@gtc6244/immediacy-daemon 0.2.1 → 0.2.3

package/dist/src/session-socket.js

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/**
+ * SessionSocket — presents a LAN/relay session (a frame `Mux` + a handshake
+ * `SecureChannel`) to the server dispatch as a `SocketLike`, so one `handleFrame`
+ * serves every transport (docs/WEBRTC_MIGRATION.md Phase 4 wiring).
+ *
+ * App traffic rides the `rpc` channel: each envelope JSON is sealed with the
+ * session key and sent as one Mux message; inbound frames are opened back to a
+ * JSON string and handed to the dispatch. The Hub treats this socket with the
+ * cleartext codec (plain JSON in/out) — the sealing happens here, at the
+ * transport boundary, exactly like the WS `sessionCodec` does for the live path.
+ */
+import { Channel } from "./framing.js";
+const OPEN = 1;
+const CLOSED = 3;
+export class SessionSocket {
+    mux;
+    channel;
+    closeTransport;
+    readyState = OPEN;
+    onMsg = null;
+    onCloseCb = null;
+    constructor(mux, channel, closeTransport) {
+        this.mux = mux;
+        this.channel = channel;
+        this.closeTransport = closeTransport;
+        // App traffic on the rpc channel: open the sealed frame → JSON → dispatch.
+        // (This overwrites the mux handler the handshake used, which is intended —
+        // the handshake is complete by the time a SessionSocket is created.)
+        this.mux.onMessage((channelId, message) => {
+            if (channelId !== Channel.rpc)
+                return;
+            let plaintext;
+            try {
+                plaintext = this.channel.open(message);
+            }
+            catch {
+                return; // tamper/replay — drop, keep the session
+            }
+            this.onMsg?.(plaintext.toString("utf8"));
+        });
+    }
+    /** Backpressure isn't surfaced per-session here; the Mux paces large sends. */
+    get bufferedAmount() {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    send(data, cb) {
+        if (this.readyState !== OPEN) {
+            cb?.(new Error("socket not open"));
+            return;
+        }
+        try {
+            const sealed = this.channel.seal(Buffer.from(data, "utf8"));
+            void this.mux.send(Channel.rpc, sealed);
+            cb?.(undefined);
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            cb?.(err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err)));
+        }
+    }
+    /** Register the inbound-envelope handler (the server's dispatch). */
+    onMessage(cb) {
+        this.onMsg = cb;
+    }
+    /** Register the close handler (the server's teardown). */
+    onClose(cb) {
+        this.onCloseCb = cb;
+    }
+    /** Close from our side (tears down the underlying transport). */
+    close() {
+        if (this.readyState !== OPEN)
+            return;
+        this.readyState = CLOSED;
+        this.closeTransport();
+        this.onCloseCb?.();
+    }
+    /** The peer/transport dropped — mark closed and notify (no re-teardown). */
+    handlePeerClose() {
+        if (this.readyState !== OPEN)
+            return;
+        this.readyState = CLOSED;
+        this.onCloseCb?.();
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=session-socket.js.map

package/dist/src/session-socket.js.map

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package/dist/src/session.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+/**
+ * Session handshake — the transport-independent §5.3 mutual authentication that
+ * replaces Cloudflare Access as the trust gate.
+ *
+ * This module only produces and consumes the two handshake messages and, on
+ * success, hands back a `SecureChannel`. It knows nothing about sockets — the
+ * transport (loopback, LAN, relay, WebRTC) pumps the messages. This is what lets
+ * every transport reuse one construction verbatim.
+ *
+ * Shape (initiator = client/device, responder = daemon):
+ *   1. Initiator mints a 16-byte random `sessionId`, generates an ephemeral
+ *      X25519 keypair, and signs the transcript `ephPub || rendezvousId ||
+ *      sessionId` with its long-term Ed25519 device key. It sends msg1 =
+ *      { v, sid, eph, sig, dev } (dev = its long-term Ed25519 pubkey).
