@getmarrow/mcp 3.9.102 → 3.9.106

package/dist/normalized-action.js

@@ -5,12 +5,13 @@ exports.looksLikeKey = looksLikeKey;
 exports.classifySecretName = classifySecretName;
 exports.normalizeShellCommand = normalizeShellCommand;
 exports.deployCommandText = deployCommandText;
+exports.shellToolRunOptionsKey = shellToolRunOptionsKey;
 exports.normalizedHookAction = normalizedHookAction;
 const node_crypto_1 = require("node:crypto");
 const node_os_1 = require("node:os");
 const hook_tool_policy_1 = require("./hook-tool-policy");
 const SECRET = '[secret]';
-const HASH_VERSION = 'marrow-normalized-action-v2';
+const HASH_VERSION = 'marrow-normalized-action-v3';
 const EDIT_TOOLS = /^(?:edit|write|multiedit|apply_patch|notebookedit|replace|write_file|edit_file|delete_file|search_replace|delete|create_file)$/i;
 const MAX_DEPTH = 3;
 /** A word, data text or input string longer than this is not scanned: it is withheld and the action marked truncated. */
@@ -27,8 +28,16 @@ const DEFAULT_NORMALIZE_MS = 1_000;
 /** Thrown when normalization runs out of its budget: the caller sends a truncated placeholder instead. */
 class NormalizationLimit extends Error {
 }
-function newExactness(deadline = Date.now() + DEFAULT_NORMALIZE_MS) {
-    return { truncated: false, budget: { scanned: 0, deadline } };
+function newExactness(deadline = Date.now() + DEFAULT_NORMALIZE_MS, exact = false) {
+    return { truncated: false, budget: { scanned: 0, deadline }, exact, sigs: [] };
+}
+/**
+ * A value withheld only because it MAY be a secret (it may also be an id, a commit or a name that decides the
+ * action): replaced and the action marked truncated; the exact pass keeps it as it is.
+ */
+function withheld(state, original, replacement = SECRET) {
+    state.truncated = true; // exact: kept
+    return state.exact ? original : replacement;
 }
 /** Counts text about to be scanned against the shared budget; past it, normalization stops. */
 function spend(state, chars) {
@@ -44,6 +53,8 @@ function sha256(text) {
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 const KNOWN_KEY_PREFIX = /^(?:AKIA|ASIA|AGPA|AIDA|AROA)[0-9A-Z]{12,}$|^(?:ghp|gho|ghu|ghs|ghr)_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}$|^github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}$|^(?:sk|pk|rk)[-_](?:live|test|proj|ant)?[-_]?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}$|^xox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}$|^AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{30,}$|^glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}$|^npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}$|^mrw_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}$|^cfut_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}$|^eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}$/;
 const PEM = /-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*(?:PRIVATE KEY|CERTIFICATE)-----/;
+/** Known formats that only name a key or are public (AWS key, user, group and role ids; publishable keys): the exact pass keeps them. */
+const PUBLIC_KNOWN_KEY = /^(?:AKIA|ASIA|AGPA|AIDA|AROA)[0-9A-Z]{12,}$|^pk[-_]/;
 /** A value shaped like a key, token or password hash (mixed-case random text, long hex, known prefixes). */
 function looksLikeKey(value) {
     const text = value.trim();
@@ -72,18 +83,19 @@ function redactKeyShapes(text, state) {
     const whole = text.trim();
     if (whole && !/\s/.test(whole) && looksLikeKey(whole)) {
         if (!KNOWN_KEY_PREFIX.test(whole) && !PEM.test(whole))
-            state.truncated = true;
-        return SECRET;
+            return withheld(state, text);
+        return state.exact && PUBLIC_KNOWN_KEY.test(whole) ? text : SECRET;
     }
     if (PEM.test(text)) {
-        return text.replace(/-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*-----[\s\S]*?(?:-----END [A-Z ]*-----|$)/g, SECRET);
+        // The exact pass replaces only a private key block; a certificate or a public key block is kept.
+        return text.replace(/-----BEGIN ([A-Z ]*)-----[\s\S]*?(?:-----END [A-Z ]*-----|$)/g, (block, label) => (state.exact && !/PRIVATE/.test(label) ? block : SECRET));
     }
     return text.split(KEY_SPLIT).map((part) => {
         if (!looksLikeKey(part))
             return part;
         if (!KNOWN_KEY_PREFIX.test(part))
-            state.truncated = true;
-        return SECRET;
+            return withheld(state, part);
+        return state.exact && PUBLIC_KNOWN_KEY.test(part) ? part : SECRET;
     }).join('');
 }
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -129,6 +141,24 @@ function holdsSecret(name) {
     const kind = classifySecretName(name);
     return kind === 'credential' || kind === 'ambiguous';
 }
+/** A name part that ends in a credential word (DB_PASSWORD, PGPASSWORD, GITHUB_TOKEN, ADMINPASS), not one that only starts with it. */
+const CERTAIN_END = /(?:password|passwd|passphrase|passcode|secret|token|apikey|accesskey|privatekey|signingkey|masterkey|encryptionkey|accountkey|credential|creds|bearer|cookie|authorization|requirepass|masterauth|storepass|keypass|newpass|oldpass|pwd)$/;
+/**
+ * classifySecretName, except that the exact pass (exact_hmac, never sent) reads a credential name as certain only
+ * when a part ends in a credential word, is one (otp, pat, jwt), or the name holds a pair (api_key): a value under
+ * `passwordless`, `SECRETNAME`, `TOKENID`, `max_tokens` or `credentials` may name or count something that decides
+ * the action, so the exact pass keeps it (as an ambiguous value). Pass 1 is unchanged.
+ */
+function nameClass(name, state) {
+    const kind = classifySecretName(name);
+    if (!state.exact || kind !== 'credential')
+        return kind;
+    const parts = nameParts(name);
+    const joined = parts.join('_');
+    const pair = CREDENTIAL_PAIRS.some((item) => joined === item || joined.startsWith(`${item}_`) || joined.endsWith(`_${item}`) || joined.includes(`_${item}_`));
+    const certain = pair || parts.some((part) => CREDENTIAL_WORDS.has(part) || CERTAIN_END.test(part) || (holdsPass(part) && part.endsWith('pass')));
+    return certain ? 'credential' : 'ambiguous';
+}
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Secrets inside a text
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -195,10 +225,10 @@ function cutCredential(value, state) {
     const at = credentialValueEnd(value, 0, true);
     if (at >= value.length) {
         if (holdsMoreThanCredential(value))
-            state.truncated = true;
+            return withheld(state, value);
         return SECRET;
     }
-    state.truncated = true;
+    state.truncated = true; // exact: certain (the credential before the field; the rest is scanned in the same pass)
     return SECRET + redactText(value.slice(at), state);
 }
 /** One-value auth header (`Authorization: Bearer X`, `X-Api-Key: K`): the whole value is the credential. */
@@ -209,21 +239,29 @@ const SINGLE_VALUE_HEADER = /^[^:\s]{1,128}:[ \t]*(?:(?:Bearer|Basic|Token|Bot)[
  * names mark the action truncated) and key-shaped values.
