@ghostlytools/cli 1.2.0 → 1.2.2

package/dist/assets/{src-BMUcYQ7b.js → src-XzcHzneo.js}

@@ -142,9 +142,20 @@ var KEEP = /[\u200c\u200d]/;
 function stripHidden(text) {
 	return text.replace(HIDDEN, (char) => KEEP.test(char) ? char : "");
 }
+/**
+* What draws nothing when it stands alone and `HIDDEN` leaves in, since text needs it beside something else: the
+* joiners, the fillers, the variation selectors and the other default-ignorable code points, combining marks, white
+* space and the blank Braille pattern.
+*/
+var UNSEEN = /^[\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}\p{M}\p{White_Space}\u2800]*$/u;
+/** Whether `text` holds a character that shows by itself: a name of joiners, fillers or marks alone has none. */
+function hasVisible(text) {
+	return !UNSEEN.test(text);
+}
 /** Undefined when nothing visible is left, so callers can fall back. */
 function sanitizeDisplayText(text, max) {
-	return [...stripHidden(text)].slice(0, max).join("").trim() || void 0;
+	const clean = [...stripHidden(text)].slice(0, max).join("").trim();
+	return hasVisible(clean) ? clean : void 0;
 }
 /** A nickname as it arrived from a peer, ready to show. */
 function sanitizeNick(nick) {
@@ -764,12 +775,15 @@ var asker = (options, write) => ({
 	write,
 	signal: !!options.signal,
 	watch: !!options.watch && !write,
-	watchWrite: !!options.watch && write
+	watchWrite: !!options.watch && write,
+	departed: !!options.departed && !write
 });
 /** A 1:1 chat's request: neither a group's nor a background one. */
 var isChat = (who) => !who.background && !who.group;
 /** A 1:1 chat's offer or answer, or its read for the answer to its offer: it may use the allowance (`SIGNALING_ALLOWANCE_SHARE`). */
 var isChatSignal = (who) => who.signal && isChat(who);
+/** A 1:1 chat's read of a contact that just went away: a few may use the chat's allowance (`DEPARTED_READS`). */
+var isDepartedRead = (who) => who.departed && isChat(who);
 /** A group's edge looking fast for a signal (`GROUP_BURST_MS`). */
 var isGroupUrgentRead = (who) => who.group && who.urgent && !who.write && !who.background;
 /**
@@ -887,7 +901,8 @@ var CATCH_UP_ASKER = {
 	write: true,
 	signal: false,
 	watch: false,
-	watchWrite: false
+	watchWrite: false,
+	departed: false
 };
 /** Keys whose last relay is remembered for their next read (`resolve`): a profile's links and lookups, with room. */
 var READ_TURNS_KEPT = 512;
@@ -968,6 +983,8 @@ var RelayTransport = class {
 	spentWatch = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
 	/** Groups' reads past the limit on each relay in the last `GROUP_OVER_PACE_MS` (`GROUP_SIGNALING_ALLOWANCE_SHARE`). */
 	spentGroupOver = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+	/** Per contact, its departed reads past the limit in the last minute, every relay together (`DEPARTED_READS`). */
+	departedOver = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
 	/**
 	* Per key a group reads (not in the background), when a read of it last went out and when it last asked: whose turn
 	* it is under the watch share (`WATCH_SHARE`) and while the groups' reads are rationed (`GROUP_RATION_WINDOW_MS`).
@@ -1575,6 +1592,7 @@ var RelayTransport = class {
 		}
 		if (writer) this.writeWaiting.delete(`${writer} ${relay}`);
 		if (isGroupSignal(who) && !who.write && this.spent.get(relay).length >= this.limitOf(relay)) this.spentGroupOver.get(relay).push(now);
+		if (isDepartedRead(who) && this.spent.get(relay).length >= this.limitOf(relay)) this.departedOverAdd(key, now);
 		this.spent.get(relay).push(now);
 		if (who.background) this.spentBackground.get(relay).push(now);
 		if (isGroupUrgentRead(who)) this.spentGroupUrgent.get(relay).push(now);
@@ -1597,7 +1615,8 @@ var RelayTransport = class {
 	*
 	* Who goes first: a chat's refused write holds back everything but chat writes; a group's refused write holds back
 	* group reads and background requests, never a chat's. Background requests yield to a link that signals. A chat's
-	* signaling goes over the limit by its allowance (`SIGNALING_ALLOWANCE_SHARE`).
+	* signaling goes over the limit by its allowance (`SIGNALING_ALLOWANCE_SHARE`), and so do a few of its reads of a
+	* contact that just went away (`DEPARTED_READS`).
 	*/
 	heldFor(relay, who, now = Date.now(), key) {
 		const recent = (this.spent.get(relay) ?? []).filter((at) => now - at < 6e4);
@@ -1606,7 +1625,8 @@ var RelayTransport = class {
 		this.spentBackground.set(relay, recentBackground);
 		const over = (list, limit) => list.length >= limit ? list[list.length - limit] + 6e4 - now : 0;
 		const limit = this.limitOf(relay);
-		const share = isChatSignal(who) ? SIGNALING_ALLOWANCE_SHARE : isGroupSignal(who) ? GROUP_SIGNALING_ALLOWANCE_SHARE : 0;
+		const departed = isDepartedRead(who) && key !== void 0 && recent.length >= limit && this.departedReads(key, now) < 6;
+		const share = isChatSignal(who) || departed ? SIGNALING_ALLOWANCE_SHARE : isGroupSignal(who) ? GROUP_SIGNALING_ALLOWANCE_SHARE : 0;
 		let wait = over(recent, limit + (share ? Math.max(0, Math.floor(limit * share) - (who.write ? 0 : 1)) : 0));
 		const groupOver = (this.spentGroupOver.get(relay) ?? []).filter((at) => now - at < GROUP_OVER_PACE_MS);
 		this.spentGroupOver.set(relay, groupOver);
@@ -1646,7 +1666,7 @@ var RelayTransport = class {
 			const at = this.writeWaiting.get(`${lane} ${relay}`);
 			return at !== void 0 && now - at < 5e3 ? at + WRITE_FIRST_MS - now : 0;
 		};
-		if (writer !== "chat") wait = Math.max(wait, waiting("chat"));
+		if (writer !== "chat" && !departed) wait = Math.max(wait, waiting("chat"));
 		if (writer === null && who.group && !pastLimit || who.background) wait = Math.max(wait, waiting("group"));
 		return Math.max(wait, 0);
 	}
@@ -1677,6 +1697,18 @@ var RelayTransport = class {
 		}
 		return ahead;
 	}
+	/** This contact's departed reads past the limit in the last minute (`DEPARTED_READS`). */
+	departedReads(key, now) {
+		const reads = (this.departedOver.get(key) ?? []).filter((at) => now - at < 6e4);
+		if (reads.length) this.departedOver.set(key, reads);
+		else this.departedOver.delete(key);
+		return reads.length;
+	}
+	/** One more, the contacts with none in the last minute dropped. */
+	departedOverAdd(key, now) {
+		for (const [other, reads] of this.departedOver) if (now - reads[reads.length - 1] >= 6e4) this.departedOver.delete(other);
+		this.departedOver.set(key, [...this.departedOver.get(key) ?? [], now]);
+	}
 	chatNeed(key) {
 		let need = this.chatNeeds.get(key);
 		if (!need) this.chatNeeds.set(key, need = {
@@ -1987,7 +2019,8 @@ var isZero = (bytes) => bytes.every((b) => b === 0);
 * A device's name as its slot holds it: UTF-8, cut at a character boundary to 16 bytes, and with no NUL (the padding).
 * A character is what a person sees as one (a grapheme), so a cut never leaves half an emoji or a lone joiner.
 * A name is display text a device chooses for itself and every device of the set shows: it is cleaned as a nickname is
-* (`sanitizeDisplayText`: no control, invisible or direction-changing character) and trimmed, made and read alike.
+* (`sanitizeDisplayText`: no control, invisible or direction-changing character, and empty when nothing of it shows)
+* and trimmed, made and read alike.
 */
 function turnName(name) {
 	const clean = stripHidden(name).trim();
@@ -2000,7 +2033,7 @@ function turnName(name) {
 		out += character;
 		length += size;
 	}
-	return out.trimEnd();
+	return hasVisible(out) ? out.trimEnd() : "";
 }
 function u32$3(value) {
 	return Uint8Array.of(value >>> 24 & 255, value >>> 16 & 255, value >>> 8 & 255, value & 255);
@@ -5532,6 +5565,13 @@ var WATCH_PEER_MS = 12e4;
 * past the 12 s such a connection is given (`DISCONNECT_GRACE_MS`), by when it is back or the session is gone.
 */
 var STALLED_LOOK_MS = 15e3;
+/**
+* For this long after its contact went away from a live session, a chat's reads of it say so (`PkarrRequestOptions.departed`):
+* a few may go over the relays' budget (`DEPARTED_READS` in relay.ts). The fast window that follows a goodbye
+* (`EXPECT_PEER_MS`): an app that restarts has its offer out well within it (2.5 to 10 s after its goodbye in the lab of
+* #1441, on a loaded host), and past it the race's DHT dial has brought the chat back anyway.
+*/
+var DEPARTED_READ_MS = EXPECT_PEER_MS;
 var PUBLISH_RETRY_MS = 4e3;
 /**
 * A packet the relays' request budget held back goes again when the budget frees a request, and at least this often
@@ -5592,6 +5632,8 @@ var LinkSession = class {
 	watchUntil = 0;
 	/** The time of the peer's packet read last when it went away (`watchPeer`): a newer one that advertises says it is back. */
 	watchFrom = 0;
+	/** Until when the reads of a contact that went away are its first ones (`DEPARTED_READ_MS`). */
+	departedUntil = 0;
 	publishRetryTimer = null;
 	active = false;
 	connected = false;
@@ -5749,6 +5791,7 @@ var LinkSession = class {
 	watchPeer() {
 		this.watchUntil = Math.max(this.watchUntil, Date.now() + WATCH_PEER_MS);
 		this.watchFrom = this.presence.lastPacketAt;
+		this.departedUntil = Date.now() + DEPARTED_READ_MS;
 		this.expectPeer();
 	}
 	/** The data link carries chat and services while it is up. */
@@ -6017,11 +6060,13 @@ var LinkSession = class {
 			const pace = this.pace();
 			const signal = pace === "fast" && this.fastStepsAfter > 0 && this.rtcSignalOut !== null;
 			const watch = !signal && this.watching();
+			const departed = !signal && Date.now() < this.departedUntil;
 			const packet = await this.transport.resolve(this.peerPubKeyZ32, {
 				background: pace === "background" || pace === "connected",
 				urgent: pace === "fast",
 				...signal && { signal },
-				...watch && { watch }
+				...watch && { watch },
+				...departed && { departed }
 			});
 			if (!this.running) return;
 			this.discoveryResult("read");
@@ -7194,11 +7239,23 @@ async function signAppRevocation(statement, signer) {
 		signature
 	};
 }
+/** What a checked revocation is kept by: the SHA-256 of its canonical bytes (statement and signature), base64url. */
+function appRevocationId(revocation) {
+	return toBase64Url(sha256(canonicalJsonBytes(revocation)));
+}
 /**
 * Reads one signed revocation (a parsed value, from `ghostly-revoke.json` or a store index's `revoked`): its shape, then
-* the signature under `ghostly-revoke/1` by the publisher its `app` names.
+* the signature under `ghostly-revoke/1` by the publisher its `app` names. One that `checked` holds verified before, so
+* its signature is not checked again; one that verifies now is added to it.
 */
-function readAppRevocation(value) {
+function readAppRevocation(value, checked) {
+	const read = readAppRevocationShape(value);
+	if (!read.ok) return read;
+	const verified = verifyAppRevocation(read.revocation, checked);
+	return verified.ok ? read : verified;
+}
+/** The first half of `readAppRevocation`: the shape of a signed revocation, with no signature checked. */
+function readAppRevocationShape(value) {
 	if (!exactKeys$1(value, ["statement", "signature"])) return {
 		ok: false,
 		reason: "bad-revocation",
@@ -7214,17 +7271,22 @@ function readAppRevocation(value) {
 		ok: false,
 		reason: "bad-signature-statement"
 	};
-	const statement = value.statement;
-	const checked = verifyAppSignature(APP_PREFIXES.revoke, canonicalJsonBytes(statement), value.signature, appRefPublisher(statement.app));
-	if (!checked.ok) return checked;
 	return {
 		ok: true,
 		revocation: {
-			statement,
+			statement: value.statement,
 			signature: value.signature
 		}
 	};
 }
+/** The second half: the signature of a revocation of the right shape, unless `checked` holds it. */
+function verifyAppRevocation(revocation, checked) {
+	const id = checked && appRevocationId(revocation);
+	if (id !== void 0 && checked.has(id)) return { ok: true };
+	const verified = verifyAppSignature(APP_PREFIXES.revoke, canonicalJsonBytes(revocation.statement), revocation.signature, appRefPublisher(revocation.statement.app));
+	if (verified.ok && id !== void 0) checked.add(id);
+	return verified;
+}
 /**
 * Reads `ghostly-revoke.json`: canonical bytes holding a list of signed revocations. One that does not verify refuses the
 * file, as a store index's `revoked` does.
@@ -9380,6 +9442,16 @@ var DhtDelivery = class DhtDelivery {
 		}
 		this.fastUntil = 0;
 		this.signalReads = 0;
+		if (this.options.credentials.peerKey && (!this.state.wasLive || this.state.inviteTaken)) this.serialize(async () => {
+			const taken = this.state.inviteTaken;
+			if (taken) traceLink(this.from, "invite-untaken", {});
+			const { inviteTaken: _taken, ...kept } = this.state;
+			await this.persist({
+				...kept,
+				wasLive: true
+			});
+			if (taken) this.changed();
+		}).catch(() => {});
 		if (this.options.credentials.peerKey && this.state.peerMode) this.tick();
 		else this.schedule();
 	}
@@ -9835,14 +9907,15 @@ var DhtDelivery = class DhtDelivery {
 	}
 	/**
 	* The contact's envelope is sealed to another key (`open`): it pinned someone else who used the same invite first, so
-	* nothing of this side's will ever be read. Said once this side is not proven the one it pinned (never seen in the
-	* pinned mailbox, no text confirmed, never live). The hint is sealed under the invite's key, which any copy of it
-	* holds: a passive warning, taken back by the contact's next envelope that opens here.
+	* nothing of this side's will ever be read. Said only while this side is not proven the one it pinned: no envelope
+	* sealed to this side read (`peerPinned`), no text confirmed, never live (`wasLive`). The hint is sealed under the
+	* invite's key, which any copy of it holds, so past that proof it says nothing of the contact: a passive warning,
+	* taken back by the contact's next envelope that opens here, or by a live session.
 	*/
 	async sealedToAnother(sender) {
 		const expected = this.options.credentials.peerKey ?? this.options.credentials.expectedPeerKey;
 		if (this.state.inviteTaken || !expected || sender !== expected) return;
-		if (this.state.peerPinned === "seen" || this.state.confirmed || this.live) return;
+		if (this.state.peerPinned || this.state.confirmed || this.state.wasLive || this.live) return;
 		traceLink(this.from, "invite-taken", {});
 		await this.persist({
 			...this.state,
@@ -12535,219 +12608,491 @@ async function fitSignedPairedSignalWith(signal, signer, from, to, fits) {
 	}
 }
 //#endregion
-//#region ../core/src/storeForward.ts
-/**
-* Store-and-forward for an away contact (WISP 404 draft, `hold/1`).
-*
-* What a person sends while the contact is away is sealed into a *bundle* (signed by the sender's
-* participation key, then encrypted to a key only the two of them can derive), put in the sender's
-* own storage (WISP 1000), and named in a *manifest* the storage also holds. A small signed, encrypted
-* *pointer* record on a per-link Pkarr key tells the contact where the manifest is (a URL that expires)
-* and which of the contact's own bundles have been received. Storage and relays see ciphertext, sizes
-* and timing only. Nothing here promises forward secrecy or retention beyond the bounds below.
-*/
-var HOLD_CAPABILITY = "hold/1";
-var HOLD_LIMITS = {
-	/** One bundle, ciphertext and header included: a picture, not a video. */
-	maxBundleBytes: 8388608,
-	/** All bundles held for one contact at once. */
-	maxMailboxBytes: 67108864,
-	maxMailboxBundles: 64,
-	/** A bundle not picked up by then is dropped by its sender. The longest a presigned URL lives, too. */
-	ttlMs: 6048e5,
-	maxTextBytes: 16384,
-	maxPaymentRequestBytes: 65536,
-	maxManifestBytes: 65536,
-	/**
-	* How far past one lifetime from now an expiry may reach by the reader's clock: the sender's clock may be ahead, and
-	* a day covers any clock that is merely wrong. Nothing else about a pointer or a bundle is held against this clock.
-	*/
-	clockSkewMs: 864e5
-};
-/**
-* How far before its own clock a sender dates its pointer and its manifest, and ends the lifetimes it gives. A reader
-* refuses nothing for those dates: `rev` orders pointers and `seq` orders items, both kept by the reader. Apps up to
-* 1.0.2 refuse a pointer or a manifest dated more than a minute past their clock, and an expiry more than a minute
-* past one lifetime from now, each without a word: the items of a sender whose clock ran two minutes fast were never
-* fetched. Dated back, a sender up to about eleven minutes ahead is read by them.
