@ghostlytools/sdk 1.10.3 → 1.10.4

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/testing.js CHANGED
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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- import { Mw as createIdentity, Pu as emptyIdentityLedger, Ru as identityStatement, Vu as newIdentityBinding, ia as isBitcoinAddress, ju as IdentityExchange, ka as decodeBolt11, xu as IDENTITY_MAX_EVIDENCE } from "./src-CCGK1Q_h.js";
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+ import { Bu as identityStatement, Iu as emptyIdentityLedger, Lw as createIdentity, Nu as IdentityExchange, Su as IDENTITY_MAX_EVIDENCE, Uu as newIdentityBinding, ia as isBitcoinAddress, ka as decodeBolt11 } from "./src-0lxL4lAH.js";
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  import { l as providerDescriptorProblems, o as isNothingSpentError } from "./types-DvtCy3WB.js";
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- import { i as verifyIdentity, r as descriptorProblems } from "./verify-DXMSqZzR.js";
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- import { _ as fakeAddress, a as fakeAccount, b as fakeOnchain, c as fakeKeySign, d as fakeRecord, f as fakeRecordText, g as TEST_PROVIDERS_FLAG, h as FakeOnchainProvider, i as TEST_IDENTITIES_FLAG, l as fakeKeySubject, m as FakeLightningProvider, n as FAKE_ISSUER, o as fakeAccountToken, p as testIdentitiesEnabled, r as FAKE_RECORD_HOST, s as fakeKey, t as FAKE_IDENTITY_PROVIDERS, u as fakeKeyring, v as fakeInvoice, x as testProvidersEnabled, y as fakeLightning } from "./fakes-Dbw01Dk9.js";
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+ import { i as verifyIdentity, r as descriptorProblems } from "./verify-DyjsMutX.js";
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+ import { _ as fakeAddress, a as fakeAccount, b as fakeOnchain, c as fakeKeySign, d as fakeRecord, f as fakeRecordText, g as TEST_PROVIDERS_FLAG, h as FakeOnchainProvider, i as TEST_IDENTITIES_FLAG, l as fakeKeySubject, m as FakeLightningProvider, n as FAKE_ISSUER, o as fakeAccountToken, p as testIdentitiesEnabled, r as FAKE_RECORD_HOST, s as fakeKey, t as FAKE_IDENTITY_PROVIDERS, u as fakeKeyring, v as fakeInvoice, x as testProvidersEnabled, y as fakeLightning } from "./fakes-r4tfM7wk.js";
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  import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
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  //#region ../browser/src/engine/paymentAdapters/providers/contractSuite.ts
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  var WAIT = 1e4;
@@ -218,10 +218,13 @@ export interface IdentityProofProvider<E = unknown> {
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  /**
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  * When a verifier's check can go stale (the DNS record may be removed later): the contact's app offers
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  * "Check again" after this many seconds and shows the last check time. Omit when the evidence is a
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- * signature that stays valid until expiry.
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+ * signature that stays valid until expiry. `perHour`: the most checks the app runs on its own in an hour, for a
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+ * server that limits lookups per IP (the rest wait for later); well under that limit, so a check a person starts
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+ * (a new contact's proof, "Check again") still gets an answer.
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  */
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  recheck?: {
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  afterSeconds: number;
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+ perHour?: number;
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  };
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  /** One sentence for people: what `verify` contacts and who learns what. "Nothing: checked on this device." */
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  privacy: string;
@@ -37,6 +37,13 @@ export declare const LEAVING_DHT_FAST_MS: number;
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  * side's offer and its reads for the answer go over the minute on (`SIGNALING_ALLOWANCE_SHARE` in relay.ts).
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  */
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  export declare const LEAVING_SIGNAL_READS = 3;
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+ /**
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+ * How long a fresh link packet of a contact that still says DHT only after the reads it started waits before it may
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+ * start them again (`peerLinkPacket`), doubling up to `LEAVING_PROBE_MAX_GAP_MS`. One that really left says so in
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+ * seconds; one that stays (or anyone holding the invite) cannot keep this side reading its mailbox at the DHT pace.
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+ */
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+ export declare const LEAVING_PROBE_GAP_MS: number;
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+ export declare const LEAVING_PROBE_MAX_GAP_MS: number;
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  /** Only this often while layer 1 carries the chat (WISP 403, Q7): the relays' per-IP budget is shared by every chat. */
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  export declare const LIVE_POLL_MS: number;
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  /**
@@ -183,6 +190,11 @@ export declare class DhtDelivery {
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  private urgent;
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  /** Reads left that are signaling: the contact is leaving DHT only, and the live link waits on them (`expect`). */
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  private signalReads;
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+ /** The read as this side leaves DHT only, before the signaling ones (`setMode`): a plain one. */
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+ private leavingRead;
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+ /** Until when a fresh link packet of the contact starts no signaling reads, and the wait it was held to (`peerLinkPacket`). */
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+ private probeAt;
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+ private probeGap;
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  private timer;
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  /** The first control envelope of a start that waits (`firstControlAfterMs`). */
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  private controlTimer;
@@ -201,6 +213,11 @@ export declare class DhtDelivery {
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  private unsealedOut;
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  /** Until when the relays' request budget holds publications back: what is due then goes at once. */
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  private budgetUntil;
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+ /**
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+ * This side left DHT only and no envelope saying so went out yet: the contact's live link waits on it (it holds this
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+ * side's offer until it reads that), so it goes as signaling (`PkarrRequestOptions.signal`).