  */
 function redactText(text, state) {
-    if (text.length > exports.MAX_SCAN_CHARS) {
-        state.truncated = true;
-        return SECRET;
-    }
+    // Not scanned (the exact pass keeps it as it is).
+    if (text.length > exports.MAX_SCAN_CHARS)
+        return withheld(state, text);
     spend(state, text.length);
     // A short word without a separator cannot hold any of these (keys need 12 or more characters).
     if (text.length < 12 && !/[:=?&@\s]/.test(text))
         return text;
-    let out = text.replace(URL_CREDENTIALS, (_match, scheme, user) => `${scheme}${user}:${SECRET}@`);
-    out = replaceValuesAfter(out, AUTH_SCHEME);
-    out = replaceValuesAfter(out, URL_CODE);
+    // M2-R1: a `#` or `?` in the password ends the URL authority for URL parsers (`https://deploy:443#@host`
+    // goes to host `deploy`), while libpq, mysql and redis clients take the whole span as the password. It is
+    // hidden either way, but it is not a certain credential: the action is marked truncated and the exact pass
+    // keeps the span, so it never shares a key with `https://deploy:<pw>@host`.
+    let out = text.replace(URL_CREDENTIALS, (_match, scheme, user, password) => (`${scheme}${user}:${/[#?]/.test(password) ? withheld(state, password) : SECRET}@`));
+    // The exact pass keeps a `Token`/`Bot` value that is not key-shaped (`git commit -m "Token rotation"`).
+    out = replaceValuesAfter(out, AUTH_SCHEME, state.exact ? (scheme, value) => /^(?:Token|Bot)$/.test(scheme) && !looksLikeKey(value) : null);
+    // The exact pass keeps a URL `code` value: it may be an OAuth code, but it may as well be a country or product code.
+    out = replaceValuesAfter(out, URL_CODE, state.exact ? () => true : null);
     return redactKeyShapes(redactAssignments(out, state), state);
 }
-/** Replaces the value after each match of `pattern` (an auth scheme, an OAuth code), ended by the shared rule. */
-function replaceValuesAfter(text, pattern) {
+/**
+ * Replaces the value after each match of `pattern` (an auth scheme, an OAuth code), ended by the shared rule.
+ * `keep` (exact pass only): a value it returns true for stays as it is.
+ */
+function replaceValuesAfter(text, pattern, keep) {
     pattern.lastIndex = 0;
     let out = '';
     let copied = 0;
@@ -234,6 +272,10 @@ function replaceValuesAfter(text, pattern) {
             pattern.lastIndex = start + 1;
             continue;
         }
+        if (keep && keep(match[1], text.slice(start, end))) {
+            pattern.lastIndex = end;
+            continue;
+        }
         out += text.slice(copied, start) + SECRET;
         copied = end;
         pattern.lastIndex = end;
@@ -254,11 +296,10 @@ function redactAssignments(text, state) {
     let matches = 0;
     for (let match = pattern.exec(text); match; match = pattern.exec(text)) {
         matches += 1;
-        if (matches > MAX_ASSIGNMENTS) {
-            state.truncated = true;
-            return SECRET;
-        }
-        const kind = classifySecretName(match[2]);
+        // Too many names to scan: withheld (the exact pass keeps the text as it is).
+        if (matches > MAX_ASSIGNMENTS)
+            return withheld(state, text);
+        const kind = nameClass(match[2], state);
         if (kind !== 'credential' && kind !== 'ambiguous')
             continue;
         let start = match.index + match[0].length;
@@ -275,34 +316,63 @@ function redactAssignments(text, state) {
             continue;
         const value = text.slice(start, end);
         if (!value.startsWith('[secret') && !value.startsWith('[data:')) {
-            if (kind === 'ambiguous' || holdsMoreThanCredential(value))
-                state.truncated = true;
-            out += text.slice(copied, start) + SECRET;
+            const replacement = kind === 'ambiguous' || holdsMoreThanCredential(value) ? withheld(state, value) : SECRET;
+            out += text.slice(copied, start) + replacement;
             copied = end;
         }
         pattern.lastIndex = end;
     }
     return out + text.slice(copied);
 }
-/** Whether a text carries anything secret-shaped (it is then withheld, never hashed). */
-function secretShaped(text, state) {
-    const probe = { truncated: false, budget: state.budget };
-    return redactText(text, probe) !== text;
-}
 /**
- * Data a command reads: its SHA-256 in the hashed form, or `[secret]` and
- * truncated when it feeds a secrets command or file or looks secret.
+ * Data a command reads: its SHA-256 in the hashed form; `[secret]` and
+ * truncated when it feeds a secrets command or file (all of it is the
+ * secret); the SHA-256 of its redacted form and truncated when it looks secret.
  */
-function dataMarker(text, feedsSecrets, state) {
-    if (feedsSecrets || secretShaped(text, state)) {
-        state.truncated = true;
+function dataMarker(text, feedsSecrets, state, words = null) {
+    if (state.exact) {
+        // The exact pass: only the certain credentials inside the data are replaced and the rest is hashed, also for
+        // data a secrets command or file reads (a vault policy, an authorized_keys line, a kubeconfig differ outside
+        // any secret), so data that differs outside a certain credential never shares exact material.
+        const probe = { truncated: false, budget: state.budget, exact: true, sigs: [] };
+        return `[data:${sha256(`${HASH_VERSION}\nexact-data\n${redactText(text, probe)}`)}]`;
+    }
+    if (feedsSecrets) {
+        state.truncated = true; // exact: kept (hashed above, certain credentials replaced)
         return SECRET;
     }
-    return `[data:${sha256(`${HASH_VERSION}\ndata\n${text}`)}]`;
+    // Secret-shaped data (`'{"api_key":"S","env":"production"}'`): the secrets are
+    // replaced and the rest is hashed, so data that differs outside a secret gives
+    // a different key, data that differs only in a secret the same one. Withheld:
+    // the action is truncated and never binds an approval.
+    const probe = { truncated: false, budget: state.budget, exact: false, sigs: [] };
+    const redacted = redactText(text, probe);
+    if (redacted !== text) {
+        state.truncated = true; // exact: kept (hashed above, certain credentials replaced)
+        return `[secret-data:${sha256(`${HASH_VERSION}\nsecret-data\n${redacted}`)}]`;
+    }
+    // Printed words (`words`): hashed as their list, so word boundaries count.
