@goplus/agentguard 1.1.1 → 1.1.3

package/docs/SECURITY-POLICY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,558 @@
+# GoPlus AgentGuard Security Policy
+
+Unified security policy reference for all platforms (Claude Code, OpenClaw, and future integrations).
+
+---
+
+## 1. Overview
+
+### Design Principles
+
+1. **Defense in Depth**: Multiple layers of protection (static scan, runtime evaluation, trust registry)
+2. **Fail-Secure**: Unknown or ambiguous actions default to denial/confirmation
+3. **Least Privilege**: Skills receive minimal capabilities by default
+4. **User Sovereignty**: Users always retain final approval authority
+
+### Three-Module Architecture
+
+| Module | Purpose | When Invoked |
+|--------|---------|--------------|
+| **Static Scanner** | Detect malicious patterns in code/prompts | Before execution (`/agentguard scan`) |
+| **Action Evaluator** | Runtime policy decisions on agent actions | On tool calls (hooks) |
+| **Trust Registry** | Skill identity and capability attestation | Skill invocation & lookup |
+
+---
+
+## 2. Protection Levels
+
+Configure via `/agentguard config <level>`:
+
+| Level | Description | DENY Behavior | CONFIRM Behavior |
+|-------|-------------|---------------|------------------|
+| **strict** | Maximum security. All risk operations blocked. | Block | Block (treated as deny) |
+| **balanced** (default) | Critical threats blocked, high-risk prompts user. | Block | Prompt user |
+| **permissive** | Only critical threats blocked, others prompt. | Block if critical; else prompt | Prompt if high/critical |
+
+### Decision Matrix
+
+| Risk Level | strict | balanced | permissive |
+|------------|--------|----------|------------|
+| critical + DENY | Block | Block | Block |
+| critical + CONFIRM | Block | Prompt | Prompt |
+| high + DENY | Block | Block | Prompt |
+| high + CONFIRM | Block | Prompt | Prompt |
+| medium + DENY | Block | Block | Prompt |
+| medium + CONFIRM | Block | Prompt | Allow |
+| low | Allow | Allow | Allow |
+
+---
+
+## 3. Decision Framework
+
+### Decision Types
+
+| Decision | Meaning | Typical Outcome |
+|----------|---------|-----------------|
+| **ALLOW** | Safe to proceed | Action executes |
+| **DENY** | Must not proceed | Action blocked (error to agent) |
+| **CONFIRM** | Requires user approval | Prompt user for confirmation |
+
+### Risk Levels
+
+| Level | Priority Range | Description |
+|-------|----------------|-------------|
+| **critical** | 90-100 | Immediate block — private keys, destructive commands |
+| **high** | 70-89 | Strong risk — API secrets, untrusted network exfil |
+| **medium** | 50-69 | Moderate risk — system commands, network activity |
+| **low** | 0-49 | Minimal risk — safe/read-only operations |
+
+---
+
+## 4. Runtime Action Rules (ActionScanner)
+
+### 4.1 Command Execution (`exec_command`)
+
+#### Safe Commands (Always ALLOW)
+
+Commands matching the safe list are allowed without restriction, **unless** they contain shell metacharacters or access sensitive paths.