-*/
-var HOLD_DATED_BACK_MS = 6e5;
-var KINDS$1 = [
-	"text",
-	"file",
-	"pay-req",
-	"manifest"
+//#region ../core/src/domainProofs.ts
+var DNS_LABEL = "_ghostly";
+var WELL_KNOWN_PATH = "/.well-known/ghostly.json";
+var NIP05_PATH = "/.well-known/nostr.json?name=_";
+/** Everything read from a domain is bounded; these match the fetch limits. */
+var DOMAIN_FILE_MAX_BYTES = 16384;
+var z32 = /^[ybndrfg8ejkmcpqxot1uwisza345h769]{52}$/;
+var hex64 = /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/;
+/** Names that never resolve publicly (RFC 6761, 6762, 7686, 8375, 9476) or that
+* only ever mean a private network. A proof for them could only point inward. */
+var SPECIAL_USE = [
+	"localhost",
+	"local",
+	"internal",
+	"lan",
+	"home",
+	"corp",
+	"intranet",
+	"private",
+	"test",
+	"example",
+	"invalid",
+	"onion",
+	"alt",
+	"arpa"
 ];
-var WIRE_ID = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,64}$/;
-var MAILBOX = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22}$/;
-var SIG$3 = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{86}$/;
-var MAGIC$2 = utf8Encode("GHLD");
-var VERSION = 1;
-var NONCE$2 = 24;
-/** Why a bundle, manifest or pointer was refused. Never a reason to trust it a little. */
-var HoldRefusedError = class extends Error {
-	reason;
-	constructor(reason, message) {
-		super(message);
-		this.reason = reason;
-	}
-};
-var bodyDigest = (body) => toBase64Url(sha256(body));
-var newMailbox = () => toBase64Url(randomBytes(16)).slice(0, 22);
 /**
-* Everything derived once per link for this feature: my pointer key, the contact's pointer address and
-* the key that seals bundles and pointers between the two participation keys. Needs a pinned contact.
+* Normalizes what a person typed ("Example.COM.", "https://example.com/") into
+* a lowercase ASCII host name, or throws with a message fit for the UI.
+* Internationalized names become punycode (xn--), the form DNS carries.
 */
-var HoldKeys = class {
-	from;
-	to;
-	me;
-	peer;
-	/** Publishes my pointer. */
-	identity;
-	/** Where the contact publishes its pointer. */
-	peerAddress;
-	seed;
-	sealKey;
-	constructor(params, participationSeedB64, peerKey) {
-		this.from = identityFromSeedB64(params.seedB64).pubKeyZ32;
-		this.to = params.peerPubKeyZ32;
-		const mine = identityFromSeedB64(participationSeedB64);
-		this.seed = mine.seed;
-		this.me = mine.pubKeyZ32;
-		this.peer = peerKey;
-		const secret = fromBase64Url(params.encKeyB64);
-		const context = JSON.stringify(["ghostly-hold/1", [this.from, this.to].sort()]);
-		const derive = (label) => hkdf(sha256, secret, utf8Encode(context), utf8Encode(label), 32);
-		this.identity = identityFromSeed(derive(`pointer:${this.from}`));
-		this.peerAddress = identityFromSeed(derive(`pointer:${this.to}`)).pubKeyZ32;
-		const shared = x25519.getSharedSecret(ed25519.utils.toMontgomerySecret(this.seed), ed25519.utils.toMontgomery(publicKeyFromZ32(peerKey)));
-		this.sealKey = hkdf(sha256, shared, derive("envelope"), utf8Encode("ghostly-hold-envelope/1"), 32);
-	}
-	/** Seals one item for the contact: signed with my participation key, encrypted to our shared key. */
-	seal(item, body) {
-		const fields = [
-			VERSION,
-			this.from,
-			this.to,
-			this.me,
-			this.peer,
-			item.mailbox,
-			item.seq,
-			item.id,
-			item.ts,
-			item.kind,
-			item.meta ?? null,
-			bodyDigest(body),
-			item.expires
-		];
-		const signature = toBase64Url(sign(utf8Encode(JSON.stringify(["ghostly-hold-bundle", fields])), this.seed));
-		const header = utf8Encode(JSON.stringify([fields, signature]));
-		const length = /* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(4);
-		new DataView(length.buffer).setUint32(0, header.length);
-		const nonce = randomBytes(NONCE$2);
-		const box = xsalsa20poly1305(this.sealKey, nonce).encrypt(concatBytes$1(length, header, body));
-		return concatBytes$1(MAGIC$2, new Uint8Array([VERSION]), nonce, box);
-	}
-	/**
-	* Opens a bundle the contact sealed for me. Everything is checked before anything is returned: the
-	* authenticated encryption, the header's shape, that it names this link, this contact and me, the
-	* signature, the body digest and the limits of its kind.
-	*/
-	open(bytes, expect = {}) {
-		const now = expect.now ?? Date.now();
-		if (bytes.length > (expect.maxBytes ?? HOLD_LIMITS.maxBundleBytes)) throw new HoldRefusedError("size", "The held item is larger than allowed");
-		if (bytes.length < MAGIC$2.length + 1 + NONCE$2 + 16 + 4 || !MAGIC$2.every((b, i) => bytes[i] === b)) throw new HoldRefusedError("format", "Not a held item");
-		if (bytes[MAGIC$2.length] !== VERSION) throw new HoldRefusedError("format", "Held item from a newer Ghostly");
-		let plain;
-		try {
-			plain = xsalsa20poly1305(this.sealKey, bytes.subarray(MAGIC$2.length + 1, MAGIC$2.length + 1 + NONCE$2)).decrypt(bytes.subarray(MAGIC$2.length + 1 + NONCE$2));
-		} catch {
-			throw new HoldRefusedError("tampered", "The held item was changed or is not for this chat");
-		}
-		if (plain.length < 4) throw new HoldRefusedError("format", "Not a held item");
-		const headerLength = new DataView(plain.buffer, plain.byteOffset, 4).getUint32(0);
-		if (headerLength > 131072 || 4 + headerLength > plain.length) throw new HoldRefusedError("format", "Not a held item");
-		let parsed;
+function normalizeDomain(input) {
+	if (typeof input !== "string") throw new Error("Enter a domain name, like example.com");
+	let value = input.trim();
+	if (!value || value.length > 300) throw new Error("Enter a domain name, like example.com");
+	if (/^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\//i.test(value)) {
+		let url;
 		try {
-			parsed = JSON.parse(utf8Decode(plain.subarray(4, 4 + headerLength)));
+			url = new URL(value);
 		} catch {
-			throw new HoldRefusedError("format", "Not a held item");
+			throw new Error("Enter a domain name, like example.com");
 		}
-		if (!Array.isArray(parsed) || parsed.length !== 2 || !Array.isArray(parsed[0]) || parsed[0].length !== 13 || typeof parsed[1] !== "string" || !SIG$3.test(parsed[1])) throw new HoldRefusedError("format", "Not a held item");
-		const [fields, signature] = parsed;
-		const [v, from, to, author, recipient, mailbox, seq, id, ts, kind, meta, digest, expires] = fields;
-		if (v !== VERSION || typeof from !== "string" || typeof to !== "string" || typeof author !== "string" || typeof recipient !== "string" || typeof mailbox !== "string" || !MAILBOX.test(mailbox) || !Number.isSafeInteger(seq) || seq < 0 || typeof id !== "string" || !WIRE_ID.test(id) || !Number.isSafeInteger(ts) || ts <= 0 || typeof kind !== "string" || !KINDS$1.includes(kind) || typeof digest !== "string" || !Number.isSafeInteger(expires)) throw new HoldRefusedError("format", "Not a held item");
-		if (from !== this.to || to !== this.from || recipient !== this.me) throw new HoldRefusedError("not-for-me", "The held item is for another chat");
-		if (author !== this.peer) throw new HoldRefusedError("author", "The held item was not signed by this contact");
-		if (expect.mailbox && mailbox !== expect.mailbox) throw new HoldRefusedError("not-for-me", "The held item is from another mailbox");
-		let valid;
+		if (url.protocol !== "https:" || url.username || url.password || url.port || url.pathname !== "/" && url.pathname !== "" || url.search || url.hash) throw new Error("Enter only the domain name, without a path or port");
+		value = url.hostname;
+	} else {
+		if (/[/:@?#\s\\]/.test(value)) throw new Error("Enter only the domain name, without a path or port");
 		try {
-			valid = verify(fromBase64Url(signature), utf8Encode(JSON.stringify(["ghostly-hold-bundle", fields])), publicKeyFromZ32(author));
+			value = new URL(`https://${value}`).hostname;
 		} catch {
-			valid = false;
+			throw new Error("That is not a valid domain name");
 		}
-		if (!valid) throw new HoldRefusedError("signature", "The held item's signature does not check out");
-		const body = plain.subarray(4 + headerLength);
-		if (bodyDigest(body) !== digest) throw new HoldRefusedError("digest", "The held item's content does not match its header");
-		if (expires <= ts || expires > now + HOLD_LIMITS.ttlMs + HOLD_LIMITS.clockSkewMs) throw new HoldRefusedError("limits", "The held item's lifetime is out of bounds");
-		const header = {
-			v: 1,
-			from,
-			to,
-			author,
-			recipient,
-			mailbox,
-			seq,
-			id,
-			ts,
-			kind,
-			meta,
-			digest,
-			expires
-		};
-		checkKind(header, body);
-		return {
-			header,
-			body
-		};
-	}
-	/** My pointer, as records to publish under `identity`. Throws when it cannot fit a packet. */
-	pointerRecords(pointer, now = Date.now()) {
-		const body = [
-			VERSION,
-			pointer.rev,
-			pointer.issued,
-			pointer.expires,
-			pointer.manifestUrl,
-			pointer.top,
-			pointer.ack,
-			pointer.count,
-			pointer.bytes,
-			pointer.refused.slice(-32)
-		];
-		const signature = toBase64Url(sign(utf8Encode(JSON.stringify([
-			"ghostly-hold-pointer",
-			this.from,
-			this.to,
-			body
-		])), this.seed));
-		const ttl = Math.min(86400, Math.max(60, Math.ceil((pointer.expires - now) / 1e3)));
-		const records = [{
-			label: "_hold",
-			value: encrypt(JSON.stringify([body, signature]), this.sealKey),
-			ttl
-		}];
-		if (measureRecords(this.identity.pubKeyZ32, records) > 1e3) throw new Error("The storage address is too long for a DHT packet. Use a shorter endpoint or prefix.");
-		return records;
 	}
-	/**
-	* The contact's pointer out of its packet, or null when the packet is not one of its pointers. Its `issued` is the
-	* contact's clock and refuses nothing: an older pointer cannot take a newer one's place because of `rev`.
-	*/
-	readPointer(packet) {
-		if (packet.pubKeyZ32 !== this.peerAddress || measureRecords(packet.pubKeyZ32, packet.records) > 1e3) return null;
-		const records = packet.records.filter((r) => r.label === "_hold");
+	value = value.toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "");
+	if (value.length > 244) throw new Error("That domain name is too long");
+	const labels = value.split(".");
+	if (labels.length < 2) throw new Error("Use a full domain name, like example.com");
+	for (const label of labels) if (!/^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$/.test(label)) throw new Error("That is not a valid domain name");
+	const tld = labels[labels.length - 1];
+	if (/^[0-9]+$/.test(tld) || /^\[/.test(value)) throw new Error("Use a domain name, not an IP address");
+	if (SPECIAL_USE.includes(tld) || labels.length >= 2 && labels.slice(-2).join(".") === "home.arpa") throw new Error("That name only works on private networks");
+	return value;
+}
+var dnsProofName = (domain) => `${DNS_LABEL}.${normalizeDomain(domain)}`;
+var wellKnownUrl = (domain, method = "https") => `https://${normalizeDomain(domain)}${method === "nip05" ? NIP05_PATH : WELL_KNOWN_PATH}`;
+function validDomainRecord(r) {
+	if (!r || typeof r.key !== "string" || typeof r.proof !== "string" || !z32.test(r.key) || !hex64.test(r.proof)) return false;
+	try {
+		return toZ32(fromZ32(r.key)) === r.key;
+	} catch {
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+/** The TXT record value, in the `tag=value; …` style people know from DKIM. */
+function domainTxtRecord(r) {
+	if (!validDomainRecord(r)) throw new Error("Invalid domain record");
+	return `v=ghostly1; key=${r.key}; proof=${r.proof}`;
+}
+/** Parses one TXT string. Undefined for anything that is not ours or not exactly
+* well-formed; unknown extra tags are ignored for forward compatibility. */
+function parseDomainTxt(value) {
+	if (typeof value !== "string" || utf8Encode(value).length > 1024) return;
+	const tags = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+	const parts = value.split(";").map((p) => p.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+	for (const part of parts) {
+		const eq = part.indexOf("=");
+		if (eq < 1) return;
+		const name = part.slice(0, eq).trim().toLowerCase();
+		if (tags.has(name)) return;
+		tags.set(name, part.slice(eq + 1).trim());
+	}
+	if (!parts[0]?.toLowerCase().startsWith("v=") || tags.get("v") !== "ghostly1") return;
+	const r = {
+		key: tags.get("key"),
+		proof: tags.get("proof")
+	};
+	return validDomainRecord(r) ? r : void 0;
+}
+var addRecord = (list, r) => {
+	if (!list.some((x) => x.key === r.key && x.proof === r.proof)) list.push(r);
+};
+/** All records among the TXT strings of `_ghostly.<domain>`; other strings are skipped. */
+function recordsFromTxt(values) {
+	const out = [];
+	for (const value of values.slice(0, 32)) {
+		const r = parseDomainTxt(value);
+		if (r) addRecord(out, r);
+	}
+	return out.slice(0, 8);
+}
+/** The body of `/.well-known/ghostly.json`. */
+function domainWellKnownFile(records) {
+	if (!records.length || records.length > 8 || !records.every(validDomainRecord)) throw new Error("Invalid domain records");
+	return JSON.stringify({
+		ghostly: 1,
+		proofs: records.map((r) => ({
+			key: r.key,
+			proof: r.proof
+		}))
+	}, null, 2) + "\n";
+}
+function parseJson(text) {
+	if (typeof text !== "string" || utf8Encode(text).length > 16384) throw new Error("File too large");
+	return JSON.parse(text);
+}
+/** Records from `ghostly.json`. Throws on a malformed file; [] when it names none. */
+function recordsFromWellKnown(text) {
+	const body = parseJson(text);
+	if (!body || typeof body !== "object" || Array.isArray(body) || body.ghostly !== 1 || !Array.isArray(body.proofs)) throw new Error("Not a Ghostly domain file");
+	const out = [];
+	for (const entry of body.proofs.slice(0, 32)) {
+		if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") continue;
+		const r = {
+			key: entry.key,
+			proof: entry.proof
+		};
+		if (validDomainRecord(r)) addRecord(out, r);
+	}
+	return out.slice(0, 8);
+}
+/** NIP-05: only the root name `_` speaks for the domain itself. Undefined when absent. */
+function nip05RootKey(text) {
+	const body = parseJson(text);
+	if (!body || typeof body !== "object" || !body.names || typeof body.names !== "object" || Array.isArray(body.names)) throw new Error("Not a NIP-05 file");
+	const root = body.names["_"];
+	return typeof root === "string" && hex64.test(root) ? root : void 0;
+}
+var recordsName = (records, r) => records.some((x) => x.key === r.key && x.proof === r.proof);
+var DNS_TYPE = {
+	A: 1,
+	CNAME: 5,
+	TXT: 16,
+	AAAA: 28
+};
+/** A recursive query for one name and type. ID 0, as RFC 8484 recommends for caching;
+* the AD bit asks the resolver to report DNSSEC validation (RFC 6840 §5.7). */
+function encodeDnsQuery(name, type) {
+	const labels = name.replace(/\.$/, "").split(".");
+	const parts = [Uint8Array.of(0, 0, 1, 32, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)];
+	for (const label of labels) {
+		const bytes = utf8Encode(label);
+		if (!bytes.length || bytes.length > 63) throw new Error("Invalid DNS name");
+		parts.push(Uint8Array.of(bytes.length), bytes);
+	}
+	const code = DNS_TYPE[type];
+	parts.push(Uint8Array.of(0, code >> 8, code & 255, 0, 1));
+	return concatBytes$1(...parts);
+}
+function readName(data, start) {
+	const labels = [];
+	let pos = start, next = -1, jumps = 0, length = 0;
+	for (;;) {
+		if (pos >= data.length) throw new Error("DNS name out of bounds");
+		const len = data[pos];
+		if ((len & 192) === 192) {
+			if (pos + 1 >= data.length) throw new Error("DNS pointer out of bounds");
+			if (next < 0) next = pos + 2;
+			pos = (len & 63) << 8 | data[pos + 1];
+			if (++jumps > 32) throw new Error("DNS name loops");
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (len & 192) throw new Error("Unsupported DNS label");
+		pos += 1;
+		if (len === 0) break;
+		if (pos + len > data.length) throw new Error("DNS label out of bounds");
+		length += len + 1;
+		if (length > 255) throw new Error("DNS name too long");
+		labels.push(utf8Decode(data.subarray(pos, pos + len)).toLowerCase());
+		pos += len;
+	}
+	return {
+		name: labels.join("."),
+		next: next < 0 ? pos : next
+	};
+}
+/**
+* Decodes a resolver's answer to `encodeDnsQuery(name, type)`. Refuses a reply
+* to another question or a truncated one, and keeps only records of the asked
+* type owned by the name or by the CNAME chain the answer itself follows.
