@guren/plugin-cloudflare 0.13.0 → 0.13.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.js
CHANGED
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@@ -341,8 +341,13 @@ var R2Driver = class {
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if (!this.presign) throw new Error("R2Driver.temporaryUrl() cannot sign URLs through the R2 binding. Either configure \"presign: { accountId, bucket, accessKeyId, secretAccessKey }\" (an R2 API token, used with the S3-compatible endpoint) or serve private files through a signed app route.");
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const expiresIn = Math.floor((expiration.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1e3);
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if (expiresIn > MAX_PRESIGN_SECONDS) throw new Error(`R2Driver.temporaryUrl(): R2 presigned URLs may be valid for at most 7 days (requested ${expiresIn}s).`);
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344
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const bucketUrl = `https://${this.presign.accountId}.r2.cloudflarestorage.com/${this.presign.bucket}`;
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345
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const url = `${bucketUrl}/${encodeKey(this.key(path))}`;
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346
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const signedPath = new URL(url).pathname;
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347
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const rootPath = trimTrailingSlashes(new URL(`${bucketUrl}/${encodeKey(this.prefix)}`).pathname);
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348
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if (signedPath !== rootPath && !signedPath.startsWith(`${rootPath}/`)) throw new Error(`R2Driver.temporaryUrl(): path escapes the storage root: "${path}"`);
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return presignGetUrl({
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-
url
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url,
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accessKeyId: this.presign.accessKeyId,
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secretAccessKey: this.presign.secretAccessKey,
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region: "auto",
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package/package.json
CHANGED
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@@ -39,6 +39,14 @@ import {
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*/
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const LOGIN_PATH = '/login'
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/**
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* The guard the consenting user is read from: the session guard `auth.useModel()`
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* registers. Never an unqualified `this.auth.id()`, which answers with an API
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* token's user for a request carrying `Authorization: Bearer`, and a grant minted
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* for a token outlives revoking it. Change this if your session guard has another name.
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*/
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const SESSION_GUARD = 'web'
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/**
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* What a client that sent no `scope` is offered. RFC 6749 §3.3 requires a default
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* or a refusal, and the MCP clients measured (Claude's connector, MCP Inspector)
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@@ -55,7 +63,7 @@ interface WorkerEnvWithProvider {
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export default class McpOAuthController extends Controller {
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/** GET /oauth/authorize — render the consent screen. */
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async show(): Promise<Response> {
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-
const userId = await this.auth.id()
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+
const userId = await this.auth.guard(SESSION_GUARD).id()
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if (userId === null || userId === undefined) {
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return this.redirect(this.loginUrl())
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}
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@@ -69,6 +77,8 @@ export default class McpOAuthController extends Controller {
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return this.view(McpOAuthConsentPage, {
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clientName: client?.clientName ?? parsed.clientId,
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// From the request, never `client.redirectUris`: a client may register several.
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redirectTarget: redirectTargetOf(parsed.redirectUri),
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query: new URL(this.ctx.req.url).searchParams.toString(),
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tools: this.offeredTools(parsed.scope),
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csrfToken: getCsrfToken(this.ctx),
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@@ -77,7 +87,7 @@ export default class McpOAuthController extends Controller {
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/** POST /oauth/authorize — record the decision and hand back to the provider. */
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async approve(): Promise<Response> {
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80
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-
const userId = await this.auth.id()
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const userId = await this.auth.guard(SESSION_GUARD).id()
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if (userId === null || userId === undefined) {
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return this.redirect(this.loginUrl())
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}
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@@ -222,6 +232,21 @@ export default class McpOAuthController extends Controller {
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}
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}
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/**
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* The redirect URI as `protocol//host`, or the scheme alone if it has no host,
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* read by the `new URL` parse `completeAuthorization` redirects with, so userinfo
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* like `https://claude.ai@attacker.example` shows the host the code really goes to.
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* One that will not parse is shown as it came; the page escapes it.
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*/
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function redirectTargetOf(redirectUri: string): string {
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try {
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const { protocol, host } = new URL(redirectUri)
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return host ? `${protocol}//${host}` : protocol
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} catch {
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return redirectUri
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}
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}
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/** One value from a parsed body field that may legally hold several. */
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function single(value: unknown): string {
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return typeof value === 'string' ? value : ''
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@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ export const QUERY_FIELD = 'authorize_query'
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export interface McpOAuthConsentPageProps {
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/** The client's own registered name, or its id when it registered none. */
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clientName: string
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/** Where approving sends the authorization code: this request's redirect URI, reduced to scheme and host. */
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redirectTarget: string
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/** The authorize request's query string, handed back on submit. */
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query: string
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/** The tools this request may grant — already intersected with what it asked for. */
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@@ -44,6 +46,8 @@ const STYLES = `
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.desc { display: block; margin: .25rem 0 0 1.75rem; opacity: .8; }
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.badge { border: 1px solid currentColor; border-radius: .5rem; font-size: .75rem; margin-left: .5rem; padding: 0 .4rem; }
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.empty { opacity: .8; }
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.target { border: 1px solid rgba(128,128,128,.35); border-radius: .5rem; margin: 1rem 0; padding: .75rem; }
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.host { display: block; font-family: ui-monospace, monospace; font-weight: 600; overflow-wrap: anywhere; }
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code { font-family: ui-monospace, monospace; font-size: .9em; }
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button { font: inherit; padding: .5rem 1rem; }
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`
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@@ -94,8 +98,15 @@ const NothingToGrant: FC = () => (
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</>
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)
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/**
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* Registration at `/oauth/register` is open, so the name is whatever the caller
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* chose and the redirect target is the only part of this page it cannot fake. The
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* target stays text, never an `href`. An app that creates its own clients with
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* `createClient()` and closes registration removes the label and its sentence by hand.
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*/
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export const McpOAuthConsentPage: FC<McpOAuthConsentPageProps> = ({
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clientName,
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redirectTarget,
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query,
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tools,
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csrfToken,
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@@ -109,8 +120,17 @@ export const McpOAuthConsentPage: FC<McpOAuthConsentPageProps> = ({
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</head>
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<body>
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<h1>
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-
<strong>{clientName}</strong>
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A client calling itself <strong>{clientName}</strong>{' '}
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<span class="badge">unverified</span> is asking to use this application's tools
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</h1>
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<p>
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This application has not verified that name, and anyone can register a client under any
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name. Go by where the access goes, not by what the client calls itself.
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</p>
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<p class="target">
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Approving hands access to whoever controls{' '}
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<span class="host">{redirectTarget}</span>
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</p>
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<p>
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Approving lets it act as you, through the tools you select. Uncheck anything you would
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rather it could not do.
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