@groeponline/pi-wishcraft 0.23.4 → 0.24.0

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package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -2,6 +2,11 @@
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  ## [Unreleased]
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+ ## [0.24.0] - 2026-08-20
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+
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+ ### Added
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+ - Declarative policy engine (`wishcraft.policy`): in-process deny/inject rules in global settings, evaluated before command hooks. No process spawn. `policyEnabled: false` is the kill-switch.
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+
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  ## [0.23.4] - 2026-08-20
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  ### Fixed
package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -171,6 +171,35 @@ PY
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  Repairs run on custom/extension tools only, before hooks: drop null optionals, parse JSON-string arrays before wrapping, turn `{}` into `[]` on array keys, wrap bare strings, alias `filePath` / `absolutePath` / `target_file` to `path`, unwrap degenerate markdown auto-links. Core tools (`bash`, `read`, `edit`, `write`, `grep`, `find`, `ls`) are never rewritten. `/repairs` prints the counters.
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+ ## Policy
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+
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+ Declarative deny/inject rules in the **global** agent settings file. No shell commands — pure in-process regex. Evaluated before command hooks. `wishcraft.policyEnabled: false` disables policy without deleting rules.
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+
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+ ```json
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+ {
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+ "wishcraft": {
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+ "policy": [
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+ {
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+ "action": "deny",
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+ "tool": "bash",
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+ "match": "sudo\\s+rm",
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+ "reason": "destructive sudo rm"
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+ },
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+ {
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+ "action": "inject",
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+ "tool": "read",
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+ "pathMatch": "\\.env",
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+ "context": "Do not leak secrets from .env files into the conversation."
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+ }
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+ ]
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+ }
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+ }
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+ ```
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+
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+ **deny** — regex on tool input (`bash` uses `command`; other tools use JSON-serialized input). First match wins; the tool call is blocked with `reason`.
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+
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+ **inject** — regex on file path after a matching tool completes; context is appended to the tool result (same shape as postToolUse hook `additionalContext`).
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+
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  ## Limits
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  - No mouse on the live footer. Pi core owns that surface.
@@ -218,6 +218,8 @@ Set `powerline.costAlert` to a USD threshold to get a single warning notificatio
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  Command hooks live under `wishcraft.hooks` in the **global** agent settings file. `wishcraft.hooksEnabled: false` is the kill-switch. See the README Hooks section for three copy-paste examples (bash-guard, write-audit, SessionStart git-status).
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+ Declarative policy rules (`wishcraft.policy`) live in the same global file. They run in-process before command hooks: **deny** blocks a tool call when input matches a regex; **inject** appends context after a matching read/write path. `wishcraft.policyEnabled: false` disables policy without deleting rules. See the README Policy section for two copy-paste examples.
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+
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  Tool-input repairs apply to custom/extension tools only (`wishcraft.repairsEnabled`, default on). `/repairs` prints the counters.
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  ## Token budget
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "@groeponline/pi-wishcraft",
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- "version": "0.23.4",
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+ "version": "0.24.0",
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  "description": "Wishcraft cockpit for the pi coding agent — powerline status, vibes, idea inbox, bash mode, and full customization.",
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  "type": "module",
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  "files": [
@@ -27,6 +27,14 @@ import {
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  runHookCommand,
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  type HookPayload,
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  } from "./hooks-runner.ts";
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+ import {
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+ parsePolicySettings,
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+ type PolicyRule,
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+ } from "./policy-config.ts";
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+ import {
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+ evalPostToolUsePolicy,
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+ evalPreToolUsePolicy,
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+ } from "./policy-engine.ts";
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  import {
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  recordRepairs,
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  repairToolInput,
@@ -34,6 +42,8 @@ import {
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  let hooksSettings: WishcraftHooksSettings = {};
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  let hooksEnabled = false;
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+ let policyRules: PolicyRule[] = [];
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+ let policyEnabled = false;
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  let repairsEnabled = true;
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  let pendingSessionContext: string | null = null;
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@@ -46,6 +56,9 @@ function refreshSettings(cwd: string): void {
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  const parsed = parseHooksSettings(globalWishcraft);
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  hooksSettings = parsed.hooks;
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  hooksEnabled = parsed.enabled && hasAnyHook(parsed.hooks);
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+ const policy = parsePolicySettings(globalWishcraft);