+ *   2. Responder looks up `dev` in its device table (unknown/revoked ⇒ ABORT —
+ *      this is the revoke-fails-handshake guarantee), verifies the signature
+ *      against `dev`, generates its own ephemeral X25519 keypair, and signs the
+ *      same-shaped transcript with the daemon identity key. It replies msg2 =
+ *      { v, eph, sig } and derives the session keys.
+ *   3. Initiator verifies msg2's signature against the *known* daemon Ed25519
+ *      pubkey it pinned at pair time (mismatch ⇒ visible ABORT, never a silent
+ *      retry) and derives the same session keys.
+ *
+ * Both sides then ECDH their ephemeral keys → HKDF-SHA256 → two directional
+ * keys. Frames are sealed with AES-256-GCM (12-byte nonce, 16-byte tag).
+ * Because the keys are ephemeral per session, nonces are a per-direction counter
+ * from 0 — safe, and never a counter with a long-term key.
+ *
+ * AEAD choice (refines docs/WEBRTC_MIGRATION.md §7): AES-256-GCM is the one AEAD
+ * available *natively* on all three clients — Node `crypto` (daemon),
+ * CryptoKit `AES.GCM` (macOS), and the pure-Dart `cryptography` package
+ * (Flutter) — so no client needs to link libsodium just for the sealer. X25519,
+ * Ed25519, and HKDF-SHA256 are likewise standard on all three. The wire
+ * construction is: `ecdh = X25519(ephSec, peerEphPub)`, `okm = HKDF-SHA256(salt,
+ * ecdh, info=SESSION_HKDF_INFO||sessionId, 64)`, split into two 32-byte keys.
+ */
+declare const PROTOCOL_VERSION: 1;
+/** A handshake step failed. `code` is a stable machine-readable reason. */
+export declare class HandshakeError extends Error {
+    code: "unknown_device" | "bad_signature" | "bad_message" | "bad_key";
+    constructor(code: "unknown_device" | "bad_signature" | "bad_message" | "bad_key", message: string);
+}
+/** Msg 1: initiator → responder. */
+export interface HandshakeMsg1 {
+    v: typeof PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+    sid: string;
+    eph: string;
+    sig: string;
+    dev: string;
+    code?: string;
+    label?: string;
+}
+/** Msg 2: responder → initiator. */
+export interface HandshakeMsg2 {
+    v: typeof PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+    eph: string;
+    sig: string;
+}
+/**
+ * A per-session symmetric channel. Each direction seals with its own key and a
+ * counter nonce from 0. Assumes ordered delivery per direction (true for the
+ * loopback/LAN/relay reliable channels this Phase-1 handshake feeds); the recv
+ * counter enforces strict monotonic order and rejects replays.
+ */
+export declare class SecureChannel {
+    private readonly sendKey;
+    private readonly recvKey;
+    private sendCounter;
+    private recvCounter;
+    constructor(sendKey: Buffer, recvKey: Buffer);
+    private static nonce;
+    /**
+     * Seal a plaintext frame for the peer. Returns `ciphertext || tag` (the GCM
+     * tag appended, matching CryptoKit's `combined` layout minus the nonce, which
+     * is the implicit counter). Nonce derives from the send counter.
+     */
+    seal(plaintext: Buffer): Buffer;
+    /** Open a sealed frame from the peer (next in order). Throws on tamper/replay. */
+    open(sealed: Buffer): Buffer;
+}
+/** Options for the initiator (client/device) side. */
+export interface InitiatorOpts {
+    /** This device's long-term Ed25519 secret key (64 bytes). */
+    deviceSignSecret: Buffer;
+    /** This device's long-term Ed25519 public key, base64. */
+    devicePublicKeyB64: string;
+    /** The daemon's rendezvous id (pinned at pair time). */
+    rendezvousId: string;
+    /** The daemon's long-term Ed25519 public key, base64 (pinned at pair time). */
+    daemonPublicKeyB64: string;
+    /**
+     * First-pairing only: the single-use pairing code scanned from the daemon's QR.
+     * When set (and the device is not yet paired) it is carried in msg1 so the
+     * responder can pair the device inline. Omit on a normal (already-paired)
+     * handshake.