+    return words === null ? `[data:${sha256(`${HASH_VERSION}\ndata\n${text}`)}]` : `[data:${sha256(`${HASH_VERSION}\nwords\n${JSON.stringify(words)}`)}]`;
+}
+/**
+ * Text echoed or printed into a pipe or a file: probed for secrets as the shell joins it (one space), as
+ * before; hashed as the list of printed words, so word boundaries and flags count (`echo -n X` is not
+ * `echo "-n X"`, `printf '%s\n' a b` is not `printf '%s\n' 'a b'`). The exact pass replaces the certain
+ * credentials word by word and keeps the boundaries too.
+ */
+function printedData(words, feedsSecrets, state) {
+    if (state.exact) {
+        const probe = { truncated: false, budget: state.budget, exact: true, sigs: [] };
+        return `[data:${sha256(`${HASH_VERSION}\nexact-words\n${JSON.stringify(words.map((word) => redactText(word, probe)))}`)}]`;
+    }
+    return dataMarker(words.join(' '), feedsSecrets, state, words);
 }
 const OPERATORS = ['<<<', '&&', '||', '|&', '>>', '<<', ';;', '|', '&', ';', '<', '>', '(', ')', '\n'];
-/** Splits a command into words and operators, honoring quotes and escapes (an approximation of the shell). */
-function tokenize(command) {
+/**
+ * Splits a command into words and operators, honoring quotes and escapes (an approximation of the shell).
+ * `crIsWord` (the exact pass): a CR is a word character, as it is to the shell.
+ */
+function tokenize(command, crIsWord = false) {
     const tokens = [];
     let current = '';
     let started = false;
@@ -328,7 +398,7 @@ function tokenize(command) {
             i = end < 0 ? command.length : end;
             continue;
         }
-        if (ch === ' ' || ch === '\t' || ch === '\r') {
+        if (ch === ' ' || ch === '\t' || (ch === '\r' && !crIsWord)) {
             push();
             continue;
         }
@@ -489,10 +559,10 @@ function takesSecrets(words, parsed) {
     return parsed.targets.some(isSecretFile);
 }
 function assignedValue(name, value, state) {
-    const kind = classifySecretName(name);
+    const kind = nameClass(name, state);
     if (kind === 'credential' || kind === 'ambiguous') {
         if (kind === 'ambiguous' || holdsMoreThanCredential(value))
-            state.truncated = true;
+            return `${name}=${withheld(state, state.exact ? dataMarker(value, false, state) : value)}`;
         return `${name}=${SECRET}`;
     }
     return value ? `${name}=${dataMarker(value, false, state)}` : `${name}=`;
@@ -539,7 +609,7 @@ function redactSegment(words, ctx) {
     if ((program === 'echo' || program === 'printf') && (ctx.pipedOut || targets.length)) {
         const printed = parsed.plain;
         if (printed.length) {
-            out[printed[0]] = dataMarker(printed.map((i) => out[i]).join(' '), downstreamTakes || secretTarget, state);
+            out[printed[0]] = printedData(printed.map((i) => out[i]), downstreamTakes || secretTarget, state);
             handled.add(printed[0]);
             for (const i of printed.slice(1))
                 removed.add(i);
@@ -560,8 +630,7 @@ function redactSegment(words, ctx) {
     // Commands inside the command: `bash -c CMD`, `ssh HOST CMD …`, `eval …`, `su -c CMD`.
     const embed = (at, text, also = []) => {
         if (ctx.depth >= MAX_DEPTH) {
-            out[at] = SECRET;
-            state.truncated = true;
+            out[at] = withheld(state, text);
         }
         else {
             out[at] = normalizeInner(text, state, ctx.depth + 1).text;
@@ -620,23 +689,31 @@ function redactSegment(words, ctx) {
     const envStore = storeContext(lowered.slice(0, 4));
     const stem = programStem(program);
     const redactAt = (i, ambiguous = false) => {
-        if (ambiguous || holdsMoreThanCredential(out[i]))
-            state.truncated = true;
-        out[i] = SECRET;
+        out[i] = ambiguous || holdsMoreThanCredential(out[i]) ? withheld(state, out[i]) : SECRET;
         handled.add(i);
     };
     // An auth header: a one-value header is the credential; any other (`Cookie: a=1; env=prod`)
     // keeps its other fields, with the credentials inside replaced.
     const redactHeaderValue = (header) => {
         if (SINGLE_VALUE_HEADER.test(header)) {
-            if (holdsMoreThanCredential(header.replace(/^[^:]*:/, '')))
-                state.truncated = true;
-            return SECRET;
+            const colon = header.indexOf(':');
+            const value = header.slice(colon + 1);
+            if (holdsMoreThanCredential(value))
+                return withheld(state, header);
+            if (!state.exact)
+                return SECRET;
+            // The exact pass: the value of a credential header (or a Bearer/Basic value) is certain; any other
+            // one-value header (`X-Idempotency-Key: k`) and the header name are kept.
+            const name = header.slice(0, colon);
+            if (nameClass(name, state) !== 'credential' && !/^[ \t]*(?:Bearer|Basic)[ \t]/i.test(value))
+                return header;
+            // Basic USER:PASSWORD names who acts, as `curl -u` does: only the password is certain.
+            const basic = /^[ \t]*Basic[ \t]+([A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,2})[ \t]*$/i.exec(value);
+            const decoded = basic ? Buffer.from(basic[1], 'base64').toString('latin1') : '';
+            return /^[\x20-\x7e]*:/.test(decoded) ? `${name}:Basic ${JSON.stringify(decoded.slice(0, decoded.indexOf(':')))}:${SECRET}` : `${name}:${SECRET}`;
         }
         const redacted = redactText(header, state);
-        if (redacted === header)
-            state.truncated = true;
-        return redacted === header ? SECRET : redacted;
+        return redacted === header ? withheld(state, header) : redacted;
     };
     // curl -b/--cookie NAME=VALUE[; …] is a Cookie header (without `=` it names a cookie file).
     const redactCookieValue = (value) => {
@@ -651,7 +728,11 @@ function redactSegment(words, ctx) {
             return redactText(`${name}=${value}`, state);
         return `${name}=${cutCredential(value, state)}`;
     };
-    // A program named for a secret (set-password.sh): its arguments cannot be told apart.
+    // The exact pass: `curl -u USER:PASSWORD` names who acts; only the password is certain.
+    const exactUser = (value) => (value.includes(':') ? `${value.slice(0, value.indexOf(':'))}:${SECRET}` : value);
+    // The exact pass: openssl `pass:X` and a bare value are the password; `env:`, `file:`, `fd:` name where it is.