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+ */
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+ private leavingOut;
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  /**
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  * Until when it held this side's last read of the contact's mailbox back: the read goes again then, not at the next
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  * poll. A chat in the background reads every 30 s, and one held back while its link was redialling read the contact
@@ -208,6 +225,8 @@ export declare class DhtDelivery {
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  */
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  private readHeldUntil;
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  private errors;
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+ /** Texts whose last `send` went nowhere (`wentNowhereFor`), newest last. */
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+ private wentNowhere;
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  /** When the device's network last came back (`networkBack`): a read or publication started before failed for want of it. */
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  private networkBackAt;
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  private foreignKeySeenAt?;
@@ -325,9 +344,21 @@ export declare class DhtDelivery {
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  private changed;
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  private serialize;
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  private persist;
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+ /** The key an envelope between this side and `peer` is sealed with: the same for the same contact, so derived once. */
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+ private sealedKeys?;
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  private sealedKey;
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  private signed;
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  private records;
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+ /**
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+ * Whether an envelope to `recipient` whose plaintext is this many bytes fits the packet: its size depends on the
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+ * length alone, so it is measured on a placeholder, with no signature, key or encryption.
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+ */
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+ private fits;
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+ /**
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+ * Whether `body` fits an envelope to `recipient`, as `envelope` would find it, without building one: the signature is
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+ * always 86 characters of base64url.
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+ */
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+ private bodyFits;
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  /**
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  * The envelope's records. Ratcheted (`ratcheted`), its `_dr` record is the right length but not sealed yet: `seal`
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  * gives its bytes, under the chat's lock, once the publication is sure to go. Measuring a packet takes no key.
@@ -355,6 +386,13 @@ export declare class DhtDelivery {
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  * (`LEAVING_SIGNAL_READS` in all) are signaling (`PkarrRequestOptions.signal`).
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  */
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  expect(ms?: number, signal?: boolean): void;
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+ /**
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+ * A fresh link packet of a contact still saying DHT only (`expect`, signaling). Nothing signed says it is the contact's,
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+ * and one that stays on DHT only (or anyone holding the invite) can put one before every read: the reads it starts are
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+ * then held to a wait that doubles from `LEAVING_PROBE_GAP_MS` to `LEAVING_PROBE_MAX_GAP_MS`, and start over once the
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+ * contact says it left. False when held. Its offer, signed by its pinned key, is not held (`expect` directly).
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+ */
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+ peerLinkPacket(ms: number): boolean;
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  /**
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  * Layer 1 carries the chat, or no longer does. While it does, the mailbox is read every 5 minutes, after one
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  * last look as it goes live: a text the contact put on the DHT in the seconds before (after this side's last
@@ -369,6 +407,10 @@ export declare class DhtDelivery {
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  /** The chat is open with the app in front: on the DHT, its mailbox is read at the signaling pace. */
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  setActive(active: boolean): void;
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  validate(text: string, timestamp: number, id: string, reply?: string, edit?: DhtEdit): string | null;
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+ /**
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+ * Measured, not built (`bodyFits`): the outbox asks it of every waiting text at each look, and a text that waits as no
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+ * relay takes it would cost a signature and a seal each time, for an answer that does not change.
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+ */
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  private packetError;
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  /** Whether a text with its hop count fits the packet and what a reader reads (`MAX_ENVELOPE_PLAINTEXT`). */
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  private roomForHops;
@@ -377,6 +419,11 @@ export declare class DhtDelivery {
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  * room for it: the text is what matters, and it then reads as written here.
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  */
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  send(text: string, timestamp: number, id: string, reply?: string, edit?: DhtEdit, forwarded?: number): Promise<string | null>;
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+ /**
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+ * The last `send` of this id failed with no relay holding it, and it was not out before (`PublishFailedError`): it
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+ * never left this device, and is no longer the floor's to publish.
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+ */
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+ wentNowhereFor(id: string): boolean;
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  /**
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  * The envelope a file's offer would go in, as `send` builds a text's: the most it can say that fits the packet and
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  * what a reader reads (`MAX_ENVELOPE_PLAINTEXT`). Its meta goes first (a voice note's waveform thinned if it must),
@@ -24,6 +24,12 @@ export declare const LIMITS: {
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  readonly maxConcurrentRequestsPerPeer: 32;
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  /** Requests a client keeps in flight; the rest wait in a queue. */
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  readonly maxClientInFlight: 16;
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+ /**
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+ * Requests, and their bodies' bytes, a client keeps waiting for a slot: past either, a request is refused at once
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+ * (`busy`), so whatever asks (a contact's app in a viewer) cannot make it hold unbounded memory.