+*/
+function decodeDnsResponse(data, name, type) {
+	if (data.length < 12) throw new Error("DNS response too short");
+	const view = new DataView(data.buffer, data.byteOffset, data.byteLength);
+	const flags = view.getUint16(2);
+	if (!(flags & 32768) || flags & 30720 || flags & 512) throw new Error("Unusable DNS response");
+	const questions = view.getUint16(4), count = view.getUint16(6);
+	const want = name.replace(/\.$/, "").toLowerCase(), code = DNS_TYPE[type];
+	if (questions !== 1) throw new Error("DNS response is for another question");
+	const q = readName(data, 12);
+	if (q.name !== want || q.next + 4 > data.length || view.getUint16(q.next) !== code) throw new Error("DNS response is for another question");
+	let pos = q.next + 4;
+	const all = [];
+	for (let i = 0; i < count && i < 64; i++) {
+		const owner = readName(data, pos);
+		pos = owner.next;
+		if (pos + 10 > data.length) throw new Error("DNS record out of bounds");
+		const rtype = view.getUint16(pos), ttl = view.getUint32(pos + 4), len = view.getUint16(pos + 8);
+		pos += 10;
+		if (pos + len > data.length) throw new Error("DNS record out of bounds");
+		const rdata = rtype === DNS_TYPE.CNAME ? utf8Encode(readName(data, pos).name) : data.slice(pos, pos + len);
+		all.push({
+			name: owner.name,
+			type: rtype,
+			ttl,
+			data: rdata
+		});
+		pos += len;
+	}
+	const owners = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([want]);
+	for (let hop = 0; hop < 8; hop++) {
+		const cname = all.find((a) => a.type === DNS_TYPE.CNAME && owners.has(a.name) && !owners.has(utf8Decode(a.data)));
+		if (!cname) break;
+		owners.add(utf8Decode(cname.data));
+	}
+	return {
+		rcode: flags & 15,
+		authenticated: !!(flags & 32),
+		answers: all.filter((a) => a.type === code && owners.has(a.name))
+	};
+}
+/** The TXT character-strings of one record, joined as RFC 7208 §3.3 does. */
+function txtValue(rdata) {
+	const parts = [];
+	for (let p = 0; p < rdata.length;) {
+		const len = rdata[p];
+		if (p + 1 + len > rdata.length) throw new Error("DNS text out of bounds");
+		parts.push(rdata.subarray(p + 1, p + 1 + len));
+		p += 1 + len;
+	}
+	return new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true }).decode(concatBytes$1(...parts));
+}
+/** False for loopback, private, link-local, shared (CGNAT), multicast, reserved
+* and unspecified addresses, including IPv4 embedded in IPv6. */
+function isPublicAddress(address) {
+	if (address.length === 4) {
+		const [a, b, c] = address;
+		return !(a === 0 || a === 10 || a === 127 || a >= 224 || a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127 || a === 169 && b === 254 || a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31 || a === 192 && b === 168 || a === 192 && b === 0 && c === 0 || a === 198 && (b === 18 || b === 19));
+	}
+	if (address.length !== 16) return false;
+	const zeroTo = (n) => address.subarray(0, n).every((x) => x === 0);
+	if (zeroTo(15) && (address[15] === 0 || address[15] === 1)) return false;
+	if (zeroTo(10) && address[10] === 255 && address[11] === 255) return isPublicAddress(address.subarray(12));
+	if (address[0] === 0 && address[1] === 100 && address[2] === 255 && address[3] === 155 && address.subarray(4, 12).every((x) => x === 0)) return isPublicAddress(address.subarray(12));
+	if (zeroTo(12)) return false;
+	if ((address[0] & 254) === 252) return false;
+	if (address[0] === 254 && (address[1] & 192) === 128) return false;
+	if (address[0] === 254 && (address[1] & 192) === 192) return false;
+	if (address[0] === 255) return false;
+	if (address[0] === 1 && address.subarray(1, 8).every((x) => x === 0)) return false;
+	return (address[0] & 224) === 32;
+}
+//#endregion
+//#region ../core/src/storeForward.ts
+/**
+* Store-and-forward for an away contact (WISP 404 draft, `hold/1`).
+*
+* What a person sends while the contact is away is sealed into a *bundle* (signed by the sender's
+* participation key, then encrypted to a key only the two of them can derive), put in the sender's
+* own storage (WISP 1000), and named in a *manifest* the storage also holds. A small signed, encrypted
+* *pointer* record on a per-link Pkarr key tells the contact where the manifest is (a URL that expires)
+* and which of the contact's own bundles have been received. Storage and relays see ciphertext, sizes
+* and timing only. Nothing here promises forward secrecy or retention beyond the bounds below.
+*/
+var HOLD_CAPABILITY = "hold/1";
+var HOLD_LIMITS = {
+	/** One bundle, ciphertext and header included: a picture, not a video. */
+	maxBundleBytes: 8388608,
+	/** All bundles held for one contact at once. */
+	maxMailboxBytes: 67108864,
+	maxMailboxBundles: 64,
+	/** A bundle not picked up by then is dropped by its sender. The longest a presigned URL lives, too. */
+	ttlMs: 6048e5,
+	maxTextBytes: 16384,
+	maxPaymentRequestBytes: 65536,
+	maxManifestBytes: 65536,
+	/**
+	* How far past one lifetime from now an expiry may reach by the reader's clock: the sender's clock may be ahead, and
+	* a day covers any clock that is merely wrong. Nothing else about a pointer or a bundle is held against this clock.
+	*/
+	clockSkewMs: 864e5
+};
+/**
+* How far before its own clock a sender dates its pointer and its manifest, and ends the lifetimes it gives. A reader
+* refuses nothing for those dates: `rev` orders pointers and `seq` orders items, both kept by the reader. Apps up to
+* 1.0.2 refuse a pointer or a manifest dated more than a minute past their clock, and an expiry more than a minute
+* past one lifetime from now, each without a word: the items of a sender whose clock ran two minutes fast were never
+* fetched. Dated back, a sender up to about eleven minutes ahead is read by them.
+*/
+var HOLD_DATED_BACK_MS = 6e5;
+var KINDS$1 = [
+	"text",
+	"file",
+	"pay-req",
+	"manifest"
+];
+var WIRE_ID = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,64}$/;
+var MAILBOX = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22}$/;
+var SIG$3 = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{86}$/;
+var MAGIC$2 = utf8Encode("GHLD");
+var VERSION = 1;
+var NONCE$2 = 24;
+/** Why a bundle, manifest or pointer was refused. Never a reason to trust it a little. */
+var HoldRefusedError = class extends Error {
+	reason;
+	constructor(reason, message) {
+		super(message);
+		this.reason = reason;
+	}
+};
+var bodyDigest = (body) => toBase64Url(sha256(body));
+var newMailbox = () => toBase64Url(randomBytes(16)).slice(0, 22);
+/**
+* Everything derived once per link for this feature: my pointer key, the contact's pointer address and
+* the key that seals bundles and pointers between the two participation keys. Needs a pinned contact.
+*/
+var HoldKeys = class {
+	from;
+	to;
+	me;
+	peer;
+	/** Publishes my pointer. */
+	identity;
+	/** Where the contact publishes its pointer. */
+	peerAddress;
+	seed;
+	sealKey;
+	constructor(params, participationSeedB64, peerKey) {
+		this.from = identityFromSeedB64(params.seedB64).pubKeyZ32;
+		this.to = params.peerPubKeyZ32;
+		const mine = identityFromSeedB64(participationSeedB64);
+		this.seed = mine.seed;
+		this.me = mine.pubKeyZ32;
+		this.peer = peerKey;
+		const secret = fromBase64Url(params.encKeyB64);
+		const context = JSON.stringify(["ghostly-hold/1", [this.from, this.to].sort()]);
+		const derive = (label) => hkdf(sha256, secret, utf8Encode(context), utf8Encode(label), 32);
+		this.identity = identityFromSeed(derive(`pointer:${this.from}`));
+		this.peerAddress = identityFromSeed(derive(`pointer:${this.to}`)).pubKeyZ32;
+		const shared = x25519.getSharedSecret(ed25519.utils.toMontgomerySecret(this.seed), ed25519.utils.toMontgomery(publicKeyFromZ32(peerKey)));
+		this.sealKey = hkdf(sha256, shared, derive("envelope"), utf8Encode("ghostly-hold-envelope/1"), 32);
+	}
+	/** Seals one item for the contact: signed with my participation key, encrypted to our shared key. */
+	seal(item, body) {
+		const fields = [
+			VERSION,
+			this.from,
+			this.to,
+			this.me,
+			this.peer,
+			item.mailbox,
+			item.seq,
+			item.id,
+			item.ts,
+			item.kind,
+			item.meta ?? null,
+			bodyDigest(body),
+			item.expires
+		];
+		const signature = toBase64Url(sign(utf8Encode(JSON.stringify(["ghostly-hold-bundle", fields])), this.seed));
+		const header = utf8Encode(JSON.stringify([fields, signature]));
+		const length = /* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(4);
+		new DataView(length.buffer).setUint32(0, header.length);
+		const nonce = randomBytes(NONCE$2);
+		const box = xsalsa20poly1305(this.sealKey, nonce).encrypt(concatBytes$1(length, header, body));
+		return concatBytes$1(MAGIC$2, new Uint8Array([VERSION]), nonce, box);
+	}
+	/**
+	* Opens a bundle the contact sealed for me. Everything is checked before anything is returned: the
+	* authenticated encryption, the header's shape, that it names this link, this contact and me, the
+	* signature, the body digest and the limits of its kind. `loopback`: see `isHoldUrl`.
+	*/
+	open(bytes, expect = {}) {
+		const now = expect.now ?? Date.now();
+		if (bytes.length > (expect.maxBytes ?? HOLD_LIMITS.maxBundleBytes)) throw new HoldRefusedError("size", "The held item is larger than allowed");
+		if (bytes.length < MAGIC$2.length + 1 + NONCE$2 + 16 + 4 || !MAGIC$2.every((b, i) => bytes[i] === b)) throw new HoldRefusedError("format", "Not a held item");
+		if (bytes[MAGIC$2.length] !== VERSION) throw new HoldRefusedError("format", "Held item from a newer Ghostly");
+		let plain;
+		try {
+			plain = xsalsa20poly1305(this.sealKey, bytes.subarray(MAGIC$2.length + 1, MAGIC$2.length + 1 + NONCE$2)).decrypt(bytes.subarray(MAGIC$2.length + 1 + NONCE$2));
+		} catch {
+			throw new HoldRefusedError("tampered", "The held item was changed or is not for this chat");
+		}
+		if (plain.length < 4) throw new HoldRefusedError("format", "Not a held item");
+		const headerLength = new DataView(plain.buffer, plain.byteOffset, 4).getUint32(0);
+		if (headerLength > 131072 || 4 + headerLength > plain.length) throw new HoldRefusedError("format", "Not a held item");
+		let parsed;
+		try {
+			parsed = JSON.parse(utf8Decode(plain.subarray(4, 4 + headerLength)));
+		} catch {
+			throw new HoldRefusedError("format", "Not a held item");
+		}
+		if (!Array.isArray(parsed) || parsed.length !== 2 || !Array.isArray(parsed[0]) || parsed[0].length !== 13 || typeof parsed[1] !== "string" || !SIG$3.test(parsed[1])) throw new HoldRefusedError("format", "Not a held item");
+		const [fields, signature] = parsed;
+		const [v, from, to, author, recipient, mailbox, seq, id, ts, kind, meta, digest, expires] = fields;
+		if (v !== VERSION || typeof from !== "string" || typeof to !== "string" || typeof author !== "string" || typeof recipient !== "string" || typeof mailbox !== "string" || !MAILBOX.test(mailbox) || !Number.isSafeInteger(seq) || seq < 0 || typeof id !== "string" || !WIRE_ID.test(id) || !Number.isSafeInteger(ts) || ts <= 0 || typeof kind !== "string" || !KINDS$1.includes(kind) || typeof digest !== "string" || !Number.isSafeInteger(expires)) throw new HoldRefusedError("format", "Not a held item");
+		if (from !== this.to || to !== this.from || recipient !== this.me) throw new HoldRefusedError("not-for-me", "The held item is for another chat");
+		if (author !== this.peer) throw new HoldRefusedError("author", "The held item was not signed by this contact");
+		if (expect.mailbox && mailbox !== expect.mailbox) throw new HoldRefusedError("not-for-me", "The held item is from another mailbox");
+		let valid;
+		try {
+			valid = verify(fromBase64Url(signature), utf8Encode(JSON.stringify(["ghostly-hold-bundle", fields])), publicKeyFromZ32(author));
+		} catch {
+			valid = false;
+		}
+		if (!valid) throw new HoldRefusedError("signature", "The held item's signature does not check out");
+		const body = plain.subarray(4 + headerLength);
+		if (bodyDigest(body) !== digest) throw new HoldRefusedError("digest", "The held item's content does not match its header");
+		if (expires <= ts || expires > now + HOLD_LIMITS.ttlMs + HOLD_LIMITS.clockSkewMs) throw new HoldRefusedError("limits", "The held item's lifetime is out of bounds");
+		const header = {
+			v: 1,
+			from,
+			to,
+			author,
+			recipient,
+			mailbox,
+			seq,
+			id,
+			ts,
+			kind,
+			meta,
+			digest,
+			expires
+		};
+		checkKind(header, body, expect.loopback);
+		return {
+			header,
+			body
+		};
+	}
+	/** My pointer, as records to publish under `identity`. Throws when it cannot fit a packet. */
+	pointerRecords(pointer, now = Date.now()) {
+		const body = [
+			VERSION,
+			pointer.rev,
+			pointer.issued,
+			pointer.expires,
+			pointer.manifestUrl,
+			pointer.top,
+			pointer.ack,
+			pointer.count,
+			pointer.bytes,
+			pointer.refused.slice(-32)
+		];
+		const signature = toBase64Url(sign(utf8Encode(JSON.stringify([
+			"ghostly-hold-pointer",
+			this.from,
+			this.to,
+			body
+		])), this.seed));
+		const ttl = Math.min(86400, Math.max(60, Math.ceil((pointer.expires - now) / 1e3)));
+		const records = [{
+			label: "_hold",
+			value: encrypt(JSON.stringify([body, signature]), this.sealKey),
+			ttl
+		}];
+		if (measureRecords(this.identity.pubKeyZ32, records) > 1e3) throw new Error("The storage address is too long for a DHT packet. Use a shorter endpoint or prefix.");
+		return records;
+	}
+	/**
+	* The contact's pointer out of its packet, or null when the packet is not one of its pointers. Its `issued` is the
+	* contact's clock and refuses nothing: an older pointer cannot take a newer one's place because of `rev`. The
+	* manifest's address is held to what an item's is (`isHoldUrl`): it is fetched as soon as the pointer is read.
+	*/
+	readPointer(packet, loopback = false) {
+		if (packet.pubKeyZ32 !== this.peerAddress || measureRecords(packet.pubKeyZ32, packet.records) > 1e3) return null;
+		const records = packet.records.filter((r) => r.label === "_hold");
 		if (records.length !== 1) return null;
 		const plain = tryDecrypt(records[0].value, this.sealKey);
 		if (!plain) return null;
@@ -12768,7 +13113,7 @@ var HoldKeys = class {
 			ack,
 			count,
 			bytes
-		].every((n) => Number.isSafeInteger(n) && n >= 0) || manifestUrl !== null && (typeof manifestUrl !== "string" || manifestUrl.length > 2048) || !Array.isArray(refused) || refused.length > 32 || !refused.every((n) => Number.isSafeInteger(n) && n > 0)) return null;
+		].every((n) => Number.isSafeInteger(n) && n >= 0) || manifestUrl !== null && !isHoldUrl(manifestUrl, loopback) || !Array.isArray(refused) || refused.length > 32 || !refused.every((n) => Number.isSafeInteger(n) && n > 0)) return null;
 		try {
 			if (!verify(fromBase64Url(signature), utf8Encode(JSON.stringify([
 				"ghostly-hold-pointer",
@@ -12792,22 +13137,31 @@ var HoldKeys = class {
 		};
 	}
 };
-/** A URL a bundle or manifest may be fetched from: HTTPS, or HTTP to this machine while testing. */
-function isHoldUrl(value) {
+/**
+* A URL a bundle or manifest may be fetched from. The contact chose it and this device fetches it on its own, so it
+* is HTTPS, without a user or password, at a name or a public IPv4 address: never this machine or its network.
+* `loopback` adds plain HTTP to this machine, for a test against a local server; no shipped app passes it.
+*/
+function isHoldUrl(value, loopback = false) {
 	if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length > 2048) return false;
+	let url;
 	try {
-		const url = new URL(value);
-		return url.protocol === "https:" || url.protocol === "http:" && [
-			"localhost",
-			"127.0.0.1",
-			"[::1]"
-		].includes(url.hostname);
+		url = new URL(value);
 	} catch {
 		return false;
 	}
+	if (url.username || url.password) return false;
+	const host = url.hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "");
+	if (loopback && url.protocol === "http:" && [
+		"localhost",
+		"127.0.0.1",
+		"[::1]"
+	].includes(host)) return true;
+	if (url.protocol !== "https:" || !host || host.startsWith("[") || host === "localhost" || host.endsWith(".localhost")) return false;
+	return !/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/.test(host) || isPublicAddress(Uint8Array.from(host.split("."), Number));
 }
 /** The limits of each kind, on the way in. */
-function checkKind(header, body) {
+function checkKind(header, body, loopback = false) {
 	const bad = (message) => new HoldRefusedError("limits", message);
 	switch (header.kind) {
 		case "text":
@@ -12828,12 +13182,12 @@ function checkKind(header, body) {
 		}
 		case "manifest":
 			if (body.length !== 0) throw bad("A manifest carries no body");
-			readManifest(header.meta);
+			readManifest(header.meta, loopback);
 			return;
 	}
 }
 /** The entries of a manifest, checked: strictly increasing sequences, bounded sizes, fetchable URLs. */
-function readManifest(meta) {
+function readManifest(meta, loopback = false) {
 	const bad = (message) => new HoldRefusedError("limits", message);
 	const entries = meta?.entries;
 	if (!Array.isArray(entries) || entries.length > HOLD_LIMITS.maxMailboxBundles) throw bad("The manifest lists too many items");
@@ -12842,7 +13196,7 @@ function readManifest(meta) {
 	for (const entry of entries) {
 		if (!Array.isArray(entry) || entry.length !== 6) throw bad("The manifest is malformed");
 		const [seq, id, kind, bytes, url, expires] = entry;
-		if (!Number.isSafeInteger(seq) || seq <= last || typeof id !== "string" || !WIRE_ID.test(id) || typeof kind !== "string" || !KINDS$1.includes(kind) || kind === "manifest" || !Number.isSafeInteger(bytes) || bytes < 0 || bytes > HOLD_LIMITS.maxBundleBytes || !isHoldUrl(url) || !Number.isSafeInteger(expires)) throw bad("The manifest is malformed");
+		if (!Number.isSafeInteger(seq) || seq <= last || typeof id !== "string" || !WIRE_ID.test(id) || typeof kind !== "string" || !KINDS$1.includes(kind) || kind === "manifest" || !Number.isSafeInteger(bytes) || bytes < 0 || bytes > HOLD_LIMITS.maxBundleBytes || !isHoldUrl(url, loopback) || !Number.isSafeInteger(expires)) throw bad("The manifest is malformed");
 		last = seq;
 		total += bytes;
 		if (total > HOLD_LIMITS.maxMailboxBytes) throw bad("The manifest lists more than a mailbox may hold");
@@ -14238,6 +14592,8 @@ var TypingReceiver = class {
 * receiver says where it stands (accept from an offset, wait, done, refuse) and the sender goes on from
 * there. Nothing but the offset a receiver confirms moves a sender forward. A receiver may say `pf-accept`
 * again at any time (nothing arrived for a while, or its person asked again): the sender goes on from that offset.
