@geolens/sdk 1.19.1 → 1.21.0

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@@ -154,11 +154,9 @@ export const exportAuditLogsAdminAuditLogsExportFormatGet = (options) => (option
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  * Pass ?force=true to delete all existing embeddings and regenerate from
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  * scratch (required after changing the embedding model or dimensions).
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  *
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- * fix(#1542): the run happens on the job queue, not in this request. A full
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- * regenerate is provider-bound and linear in catalog size, so it outgrew the
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- * 600s edge timeout somewhere below 59,000 records — and the request dying at
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- * the proxy never stopped the work, it only hid it. Returns the job id;
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- * poll ``GET /jobs/{job_id}`` for the outcome.
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+ * The run happens on the job queue because a full regeneration can exceed
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+ * request timeouts. This endpoint returns the job id; poll
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+ * ``GET /jobs/{job_id}`` for the outcome.
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  */
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  export const triggerBackfillAdminBackfillEmbeddingsPost = (options) => (options?.client ?? client).post({
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  security: [
@@ -330,7 +328,7 @@ export const getCatalogStatsAdminStatsGet = (options) => (options?.client ?? cli
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  /**
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  * List Users
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  *
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- * List all users with pagination and optional status/search/sort filter (admin only).
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+ * List users with optional status, role, search, and sort filters (admin only).
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  *
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  * `sort` and `order` are closed enums, so an unrecognised value is refused
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  * with a 422 and never reaches the query.
@@ -536,21 +534,16 @@ export const rejectUserAdminUsersUserIdRejectPost = (options) => (options.client
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  *
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  * Set a user's password (admin only).
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  *
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- * feat(#1715): the login page tells a locked-out user to ask an
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- * administrator, and there was nothing for the administrator to do. This is
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- * the recovery path, so it asks for no current password -- holding
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- * manage_users is the whole authorization, and the audit row is what makes
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- * the action answerable for. The submitted value reaches the hash column and
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- * nowhere else: not the audit details, not a log line, not the response.
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+ * The ``manage_users`` permission authorizes this recovery path, so no current
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+ * password is required. The submitted password is stored only as a hash and
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+ * is omitted from audit details, logs, and the response.
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  *
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- * 422 when the target signs in through an identity provider (no local
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- * password to replace), 404 when no such user exists -- both via the shared
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- * _raise_on_error mapping the sibling lifecycle routes use.
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+ * Returns 422 when the target signs in through an identity provider and has
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+ * no local password, or 404 when the user does not exist.
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  *
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  * Resetting your own password is permitted and ends every session the
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  * account holds, including the one making this request, because the reset
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- * revokes the account's credentials. That is the same consequence
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- * POST /auth/change-password/ has for the caller who invokes it.
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+ * revokes the account's credentials.
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  */
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  export const resetUserPasswordAdminUsersUserIdResetPasswordPost = (options) => (options.client ?? client).post({
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  security: [
@@ -572,13 +565,10 @@ export const resetUserPasswordAdminUsersUserIdResetPasswordPost = (options) => (
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  /**
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  * Ai Availability Endpoint
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  *
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- * Report whether builder AI chat is usable (#338).
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+ * Report whether builder AI chat is usable.
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  *
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- * Permission-gated on ``use_ai_chat`` so non-admin editors (who cannot read
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- * ``/admin/ai-status``) can learn availability. Returns ``available=false``
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- * rather than 503 when provider keys are missing, so the builder shows a safe
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- * disabled state without console-noise errors. A viewer (no ``use_ai_chat``)
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- * gets 403.
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+ * Requires ``use_ai_chat``. Returns ``available=false`` when provider keys
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+ * are missing and 403 when the caller lacks permission.
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  */
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  export const aiAvailabilityEndpointAiAvailabilityGet = (options) => (options?.client ?? client).get({
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  security: [
@@ -805,15 +795,9 @@ export const generateMetadataSummaryAiMetadataSummaryPost = (options) => (option
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  * Surfaces the column-DDL events to dataset owners so they can detect
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  * editor-initiated schema changes.
