@gotgenes/pi-permission-system 18.0.0 → 18.0.1

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,13 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## [18.0.1](https://github.com/gotgenes/pi-packages/compare/pi-permission-system-v18.0.0...pi-permission-system-v18.0.1) (2026-06-30)
+
+
+### Documentation
+
+* **pi-permission-system:** name the path-values boundary contract and guard it ([#506](https://github.com/gotgenes/pi-packages/issues/506)) ([a47648c](https://github.com/gotgenes/pi-packages/commit/a47648c1fcff3226b6ea3269392f9d8548654ee1))
+
 ## [18.0.0](https://github.com/gotgenes/pi-packages/compare/pi-permission-system-v17.1.1...pi-permission-system-v18.0.0) (2026-06-29)
 
 

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@gotgenes/pi-permission-system",
-  "version": "18.0.0",
+  "version": "18.0.1",
   "description": "Permission enforcement extension for the Pi coding agent.",
   "type": "module",
   "exports": {

package/src/access-intent/access-intent.ts

@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ export interface ToolAccessIntent {
  * Not gate-emitted: the resolver produces it internally by unwrapping an
  * `access-path` intent via `matchValues()`, keeping the low-level manager
  * string-based (it never imports `AccessPath`). See {@link ResolvedAccessIntent}.
+ *
+ * This string seam is a deliberate, formalized boundary — not transitional
+ * scaffolding to collapse into the manager (ADR-0002,
+ * `docs/decisions/0002-path-values-string-boundary.md`).
  */
 export interface PathValuesAccessIntent {
   kind: "path-values";
@@ -53,6 +57,9 @@ export type AccessIntent = ToolAccessIntent | AccessPathAccessIntent;
  * What the manager consumes — the `access-path` variant has already been
  * unwrapped to `path-values` by the resolver via `path.matchValues()`.
  *
- * The manager stays string-based and never imports `AccessPath`.
+ * The manager stays string-based and never imports `AccessPath`: this is the
+ * deliberate boundary formalized in ADR-0002
+ * (`docs/decisions/0002-path-values-string-boundary.md`), guarded by a
+ * `no-restricted-imports` lint rule on `permission-manager.ts`.
  */
 export type ResolvedAccessIntent = ToolAccessIntent | PathValuesAccessIntent;

package/src/access-intent/access-path.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import {
   canonicalNormalizePathForComparison,
   getPathPolicyValues,
   normalizePathForComparison,
-} from "#src/path-utils";
+} from "./path-normalization";
 
 /**
  * A path's two representations held behind type-distinct accessors.

package/src/access-intent/bash/bash-path-resolver.ts

@@ -14,8 +14,9 @@ import {
   collectRedirectTokens,
   extractCommandName,
 } from "#src/access-intent/bash/token-collection";
+import { normalizePathPolicyLiteral } from "#src/access-intent/path-normalization";
 import type { PathNormalizer } from "#src/path-normalizer";
-import { isSafeSystemPath, normalizePathPolicyLiteral } from "#src/path-utils";
+import { isSafeSystemPath } from "#src/safe-system-paths";
 