+* What a sender sends again that way is bounded (`FILE_LIMITS.resendBytes`, and the host's `resend`): past it the
+* sender ends the transfer.
 */
 var FILE_LIMITS = {
 	/** Bytes in one `pf-data` frame: a frame stays far below the 60 KiB a session carries. */
@@ -14271,7 +14627,12 @@ var FILE_LIMITS = {
 	/** A sender reads its file this much at a time. */
 	readBytes: 1048576,
 	/** The session refused a data frame (its send budget was full): the sender looks again after this long. */
-	sendRetryMs: 250
+	sendRetryMs: 250,
+	/**
+	* What a sender sends of one file beyond its size (parts sent again after a drop, a restart of the receiver, or a
+	* `pf-accept` from an earlier offset): twice the file's size and this much. Past it the sender ends the transfer (WISP 501 § Resume).
+	*/
+	resendBytes: 268435456
 };
 var ID = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,64}$/;
 var DIGEST$1 = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/;
@@ -14357,6 +14718,7 @@ var ChatFiles = class {
 			const entry = { record: { ...record } };
 			if (record.direction === "out") entry.out = {
 				next: record.confirmed,
+				sent: 0,
 				generation: 0
 			};
 			else entry.in = {
@@ -14388,6 +14750,10 @@ var ChatFiles = class {
 		const entry = this.entries.get(key(direction, id));
 		return entry ? this.moved(entry) : 0;
 	}
+	/** Bytes of data sent for a file so far, parts sent again included: what sending it cost, whatever the receiver confirmed. */
+	sent(id) {
+		return this.entries.get(key("out", id))?.out?.sent ?? 0;
+	}
 	moved(entry) {
 		return entry.in && !transferEnded(entry.record) ? Math.max(entry.in.stored, entry.record.confirmed) : entry.record.confirmed;
 	}
@@ -14468,6 +14834,7 @@ var ChatFiles = class {
 			},
 			out: {
 				next: 0,
+				sent: 0,
 				generation: 0
 			}
 		};
@@ -14541,6 +14908,15 @@ var ChatFiles = class {
 		const { record } = entry, out = entry.out;
 		return this.attached && record.state === "active" && out.next < record.file.size && out.next - record.confirmed < FILE_LIMITS.windowBytes;
 	}
+	/**
+	* Whether the next `length` bytes go. Within the file's size they always do; past it the receiver is having parts
+	* sent again, which nothing it says bounds, so this side does.
+	*/
+	mayResend(entry, length) {
+		const { record } = entry, size = record.file.size, sent = entry.out.sent + length;
+		if (sent <= size) return true;
+		return sent - size <= 2 * size + FILE_LIMITS.resendBytes && this.host.resend?.({ ...record }, sent) !== false;
+	}
 	async pump(entry) {
 		const out = entry.out;
 		if (out.pumping === out.generation) return;
@@ -14554,6 +14930,14 @@ var ChatFiles = class {
 				const room = this.host.writable?.();
 				if (room) await room;
 				if (generation !== out.generation || !this.shouldPump(entry) || out.next !== offset) break;
+				if (!this.mayResend(entry, chunk.length)) {
+					this.send({
+						t: "pf-abort",
+						id: entry.record.id
+					});
+					this.end(entry, "failed", "Your contact asked for the same part of this file too many times");
+					break;
+				}
 				if (!this.send({
 					t: "pf-data",
 					id: entry.record.id,
@@ -14564,6 +14948,7 @@ var ChatFiles = class {
 					break;
 				}
 				out.next = offset + chunk.length;
+				out.sent += chunk.length;
 			}
 		} catch (error) {
 			if (generation === out.generation) {
@@ -15272,6 +15657,7 @@ var ChatFiles = class {
 		clearTimeout(entry.out.wake);
 		entry.out = {
 			next: 0,
+			sent: 0,
 			generation: entry.out.generation + 1
 		};
 		this.changed(entry);
@@ -16830,6 +17216,8 @@ var GhostLink = class {
 	}
 	/** The attempt (`connectionEpoch`) in which the data link began answering the contact's offer. */
 	answeringEpoch = -1;
+	/** Set while a dial waits for its WebRTC offer to be made: ends that wait, the contact's offer being answered instead. */
+	offerReplaced;
 	lastAutoConnectAt = 0;
 	autoConnectFailures = 0;
 	/** The look due when a failed dial's backoff ends (`lookAtRetry`). */
@@ -17175,6 +17563,7 @@ var GhostLink = class {
 				}
 				if (state === "answering") {
 					this.answeringEpoch = this.connectionEpoch;
+					this.offerReplaced?.();
 					if (this.resumingOverRtc) {
 						const epoch = this.connectionEpoch;
 						setTimeout(() => this.maybeKnockAnswering(epoch), 0);
@@ -18352,7 +18741,12 @@ var GhostLink = class {
 					} : void 0;
 					const gate = this.dialGate;
 					this.dialGate = void 0;
-					if (await this.dataLink.connect(gate) === "held") {
+					const replaced = new Promise((resolve) => {
+						this.offerReplaced = resolve;
+					});
+					const made = await Promise.race([this.dataLink.connect(gate), replaced]);
+					this.offerReplaced = void 0;
+					if (made === "held") {
 						traceLink(this.myPubKeyZ32, "dial-held", {});
 						this.afterRtc = void 0;
 						this.offered = void 0;
@@ -20919,535 +21313,308 @@ function decodeBolt11(text) {
 		at += 3 + length;
 		if (tag === "d") description = new TextDecoder().decode(wordsToBytes(field)).trim() || void 0;
 		else if (tag === "x") expiry = wordsToInt(field);
-		else if (tag === "p" && length === 52) paymentHash = [...wordsToBytes(field)].map((byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
-		else if (tag === "h" && length === 52) descriptionHash = [...wordsToBytes(field)].map((byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
-	}
-	return {
-		invoice,
-		network: NETWORKS[prefix[1]],
-		amountMsat,
-		amountSat: amountMsat === null ? null : Number((amountMsat + 999n) / 1000n),
-		createdAt,
-		expiresAt: createdAt + expiry,
-		description,
-		descriptionHash,
-		paymentHash
-	};
-}
-//#endregion
-//#region ../core/src/lnurl.ts
-var LNURL_LIMITS = {
-	timeoutMs: 15e3,
-	maxBytes: 65536,
-	maxUrlLength: 2048,
-	maxMetadataLength: 8192,
-	maxComment: 2e3
-};
-var ADDRESS = /^([a-z0-9._+-]{1,64})@([a-z0-9-]+(?:\.[a-z0-9-]+)*(?::\d{1,5})?)$/i;
-var LNURL_BECH32 = /^lnurl1[02-9ac-hj-np-z]{6,}$/i;
-var isLoopback = (hostname) => [
-	"localhost",
-	"127.0.0.1",
-	"[::1]"
-].includes(hostname);
-/** HTTPS, or plain HTTP only for a hidden service or a test server on this machine; never credentials. */
-function acceptUrl(text) {
-	if (text.length > LNURL_LIMITS.maxUrlLength) throw new Error("That LNURL is too long");
-	let url;
-	try {
-		url = new URL(text);
-	} catch {
-		throw new Error("That LNURL does not point to a valid address");
-	}
-	const plainAllowed = url.hostname.endsWith(".onion") || isLoopback(url.hostname);
-	if (url.protocol !== "https:" && !(url.protocol === "http:" && plainAllowed)) throw new Error("Lightning addresses and LNURLs must use HTTPS");
-	if (url.username || url.password) throw new Error("That LNURL carries credentials, which is not allowed");
-	return url;
-}
-/** Reads what was pasted as a Lightning address or an LNURL; null when it is neither. Throws when it is one, but a bad one. */
-function parseLightningDestination(input) {
-	const text = input.trim().replace(/^(lightning:|⚡\s*)/i, "").trim();
-	if (!text) return null;
-	if (LNURL_BECH32.test(text)) {
-		let decoded;
-		try {
-			decoded = bech32.decode(text.toLowerCase(), LNURL_LIMITS.maxUrlLength);
-		} catch {
-			throw new Error("That LNURL is not valid");
-		}
-		const url = acceptUrl(new TextDecoder().decode(bech32.fromWords(decoded.words)));
-		return {
-			kind: "lnurl",
-			text: text.toLowerCase(),
-			url: url.href,
-			domain: url.host
-		};
-	}
-	if (/^lnurlp:\/\//i.test(text)) {
-		const bare = text.slice(9);
-		const host = bare.split(/[/?#]/)[0].toLowerCase();
-		const url = acceptUrl(`${host.endsWith(".onion") || isLoopback(host.replace(/:\d+$/, "")) ? "http" : "https"}://${bare}`);
-		return {
-			kind: "lnurl",
-			text: `lnurlp://${bare}`,
-			url: url.href,
-			domain: url.host
-		};
-	}
-	const address = ADDRESS.exec(text);
-	if (!address) return null;
-	const name = address[1].toLowerCase(), domain = address[2].toLowerCase();
-	const hostname = domain.replace(/:\d+$/, "");
-	if (!hostname.includes(".") && !isLoopback(hostname)) return null;
-	const url = acceptUrl(`${hostname.endsWith(".onion") || isLoopback(hostname) ? "http" : "https"}://${domain}/.well-known/lnurlp/${name}`);
-	return {
-		kind: "address",
-		text: `${name}@${domain}`,
-		url: url.href,
-		domain: url.host,
-		name
-	};
-}
-var hex$1 = (bytes) => Array.from(bytes, (b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
-var reason = (value) => typeof value === "string" ? value.replace(/\s+/g, " ").slice(0, 200) : "";
-var isRecord = (value) => !!value && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value);
-async function readBounded(response, maxBytes) {
-	const reader = response.body?.getReader?.();
-	if (!reader) {
-		const text = await response.text();
-		if (text.length > maxBytes) throw new Error("The server's answer is too large");
-		return text;
-	}
-	const chunks = [];
-	let size = 0;
-	for (;;) {
-		const { done, value } = await reader.read();
-		if (done) break;
-		size += value.byteLength;
-		if (size > maxBytes) {
-			await reader.cancel().catch(() => {});
-			throw new Error("The server's answer is too large");
-		}
-		chunks.push(value);
-	}
-	const all = new Uint8Array(size);
-	let at = 0;
-	for (const chunk of chunks) {
-		all.set(chunk, at);
-		at += chunk.byteLength;
-	}
-	return new TextDecoder().decode(all);
-}
-/** One GET to an LNURL service: bounded in time and size, no credentials, no referrer, and the answer must be JSON. */
-async function fetchLnurlJson(url, options = {}) {
-	const target = acceptUrl(url);
-	const doFetch = options.fetch ?? globalThis.fetch;
-	if (!doFetch) throw new Error("No way to reach the network here");
-	const controller = new AbortController();
-	const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(/* @__PURE__ */ new Error("The server took too long to answer")), options.timeoutMs ?? LNURL_LIMITS.timeoutMs);
-	const onAbort = () => controller.abort(options.signal?.reason);
-	options.signal?.addEventListener("abort", onAbort, { once: true });
-	try {
-		let response;
-		try {
-			response = await doFetch(target.href, {
-				signal: controller.signal,
-				headers: { accept: "application/json" },
-				credentials: "omit",
-				referrerPolicy: "no-referrer",
-				redirect: "follow"
-			});
-		} catch {
-			if (controller.signal.aborted) throw controller.signal.reason instanceof Error ? controller.signal.reason : /* @__PURE__ */ new Error("The request was cancelled");
-			throw engineError("lnurlUnreachable", { host: target.host });
-		}
-		if (response.url) acceptUrl(response.url);
-		const text = await readBounded(response, options.maxBytes ?? LNURL_LIMITS.maxBytes);
-		let body;
-		try {
-			body = JSON.parse(text);
-		} catch {
-			throw new Error(`${target.host} did not answer with JSON${response.ok ? "" : ` (HTTP ${response.status})`}`);
-		}
-		if (isRecord(body) && body.status === "ERROR") throw new Error(`${target.host} refused: ${reason(body.reason) || "no reason given"}`);
-		if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`${target.host} answered HTTP ${response.status}`);
-		return body;
-	} finally {
-		clearTimeout(timer);
-		options.signal?.removeEventListener("abort", onAbort);
-	}
-}
-/** Checks a service's `payRequest` answer (LUD-06), and reads what a person needs to see of it. */
-function parsePayParams(body, destination) {
-	if (!isRecord(body)) throw new Error(`${destination.domain} did not answer with a pay request`);
-	if (body.tag !== "payRequest") throw new Error(`${destination.domain} answered with something other than a pay request${typeof body.tag === "string" ? ` (${reason(body.tag)})` : ""}`);
-	if (typeof body.callback !== "string") throw new Error("The pay request has no callback");
-	const callback = acceptUrl(body.callback);
-	const { minSendable, maxSendable, metadata, commentAllowed } = body;
-	if (!Number.isSafeInteger(minSendable) || !Number.isSafeInteger(maxSendable) || minSendable <= 0 || maxSendable < minSendable) throw new Error("The pay request has invalid amount limits");
-	const minSat = Math.ceil(minSendable / 1e3), maxSat = Math.floor(maxSendable / 1e3);
-	if (minSat > maxSat) throw new Error("The pay request only takes fractions of a sat, which cannot be paid here");
-	if (typeof metadata !== "string" || metadata.length > LNURL_LIMITS.maxMetadataLength) throw new Error("The pay request has no usable metadata");
-	let entries;
-	try {
-		entries = JSON.parse(metadata);
-	} catch {
-		throw new Error("The pay request's metadata is not JSON");
-	}
-	if (!Array.isArray(entries) || !entries.every((e) => Array.isArray(e) && typeof e[0] === "string")) throw new Error("The pay request's metadata is malformed");
-	const entry = (type) => entries.find((e) => e[0] === type)?.[1];
-	const description = entry("text/plain");
-	if (typeof description !== "string") throw new Error("The pay request says nothing about what it is for (no text/plain metadata)");
-	const identifier = [entry("text/identifier"), entry("text/email")].find((v) => typeof v === "string")?.toLowerCase();
-	if (destination.kind === "address" && identifier && identifier !== destination.text) throw new Error(`${destination.domain} answered for ${identifier}, not ${destination.text}`);
-	const comment = Number.isSafeInteger(commentAllowed) && commentAllowed > 0 ? Math.min(commentAllowed, LNURL_LIMITS.maxComment) : 0;
-	return {
-		destination,
-		callback: callback.href,
-		callbackDomain: callback.host,
-		minSendable,
-		maxSendable,
-		minSat,
-		maxSat,
-		metadata,
-		descriptionHash: hex$1(sha256(new TextEncoder().encode(metadata))),
-		description: description.slice(0, 280),
-		identifier,
-		commentAllowed: comment
-	};
-}
-/** Where to ask for the invoice of `amountSat` (and a comment, LUD-12). Throws when the amount or comment is not allowed. */
-function invoiceCallbackUrl(params, amountSat, comment) {
-	if (!Number.isSafeInteger(amountSat) || amountSat <= 0) throw new Error("Enter a whole number of sats");
-	if (amountSat < params.minSat || amountSat > params.maxSat) throw params.minSat === params.maxSat ? engineError("lnurlExactly", {
-		domain: params.destination.domain,
-		amount: params.minSat.toLocaleString()
-	}) : engineError("lnurlRange", {
-		domain: params.destination.domain,
-		min: params.minSat.toLocaleString(),
-		max: params.maxSat.toLocaleString()
-	});
-	const url = new URL(params.callback);
-	url.searchParams.set("amount", String(amountSat * 1e3));
-	const text = comment?.trim();
-	if (text) {
-		if (!params.commentAllowed) throw new Error(`${params.destination.domain} does not take a comment`);
-		if (text.length > params.commentAllowed) throw new Error(`The comment can be at most ${params.commentAllowed} characters`);
-		url.searchParams.set("comment", text);
-	}
-	return url.href;
-}
-/**
-* Checks the invoice a service answered with (LUD-06): the amount asked, a payment hash, not expired, and
-* a commitment to the metadata the person was shown: the `h` tag is its sha256, or the invoice carries the
-* metadata itself as its description (the same commitment, unhashed).
