@goodandready/dsh-messenger-gateway 0.4.37 → 0.4.38

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package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -149,6 +149,9 @@ In addition to Telegram, outbound messages can be dispatched to Discord and Slac
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  - `telegram.proxyUrl` is a secret: the settings API returns only a masked value and an empty field keeps the configured proxy
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  - Inbound archives are extraction-capped (per-entry and per-archive budget verified against actual bytes — a lying ZIP header cannot balloon the heap)
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  - Mini App artifacts are chat-scoped: a Telegram user sees only artifacts produced in their own chat; allowlisted admins see all
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+ - Mini App sign-in is hardened: `auth_date` required, 1h acceptance window, one-time `query_id` (replays rejected); `initData` in URL query is not accepted — the Mini App must send it via the `Authorization: tma` header
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+ - HITL approvals are fail-closed by default: in `mutations` sensitivity every tool that is not recognizably read-only (including network, send and MCP tools) asks for confirmation; a chat without a target refuses unconfirmed actions
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+ - All state files (pairing, outbox, voice prefs) are written with `0600` permissions inside `0700` directories
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  - `sessionList`: `true` (default) — enables `/sessions` and `/resume` commands in chat
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  - `sessionTitleFromChat`: `false` (default) — name each new session after its originating chat (`TG · @user`, `TG · Group › topic N`) instead of generic generated titles
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  - `voiceMode`: `mirror` / `always` / `off` — when to speak replies (also `/voice`)
@@ -85,23 +85,44 @@ export function formatApprovalCard(req, locale = "en") {
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  return t("ask.confirm_title", { tool: escapeHtml(tool), reason: reason + detail }, locale, { escape: false })
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  }
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- export async function answerApproval(gw, chatKeyValue, req, next) {
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+ // Read-only allowlist for the "mutations" sensitivity (#203): everything NOT
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+ // matching this allowlist (unknown tools, MCP tools, network and send tools)
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+ // requires explicit user confirmation. Anything that mutates, sends, or
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+ // executes can never be in the safe set regardless of its name.
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+ const SAFE_READ_ONLY_TOOLS = new Set([
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+ "read_file", "read_many_files", "list_files", "list_dir",
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+ "glob", "grep", "doc_search", "view", "show",
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+ ])
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+ const SAFE_READ_ONLY_PREFIX = /^(read|list|get|view|show|describe)[_-]/i
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+ const UNSAFE_HINT = /(write|replace|edit|delete|remove|create|patch|send|post|put|exec|run|deploy|install|apply|curl|wget|fetch|http|schedule|email)/i
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+
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+ /** True when a tool is recognizably read-only and safe to run unconfirmed. */
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+ export function isSafeReadOnlyTool(toolName) {
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+ if (!toolName) return false
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+ const t = String(toolName)
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+ if (UNSAFE_HINT.test(t)) return false
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+ return SAFE_READ_ONLY_TOOLS.has(t) || SAFE_READ_ONLY_PREFIX.test(t)
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+ }
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+
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+ export async function answerApproval(gw, chatKeyValue, req, _next) {
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  try {
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  const tg = gw.tg ? gw.tg() : (gw.config?.telegram || {})
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  if (tg.approvalsEnabled === false || tg.approvalsSensitivity === "disabled") {
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  return "allowed-once"
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  }
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  const tool = req.toolName || "tool"
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- const sensitivity = tg.approvalsSensitivity || "mutations"
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- if (sensitivity === "mutations" && !isSensitiveTool(tool)) {
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- return "allowed-once"
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- }
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+ // Fail-closed (#203): without a messenger target we cannot ask the user,
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+ // so an unconfirmed action is refused instead of silently executed.