+
+| Category | Commands |
+|----------|----------|
+| **Read-only** | `ls`, `echo`, `pwd`, `whoami`, `date`, `hostname`, `uname`, `tree`, `du`, `df`, `sort`, `uniq`, `diff`, `cd` |
+| **File inspection** | `cat`, `head`, `tail`, `wc`, `grep`, `find`, `which`, `type` |
+| **File operations** | `mkdir`, `cp`, `mv`, `touch` |
+| **Git** | `git status`, `git log`, `git diff`, `git branch`, `git show`, `git remote`, `git clone`, `git checkout`, `git pull`, `git fetch`, `git merge`, `git add`, `git commit`, `git push` |
+| **Package managers** | `npm install`, `npm run`, `npm test`, `npm ci`, `npm start`, `npx`, `yarn`, `pnpm`, `pip install`, `pip3 install` |
+| **Version checks** | `node -v`, `npm -v`, `python --version`, `tsc --version`, `go version`, `rustc --version`, `java -version` |
+| **Build & run** | `tsc`, `go build`, `go run`, `cargo build`, `cargo run`, `cargo test`, `make` |
+
+**Shell metacharacters that disqualify safe commands**: `;`, `|`, `&`, `` ` ``, `$`, `(`, `)`, `{`, `}`
+
+#### Dangerous Commands (Always DENY — Critical)
+
+| Pattern | Description |
+|---------|-------------|
+| `rm -rf` / `rm -fr` | Recursive delete |
+| `mkfs` | Format filesystem |
+| `dd if=` | Raw disk write |
+| `:(){:\|:&};:` | Fork bomb (with space variants) |
+| `chmod 777` / `chmod -R 777` | World-writable permissions |
+| `> /dev/sda` | Disk overwrite |
+| `mv /* ` | Move root contents |
+| `curl\|sh` / `wget\|bash` | Download and execute |
+
+#### Sensitive Data Access (High Risk — CONFIRM)
+
+| Pattern | Target |
+|---------|--------|
+| `cat /etc/passwd` | User database |
+| `cat /etc/shadow` | Password hashes |
+| `cat ~/.ssh` | SSH keys |
+| `cat ~/.aws` | AWS credentials |
+| `cat ~/.kube` | Kubernetes config |
+| `cat ~/.npmrc` | npm auth tokens |
+| `cat ~/.netrc` | Network credentials |
+| `printenv` / `env` / `set` | All environment variables |
+
+#### System Commands (Medium Risk — Audit)
+
+`sudo`, `su`, `chown`, `chmod`, `chgrp`, `useradd`, `userdel`, `groupadd`, `passwd`, `visudo`, `systemctl`, `service`, `init`, `shutdown`, `reboot`, `halt`
+
+#### Network Commands (Medium Risk — Audit)
+
+`curl`, `wget`, `nc`/`netcat`/`ncat`, `ssh`, `scp`, `rsync`, `ftp`, `sftp`
+
+#### Shell Injection Patterns (Medium Risk)
+
+| Pattern | Description |
+|---------|-------------|
+| `; command` | Command separator |
+| `\| command` | Pipe |
+| `` `command` `` | Backtick execution |
+| `$(command)` | Command substitution |
+| `&& command` | Conditional chain |
+| `\|\| command` | Or chain |
+
+---
+
+### 4.2 Network Requests (`network_request`)
+
+#### Webhook / Exfiltration Domains (DENY unless allowlisted)
+
+| Domain | Service |
+|--------|---------|
+| `discord.com` / `discordapp.com` | Discord webhooks |
+| `api.telegram.org` | Telegram bot API |
+| `hooks.slack.com` | Slack webhooks |
+| `webhook.site` | Webhook testing |
+| `requestbin.com` | Request inspection |
+| `pipedream.com` | Workflow automation |
+| `ngrok.io` / `ngrok-free.app` | Tunneling |
+| `beeceptor.com` | API mocking |
+| `mockbin.org` | HTTP mocking |
+
+#### High-Risk TLDs (Medium → High with POST/PUT)
+
+`.xyz`, `.top`, `.tk`, `.ml`, `.ga`, `.cf`, `.gq`, `.work`, `.click`, `.link`
+
+#### Request Body Secret Scanning
+
+| Secret Type | Priority | Risk Level | Decision |
+|-------------|----------|------------|----------|
+| Private Key (`0x` + 64 hex) | 100 | critical | DENY |
+| Mnemonic (12-24 BIP-39 words) | 100 | critical | DENY |
+| SSH Private Key (`-----BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY`) | 90 | critical | DENY |
+| AWS Secret Key (40-char near AWS context) | 80 | high | CONFIRM |
+| AWS Access Key (`AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}`) | 70 | high | CONFIRM |
+| GitHub Token (`gh[pousr]_...`) | 70 | high | CONFIRM |