-*/
-function parseInvoiceCallback(body, params, amountSat) {
-	if (!isRecord(body) || typeof body.pr !== "string") throw new Error(`${params.callbackDomain} did not answer with an invoice`);
-	const invoice = decodeBolt11(body.pr);
-	if (!invoice) throw new Error(`${params.callbackDomain} answered with an invoice that does not decode`);
-	if (invoice.amountMsat !== BigInt(amountSat) * 1000n) throw new Error(`The invoice asks for ${invoice.amountSat === null ? "any amount" : `${invoice.amountSat.toLocaleString()} sats`}, not the ${amountSat.toLocaleString()} sats you chose`);
-	if (!invoice.paymentHash) throw new Error("The invoice has no payment hash");
-	if (invoice.descriptionHash !== params.descriptionHash && invoice.description !== params.metadata) throw new Error("The invoice does not commit to what the service said the payment is for");
-	if (invoice.expiresAt * 1e3 < Date.now()) throw new Error("The invoice the service answered with has already expired");
-	let successAction;
-	const action = body.successAction;
-	if (isRecord(action)) {
-		if (action.tag === "message" && typeof action.message === "string") successAction = {
-			tag: "message",
-			message: reason(action.message)
-		};
-		else if (action.tag === "url" && typeof action.url === "string" && /^https:\/\//i.test(action.url) && action.url.length <= LNURL_LIMITS.maxUrlLength) successAction = {
-			tag: "url",
-			description: reason(action.description),
-			url: action.url
-		};
+		else if (tag === "p" && length === 52) paymentHash = [...wordsToBytes(field)].map((byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
+		else if (tag === "h" && length === 52) descriptionHash = [...wordsToBytes(field)].map((byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
 	}
 	return {
 		invoice,
-		successAction
+		network: NETWORKS[prefix[1]],
+		amountMsat,
+		amountSat: amountMsat === null ? null : Number((amountMsat + 999n) / 1000n),
+		createdAt,
+		expiresAt: createdAt + expiry,
+		description,
+		descriptionHash,
+		paymentHash
 	};
 }
-/** Fetches and checks what a Lightning address or LNURL asks for. The service's domain learns of it. */
-async function resolveLightningDestination(text, options = {}) {
-	const destination = parseLightningDestination(text);
-	if (!destination) throw new Error("That is not a Lightning address or an LNURL");
-	return parsePayParams(await fetchLnurlJson(destination.url, options), destination);
-}
-/** Asks the service for an invoice of `amountSat`, and checks it before it is handed to any wallet. */
-async function requestLnurlInvoice(params, amountSat, comment, options = {}) {
-	return parseInvoiceCallback(await fetchLnurlJson(invoiceCallbackUrl(params, amountSat, comment), options), params, amountSat);
-}
 //#endregion
-//#region ../core/src/domainProofs.ts
-var DNS_LABEL = "_ghostly";
-var WELL_KNOWN_PATH = "/.well-known/ghostly.json";
-var NIP05_PATH = "/.well-known/nostr.json?name=_";
-/** Everything read from a domain is bounded; these match the fetch limits. */
-var DOMAIN_FILE_MAX_BYTES = 16384;
-var z32 = /^[ybndrfg8ejkmcpqxot1uwisza345h769]{52}$/;
-var hex64 = /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/;
-/** Names that never resolve publicly (RFC 6761, 6762, 7686, 8375, 9476) or that
-* only ever mean a private network. A proof for them could only point inward. */
-var SPECIAL_USE = [
-	"localhost",
-	"local",
-	"internal",
-	"lan",
-	"home",
-	"corp",
-	"intranet",
-	"private",
-	"test",
-	"example",
-	"invalid",
-	"onion",
-	"alt",
-	"arpa"
+//#region ../core/src/lnurl.ts
+var LNURL_LIMITS = {
+	timeoutMs: 15e3,
+	maxBytes: 65536,
+	maxRedirects: 5,
+	maxUrlLength: 2048,
+	maxMetadataLength: 8192,
+	maxComment: 2e3
+};
+var ADDRESS = /^([a-z0-9._+-]{1,64})@([a-z0-9-]+(?:\.[a-z0-9-]+)*(?::\d{1,5})?)$/i;
+var LNURL_BECH32 = /^lnurl1[02-9ac-hj-np-z]{6,}$/i;
+var REDIRECTS = [
+	301,
+	302,
+	303,
+	307,
+	308
 ];
 /**
-* Normalizes what a person typed ("Example.COM.", "https://example.com/") into
-* a lowercase ASCII host name, or throws with a message fit for the UI.
-* Internationalized names become punycode (xn--), the form DNS carries.
+* A host that is not on the public internet, as far as its name tells: this machine, a single label, `.local` and its
+* kin, private and reserved IP addresses. (What a public name resolves to is checked where the client resolves names
+* itself, as Ghostly Desktop does.)
 */
-function normalizeDomain(input) {
-	if (typeof input !== "string") throw new Error("Enter a domain name, like example.com");
-	let value = input.trim();
-	if (!value || value.length > 300) throw new Error("Enter a domain name, like example.com");
-	if (/^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\//i.test(value)) {
-		let url;
-		try {
-			url = new URL(value);
-		} catch {
-			throw new Error("Enter a domain name, like example.com");
-		}
-		if (url.protocol !== "https:" || url.username || url.password || url.port || url.pathname !== "/" && url.pathname !== "" || url.search || url.hash) throw new Error("Enter only the domain name, without a path or port");
-		value = url.hostname;
-	} else {
-		if (/[/:@?#\s\\]/.test(value)) throw new Error("Enter only the domain name, without a path or port");
-		try {
-			value = new URL(`https://${value}`).hostname;
-		} catch {
-			throw new Error("That is not a valid domain name");
-		}
+function isLocalHost(hostname) {
+	const host = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "").replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "");
+	if (!host.includes(".") && !host.includes(":")) return true;
+	if (/(^|\.)(localhost|local|internal|lan|home\.arpa)$/.test(host)) return true;
+	const v4 = /^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/.exec(host);
+	if (v4) {
+		const [a, b] = [Number(v4[1]), Number(v4[2])];
+		return a === 0 || a === 10 || a === 127 || a >= 224 || a === 169 && b === 254 || a === 172 && b >= 16 && b < 32 || a === 192 && b === 168 || a === 100 && b >= 64 && b < 128 || a === 198 && (b === 18 || b === 19) || a === 192 && b === 0;
 	}
-	value = value.toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "");
-	if (value.length > 244) throw new Error("That domain name is too long");
-	const labels = value.split(".");
-	if (labels.length < 2) throw new Error("Use a full domain name, like example.com");
-	for (const label of labels) if (!/^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$/.test(label)) throw new Error("That is not a valid domain name");
-	const tld = labels[labels.length - 1];
-	if (/^[0-9]+$/.test(tld) || /^\[/.test(value)) throw new Error("Use a domain name, not an IP address");
-	if (SPECIAL_USE.includes(tld) || labels.length >= 2 && labels.slice(-2).join(".") === "home.arpa") throw new Error("That name only works on private networks");
-	return value;
+	if (host.includes(":")) return !/^[23][0-9a-f]{0,3}:/.test(host) || host.includes(".") || /^2001:0?db8:/.test(host);
+	return false;
 }
-var dnsProofName = (domain) => `${DNS_LABEL}.${normalizeDomain(domain)}`;
-var wellKnownUrl = (domain, method = "https") => `https://${normalizeDomain(domain)}${method === "nip05" ? NIP05_PATH : WELL_KNOWN_PATH}`;
-function validDomainRecord(r) {
-	if (!r || typeof r.key !== "string" || typeof r.proof !== "string" || !z32.test(r.key) || !hex64.test(r.proof)) return false;
+var isLoopback = (hostname) => [
+	"localhost",
+	"127.0.0.1",
+	"[::1]"
+].includes(hostname);
+/** HTTPS, or plain HTTP only for a hidden service or a test server on this machine; never credentials. */
+function acceptUrl(text) {
+	if (text.length > LNURL_LIMITS.maxUrlLength) throw new Error("That LNURL is too long");
+	let url;
 	try {
-		return toZ32(fromZ32(r.key)) === r.key;
+		url = new URL(text);
 	} catch {
-		return false;
-	}
-}
-/** The TXT record value, in the `tag=value; …` style people know from DKIM. */
-function domainTxtRecord(r) {
-	if (!validDomainRecord(r)) throw new Error("Invalid domain record");
-	return `v=ghostly1; key=${r.key}; proof=${r.proof}`;
-}
-/** Parses one TXT string. Undefined for anything that is not ours or not exactly
-* well-formed; unknown extra tags are ignored for forward compatibility. */
-function parseDomainTxt(value) {
-	if (typeof value !== "string" || utf8Encode(value).length > 1024) return;
-	const tags = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-	const parts = value.split(";").map((p) => p.trim()).filter(Boolean);
-	for (const part of parts) {
-		const eq = part.indexOf("=");
-		if (eq < 1) return;
-		const name = part.slice(0, eq).trim().toLowerCase();
-		if (tags.has(name)) return;
-		tags.set(name, part.slice(eq + 1).trim());
+		throw new Error("That LNURL does not point to a valid address");
 	}
-	if (!parts[0]?.toLowerCase().startsWith("v=") || tags.get("v") !== "ghostly1") return;
-	const r = {
-		key: tags.get("key"),
-		proof: tags.get("proof")
-	};
-	return validDomainRecord(r) ? r : void 0;
+	const plainAllowed = url.hostname.endsWith(".onion") || isLoopback(url.hostname);
+	if (url.protocol !== "https:" && !(url.protocol === "http:" && plainAllowed)) throw new Error("Lightning addresses and LNURLs must use HTTPS");
+	if (url.username || url.password) throw new Error("That LNURL carries credentials, which is not allowed");
+	return url;
 }
-var addRecord = (list, r) => {
-	if (!list.some((x) => x.key === r.key && x.proof === r.proof)) list.push(r);
-};
-/** All records among the TXT strings of `_ghostly.<domain>`; other strings are skipped. */
-function recordsFromTxt(values) {
-	const out = [];
-	for (const value of values.slice(0, 32)) {
-		const r = parseDomainTxt(value);
-		if (r) addRecord(out, r);
+/** Reads what was pasted as a Lightning address or an LNURL; null when it is neither. Throws when it is one, but a bad one. */
+function parseLightningDestination(input) {
+	const text = input.trim().replace(/^(lightning:|⚡\s*)/i, "").trim();
+	if (!text) return null;
+	if (LNURL_BECH32.test(text)) {
+		let decoded;
+		try {
+			decoded = bech32.decode(text.toLowerCase(), LNURL_LIMITS.maxUrlLength);
+		} catch {
+			throw new Error("That LNURL is not valid");
+		}
+		const url = acceptUrl(new TextDecoder().decode(bech32.fromWords(decoded.words)));
+		return {
+			kind: "lnurl",
+			text: text.toLowerCase(),
+			url: url.href,
+			domain: url.host
+		};
 	}
-	return out.slice(0, 8);
-}
-/** The body of `/.well-known/ghostly.json`. */
-function domainWellKnownFile(records) {
-	if (!records.length || records.length > 8 || !records.every(validDomainRecord)) throw new Error("Invalid domain records");
-	return JSON.stringify({
-		ghostly: 1,
-		proofs: records.map((r) => ({
-			key: r.key,
-			proof: r.proof
-		}))
-	}, null, 2) + "\n";
-}
-function parseJson(text) {
-	if (typeof text !== "string" || utf8Encode(text).length > 16384) throw new Error("File too large");
-	return JSON.parse(text);
-}
-/** Records from `ghostly.json`. Throws on a malformed file; [] when it names none. */
-function recordsFromWellKnown(text) {
-	const body = parseJson(text);
-	if (!body || typeof body !== "object" || Array.isArray(body) || body.ghostly !== 1 || !Array.isArray(body.proofs)) throw new Error("Not a Ghostly domain file");
-	const out = [];
-	for (const entry of body.proofs.slice(0, 32)) {
-		if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") continue;
-		const r = {
-			key: entry.key,
-			proof: entry.proof
+	if (/^lnurlp:\/\//i.test(text)) {
+		const bare = text.slice(9);
+		const host = bare.split(/[/?#]/)[0].toLowerCase();
+		const url = acceptUrl(`${host.endsWith(".onion") || isLoopback(host.replace(/:\d+$/, "")) ? "http" : "https"}://${bare}`);
+		return {
+			kind: "lnurl",
+			text: `lnurlp://${bare}`,
+			url: url.href,
+			domain: url.host
 		};
-		if (validDomainRecord(r)) addRecord(out, r);
 	}
-	return out.slice(0, 8);
-}
-/** NIP-05: only the root name `_` speaks for the domain itself. Undefined when absent. */
-function nip05RootKey(text) {
-	const body = parseJson(text);
-	if (!body || typeof body !== "object" || !body.names || typeof body.names !== "object" || Array.isArray(body.names)) throw new Error("Not a NIP-05 file");
-	const root = body.names["_"];
-	return typeof root === "string" && hex64.test(root) ? root : void 0;
+	const address = ADDRESS.exec(text);
+	if (!address) return null;
+	const name = address[1].toLowerCase(), domain = address[2].toLowerCase();
+	const hostname = domain.replace(/:\d+$/, "");
+	if (!hostname.includes(".") && !isLoopback(hostname)) return null;
+	const url = acceptUrl(`${hostname.endsWith(".onion") || isLoopback(hostname) ? "http" : "https"}://${domain}/.well-known/lnurlp/${name}`);
+	return {
+		kind: "address",
+		text: `${name}@${domain}`,
+		url: url.href,
+		domain: url.host,
+		name
+	};
 }
-var recordsName = (records, r) => records.some((x) => x.key === r.key && x.proof === r.proof);
-var DNS_TYPE = {
-	A: 1,
-	CNAME: 5,
-	TXT: 16,
-	AAAA: 28
-};
-/** A recursive query for one name and type. ID 0, as RFC 8484 recommends for caching;
-* the AD bit asks the resolver to report DNSSEC validation (RFC 6840 §5.7). */
-function encodeDnsQuery(name, type) {
-	const labels = name.replace(/\.$/, "").split(".");
-	const parts = [Uint8Array.of(0, 0, 1, 32, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)];
-	for (const label of labels) {
-		const bytes = utf8Encode(label);
-		if (!bytes.length || bytes.length > 63) throw new Error("Invalid DNS name");
-		parts.push(Uint8Array.of(bytes.length), bytes);
+var hex$1 = (bytes) => Array.from(bytes, (b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
+var reason = (value) => typeof value === "string" ? value.replace(/\s+/g, " ").slice(0, 200) : "";
+var isRecord = (value) => !!value && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value);
+async function readBounded(response, maxBytes) {
+	const reader = response.body?.getReader?.();
+	if (!reader) {
+		const text = await response.text();
+		if (text.length > maxBytes) throw new Error("The server's answer is too large");
+		return text;
+	}
+	const chunks = [];
+	let size = 0;
+	for (;;) {
+		const { done, value } = await reader.read();
+		if (done) break;
+		size += value.byteLength;
+		if (size > maxBytes) {
+			await reader.cancel().catch(() => {});
+			throw new Error("The server's answer is too large");
+		}
+		chunks.push(value);
 	}
-	const code = DNS_TYPE[type];
-	parts.push(Uint8Array.of(0, code >> 8, code & 255, 0, 1));
-	return concatBytes$1(...parts);
+	const all = new Uint8Array(size);
+	let at = 0;
+	for (const chunk of chunks) {
+		all.set(chunk, at);
+		at += chunk.byteLength;
+	}
+	return new TextDecoder().decode(all);
 }
-function readName(data, start) {
-	const labels = [];
-	let pos = start, next = -1, jumps = 0, length = 0;
-	for (;;) {
-		if (pos >= data.length) throw new Error("DNS name out of bounds");
-		const len = data[pos];
-		if ((len & 192) === 192) {
-			if (pos + 1 >= data.length) throw new Error("DNS pointer out of bounds");
-			if (next < 0) next = pos + 2;
-			pos = (len & 63) << 8 | data[pos + 1];
-			if (++jumps > 32) throw new Error("DNS name loops");
-			continue;
+/** One GET to an LNURL service (and to each checked redirect of it): bounded in time and size, no credentials, no referrer, and the answer must be JSON. */
+async function fetchLnurlJson(url, options = {}) {
+	const target = acceptUrl(url);
+	const doFetch = options.fetch ?? globalThis.fetch;
+	if (!doFetch) throw new Error("No way to reach the network here");
+	const controller = new AbortController();
+	const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(/* @__PURE__ */ new Error("The server took too long to answer")), options.timeoutMs ?? LNURL_LIMITS.timeoutMs);
+	const onAbort = () => controller.abort(options.signal?.reason);
+	options.signal?.addEventListener("abort", onAbort, { once: true });
+	try {
+		let response;
+		for (let at = target, hops = 0;; hops++) {
+			try {
+				response = await doFetch(at.href, {
+					signal: controller.signal,
+					headers: { accept: "application/json" },
+					credentials: "omit",
+					referrerPolicy: "no-referrer",
+					redirect: "manual"
+				});
+			} catch {
+				if (controller.signal.aborted) throw controller.signal.reason instanceof Error ? controller.signal.reason : /* @__PURE__ */ new Error("The request was cancelled");
+				throw engineError("lnurlUnreachable", { host: target.host });
+			}
+			if (response.url) acceptUrl(response.url);
+			if (response.type === "opaqueredirect") throw new Error(`${target.host} redirects to another address, which cannot be checked here`);
+			const location = REDIRECTS.includes(response.status) ? response.headers.get("location") : null;
+			if (!location) break;
+			await response.body?.cancel().catch(() => {});
+			if (hops >= LNURL_LIMITS.maxRedirects) throw new Error(`${target.host} redirects too many times`);
+			let next;
+			try {
+				next = new URL(location, at);
+			} catch {
+				throw new Error(`${target.host} redirects to an invalid address`);
+			}
+			next = acceptUrl(next.href);
+			if (next.host !== at.host) {
+				if (next.protocol !== "https:") throw new Error("Lightning addresses and LNURLs must use HTTPS");
+				if (isLocalHost(next.hostname)) throw new Error(`${target.host} redirects to a local address`);
+			}
+			at = next;
 		}
-		if (len & 192) throw new Error("Unsupported DNS label");
-		pos += 1;
-		if (len === 0) break;
-		if (pos + len > data.length) throw new Error("DNS label out of bounds");
-		length += len + 1;
-		if (length > 255) throw new Error("DNS name too long");
-		labels.push(utf8Decode(data.subarray(pos, pos + len)).toLowerCase());
-		pos += len;
+		const text = await readBounded(response, options.maxBytes ?? LNURL_LIMITS.maxBytes);
+		let body;
+		try {
+			body = JSON.parse(text);
+		} catch {
+			throw new Error(`${target.host} did not answer with JSON${response.ok ? "" : ` (HTTP ${response.status})`}`);
+		}
+		if (isRecord(body) && body.status === "ERROR") throw new Error(`${target.host} refused: ${reason(body.reason) || "no reason given"}`);
+		if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`${target.host} answered HTTP ${response.status}`);
+		return body;
+	} finally {
+		clearTimeout(timer);
+		options.signal?.removeEventListener("abort", onAbort);
+	}
+}
+/** Checks a service's `payRequest` answer (LUD-06), and reads what a person needs to see of it. */
+function parsePayParams(body, destination) {
+	if (!isRecord(body)) throw new Error(`${destination.domain} did not answer with a pay request`);
+	if (body.tag !== "payRequest") throw new Error(`${destination.domain} answered with something other than a pay request${typeof body.tag === "string" ? ` (${reason(body.tag)})` : ""}`);
+	if (typeof body.callback !== "string") throw new Error("The pay request has no callback");
+	const callback = acceptUrl(body.callback);
+	const { minSendable, maxSendable, metadata, commentAllowed } = body;
+	if (!Number.isSafeInteger(minSendable) || !Number.isSafeInteger(maxSendable) || minSendable <= 0 || maxSendable < minSendable) throw new Error("The pay request has invalid amount limits");
+	const minSat = Math.ceil(minSendable / 1e3), maxSat = Math.floor(maxSendable / 1e3);
+	if (minSat > maxSat) throw new Error("The pay request only takes fractions of a sat, which cannot be paid here");
+	if (typeof metadata !== "string" || metadata.length > LNURL_LIMITS.maxMetadataLength) throw new Error("The pay request has no usable metadata");
+	let entries;
+	try {
+		entries = JSON.parse(metadata);
+	} catch {
+		throw new Error("The pay request's metadata is not JSON");
 	}
+	if (!Array.isArray(entries) || !entries.every((e) => Array.isArray(e) && typeof e[0] === "string")) throw new Error("The pay request's metadata is malformed");
+	const entry = (type) => entries.find((e) => e[0] === type)?.[1];
+	const description = entry("text/plain");
+	if (typeof description !== "string") throw new Error("The pay request says nothing about what it is for (no text/plain metadata)");
+	const identifier = [entry("text/identifier"), entry("text/email")].find((v) => typeof v === "string")?.toLowerCase();
+	if (destination.kind === "address" && identifier && identifier !== destination.text) throw new Error(`${destination.domain} answered for ${identifier}, not ${destination.text}`);
+	const comment = Number.isSafeInteger(commentAllowed) && commentAllowed > 0 ? Math.min(commentAllowed, LNURL_LIMITS.maxComment) : 0;
 	return {
-		name: labels.join("."),
-		next: next < 0 ? pos : next
+		destination,
+		callback: callback.href,
+		callbackDomain: callback.host,
+		minSendable,
+		maxSendable,
+		minSat,
+		maxSat,
+		metadata,
+		descriptionHash: hex$1(sha256(new TextEncoder().encode(metadata))),
+		description: description.slice(0, 280),
+		identifier,
+		commentAllowed: comment
 	};
 }
+/** Where to ask for the invoice of `amountSat` (and a comment, LUD-12). Throws when the amount or comment is not allowed. */
+function invoiceCallbackUrl(params, amountSat, comment) {
+	if (!Number.isSafeInteger(amountSat) || amountSat <= 0) throw new Error("Enter a whole number of sats");
+	if (amountSat < params.minSat || amountSat > params.maxSat) throw params.minSat === params.maxSat ? engineError("lnurlExactly", {
+		domain: params.destination.domain,
+		amount: params.minSat.toLocaleString()
+	}) : engineError("lnurlRange", {
+		domain: params.destination.domain,
+		min: params.minSat.toLocaleString(),
+		max: params.maxSat.toLocaleString()
+	});
+	const url = new URL(params.callback);
+	url.searchParams.set("amount", String(amountSat * 1e3));
+	const text = comment?.trim();
+	if (text) {
+		if (!params.commentAllowed) throw new Error(`${params.destination.domain} does not take a comment`);
+		if (text.length > params.commentAllowed) throw new Error(`The comment can be at most ${params.commentAllowed} characters`);
+		url.searchParams.set("comment", text);
+	}
+	return url.href;
+}
 /**
-* Decodes a resolver's answer to `encodeDnsQuery(name, type)`. Refuses a reply
-* to another question or a truncated one, and keeps only records of the asked
-* type owned by the name or by the CNAME chain the answer itself follows.