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+ */
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+ readonly maxClientWaiting: 64;
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+ readonly maxClientWaitingBodyBytes: number;
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  readonly maxChatMessageBytes: number;
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  readonly maxFileBytes: number;
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  /** Files a peer may be sending us at once. */
@@ -1353,6 +1353,8 @@ export declare class GhostLink {
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  fileAnnounceError(file: DhtFileOffer, timestamp: number, reply?: WireReply, forwarded?: number): string | null;
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  /** What awaits its receipt on the DHT floor now, if anything does. */
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  get dhtPendingId(): string | undefined;
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+ /** The last DHT send of this text went nowhere: no relay holds it, and it is off the floor (`DhtDelivery.wentNowhereFor`). */
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+ dhtWentNowhere(id: string): boolean;
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  /** What went on the DHT floor under this id needs no more retries there (it went live, or was withdrawn). */
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  settleDht(id: string): Promise<void>;
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  /** Publishes a `_call` signal; a connected peer also gets it right away over the data link. */
@@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ export declare const COMMUNITY_LIMITS: {
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  readonly window: 64;
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  /** Commits known off the main branch. */
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  readonly side: 512;
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+ /**
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+ * Of those, the branches one member's commit ends (its newest), and the commits it signed: a handful of races, and
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+ * one full run of its admissions (`memberAdmissions`, with the leaves among them). The admin's are not counted.
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+ */
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+ readonly sideTips: 8;
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+ readonly sideCommits: 64;
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  /** Commits waiting for their parent. */
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  readonly pendingCommits: 64;
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  /** Epoch secrets waiting for their commit. */
@@ -61,6 +67,11 @@ export declare const COMMUNITY_LIMITS: {
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  readonly pendingMs: 120000;
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  readonly waiting: 64;
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  readonly waitingBytes: number;
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+ /**
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+ * Of those, the ones signed by a key no commit I know names (a newcomer whose admission has not come yet, or a key
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+ * anyone can make up): the newest only, they push out nobody else's, and they make no catch-up hurry.
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+ */
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+ readonly waitingStrangers: 8;
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  readonly replay: 256;
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  /** Commits in one welcome or chain piece. */
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  readonly chainPiece: 100;
@@ -741,7 +752,13 @@ export declare class CommunitySession {
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  private holdDroppedLeaves;
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  /** The entry key is the one the main branch names; its seed comes with a `group-entry` from whoever holds it. */
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  private followEntry;
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- /** Side commits stay up to a bound, the most recent ones (a longer branch being assembled included). */
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+ /**
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+ * Side commits stay up to a bound, the most recent ones (a longer branch being assembled included), and a member's
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+ * newest only: past `sideTips` of the branches it ends or `sideCommits` of its commits, its oldest branch goes, from
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+ * the tip down, so nothing kept loses its parent. Each is weighed at every commit taken and saved with the group, so
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+ * what one member signs off the main branch costs every member a bounded amount. What it signs last is kept, so a
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+ * branch it grows still comes in commit by commit (one let go comes again from where it parts in a catch-up).
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+ */
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  private pruneSide;
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  /**
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  * Seen marks of epochs older than the window go, every sender's, once the branch I follow moves past them: as
@@ -750,6 +767,10 @@ export declare class CommunitySession {
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  * within the window stay, a leaver's too: what it wrote before its leave is still taken up to its mark there.
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  */
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  private pruneSeen;
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+ /**
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+ * Those of the main branch's window always stay, the current epoch's included; side commits, however many are
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+ * kept, only get what is left of the bound, the most recent first.
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+ */
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  private pruneSecrets;
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  /** A derived epoch's secret, from its parent's, when that is held. */
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  private takeDerived;
@@ -969,7 +990,7 @@ export declare class CommunitySession {
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  private haveOf;
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  private markSeen;
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  private park;
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- /** Something is missing here: the current epoch's secret, or the epoch of frames waiting. */
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+ /** Something is missing here: the current epoch's secret, or the epoch of a member's frames waiting. */
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  get needsCatchUp(): boolean;
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  /** Asks a member I have an edge to for what I lack (the engine calls it now and then while `needsCatchUp`). */
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  catchUp(to: string): void;
@@ -28,6 +28,13 @@ export declare const GROUP_LIMITS: {
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  /** Frames waiting for an epoch (or its secret) that has not arrived yet. */
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  readonly waiting: 64;
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  readonly waitingBytes: number;
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+ /**
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+ * Of those, and of the edits waiting, the ones signed by a key no recent commit names (a newcomer whose admission has
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+ * not come yet, or a key anyone can make up): the newest only, they go first, and they never say I am behind.
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+ */
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+ readonly waitingStrangers: 8;
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+ /** How long a frame or edit waits: then it is dropped, and a later catch-up brings it again if it was real. */
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+ readonly waitingMs: 120000;
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  /** Epoch secrets kept: past this, older epochs cannot be read or handed on. */
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  readonly secrets: 32;
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  /** Secrets in one `group-secrets` frame: apps from before revision 0.9 drop a frame with more. */
@@ -466,6 +473,11 @@ export declare class GroupSession {
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  private waitingBytes;
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  /** Edits for an epoch, or a secret, not here yet: tried again with the frames above. In memory only. */
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  private waitingEdits;
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+ /**
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+ * Members one of whose frames waited `waitingMs` for an epoch that never came → when it was dropped: until my chain
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+ * moves, theirs waiting say I am behind no more (`behind`). In memory only.
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+ */
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+ private waitedInVain;
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  private pendingCommits;
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  /** When each member was last asked to catch me up, so a stream of unreadable frames is one question, not a loop. */
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  private asked;
@@ -748,7 +760,10 @@ export declare class GroupSession {
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  * edits, reactions); one who read the first does not show it twice. The engine calls this on each tick.
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  */
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  reseal(): Promise<void>;
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- /** Something is missing here: the current epoch's secret, a commit ahead of my chain, or the epoch of frames waiting. */
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+ /**
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+ * Something is missing here: the current epoch's secret, a commit ahead of my chain, or the epoch of a member's frames
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+ * waiting, unless one of that member's waited in vain since my chain last moved (`waitedInVain`).
