@git-stunts/git-warp 10.4.2 → 10.7.0

package/src/domain/services/SyncAuthService.js

@@ -0,0 +1,396 @@
+/**
+ * HMAC-SHA256 request signing and verification for the sync protocol.
+ *
+ * Provides:
+ * - Canonical payload construction
+ * - Request signing (client side)
+ * - Request verification with replay protection (server side)
+ *
+ * @module domain/services/SyncAuthService
+ */
+
+import LRUCache from '../utils/LRUCache.js';
+import defaultCrypto from '../utils/defaultCrypto.js';
+import nullLogger from '../utils/nullLogger.js';
+
+const SIG_VERSION = '1';
+const SIG_PREFIX = 'warp-v1';
+const HMAC_ALGO = 'sha256';
+const MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
+const DEFAULT_NONCE_CAPACITY = 100_000;
+const NONCE_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-4[0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;
+const SIG_HEX_LENGTH = 64;
+const HEX_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-f]+$/;
+const MAX_TIMESTAMP_DIGITS = 16;
+
+/**
+ * Canonicalizes a URL path for signature computation.
+ *
+ * @param {string} url - URL or path to canonicalize
+ * @returns {string} Canonical path (pathname + search, no fragment)
+ */
+export function canonicalizePath(url) {
+  const parsed = new URL(url, 'http://localhost');
+  return parsed.pathname + (parsed.search || '');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Builds the canonical string that gets signed.
+ *
+ * @param {Object} params
+ * @param {string} params.keyId - Key identifier
+ * @param {string} params.method - HTTP method (uppercased by caller)
+ * @param {string} params.path - Canonical path
+ * @param {string} params.timestamp - Epoch milliseconds as string
+ * @param {string} params.nonce - UUIDv4 nonce
+ * @param {string} params.contentType - Content-Type header value
+ * @param {string} params.bodySha256 - Hex SHA-256 of request body
+ * @returns {string} Pipe-delimited canonical payload
+ */
+export function buildCanonicalPayload({ keyId, method, path, timestamp, nonce, contentType, bodySha256 }) {
+  return `${SIG_PREFIX}|${keyId}|${method}|${path}|${timestamp}|${nonce}|${contentType}|${bodySha256}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Signs an outgoing sync request.
+ *
+ * @param {Object} params
+ * @param {string} params.method - HTTP method
+ * @param {string} params.path - Canonical path
+ * @param {string} params.contentType - Content-Type header value
+ * @param {Buffer|Uint8Array} params.body - Raw request body
+ * @param {string} params.secret - Shared secret
+ * @param {string} params.keyId - Key identifier
+ * @param {Object} deps
+ * @param {import('../../ports/CryptoPort.js').default} [deps.crypto] - Crypto port
+ * @returns {Promise<Record<string, string>>} Auth headers
+ */
+export async function signSyncRequest({ method, path, contentType, body, secret, keyId }, { crypto } = {}) {
+  const c = crypto || defaultCrypto;
+  const timestamp = String(Date.now());
+  const nonce = globalThis.crypto.randomUUID();
+
+  const bodySha256 = await c.hash('sha256', body);
+  const canonical = buildCanonicalPayload({
+    keyId,
+    method: method.toUpperCase(),
+    path,
+    timestamp,
+    nonce,
+    contentType,
+    bodySha256,
+  });
+
+  const hmacBuf = await c.hmac(HMAC_ALGO, secret, canonical);
+  const signature = Buffer.from(hmacBuf).toString('hex');
+
+  return {
+    'x-warp-sig-version': SIG_VERSION,
+    'x-warp-key-id': keyId,
+    'x-warp-timestamp': timestamp,
+    'x-warp-nonce': nonce,
+    'x-warp-signature': signature,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * @param {string} reason
+ * @param {number} status
+ * @returns {{ ok: false, reason: string, status: number }}
+ */
+function fail(reason, status) {
+  return { ok: false, reason, status };
+}
+
+/**
+ * @returns {{ authFailCount: number, replayRejectCount: number, nonceEvictions: number, clockSkewRejects: number, malformedRejects: number, logOnlyPassthroughs: number }}
+ */
+function _freshMetrics() {
+  return {
+    authFailCount: 0,
+    replayRejectCount: 0,
+    nonceEvictions: 0,
+    clockSkewRejects: 0,
+    malformedRejects: 0,
+    logOnlyPassthroughs: 0,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validates format of individual auth header values.
+ *
+ * @param {string} timestamp
+ * @param {string} nonce
+ * @param {string} signature
+ * @returns {{ ok: false, reason: string, status: number } | { ok: true }}
+ */
+function _checkHeaderFormats(timestamp, nonce, signature) {