+    const exactOpensslPass = (value) => (/^(?:env|file|fd):/.test(value) ? value : /^pass:/.test(value) ? `pass:${SECRET}` : SECRET);
+    // A program named for a secret (set-password.sh): its arguments cannot be told apart (the exact pass keeps them).
     if (!SECRET_PROGRAMS.has(stem) && classifySecretName(stem) === 'credential') {
         for (const i of positionals)
             redactAt(i, true);
@@ -666,12 +747,14 @@ function redactSegment(words, ctx) {
             const j = args[k + 1];
             return j !== undefined && !handled.has(j) && !out[j].startsWith('-') ? j : null;
         };
-        const next = (ambiguous = false) => {
+        // `exactForm` (exact pass only): the certain part of a value that also names something (a user, a file).
+        const next = (ambiguous = false, exactForm = null) => {
             const j = valueAt();
             if (j !== null) {
                 if (ambiguous)
-                    state.truncated = true;
-                out[j] = cutCredential(out[j], state);
+                    out[j] = state.exact ? withheld(state, out[j]) : withheld(state, out[j], cutCredential(out[j], state));
+                else
+                    out[j] = state.exact && exactForm ? exactForm(out[j]) : cutCredential(out[j], state);
                 handled.add(j);
                 k += 1;
             }
@@ -686,7 +769,7 @@ function redactSegment(words, ctx) {
             }
         };
         const byName = (name) => {
-            const kind = classifySecretName(name);
+            const kind = nameClass(name, state);
             if (kind === 'credential')
                 next();
             else if (kind === 'ambiguous')
@@ -697,13 +780,12 @@ function redactSegment(words, ctx) {
         if (long) {
             const name = long[1].replace(/^-+/, '');
             if (name === 'from-literal' || name === 'from-env-literal') {
-                if (holdsMoreThanCredential(long[2].replace(/^[^=]*=/, '')))
-                    state.truncated = true;
-                out[i] = `${long[1]}=${long[2].replace(/^([^=]*)=.*$/s, `$1=${SECRET}`)}`;
+                const replaced = `${long[1]}=${long[2].replace(/^([^=]*)=.*$/s, `$1=${SECRET}`)}`;
+                out[i] = holdsMoreThanCredential(long[2].replace(/^[^=]*=/, '')) ? withheld(state, arg, replaced) : replaced;
                 handled.add(i);
             }
             else if (CURL_FAMILY.has(program) && /^(?:u|user|proxy-user)$/.test(name)) {
-                out[i] = `${long[1]}=${SECRET}`;
+                out[i] = `${long[1]}=${state.exact ? exactUser(long[2]) : SECRET}`;
                 handled.add(i);
             }
             else if (CURL_FAMILY.has(program) && name === 'header' && AUTH_HEADER.test(long[2])) {
@@ -715,9 +797,11 @@ function redactSegment(words, ctx) {
                 handled.add(i);
             }
             else if (holdsSecret(name)) {
-                if (classifySecretName(name) === 'ambiguous')
-                    state.truncated = true;
-                out[i] = `${long[1]}=${cutCredential(long[2], state)}`;
+                const kind = nameClass(name, state);
+                if (kind === 'ambiguous')
+                    out[i] = withheld(state, arg, `${long[1]}=${cutCredential(long[2], state)}`);
+                else if (kind === 'credential')
+                    out[i] = `${long[1]}=${cutCredential(long[2], state)}`;
                 handled.add(i);
             }
             continue;
@@ -726,7 +810,7 @@ function redactSegment(words, ctx) {
         if (/^--[A-Za-z0-9]/.test(arg)) {
             const name = arg.slice(2);
             if (CURL_FAMILY.has(program) && /^(?:user|proxy-user)$/.test(name))
-                next();
+                next(false, exactUser);
             else if (CURL_FAMILY.has(program) && name === 'header') {
                 const j = valueAt();
                 if (j !== null && AUTH_HEADER.test(out[j])) {
@@ -764,7 +848,7 @@ function redactSegment(words, ctx) {
             else if (REDIS_FAMILY.has(program) && /^-a/.test(arg))
                 attachedOrNext('-a');
             else if (CURL_FAMILY.has(program) && (arg === '-u' || arg === '-U'))
-                next();
+                next(false, exactUser);
             else if (CURL_FAMILY.has(program) && arg === '-H') {
                 const j = valueAt();
                 if (j !== null && AUTH_HEADER.test(out[j])) {
@@ -782,7 +866,7 @@ function redactSegment(words, ctx) {
                 }
             }
             else if (program === 'openssl' && OPENSSL_PASS_FLAGS.has(arg))
-                next();
+                next(false, arg === '-kfile' ? (value) => value : exactOpensslPass);
             else if (program === 'gh' && secretContext && arg === '-b')
                 next();
             else if (/^-[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_-]{2,}$/.test(arg))
@@ -795,15 +879,17 @@ function redactSegment(words, ctx) {
             const [, name, value] = assignment;
             if (secretContext) {
                 // In a secrets command every value is a secret: withheld whole, and truncated if it held more fields.
-                if (/[&#]/.test(value) || holdsMoreThanCredential(value))
-                    state.truncated = true;
-                out[i] = `${name}=${SECRET}`;
+                out[i] = /[&#]/.test(value) || holdsMoreThanCredential(value) ? withheld(state, arg, `${name}=${SECRET}`) : `${name}=${SECRET}`;
                 handled.add(i);
             }
             else if (holdsSecret(name)) {
-                if (classifySecretName(name) === 'ambiguous')
-                    state.truncated = true;
-                out[i] = credentialArgument(name, value);
+                const kind = nameClass(name, state);
+                if (kind === 'ambiguous')
+                    out[i] = withheld(state, arg, credentialArgument(name, value));
+                else if (kind === 'credential')
+                    out[i] = credentialArgument(name, value);
+                else
+                    out[i] = redactText(arg, state);
                 handled.add(i);
             }
             else if (envStore) {
@@ -813,7 +899,7 @@ function redactSegment(words, ctx) {
             continue;
         }
         if (program === 'openssl' && /^(?:pass|env|file|fd):/.test(arg)) {
-            out[i] = arg.replace(/:.*/s, `:${SECRET}`);
+            out[i] = state.exact ? exactOpensslPass(arg) : arg.replace(/:.*/s, `:${SECRET}`);
             handled.add(i);
             continue;
         }
@@ -830,7 +916,7 @@ function redactSegment(words, ctx) {
         if (envStore && position > 0 && /^(?:env|config|variables?|vars?):(?:set|add|push|import|create|update|put)$|^(?:set|add|put|push|import|create|update)$/.test(previous)) {
             const j = valueAt();
             if (j !== null) {
-                const kind = classifySecretName(arg);
+                const kind = nameClass(arg, state);
                 if (kind === 'credential')
                     redactAt(j);
                 else if (kind === 'ambiguous')
@@ -880,12 +966,95 @@ function redactSegment(words, ctx) {
 function quoteWord(word) {
     return /[\s'"\\|&;<>()$`*?]/.test(word) ? `'${word.replace(/'/g, `'\\''`)}'` : word;
 }
+const SIG_SPECIAL = '$`*?[{~';
+const HEREDOC_OPEN = /(?<!<)<<(-?)[ \t]*(['"]?)([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\2/g;
+/**
+ * What quoting does to the characters the shell expands (`$`, backquote, `*`, `?`, `[`, `{`, `~`), in order: `A`
+ * when the shell acts on it, `L` when it is literal (single quotes, a backslash, double quotes for all but `$` and
+ * backquote, a quoted heredoc). The words the normalizer reads are unquoted, so `rm -rf '*'` and `rm -rf *`,
+ * `'$HOME'` and `$HOME`, `<<'EOF'` and `<<EOF` read alike; this signature keeps them apart. `'*'`, `"*"` and `\*`
+ * mean the same and sign the same.