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+ */
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  private get behind();
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  private resealBehind;
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  /**
@@ -924,6 +939,10 @@ export declare class GroupSession {
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  */
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  private pruneSeen;
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  private park;
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+ /** Not in the roster, nor in any of the last `secrets` commits: a key whose frames may be no member's. */
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+ private stranger;
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+ /** Frames and edits that waited `waitingMs`: dropped, and a member's noted (`waitedInVain`). */
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+ private expireWaiting;
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  /** Whoever sent something I cannot read yet is ahead of me, or holds a secret I lack: ask, but not in a loop. */
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  private ask;
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  /**
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ export declare class HttpClient {
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  private nextId;
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  private readonly streams;
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  private readonly waiting;
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+ private waitingBytes;
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  private inFlight;
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  private closed;
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  constructor(channel: FrameChannel);
@@ -35,6 +35,19 @@ export declare const IDENTITY_MAX_RECEIVED = 16;
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  /** `idp-*` frames a paired session reads from the contact per `IDENTITY_FRAME_WINDOW_MS`; the rest are dropped unread. */
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  export declare const IDENTITY_FRAME_LIMIT = 40;
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  export declare const IDENTITY_FRAME_WINDOW_MS = 60000;
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+ /**
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+ * A proof this side holds verified, presented again with the same evidence between the same keys, is answered from that
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+ * check while it is younger than this (seconds): the contact chooses how often it presents, and each check costs this
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+ * device a provider lookup (a forge's per-IP quota, a DNS query, a contact's server) and a Pkarr read. An hour keeps an
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+ * answer as fresh as a re-share can expect; past it, and between, the daily re-check (or Check again) asks the provider.
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+ */
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+ export declare const IDENTITY_REUSE_CHECK_S = 3600;
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+ /**
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+ * Presentations a verifier checks with their provider per contact in an hour; past it the contact is told the check
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+ * could not run. Room for every proof it may keep (`IDENTITY_MAX_RECEIVED`) and a few retries: a contact making fresh
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+ * proofs cannot spend a forge's per-IP quota (GitHub: 60 an hour) for every chat and app on this network.
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+ */
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+ export declare const IDENTITY_MAX_CHECKS_PER_HOUR = 20;
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  export declare const IDENTITY_PROVIDER_ID: RegExp;
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  /** Printable ASCII without spaces, so the statement can be built but never needs parsing. */
40
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  export declare const IDENTITY_SUBJECT: RegExp;
@@ -232,6 +245,8 @@ export declare class IdentityExchange {
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  private requested;
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  /** The nonces of the presentations in their provider's check now. */
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  private checking;
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+ /** When the contact's presentations were checked with their provider (seconds), for `IDENTITY_MAX_CHECKS_PER_HOUR`. */
249
+ private checks;
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  constructor(options: IdentityExchangeOptions);
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  private now;
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  /** The ledger with one more step on the chat's timeline, in milliseconds (a test's clock, in seconds, when given). */
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@
8
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  export type IdentityTimelineSide = "mine" | "theirs";
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  export type IdentityTimelineState = "verifying" | "verified" | "failed";
10
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  export interface IdentityTimelineEntry {
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- /** Unique in the chat: side, proof and one past the highest number that proof's kept entries on that side have. */
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+ /**
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+ * Unique in the chat: side, proof and one past the highest number that proof's kept entries on that side have. A
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+ * contact's later attempt that took the entry over keeps it (see applyIdentityEvent).
14
+ */
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  id: string;
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  /** The proof's id (identityStatement().id). */
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  proof: string;
@@ -65,7 +68,10 @@ export declare const IDENTITY_TIMELINE_MAX = 100;
65
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  /**
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  * The timeline after one step. A share already on it is updated in place, never repeated: a request sent again at
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  * a reconnect, a second share of a proof the contact already verified. A new attempt after a failure or a stop is
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- * a new entry. A stop is written once; a withdrawal later found revoked becomes a revocation in place.
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+ * a new entry, except the contact's own not verified: those keep one entry per kind, which its next attempt takes
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+ * over in place (its id and time stay, so no new sound and the chat does not move). The ids and the kind are the
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+ * contact's to choose, so otherwise its requests alone could push every other entry, this side's too, out of the
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+ * bound. A stop is written once; a withdrawal later found revoked becomes a revocation in place.
69
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  */
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  export declare function applyIdentityEvent(timeline: readonly IdentityTimelineEntry[], event: IdentityTimelineEvent, at: number): IdentityTimelineEntry[];
71
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  /** When the contact last shared an identity here (milliseconds), for the chat list: 0 when never. */
@@ -304,6 +304,8 @@ export declare class LinkSession {
304
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  private signalReadsLeft;
305
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  /** Fast reads still signaling while the contact's offer is due (`SIGNAL_DUE_READS`). */
306
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  private dueSignalReadsLeft;
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+ /** This side just left DHT only and its presence is not out yet: the contact dials on it (`presenceDue`). */
308
+ private presenceDueOut;
307
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  /** When the last `expectPeer` window ends (or ended): the pace slows down from there step by step. */
308
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  private expectUntil;
309
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  /**
@@ -398,6 +400,12 @@ export declare class LinkSession {
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  * the windows that look fast for the contact (`expectPeer`, `watchPeer`) end, and the link reads at its pace from the
399
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  * next read on. An offer of this side's out keeps its window.