+| Bearer/JWT Token (`ey...`) | 60 | medium | CONFIRM |
+| API Secret (generic patterns) | 50 | medium | CONFIRM |
+| DB Connection String | 50 | medium | CONFIRM |
+| Password in Config | 40 | low | CONFIRM |
+
+#### Network Decision Logic
+
+1. Invalid URL → **DENY** (high)
+2. Domain in webhook list & not allowlisted → **DENY** (high)
+3. Body contains private key / mnemonic / SSH key → **DENY** (critical)
+4. Body contains other secrets → risk based on priority
+5. High-risk TLD & not allowlisted → **CONFIRM** (medium)
+6. POST/PUT to untrusted domain → escalate medium → high
+7. Domain in allowlist → **ALLOW** (low)
+
+---
+
+### 4.3 File Operations (`read_file` / `write_file`)
+
+#### Sensitive Paths (DENY or CONFIRM based on level)
+
+| Path Pattern | Description |
+|--------------|-------------|
+| `.env`, `.env.local`, `.env.production` | Environment secrets |
+| `.ssh/`, `id_rsa`, `id_ed25519` | SSH keys |
+| `.aws/credentials`, `.aws/config` | AWS credentials |
+| `.npmrc`, `.netrc` | Package/network auth |
+| `credentials.json`, `serviceAccountKey.json` | Service accounts |
+| `.kube/config` | Kubernetes config |
+
+---
+
+### 4.4 Secret Leak Detection Priority
+
+| Secret Type | Priority | Risk Level |
+|-------------|----------|------------|
+| `PRIVATE_KEY` | 100 | critical |
+| `MNEMONIC` | 100 | critical |
+| `SSH_KEY` | 90 | critical |
+| `AWS_SECRET` | 80 | high |
+| `AWS_KEY` | 70 | high |
+| `GITHUB_TOKEN` | 70 | high |
+| `BEARER_TOKEN` | 60 | medium |
+| `API_SECRET` | 50 | medium |
+| `DB_CONNECTION` | 50 | medium |
+| `PASSWORD_CONFIG` | 40 | low |
+
+---
+
+### 4.5 Web3 Operations (`web3_tx` / `web3_sign`)
+
+#### GoPlus Integration
+
+| Check | Description | Trigger → Action |
+|-------|-------------|------------------|
+| **Phishing Site** | Origin URL on phishing list | `PHISHING_ORIGIN` → DENY (critical) |
+| **Malicious Address** | Target address blacklisted | `MALICIOUS_ADDRESS` → DENY (critical) |
+| **Honeypot Related** | Address associated with honeypot | `HONEYPOT_RELATED` → flag (high) |
+| **Unlimited Approval** | Token approval for max uint256 | `UNLIMITED_APPROVAL` → CONFIRM (high) |
+| **Simulation Failed** | Transaction simulation error | `SIMULATION_FAILED` → flag (medium) |
+
+#### Environment Variables
+
+```bash
+GOPLUS_API_KEY=your_key         # Required for simulation
+GOPLUS_API_SECRET=your_secret   # Required for simulation
+```
+
+#### Degradation Strategy
+
+When GoPlus is unavailable:
+1. `SIMULATION_UNAVAILABLE` tag is set
+2. Decision falls back to policy-based rules only
+3. Capability model and secret scanning still apply
+
+---
+
+## 5. Static Scan Rules (24 Rules)
+
+### Critical Severity
+
+| Rule | ID | Target Files |
+|------|-----|--------------|
+| Auto-Update / Remote Code Execution | `AUTO_UPDATE` | `.js`, `.ts`, `.py`, `.sh`, `.md` |
+| Remote Code Loader | `REMOTE_LOADER` | `.js`, `.ts`, `.mjs`, `.py`, `.md` |
+| Read SSH Keys | `READ_SSH_KEYS` | All |
+| Read Keychain/Browser Credentials | `READ_KEYCHAIN` | All |
+| Private Key Pattern | `PRIVATE_KEY_PATTERN` | All |
+| Mnemonic Pattern | `MNEMONIC_PATTERN` | All |
+| Wallet Draining | `WALLET_DRAINING` | `.js`, `.ts`, `.sol` |
+| Prompt Injection | `PROMPT_INJECTION` | All |
+| Webhook Exfiltration URL | `WEBHOOK_EXFIL` | All |
+| Trojan Distribution | `TROJAN_DISTRIBUTION` | `.md` |
+
+### High Severity
+
+| Rule | ID | Target Files |
+|------|-----|--------------|
+| Shell Execution | `SHELL_EXEC` | `.js`, `.ts`, `.mjs`, `.cjs`, `.py`, `.md` |
+| Unlimited Approval | `UNLIMITED_APPROVAL` | `.js`, `.ts`, `.sol` |
+| Dangerous Selfdestruct | `DANGEROUS_SELFDESTRUCT` | `.sol` |
+| Reentrancy Pattern | `REENTRANCY_PATTERN` | `.sol` |
+| Signature Replay | `SIGNATURE_REPLAY` | `.sol` |
+| Obfuscation | `OBFUSCATION` | `.js`, `.ts`, `.mjs`, `.py`, `.md` |