+  if (!/^\d+$/.test(timestamp) || timestamp.length > MAX_TIMESTAMP_DIGITS) {
+    return fail('MALFORMED_TIMESTAMP', 400);
+  }
+
+  if (!NONCE_PATTERN.test(nonce)) {
+    return fail('MALFORMED_NONCE', 400);
+  }
+
+  if (signature.length !== SIG_HEX_LENGTH || !HEX_PATTERN.test(signature)) {
+    return fail('MALFORMED_SIGNATURE', 400);
+  }
+
+  return { ok: true };
+}
+
+/**
+ * @param {Record<string, string>|undefined} keys
+ */
+function _validateKeys(keys) {
+  if (!keys || typeof keys !== 'object' || Object.keys(keys).length === 0) {
+    throw new Error('SyncAuthService requires a non-empty keys map');
+  }
+}
+
+export default class SyncAuthService {
+  /**
+   * @param {Object} options
+   * @param {Record<string, string>} options.keys - Key-id to secret mapping
+   * @param {'enforce'|'log-only'} [options.mode='enforce'] - Auth enforcement mode
+   * @param {number} [options.nonceCapacity] - Nonce LRU capacity
+   * @param {number} [options.maxClockSkewMs] - Max clock skew tolerance
+   * @param {import('../../ports/CryptoPort.js').default} [options.crypto] - Crypto port
+   * @param {import('../../ports/LoggerPort.js').default} [options.logger] - Logger port
+   * @param {() => number} [options.wallClockMs] - Wall clock function
+   */
+  constructor({ keys, mode = 'enforce', nonceCapacity, maxClockSkewMs, crypto, logger, wallClockMs } = /** @type {*} */ ({})) { // TODO(ts-cleanup): needs options type
+    _validateKeys(keys);
+    this._keys = keys;
+    this._mode = mode;
+    this._crypto = crypto || defaultCrypto;
+    this._logger = logger || nullLogger;
+    this._wallClockMs = wallClockMs || (() => Date.now());
+    this._maxClockSkewMs = typeof maxClockSkewMs === 'number' ? maxClockSkewMs : MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_MS;
+    this._nonceCache = new LRUCache(nonceCapacity || DEFAULT_NONCE_CAPACITY);
+    this._metrics = _freshMetrics();
+  }
+
+  /** @returns {'enforce'|'log-only'} */
+  get mode() {
+    return this._mode;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Validates auth header presence and format.
+   *
+   * @param {Record<string, string>} headers
+   * @returns {{ ok: false, reason: string, status: number } | { ok: true, sigVersion: string, signature: string, timestamp: string, nonce: string, keyId: string }}
+   * @private
+   */
+  _validateHeaders(headers) {
+    const sigVersion = headers['x-warp-sig-version'];
+    if (sigVersion !== SIG_VERSION) {
+      return fail('INVALID_VERSION', 400);
+    }
+
+    const keyId = headers['x-warp-key-id'];
+    const signature = headers['x-warp-signature'];
+    const timestamp = headers['x-warp-timestamp'];
+    const nonce = headers['x-warp-nonce'];
+
+    if (!keyId || !signature || !timestamp || !nonce) {
+      return fail('MISSING_AUTH', 401);
+    }
+
+    const formatCheck = _checkHeaderFormats(timestamp, nonce, signature);
+    if (!formatCheck.ok) {
+      return formatCheck;
+    }
+
+    return { ok: true, sigVersion, signature, timestamp, nonce, keyId };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Checks that the timestamp is within the allowed clock skew.
+   *
+   * @param {string} timestamp - Epoch ms as string
+   * @returns {{ ok: false, reason: string, status: number } | { ok: true }}
+   * @private
+   */
+  _validateFreshness(timestamp) {
+    const ts = Number(timestamp);
+    const now = this._wallClockMs();
+    if (Math.abs(now - ts) > this._maxClockSkewMs) {
+      this._metrics.clockSkewRejects += 1;
+      return fail('EXPIRED', 403);
+    }
+    return { ok: true };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Atomically reserves a nonce. Returns replay failure if already seen.
+   *
+   * @param {string} nonce
+   * @returns {{ ok: false, reason: string, status: number } | { ok: true }}
+   * @private
+   */
+  _reserveNonce(nonce) {
+    if (this._nonceCache.has(nonce)) {
+      this._metrics.replayRejectCount += 1;
+      return fail('REPLAY', 403);
+    }
+
+    const sizeBefore = this._nonceCache.size;
+    this._nonceCache.set(nonce, true);
+    if (this._nonceCache.size <= sizeBefore && sizeBefore >= this._nonceCache.maxSize) {
+      this._metrics.nonceEvictions += 1;
+    }
+
+    return { ok: true };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Resolves the shared secret for a key-id.
+   *
+   * @param {string} keyId
+   * @returns {{ ok: false, reason: string, status: number } | { ok: true, secret: string }}
+   * @private
+   */
+  _resolveKey(keyId) {