400
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  */
403
+ /**
404
+ * This side just left DHT only: the contact that dials waits on its next packet that advertises, so that one is
405
+ * signaling (`PkarrRequestOptions.signal`). As a plain write, an app that had spent its relay minute held it 55 s,
406
+ * and the contact dialled only then.
407
+ */
408
+ presenceDue(): void;
401
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  calm(): void;
402
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  /** The data link carries chat and services while it is up. */
403
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  setDataLinkOpen(open: boolean): void;
@@ -91,6 +91,19 @@ export declare const SIGNALING_ALLOWANCE_SHARE: number;
91
91
  * came up was never read, and the chat came back only through the race's DHT dial, 8 s on (2026-10-07).
92
92
  */
93
93
  export declare const DEPARTED_READS = 6;
94
+ /**
95
+ * A 1:1 chat's reads of an invite this side made, while its joiner is due and has not shown (`awaited`, `AWAITING_PEER_MS`
96
+ * in link.ts), may go over a relay's minute within the chat's allowance (`SIGNALING_ALLOWANCE_SHARE`) the same way: at
97
+ * most this many of each invite's in a minute, every relay together. And while one asked in the last minute, the departed
98
+ * reads leave them half of that on each relay: the last `AWAITED_READS / 2` of the allowance's reads (`DEPARTED_READS`
99
+ * then take at most 3 on a relay of 30, against 5). Read every 2 to 4 s, they cover the seconds in which a joiner that
100
+ * opened the link at once knocks. Within the chats' allowance, they add nothing to what a relay may see in a minute
101
+ * (`WAY_BACK_SHARE`): 36 at most from the chats on a relay of 30, none past 5 on a relay of 5. An inviter pairing one joiner after
102
+ * another on relays of 30 spent the minute on both 12 s in (two pairings, about 15 requests a relay each), the departed
103
+ * reads of the contact that had just left took the allowance, and the third invite's key was read once, then not until
104
+ * the minute freed: the joiner's knock 48 s late, and join to live in 60 s, against 2.6 and 4.6 s (CLI lab, 2026-11-07).
105
+ */
106
+ export declare const AWAITED_READS = 4;
94
107
  /**
95
108
  * A group edge's requests for a member that may be back may go over a relay's minute by this fraction of it (4 on a
96
109
  * relay of 30, 8 on one of 60, none on a relay of 5): its reads of a member that went away and its packet
@@ -300,7 +313,9 @@ export declare class RelayTransport implements PkarrTransport {
300
313
  * records are written by every member, an inviter warms its contact's key with an empty packet, and this device's
301
314
  * own clock may have been set back since it last wrote. A relay and the DHT keep only the packet dated latest, so
302
315
  * one dated by this clock alone, when it is behind, was refused (409) or silently never read, until this clock
303
- * caught up with the other one: minutes, or an hour.
316
+ * caught up with the other one: minutes, or an hour. Only up to `PKARR_FUTURE_SKEW_MS` ahead of this clock
317
+ * (`withinSkew`): a packet one holder of a shared key dated further ahead must not date every later one of this
318
+ * device past it (past 64 bits, unsignable; else ahead of every reader's clock, never taken over one dated now).
304
319
  */
305
320
  private readonly seenTimestamp;
306
321
  /**
@@ -335,6 +350,10 @@ export declare class RelayTransport implements PkarrTransport {
335
350
  private readonly spentAnswerAllowance;
336
351
  /** Per contact, its departed reads past the limit in the last minute, every relay together (`DEPARTED_READS`). */
337
352
  private readonly departedOver;
353
+ /** Per invite, its awaited reads past the limit in the last minute, every relay together (`AWAITED_READS`). */
354
+ private readonly awaitedOver;
355
+ /** When an awaited invite's read last asked: the departed reads leave it room for a minute (`AWAITED_READS`). */
356
+ private awaitedAt;
338
357
  /**
339
358
  * Per key a group reads (not in the background), when a read of it last went out and when it last asked: whose turn
340
359
  * it is under the watch share (`WATCH_SHARE`) and while the groups' reads are rationed (`GROUP_RATION_WINDOW_MS`). And
@@ -387,6 +406,10 @@ export declare class RelayTransport implements PkarrTransport {
387
406
  private readonly hedgeMs;
388
407
  /** Until when each relay found slow (`SLOW_MS`) goes after the others in a read (`readOrder`). */
389
408
  private readonly slowUntil;
409
+ /** Per relay, when each of this client's requests still waiting for its answer went out (`unanswering`). */
410
+ private readonly waiting;
411
+ /** When each relay last answered a request of this client, whatever it said (`unanswering`). */
412
+ private readonly answeredAt;
390
413
  /** Keys whose last read was answered 404: their next read hedges later (`HEDGE_MISSING_MS`). */
391
414
  private readonly missing;
392
415
  private readonly listeners;
@@ -395,6 +418,14 @@ export declare class RelayTransport implements PkarrTransport {
395
418
  discovery(): DiscoveryStatus;
396
419
  /** Back online on some network: relays that failed (or rate limited this address) on the old one are asked again. */
397
420
  networkChanged(): void;
421
+ /**
422
+ * `PkarrTransport.forget`: the packets and dates this client kept under these keys go, on every relay (`written`,
423
+ * `newest`, `lastTimestamp`, `seenTimestamp`, `lastPut`). A spare invite replaced unused left them here for its two keys
424
+ * for good: an idle CLI daemon gained 8 keys an hour (343 in `written` and 690 `lastPut` entries after a day). The maps
425
+ * that bound themselves (`readAt`, `lastReadFrom`, `heldBack`, `missing`, the turns) and the catch-ups, which go once
426
+ * put, are left as they are. A later put under one of these keys goes as a key's first.