+| Unrestricted Network Exfil | `NET_EXFIL_UNRESTRICTED` | `.js`, `.ts`, `.mjs`, `.py`, `.md` |
+| Suspicious Paste URL | `SUSPICIOUS_PASTE_URL` | All |
+
+### Medium Severity
+
+| Rule | ID | Target Files |
+|------|-----|--------------|
+| Read Environment Secrets | `READ_ENV_SECRETS` | `.js`, `.ts`, `.mjs`, `.py` |
+| Hidden Transfer | `HIDDEN_TRANSFER` | `.sol` |
+| Proxy Upgrade | `PROXY_UPGRADE` | `.sol`, `.js`, `.ts` |
+| Flash Loan Risk | `FLASH_LOAN_RISK` | `.sol`, `.js`, `.ts` |
+| Suspicious IP Address | `SUSPICIOUS_IP` | All |
+| Social Engineering | `SOCIAL_ENGINEERING` | `.md` |
+
+---
+
+## 6. Trust Registry & Capability Model
+
+### Trust Levels
+
+| Level | Priority | Description |
+|-------|----------|-------------|
+| `untrusted` | 0 | Unknown skill — read-only access only |
+| `restricted` | 1 | Limited capabilities — per attestation |
+| `trusted` | 2 | Full capabilities within attestation |
+
+### Capability Model Structure
+
+```typescript
+interface CapabilityModel {
+  network_allowlist: string[];      // Allowed domains (glob patterns)
+  filesystem_allowlist: string[];   // Allowed paths (glob patterns)
+  exec: 'allow' | 'deny';           // Command execution
+  secrets_allowlist: string[];      // Allowed secret patterns
+  web3?: {
+    chains_allowlist: number[];     // Chain IDs
+    rpc_allowlist: string[];        // RPC endpoints
+    tx_policy: 'allow' | 'confirm_high_risk' | 'deny';
+  };
+}
+```
+
+### Capability Presets
+
+#### `none` — Most Restrictive
+```json
+{
+  "network_allowlist": [],
+  "filesystem_allowlist": [],
+  "exec": "deny",
+  "secrets_allowlist": []
+}
+```
+
+#### `read_only`
+```json
+{
+  "network_allowlist": [],
+  "filesystem_allowlist": ["./**"],
+  "exec": "deny",
+  "secrets_allowlist": []
+}
+```
+
+#### `trading_bot`
+```json
+{
+  "network_allowlist": [
+    "api.binance.com", "api.bybit.com", "api.okx.com",
+    "api.coinbase.com", "*.dextools.io", "*.coingecko.com"
+  ],
+  "filesystem_allowlist": ["./config/**", "./logs/**"],
+  "exec": "deny",
+  "secrets_allowlist": ["*_API_KEY", "*_API_SECRET"],
+  "web3": {
+    "chains_allowlist": [1, 56, 137, 42161],
+    "rpc_allowlist": ["*"],
+    "tx_policy": "confirm_high_risk"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+#### `defi`
+```json
+{
+  "network_allowlist": ["*"],
+  "filesystem_allowlist": [],
+  "exec": "deny",
+  "secrets_allowlist": [],
+  "web3": {
+    "chains_allowlist": [1, 56, 137, 42161, 10, 8453, 43114],
+    "rpc_allowlist": ["*"],
+    "tx_policy": "confirm_high_risk"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+### Capability Enforcement
+
+| Action Type | Capability Check |
+|-------------|------------------|
+| `exec_command` | `can_exec !== false` |
+| `network_request` | `can_network !== false` |
+| `write_file` | `can_write !== false` |
+| `read_file` | `can_read !== false` |
+| `web3_tx` / `web3_sign` | `can_web3 !== false` |
+
+---
+
+## 7. Platform Integration
+
+### 7.1 Claude Code
+
+**Hook Events**: `PreToolUse`, `PostToolUse`
+
+**Tool Mapping**:
+
+| Claude Code Tool | Action Type |
+|------------------|-------------|
+| `Bash` | `exec_command` |
+| `Write` | `write_file` |
+| `Edit` | `write_file` |
+| `WebFetch` | `network_request` |
+| `WebSearch` | `network_request` |
+
+**Configuration** (`~/.claude/settings.json`):
+
+```json
+{
+  "hooks": {
+    "PreToolUse": [
+      {
+        "matcher": { "tool_name": "*" },
+        "hooks": ["agentguard-hook"]
+      }
+    ]
+  }
+}
+```
+
+### 7.2 OpenClaw
+
+**Hook Events**: `before_tool_call`, `after_tool_call`
+
+**Tool Mapping**:
+
+| OpenClaw Tool | Action Type |
+|---------------|-------------|
+| `exec` / `exec_*` | `exec_command` |
+| `write` | `write_file` |
+| `read` | `read_file` |