+    const secret = this._keys[keyId];
+    if (!secret) {
+      return fail('UNKNOWN_KEY_ID', 401);
+    }
+    return { ok: true, secret };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Verifies the HMAC signature against the canonical payload.
+   *
+   * @param {Object} params
+   * @param {{ method: string, url: string, headers: Record<string, string>, body?: Buffer|Uint8Array }} params.request
+   * @param {string} params.secret
+   * @param {string} params.keyId
+   * @param {string} params.timestamp
+   * @param {string} params.nonce
+   * @returns {Promise<{ ok: false, reason: string, status: number } | { ok: true }>}
+   * @private
+   */
+  async _verifySignature({ request, secret, keyId, timestamp, nonce }) {
+    const body = request.body || new Uint8Array(0);
+    const bodySha256 = await this._crypto.hash('sha256', body);
+    const contentType = request.headers['content-type'] || '';
+    const path = canonicalizePath(request.url || '/');
+
+    const canonical = buildCanonicalPayload({
+      keyId,
+      method: (request.method || 'POST').toUpperCase(),
+      path,
+      timestamp,
+      nonce,
+      contentType,
+      bodySha256,
+    });
+
+    const expectedBuf = await this._crypto.hmac(HMAC_ALGO, secret, canonical);
+    const receivedHex = request.headers['x-warp-signature'];
+
+    let receivedBuf;
+    try {
+      receivedBuf = Buffer.from(receivedHex, 'hex');
+    } catch {
+      return fail('INVALID_SIGNATURE', 401);
+    }
+
+    if (receivedBuf.length !== expectedBuf.length) {
+      return fail('INVALID_SIGNATURE', 401);
+    }
+
+    let equal;
+    try {
+      equal = this._crypto.timingSafeEqual(
+        Buffer.from(expectedBuf),
+        receivedBuf,
+      );
+    } catch {
+      return fail('INVALID_SIGNATURE', 401);
+    }
+
+    if (!equal) {
+      return fail('INVALID_SIGNATURE', 401);
+    }
+
+    return { ok: true };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Verifies an incoming sync request.
+   *
+   * @param {{ method: string, url: string, headers: Record<string, string>, body?: Buffer|Uint8Array }} request
+   * @returns {Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false, reason: string, status: number }>}
+   */
+  async verify(request) {
+    const headers = request.headers || {};
+
+    const headerResult = this._validateHeaders(headers);
+    if (!headerResult.ok) {
+      this._metrics.malformedRejects += 1;
+      return this._fail('header validation failed', { reason: headerResult.reason }, headerResult);
+    }
+
+    const { timestamp, nonce, keyId } = headerResult;
+
+    const freshnessResult = this._validateFreshness(timestamp);
+    if (!freshnessResult.ok) {
+      return this._fail('clock skew rejected', { keyId, timestamp }, freshnessResult);
+    }
+
+    const keyResult = this._resolveKey(keyId);
+    if (!keyResult.ok) {
+      return this._fail('unknown key-id', { keyId }, keyResult);
+    }
+
+    const sigResult = await this._verifySignature({
+      request, secret: keyResult.secret, keyId, timestamp, nonce,
+    });
+    if (!sigResult.ok) {
+      return this._fail('signature mismatch', { keyId }, sigResult);
+    }
+
+    // Reserve nonce only after signature verification succeeds to avoid
+    // consuming nonces for requests with invalid signatures.
+    const nonceResult = this._reserveNonce(nonce);
+    if (!nonceResult.ok) {
+      return this._fail('replay detected', { keyId, nonce }, nonceResult);
+    }
+
+    return { ok: true };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Records an auth failure and returns the result.
+   * @param {string} message
+   * @param {Record<string, *>} context
+   * @param {{ ok: false, reason: string, status: number }} result
+   * @returns {{ ok: false, reason: string, status: number }}
+   * @private
+   */
+  _fail(message, context, result) {
+    this._metrics.authFailCount += 1;
+    this._logger.warn(`sync auth: ${message}`, context);
+    return result;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Increments the log-only passthrough counter.
+   */
+  recordLogOnlyPassthrough() {
+    this._metrics.logOnlyPassthroughs += 1;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Returns a snapshot of auth metrics.
+   *
+   * @returns {{ authFailCount: number, replayRejectCount: number, nonceEvictions: number, clockSkewRejects: number, malformedRejects: number, logOnlyPassthroughs: number }}
+   */
+  getMetrics() {
+    return { ...this._metrics };
+  }
+}