 // ── Internal types ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 

package/src/access-intent/path-normalization.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+import { posix as posixPath, win32 as winPath } from "node:path";
+
+import { canonicalizePath } from "#src/canonicalize-path";
+import { expandHomePath } from "#src/expand-home";
+import { isPathWithinDirectory } from "#src/path-containment";
+
+/**
+ * Representation derivation backing {@link AccessPath}: turn an accessed path
+ * into the lexical / canonical / policy-value forms the resolver matches
+ * against rules. Pure (no filesystem access except `canonicalizePath`'s
+ * best-effort symlink resolution); the `platform` is injected, never read
+ * ambiently.
+ */
+export function normalizePathForComparison(
+  pathValue: string,
+  cwd: string,
+  platform: NodeJS.Platform,
+): string {
+  const trimmed = pathValue.trim().replace(/^['"]|['"]$/g, "");
+  if (!trimmed) {
+    return "";
+  }
+
+  let normalizedPath = trimmed.startsWith("@") ? trimmed.slice(1) : trimmed;
+  normalizedPath = expandHomePath(normalizedPath);
+
+  const impl = platform === "win32" ? winPath : posixPath;
+  const absolutePath = impl.resolve(cwd, normalizedPath);
+  const normalizedAbsolutePath = impl.normalize(absolutePath);
+  return platform === "win32"
+    ? normalizedAbsolutePath.toLowerCase()
+    : normalizedAbsolutePath;
+}
+
+export interface PathPolicyValueOptions {
+  /**
+   * Current Pi working directory. When provided, returned values include a
+   * project-relative alias for paths that resolve inside this directory.
+   */
+  cwd?: string;
+  /**
+   * Directory used to resolve `pathValue` into an absolute policy value.
+   * Defaults to `cwd`. Bash uses this for tokens seen after a literal `cd`.
+   */
+  resolveBase?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Normalize a single path-like lookup value without resolving it against CWD.
+ *
+ * Preserves compatibility with existing relative path rules (`src/*`, `*.env`)
+ * while applying the same lexical cleanup as
+ * {@link normalizePathForComparison}: trim, strip simple wrapping quotes,
+ * strip the OpenCode-style leading `@`, and expand `~` / `$HOME`.
+ */
+export function normalizePathPolicyLiteral(pathValue: string): string {
+  const trimmed = pathValue.trim().replace(/^['"]|['"]$/g, "");
+  if (!trimmed) return "";
+  const unprefixed = trimmed.startsWith("@") ? trimmed.slice(1) : trimmed;
+  return expandHomePath(unprefixed);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return equivalent lookup values for path-policy matching.
+ *
+ * The first value is the cwd/effective-base normalized absolute path when a
+ * base is available. The later values preserve project-relative and raw
+ * relative forms so existing rules like `src/*` and `*.env` continue to match.
+ */
+export function getPathPolicyValues(
+  pathValue: string,
+  options: PathPolicyValueOptions,
+  platform: NodeJS.Platform,
+): string[] {
+  const literal = normalizePathPolicyLiteral(pathValue);
+  if (!literal) return [];
+  if (literal === "*") return ["*"];
+
+  return [
+    ...new Set([
+      ...getAbsolutePathPolicyValues(pathValue, options, platform),
+      literal,
+    ]),
+  ];
+}
+
+function getAbsolutePathPolicyValues(
+  pathValue: string,
+  options: PathPolicyValueOptions,
+  platform: NodeJS.Platform,
+): string[] {
+  const resolveBase = options.resolveBase ?? options.cwd;
+  if (!resolveBase) return [];
+
+  const absolute = normalizePathForComparison(pathValue, resolveBase, platform);
+  if (!absolute) return [];
+
+  return [
+    absolute,
+    ...getCwdRelativePathPolicyValues(absolute, options.cwd, platform),
+  ];
+}
+
+function getCwdRelativePathPolicyValues(
+  absolute: string,
+  cwd: string | undefined,
+  platform: NodeJS.Platform,
+): string[] {
+  if (!cwd) return [];
+
+  const normalizedCwd = normalizePathForComparison(cwd, cwd, platform);
+  if (!normalizedCwd) return [];
+  if (
+    absolute !== normalizedCwd &&
+    !isPathWithinDirectory(absolute, normalizedCwd, platform)
+  ) {
+    return [];
+  }
+
+  const impl = platform === "win32" ? winPath : posixPath;
+  const relativeValue = impl.relative(normalizedCwd, absolute);
+  return relativeValue ? [relativeValue] : [];
+}
+
+/**
+ * Like {@link normalizePathForComparison} but also resolves symlinks via
+ * `realpathSync` (best-effort). Use this for containment decisions where the
+ * OS-followed path matters, not for pattern matching.
+ */
+export function canonicalNormalizePathForComparison(
+  pathValue: string,
+  cwd: string,
+  platform: NodeJS.Platform,
+): string {
+  const lexical = normalizePathForComparison(pathValue, cwd, platform);
+  if (!lexical) return "";
+  const canonical = canonicalizePath(lexical, platform);
+  return platform === "win32" ? canonical.toLowerCase() : canonical;
+}