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  const chat = gw.chats.get(chatKeyValue)
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- if (!chat?.target) return next()
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+ if (!chat?.target) return "rejected"
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  if (chat.sessionAllowlist?.has(tool)) {
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  return "allowed-once"
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  }
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+ const sensitivity = tg.approvalsSensitivity || "mutations"
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+ if (sensitivity === "mutations" && isSafeReadOnlyTool(tool)) {
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+ return "allowed-once"
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+ }
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  const locale = gw.resolveLocale ? gw.resolveLocale(chat.target) : "en"
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  const text = formatApprovalCard(req, locale)
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  const buttons = [
package/lib/pairing.js CHANGED
@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ export function generatePairingCode(length = 8) {
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  function writeJsonAtomicSync(filePath, data) {
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  const dir = dirname(filePath)
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- mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true })
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+ mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 })
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  const tmpPath = `${filePath}.${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}.tmp`
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  try {
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- writeFileSync(tmpPath, JSON.stringify(data, null, 2), 'utf8')
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+ writeFileSync(tmpPath, JSON.stringify(data, null, 2), { encoding: 'utf8', mode: 0o600 })
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  renameSync(tmpPath, filePath)
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  } catch (err) {
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  try { unlinkSync(tmpPath) } catch { /* safe best-effort temp file cleanup */ }
@@ -3,17 +3,23 @@ import { writeFileSync, renameSync, mkdirSync, unlinkSync } from 'node:fs'
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  import { dirname } from 'node:path'
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  import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'
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+ // State files carry message texts, approved user ids and pairing data: they
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+ // must not be world-readable (#204). Directories are created 0o700 so the
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+ // contents stay private even when the parent is shared.
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+ const FILE_MODE = 0o600
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+ const DIR_MODE = 0o700
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+
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  /**
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  * Write JSON atomically via temporary file and rename.
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  * Guarantees that readers never observe partially written files.
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  */
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  export async function writeJsonAtomic(filePath, data) {
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  const dir = dirname(filePath)
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- await mkdir(dir, { recursive: true })
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+ await mkdir(dir, { recursive: true, mode: DIR_MODE })
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  const tmpPath = `${filePath}.${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}.tmp`
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  const serialized = JSON.stringify(data, null, 2)
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  try {
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- await writeFile(tmpPath, serialized, 'utf8')
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+ await writeFile(tmpPath, serialized, { encoding: 'utf8', mode: FILE_MODE })
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  await rename(tmpPath, filePath)
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  } catch (err) {
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  await unlink(tmpPath).catch((e) => { void e })
@@ -26,13 +32,13 @@ export async function writeJsonAtomic(filePath, data) {
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  */
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  export function writeJsonAtomicSync(filePath, data) {
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  const dir = dirname(filePath)
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- mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true })
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+ mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: DIR_MODE })
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  const tmpPath = `${filePath}.${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}.tmp`
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  try {
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- writeFileSync(tmpPath, JSON.stringify(data, null, 2), 'utf8')
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+ writeFileSync(tmpPath, JSON.stringify(data, null, 2), { encoding: 'utf8', mode: FILE_MODE })
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  renameSync(tmpPath, filePath)
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  } catch (err) {
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  try { unlinkSync(tmpPath) } catch { /* ignore */ }
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  throw err
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  }
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- }
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+ }
@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"
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  function writeJsonAtomicSync(filePath, data) {
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  const dir = dirname(filePath)
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- mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true })
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+ mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 })
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  const tmpPath = `${filePath}.${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}.tmp`
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  try {
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- writeFileSync(tmpPath, JSON.stringify(data, null, 2), "utf8")
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+ writeFileSync(tmpPath, JSON.stringify(data, null, 2), { encoding: "utf8", mode: 0o600 })
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  renameSync(tmpPath, filePath)
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  } catch (err) {
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  try { unlinkSync(tmpPath) } catch { /* safe best-effort temp file cleanup */ }
package/lib/webapp.js CHANGED
@@ -1,17 +1,34 @@
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  import { createHmac } from 'node:crypto'
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  import { timingSafeCompare, isTrustedSettingsRequest, readBody, writeJson } from './http.js'
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+ // Replay guard (#202): a query_id can be redeemed only once. Telegram issues a
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+ // fresh query_id on every Mini App opening, so legitimate re-openings are not
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+ // affected; a stolen initData string becomes useless after the first use.