+     */
+    code?: string;
+    /** First-pairing only: the human label to record for this device. */
+    label?: string;
+}
+/** Options for the responder (daemon) side. */
+export interface ResponderOpts {
+    /** The daemon's long-term Ed25519 secret key (64 bytes). */
+    daemonSignSecret: Buffer;
+    /** The daemon's rendezvous id. */
+    rendezvousId: string;
+    /**
+     * Membership check against the device table. Return true iff `devicePubB64`
+     * is a currently-paired (non-revoked) device. A false result normally aborts
+     * the handshake — this is the revoke-fails-next-handshake guarantee — unless
+     * `redeemCode` accepts a first-pairing code (below).
+     */
+    isPaired: (devicePubB64: string) => boolean;
+    /**
+     * First-pairing hook. Called only when `isPaired` is false and msg1 carries a
+     * `code`. Return true iff the code is a valid, unconsumed pairing code — which
+     * consumes it and authorizes the handshake to proceed; the caller then records
+     * the device (see `acceptHandshake`'s `paired` result). Omit to disable inline
+     * pairing on this transport (handshake stays paired-only).
+     */
+    redeemCode?: (devicePubB64: string, code: string) => boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Begin the handshake as the initiator. Returns msg1 to send and a `finish`
+ * that consumes the responder's msg2 and yields the `SecureChannel`.
+ */
+export declare function startHandshake(opts: InitiatorOpts): {
+    msg1: HandshakeMsg1;
+    finish: (msg2: HandshakeMsg2) => SecureChannel;
+};
+/**
+ * Handle the handshake as the responder. Verifies the initiator, produces msg2
+ * to send back, and returns the established `SecureChannel`. Throws
+ * `HandshakeError` on any failure (unknown/revoked device, bad signature,
+ * malformed message).
+ */
+export declare function acceptHandshake(msg1: HandshakeMsg1, opts: ResponderOpts): {
+    msg2: HandshakeMsg2;
+    channel: SecureChannel;
+    /** The initiator's long-term Ed25519 pubkey (base64). */
+    devicePub: string;
+    /**
+     * True iff this handshake just paired a new device via `redeemCode` — the
+     * caller MUST record it (`devices.add(devicePub, label)`); the code is already
+     * consumed. False on a normal handshake by an already-paired device.
+     */
+    paired: boolean;
+    /** The label from msg1, when this was a first pairing (else undefined). */
+    label?: string;
+};
+export {};

package/dist/src/session.js

@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+/**
+ * Session handshake — the transport-independent §5.3 mutual authentication that
+ * replaces Cloudflare Access as the trust gate.
+ *
+ * This module only produces and consumes the two handshake messages and, on
+ * success, hands back a `SecureChannel`. It knows nothing about sockets — the
+ * transport (loopback, LAN, relay, WebRTC) pumps the messages. This is what lets
+ * every transport reuse one construction verbatim.
+ *
+ * Shape (initiator = client/device, responder = daemon):
+ *   1. Initiator mints a 16-byte random `sessionId`, generates an ephemeral
+ *      X25519 keypair, and signs the transcript `ephPub || rendezvousId ||
+ *      sessionId` with its long-term Ed25519 device key. It sends msg1 =
+ *      { v, sid, eph, sig, dev } (dev = its long-term Ed25519 pubkey).
+ *   2. Responder looks up `dev` in its device table (unknown/revoked ⇒ ABORT —
+ *      this is the revoke-fails-handshake guarantee), verifies the signature
+ *      against `dev`, generates its own ephemeral X25519 keypair, and signs the
+ *      same-shaped transcript with the daemon identity key. It replies msg2 =
+ *      { v, eph, sig } and derives the session keys.
+ *   3. Initiator verifies msg2's signature against the *known* daemon Ed25519
+ *      pubkey it pinned at pair time (mismatch ⇒ visible ABORT, never a silent
+ *      retry) and derives the same session keys.
+ *
+ * Both sides then ECDH their ephemeral keys → HKDF-SHA256 → two directional
+ * keys. Frames are sealed with AES-256-GCM (12-byte nonce, 16-byte tag).