package/src/handlers/gates/external-directory.ts

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 import type { PathNormalizer } from "#src/path-normalizer";
-import { getToolInputPath } from "#src/path-utils";
 import type { ScopedPermissionResolver } from "#src/permission-resolver";
 import { SessionApproval } from "#src/session-approval";
 import { deriveApprovalPattern } from "#src/session-rules";
 import type { ToolAccessExtractorLookup } from "#src/tool-access-extractor-registry";
+import { getToolInputPath } from "#src/tool-input-path";
 import type { GateResult } from "./descriptor";
 import { formatExternalDirectoryAskPrompt } from "./external-directory-messages";
 import { resolveExternalDirectoryPolicy } from "./external-directory-policy";

package/src/handlers/gates/path.ts

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 import type { PathNormalizer } from "#src/path-normalizer";
-import { getToolInputPath } from "#src/path-utils";
 import type { ScopedPermissionResolver } from "#src/permission-resolver";
 import { SessionApproval } from "#src/session-approval";
 import { deriveApprovalPattern } from "#src/session-rules";
 import type { ToolAccessExtractorLookup } from "#src/tool-access-extractor-registry";
+import { getToolInputPath } from "#src/tool-input-path";
 import type { GateDescriptor, GateResult } from "./descriptor";
 import type { ToolCallContext } from "./types";
 

package/src/handlers/gates/tool-call-gate-pipeline.ts

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 import type { AccessPath } from "#src/access-intent/access-path";
 import { BashProgram } from "#src/access-intent/bash/program";
 import type { PathNormalizer } from "#src/path-normalizer";
-import { getPathBearingToolPath } from "#src/path-utils";
 import type { ScopedPermissionResolver } from "#src/permission-resolver";
 import type { SkillPromptEntry } from "#src/skill-prompt-sanitizer";
 import type { ToolAccessExtractorLookup } from "#src/tool-access-extractor-registry";
 import type { ToolInputFormatterLookup } from "#src/tool-input-formatter-registry";
+import { getPathBearingToolPath } from "#src/tool-input-path";
 import {
   ToolPreviewFormatter,
   type ToolPreviewFormatterOptions,

package/src/handlers/gates/tool.ts

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 import type { AccessPath } from "#src/access-intent/access-path";
-import { getPathBearingToolPath, PATH_BEARING_TOOLS } from "#src/path-utils";
+import { PATH_BEARING_TOOLS } from "#src/path-surfaces";
 import { suggestSessionPattern } from "#src/pattern-suggest";
 import { formatAskPrompt } from "#src/permission-prompts";
 import { SessionApproval } from "#src/session-approval";
+import { getPathBearingToolPath } from "#src/tool-input-path";
 import type { ToolPreviewFormatter } from "#src/tool-preview-formatter";
 import type { PermissionCheckResult } from "#src/types";
 import type { GateDescriptor } from "./descriptor";

package/src/input-normalizer.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import type { AccessIntent } from "./access-intent/access-intent";
 import { stripBashCommentLines } from "./bash-arity";
 import { createMcpPermissionTargets } from "./mcp-targets";
 import type { PathNormalizer } from "./path-normalizer";
-import { PATH_SURFACES } from "./path-utils";
+import { PATH_SURFACES } from "./path-surfaces";
 import { getNonEmptyString, toRecord } from "./value-guards";
 