+* Checks the invoice a service answered with (LUD-06): the amount asked, a payment hash, not expired, and
+* a commitment to the metadata the person was shown: the `h` tag is its sha256, or the invoice carries the
+* metadata itself as its description (the same commitment, unhashed).
 */
-function decodeDnsResponse(data, name, type) {
-	if (data.length < 12) throw new Error("DNS response too short");
-	const view = new DataView(data.buffer, data.byteOffset, data.byteLength);
-	const flags = view.getUint16(2);
-	if (!(flags & 32768) || flags & 30720 || flags & 512) throw new Error("Unusable DNS response");
-	const questions = view.getUint16(4), count = view.getUint16(6);
-	const want = name.replace(/\.$/, "").toLowerCase(), code = DNS_TYPE[type];
-	if (questions !== 1) throw new Error("DNS response is for another question");
-	const q = readName(data, 12);
-	if (q.name !== want || q.next + 4 > data.length || view.getUint16(q.next) !== code) throw new Error("DNS response is for another question");
-	let pos = q.next + 4;
-	const all = [];
-	for (let i = 0; i < count && i < 64; i++) {
-		const owner = readName(data, pos);
-		pos = owner.next;
-		if (pos + 10 > data.length) throw new Error("DNS record out of bounds");
-		const rtype = view.getUint16(pos), ttl = view.getUint32(pos + 4), len = view.getUint16(pos + 8);
-		pos += 10;
-		if (pos + len > data.length) throw new Error("DNS record out of bounds");
-		const rdata = rtype === DNS_TYPE.CNAME ? utf8Encode(readName(data, pos).name) : data.slice(pos, pos + len);
-		all.push({
-			name: owner.name,
-			type: rtype,
-			ttl,
-			data: rdata
-		});
-		pos += len;
-	}
-	const owners = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([want]);
-	for (let hop = 0; hop < 8; hop++) {
-		const cname = all.find((a) => a.type === DNS_TYPE.CNAME && owners.has(a.name) && !owners.has(utf8Decode(a.data)));
-		if (!cname) break;
-		owners.add(utf8Decode(cname.data));
+function parseInvoiceCallback(body, params, amountSat) {
+	if (!isRecord(body) || typeof body.pr !== "string") throw new Error(`${params.callbackDomain} did not answer with an invoice`);
+	const invoice = decodeBolt11(body.pr);
+	if (!invoice) throw new Error(`${params.callbackDomain} answered with an invoice that does not decode`);
+	if (invoice.amountMsat !== BigInt(amountSat) * 1000n) throw new Error(`The invoice asks for ${invoice.amountSat === null ? "any amount" : `${invoice.amountSat.toLocaleString()} sats`}, not the ${amountSat.toLocaleString()} sats you chose`);
+	if (!invoice.paymentHash) throw new Error("The invoice has no payment hash");
+	if (invoice.descriptionHash !== params.descriptionHash && invoice.description !== params.metadata) throw new Error("The invoice does not commit to what the service said the payment is for");
+	if (invoice.expiresAt * 1e3 < Date.now()) throw new Error("The invoice the service answered with has already expired");
+	let successAction;
+	const action = body.successAction;
+	if (isRecord(action)) {
+		if (action.tag === "message" && typeof action.message === "string") successAction = {
+			tag: "message",
+			message: reason(action.message)
+		};
+		else if (action.tag === "url" && typeof action.url === "string" && /^https:\/\//i.test(action.url) && action.url.length <= LNURL_LIMITS.maxUrlLength) successAction = {
+			tag: "url",
+			description: reason(action.description),
+			url: action.url
+		};
 	}
 	return {
-		rcode: flags & 15,
-		authenticated: !!(flags & 32),
-		answers: all.filter((a) => a.type === code && owners.has(a.name))
+		invoice,
+		successAction
 	};
 }
-/** The TXT character-strings of one record, joined as RFC 7208 §3.3 does. */
-function txtValue(rdata) {
-	const parts = [];
-	for (let p = 0; p < rdata.length;) {
-		const len = rdata[p];
-		if (p + 1 + len > rdata.length) throw new Error("DNS text out of bounds");
-		parts.push(rdata.subarray(p + 1, p + 1 + len));
-		p += 1 + len;
-	}
-	return new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true }).decode(concatBytes$1(...parts));
+/** Fetches and checks what a Lightning address or LNURL asks for. The service's domain learns of it. */
+async function resolveLightningDestination(text, options = {}) {
+	const destination = parseLightningDestination(text);
+	if (!destination) throw new Error("That is not a Lightning address or an LNURL");
+	return parsePayParams(await fetchLnurlJson(destination.url, options), destination);
 }
-/** False for loopback, private, link-local, shared (CGNAT), multicast, reserved
-* and unspecified addresses, including IPv4 embedded in IPv6. */
-function isPublicAddress(address) {
-	if (address.length === 4) {
-		const [a, b, c] = address;
-		return !(a === 0 || a === 10 || a === 127 || a >= 224 || a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127 || a === 169 && b === 254 || a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31 || a === 192 && b === 168 || a === 192 && b === 0 && c === 0 || a === 198 && (b === 18 || b === 19));
-	}
-	if (address.length !== 16) return false;
-	const zeroTo = (n) => address.subarray(0, n).every((x) => x === 0);
-	if (zeroTo(15) && (address[15] === 0 || address[15] === 1)) return false;
-	if (zeroTo(10) && address[10] === 255 && address[11] === 255) return isPublicAddress(address.subarray(12));
-	if (address[0] === 0 && address[1] === 100 && address[2] === 255 && address[3] === 155 && address.subarray(4, 12).every((x) => x === 0)) return isPublicAddress(address.subarray(12));
-	if (zeroTo(12)) return false;
-	if ((address[0] & 254) === 252) return false;
-	if (address[0] === 254 && (address[1] & 192) === 128) return false;
-	if (address[0] === 254 && (address[1] & 192) === 192) return false;
-	if (address[0] === 255) return false;
-	if (address[0] === 1 && address.subarray(1, 8).every((x) => x === 0)) return false;
-	return (address[0] & 224) === 32;
+/** Asks the service for an invoice of `amountSat`, and checks it before it is handed to any wallet. */
+async function requestLnurlInvoice(params, amountSat, comment, options = {}) {
+	return parseInvoiceCallback(await fetchLnurlJson(invoiceCallbackUrl(params, amountSat, comment), options), params, amountSat);
 }
 //#endregion
 //#region ../core/src/pkdns.ts
@@ -25763,7 +25930,7 @@ var GroupSession = class {
 			const text = edit.text.trim();
 			if (!validEditText(text)) return { error: text ? "Message exceeds 16 KiB" : "An edit cannot be empty" };
 			if (!this.secret(ref.e)) return { error: "This message is too old to edit: its epoch's key is gone" };
-			const named = validMentions(wireMentions(edit.mentions ?? []), text, rosterAdmin(commit.m) === this.myKey);
+			const named = validMentions(wireMentions(edit.mentions ?? []), text, rosterAdmin(commit.m) === this.myKey && this.isAdmin);
 			const plain = JSON.stringify({
 				text,
 				...named.length ? { m: named } : {},
@@ -26087,7 +26254,7 @@ var GroupSession = class {
 			return;
 		}
 		const id = first && !this.provisional.has(own) ? groupMessageId(raw.s, first.e, first.n) : own;
-		const mentions = this.openMentions(key, raw, text, rosterAdmin(commit.m) === raw.s);
+		const mentions = this.openMentions(key, raw, text, rosterAdmin(commit.m) === raw.s && this.admin === raw.s);
 		const reply = this.openReply(key, raw);
 		const forwarded = readForwarded(raw.f);
 		const card = this.openCard(key, raw);
@@ -26150,7 +26317,7 @@ var GroupSession = class {
 			return;
 		}
 		if (!body || typeof body !== "object" || !validEditText(body.text)) return;
-		const k = validMentions(body.m, body.text, rosterAdmin(commit.m) === raw.s);
+		const k = validMentions(body.m, body.text, rosterAdmin(commit.m) === raw.s && this.admin === raw.s);
 		const sc = body.sc === void 0 ? void 0 : readStatusCard(body.sc);
 		if (!validEditNumber(raw.v) && !sc) return;
 		const copy = (this.state.relay ?? []).find((f) => f.s === raw.s && f.e === raw.e && f.n === raw.n);
@@ -26778,6 +26945,10 @@ var COMMUNITY_LIMITS = {
 	side: 512,
 	/** Commits waiting for their parent. */
 	pendingCommits: 64,
+	/** Epoch secrets waiting for their commit. */
+	pendingSecrets: 32,
+	/** How long a commit waits for its parent, or a secret for its commit: many catch-ups; after it, a catch-up brings both again. */
+	pendingMs: 12e4,
 	waiting: 64,
 	waitingBytes: 1048576,
 	replay: 256,
@@ -26837,6 +27008,17 @@ var FRESH = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
 	"rotate"
 ]);
 /**
+* Commits that make the membership history longer and the group no smaller. A committer signs one only while the
+* history keeps room for everyone else to get out after it: two commits a member (a leave or a remove is one, and a
+* leaving admin hands the role over first). The history is never compacted, and one that filled with people in it
+* took no leave, remove or handover any more. Its own rule: a history up to `COMMUNITY_LIMITS.chain` verifies as before.
+*/
+var GROWS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+	"add",
+	"rotate",
+	"link"
+]);
+/**
 * Kinds only the admin commits. They are final: a branch that drops one never replaces the branch
 * that has it, however long, so no member can undo a removal, a hand-over, a rotation or a link change
 * by outgrowing it with admissions.
@@ -27515,13 +27697,20 @@ var CommunitySession = class {
 		if (typeof p !== "string" || !Number.isSafeInteger(e)) return false;
 		const parent = this.known.get(p), parentRoster = parent ? this.rosterAt(p) : void 0;
 		if (!parent || !parentRoster) {
-			if (this.pendingCommits.size < COMMUNITY_LIMITS.pendingCommits) {
-				this.pendingCommits.set(p + ":" + String(e), {
+			const commit = parseCommit(raw);
+			if (!commit || commit.g !== this.id || !verify(fromBase64Url(commit.sig), utf8Encode(tuple(commit)), publicKeyFromZ32(commit.by))) return false;
+			if (this.wasAdmin(commit.by)) {
+				const now = this.hooks.clock?.() ?? Date.now(), key = p + ":" + String(e);
+				this.dropStale(this.pendingCommits, now);
+				this.pendingCommits.delete(key);
+				if (this.pendingCommits.size >= COMMUNITY_LIMITS.pendingCommits) this.pendingCommits.delete(this.pendingCommits.keys().next().value);
+				this.pendingCommits.set(key, {
 					from,
-					commit: raw
+					commit,
+					at: now
 				});
-				this.ask(from);
 			}
+			this.ask(from);
 			return false;
 		}
 		const result = verifyCommunityCommit(raw, parent, parentRoster, this.id);
@@ -27557,7 +27746,7 @@ var CommunitySession = class {
 		const sealed = this.pendingSecrets.get(h);
 		if (sealed) {
 			this.pendingSecrets.delete(h);
-			this.takeSecret(h, sealed);
+			this.takeSecret(h, sealed.sealed);
 		}
 		await this.chooseBranch();
 		for (const [key, pending] of [...this.pendingCommits]) if (key.startsWith(h + ":")) {
@@ -27571,6 +27760,18 @@ var CommunitySession = class {
 		}
 		return true;
 	}
+	/** Is, or was on the branch I follow, the admin (and was not taken out since). */
+	wasAdmin(key) {
+		if (this.wasRemoved(key)) return false;
+		return this.admin === key || this.state.chain.some((c, i) => i === 0 ? c.by === key : c.k === "role" && c.s === key);
+	}
+	/** What waited longer than `pendingMs` goes (the oldest first: a Map keeps the order they came in). */
+	dropStale(pending, now) {
+		for (const [key, { at }] of pending) {
+			if (now - at < COMMUNITY_LIMITS.pendingMs) break;
+			pending.delete(key);
+		}
+	}
 	/**
 	* Follows the best branch among the known tips (see `better`); reorganizes the main branch when it
 	* changed. A branch that keeps the admin's changes, or a longer one, wins however far back it parts
@@ -27673,7 +27874,15 @@ var CommunitySession = class {
 	takeSecret(h, sealed) {
 		const c = this.known.get(h);
 		if (!c) {
-			if (isSealed(sealed) && this.pendingSecrets.size < 32) this.pendingSecrets.set(h, sealed);
+			if (!HASH.test(h) || !isSealed(sealed)) return false;
+			const now = this.hooks.clock?.() ?? Date.now();
+			this.dropStale(this.pendingSecrets, now);
+			this.pendingSecrets.delete(h);
+			if (this.pendingSecrets.size >= COMMUNITY_LIMITS.pendingSecrets) this.pendingSecrets.delete(this.pendingSecrets.keys().next().value);
+			this.pendingSecrets.set(h, {
+				sealed,
+				at: now
+			});
 			return false;
 		}
 		if (this.state.secrets[h] || !isSealed(sealed) || !rosterHas(this.rosterAt(h) ?? [], this.myKey)) return false;
@@ -27738,6 +27947,7 @@ var CommunitySession = class {
 		};
 		const roster = communityRoster(this.roster, draftBase);
 		if (!roster) throw new Error("This change is not allowed");
+		if (GROWS.has(kind) && this.state.chain.length + 1 + 2 * (roster.length - 1) > COMMUNITY_LIMITS.chain) throw new Error("This group has reached its membership history limit. Create a new group.");
 		const draft = {
 			...draftBase,
 			m: rosterHash(roster)
@@ -28443,7 +28653,9 @@ var CommunitySession = class {
 	}
 	/** Something is missing here: the current epoch's secret, or the epoch of frames waiting. */
 	get needsCatchUp() {
-		return this.isMember && (!this.state.secrets[this.topHash] || this.waiting.length > 0 || this.pendingCommits.size > 0);
+		if (!this.isMember) return false;
+		this.dropStale(this.pendingCommits, this.hooks.clock?.() ?? Date.now());
+		return !this.state.secrets[this.topHash] || this.waiting.length > 0 || this.pendingCommits.size > 0;
 	}
 	/** Asks a member I have an edge to for what I lack (the engine calls it now and then while `needsCatchUp`). */
 	catchUp(to) {
@@ -28877,6 +29089,8 @@ var APP_BUNDLE_LIMITS = {
 	/** A path, in bytes (paths are ASCII). */
 	pathBytes: 128,
 	iconBytes: 262144,
+	/** The icon's width and height, in pixels: a client decodes it whole to draw it, whatever its bytes. */
+	iconEdge: 1024,
 	screenshots: 8,
 	/** Lengths in Unicode code points. */
 	title: 40,
@@ -29272,6 +29486,11 @@ function readAppBundle(bytes) {
 			reason: "bad-icon",
 			detail: "icon.png is not a square PNG"
 		};
+		if (size.width > APP_BUNDLE_LIMITS.iconEdge) return {
+			ok: false,
+			reason: "bad-icon",
+			detail: "icon.png is larger than 1024 × 1024 pixels"
+		};
 	}
 	return {
 		ok: true,
@@ -29425,6 +29644,13 @@ var STORE_REQUIRED = [
 	"removed",
 	"revoked"
 ];
+/** Runs a check written in steps to its end, in one go. */
+function inOneRun(steps) {
+	for (;;) {
+		const step = steps.next();
+		if (step.done) return step.value;
+	}
+}
 /**
 * Checks an index's fields and bounds, and every revocation it carries (one that does not verify refuses the index:
 * the store copied it, so a broken one is the store's fault). The signature and `expires` are `readAppStore`'s. An
@@ -29432,6 +29658,14 @@ var STORE_REQUIRED = [
 * statement and keeps its exact keys.