+ * Because the keys are ephemeral per session, nonces are a per-direction counter
+ * from 0 — safe, and never a counter with a long-term key.
+ *
+ * AEAD choice (refines docs/WEBRTC_MIGRATION.md §7): AES-256-GCM is the one AEAD
+ * available *natively* on all three clients — Node `crypto` (daemon),
+ * CryptoKit `AES.GCM` (macOS), and the pure-Dart `cryptography` package
+ * (Flutter) — so no client needs to link libsodium just for the sealer. X25519,
+ * Ed25519, and HKDF-SHA256 are likewise standard on all three. The wire
+ * construction is: `ecdh = X25519(ephSec, peerEphPub)`, `okm = HKDF-SHA256(salt,
+ * ecdh, info=SESSION_HKDF_INFO||sessionId, 64)`, split into two 32-byte keys.
+ */
+import sodium from "sodium-native";
+import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, hkdfSync } from "node:crypto";
+import { signDetached, verifyDetached } from "./rendezvous.js";
+const PROTOCOL_VERSION = 1;
+/** Domain-separation label mixed into the session-key HKDF. */
+const SESSION_HKDF_INFO = "immediacy-session-v1";
+/** Fixed HKDF salt (public, constant); the ECDH secret supplies the entropy. */
+const SESSION_HKDF_SALT = Buffer.from("immediacy-session-hkdf-salt-v1", "utf8");
+const SESSION_ID_BYTES = 16;
+const KEY_BYTES = 32; // AES-256 key length
+const NONCE_BYTES = 12; // AES-GCM standard nonce
+const TAG_BYTES = 16; // AES-GCM authentication tag
+/** A handshake step failed. `code` is a stable machine-readable reason. */
+export class HandshakeError extends Error {
+    code;
+    constructor(code, message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.code = code;
+        this.name = "HandshakeError";
+    }
+}
+function randomBytes(n) {
+    const b = Buffer.alloc(n);
+    sodium.randombytes_buf(b);
+    return b;
+}
+/** Generate an ephemeral X25519 keypair (via crypto_box, which is X25519). */
+function ephemeralKeypair() {
+    const pub = Buffer.alloc(sodium.crypto_box_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
+    const sec = Buffer.alloc(sodium.crypto_box_SECRETKEYBYTES);
+    sodium.crypto_box_keypair(pub, sec);
+    return { pub, sec };
+}
+/** The signed transcript binding an ephemeral key to this session + daemon. */
+function transcript(ephPub, rendezvousId, sessionId) {
+    return Buffer.concat([ephPub, Buffer.from(rendezvousId, "utf8"), sessionId]);
+}
+/** X25519 ECDH → raw shared secret (fed into HKDF, which hashes it). */
+function ecdh(mySec, peerPub) {
+    if (peerPub.length !== sodium.crypto_scalarmult_BYTES) {
+        throw new HandshakeError("bad_key", "peer ephemeral key has the wrong length");
+    }
+    const shared = Buffer.alloc(sodium.crypto_scalarmult_BYTES);
+    sodium.crypto_scalarmult(shared, mySec, peerPub);
+    return shared;
+}
+/**
+ * HKDF-SHA256 the ECDH secret into two directional 32-byte keys. `k0` is the
+ * initiator→responder key, `k1` the responder→initiator key. Deterministic on
+ * both sides because `sessionId` is shared and mixed into the info.
+ */
+function deriveKeys(shared, sessionId) {
+    const info = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from(SESSION_HKDF_INFO, "utf8"), sessionId]);
+    const okm = Buffer.from(hkdfSync("sha256", shared, SESSION_HKDF_SALT, info, KEY_BYTES * 2));
+    return { k0: okm.subarray(0, KEY_BYTES), k1: okm.subarray(KEY_BYTES) };
+}
+function decodeB64(value, field) {
+    if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length === 0) {
+        throw new HandshakeError("bad_message", `missing ${field}`);
+    }
+    return Buffer.from(value, "base64");
+}
+/**
+ * A per-session symmetric channel. Each direction seals with its own key and a
+ * counter nonce from 0. Assumes ordered delivery per direction (true for the
+ * loopback/LAN/relay reliable channels this Phase-1 handshake feeds); the recv
+ * counter enforces strict monotonic order and rejects replays.