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  *
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- * Access control (AGENTS.md Pre-Commit Checklist Rule 1):
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- * - Owner: 200 with their own dataset's DDL history
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- * - Admin: 200 (admin access is always allowed)
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- * - Anyone else — including authenticated readers of a PUBLIC dataset: 404
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- * via check_dataset_write_access. fix(#458): the feed previously used
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- * check_dataset_access (read visibility), which let any logged-in user
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- * enumerate editor usernames/user_ids on public datasets, contradicting
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- * this owner-facing contract.
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- * - Anonymous: 401 (get_current_active_user dependency)
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+ * Owners and administrators can read the feed. Other authenticated users
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+ * receive 404, including readers of a public dataset, because the entries
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+ * identify editors. Anonymous callers receive 401.
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  *
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  * The dataset 404-before-auth-query ordering ensures non-existent datasets
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  * return 404 without leaking audit log details.
@@ -969,21 +953,14 @@ export const loginAuthLoginPost = (options) => (options.client ?? client).post({
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  *
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  * Revoke all refresh tokens and bump token_version for the current user.
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  *
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- * revoke_all_tokens bumps User.token_version so the
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- * access JWT used for this logout call (and any other outstanding access JWTs)
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- * are rejected on the next authenticated request — closing the
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- * "logout doesn't invalidate the access JWT" gap.
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+ * Logout invalidates the access JWT used for this call and all other active
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+ * browser sessions.
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  *
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- * fix(#821): logout deliberately does NOT bump key_epoch — API keys exist to
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- * outlive browser sessions (CI, MCP servers, tile URLs), so session hygiene
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- * must not revoke them. Security events (password change, role change) do.
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+ * API keys remain valid because they are independent of browser sessions.
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+ * Password and role changes still revoke them.
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  *
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- * fix(#1446): the refresh COOKIE can authenticate this call when the access
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- * token has aged out. Requiring a live bearer token meant a user returning
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- * after their 15-minute access token expired got a 401 here while their
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- * multi-day refresh cookie stayed valid — the UI reported a clean logout and
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- * the session survived it. CSRF is enforced on that path exactly as it is for
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- * /auth/refresh, since the cookie is then the credential.
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+ * A refresh cookie can authenticate logout after the access token expires.
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+ * Cookie-authenticated requests require CSRF validation.
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  */
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  export const logoutAuthLogoutPost = (options) => (options?.client ?? client).post({
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  security: [
@@ -1002,6 +979,29 @@ export const logoutAuthLogoutPost = (options) => (options?.client ?? client).pos
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  ...options?.headers
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  }
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  });
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+ /**
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+ * Logout Current Session
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+ *
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+ * Revoke only the presented session's refresh-token family.
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+ *
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+ * Other devices and API keys survive. Access JWTs remain usable until their
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+ * normal expiry; /logout/ still immediately revokes every access and refresh
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+ * session. A valid signed access JWT with sid, a refresh body token, or a
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+ * refresh cookie authorizes this operation. Legacy JWTs without sid must use
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+ * the refresh credential. Cookie authorization requires double-submit CSRF.
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+ *
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+ * Bearer/body revocation does not change cookies, allowing a captured old
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+ * session to be discarded safely after a newer login. Cookie authorization
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+ * clears the browser's refresh and CSRF cookies.
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+ */
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+ export const logoutCurrentSessionAuthLogoutSessionPost = (options) => (options?.client ?? client).post({
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+ url: '/auth/logout/session/',
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+ ...options,
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+ headers: {
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+ 'Content-Type': 'application/json',
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+ ...options?.headers
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+ }
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+ });
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  /**
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  * Me
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  *
@@ -1478,8 +1478,8 @@ export const getCollectionItemFeatureCollectionsDatasetIdItemsFeatureIdGet = (op
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  *
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  * Queryable properties for one feature collection (OGC Features Part 3).
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  *
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- * feat(#1614): derived from the live table schema (never the stored
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- * column_info snapshot) so the advertised set always matches what `filter=`
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+ * Derived from the live table schema rather than the stored column_info
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+ * snapshot, so the advertised set always matches what `filter=`
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  * on /items validates against. `additionalProperties: false` is what makes
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  * rejecting filters on unlisted properties spec-conformant.
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  */
@@ -1570,7 +1570,7 @@ export const importConfigurationConfigOpsImportPost = (options) => (options.clie
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  /**
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  * Validate Configuration
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  *
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- * Validate connectivity to storage, cache, and all enabled OIDC providers.