427
+ */
428
+ forget(keys: Iterable<string>): void;
398
429
  /** Called when a relay trips or recovers. */
399
430
  subscribe(listener: (change?: DiscoveryChange) => void): () => void;
400
431
  private changed;
@@ -500,13 +531,21 @@ export declare class RelayTransport implements PkarrTransport {
500
531
  */
501
532
  resolve(pubKeyZ32: string, options?: PkarrRequestOptions, keptOnFailure?: boolean): Promise<SignedPacket | null>;
502
533
  /**
503
- * The order a key's read asks the relays in: in turn per key (see `resolve`), relays found slow lately last. A relay
534
+ * The order a key's read asks the relays in: in turn per key (see `resolve`), relays found slow lately or leaving a
535
+ * request unanswered (`unanswering`) last. A relay
504
536
  * with a small share of its own (`RELAY_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` under `REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`: pkarr.miguelmedeiros.dev's 5)
505
537
  * takes no turns: it comes after the others, for when they refuse, fail or are slow, unless every relay is one. In the
506
538
  * turn, it was spent in seconds and the relay after it took its turns too: pkarr.pubky.org got two reads in three and
507
539
  * pkarr.pubky.app, with twice its share, one. Its few requests are then left for writes, which go to every relay.
508
540
  */
509
541
  private readOrder;
542
+ /**
543
+ * A request of this client has waited on the relay for `HEDGE_MS` and it has answered none since: it goes after the
544
+ * others in a read (`readOrder`), at no cost of a request. A relay that took connections and never answered held a
545
+ * fresh device's first pairing at its turn: the key's last read had found nothing (`HEDGE_MISSING_MS`), so the read
546
+ * waited 6 s on it before asking the relay that had held the packet all along (8 s join to live, not 2.5 s).
547
+ */
548
+ private unanswering;
510
549
  /** One GET of a key at one relay, which `controller` drops. Never rejects: what happened is the outcome. */
511
550
  private readFromRelay;
512
551
  /**
@@ -553,7 +592,7 @@ export declare class RelayTransport implements PkarrTransport {
553
592
  * Who goes first: a chat's refused write holds back everything but chat writes; a group's refused write holds back
554
593
  * group reads and background requests, never a chat's. Background requests yield to a link that signals. A chat's
555
594
  * signaling goes over the limit by its allowance (`SIGNALING_ALLOWANCE_SHARE`), and so do a few of its reads of a
556
- * contact that just went away (`DEPARTED_READS`). `ownAllowance` false: what holds an edge's read for its answer
595
+ * contact that just went away (`DEPARTED_READS`) or of an invite awaited (`AWAITED_READS`). `ownAllowance` false: what holds an edge's read for its answer
557
596
  * without its own allowance (`ANSWER_READ_ALLOWANCE`).
558
597
  */
559
598
  private heldFor;
@@ -593,10 +632,10 @@ export declare class RelayTransport implements PkarrTransport {
593
632
  private turnAhead;
594
633
  /** A 1:1 chat's read of `key` the budget has held back for `READ_STARVED_MS` without a break. */
595
634
  private starved;
596
- /** This contact's departed reads past the limit in the last minute (`DEPARTED_READS`). */
597
- private departedReads;
598
- /** One more, the contacts with none in the last minute dropped. */
599
- private departedOverAdd;
635
+ /** This key's departed or awaited reads past the limit in the last minute (`DEPARTED_READS`, `AWAITED_READS`). */
636
+ private overReads;
637
+ /** One more, the keys with none in the last minute dropped. */
638
+ private overAdd;
600
639
  /** A chat's request of `key` asked urgently (it needs every relay), or the budget refused it on `relay` (it needs that one). */
601
640
  private chatNeed;
602
641
  /** The chats that need this relay: those a request of was refused there, and the urgent ones. */
@@ -55,6 +55,11 @@ export interface PkarrRequestOptions {
55
55
  * restarts publishes its offer then. A few may go over the relay's minute (`DEPARTED_READS` in relay.ts).
56
56
  */
57
57
  departed?: boolean;
58
+ /**
59
+ * A 1:1 chat's read of an invite this side made, while its joiner is due (`AWAITING_PEER_MS` in link.ts) and has not
60
+ * shown: the joiner's knock is read there. A few may go over the relay's minute (`AWAITED_READS` in relay.ts).