 */
 function checkAppStoreIndex(value, options = {}) {
+	const fields = inOneRun(checkAppStoreFieldsSteps(value, options));
+	return fields.ok ? inOneRun(checkAppStoreRevocationsSteps(value)) : fields;
+}
+/**
+* The first half of `checkAppStoreIndex`: the fields and bounds, and the shape of every revocation, with no signature
+* checked. A step after each listing, removal and revocation (see `readAppStoreSteps`).
+*/
+function* checkAppStoreFieldsSteps(value, options = {}) {
 	if (!isObject(value)) return {
 		ok: false,
 		reason: "bad-field",
@@ -29468,38 +29702,65 @@ function checkAppStoreIndex(value, options = {}) {
 			detail: ref
 		};
 		refs.add(ref);
+		yield;
 	}
 	if (!Array.isArray(removed) || removed.length > APP_STORE_LIMITS.removed) return bad("removed");
 	for (const entry of removed) {
 		const checked = checkRemoval(entry, options);
 		if (!checked.ok) return checked;
+		yield;
 	}
 	if (!Array.isArray(revoked) || revoked.length > APP_STORE_LIMITS.revoked) return bad("revoked");
 	for (const entry of revoked) {
-		const read = readAppRevocation(entry);
+		const read = readAppRevocationShape(entry);
 		if (!read.ok) return {
 			ok: false,
 			reason: "bad-revocation",
 			detail: read.detail ?? read.reason
 		};
+		yield;
+	}
+	return fine;
+}
+/** The second half: the signature of each revocation of an index whose fields hold, one step each. */
+function* checkAppStoreRevocationsSteps(index, checked) {
+	for (const revocation of index.revoked) {
+		const verified = verifyAppRevocation(revocation, checked);
+		if (!verified.ok) return {
+			ok: false,
+			reason: "bad-revocation",
+			detail: verified.reason
+		};
+		yield;
 	}
 	return fine;
 }
 /**
-* Reads `ghostly-store.json` with its `ghostly-store.sig`, in this order: size, JSON, canonical bytes, fields and
-* revocations, the signature statement, the key the reader holds for this store (when it holds one), the signature,
-* then `expires` against `now` (seconds): more than 90 days ahead is refused, past is `expired`. A key it does not know
-* is ignored (a later store's optional field) and stays in the bytes the signature covers.
+* Reads `ghostly-store.json` with its `ghostly-store.sig`, in this order: size, JSON, canonical bytes, fields and the
+* shape of each revocation, the signature statement, the key the reader holds for this store (when it holds one), the
+* signature, the signature of each revocation, then `expires` against `now` (seconds): more than 90 days ahead is
+* refused, past is `expired`. The index's own signature comes before its revocations': an index nobody signed costs
+* its reader one signature check, whatever it carries. A key it does not know is ignored (a later store's optional
+* field) and stays in the bytes the signature covers.
 */
 function readAppStore(indexBytes, sigBytes, now, heldKey) {
+	return inOneRun(readAppStoreSteps(indexBytes, sigBytes, now, heldKey));
+}
+/**
+* `readAppStore` in steps, for a reader that shares its thread (a page): it stops after each listing, removal and
+* revocation, and after each revocation's signature check, so the caller can let the thread go between two `next()`
+* and an index of 4096 revocations never holds it for seconds. With `checked`, a revocation it holds is not checked again.
+*/
+function* readAppStoreSteps(indexBytes, sigBytes, now, heldKey, checked) {
 	if (indexBytes.length > APP_STORE_LIMITS.indexBytes) return {
 		ok: false,
 		reason: "too-large"
 	};
 	const read = readCanonicalJson(indexBytes);
 	if (!read.ok) return read;
-	const checked = checkAppStoreIndex(read.value);
-	if (!checked.ok) return checked;
+	yield;
+	const fields = yield* checkAppStoreFieldsSteps(read.value);
+	if (!fields.ok) return fields;
 	const index = read.value;
 	const statement = readAppSignature(sigBytes);
 	if (!statement.ok) return statement;
@@ -29510,6 +29771,9 @@ function readAppStore(indexBytes, sigBytes, now, heldKey) {
 	};
 	const signed = verifyAppSignature(APP_PREFIXES.store, indexBytes, statement.signature, index.key);
 	if (!signed.ok) return signed;
+	yield;
+	const revocations = yield* checkAppStoreRevocationsSteps(index, checked);
+	if (!revocations.ok) return revocations;
 	if (index.expires > now + APP_STORE_LIMITS.expiresAheadS) return {
 		ok: false,
 		reason: "expires-too-far"
@@ -29600,6 +29864,6 @@ function appStoreDecision(held, read) {
 	return read.digest === held.digest ? "same" : "equivocation";
 }
 //#endregion
-export { SSHSIG_NAMESPACE as $, readAppRevocations as $a, parseImageMeta as $i, engineError as $n, handoffContextProof as $o, pinNumberHolds as $r, HANDOFF_CAPABILITY as $s, PaymentPreflightError as $t, decodeGroupEntryLink as A, pairedReplyAuthor as Aa, withRequestOptions as Ac, IDENTITY_REVOCATION_LABEL as Ai, encodeDnsQuery as An, signalHasVideo as Ao, mergeBeacon as Ar, ENROLL_HELLO as As, didJwsAlg as At, groupWakes as B, statusCardText as Ba, publicKeyFromZ32 as Bc, lastSharedWithMe as Bi, resolveLightningDestination as Bn, HANDOFF_OFFER as Bo, FILE_LIMITS as Br, readEnrollHello as Bs, parseDidSignaturePaste as Bt, COMMUNITY_LIMITS as C, nextReactionNumber as Ca, RelayTransport as Cc, readManifest as Ci, homeserverWebEndpoint as Cn, RTC_CONFIG as Co, COMMUNITY_TOPOLOGY as Cr, readSetUpdate as Cs, DID_DOCUMENT_MAX_BYTES as Ct, decodeCommunityLink as D, readReaction as Da, traceLink as Dc, dialDescriptors as Di, dnsProofName as Dn, callSignalHeardAt as Do, freshHubs as Dr, verifySetUpdate as Ds, checkDidJws as Dt, communityHasFrame as E, reactionIsNewer as Ea, setLinkTraceSink as Ec, capsDescriptors as Ei, decodeDnsResponse as En, callRtcConfig as Eo, doorHubs as Er, signTombstone as Es, DidError as Et, mergeKnocks as F, RUN_RESULTS as Fa, openRelayPayload as Fc, identityRevocationValue as Fi, recordsFromWellKnown as Fn, HANDOFF_ACK as Fo, readBeacon as Fr, enrollDoneFrame as Fs, didWebFileUrl as Ft, COMMUNITY_EDIT_FRAME as G, shownTime as Ga, fromBase64Url as Gc, automaticTransport as Gi, findEndpoint as Gn, HANDOFF_VERIFIED as Go, TypingSender as Gr, OwnInviteError as Gs, didDhtFromPublicKey as Gt, GROUP_REACTED_FRAME as H, claimedTime as Ha, MAX_AVATAR_LENGTH as Hc, emptyProofLedger as Hi, ENDPOINT as Hn, HANDOFF_PIECE_BYTES as Ho, transferStalled as Hr, createDeviceInvite as Hs, staticDidDocument as Ht, readKnocks as I, STATUS_CARD_LIMITS as Ia, parseRelayPayload as Ic, identityStatement as Ii, recordsName as In, HANDOFF_CANCEL as Io, readBeaconHead as Ir, enrollGrantFrame as Is, didWebHost as It, carryMentions as J, appFingerprint as Ja, toZ32 as Jc, DHT_FILE_TOO_LARGE as Ji, parseFedimintRequestPayload as Jn, handoffAttemptFailed as Jo, GROUP_PIN_FRAME as Jr, encodeInviteCode as Js, resolveDidDht as Jt, GROUP_EDIT_FRAME as K, APP_PREFIXES as Ka, randomBytes as Kc, irohDescriptor as Ki, isFederationId as Kn, filePartName as Ko, sanitizeTypingStatus as Kr, createChatInvite as Ks, encodeDidDhtDeactivated as Kt, GROUP_WAKE_FRAME as L, buttonLabelClash as La, createIdentity as Lc, newIdentityBinding as Li, txtValue as Ln, HANDOFF_DONE as Lo, readLobby as Lr, enrollHelloFrame as Ls, normalizeDid as Lt, entryParams as M, replySnippet as Ma, RELAY_PAYLOAD_MAX_BYTES as Mc, IdentityExchange as Mi, nip05RootKey as Mn, HTTP_SERVICE_PROTO as Mo, newerHead as Mr, enrollCancelFrame as Ms, didWebDocumentUrl as Mt, knockIdentity as N, BUTTON_ID as Na, createRelayPayload as Nc, boundVerifiedIdentity as Ni, normalizeDomain as Nn, LEGACY_SERVICES as No, pickHubs as Nr, enrollCancelReason as Ns, didWebFile as Nt, encodeCommunityLink as O, validReactionNumber as Oa, budgetRetryMs as Oc, IDENTITY_MAX_EVIDENCE as Oi, domainTxtRecord as On, extractParamsFromSdp as Oo, lobbyKeys as Or, ENROLL_DONE as Os, checkDidSignature as Ot, knockRecords as P, ITEM_STATES as Pa, newerPacket as Pc, emptyIdentityLedger as Pi, recordsFromTxt as Pn, serviceIdFromName as Po, rankHubs as Pr, enrollDigits as Ps, didWebFileNames as Pt, SSHSIG_MAX_ARMOR as Q, isAppRef as Qa, dhtFileId as Qi, pairedMessageFrame as Qn, handoffContext as Qo, pinIsNewer as Qr, ENROLL_CAPABILITY as Qs, ONCHAIN_PROVIDER as Qt, GroupWakeLimiter as R, checkStatusCard as Ra, identityFromSeed as Rc, receivedIdentityStatus as Ri, wellKnownUrl as Rn, HANDOFF_HAVE as Ro, shouldBeHub as Rr, enrollProofFrame as Rs, parseDid as Rt, sealGroupTyping as S, ReactionWindow as Sa, DEFAULT_RELAYS as Sc, newMailbox as Si, pubkyProofPath as Sn, CALL_SIGNAL_MAX_AGE_MS as So, pickMeshHubs as Sr, SET_UPDATE as Ss, verifyAtprotoRecordProof as St, GROUP_READ_NOTE_COMMUNITY as T, reactionEmoji as Ta, normalizeRelayUrl as Tc, DHT_TEXT_CAPABILITY as Ti, DOMAIN_FILE_MAX_BYTES as Tn, buildSdpFromSignal as To, beaconRecords as Tr, setUpdateFrame as Ts, DID_JWS_MAX_LENGTH as Tt, GROUP_READ_NOTE as U, heardTime as Ua, sanitizeAvatar as Uc, validExternalKey as Ui, cashuRequestPayload as Un, HANDOFF_REQUEST as Uo, TYPING_KINDS as Ur, deviceInviteJoinerParams as Us, strictBase64Url as Ut, parseGroupWakeFrame as V, arrivalKey as Va, verify as Vc, PeerProofs as Vi, decodeBolt11 as Vn, HANDOFF_PAKE as Vo, transferEnded as Vr, verifyEnrollProof as Vs, signingKeys as Vt, GroupSession as W, receivedTimestamp as Wa, bytesEqual as Wc, TRANSPORTS as Wi, fedimintRequestPayload as Wn, HANDOFF_TIMINGS as Wo, TYPING_REFRESH_MS as Wr, readDeviceInvite as Ws, didDhtDocument as Wt, mentionsMember as X, checkAppRevokeStatement as Xa, utf8Encode as Xc, peekDhtMailbox as Xi, INVITE_TAKEN as Xn, handoffBusyFrame as Xo, mayPin as Xr, inviteOwnership as Xs, ETHEREUM_USDT as Xt, parseCommunityEdit as Y, appRef as Ya, utf8Decode as Yc, DHT_MESSAGE_TTL as Yi, GhostLink as Yn, handoffAttemptSucceeded as Yo, PIN_LIMITS as Yr, inviteLink as Ys, signDidDhtPacket as Yt, groupName as Z, isAppKey as Za, DHT_FILE_CAPABILITY as Zi, LIVENESS_PING_MS as Zn, handoffCancelFrame as Zo, nextPinNumber as Zr, DEVICES_CAPABILITY as Zs, EVM_TEST_CHAINS as Zt, readAppBundle as _, forwardedAgain as _a, readTurnPacket as _c, HOLD_CAPABILITY as _i, isPubkyProofFolder as _n, parseLocalTarget as _o, groupSignalFrame as _r, readHandoffPake as _s, isAtprotoDid as _t, planAppUpdate as a, PLAYABLE_AUDIO as aa, newDeviceSetSecret as ac, parseWakeFrame as ai, assertTokenUnits as an, MAX_GROUP_CHAIN as ao, fetchesByItself as ar, handoffOfferFrame as as, verifySshSignature as at, groupTypingEpoch as b, GROUP_REACTION_FRAME as ba, turnKeys as bc, HoldKeys as bi, pubkyProofCapability as bn, decodeControl as bo, mayBeHub as br, sealHandoffPiece as bs, shortAtprotoDid as bt, signAppStore as c, fileMessageText as ca, TURN_PUT_WINDOW_MS as cc, checkPushEndpoint as ci, validatePaymentTarget as cn, verifyCommitSignature as co, readGroupFileMeta as cr, handoffRetryAfter as cs, decodeAnyBitcoinAddress as ct, APP_ICON_PATH as d, parseVideoMeta as da, classifyTurnRead as dc, isAppVersion as di, SPARK_PROVIDER as dn, DHT_POLL_INTERVALS as do, readGroupWantNo as dr, newHandoffId as ds, ATPROTO_PROOF_COLLECTION as dt, readImageMeta as ea, deviceEchoFrame as ec, readPin as ei, SEPOLIA_TEST_USDT as en, signAppObject as eo, engineText as er, handoffDataFrame as es, SshSigError as et, appDigest as f, EDIT_BUFFER_MS as fa, turnPutSummary as fc, APPS_CAPABILITY as fi, sparkAddressKind as fn, EXPECT_PEER_MS as fo, CarriedTransport as fr, readHandoffAck as fs, ATPROTO_PROOF_SCOPE as ft, isAppUrl as g, parseLinkPreview as ga, nextTurnPosition as gc, UPGRADE_CAPABILITY as gi, isPubkyKey as gn, formatLocalTarget as go, SIGNAL_REPLY_MS as gr, readHandoffHello as gs, checkAtprotoProofRecord as gt, checkAppManifest as h, dhtEditId as ha, firstDeviceSetSecret as hc, STATUS_CARD_CAPABILITY as hi, PUBKY_PROOF_MAX_BYTES as hn, GhostlyHttpError as ho, SIGNAL_HOLD_MS as hr, readHandoffHave as hs, atprotoProofRkey as ht, checkAppBeforeRun as i, sanitizeMime as ia, devicePingFrame as ic, newWakeToken as ii, WALLET_NETWORKS as in, GROUP_MEMBER_CAP as io, GROUP_WANT_NO_FRAME as ir, handoffManifestFrames as is, sshSignCommand as it, encodeGroupEntryLink as j, readReply as ja, PacketTooLargeError as jc, IdentityCheckUnavailable as ji, isPublicAddress as jn, emptyLinkRecords as jo, mergeLobby as jr, ENROLL_PROOF as js, didSignedMessages as jt, KNOCK_TTL_MS as k, wireReaction as ka, isDiscoveryBudgetError as kc, IDENTITY_MAX_VALIDITY as ki, domainWellKnownFile as kn, parseCallSignal as ko, lobbyRecords as kr, ENROLL_GRANT as ks, didGhostlyServiceEntry as kt, APP_BUNDLE_LIMITS as l, parseVoiceMeta as la, TURN_RAISE_READ_TIMEOUT_MS as lc, vapidKeysMatch as li, walletNetworkOf as ln, edgeParams as lo, readGroupHave as lr, handoffStreamKey as ls, ATPROTO_DECLARED_SCOPE as lt, assembleAppBundle as m, RateWindow as ma, TURN_MAX as mc, EDIT_CAPABILITY as mi, isBitcoinAddress as mn, presenceSeenAt as mo, SIGNAL_FRESH_MS as mr, readHandoffDone as ms, atprotoProofRecord as mt, appStoreDecision as n, safeBlobType as na, deviceKeyZ32 as nc, WakeLimiter as ni, TEST_USDT_FAUCET_AMOUNT as nn, canonicalJson as no, GROUP_HAVE_FRAME as nr, handoffEphemeral as ns, parseSshSignature as nt, checkAppStoreIndex as o, VOICE_LIMITS as oa, seedSigner as oc, relayRequest as oi, assertWholeSats as on, MEMBER_KEY as oo, groupFileFallback as or, handoffPakeFrame as os, verifyBitcoinMessage as ot, appViewOf as p, EDIT_RATE_WINDOW_MS as pa, TURN_LAST_SEQUENCE as pc, BUTTONS_CAPABILITY as pi, sparkInvoiceDetails as pn, RELAY_POLL_INTERVALS as po, GROUP_SIGNAL_FRAME as pr, readHandoffCancel as ps, atprotoDidMethod as pt, GROUP_EDIT_TEXT_BYTES