deriveAppKey, deriveAppKeyring, detectLocaleMiddleware, different, email as emailRule, encodeCursor, encrypt, endsWith, exchangeOAuthCode, exists, fetchOAuthUserProfile, file as fileRule, filterSensitiveData, formatValidationErrors, generateAppKey, generateKey, generateOtp, generatePassword, generateSlug, getApiToken, getApiTokenOrFail, getAppKeyringFromEnv, getBroadcastManager, getContainer, getCspNonce, getCsrfToken, getEncrypter, getExceptionHandler, getGate, getI18n, getInertiaSharedPropsResolver, getJob, getLogManager, getMailManager, getNextOccurrence, getNextOccurrences, getNotification, getNotificationManager, getPluralizationRule, getQueueDriver, getRateLimitInfo, getRegisteredJobs, getRequestLocale, getRequestTranslator, getSessionFromContext, getUserApiTokens, getValidatedData, hash, hashPassword, hmac, image as imageRule, inValues, inertia, integer, ip, ipv4, ipv6, isDue, isDueInTimezone, isEmailVerified, isSafeRedirectUrl, jsonResponse, json as jsonRule, mail, matchesCron, max, maxFileSize, md5, mimes, min, minFileSize, mountModuleRoutes, needsRehash, normalizeAppKey, notIn, nullable, numeric, object as objectRule, paginate, parseApiToken, parseAppKey, parseCron, parseOAuthRedirectUrl, parsePasswordResetUrl, parsePreviousAppKeys, parseRequestPayload, parseSignature, parseVerificationUrl, pick, pluralizationRules, processJob, quickValidate, quickValidateOrThrow, random, randomBase64, randomBase64Url, randomHex, randomInt, randomString, regex, registerJob, registerNotification, renderDebugPage, renderDocument, renderErrorPage, requestIdMiddleware, requestLoggingMiddleware, requireAuthenticated, requireGuest, requireVerifiedEmail, required, requiredIf, requiredUnless, requiredWith, requiredWithout, resetCalledSeeders, resetRateLimit, resolve, resolveJobName, resolveNotifiableType, revokeAllApiTokens, revokeApiToken, same, sample, sanitizeOAuthRedirect, secureCompare, selectPluralForm, setBroadcastManager, setContainer, setEncrypter, setExceptionHandler, setGate, setI18n, setInertiaDocument, setInertiaSharedProps, setInertiaSsrRenderer, setLogManager, setMailManager, setNotificationManager, setQueueDriver, sha256, sha512, shareInertiaProps, shuffle, signUrl, size, startsWith, string as stringRule, t, tc, toTimezone, tokenCan, tokenCanAll, tokenCanAny, tryGetI18n, unique, url as urlRule, urlSafeToken, uuid, uuid$1 as uuidRule, validate, validateRequest, validateRequestWith, validateSafe, verifyApiToken, verifyCsrfToken, verifyEmailToken, verifyHmac, verifyOAuthState, verifyPassword, verifyPasswordResetToken, verifySignedUrl, viteAsset, withAuthorization };
9107
+ export { AGENT_REDACTED, AGENT_TOOL_NAME_PATTERN, API_TOKEN_KEY, AUTH_CONTEXT_KEY, AgentToolDenied, AgentToolInvoked, Application, ApplicationShutdown, ApplicationStarted, AuthManager, Response$1 as AuthResponse, AuthServiceProvider, AuthenticatableModel, AuthenticationException, AuthorizationException, AuthorizationServiceProvider, AutoDiscovery, BaseFactory, BaseFactory as Factory, BaseSeeder, BaseSeeder as Seeder, BaseUserProvider, BroadcastManager, BroadcastServiceProvider, BufferedOutput, CSP_NONCE_KEY, CSRF_FORM_FIELD, CSRF_HEADER_NAME, CSRF_TOKEN_KEY, CacheCheck, CacheManager, CacheServiceProvider, Channel, Command, ConsoleChannel, ConsoleKernel, Container, Controller, CursorPaginator, CustomCheck, DailyFileChannel, DatabaseChannel, DatabaseCheck, DefaultHasher, DefaultHasher