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+ * Validate storage, cache, credential handoff, and enabled OIDC providers.
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  *
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  * Returns pass/fail with latency and error details for each service.
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  */
@@ -2011,6 +2011,42 @@ export const getColumnValuesDatasetsDatasetIdColumnsColumnNameValuesGet = (optio
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  url: '/datasets/{dataset_id}/columns/{column_name}/values/',
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  ...options
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  });
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+ /**
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+ * Get Pointcloud File
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+ *
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+ * Serve a published COPC point cloud's file, whole or by HTTP byte range.
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+ *
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+ * Point a client at the dataset's ``pointcloud.url``. The path names the
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+ * upload attempt, so a replaced file gets a new URL and the old one answers
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+ * 404. Header credentials (``X-Api-Key`` or ``Authorization``) or the
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+ * ``api_key`` query parameter authenticate the read, and any caller who can
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+ * view the dataset can read the file. The response carries a strong ETag and
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+ * honours ``Range``, ``If-Range``, ``If-Match`` and ``If-None-Match``; a
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+ * malformed byte range, or one naming no byte of the file, answers 416.
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+ * Each client may make 1200 reads a minute. A read of one byte range of up
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+ * to 16 MiB also draws its size on a budget of 1 GiB a minute, in 64 KiB
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+ * units; any other read of the file, such as one without ``Range``, counts
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+ * against a limit of 10 a minute instead. Past any of these the read answers
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+ * 429.
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+ * A page on any origin can read a public file without credentials. Through
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+ * the bundled web server it can also send header credentials; the API alone
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+ * accepts those only from the origins in ``CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS``. A
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+ * private, missing or replaced point cloud answers 404, and a storage
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+ * failure answers 502.
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+ */
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+ export const getPointcloudFileDatasetsDatasetIdCopcAttemptIdNameCopcLazGet = (options) => (options.client ?? client).get({
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+ security: [
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+ { scheme: 'bearer', type: 'http' },
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+ { name: 'X-Api-Key', type: 'apiKey' },
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+ {
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+ in: 'query',
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+ name: 'api_key',
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+ type: 'apiKey'
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+ }
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+ ],
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+ url: '/datasets/{dataset_id}/copc/{attempt_id}/{name}.copc.laz',
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+ ...options
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+ });
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  /**
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  * Get Dcat Us3 Record
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  *
@@ -2088,8 +2124,12 @@ export const validateDcat3RecordDatasetsDatasetIdDcatValidationGet = (options) =
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  *
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  * Download the Cloud-Optimized GeoTIFF for a raster dataset.
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  *
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- * Local storage: streams the COG file with Content-Type image/tiff.
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- * S3 storage: returns a 302 redirect to a presigned GET URL (1-hour expiry).
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+ * On S3 storage with presigned downloads enabled, answers 302 to a
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+ * short-lived presigned URL (at most 5 minutes, and never past the expiry of
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+ * a ``?token=`` download token); otherwise streams the object with
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+ * Content-Type image/tiff. Even then, a GET carrying If-Match, or a resume
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+ * whose If-Range no longer matches, is streamed. A COG imported by reference
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+ * redirects to its origin.
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  * Accepts standard auth or ?token= JWT query parameter for browser downloads.
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  *
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  * ``user`` may be None when a no-sub anonymous
@@ -2139,23 +2179,15 @@ export const exportDatasetEndpointDatasetsDatasetIdExportGet = (options) => (opt
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  *
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  * Return up to 5,000 features as RFC 7946 GeoJSON with Z coordinates.
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  *
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- * fix(#394) codex P2: the viewer's bounded-GeoJSON path (small 3D layers,
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- * eligible cluster layers) already sends ``X-Embed-Token``, and the
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- * shared-map union now exposes embed-scoped private layers to embeds — so
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- * this endpoint accepts the token as fallback authorization via the SAME
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- * ``validate_embed_token_access`` capability check as tile serving.
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+ * ``X-Embed-Token`` authorizes private datasets in the token's scope through
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+ * the same capability check used for tile requests.
