@goodandready/dsh-approval-gate 0.1.16 → 0.1.17

package/lib/index.js

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { SecurityEngine } from "./engine.js";
 import { BandsEngine } from "./bands.js";
 import { AuditLogger } from "./audit-log.js";
 import { DeclarativeRulesEngine } from "./rules-loader.js";
+import { LlmClassifier } from "./classifier.js";
 import Schema from "@deepseek-ai/schemastery";
 
 if (typeof Schema.prototype?.volatile !== "function") {
@@ -217,6 +218,18 @@ export const Config = Schema.object({
   auditFailClosed: Schema.boolean().default(false).volatile(),
   /** Optional custom declarative rules YAML file path (#38). */
   rulesFile: Schema.string().default("").volatile(),
+  /** Semantic LLM classifier endpoint URL (#127). */
+  classifierEndpoint: Schema.string().default("").volatile(),
+  /** API key for classifier endpoint (#115). */
+  classifierApiKey: Schema.string().default("").volatile(),
+  /** Model name for semantic classification. */
+  classifierModel: Schema.string().default("gpt-4o-mini").volatile(),
+  /** Request timeout in ms for classifier (#118). */
+  classifierTimeout: Schema.number().default(3000).volatile(),
+  /** Policy on classifier timeout: 'strict' or 'permissive' (#118). */
+  classifierTimeoutPolicy: Schema.union(["strict", "permissive"]).default("strict").volatile(),
+  /** Maximum context characters for classifier prompt (#117). */
+  classifierMaxContext: Schema.number().default(1000).volatile(),
   /** Security engine instance (internal/testing). */
   engine: Schema.any().hidden(),
 });
@@ -256,9 +269,22 @@ export function apply(ctx, config) {
   };
   const unattendedPolicies = cfg.unattendedPolicies || DEFAULT_UNATTENDED_POLICIES.slice();
   const forcedUnattended = cfg.unattended === true;
+  const classifier = cfg.classifierEndpoint
+    ? new LlmClassifier({
+        endpoint: cfg.classifierEndpoint,
+        apiKey: cfg.classifierApiKey,
+        model: cfg.classifierModel,
+        timeoutMs: cfg.classifierTimeout,
+        timeoutPolicy: cfg.classifierTimeoutPolicy,
+        maxContextChars: cfg.classifierMaxContext,
+      })
+    : null;
+
   const engine = (config && config.engine) || cfg.engine || new SecurityEngine({
     inspectConfig: { toolName: toolName, fileWriteTools: fileWriteTools, workspaceDir: cfg.workspaceDir || "" },
     bands: new BandsEngine({ toolRegistry: ctx && ctx.tools }),
+    classifier,
+    timeoutPolicy: cfg.classifierTimeoutPolicy || "strict",
     defaultVerdict: cfg.defaultVerdict || "allow",
     dryRun: Boolean(cfg.dryRun || cfg.shadowMode),
     auditFailClosed: Boolean(cfg.auditFailClosed),
@@ -288,6 +314,8 @@ export function apply(ctx, config) {
       active: true,
       dryRun: Boolean(cfg.dryRun || cfg.shadowMode),
       auditFailClosed: Boolean(cfg.auditFailClosed),
+      classifierActive: Boolean(classifier || engine.classifier),
+      timeoutPolicy: engine.timeoutPolicy || "strict",
       counters: engine.getCounters(),
       rulesCount: engine.declarativeRules ? engine.declarativeRules.count() : 0,
       cacheStats: engine.cache ? engine.cache.stats() : null,
@@ -519,3 +547,11 @@ export {
   WORKSPACE_RULES_REL,
   USER_RULES_REL,
 } from "./rules-loader.js";
+export {
+  normalizeChatCompletionsUrl,
+  withLlmRetry,
+  sanitizeClassifierInput,
+  truncateClassifierContext,
+  isLowRiskExecution,
+  LlmClassifier,
+} from "./classifier.js";