+| `web_fetch` | `network_request` |
+| `browser` | `network_request` |
+
+**Auto-Scan & Registration**:
+
+When AgentGuard registers as an OpenClaw plugin, it automatically:
+
+1. **Scans all loaded plugins** - Static analysis of each plugin's source code
+2. **Determines trust level** - Based on scan results (critical findings → untrusted)
+3. **Infers capabilities** - Based on registered tools and scan risk level
+4. **Registers to trust registry** - Auto-attests each plugin
+5. **Builds tool mapping** - Maps `toolName → pluginId` for initiating skill inference
+
+**Trust Level Assignment**:
+
+| Scan Result | Trust Level | Capabilities |
+|-------------|-------------|--------------|
+| critical / dangerous patterns | `untrusted` | read-only |
+| high risk | `restricted` | limited per scan |
+| medium risk | `restricted` | limited per scan |
+| low risk | `trusted` | full per tool type |
+
+**Configuration** (Plugin registration):
+
+```typescript
+import { registerOpenClawPlugin } from '@goplus/agentguard';
+
+// Basic registration (auto-scan enabled)
+registerOpenClawPlugin(api);
+
+// With options
+registerOpenClawPlugin(api, {
+  level: 'balanced',        // Protection level
+  skipAutoScan: false,      // Set true to disable auto-scanning
+});
+```
+
+**Exported Utilities**:
+
+```typescript
+import {
+  getPluginIdFromTool,    // Get plugin ID from tool name
+  getPluginScanResult,    // Get cached scan result for plugin
+} from '@goplus/agentguard';
+```
+
+---
+
+## 8. Quick Reference Tables
+
+### Always Block (Critical — DENY)
+
+| Category | Rules |
+|----------|-------|
+| **Destructive commands** | `rm -rf`, `mkfs`, `dd if=`, fork bomb, `chmod 777`, `curl\|bash` |
+| **Key exfiltration** | Private keys (0x+64 hex), mnemonics (12-24 BIP39), SSH keys |
+| **Webhook exfil** | Discord/Telegram/Slack webhooks (unless allowlisted) |
+| **Prompt injection** | `ignore previous instructions`, jailbreak attempts |
+| **Malicious addresses** | GoPlus-flagged phishing/blacklisted addresses |
+
+### Require Confirmation (High — CONFIRM in balanced)
+
+| Category | Rules |
+|----------|-------|
+| **Sensitive data access** | `cat /etc/passwd`, `cat ~/.ssh`, `env`, `printenv` |
+| **API key leakage** | AWS/GitHub/Bearer tokens in request body |
+| **Untrusted domains** | POST/PUT to non-allowlisted domains |
+| **Web3 high-risk** | Unlimited approval, unknown spender |
+| **Untrusted skills** | Skills not in trust registry |
+
+### Audit but Allow (Medium — ALLOW with logging)
+
+| Category | Rules |
+|----------|-------|
+| **Install commands** | `npm install`, `pip install`, `git clone` |
+| **System commands** | `sudo`, `systemctl`, `chmod` |
+| **Network commands** | `curl`, `wget`, `ssh` |
+| **Shell metacharacters** | Commands with pipes, semicolons, etc. |
+
+### Safe Pass-through (Low — ALLOW)
+
+| Category | Commands |
+|----------|----------|
+| **Read-only** | `ls`, `cat`, `grep`, `find`, `pwd`, `whoami` |
+| **Git operations** | `git status`, `git log`, `git diff`, `git add`, `git commit`, `git push` |
+| **Build commands** | `npm run`, `npm test`, `tsc`, `go build`, `cargo build` |
+| **Version checks** | `node -v`, `npm -v`, `python --version` |
+
+---
+
+## 9. Default Policy Summary
+
+```yaml
+# Secret Exfiltration
+secret_exfil:
+  private_key: DENY (always)
+  mnemonic: DENY (always)
+  ssh_key: DENY (always)
+  api_secret: CONFIRM
+
+# Command Execution
+exec_command:
+  dangerous: DENY (always)
+  safe_list: ALLOW
+  default: evaluate by capability
+
+# Network
+network:
+  webhook_domain: DENY (unless allowlisted)
+  body_contains_secret: DENY/CONFIRM by priority
+  untrusted_domain: CONFIRM
+
+# Web3
+web3:
+  phishing_origin: DENY
+  malicious_address: DENY
+  unlimited_approval: CONFIRM
+  unknown_spender: CONFIRM