as Hash, Encrypter, EncryptionServiceProvider, ErrorServiceProvider, Event, EventManager, EventServiceProvider, ExceptionHandler, FailedJobReporter, FieldValidator, FileStore as FileCacheStore, FileChannel, FormRequest, Gate, HealthCheck, HealthManager, HealthServiceProvider, HttpException, I18nManager, I18nServiceProvider, InertiaServiceProvider, Input, Job, JobFailed, JobProcessed, JsonLoader, JsonResource, LOCALE_CONTEXT_KEY, LOG_LEVEL_PRIORITY, Listener, LocalDriver as LocalStorageDriver, LogManager, LogServiceProvider, LogTransport, Logger, Mail, MailChannel, MailManager, MailServiceProvider, MemoryApiTokenStore, MemoryDriver as MemoryBroadcastDriver, MemoryStore as MemoryCacheStore, MemoryChannel, MemoryCheck, MemoryDriver$1 as MemoryDriver, MemoryDriver$1 as MemoryQueueDriver, MemoryEmailVerificationStore, MemoryLoader, MemoryOAuthStateStore, MemoryPasswordResetStore, MemoryRateLimitStore, MemorySessionStore, MemoryDriver$2 as MemoryStorageDriver, MemoryTransport, MessageSigner, MethodNotAllowedException, ModelUserProvider, NodeHasher, NotFoundHttpException, Notification, NotificationManager, NotificationServiceProvider, OAUTH_SESSION_BINDING_KEY, OAuthManager, OAuthServiceProvider, Output, PREFLIGHT_ARGUMENT, Paginator, PendingSchedule, Policy, PresenceChannel, PrivateChannel, ProviderManager, QueueManager, QueueServiceProvider, RedisDriver as RedisBroadcastDriver, RedisStore as RedisCacheStore, RedisCheck, RedisDriver$1 as RedisDriver, RedisDriver$1 as RedisQueueDriver, RequestFinished, RequestReceived, ResendTransport, Resource, ResourceCollection, Router, S3Driver, Schedule, ScheduledTask, Scheduler, SchedulingServiceProvider, ScryptHasher, SeederRunner, ServiceProvider, SessionGuard, SlackChannel, SlidingWindowRateLimitStore, SmtpTransport, SqsDriver, StorageCheck, StorageManager, StorageServiceProvider, SyncDriver, SyncDriver as SyncQueueDriver, TaggedCache, TokenGuard, Translator, UserAuthenticated, UserLoggedOut, VALIDATED_DATA_KEY, ValidationException, Validator, ViewEngine, Worker, abort, abortIf, abortUnless, advertisesStructuredOutput, after, afterOrEqual, alpha, alphaDash, alphaNum, array as arrayRule, attachAuthContext, authorize as authorizeAbility, authorizeAllMiddleware, authorizeMiddleware, authorizeResourceMiddleware, before, beforeOrEqual, between, boolean as booleanRule, buildOAuthAuthorizeUrl, buildOAuthRedirectUrl, buildPasswordResetUrl, buildToolRequest, buildVerificationUrl, can, cannot, check as checkHash, clearJobRegistry, clearNotificationRegistry, collect, completeEmailVerification, completePasswordReset, confirmed, createApiToken, createApp, createBearerTokenMiddleware, createBroadcastManager, createCacheManager, createConsoleKernel, createContainer, createCorsMiddleware, createCspMiddleware, createCsrfMiddleware, createDiscordOAuthProviderConfig, createEmailVerificationToken, createEncrypter, createEventManager, createExceptionHandler, createFacade, createFacades, createForceHttpsMiddleware, createGate, createGitHubOAuthProviderConfig, createGoogleOAuthProviderConfig, createHealthManager, createHostAuthorizationMiddleware, createI18n, createLogManager, createMailManager, createNotificationManager, createOAuthManager, createOAuthState, createPasswordResetToken, createQueueManager, createRateLimitMiddleware, createRedirectSafetyMiddleware, createRedisClient, createScheduler, createSecurityHeaders, createSeederRunner, createSessionMiddleware, createSqsAdapter, createStorageManager, createTypedBroadcaster, createValidator, csrfField, cursorPaginate, custom, customCheck, dateFormat, date