package/lib/messages.js

@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ export const MESSAGES = Object.freeze({
     ruleRetryExhaustion: "Exhausted repeated attempts to bypass safety gate",
     ruleFailClosedAudit: "Audit log write failure blocked by fail-closed policy",
     ruleLockedAskUnattended: "Critical operation requires human confirmation and cannot be bypassed in unattended mode",
+    ruleClassifierTimeoutStrict: "Semantic classifier timed out under strict confirmation policy",
+    ruleClassifierTimeoutPermissive: "Semantic classifier timed out; allowed by low-risk fallback policy",
+    askClassifierTimeout: "Semantic classifier request timed out; human confirmation required",
+    askClassifierError: "Semantic classifier error; human confirmation required",
     hintRecursiveRm: "Specify exact target files instead of recursive deletion",
     hintPathTraversal: "Keep operations strictly within the project directory",
     hintSecretWrite: "Modify configuration via settings or environment variables, not raw file overwrite",
@@ -78,6 +82,7 @@ export const MESSAGES = Object.freeze({
     hintRetryExhaustion: "Repeated denials detected; manual operator intervention required",
     hintFailClosedAudit: "Ensure the audit log directory is writable and disk space is available",
     hintLockedAskUnattended: "Switch to an interactive session or request explicit human confirmation",
+    hintClassifierTimeout: "Check external LLM connectivity or review timeout policy settings",
   },
   zh: {
     blockedPrefix: "dsh-approval-gate 规则已阻止",
@@ -140,6 +145,10 @@ export const MESSAGES = Object.freeze({
     ruleRetryExhaustion: "多次尝试绕过安全网关已达上限",
     ruleFailClosedAudit: "审计日志写入失败，受安全失败策略阻止",
     ruleLockedAskUnattended: "关键操作需要人工确认，无法在无人值守模式下自动批准",
+    ruleClassifierTimeoutStrict: "语义分类器在严格策略下超时",
+    ruleClassifierTimeoutPermissive: "语义分类器超时；根据低风险容错策略放行",
+    askClassifierTimeout: "语义分类器请求超时；需要人工审查",
+    askClassifierError: "语义分类器发生异常；需要人工审查",
     hintRecursiveRm: "请指定具体目标文件，避免递归删除",
     hintPathTraversal: "请将操作限制在项目根目录内",
     hintSecretWrite: "请通过设置或环境变量修改配置，不要直接覆盖敏感配置文件",
@@ -155,6 +164,7 @@ export const MESSAGES = Object.freeze({
     hintRetryExhaustion: "检测到重复拒绝；需要操作员手动介入",
     hintFailClosedAudit: "请确保审计日志目录可写且磁盘空间充足",
     hintLockedAskUnattended: "请切换到交互式会话或请求人工显式确认",
+    hintClassifierTimeout: "请检查外部 LLM 服务连通性或调整分类器超时容错策略",
   },
 });
 
@@ -217,6 +227,9 @@ const RULE_KEYS = Object.freeze({
   "retry-exhaustion": "ruleRetryExhaustion",
   "fail-closed-audit": "ruleFailClosedAudit",
   "locked-ask-unattended-denied": "ruleLockedAskUnattended",
+  "classifier-timeout-strict": "ruleClassifierTimeoutStrict",
+  "classifier-timeout-fallback-strict": "ruleClassifierTimeoutStrict",
+  "classifier-timeout-fallback-permissive": "ruleClassifierTimeoutPermissive",
 });
 
 const HINT_KEYS = Object.freeze({
@@ -235,6 +248,8 @@ const HINT_KEYS = Object.freeze({
   "retry-exhaustion": "hintRetryExhaustion",
   "fail-closed-audit": "hintFailClosedAudit",
   "locked-ask-unattended-denied": "hintLockedAskUnattended",
+  "classifier-timeout-strict": "hintClassifierTimeout",
+  "classifier-timeout-fallback-strict": "hintClassifierTimeout",
 });
 