+ */
+export class SecureChannel {
+    sendKey;
+    recvKey;
+    sendCounter = 0;
+    recvCounter = 0;
+    constructor(sendKey, recvKey) {
+        this.sendKey = sendKey;
+        this.recvKey = recvKey;
+    }
+    static nonce(counter) {
+        const nonce = Buffer.alloc(NONCE_BYTES);
+        // 64-bit little-endian counter in the low 8 bytes; the rest stays zero.
+        nonce.writeBigUInt64LE(BigInt(counter), 0);
+        return nonce;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Seal a plaintext frame for the peer. Returns `ciphertext || tag` (the GCM
+     * tag appended, matching CryptoKit's `combined` layout minus the nonce, which
+     * is the implicit counter). Nonce derives from the send counter.
+     */
+    seal(plaintext) {
+        const nonce = SecureChannel.nonce(this.sendCounter++);
+        const cipher = createCipheriv("aes-256-gcm", this.sendKey, nonce);
+        const body = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext), cipher.final()]);
+        const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
+        return Buffer.concat([body, tag]);
+    }
+    /** Open a sealed frame from the peer (next in order). Throws on tamper/replay. */
+    open(sealed) {
+        if (sealed.length < TAG_BYTES) {
+            throw new HandshakeError("bad_message", "ciphertext shorter than the tag");
+        }
+        const nonce = SecureChannel.nonce(this.recvCounter);
+        const body = sealed.subarray(0, sealed.length - TAG_BYTES);
+        const tag = sealed.subarray(sealed.length - TAG_BYTES);
+        const decipher = createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm", this.recvKey, nonce);
+        decipher.setAuthTag(tag);
+        try {
+            const plaintext = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(body), decipher.final()]);
+            this.recvCounter++;
+            return plaintext;
+        }
+        catch {
+            throw new HandshakeError("bad_message", "frame authentication failed");
+        }
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Begin the handshake as the initiator. Returns msg1 to send and a `finish`
+ * that consumes the responder's msg2 and yields the `SecureChannel`.
+ */
+export function startHandshake(opts) {
+    const sessionId = randomBytes(SESSION_ID_BYTES);
+    const eph = ephemeralKeypair();
+    const sig = signDetached(transcript(eph.pub, opts.rendezvousId, sessionId), opts.deviceSignSecret);
+    const msg1 = {
+        v: PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+        sid: sessionId.toString("base64"),
+        eph: eph.pub.toString("base64"),
+        sig: sig.toString("base64"),
+        dev: opts.devicePublicKeyB64,
+        ...(opts.code ? { code: opts.code } : {}),
+        ...(opts.label ? { label: opts.label } : {}),
+    };
+    const daemonPub = Buffer.from(opts.daemonPublicKeyB64, "base64");
+    const finish = (msg2) => {
+        if (!msg2 || msg2.v !== PROTOCOL_VERSION) {
+            throw new HandshakeError("bad_message", "malformed handshake reply");
+        }
+        const peerEph = decodeB64(msg2.eph, "responder ephemeral key");
+        const peerSig = decodeB64(msg2.sig, "responder signature");
+        const ok = verifyDetached(peerSig, transcript(peerEph, opts.rendezvousId, sessionId), daemonPub);
+        if (!ok) {
+            // Wrong/rotated daemon key ⇒ possible MITM. Surface it, never silent-retry.
+            throw new HandshakeError("bad_signature", "daemon signature did not match the pinned identity key");
+        }
+        const shared = ecdh(eph.sec, peerEph);
+        const { k0, k1 } = deriveKeys(shared, sessionId);
+        // Initiator sends on k0, receives on k1.
+        return new SecureChannel(k0, k1);
+    };
+    return { msg1, finish };
+}
+/**
+ * Handle the handshake as the responder. Verifies the initiator, produces msg2
+ * to send back, and returns the established `SecureChannel`. Throws
+ * `HandshakeError` on any failure (unknown/revoked device, bad signature,
+ * malformed message).