+ */
+function quoteSignature(command) {
+    const parts = [];
+    const lines = command.split('\n');
+    const pending = [];
+    let quote = '';
+    for (let n = 0; n < lines.length; n += 1) {
+        if (pending.length && !quote) {
+            const doc = pending.shift();
+            for (; n < lines.length; n += 1) {
+                const line = lines[n];
+                if (line.replace(/^[ \t]+|[ \t]+$/g, '') === doc.tag)
+                    break;
+                for (let i = 0; i < line.length; i += 1) {
+                    const c = line[i];
+                    if (!doc.quoted && c === '\\' && i + 1 < line.length && '$`\\'.includes(line[i + 1])) {
+                        if (SIG_SPECIAL.includes(line[i + 1]))
+                            parts.push(`L${line[i + 1]}`);
+                        i += 1;
+                    }
+                    else if (SIG_SPECIAL.includes(c))
+                        parts.push(`${!doc.quoted && (c === '$' || c === '`') ? 'A' : 'L'}${c}`);
+                }
+            }
+            parts.push('|');
+            continue;
+        }
+        const line = lines[n];
+        if (!quote)
+            for (const match of line.matchAll(HEREDOC_OPEN))
+                pending.push({ tag: match[3], quoted: match[2] !== '' });
+        for (let i = 0; i < line.length; i += 1) {
+            const c = line[i];
+            if (quote === "'") {
+                if (c === "'")
+                    quote = '';
+                else if (SIG_SPECIAL.includes(c))
+                    parts.push(`L${c}`);
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (c === '\\' && i + 1 < line.length) {
+                const next = line[i + 1];
+                if (SIG_SPECIAL.includes(next))
+                    parts.push(`L${next}`);
+                i += 1;
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (quote === '"') {
+                if (c === '"')
+                    quote = '';
+                else if (SIG_SPECIAL.includes(c))
+                    parts.push(`${c === '$' || c === '`' ? 'A' : 'L'}${c}`);
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (c === "'" || c === '"') {
+                quote = c;
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (SIG_SPECIAL.includes(c))
+                parts.push(`A${c}`);
+        }
+        if (quote)
+            parts.push('/');
+    }
+    return parts.join('');
+}
 function normalizeInner(command, state, depth) {
     if (command.length > MAX_COMMAND_CHARS)
         throw new NormalizationLimit();
     spend(state, 0);
+    // Quoting of the characters the shell expands (kept apart from the unquoted words, see quoteSignature).
+    const signature = quoteSignature(command);
+    if (signature)
+        state.sigs.push(`${depth}:${signature}`);
+    // A lone CR (not before LF) is a word character to the shell; read as a line end here, so the action is
+    // truncated and the exact pass keeps it (`main<CR>` is not `main`, `build<CR>dist` is not `build ; dist`).
+    if (/\r(?!\n)/.test(command))
+        state.truncated = true; // exact: kept (crIsWord)
     const data = [];
-    const tokens = tokenize(extractHeredocs(command.replace(/\r\n?/g, '\n'), data));
+    const lines = state.exact ? command.replace(/\r\n/g, '\n') : command.replace(/\r\n?/g, '\n');
+    const tokens = tokenize(extractHeredocs(lines, data), state.exact);
     if (tokens.length > MAX_TOKENS)
         throw new NormalizationLimit();
     const segments = [];
@@ -953,10 +1122,13 @@ function normalizeInner(command, state, depth) {
  * never sent. `truncated` is true when something that may change what the
  * command does had to be withheld. Exported for tests.
  */
-function normalizeShellCommand(command, deadline) {
-    const state = newExactness(deadline);
+function normalizeShellCommand(command, deadline, exact = false) {
+    const state = newExactness(deadline, exact);
     try {
         const result = normalizeInner(command, state, 0);
+        // The exact pass: the form exact_hmac keys (the words, the shell references and the quoting).
+        if (exact)
+            return { ...result, text: exactShellForm(result.text, command, state), truncated: state.truncated };
         return { ...result, truncated: state.truncated };
     }
     catch (error) {
@@ -975,28 +1147,37 @@ function sortedValue(value, depth = 0) {
 }
 /** A tool input with credentials and key-shaped values replaced; hashed, never sent. */
 function redactedInput(value, state, depth = 0) {
+    // Past the depth or entry bounds the exact pass stops; exact_hmac then keys the raw canonical input.
     if (depth > 6) {
-        state.truncated = true;
+        if (state.exact)
+            throw new NormalizationLimit();
+        state.truncated = true; // exact: raw (canonical input)
         return SECRET;
     }
     if (typeof value === 'string')
         return redactText(value, state);
     if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+        if (value.length > 64 && state.exact)
+            throw new NormalizationLimit();
         if (value.length > 64)
-            state.truncated = true;
+            state.truncated = true; // exact: raw (canonical input)
         return value.slice(0, 64).map((item) => redactedInput(item, state, depth + 1));
     }
     if (value && typeof value === 'object') {
         const entries = Object.entries(value);
+        if (entries.length > 64 && state.exact)
+            throw new NormalizationLimit();
         if (entries.length > 64)
-            state.truncated = true;
+            state.truncated = true; // exact: raw (canonical input)
         const out = {};
         for (const [key, item] of entries.slice(0, 64)) {
-            const kind = classifySecretName(key);
+            const kind = nameClass(key, state);
             if (kind === 'credential' || kind === 'ambiguous') {
+                // The exact pass keeps an ambiguous value, and looks inside an object or array under a credential
+                // name (`credentials: {user, role, password}`): only a value itself is certain.
                 if (kind === 'ambiguous')
-                    state.truncated = true;
-                out[key] = SECRET;
+                    state.truncated = true; // exact: kept (below)
+                out[key] = state.exact && (kind === 'ambiguous' || (item !== null && typeof item === 'object')) ? redactedInput(item, state, depth + 1) : SECRET;
             }
             else {
                 out[key] = redactedInput(item, state, depth + 1);
@@ -1006,12 +1187,35 @@ function redactedInput(value, state, depth = 0) {
     }
     return value;
 }
+/**
+ * The host's own shell text when trimming changed what bash runs, else null. The command is read trimmed, but a
+ * lone CR, a vertical tab, a form feed or a non-ASCII space at either end is part of a word in bash (`main<CR>` is
+ * another ref than `main`). ASCII spaces, tabs, newlines and CRLF line ends at the ends change nothing.