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+ const seenQueryIds = new Map()
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+ function checkAndRememberQueryId(queryId) {
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+ if (!queryId) return null
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+ const now = Date.now()
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+ for (const [k, ts] of seenQueryIds) {
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+ if (now - ts > 26 * 3600_000) seenQueryIds.delete(k)
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+ }
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+ if (seenQueryIds.has(queryId)) return 'replayed_query_id'
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+ seenQueryIds.set(queryId, now)
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+ return null
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+ }
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+
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  /**
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  * Validates Telegram WebApp initData string using HMAC-SHA256 according to Telegram specification:
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  * https://core.telegram.org/bots/webapps#validating-data-received-via-the-mini-app
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  *
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+ * Hardened (#202): auth_date is REQUIRED, the default acceptance window is
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+ * 1 hour, and a query_id can be redeemed only once.
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+ *
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  * @param {string} rawInitData - URL-encoded query string received from Telegram.WebApp.initData
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  * @param {string} botToken - Telegram Bot Token
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- * @param {number} [maxAgeSec=86400] - Maximum allowed age of initData in seconds (default 24h)
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- * @returns {{ ok: boolean, user?: object, authDate?: number, queryId?: string, chatType?: string, error?: string }}
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+ * @param {number} [maxAgeSec=3600] - Maximum allowed age of initData in seconds (default 1h)
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+ * @returns {{ ok: boolean, user?: object, authDate?: number, queryId?: string, chatType?: string, chatInstance?: string, data?: Record<string, string>, error?: string }}
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  */
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- /** @returns {any} TMA auth result */
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- export function validateTelegramWebAppData(rawInitData, botToken, maxAgeSec = 86400) {
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+ export function validateTelegramWebAppData(rawInitData, botToken, maxAgeSec = 3600) {
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  if (!rawInitData || typeof rawInitData !== 'string') {
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  return { ok: false, error: 'empty_init_data' }
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  }
@@ -38,13 +55,21 @@ export function validateTelegramWebAppData(rawInitData, botToken, maxAgeSec = 86
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  const authDateStr = params.get('auth_date')
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  const authDate = Number(authDateStr) || 0
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- if (authDate > 0 && maxAgeSec > 0) {
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+ if (!authDate) {
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+ return { ok: false, error: 'missing_auth_date' }
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+ }
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+ if (maxAgeSec > 0) {
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  const nowSec = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)
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  if (Math.abs(nowSec - authDate) > maxAgeSec) {
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  return { ok: false, error: 'expired', authDate }
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  }
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  }
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+ const replayError = checkAndRememberQueryId(params.get('query_id'))
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+ if (replayError) {
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+ return { ok: false, error: replayError }
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+ }
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+
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  let user = null
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  const userStr = params.get('user')
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  if (userStr) {
@@ -614,9 +639,9 @@ export function createWebAppHandler(options = {}) {
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  initData = authHeader.slice(4).trim()
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  } else if (req.headers['x-telegram-init-data']) {
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  initData = String(req.headers['x-telegram-init-data']).trim()
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- } else if (url.searchParams.get('initData')) {
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- initData = url.searchParams.get('initData')
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  }
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+ // initData in the URL query is no longer accepted (#202): it leaks into
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+ // browser history, Referer headers and access logs.
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  if (initData) {
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  const val = validateTelegramWebAppData(initData, botToken)
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "@goodandready/dsh-messenger-gateway",
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- "version": "0.4.37",
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+ "version": "0.4.38",
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  "description": "Telegram messenger bridge for DeepSeek Harness: sessions, steer, homes, inline asks, notify bridge, and optional TTS voice notes.",
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  "license": "MIT",
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  "type": "module",