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+ policyRules = policy.rules;
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+ policyEnabled = policy.enabled;
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  repairsEnabled =
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  !merged ||
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  typeof merged !== "object" ||
@@ -125,6 +138,12 @@ export function setupHooks(
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  const result = repairToolInput(toolName, event.input);
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  if (result.repairs.length > 0) recordRepairs(result);
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  }
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+ if (policyEnabled) {
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+ const policyVerdict = evalPreToolUsePolicy(policyRules, toolName, event.input);
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+ if (policyVerdict.block) {
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+ return { block: true, reason: policyVerdict.reason };
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+ }
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+ }
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  if (!hooksEnabled) return;
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  const cmds = commandsFor(hooksSettings, "preToolUse", toolName);
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  if (cmds.length === 0) return;
@@ -147,27 +166,33 @@ export function setupHooks(
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  });
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  pi.on("tool_result", async (event: any, ctx: any) => {
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- if (!hooksEnabled) return;
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- const cmds = commandsFor(hooksSettings, "postToolUse", event.toolName);
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- if (cmds.length === 0) return;
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- const payload = basePayload("postToolUse", ctx);
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- payload.tool_use_id = event.toolCallId;
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- payload.tool_name = event.toolName;
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- payload.tool_input = event.input;
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- payload.tool_response =
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- typeof event.content === "string"
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- ? event.content
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- : Array.isArray(event.content)
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- ? event.content.map((c: any) => c.text ?? "").join("\n")
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- : "";
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- // parallel: één crashende hook annuleert de rest niet
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- const outs = await Promise.all(cmds.map((c) => runHookCommand(c, payload)));
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  let extra = "";
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- for (const out of outs) {
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- const add = out.parsed?.hookSpecificOutput?.additionalContext;
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- if (add) extra += (extra ? "\n" : "") + add;
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- if (out.parsed?.systemMessage && ctx?.ui?.notify) {
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- ctx.ui.notify(out.parsed.systemMessage, "info");
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+ if (policyEnabled) {
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+ const inject = evalPostToolUsePolicy(policyRules, event.toolName, event.input);
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+ if (inject) extra = inject.additionalContext;
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+ }
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+ if (hooksEnabled) {
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+ const cmds = commandsFor(hooksSettings, "postToolUse", event.toolName);
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+ if (cmds.length > 0) {
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+ const payload = basePayload("postToolUse", ctx);
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+ payload.tool_use_id = event.toolCallId;
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+ payload.tool_name = event.toolName;
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+ payload.tool_input = event.input;
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+ payload.tool_response =
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+ typeof event.content === "string"
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+ ? event.content
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+ : Array.isArray(event.content)
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+ ? event.content.map((c: any) => c.text ?? "").join("\n")
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+ : "";
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+ // parallel: één crashende hook annuleert de rest niet
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+ const outs = await Promise.all(cmds.map((c) => runHookCommand(c, payload)));
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+ for (const out of outs) {
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+ const add = out.parsed?.hookSpecificOutput?.additionalContext;
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+ if (add) extra += (extra ? "\n" : "") + add;
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+ if (out.parsed?.systemMessage && ctx?.ui?.notify) {
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+ ctx.ui.notify(out.parsed.systemMessage, "info");
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+ }
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+ }
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  }
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  }
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  if (extra && Array.isArray(event.content)) {
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
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+ /**
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+ * policy-config.ts
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+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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+ * Declarative policy rules (deny / inject) from global wishcraft settings.
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+ * No process spawn — pure regex evaluation in-process.
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+ *
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+ * "wishcraft": {
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+ * "policyEnabled": true,
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+ * "policy": [
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+ * { "action": "deny", "tool": "bash", "match": "sudo\\s+rm", "reason": "…" },
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+ * { "action": "inject", "tool": "read", "pathMatch": "\\.env", "context": "…" }
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+ * ]
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+ * }
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+ *
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+ * policyEnabled defaults to true when policy is non-empty; explicit false
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+ * is the kill-switch. Malformed rules are dropped (no throw).