 /**

package/src/path-containment.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+import { posix as posixPath, win32 as winPath } from "node:path";
+
+import { isSafeSystemPath } from "./safe-system-paths";
+
+/**
+ * Returns true when `pathValue` is `directory` itself or nested inside it.
+ *
+ * Containment is decided with Node's platform-native `path.relative` rather
+ * than a hand-rolled prefix check: on `win32` the comparison folds case (and
+ * tolerates either separator), matching the case-insensitive filesystem.
+ * `platform` is injected from the composition root so Windows behavior is
+ * testable on a POSIX CI.
+ */
+export function isPathWithinDirectory(
+  pathValue: string,
+  directory: string,
+  platform: NodeJS.Platform,
+): boolean {
+  if (!pathValue || !directory) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (pathValue === directory) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  const impl = platform === "win32" ? winPath : posixPath;
+  const rel = impl.relative(directory, pathValue);
+  return (
+    rel !== "" &&
+    rel !== ".." &&
+    !rel.startsWith(`..${impl.sep}`) &&
+    !impl.isAbsolute(rel)
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Pure geometry: is `canonicalPath` outside `canonicalCwd`?
+ *
+ * Both operands must already be canonical (symlink-resolved, win32-lowercased)
+ * — the caller prepares them (see {@link PathNormalizer.isOutsideWorkingDirectory}).
+ * This predicate touches no filesystem and does no derivation.
+ */
+export function isPathOutsideWorkingDirectory(
+  canonicalPath: string,
+  canonicalCwd: string,
+  platform: NodeJS.Platform,
+): boolean {
+  if (!canonicalCwd || !canonicalPath) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (isSafeSystemPath(canonicalPath)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return !isPathWithinDirectory(canonicalPath, canonicalCwd, platform);
+}

package/src/path-normalizer.ts

@@ -1,12 +1,15 @@
 import { posix as posixPath, win32 as winPath } from "node:path";
 
 import { AccessPath } from "./access-intent/access-path";
+import {
+  canonicalNormalizePathForComparison,
+  normalizePathForComparison,
+} from "./access-intent/path-normalization";
 import {
   isPathOutsideWorkingDirectory,
   isPathWithinDirectory,
-  isPiInfrastructureRead,
-  normalizePathForComparison,
-} from "./path-utils";
+} from "./path-containment";
+import { isPiInfrastructureRead } from "./pi-infrastructure-read";
 
 /**
  * Path-interpretation collaborator, constructed once at the session edge with
@@ -19,16 +22,19 @@ import {
  * prepared {@link AccessPath} values, instead of reading `process.platform`
  * ambiently or threading `cwd` through every call. Internally it selects the
  * `win32`/`posix` path flavor once and delegates to the platform-parameterized
- * `path-utils` / `AccessPath` primitives.
+ * `path-containment` / `path-normalization` / `AccessPath` primitives.
  */
 export class PathNormalizer {
   private readonly impl: typeof posixPath;
+  /** Canonical form of the baked cwd, resolved once (the symlink target is stable per session). */
+  private readonly canonicalCwd: string;
 
   constructor(
     private readonly platform: NodeJS.Platform,
     private readonly cwd: string,
   ) {
     this.impl = platform === "win32" ? winPath : posixPath;
+    this.canonicalCwd = canonicalNormalizePathForComparison(cwd, cwd, platform);
   }
 
   /** Build an AccessPath for a token, resolved against `resolveBase` (default cwd). */
@@ -67,7 +73,16 @@ export class PathNormalizer {
 
   /** Canonical (symlink-resolved) outside-cwd test against the baked cwd. */
   isOutsideWorkingDirectory(pathValue: string): boolean {
-    return isPathOutsideWorkingDirectory(pathValue, this.cwd, this.platform);
+    const canonicalPath = canonicalNormalizePathForComparison(
+      pathValue,
+      this.cwd,
+      this.platform,
+    );
+    return isPathOutsideWorkingDirectory(
+      canonicalPath,
+      this.canonicalCwd,
+      this.platform,
+    );
   }
 