+ */
+export function acceptHandshake(msg1, opts) {
+    if (!msg1 || msg1.v !== PROTOCOL_VERSION) {
+        throw new HandshakeError("bad_message", "malformed handshake message");
+    }
+    const sessionId = decodeB64(msg1.sid, "sessionId");
+    if (sessionId.length !== SESSION_ID_BYTES) {
+        throw new HandshakeError("bad_message", "sessionId has the wrong length");
+    }
+    const peerEph = decodeB64(msg1.eph, "initiator ephemeral key");
+    const peerSig = decodeB64(msg1.sig, "initiator signature");
+    // Authorization first: an unknown or revoked device never gets to a verify —
+    // UNLESS it presents a valid first-pairing code, which pairs it inline.
+    if (typeof msg1.dev !== "string") {
+        throw new HandshakeError("bad_message", "missing device key");
+    }
+    let paired = false;
+    if (!opts.isPaired(msg1.dev)) {
+        if (typeof msg1.code !== "string" ||
+            !opts.redeemCode ||
+            !opts.redeemCode(msg1.dev, msg1.code)) {
+            throw new HandshakeError("unknown_device", "device is not paired (or revoked)");
+        }
+        paired = true; // valid code — the caller records the device on success
+    }
+    const devicePub = Buffer.from(msg1.dev, "base64");
+    const ok = verifyDetached(peerSig, transcript(peerEph, opts.rendezvousId, sessionId), devicePub);
+    if (!ok) {
+        throw new HandshakeError("bad_signature", "device signature did not match its paired key");
+    }
+    const eph = ephemeralKeypair();
+    const sig = signDetached(transcript(eph.pub, opts.rendezvousId, sessionId), opts.daemonSignSecret);
+    const msg2 = {
+        v: PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+        eph: eph.pub.toString("base64"),
+        sig: sig.toString("base64"),
+    };
+    const shared = ecdh(eph.sec, peerEph);
+    const { k0, k1 } = deriveKeys(shared, sessionId);
+    // Responder receives on k0 (initiator's send key), sends on k1.
+    return {
+        msg2,
+        channel: new SecureChannel(k1, k0),
+        devicePub: msg1.dev,
+        paired,
+        ...(paired && typeof msg1.label === "string" ? { label: msg1.label } : {}),
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=session.js.map

package/dist/src/session.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/src/tcp-transport.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/**
+ * TCP transport (docs/WEBRTC_MIGRATION.md Phase 3, LAN direct).
+ *
+ * Adapts a Node `net.Socket` to the `Transport` interface so the frame codec +
+ * `Mux` (framing.ts / transport.ts) run over a LAN TCP connection unchanged.
+ *
+ * A TCP socket is a byte STREAM with no message boundaries, so each frame is
+ * length-delimited on the wire with a 4-byte big-endian prefix:
+ *
+ *   ┌──────────────┬───────────────────────────┐
+ *   │ len u32 (BE) │ encoded frame (len bytes)  │
+ *   └──────────────┴───────────────────────────┘
+ *
+ * The length prefix is internal to this transport — the `Mux` above only ever
+ * sees whole frames, exactly as it does over a WebSocket message boundary.
+ * Backpressure maps to the socket's own `writableLength` + `drain` event.
+ */
+import type { Socket } from "node:net";
+import type { Transport } from "./transport.js";
+export declare class TcpTransport implements Transport {
+    private readonly socket;
+    private frameCb;
+    private closeCb;
+    private inbound;
+    private drainWaiters;
+    private closed;
+    constructor(socket: Socket);
+    send(bytes: Buffer): void;
+    bufferedAmount(): number;
+    onFrame(cb: (bytes: Buffer) => void): void;
+    onClose(cb: () => void): void;
+    whenWritable(highWaterMark: number): Promise<void>;
+    close(): void;
+    private wakeDrainWaiters;
+    /** Accumulate stream bytes and emit each complete length-prefixed frame. */
+    private onData;
+}

package/dist/src/tcp-transport.js

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/**
+ * TCP transport (docs/WEBRTC_MIGRATION.md Phase 3, LAN direct).