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  *
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- * fix(#390): the non-embed path uses ``check_dataset_access_or_anonymous``
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- * so public+published datasets serve to anonymous callers (matching vector
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- * tiles and the dataset-detail read path); private/restricted datasets still
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- * 404 for anon and follow full RBAC for credentialed callers. This unblocks
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- * client clustering for anonymous public-map viewers.
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+ * Anonymous callers can read public, published datasets. Private or
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+ * restricted datasets return 404 unless user or embed credentials authorize
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+ * access.
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  *
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- * fix(#390) codex P2: a request that *supplied* credentials which failed to
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- * resolve (expired / revoked JWT) gets 401, not the anonymous 404, so the
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- * frontend's refresh-on-401 retry fires instead of a private layer
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- * permanently failing as "not found". Truly credentialless requests keep the
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- * anonymous public path.
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+ * Supplied credentials that are expired or revoked receive 401 so clients can
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+ * refresh them. Requests without credentials use the anonymous access path.
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  */
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  export const getFeaturesGeojsonZEndpointDatasetsDatasetIdFeaturesGeojsonGet = (options) => (options.client ?? client).get({
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  security: [
@@ -2175,9 +2207,9 @@ export const getFeaturesGeojsonZEndpointDatasetsDatasetIdFeaturesGeojsonGet = (o
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  *
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  * Get paginated GeoJSON features for a dataset.
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  *
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- * Pagination is OFFSET-based (fix(#458), documented limitation): rows can
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- * skip or duplicate across pages under concurrent writes, though feature ids
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- * stay stable (ORDER BY gid, the primary key). Clients that need stable
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+ * Offset pagination can skip or duplicate rows during concurrent writes,
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+ * though feature ids remain stable because rows are ordered by the primary
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+ * key. Clients that need stable
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  * cursoring should use the OGC API Features endpoint, which supports keyset
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  * pagination via ``after_gid``.
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  */
@@ -2220,6 +2252,11 @@ export const createFeatureDatasetsDatasetIdFeaturesPost = (options) => (options.
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  * Delete Single Feature
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  *
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  * Delete a feature by gid (hard delete).
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+ *
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+ * The X-GeoLens-Tile-Cache-Version response header carries the dataset's
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+ * tile_cache_version after the delete committed; a 204 response has no
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+ * body to carry it in, unlike the create, replace and patch endpoints,
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+ * which return it as a field of the written feature.
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  */
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  export const deleteSingleFeatureDatasetsDatasetIdFeaturesGidDelete = (options) => (options.client ?? client).delete({
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  security: [
@@ -2415,20 +2452,19 @@ export const getQuicklookDatasetsDatasetIdQuicklookGet = (options) => (options.c
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  * complete, so a refresh that fails leaves the live table and its freshness
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  * exactly as they were.
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  *
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- * Two origin kinds take their own execution strategy, and neither moves any
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- * data. A dataset registered from an existing PostGIS table (#1265) has an
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- * origin that IS the table it serves from, so its refresh re-measures the
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+ * Different origin kinds use different execution strategies. A dataset
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+ * registered from an existing PostGIS table serves directly from its origin,
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+ * so refresh re-measures the
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  * live relation — recounting features, recomputing the extent, rebuilding
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  * the column schema snapshot and statistics. A dataset imported from a STAC
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- * item (#1266) is nothing but a pointer at somebody else's COG, so its
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+ * item points to an external COG, so its
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  * refresh re-reads the item document and follows the asset if the publisher
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  * moved it. Admission, the run row and the history they write are identical
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  * across all three.
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  *
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  * Refuses with 409 ``dataset_busy`` while another refresh or re-upload is
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- * active for this dataset — v1 rejects rather than queues (Decision 5b), and
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- * the refusal comes from a partial unique index rather than a check, so two
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- * simultaneous clicks cannot both be admitted.
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+ * active for this dataset. A partial unique index prevents simultaneous
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+ * requests from both being admitted.
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  */
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  export const refreshDatasetDatasetsDatasetIdRefreshPost = (options) => (options.client ?? client).post({
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  security: [
@@ -2450,24 +2486,11 @@ export const refreshDatasetDatasetsDatasetIdRefreshPost = (options) => (options.
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  /**
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  * List Dataset Refresh Runs
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  *
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- * Refresh history for a dataset: every attempt, including the failures.