+
+# File Operations
+file:
+  sensitive_path_write: DENY/CONFIRM by level
+  read: ALLOW (unless sensitive)
+```
+
+---
+
+## 10. Changelog
+
+| Date | Version | Changes |
+|------|---------|---------|
+| 2025-02 | 1.0.0 | Initial unified policy document |
+
+---
+
+*This document consolidates security policies from `skills/agentguard/action-policies.md`, `skills/agentguard/scan-rules.md`, and implementation in `src/action/detectors/`.*

package/docs/architecture.md

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# Architecture
+
+## Project Structure
+
+```
+agentguard/
+├── skills/agentguard/        # Agent Skills definition
+│   ├── SKILL.md               # Skill entry point
+│   ├── scan-rules.md          # Detection rule reference
+│   ├── action-policies.md     # Action policy reference
+│   ├── web3-patterns.md       # Web3 patterns reference
+│   └── scripts/               # CLI tools (trust-cli, action-cli, guard-hook)
+├── hooks/hooks.json           # Plugin hooks configuration
+├── src/                       # TypeScript source
+│   ├── scanner/               # 20-rule static analysis engine
+│   ├── action/                # Runtime action evaluator + GoPlus integration
+│   ├── registry/              # Trust level management
+│   ├── policy/                # Default policies and presets
+│   └── tests/                 # Test suite
+├── examples/vulnerable-skill/ # Demo project for testing
+├── data/registry.json         # Trust registry storage
+├── setup.sh                   # One-click install script
+└── dist/                      # Compiled output
+```
+
+## Two-Layer Architecture
+
+```
+┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│  Layer 1: Auto Guard (hooks — install once, forget)  │
+│  ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐  │
+│  │ PreToolUse   │ │ PostToolUse  │ │ Config       │  │
+│  │ Block danger │ │ Audit log    │ │ 3 levels     │  │
+│  └──────┬───────┘ └──────┬───────┘ └──────┬───────┘  │
+│         └────────┬───────┘               │           │
+│                  ▼                       │           │
+│        ActionScanner Engine ◄────────────┘           │
+└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│  Layer 2: Deep Scan (skill — on demand)              │
+│  /agentguard scan   — 20-rule static analysis        │
+│  /agentguard action — Runtime action evaluation      │
+│  /agentguard trust  — Skill trust management         │
+│  /agentguard report — Security event log             │
+└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+```
+
+## Testing
+
+```bash
+npm install && npm run build && npm test
+```
+
+32 tests across 4 suites: scanner rules, exec command detector, network request detector, and registry CRUD.

package/docs/claude-code.md

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# Claude Code
+
+Claude Code can call AgentGuard before risky tool use.
+
+## Minimal runtime hook
+
+To write the template automatically in the current project:
+
+```bash
+agentguard init --agent claude-code
+```
+
+This creates `.claude/hooks/agentguard-protect.sh` and `.claude/settings.local.json`.
+
+Configure a PreToolUse hook that pipes Claude Code hook JSON to `agentguard protect`:
+
+```json
+{
+  "matcher": "Bash",
+  "hooks": [
+    {
+      "type": "command",
+      "command": "AGENTGUARD_AGENT_HOST=claude-code AGENTGUARD_ACTION_TYPE=shell AGENTGUARD_TOOL_NAME=Bash agentguard protect"
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+Recommended matchers:
+
+- `Bash` → `shell`
+- `Read` → `file_read`
+- `Write`, `Edit`, `MultiEdit` → `file_write`
+- `WebFetch`, `WebSearch` → `network`
+
+## Decisions
+
+- `allow` and `warn` exit `0`
+- `require_approval` and `block` exit `2`
+
+Connected Cloud approvals print the approval id when creation succeeds.