   /**

package/src/path-surfaces.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/**
+ * File tools that only read — never write — the filesystem.
+ * Only these tools are eligible for the Pi infrastructure auto-allow.
+ */
+export const READ_ONLY_PATH_BEARING_TOOLS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
+  "read",
+  "find",
+  "grep",
+  "ls",
+]);
+
+export const PATH_BEARING_TOOLS = new Set([
+  "read",
+  "write",
+  "edit",
+  "find",
+  "grep",
+  "ls",
+]);
+
+/**
+ * Surfaces whose patterns are matched against filesystem paths and therefore
+ * fold case (and separators) on Windows: the path-bearing tools plus the
+ * cross-cutting `path` gate and the `external_directory` boundary gate.
+ */
+export const PATH_SURFACES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
+  ...PATH_BEARING_TOOLS,
+  "external_directory",
+  "path",
+]);

package/src/pattern-suggest.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { prefix, stripBashCommentLines } from "./bash-arity";
-import { PATH_BEARING_TOOLS } from "./path-utils";
+import { PATH_BEARING_TOOLS } from "./path-surfaces";
 import { deriveApprovalPattern } from "./session-rules";
 
 /** The suggestion returned for a "Yes, for this session" dialog option. */

package/src/permission-manager.ts

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import {
 } from "./config-paths";
 import { normalizeInput } from "./input-normalizer";
 import { normalizeFlatConfig } from "./normalize";
-import { PATH_SURFACES } from "./path-utils";
+import { PATH_SURFACES } from "./path-surfaces";
 import {
   FilePolicyLoader,
   type PolicyLoader,
@@ -249,6 +249,12 @@ export class PermissionManager implements ScopedPermissionManager {
    * extension surfaces). Path-bearing surfaces arrive as `"path-values"` via
    * the access-path gate (#502) or service/RPC builder (#503).
    * `"path-values"` → evaluates the precomputed values directly.
+   *
+   * The manager stays string-based by design: it consumes `ResolvedAccessIntent`
+   * (`tool | path-values`) and never imports `AccessPath`. This deliberate
+   * boundary is formalized in ADR-0002
+   * (`docs/decisions/0002-path-values-string-boundary.md`) and guarded by a
+   * `no-restricted-imports` lint rule on this file.
    */
   check(
     intent: ResolvedAccessIntent,

package/src/permission-resolver.ts

@@ -26,6 +26,11 @@ export interface ScopedPermissionResolver {
  *
  * Tell-Don't-Ask: the resolver asks an `AccessPath` for its `matchValues()`,
  * so the low-level manager never imports the value object.
+ *
+ * This is the sole `matchValues()` unwrap site — the single place the lexical ∪
+ * canonical alias set (#418) is derived. Keeping it here (not in the manager)
+ * is the deliberate boundary formalized in ADR-0002
+ * (`docs/decisions/0002-path-values-string-boundary.md`).
  */
 function toResolvedIntent(intent: AccessIntent): ResolvedAccessIntent {
   if (intent.kind === "access-path") {