as q, APP_STATEMENT_LIMITS as qa, toBase64Url as qc, irohRelayUrl as qi, parseCashuRequestPayload as qn, handoffAttemptAllowed as qo, typingActivity as qr, decodeInviteCode as qs, encodeDidDhtPacket as qt, appUpdateDecision as r, sanitizeFileName as ra, deviceLinkPairing as rc, deviceWakeRequest as ri, USDT_PUBLIC_RPC as rn, canonicalJsonBytes as ro, GROUP_WANT_FRAME as rr, handoffHelloFrame as rs, sameSshKey as rt, readAppStore as s, baseMime as sa, webCryptoSigner as sc, wakeRequest as si, formatPaymentAmount as sn, rosterHas as so, isGroupMessageId as sr, handoffReleaseFrame as ss, BitcoinAddressError as st, appRevocationFor as t, formatFileSize as ta, deviceEchoNonce as tc, WAKE_CALL_INTERVAL_MS as ti, SEPOLIA_TEST_USDT_FAUCET as tn, signAppRevocation as to, GROUP_FILE_LIMITS as tr, handoffDigest as ts, parseSshPublicKey as tt, APP_BUNDLE_MAGIC as u, voicePeaksOf as ua, TURN_SETTLE_MS as uc, chatAppId as ui, SPARK_NETWORKS as un, DirectPathWatch as uo, readGroupWant as ur, handoffVersions as us, ATPROTO_FULL_SCOPE as ut, GROUP_TYPING_FRAME as v, readForwarded as va, signTurnPacket as vc, HOLD_DATED_BACK_MS as vi, newPubkyProofFolder as vn, webLocalFetch as vo, readGroupSignal as vr, readHandoffTurnFrame as vs, normalizeAtprotoHandle as vt, CommunitySession as w, queueReaction as wa, currentRelays as wc, CapsExchange as wi, pubkyHomeserverOf as wn, answersOffer as wo, beaconKeys as wr, setAckFrame as ws, DID_FILE_MAX_BYTES as wt, openGroupTyping as x, REACTION_LIMITS as xa, turnName as xc, HoldRefusedError as xi, pubkyProofFile as xn, encodeControl as xo, meshHubs as xr, SET_ACK as xs, AtprotoProofError as xt, GroupTypingBoard as y, COMMUNITY_REACTION_FRAME as ya, signTurnRelease as yc, HOLD_LIMITS as yi, normalizePubkyKey as yn, LIMITS as yo, MESH_HUBS as yr, readHandoffVerified as ys, parseAtprotoDidDocument as yt, groupWakeFrame as z, sameButtonText as za, identityFromSeedB64 as zc, revokesIdentity as zi, requestLnurlInvoice as zn, HANDOFF_HELLO as zo, ChatFiles as zr, readEnrollGrant as zs, parseDidDocument as zt };
+export { groupName as $, APP_PREFIXES as $a, sanitizeAvatar as $c, peekDhtMailbox as $i, readGroupWantNo as $n, HANDOFF_REQUEST as $o, isAppVersion as $r, deviceInviteJoinerParams as $s, EVM_TEST_CHAINS as $t, encodeCommunityLink as A, readReaction as Aa, turnKeys as Ac, dialDescriptors as Ai, ENDPOINT as An, decodeControl as Ao, transferStalled as Ar, sealHandoffPiece as As, checkDidSignature as At, GroupWakeLimiter as B, RUN_RESULTS as Ba, withRequestOptions as Bc, newIdentityBinding as Bi, pairedMessageFrame as Bn, signalHasVideo as Bo, pinIsNewer as Br, ENROLL_HELLO as Bs, parseDid as Bt, openGroupTyping as C, GROUP_REACTION_FRAME as Ca, TURN_LAST_SEQUENCE as Cc, recordsFromWellKnown as Ci, pubkyProofFile as Cn, RELAY_POLL_INTERVALS as Co, readBeacon as Cr, readHandoffCancel as Cs, AtprotoProofError as Ct, GROUP_READ_NOTE_COMMUNITY as D, queueReaction as Da, readTurnPacket as Dc, CapsExchange as Di, requestLnurlInvoice as Dn, parseLocalTarget as Do, ChatFiles as Dr, readHandoffPake as Ds, DID_JWS_MAX_LENGTH as Dt, CommunitySession as E, nextReactionNumber as Ea, nextTurnPosition as Ec, wellKnownUrl as Ei, pubkyHomeserverOf as En, formatLocalTarget as Eo, shouldBeHub as Er, readHandoffHello as Es, DID_FILE_MAX_BYTES as Et, knockIdentity as F, replySnippet as Fa, normalizeRelayUrl as Fc, IdentityExchange as Fi, parseCashuRequestPayload as Fn, buildSdpFromSignal as Fo, typingActivity as Fr, setUpdateFrame as Fs, didWebFile as Ft, GROUP_READ_NOTE as G, checkStatusCard as Ga, openRelayPayload as Gc, emptyProofLedger as Gi, GROUP_WANT_FRAME as Gn, HANDOFF_ACK as Go, deviceWakeRequest as Gr, enrollDoneFrame as Gs, strictBase64Url as Gt, groupWakes as H, buttonLabelClash as Ha, RELAY_PAYLOAD_MAX_BYTES as Hc, revokesIdentity as Hi, engineText as Hn, HTTP_SERVICE_PROTO as Ho, readPin as Hr, enrollCancelFrame as Hs, parseDidSignaturePaste as Ht, knockRecords as I, BUTTON_ID as Ia, setLinkTraceSink as Ic, boundVerifiedIdentity as Ii, parseFedimintRequestPayload as In, callRtcConfig as Io, GROUP_PIN_FRAME as Ir, signTombstone as Is, didWebFileNames as It, GROUP_EDIT_FRAME as J, arrivalKey as Ja, identityFromSeed as Jc, automaticTransport as Ji, groupFileFallback as Jn, HANDOFF_HAVE as Jo, relayRequest as Jr, enrollProofFrame as Js, encodeDidDhtDeactivated as Jt, GroupSession as K, sameButtonText as Ka, parseRelayPayload as Kc, validExternalKey as Ki, GROUP_WANT_NO_FRAME as Kn, HANDOFF_CANCEL as Ko, newWakeToken as Kr, enrollGrantFrame as Ks, didDhtDocument as Kt, mergeKnocks as L, ITEM_STATES as La, traceLink as Lc, emptyIdentityLedger as Li, GhostLink as Ln, callSignalHeardAt as Lo, PIN_LIMITS as Lr, verifySetUpdate as Ls, didWebFileUrl as Lt, decodeGroupEntryLink as M, wireReaction as Ma, DEFAULT_RELAYS as Mc, IDENTITY_MAX_VALIDITY as Mi, fedimintRequestPayload as Mn, CALL_SIGNAL_MAX_AGE_MS as Mo, TYPING_REFRESH_MS as Mr, SET_UPDATE as Ms, didJwsAlg as Mt, encodeGroupEntryLink as N, pairedReplyAuthor as Na, RelayTransport as Nc, IDENTITY_REVOCATION_LABEL as Ni, findEndpoint as Nn, RTC_CONFIG as No, TypingSender as Nr, readSetUpdate as Ns, didSignedMessages as Nt, communityHasFrame as O, reactionEmoji as Oa, signTurnPacket as Oc, DHT_TEXT_CAPABILITY as Oi, resolveLightningDestination as On, webLocalFetch as Oo, FILE_LIMITS as Or, readHandoffTurnFrame as Os, DidError as Ot, entryParams as P, readReply as Pa, currentRelays as Pc, IdentityCheckUnavailable as Pi, isFederationId as Pn, answersOffer as Po, sanitizeTypingStatus as Pr, setAckFrame as Ps, didWebDocumentUrl as Pt, mentionsMember as Q, shownTime as Qa, MAX_AVATAR_LENGTH as Qc, DHT_MESSAGE_TTL as Qi, readGroupWant as Qn, HANDOFF_PIECE_BYTES as Qo, chatAppId as Qr, createDeviceInvite as Qs, ETHEREUM_USDT as Qt, readKnocks as R, PR_CHECKS as Ra, budgetRetryMs as Rc, identityRevocationValue as Ri, INVITE_TAKEN as Rn, extractParamsFromSdp as Ro, mayPin as Rr, ENROLL_DONE as Rs, didWebHost as Rt, groupTypingEpoch as S, COMMUNITY_REACTION_FRAME as Sa, turnPutSummary as Sc, recordsFromTxt as Si, pubkyProofCapability as Sn, EXPECT_PEER_MS as So, rankHubs as Sr, readHandoffAck as Ss, shortAtprotoDid as St, COMMUNITY_LIMITS as T, ReactionWindow as Ta, firstDeviceSetSecret as Tc, txtValue as Ti, homeserverWebEndpoint as Tn, GhostlyHttpError as To, readLobby as Tr, readHandoffHave as Ts, DID_DOCUMENT_MAX_BYTES as Tt, parseGroupWakeFrame as U, cardLine as Ua, createRelayPayload as Uc, lastSharedWithMe as Ui, GROUP_FILE_LIMITS as Un, LEGACY_SERVICES as Uo, WAKE_CALL_INTERVAL_MS as Ur, enrollCancelReason as Us, signingKeys as Ut, groupWakeFrame as V, STATUS_CARD_LIMITS as Va, PacketTooLargeError as Vc, receivedIdentityStatus as Vi, engineError as Vn, emptyLinkRecords as Vo, pinNumberHolds as Vr, ENROLL_PROOF as Vs, parseDidDocument as Vt, GROUP_REACTED_FRAME as W, cardUrl as Wa, newerPacket as Wc, PeerProofs as Wi, GROUP_HAVE_FRAME as Wn, serviceIdFromName as Wo, WakeLimiter as Wr, enrollDigits as Ws, staticDidDocument as Wt, carryMentions as X, heardTime as Xa, publicKeyFromZ32 as Xc, irohRelayUrl as Xi, readGroupFileMeta as Xn, HANDOFF_OFFER as Xo, checkPushEndpoint as Xr, readEnrollHello as Xs, resolveDidDht as Xt, GROUP_EDIT_TEXT_BYTES as Y, claimedTime as Ya, identityFromSeedB64 as Yc, irohDescriptor as Yi, isGroupMessageId as Yn, HANDOFF_HELLO as Yo, wakeRequest as Yr, readEnrollGrant as Ys, encodeDidDhtPacket as Yt, parseCommunityEdit as Z, receivedTimestamp as Za, verify as Zc, DHT_FILE_TOO_LARGE as Zi, readGroupHave as Zn, HANDOFF_PAKE as Zo, vapidKeysMatch as Zr, verifyEnrollProof as Zs, signDidDhtPacket as Zt, checkAppManifest as _, RateWindow as _a, webCryptoSigner as _c, domainWellKnownFile as _i, PUBKY_PROOF_MAX_BYTES as _n, rosterHas as _o, lobbyRecords as _r, handoffReleaseFrame as _s, atprotoProofRkey as _t, planAppUpdate as a, safeBlobType as aa, inviteLink as ac, HOLD_CAPABILITY as ai, utf8Decode as al, USDT_PUBLIC_RPC as an, isAppRef as ao, groupSignalFrame as ar, handoffAttemptSucceeded as as, sameSshKey as at, GROUP_TYPING_FRAME as b, forwardedAgain as ba, TURN_SETTLE_MS as bc, nip05RootKey as bi, newPubkyProofFolder as bn, DirectPathWatch as bo, newerHead as br, handoffVersions as bs, normalizeAtprotoHandle as bt, readAppStore as c, PLAYABLE_AUDIO as ca, ENROLL_CAPABILITY as cc, HoldKeys as ci, assertWholeSats as cn, signAppObject as co, mayBeHub as cr, handoffContext as cs, verifyBitcoinMessage as ct, APP_BUNDLE_LIMITS as d, fileMessageText as da, deviceEchoNonce as dc, newMailbox as di, walletNetworkOf as dn, canonicalJsonBytes as do, COMMUNITY_TOPOLOGY as dr, handoffDigest as ds, ATPROTO_DECLARED_SCOPE as dt, DHT_FILE_CAPABILITY as ea, readDeviceInvite as ec, APPS_CAPABILITY as ei, bytesEqual as el, ONCHAIN_PROVIDER as en, APP_STATEMENT_LIMITS as eo, CarriedTransport as er, HANDOFF_TIMINGS as es, SSHSIG_MAX_ARMOR as et, APP_BUNDLE_MAGIC as f, parseVoiceMeta as fa, deviceKeyZ32 as fc, readManifest as fi, SPARK_NETWORKS as fn, readCanonicalJson as fo, beaconKeys as fr, handoffEphemeral as fs, ATPROTO_FULL_SCOPE as ft, assembleAppBundle as g, EDIT_RATE_WINDOW_MS as ga, seedSigner as gc, domainTxtRecord as gi, isBitcoinAddress as gn, commitHash as go, lobbyKeys as gr, handoffPakeFrame as gs, atprotoProofRecord as gt, appViewOf as h, EDIT_BUFFER_MS as ha, newDeviceSetSecret as hc, dnsProofName as hi, sparkInvoiceDetails as hn, MEMBER_KEY as ho, freshHubs as hr, handoffOfferFrame as hs, atprotoDidMethod as ht, checkAppBeforeRun as i, formatFileSize as ia, encodeInviteCode as ic, UPGRADE_CAPABILITY as ii, toZ32 as il, TEST_USDT_FAUCET_AMOUNT as in, isAppKey as io, SIGNAL_REPLY_MS as ir, handoffAttemptFailed as is, parseSshSignature as it, KNOCK_TTL_MS as j, validReactionNumber as ja, turnName as jc, IDENTITY_MAX_EVIDENCE as ji, cashuRequestPayload as jn, encodeControl as jo, TYPING_KINDS as jr, SET_ACK as js, didGhostlyServiceEntry as jt, decodeCommunityLink as k, reactionIsNewer as ka, signTurnRelease as kc, capsDescriptors as ki, decodeBolt11 as kn, LIMITS as ko, transferEnded as kr, readHandoffVerified as ks, checkDidJws as kt, readAppStoreSteps as l, VOICE_LIMITS as la, HANDOFF_CAPABILITY as lc, HoldRefusedError as li, formatPaymentAmount as ln, signAppRevocation as lo, meshHubs as lr, handoffContextProof as ls, BitcoinAddressError as lt, appDigest as m, parseVideoMeta as ma, devicePingFrame as mc, decodeDnsResponse as mi, sparkAddressKind as mn, MAX_GROUP_CHAIN as mo, doorHubs as mr, handoffManifestFrames as ms, ATPROTO_PROOF_SCOPE as mt, appStoreDecision as n, parseImageMeta as na, createChatInvite as nc, EDIT_CAPABILITY as ni, randomBytes as nl, SEPOLIA_TEST_USDT as nn, appRef as no, SIGNAL_FRESH_MS as nr, filePartName as ns, SshSigError as nt, APP_STORE_LIMITS as o, sanitizeFileName as oa, inviteOwnership as oc, HOLD_DATED_BACK_MS as oi, utf8Encode as ol, WALLET_NETWORKS as on, readAppRevocation as oo, readGroupSignal as or, handoffBusyFrame as os, sshSignCommand as ot, APP_ICON_PATH as p, voicePeaksOf as pa, deviceLinkPairing as pc, DOMAIN_FILE_MAX_BYTES as pi, SPARK_PROVIDER as pn, GROUP_MEMBER_CAP as po, beaconRecords as pr, handoffHelloFrame as ps, ATPROTO_PROOF_COLLECTION as pt, COMMUNITY_EDIT_FRAME as q, statusCardText as qa, createIdentity as qc, TRANSPORTS as qi, fetchesByItself as qn, HANDOFF_DONE as qo, parseWakeFrame as qr, enrollHelloFrame as qs, didDhtFromPublicKey as qt, appUpdateDecision as r, readImageMeta as ra, decodeInviteCode as rc, STATUS_CARD_CAPABILITY as ri, toBase64Url as rl, SEPOLIA_TEST_USDT_FAUCET as rn, checkAppRevokeStatement as ro, SIGNAL_HOLD_MS as rr, handoffAttemptAllowed as rs, parseSshPublicKey as rt, checkAppStoreIndex as s, sanitizeMime as sa, DEVICES_CAPABILITY as sc, HOLD_LIMITS as si, assertTokenUnits as sn, readAppRevocations as so, MESH_HUBS as sr, handoffCancelFrame as ss, verifySshSignature as st, appRevocationFor as t, dhtFileId as ta, OwnInviteError as tc, BUTTONS_CAPABILITY as ti, fromBase64Url as tl, PaymentPreflightError as tn, appFingerprint as to, GROUP_SIGNAL_FRAME as tr, HANDOFF_VERIFIED as ts, SSHSIG_NAMESPACE as tt, signAppStore as u, baseMime as ua, deviceEchoFrame as uc, isHoldUrl as ui, validatePaymentTarget as un, canonicalJson as uo, pickMeshHubs as ur, handoffDataFrame as us, decodeAnyBitcoinAddress as ut, isAppUrl as v, dhtEditId as va, TURN_PUT_WINDOW_MS as vc, encodeDnsQuery as vi, isPubkyKey as vn, verifyCommitSignature as vo, mergeBeacon as vr, handoffRetryAfter as vs, checkAtprotoProofRecord as vt, sealGroupTyping as w, REACTION_LIMITS as wa, TURN_MAX as wc, recordsName as wi, pubkyProofPath as wn, presenceSeenAt as wo, readBeaconHead as wr, readHandoffDone as ws, verifyAtprotoRecordProof as wt, GroupTypingBoard as x, readForwarded as xa, classifyTurnRead as xc, normalizeDomain as xi, normalizePubkyKey as xn, DHT_POLL_INTERVALS as xo, pickHubs as xr, newHandoffId as xs, parseAtprotoDidDocument as xt, readAppBundle as y, parseLinkPreview as ya, TURN_RAISE_READ_TIMEOUT_MS as yc, isPublicAddress as yi, isPubkyProofFolder as yn, edgeParams as yo, mergeLobby as yr, handoffStreamKey as ys, isAtprotoDid as yt, GROUP_WAKE_FRAME as z, PR_STATES as za, isDiscoveryBudgetError as zc, identityStatement as zi, LIVENESS_PING_MS as zn, parseCallSignal as zo, nextPinNumber as zr, ENROLL_GRANT as zs, normalizeDid as zt };
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=src-BMUcYQ7b.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=src-XzcHzneo.js.map