61
+ */
62
+ awaited?: boolean;
58
63
  /**
59
64
  * A read of a contact that was live when this app last ran, made before any read of it this run was answered
60
65
  * (`LinkSessionOptions.resumed`): the link's offer waits on it. A group edge's goes on the edges' floor
@@ -99,6 +104,25 @@ export declare class DiscoveryBudgetError extends Error {
99
104
  }
100
105
  /** Whether `error` is a request the budget held back (`DiscoveryBudgetError`), also from another copy of this module. */
101
106
  export declare function isDiscoveryBudgetError(error: unknown): error is DiscoveryBudgetError;
107
+ /**
108
+ * A publish no relay took (`RelayTransport`), saying whether one of them may hold the packet all the same. Not
109
+ * `mayBeStored` only when every relay was not asked now (its budget, its rate limit, its breaker, its network
110
+ * cooldown), answered that it did not take it (a 4xx), or could not be reached before the request went (a refused
111
+ * connection or a name that does not resolve, where the runtime says so: Node does, a browser does not), or when there
112
+ * is no relay at all. A relay that did not answer in time, dropped the connection, or answered with a server error
113
+ * may have stored it. The message is the publish's usual one.
114
+ */
115
+ export declare class PublishFailedError extends Error {
116
+ readonly mayBeStored: boolean;
117
+ readonly code = "publish-failed";
118
+ constructor(message: string, mayBeStored: boolean);
119
+ }
120
+ /**
121
+ * Whether `error` is a publish that went nowhere (`PublishFailedError` with `mayBeStored` false), also from another
122
+ * copy of this module. Anything else (a timeout, the DHT's own failure beside the relays', a Desktop's error in
123
+ * words) may have left this device.
124
+ */
125
+ export declare function publishedNowhere(error: unknown): boolean;
102
126
  /**
103
127
  * A publish Ghostly Desktop's Rust relay client held back, as it says it in words (`pkarr_network.rs`
104
128
  * `publish_failure`: "Publish held back on every relay…; retry in N ms: …"), as the `DiscoveryBudgetError` it is: every
@@ -191,4 +215,9 @@ export interface PkarrTransport {
191
215
  turnPut?(pubKeyZ32: string, payload: Uint8Array, conditions: TurnConditions): Promise<TurnSourcePut[]>;
192
216
  /** The profile has a device set: the turn's sources are made ready ahead of the first read (`TurnNetwork.turnWarm`). */
193
217
  turnWarm?(): Promise<void>;
218
+ /**
219
+ * Nothing will be put or read under these keys any more (a spare invite replaced unused): what the transport kept
220
+ * per key for them (the last packet put, its dates, each relay's last put) goes. Absent where nothing is kept.
221
+ */
222
+ forget?(keys: Iterable<string>): void;
194
223
  }
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ export declare class TransportSwitch {
52
52
  /** This side chose while no session was open: the next one begins with it as a choice. */
53
53
  private apart;
54
54
  private readonly policiesRead;
55
+ /** The session on which the contact's policy, the one read already, was said again and read for free (`handle`). */
56
+ private repeatRead;
55
57
  private policyHeld;
56
58
  constructor(options: {
57
59
  key: string;
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
1
- import { Au as IdentityCheckUnavailable, Nu as boundVerifiedIdentity } from "./src-CCGK1Q_h.js";
1
+ import { Fu as boundVerifiedIdentity, Mu as IdentityCheckUnavailable } from "./src-0lxL4lAH.js";
2
2
  //#region ../browser/src/proofs/verify.ts
3
3
  var DAY = 86400;
4
4
  /**
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ function descriptorProblems(p) {
31
31
  const { defaultDays, maxDays } = p.validity;
32
32
  if (!(Number.isInteger(defaultDays) && Number.isInteger(maxDays) && defaultDays >= 1 && defaultDays <= maxDays && maxDays * DAY <= 3456e4)) problems.push("validity must be whole days, 1 ≤ default ≤ max ≤ 400");
33
33
  if (p.recheck && !(Number.isInteger(p.recheck.afterSeconds) && p.recheck.afterSeconds >= 60)) problems.push("recheck.afterSeconds must be at least 60");
34
+ if (p.recheck?.perHour !== void 0 && !(Number.isInteger(p.recheck.perHour) && p.recheck.perHour >= 1)) problems.push("recheck.perHour must be a whole number, at least 1");
34
35
  if (!p.signers.length) problems.push("no signers");
35
36
  const ids = p.signers.map((s) => s.id);
36
37
  if (new Set(ids).size !== ids.length) problems.push("signer ids are not unique");
@@ -103,4 +104,4 @@ function boundedIdentityFetch(options = { online: () => true }) {
103
104
  //#endregion
104
105
  export { verifyIdentity as i, boundedIdentityFetch as n, descriptorProblems as r, availableSigners as t };
105
106
 
106
- //# sourceMappingURL=verify-DXMSqZzR.js.map
107