package/src/pi-infrastructure-read.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+import { join } from "node:path";
+
+import { expandHomePath } from "./expand-home";
+import { isPathWithinDirectory } from "./path-containment";
+import { READ_ONLY_PATH_BEARING_TOOLS } from "./path-surfaces";
+import { wildcardMatch } from "./wildcard-matcher";
+
+function containsGlobChars(value: string): boolean {
+  return value.includes("*") || value.includes("?");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns true if the given tool + normalized path combination qualifies for
+ * automatic allow as a Pi infrastructure read.
+ *
+ * A path qualifies when:
+ * 1. The tool is read-only (in READ_ONLY_PATH_BEARING_TOOLS).
+ * 2. The normalized path is within one of the provided `infrastructureDirs`
+ *    OR within the project-local Pi package directories
+ *    (`<cwd>/.pi/npm/` or `<cwd>/.pi/git/`).
+ *
+ * `infrastructureDirs` entries may be absolute paths or patterns containing
+ * `~`/`$HOME` (expanded at call time) or glob characters (`*`, `?`).
+ * Project-local paths are computed fresh from `cwd` on each call so they
+ * follow working-directory changes without a runtime rebuild.
+ */
+export function isPiInfrastructureRead(
+  toolName: string,
+  normalizedPath: string,
+  infrastructureDirs: readonly string[],
+  cwd: string,
+  platform: NodeJS.Platform,
+): boolean {
+  if (!READ_ONLY_PATH_BEARING_TOOLS.has(toolName)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // On Windows the path value is canonicalized + lowercased; fold case (and
+  // separators) so mixed-case infra dirs and glob patterns still match.
+  const matchOptions =
+    platform === "win32"
+      ? { caseInsensitive: true, windowsSeparators: true }
+      : undefined;
+
+  for (const dir of infrastructureDirs) {
+    if (containsGlobChars(dir)) {
+      if (wildcardMatch(dir, normalizedPath, matchOptions)) return true;
+    } else {
+      if (isPathWithinDirectory(normalizedPath, expandHomePath(dir), platform))
+        return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Project-local Pi packages — checked fresh every call so CWD changes work.
+  const projectNpmDir = join(cwd, ".pi", "npm");
+  const projectGitDir = join(cwd, ".pi", "git");
+  if (isPathWithinDirectory(normalizedPath, projectNpmDir, platform)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (isPathWithinDirectory(normalizedPath, projectGitDir, platform)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}

package/src/rule.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { PATH_SURFACES } from "./path-utils";
+import { PATH_SURFACES } from "./path-surfaces";
 import type { PermissionState } from "./types";
 import { wildcardMatch } from "./wildcard-matcher";
 

package/src/safe-system-paths.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/**
+ * Paths that are universally safe and should never trigger external-directory checks.
+ * These are OS device files: read returns EOF or process streams, write discards or goes to process streams.
+ */
+export const SAFE_SYSTEM_PATHS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
+  "/dev/null",
+  "/dev/stdin",
+  "/dev/stdout",
+  "/dev/stderr",
+]);
+
+/**
+ * Returns true if the given normalized path is a safe OS device file
+ * that should never trigger external-directory checks.
+ */
+export function isSafeSystemPath(normalizedPath: string): boolean {
+  return SAFE_SYSTEM_PATHS.has(normalizedPath);
+}

package/src/tool-input-path.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+import { PATH_BEARING_TOOLS } from "./path-surfaces";
+import type { ToolAccessExtractorLookup } from "./tool-access-extractor-registry";
+import { getNonEmptyString, toRecord } from "./value-guards";
+
+export function getPathBearingToolPath(
+  toolName: string,
+  input: unknown,
+): string | null {
+  if (!PATH_BEARING_TOOLS.has(toolName)) {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  return getNonEmptyString(toRecord(input).path);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Extract the filesystem path a tool will access, for the cross-cutting `path`
+ * and `external_directory` gates.
+ *
+ * Unlike {@link getPathBearingToolPath} (built-in tools only), this recognizes
+ * extension and MCP tools so they are no longer exempt from path gating:
+ *
+ * - `bash` → `null` (bash has its own token-based path gates).
+ * - Built-in path-bearing tools → `input.path`.
+ * - `mcp` → `input.arguments.path`.
+ * - Any other tool → a registered {@link ToolAccessExtractor}'s path, else the
+ *   default `input.path` convention.
+ */
+export function getToolInputPath(
+  toolName: string,
+  input: unknown,
+  extractors?: ToolAccessExtractorLookup,
+): string | null {
+  if (toolName === "bash") {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  const record = toRecord(input);
+
+  if (PATH_BEARING_TOOLS.has(toolName)) {
+    return getNonEmptyString(record.path);
+  }
+
+  if (toolName === "mcp") {
+    return getNonEmptyString(toRecord(record.arguments).path);
+  }
+
+  const custom = extractors?.get(toolName);
+  if (custom) {
+    return getNonEmptyString(custom(record));
+  }
+
+  return getNonEmptyString(record.path);
+}