+ */
+function untrimmedShellText(event, trimmed) {
+    const input = event.tool_input && typeof event.tool_input === 'object' && !Array.isArray(event.tool_input)
+        ? event.tool_input : null;
+    const host = (0, hook_tool_policy_1.shellCommandToolText)(event)
+        ?? (typeof event.tool_input === 'string' ? event.tool_input
+            : typeof input?.command === 'string' ? input.command : typeof input?.cmd === 'string' ? input.cmd : null);
+    if (host === null || host === trimmed)
+        return null;
+    const at = host.indexOf(trimmed);
+    if (at < 0)
+        return null;
+    const edges = `${host.slice(0, at)}${host.slice(at + trimmed.length)}`.replace(/\r\n/g, '\n');
+    return /[^ \t\n]/.test(edges) ? host : null;
+}
 /**
  * The command a shell tool runs. Codex may send an argument vector
  * (["bash", "-lc", "<command>"]): its command is the same text a string form
  * would carry, so both give the same normalized action.
  */
 function shellCommand(event) {
+    // A plain Monitor or PowerShell call: its one command or script text, read as Bash's command.
+    const toolText = (0, hook_tool_policy_1.shellCommandToolText)(event);
+    if (toolText !== null)
+        return toolText.trim();
     const input = event.tool_input && typeof event.tool_input === 'object' && !Array.isArray(event.tool_input)
         ? event.tool_input : null;
     const argv = Array.isArray(input?.command) ? input.command : Array.isArray(input?.cmd) ? input.cmd : null;
@@ -1019,7 +1223,8 @@ function shellCommand(event) {
         const words = argv;
         if (words.length === 3 && /^(?:.*\/)?(?:ba|z|da|k)?sh$/.test(words[0]) && /^-[a-z]*c$/.test(words[1]))
             return words[2];
-        return words.map((word) => (/[\s'"]/.test(word) ? `'${word.replace(/'/g, `'\\''`)}'` : word)).join(' ');
+        // An argument vector runs without a shell: every word is literal, so any character the shell reads is quoted.
+        return words.map((word) => (/[\s'"\\$`*?[\]{}~|&;<>()!#]/.test(word) ? `'${word.replace(/'/g, `'\\''`)}'` : word)).join(' ');
     }
     return (0, hook_tool_policy_1.hookToolCommand)(event);
 }
@@ -1035,7 +1240,7 @@ function withoutUserName(path, state) {
     const other = /^(\/(?:home|Users))\/[^/]+(?=\/|$)/.exec(path);
     if (!other)
         return path;
-    state.truncated = true;
+    state.truncated = true; // exact: n/a (paths are not exact material; the whole input is)
     return `${other[1]}/[user]${path.slice(other[0].length)}`;
 }
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -1127,12 +1332,216 @@ function inputHash(input, state) {
         return {};
     const text = JSON.stringify(sortedValue(redactedInput(input, state)));
     if (text.includes(SECRET))
-        state.truncated = true;
+        state.truncated = true; // exact: n/a (pass 1 only; exactMaterial is the exact form)
     return { input_sha256: sha256(`${HASH_VERSION}\ninput\n${text}`) };
 }
+/**
+ * The run options of a Monitor or PowerShell call (timeout, timeout_ms, run_in_background) as key material:
+ * the hash of their canonical JSON with credentials replaced, as any tool input is hashed (so a replaced
+ * credential marks the action truncated here too), or null when the call sets none (and for any other tool).
+ * They decide how long and where the command runs, so an approval of one set is not an approval of another;
+ * `description` is not key material.
+ */
+function runOptionsKey(event, state) {
+    const options = (0, hook_tool_policy_1.shellCommandToolRunOptions)(event);
+    if (options === null)
+        return null;
+    return inputHash(options, state).input_sha256;
+}
+/** runOptionsKey as a standalone identity (no deadline), for the exact target of a call (hook-contract exactHookTarget). */
+function shellToolRunOptionsKey(event) {
+    return runOptionsKey(event, newExactness(Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY));
+}
+/** The exact form of the run options (only certain credentials replaced), for the exact material of a truncated action. */
+function exactRunOptions(event, state) {
+    const options = (0, hook_tool_policy_1.shellCommandToolRunOptions)(event);
+    return options === null ? null : JSON.stringify(sortedValue(redactedInput(options, state)));
+}
 function withExactness(action, state) {
     return state.truncated ? { ...action, truncated: true } : action;
 }
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Exact material for a truncated action (exact_hmac; M2)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+const EXACT_DOMAIN = 'marrow-exact-action-v1';
+/** Raw canonical input past this is never keyed: a nonce instead (it matches nothing). */
+const MAX_RAW_EXACT_CHARS = 1_048_576;
+const EXACT_SALT_NOTE = 'Marrow: the private device key for exact action matching is unavailable or unsafe on this machine, so a held action that hides a value is asked again instead of resumed on retry. Owner: run the Marrow installer doctor command in a terminal.';
+/** Canonical JSON (keys sorted at every depth), or null past 1 MB, past 64 levels, or when it cannot be serialized. */
+function canonicalJson(value) {
+    const parts = [];
+    let size = 0;
+    const push = (text) => {
+        size += text.length;
+        if (size > MAX_RAW_EXACT_CHARS)
+            throw new NormalizationLimit();
+        parts.push(text);
+    };
+    const walk = (item, depth) => {
+        if (depth > 64)
+            throw new NormalizationLimit();
+        if (Array.isArray(item)) {
+            if (item.length > MAX_RAW_EXACT_CHARS / 2)
+                throw new NormalizationLimit();
+            push('[');
+            item.forEach((entry, index) => { if (index)
+                push(','); walk(entry, depth + 1); });
+            push(']');
+        }
+        else if (item !== null && typeof item === 'object') {
+            const keys = Object.keys(item);
+            if (keys.length > MAX_RAW_EXACT_CHARS / 4)
+                throw new NormalizationLimit();
+            push('{');
+            keys.sort().forEach((key, index) => {
+                if (index)
+                    push(',');
+                push(`${JSON.stringify(key)}:`);
+                walk(item[key], depth + 1);
+            });
+            push('}');
+        }
+        else {
+            push(JSON.stringify(item) ?? 'null');
+        }
+    };
+    try {
+        walk(value, 0);
+        return parts.join('');
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Every shell reference in a command, in order: `$NAME`, `${...}`, `$(...)` (balanced) and backquoted text,
+ * quotes ignored (so a quoted literal `$` counts as well: stricter). A reference is never a credential value
+ * itself: `API_KEY=$READONLY_KEY` and `API_KEY=$ADMIN_KEY`, or `mysql -p"$(cat ro.pw)"` and `"$(cat admin.pw)"`,
+ * name different credentials. The exact pass replaces a credential position whole, so the references are
+ * added to the exact material; two commands that differ only in a literal credential still match.