+ //# sourceMappingURL=verify-DyjsMutX.js.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ {"version":3,"file":"verify-DyjsMutX.js","names":[],"sources":["../../browser/src/proofs/verify.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { boundVerifiedIdentity, IdentityCheckUnavailable, IDENTITY_MAX_EVIDENCE, IDENTITY_MAX_VALIDITY, type IdentityStatement, type VerifiedIdentity } from \"@ghostly/core\";\nimport type { IdentityFetch, IdentityProofProvider, IdentitySigner, VerifyContext } from \"./contract\";\n\nconst DAY = 86_400;\n\n/**\n * The checks every proof goes through, whatever its provider: known provider, validity within the\n * provider's limit, bounded evidence, strict parsing, the provider's own check, and the category rule\n * (a self-custodied proof proves exactly the subject it names; an attested one says who attests it).\n * The engine verifies a contact's proof, and the person's own proof before saving it, only through this.\n */\nexport async function verifyIdentity(providers: readonly IdentityProofProvider[], statement: IdentityStatement, evidence: unknown, ctx: VerifyContext): Promise<VerifiedIdentity> {\n const { binding } = statement;\n const provider = providers.find(p => p.id === binding.provider);\n if (!provider) throw new Error(\"This app cannot verify this kind of identity\");\n if (binding.expiresAt - binding.issuedAt > Math.min(provider.validity.maxDays * DAY, IDENTITY_MAX_VALIDITY)) throw new Error(\"The proof lasts longer than this kind of identity allows\");\n if (JSON.stringify(evidence ?? null).length > IDENTITY_MAX_EVIDENCE) throw new Error(\"Evidence too large\");\n const parsed = provider.parseEvidence(evidence);\n const verified = boundVerifiedIdentity(await provider.verify(statement, parsed, ctx));\n if (provider.category === \"self-custodied\" && verified.subject !== binding.subject) throw new Error(\"The evidence is for another identity\");\n if (provider.category === \"provider-attested\" && !verified.attester) throw new Error(\"The evidence does not say who attests it\");\n return verified;\n}\n\n/** Problems with a provider's descriptor, empty when it is well-formed. The registry and the contract suite use it. */\nexport function descriptorProblems(p: IdentityProofProvider): string[] {\n const problems: string[] = [];\n if (!/^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,31}$/.test(p.id)) problems.push(\"id must match ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,31}$\");\n if (!p.label?.trim()) problems.push(\"label is empty\");\n if (!p.description?.trim()) problems.push(\"description is empty\");\n if (!p.privacy?.trim()) problems.push(\"privacy is empty: say what verify contacts\");\n if (p.category !== \"self-custodied\" && p.category !== \"provider-attested\") problems.push(\"category is unknown\");\n if (!p.platforms.length) problems.push(\"no platforms\");\n const { defaultDays, maxDays } = p.validity;\n if (!(Number.isInteger(defaultDays) && Number.isInteger(maxDays) && defaultDays >= 1 && defaultDays <= maxDays && maxDays * DAY <= IDENTITY_MAX_VALIDITY)) problems.push(\"validity must be whole days, 1 ≤ default ≤ max ≤ 400\");\n if (p.recheck && !(Number.isInteger(p.recheck.afterSeconds) && p.recheck.afterSeconds >= 60)) problems.push(\"recheck.afterSeconds must be at least 60\");\n if (p.recheck?.perHour !== undefined && !(Number.isInteger(p.recheck.perHour) && p.recheck.perHour >= 1)) problems.push(\"recheck.perHour must be a whole number, at least 1\");\n if (!p.signers.length) problems.push(\"no signers\");\n const ids = p.signers.map(s => s.id);\n if (new Set(ids).size !== ids.length) problems.push(\"signer ids are not unique\");\n for (const s of p.signers as readonly IdentitySigner<unknown>[]) {\n if (![\"in-app\", \"external-tool\", \"redirect\", \"publish\"].includes(s.kind)) problems.push(`signer ${s.id} has an unknown kind`);\n if (s.kind === \"in-app\" && typeof s.run !== \"function\") problems.push(`signer ${s.id} has no run()`);\n if (s.kind === \"external-tool\" && (typeof s.instructions !== \"function\" || typeof s.parse !== \"function\")) problems.push(`signer ${s.id} needs instructions() and parse()`);\n if (s.kind === \"redirect\" && typeof s.start !== \"function\") problems.push(`signer ${s.id} has no start()`);\n if (s.kind === \"publish\" && (typeof s.instructions !== \"function\" || typeof s.evidence !== \"function\")) problems.push(`signer ${s.id} needs instructions() and evidence()`);\n }\n return problems;\n}\n\n/** Signers of a provider that run on this platform and are available in this window. */\nexport function availableSigners<E>(p: IdentityProofProvider<E>, platform: IdentityProofProvider[\"platforms\"][number]): IdentitySigner<E>[] {\n return p.signers.filter(s => (s.platforms ?? p.platforms).includes(platform) && (s.available?.() ?? true));\n}\n\n/**\n * The engine's `ctx.fetch`: HTTPS GET only, no credentials or referrer, a time-out, a size cap,\n * redirects refused unless asked for.\n * `online` false refuses everything (the person turned the network off).\n */\nexport function boundedIdentityFetch(options: { online: () => boolean; timeoutMs?: number; fetcher?: typeof fetch } = { online: () => true }): IdentityFetch {\n return async (url, { headers, maxBytes = 64 * 1024, signal, redirect = \"error\" } = {}) => {\n if (!options.online()) throw new IdentityCheckUnavailable(\"Offline: this identity cannot be checked now\");\n const target = new URL(url);\n if (target.protocol !== \"https:\" || target.username || target.password) throw new Error(\"Identity checks use HTTPS only\");\n const timeout = AbortSignal.timeout(options.timeoutMs ?? 10_000);\n const response = await (options.fetcher ?? fetch)(target.href, {\n headers, signal: signal ? 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package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@ghostlytools/sdk",
3
- "version": "1.10.3",
3
+ "version": "1.10.4",
4
4
  "type": "module",
5
5
  "description": "Build a wallet source, an identity proof, a mini-app or a client for Ghostly without reading its internals: the adapter contracts, their fakes and contract test suites, the plugin registry, and the mini-app API types (Apps run in Ghostly 1.2 and later).",
6
6
  "license": "MIT",