 const ASK_KEYS = Object.freeze({
@@ -250,6 +265,9 @@ const ASK_KEYS = Object.freeze({
   "credential-in-argv": "askCredentialInArgv",
   "git-remote-push": "askGitRemotePush",
   "silent-error-masked": "askSilentErrorMasked",
+  "classifier-timeout-strict": "askClassifierTimeout",
+  "classifier-timeout-fallback-strict": "askClassifierTimeout",
+  "classifier-error": "askClassifierError",
 });
 
 const DETAIL_KEYS = Object.freeze({

package/package.json

@@ -1,55 +1,55 @@
-{
-  "name": "@goodandready/dsh-approval-gate",
-  "version": "0.1.16",
-  "description": "Host-only command safety gate for DeepSeek Harness: blocks recognized dangerous operations and requests DSH approval when a command cannot be inspected.",
-  "type": "module",
-  "main": "lib/index.js",
-  "exports": {
-    ".": "./lib/index.js",
-    "./package.json": "./package.json",
-    "./cordis.patch.yml": "./cordis.patch.yml"
-  },
-  "files": [
-    "lib",
-    "rules",
-    "cordis.patch.yml",
-    "README.md",
-    "README.zh.md",
-    "README.ru.md",
-    "CHANGELOG.md",
-    "LICENSE"
-  ],
-  "dsh": {
-    "bundle": {
-      "patch": "./cordis.patch.yml"
-    }
-  },
-  "license": "MIT",
-  "peerDependencies": {
-    "@deepseek-ai/cordis": "^4.0.1",
-    "@deepseek-ai/schemastery": "^3.18.1"
-  },
-  "repository": {
-    "type": "git",
-    "url": "git+https://github.com/GooDAnDReaDY/dsh-approval-gate.git"
-  },
-  "homepage": "https://github.com/GooDAnDReaDY/dsh-approval-gate#readme",
-  "bugs": {
-    "url": "https://github.com/GooDAnDReaDY/dsh-approval-gate/issues"
-  },
-  "scripts": {
-    "test": "node --test test/*.test.mjs"
-  },
-  "publishConfig": {
-    "registry": "https://registry.npmjs.org",
-    "access": "public"
-  },
-  "keywords": [
-    "dsh",
-    "dsh-plugin",
-    "deepseek-harness",
-    "security",
-    "approval-gate",
-    "safety"
-  ]
-}
+{
+  "name": "@goodandready/dsh-approval-gate",
+  "version": "0.1.17",
+  "description": "Host-only command safety gate for DeepSeek Harness: blocks recognized dangerous operations and requests DSH approval when a command cannot be inspected.",
+  "type": "module",
+  "main": "lib/index.js",
+  "exports": {
+    ".": "./lib/index.js",
+    "./package.json": "./package.json",
+    "./cordis.patch.yml": "./cordis.patch.yml"
+  },
+  "files": [
+    "lib",
+    "rules",
+    "cordis.patch.yml",
+    "README.md",
+    "README.zh.md",
+    "README.ru.md",
+    "CHANGELOG.md",
+    "LICENSE"
+  ],
+  "dsh": {
+    "bundle": {
+      "patch": "./cordis.patch.yml"
+    }
+  },
+  "license": "MIT",
+  "peerDependencies": {
+    "@deepseek-ai/cordis": "^4.0.1",
+    "@deepseek-ai/schemastery": "^3.18.1"
+  },
+  "repository": {
+    "type": "git",
+    "url": "git+https://github.com/GooDAnDReaDY/dsh-approval-gate.git"
+  },
+  "homepage": "https://github.com/GooDAnDReaDY/dsh-approval-gate#readme",
+  "bugs": {
+    "url": "https://github.com/GooDAnDReaDY/dsh-approval-gate/issues"
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "test": "node --test test/*.test.mjs"
+  },
+  "publishConfig": {
+    "registry": "https://registry.npmjs.org",
+    "access": "public"
+  },
+  "keywords": [
+    "dsh",
+    "dsh-plugin",
+    "deepseek-harness",
+    "security",
+    "approval-gate",
+    "safety"
+  ]
+}