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- *
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- * Durable across the `ingest_jobs` retention purge — that purge is why this
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- * table exists rather than the jobs table serving as the record (#1219).
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- *
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- * Access follows Rule 1 on the read path, and ADR-002 Decision 4e adds field
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- * redaction on top: a caller who is neither the dataset owner nor an admin
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- * sees the timeline and outcomes but not who triggered each run, nor the
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- * failure text, nor the schema diff. Without that, a PUBLIC dataset's
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- * history enumerates its editors and leaks origin detail through error
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- * strings. The redaction is tested against a NAMED signed-in third party as
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- * well as an anonymous reader; a requester-scoped check that only exercises
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- * the anonymous case reads as complete and is not.
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+ * Return durable refresh history for a dataset.
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  *
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- * The owner-or-admin predicate (`can_view_dataset_provenance`) was extracted
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- * to `authorization.py` under #1316, which applies the same rule to dataset
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- * reads and `/versions/` — this endpoint's redaction is no longer the odd
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- * one out among the three.
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+ * Readers can see the timeline and outcomes. Only the dataset owner and
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+ * admins can see actors, failure details, schema changes, and verification
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+ * source data.
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  */
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  export const listDatasetRefreshRunsDatasetsDatasetIdRefreshRunsGet = (options) => (options.client ?? client).get({
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  security: [
@@ -2781,6 +2804,40 @@ export const setTargetStatusDatasetsDatasetIdTargetStatusPatch = (options) => (o
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  ...options.headers
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  }
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  });
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+ /**
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+ * Get Tileset File
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+ *
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+ * Serve one file of a published 3D Tiles tileset.
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+ *
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+ * Point a client at the dataset's ``tileset.url``, this route's
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+ * ``tileset.json``; the relative URIs inside the tileset resolve to this
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+ * same route. Header credentials (``X-Api-Key`` or ``Authorization``)
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+ * authenticate every file of a private tileset. A query-string ``api_key``
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+ * authenticates only the request it is on, so the tileset's relative URIs
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+ * lose it unless the client carries it over, as CesiumJS does through
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+ * ``Resource`` query parameters. A browser page on any origin can read a
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+ * public tileset without credentials; one that sends credentials needs its
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+ * origin on the deployment's CORS allowlist (``CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS``).
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+ * Every file carries the published tileset's
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+ * ETag and asks the client to revalidate before each reuse. Once the caller
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+ * has access and the file exists, an ``If-None-Match`` naming the current
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+ * version answers 304 and an ``If-Match`` naming another answers 412. A
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+ * private or missing tileset and a missing file all answer 404, conditional
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+ * requests included, and a storage failure answers 502.
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+ */
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+ export const getTilesetFileDatasetsDatasetIdTiles3dPathGet = (options) => (options.client ?? client).get({
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+ security: [
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+ { scheme: 'bearer', type: 'http' },
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+ { name: 'X-Api-Key', type: 'apiKey' },
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+ {
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+ in: 'query',
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+ name: 'api_key',
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+ type: 'apiKey'
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+ }
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+ ],
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+ url: '/datasets/{dataset_id}/tiles3d/{path}',
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+ ...options
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+ });
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  /**
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  * Validate Dataset
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  *
@@ -2809,12 +2866,10 @@ export const validateDatasetDatasetsDatasetIdValidateGet = (options) => (options
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  *
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  * Get paginated version history for a dataset.
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  *
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- * Access follows Rule 1 on the read path. feat(#1316): field redaction on
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- * top follows the same owner-or-admin predicate as refresh-runs and dataset
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- * reads — a caller who is neither the owner nor an admin gets the version
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+ * A caller who is neither the owner nor an administrator gets the version
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  * timeline (filenames, formats, feature counts) but not ``file_hash`` or
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- * ``uploaded_by``. Unredacted, a PUBLIC dataset's version history enumerates
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- * its editors, the exact leak ADR-002 Decision 4e closed for refresh-runs.
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+ * ``uploaded_by``. This prevents public version history from identifying
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+ * editors.