package/src/infrastructure/adapters/GitGraphAdapter.js

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
 
 import { retry } from '@git-stunts/alfred';
 import GraphPersistencePort from '../../ports/GraphPersistencePort.js';
+import { validateOid, validateRef, validateLimit, validateConfigKey } from './adapterValidation.js';
 
 /**
  * Transient Git errors that are safe to retry automatically.
@@ -374,30 +375,13 @@ export default class GitGraphAdapter extends GraphPersistencePort {
 
   /**
    * Validates that a ref is safe to use in git commands.
-   * Prevents command injection via malicious ref names.
+   * Delegates to shared validation in adapterValidation.js.
    * @param {string} ref - The ref to validate
    * @throws {Error} If ref contains invalid characters, is too long, or starts with -/--
    * @private
    */
   _validateRef(ref) {
-    if (!ref || typeof ref !== 'string') {
-      throw new Error('Ref must be a non-empty string');
-    }
-    // Prevent buffer overflow attacks with extremely long refs
-    if (ref.length > 1024) {
-      throw new Error(`Ref too long: ${ref.length} chars. Maximum is 1024`);
-    }
-    // Prevent git option injection (must check before pattern matching)
-    if (ref.startsWith('-') || ref.startsWith('--')) {
-      throw new Error(`Invalid ref: ${ref}. Refs cannot start with - or --. See https://github.com/git-stunts/git-warp#security`);
-    }
-    // Allow alphanumeric, ., /, -, _ in names
-    // Allow ancestry operators: ^ or ~ optionally followed by digits
-    // Allow range operators: .. between names
-    const validRefPattern = /^[a-zA-Z0-9._/-]+((~\d*|\^\d*|\.\.[a-zA-Z0-9._/-]+)*)$/;
-    if (!validRefPattern.test(ref)) {
-      throw new Error(`Invalid ref format: ${ref}. Only alphanumeric characters, ., /, -, _, ^, ~, and range operators are allowed. See https://github.com/git-stunts/git-warp#ref-validation`);
-    }
+    validateRef(ref);
   }
 
   /**
@@ -546,42 +530,24 @@ export default class GitGraphAdapter extends GraphPersistencePort {
 
   /**
    * Validates that an OID is safe to use in git commands.
+   * Delegates to shared validation in adapterValidation.js.
    * @param {string} oid - The OID to validate
    * @throws {Error} If OID is invalid
    * @private
    */
   _validateOid(oid) {
-    if (!oid || typeof oid !== 'string') {
-      throw new Error('OID must be a non-empty string');
-    }
-    if (oid.length > 64) {
-      throw new Error(`OID too long: ${oid.length} chars. Maximum is 64`);
-    }
-    const validOidPattern = /^[0-9a-fA-F]{4,64}$/;
-    if (!validOidPattern.test(oid)) {
-      throw new Error(`Invalid OID format: ${oid}`);
-    }
+    validateOid(oid);
   }
 
   /**
    * Validates that a limit is a safe positive integer.
+   * Delegates to shared validation in adapterValidation.js.
    * @param {number} limit - The limit to validate
    * @throws {Error} If limit is invalid
    * @private
    */
   _validateLimit(limit) {
-    if (typeof limit !== 'number' || !Number.isFinite(limit)) {
-      throw new Error('Limit must be a finite number');
-    }
-    if (!Number.isInteger(limit)) {
-      throw new Error('Limit must be an integer');
-    }
-    if (limit <= 0) {
-      throw new Error('Limit must be a positive integer');
-    }
-    if (limit > 10_000_000) {
-      throw new Error(`Limit too large: ${limit}. Maximum is 10,000,000`);
-    }
+    validateLimit(limit);
   }
 
   /**
@@ -721,26 +687,13 @@ export default class GitGraphAdapter extends GraphPersistencePort {
 
   /**
    * Validates that a config key is safe to use in git commands.
+   * Delegates to shared validation in adapterValidation.js.
    * @param {string} key - The config key to validate
    * @throws {Error} If key is invalid
    * @private
    */
   _validateConfigKey(key) {
-    if (!key || typeof key !== 'string') {
-      throw new Error('Config key must be a non-empty string');
-    }
-    if (key.length > 256) {
-      throw new Error(`Config key too long: ${key.length} chars. Maximum is 256`);
-    }
-    // Prevent git option injection
-    if (key.startsWith('-')) {
-      throw new Error(`Invalid config key: ${key}. Keys cannot start with -`);
-    }
-    // Allow section.subsection.key format
-    const validKeyPattern = /^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9._-]*$/;
-    if (!validKeyPattern.test(key)) {
-      throw new Error(`Invalid config key format: ${key}`);
-    }
+    validateConfigKey(key);
   }
 
   /**