+ */
+function shellReferences(command) {
+    const refs = [];
+    for (let i = 0; i < command.length; i += 1) {
+        const ch = command[i];
+        if (ch === '`') {
+            const end = command.indexOf('`', i + 1);
+            const stop = end < 0 ? command.length : end + 1;
+            refs.push(command.slice(i, stop));
+            i = stop - 1;
+        }
+        else if (ch === '$' && (command[i + 1] === '(' || command[i + 1] === '{')) {
+            const open = command[i + 1];
+            const close = open === '(' ? ')' : '}';
+            let depth = 0;
+            let j = i + 1;
+            for (; j < command.length; j += 1) {
+                if (command[j] === open)
+                    depth += 1;
+                else if (command[j] === close) {
+                    depth -= 1;
+                    if (depth === 0)
+                        break;
+                }
+            }
+            refs.push(command.slice(i, Math.min(j + 1, command.length)));
+            i = Math.min(j, command.length);
+        }
+        else if (ch === '$') {
+            const name = /^\$(?:[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*|[0-9@*#?$!-])/.exec(command.slice(i, i + 256));
+            if (name) {
+                refs.push(name[0]);
+                i += name[0].length - 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return refs;
+}
+/** The exact form of a command: its words (only certain credentials replaced), its shell references and its quoting. */
+function exactShellForm(text, command, state) {
+    return `${text}\n${JSON.stringify(shellReferences(command))}\n${JSON.stringify(state.sigs)}`;
+}
+/** The raw shell text as material; a plain Monitor or PowerShell call also carries its run options (raw). */
+function rawShellMaterial(event, command) {
+    const options = (0, hook_tool_policy_1.shellCommandToolText)(event) === null
+        ? null : (0, hook_tool_policy_1.shellCommandToolRunOptions)(event);
+    if (options === null)
+        return `raw-shell\n${command}`;
+    const json = canonicalJson(options);
+    return json === null ? null : `raw-shell+run\n${json}\n${command}`;
+}
+/** The raw input as material (a placeholder, or an exact pass that hit a limit): the command, or the canonical input. */
+function rawExactMaterial(event, kind) {
+    if (kind === 'shell') {
+        try {
+            const trimmed = shellCommand(event);
+            const command = untrimmedShellText(event, trimmed) ?? trimmed;
+            return typeof command === 'string' && command.length <= MAX_RAW_EXACT_CHARS ? rawShellMaterial(event, command) : null;
+        }
+        catch {
+            return null;
+        }
+    }
+    const json = canonicalJson(event.tool_input ?? null);
+    return json === null ? null : `raw-input\n${json}`;
+}
+/**
+ * The exact material of an action: the same normalization with `exact` set (only a certain credential replaced,
+ * every other value kept), or the raw input when that pass hits a limit. null: no material (a nonce instead).
+ */
+function exactMaterial(event, kind, deadline) {
+    const state = newExactness(deadline, true);
+    // Over 1 MB of material: a nonce (asked again), as for raw material.
+    const bounded = (material) => (material.length <= MAX_RAW_EXACT_CHARS + 16 ? material : null);
+    try {
+        if (kind === 'shell') {
+            const trimmed = shellCommand(event);
+            const host = untrimmedShellText(event, trimmed);
+            if (host !== null) {
+                const raw = rawShellMaterial(event, host);
+                return raw === null ? null : bounded(raw);
+            }
+            const { text } = normalizeInner(trimmed, state, 0);
+            const runOptions = (0, hook_tool_policy_1.shellCommandToolText)(event) !== null
+                ? exactRunOptions(event, newExactness(deadline, true)) : null;
+            return bounded(`exact-shell${runOptions === null ? '' : `+run\n${runOptions}`}\n${exactShellForm(text, trimmed, state)}`);
+        }
+        const input = event.tool_input;
+        const text = input === undefined || input === null ? 'null' : JSON.stringify(sortedValue(redactedInput(input, state)));
+        return bounded(`exact-input\n${text}`);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        return error instanceof NormalizationLimit ? rawExactMaterial(event, kind) : null;
+    }
+}
+let saltNoted = false;
+/** The device salt (seatbelt store, same checks), or null with one stderr line per process (no path, no value). */
+function exactSalt() {
+    let salt = null;
+    try {
+        salt = require('./seatbelt/record').deviceSalt();
+    }
+    catch {
+        salt = null;
+    }
+    if (!salt && !saltNoted) {
+        saltNoted = true;
+        try {
+            process.stderr.write(`${EXACT_SALT_NOTE}\n`);
+        }
+        catch { /* best effort */ }
+    }
+    return salt;
+}
+/**
+ * exact_hmac: HMAC-SHA256(device salt, domain, kind, the host's full tool name, material), 128 bits. Without a
+ * salt or material it is a fresh random nonce, which matches nothing: never unsalted, never the merged form.
+ */
+function exactHmac(salt, kind, toolName, material) {
+    if (!salt || salt.length < 16 || material === null)
+        return (0, node_crypto_1.randomBytes)(16).toString('hex');
+    return (0, node_crypto_1.createHmac)('sha256', salt).update(`${EXACT_DOMAIN}\n${kind}\n${JSON.stringify(toolName)}\n`).update(material).digest('hex').slice(0, 32);
+}
 /**
  * The normalized action of a hook event. `deadlineAt` bounds the time it may
  * take (default one second from now): past it, or past the size limits, the
@@ -1140,30 +1549,53 @@ function withExactness(action, state) {
  * service never binds, so the hook still answers within its host's budget.
  * An event whose input a host adapter cut or dropped (`input_truncated`) is
  * marked truncated as well.