+ *
+ * Adapts a Node `net.Socket` to the `Transport` interface so the frame codec +
+ * `Mux` (framing.ts / transport.ts) run over a LAN TCP connection unchanged.
+ *
+ * A TCP socket is a byte STREAM with no message boundaries, so each frame is
+ * length-delimited on the wire with a 4-byte big-endian prefix:
+ *
+ *   ┌──────────────┬───────────────────────────┐
+ *   │ len u32 (BE) │ encoded frame (len bytes)  │
+ *   └──────────────┴───────────────────────────┘
+ *
+ * The length prefix is internal to this transport — the `Mux` above only ever
+ * sees whole frames, exactly as it does over a WebSocket message boundary.
+ * Backpressure maps to the socket's own `writableLength` + `drain` event.
+ */
+/** Length-prefix size. */
+const LEN_BYTES = 4;
+/** Refuse an absurd length prefix before allocating (guards a hostile peer). */
+const MAX_FRAME_BYTES = 64 * 1024 + 64; // one chunk + header slack
+export class TcpTransport {
+    socket;
+    frameCb = null;
+    closeCb = null;
+    inbound = Buffer.alloc(0);
+    drainWaiters = [];
+    closed = false;
+    constructor(socket) {
+        this.socket = socket;
+        socket.on("data", (chunk) => this.onData(chunk));
+        socket.on("drain", () => this.wakeDrainWaiters());
+        socket.on("close", () => {
+            this.closed = true;
+            for (const w of this.drainWaiters)
+                w.resolve();
+            this.drainWaiters = [];
+            this.closeCb?.();
+        });
+        socket.on("error", () => {
+            /* surfaced via 'close'; swallow so a peer reset doesn't crash the process */
+        });
+    }
+    send(bytes) {
+        if (this.closed)
+            return;
+        const framed = Buffer.allocUnsafe(LEN_BYTES + bytes.length);
+        framed.writeUInt32BE(bytes.length, 0);
+        bytes.copy(framed, LEN_BYTES);
+        this.socket.write(framed);
+    }
+    bufferedAmount() {
+        return this.socket.writableLength;
+    }
+    onFrame(cb) {
+        this.frameCb = cb;
+    }
+    onClose(cb) {
+        this.closeCb = cb;
+    }
+    whenWritable(highWaterMark) {
+        if (this.closed || this.socket.writableLength < highWaterMark) {
+            return Promise.resolve();
+        }
+        return new Promise((resolve) => {
+            this.drainWaiters.push({ hw: highWaterMark, resolve });
+        });
+    }
+    close() {
+        if (this.closed)
+            return;
+        this.socket.end();
+    }
+    wakeDrainWaiters() {
+        if (this.drainWaiters.length === 0)
+            return;
+        const still = [];
+        for (const w of this.drainWaiters) {
+            if (this.socket.writableLength < w.hw)
+                w.resolve();
+            else
+                still.push(w);
+        }
+        this.drainWaiters = still;
+    }
+    /** Accumulate stream bytes and emit each complete length-prefixed frame. */
+    onData(chunk) {
+        this.inbound = this.inbound.length === 0 ? chunk : Buffer.concat([this.inbound, chunk]);
+        for (;;) {
+            if (this.inbound.length < LEN_BYTES)
+                return;
+            const len = this.inbound.readUInt32BE(0);
+            if (len > MAX_FRAME_BYTES) {
+                // Corrupt/hostile stream — drop the connection rather than allocate.
+                this.close();
+                return;
+            }
+            if (this.inbound.length < LEN_BYTES + len)
+                return; // frame not fully arrived
+            const frame = this.inbound.subarray(LEN_BYTES, LEN_BYTES + len);
+            this.frameCb?.(Buffer.from(frame));
+            this.inbound = this.inbound.subarray(LEN_BYTES + len);
+        }
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=tcp-transport.js.map

package/dist/src/tcp-transport.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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