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+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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+ */
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+
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+ export interface DenyPolicyRule {
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+ action: "deny";
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+ tool: string;
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+ match: string;
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+ reason: string;
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+ }
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+
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+ export interface InjectPolicyRule {
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+ action: "inject";
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+ tool: string;
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+ pathMatch: string;
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+ context: string;
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+ }
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+
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+ export type PolicyRule = DenyPolicyRule | InjectPolicyRule;
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+
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+ function isRecord(v: unknown): v is Record<string, unknown> {
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+ return typeof v === "object" && v !== null && !Array.isArray(v);
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+ }
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+
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+ function validRegex(pattern: string): boolean {
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+ try {
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+ new RegExp(pattern);
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+ return true;
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+ } catch {
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+ return false;
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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+ function parseDenyRule(v: unknown): DenyPolicyRule | null {
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+ if (!isRecord(v) || v.action !== "deny") return null;
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+ if (typeof v.tool !== "string" || !v.tool.trim()) return null;
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+ if (typeof v.match !== "string" || !v.match.trim()) return null;
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+ if (typeof v.reason !== "string" || !v.reason.trim()) return null;
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+ if (!validRegex(v.match)) return null;
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+ return {
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+ action: "deny",
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+ tool: v.tool,
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+ match: v.match,
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+ reason: v.reason,
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+ };
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+ }
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+
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+ function parseInjectRule(v: unknown): InjectPolicyRule | null {
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+ if (!isRecord(v) || v.action !== "inject") return null;
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+ if (typeof v.tool !== "string" || !v.tool.trim()) return null;
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+ if (typeof v.pathMatch !== "string" || !v.pathMatch.trim()) return null;
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+ if (typeof v.context !== "string" || !v.context.trim()) return null;
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+ if (!validRegex(v.pathMatch)) return null;
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+ return {
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+ action: "inject",
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+ tool: v.tool,
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+ pathMatch: v.pathMatch,
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+ context: v.context,
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+ };
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+ }
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+
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+ function parsePolicyRule(v: unknown): PolicyRule | null {
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+ if (!isRecord(v)) return null;
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+ if (v.action === "deny") return parseDenyRule(v);
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+ if (v.action === "inject") return parseInjectRule(v);
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+ return null;
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+ }
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+
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+ /** Parse wishcraft policy settings. Invalid rules are dropped. */
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+ export function parsePolicySettings(wishcraftSettings: unknown): {
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+ enabled: boolean;
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+ rules: PolicyRule[];
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+ } {
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+ if (!isRecord(wishcraftSettings)) return { enabled: false, rules: [] };
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+ const raw = wishcraftSettings.policy;
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+ if (!Array.isArray(raw)) return { enabled: false, rules: [] };
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+ const rules = raw
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+ .map(parsePolicyRule)
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+ .filter((r): r is PolicyRule => r !== null);
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+ if (rules.length === 0) return { enabled: false, rules: [] };
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+ const enabled = wishcraftSettings.policyEnabled !== false;
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+ return { enabled, rules };
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+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
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+ /**
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+ * policy-engine.ts
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+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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+ * Pure in-process policy evaluation (deny before tool use, inject after).
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+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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+ */
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+
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+ import type { PolicyRule } from "./policy-config.ts";
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+
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+ function isRecord(v: unknown): v is Record<string, unknown> {
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+ return typeof v === "object" && v !== null && !Array.isArray(v);
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+ }
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+
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+ /** Text to match deny rules against (bash command or serialized input). */
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+ export function toolInputText(toolName: string, input: unknown): string {
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+ if (toolName === "bash" && isRecord(input) && typeof input.command === "string") {
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+ return input.command;
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+ }
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+ try {
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+ return JSON.stringify(input ?? {});
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+ } catch {
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+ return String(input ?? "");
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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+ /** Path from tool input (read/write/edit and common aliases). */
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+ export function toolPath(input: unknown): string | null {
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+ if (!isRecord(input)) return null;
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+ for (const key of ["path", "filePath", "absolutePath", "target_file", "file_path"]) {
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+ const v = input[key];
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+ if (typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0) return v;
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+ }
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+ return null;
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+ }
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+
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+ export type PreToolUsePolicyVerdict =
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+ | { block: true; reason: string }
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+ | { block: false };
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+
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+ /** First matching deny rule wins. */
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+ export function evalPreToolUsePolicy(
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+ rules: PolicyRule[],
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+ toolName: string,
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+ input: unknown,
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+ ): PreToolUsePolicyVerdict {
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+ const text = toolInputText(toolName, input);
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+ for (const rule of rules) {
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+ if (rule.action !== "deny" || rule.tool !== toolName) continue;
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+ try {
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+ if (new RegExp(rule.match).test(text)) {
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+ return { block: true, reason: rule.reason };
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+ }
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+ } catch {
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+ // invalid regex at runtime — skip
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+ }
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+ }
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+ return { block: false };
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+ }
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+
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+ /** All matching inject rules contribute context (in order). */
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+ export function evalPostToolUsePolicy(
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+ rules: PolicyRule[],
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+ toolName: string,
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+ input: unknown,
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+ ): { additionalContext: string } | null {
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+ const path = toolPath(input);
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+ if (path === null) return null;
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+ let extra = "";
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+ for (const rule of rules) {
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+ if (rule.action !== "inject" || rule.tool !== toolName) continue;
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+ try {
72
+ if (new RegExp(rule.pathMatch).test(path)) {
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+ extra += (extra ? "\n" : "") + rule.context;
74
+ }
75
+ } catch {
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+ // invalid regex at runtime — skip
77
+ }
78
+ }
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+ return extra ? { additionalContext: extra } : null;
80
+ }