+ *
+ * A truncated action also carries `tool_input.exact_hmac`: a keyed hash (the
+ * device salt never leaves the machine) of the action with only certain
+ * credentials replaced, so two actions that differ anywhere else never share a
+ * correlation, hold or key, and a retry that differs only in a certain
+ * credential (an OTP) still does. A placeholder keys the raw input (up to
+ * 1 MB). Input a host adapter cut or dropped, input over 1 MB and a missing or
+ * unsafe salt give a random nonce: the action matches nothing (it is asked
+ * again). `salt` is a test seam (undefined: the device salt).
  */
 function normalizedHookAction(event, options = {}) {
-    const state = newExactness(options.deadlineAt);
+    const deadline = options.deadlineAt ?? Date.now() + DEFAULT_NORMALIZE_MS;
+    const state = newExactness(deadline);
     const toolName = (0, hook_tool_policy_1.normalizeHookToolName)(event.tool_name) || 'tool';
     // The host's own tool name, exactly as sent (stable across retries); the policy name decides the kind.
     // Not trimmed, so `X ` and `X` get different actions; a name past 128 characters is never bound.
     const rawToolName = typeof event.tool_name === 'string' && event.tool_name ? event.tool_name : toolName;
     const hostToolName = rawToolName.slice(0, 128);
     if (rawToolName.length > 128)
-        state.truncated = true;
+        state.truncated = true; // exact: kept (the full name is in exact_hmac)
+    // Claude Code built-ins first hooked in 3.9.105 that are not plain shell calls (a native git
+    // equivalent, Skill, a call whose words are not actions, an irregular Monitor or PowerShell call)
+    // are keyed by their whole input, never by one field of it.
     const kind = (0, hook_tool_policy_1.isMcpHookTool)(event.tool_name) || /^MCP:/i.test(hostToolName) ? 'mcp'
-        : (0, hook_tool_policy_1.isShellGovernedTool)(event) ? 'shell'
-            : EDIT_TOOLS.test(toolName) ? 'edit'
-                : 'other';
-    if (event.input_truncated === true)
-        state.truncated = true;
+        : (0, hook_tool_policy_1.isWholeInputNativeTool)(event) ? 'other'
+            : (0, hook_tool_policy_1.isShellGovernedTool)(event) ? 'shell'
+                : EDIT_TOOLS.test(toolName) ? 'edit'
+                    : 'other';
+    const inputCut = event.input_truncated === true;
+    if (inputCut)
+        state.truncated = true; // exact: nonce (the cut or dropped input is all that is left)
+    let action;
+    let placeholder = false;
     try {
-        return normalizedOfKind(event, kind, hostToolName, state);
+        action = normalizedOfKind(event, kind, hostToolName, state);
     }
     catch (error) {
-        if (error instanceof NormalizationLimit)
-            return { tool_kind: kind, tool_name: hostToolName, tool_input: {}, truncated: true };
-        throw error;
+        if (!(error instanceof NormalizationLimit))
+            throw error;
+        action = { tool_kind: kind, tool_name: hostToolName, tool_input: {}, truncated: true };
+        placeholder = true;
     }
+    if (action.truncated !== true)
+        return action;
+    const material = inputCut ? null : placeholder ? rawExactMaterial(event, kind) : exactMaterial(event, kind, deadline);
+    const salt = options.salt !== undefined ? options.salt : material === null ? null : exactSalt();
+    return { ...action, tool_input: { ...action.tool_input, exact_hmac: exactHmac(salt, kind, rawToolName, material) } };
 }
 function normalizedOfKind(event, kind, hostToolName, state) {
     if (kind === 'mcp') {
@@ -1171,21 +1603,34 @@ function normalizedOfKind(event, kind, hostToolName, state) {
     }
     if (kind === 'shell') {
         const raw = shellCommand(event);
+        if (untrimmedShellText(event, raw) !== null)
+            state.truncated = true; // exact: raw (the host's untrimmed text)
         const { text, programs } = normalizeInner(raw, state, 0);
         // A secret was replaced: the action is never bound or reused (it asks each time).
         if (text.includes(SECRET))
-            state.truncated = true;
+            state.truncated = true; // exact: n/a (pass 1 only; the exact pass decides each value)
         // The command text itself only for a deploy the service can judge word for word (see deployCommandText).
         // Judged on the host's exact text (a trimmed non-ASCII space must not slip through).
         const input = event.tool_input && typeof event.tool_input === 'object' && !Array.isArray(event.tool_input) ? event.tool_input : null;
         const exact = typeof input?.command === 'string' ? input.command : typeof input?.cmd === 'string' ? input.cmd : raw;
         const deployText = state.truncated ? null : deployCommandText(exact);
+        // A Monitor or PowerShell command carries its host tool name, so it never shares a hash with the
+        // same Bash command (or another tool's): the line after the version is `shell` only for every
+        // other shell call, whose hash is unchanged.
+        // Its run options (timeout, timeout_ms, run_in_background), when it sets any, are in the hash too: a
+        // different line after `shell-tool+run`, so no command text can stand for them.
+        const plainShellTool = (0, hook_tool_policy_1.shellCommandToolText)(event) !== null;
+        const runOptions = plainShellTool ? runOptionsKey(event, state) : null;
+        const domain = !plainShellTool ? 'shell'
+            : runOptions === null ? `shell-tool\n${JSON.stringify(hostToolName)}`
+                : `shell-tool+run\n${JSON.stringify(hostToolName)}\n${runOptions}`;
         return withExactness({
             tool_kind: 'shell',
             tool_name: hostToolName,
             programs,
             tool_input: {
-                command_sha256: sha256(`${HASH_VERSION}\nshell\n${text}`),
+                // An exact action also hashes its quoting (never for a truncated one: a secret's characters stay out of it).
+                command_sha256: sha256(`${HASH_VERSION}\n${domain}\n${state.truncated || !state.sigs.length ? text : `${text}\n${JSON.stringify(state.sigs)}`}`),
                 ...(deployText !== null && deployText === text ? { command: deployText } : {}),
             },
         }, state);
@@ -1193,11 +1638,11 @@ function normalizedOfKind(event, kind, hostToolName, state) {
     if (kind === 'edit') {
         const targets = (0, hook_tool_policy_1.toolTargetPaths)(event);
         if (targets.length > 64)
-            state.truncated = true;
+            state.truncated = true; // exact: n/a (paths are not exact material; the whole input is)
         const paths = targets.slice(0, 64).map((path) => {
             const redacted = redactText(withoutUserName(path, state), state);
             if (redacted.length > 512 || redacted.includes(SECRET))
-                state.truncated = true;
+                state.truncated = true; // exact: n/a (as above)
             return redacted.slice(0, 512);
         });
         return withExactness({ tool_kind: 'edit', tool_name: hostToolName, paths, tool_input: inputHash(event.tool_input, state) }, state);