as dateRule, debugErrorMiddleware, decodeCursor, decrypt, defineFactory, defineGate, defineMiddleware, defineModule, definePlugin, definePolicy, deriveAgentTools, deriveAppKey, deriveAppKeyring, detectLocaleMiddleware, different, email as emailRule, encodeCursor, encrypt, endsWith, exchangeOAuthCode, exists, expandToolScopes, fetchOAuthUserProfile, file as fileRule, filterSensitiveData, formatValidationErrors, generateAppKey, generateKey, generateOtp, generatePassword, generateSlug, getApiToken, getApiTokenOrFail, getAppKeyringFromEnv, getBroadcastManager, getContainer, getCspNonce, getCsrfToken, getEncrypter, getExceptionHandler, getGate, getI18n, getInertiaSharedPropsResolver, getJob, getLogManager, getMailManager, getNextOccurrence, getNextOccurrences, getNotification, getNotificationManager, getPluralizationRule, getQueueDriver, getRateLimitInfo, getRegisteredJobs, getRequestLocale, getRequestTranslator, getSessionFromContext, getUserApiTokens, getValidatedData, hash, hashPassword, hmac, image as imageRule, inValues, inertia, integer, ip, ipv4, ipv6, isDue, isDueInTimezone, isEmailVerified, isSafeRedirectUrl, jsonResponse, json as jsonRule, mail, mapToolResponse, matchesCron, max, maxFileSize, md5, mimes, min, minFileSize, mountModuleRoutes, needsRehash, normalizeAppKey, notIn, nullable, numeric, object as objectRule, paginate, parseApiToken, parseAppKey, parseCron, parseOAuthRedirectUrl, parsePasswordResetUrl, parsePreviousAppKeys, parseRequestPayload, parseSignature, parseToolScope, parseVerificationUrl, pick, pluralizationRules, processJob, quickValidate, quickValidateOrThrow, random, randomBase64, randomBase64Url, randomHex, randomInt, randomString, readBearerToken, redactAgentArguments, regex, registerJob, registerNotification, renderDebugPage, renderDocument, renderErrorPage, requestIdMiddleware, requestLoggingMiddleware, requireAuthenticated, requireGuest, requireVerifiedEmail, required, requiredIf, requiredUnless, requiredWith, requiredWithout, resetCalledSeeders, resetRateLimit, resolve, resolveJobName, resolveNotifiableType, revokeAllApiTokens, revokeApiToken, same, sample, sanitizeOAuthRedirect, scopesAllowTool, secureCompare, selectPluralForm, setBroadcastManager, setContainer, setEncrypter, setExceptionHandler, setGate, setI18n, setInertiaDocument, setInertiaSharedProps, setInertiaSsrRenderer, setLogManager, setMailManager, setNotificationManager, setQueueDriver, sha256, sha512, shareInertiaProps, shuffle, signUrl, size, startsWith, string as stringRule, t, tc, toTimezone, tokenCan, tokenCanAll, tokenCanAny, tryGetI18n, unique, url as urlRule, urlSafeToken, uuid, uuid$1 as uuidRule, validate, validateRequest, validateRequestWith, validateSafe, verifyApiToken, verifyCsrfToken, verifyEmailToken, verifyHmac, verifyOAuthState, verifyPassword, verifyPasswordResetToken, verifySignedUrl, viteAsset, withAuthorization };