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  */
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  export const getDatasetVersionsEndpointDatasetsDatasetIdVersionsGet = (options) => (options.client ?? client).get({
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  security: [
@@ -2955,7 +3010,9 @@ export const commitFanOutIngestCommitFanOutJobIdPost = (options) => (options.cli
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  * Commit a staged file for ingestion with user-supplied metadata.
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  *
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  * Stores user metadata on the job and queues the ingest task.
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- * Only callable on jobs with status 'pending'.
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+ * Only callable on jobs with status 'pending'. A 3D Tiles tileset's unpacked
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+ * size and a point cloud's size are checked against the storage quota again
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+ * here.
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  */
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  export const commitImportIngestCommitJobIdPost = (options) => (options.client ?? client).post({
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  security: [
@@ -3026,6 +3083,11 @@ export const applyManifestEndpointIngestManifestApplyPost = (options) => (option
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  *
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  * For vector files: returns columns, CRS, geometry type, feature count, sample rows.
3028
3085
  * For raster files: returns band count, CRS, resolution, compliance status.
3086
+ * For a 3D Tiles tileset: returns its version, root geometric error, bounding
3087
+ * volume kind, extent and unpacked size, read from the archive's directory
3088
+ * and tileset.json without unpacking it.
3089
+ * For a COPC point cloud: returns its point count and format, CRS, extent,
3090
+ * elevation range and size, read from its header and hierarchy.
3029
3091
  * Only callable on jobs with status 'pending'.
3030
3092
  */
3031
3093
  export const previewFileIngestPreviewJobIdPost = (options) => (options.client ?? client).post({
@@ -3186,21 +3248,20 @@ export const completePresignedUploadIngestUploadPresignedJobIdCompletePost = (op
3186
3248
  *
3187
3249
  * Start importing a geospatial file from an HTTP(S) URL.
3188
3250
  *
3189
- * feat(#1705): the URL variant of ``POST /ingest/upload`` — NOT a new
3190
- * source type. The server fetches the file itself and the staged bytes
3191
- * enter the normal pipeline unchanged (preview then commit).
3251
+ * The server fetches the file and sends the staged bytes through the same
3252
+ * preview and commit pipeline as a direct upload. With ``kind`` set to
3253
+ * ``tiles3d`` the URL names a 3D Tiles tileset archive, which the worker
3254
+ * checks as the upload door does before the job becomes previewable.
3192
3255
  *
3193
- * feat(#1710): the download is a background job. This call validates the
3194
- * URL and returns a job id immediately; poll ``GET /jobs/{job_id}`` and
3256
+ * The download runs as a background job. This call validates the URL and
3257
+ * returns a job id immediately; poll ``GET /jobs/{job_id}`` and
3195
3258
  * preview once the job reaches ``pending``. While the file is downloading
3196
3259
  * the job reports status ``running`` with step ``downloading``.
3197
3260
  *
3198
- * Rule 2 posture: ``validate_url_for_ssrf`` gates the URL here, the worker
3199
- * downloads through ``make_safe_client()`` (connect-time IP pinning plus
3200
- * per-hop redirect revalidation), the size cap is enforced while
3201
- * streaming, the staged file passes the same extension allowlist and
3202
- * content sniff as a direct upload, and GDAL only ever sees the staged
3203
- * local file.
3261
+ * URL validation, connection-time IP pinning, and per-hop redirect checks
3262
+ * protect the download from SSRF. The worker enforces the size cap while
3263
+ * streaming, validates the staged file like a direct upload, and gives GDAL
3264
+ * only the local staged file.
3204
3265
  */
3205
3266
  export const uploadFromUrlIngestUploadUrlPost = (options) => (options.client ?? client).post({
3206
3267
  security: [
@@ -3383,22 +3444,14 @@ export const getJobStatusJobsJobIdGet = (options) => (options.client ?? client).
3383
3444
  /**
3384
3445
  * Cancel Job
3385
3446
  *
3386
- * Cancel a pending or running ingest job (imports, refreshes, and every
3387
- * other IngestJob-shaped run — feat(#1677)).
3447
+ * Cancel a pending or running ingest job.
3388
3448
  *
3389
- * The DB compare-and-swap here is the correctness mechanism: the job row
3390
- * (fenced on the attempt id read pre-CAS) and its bound refresh run flip to
3391
- * ``cancelled`` and COMMIT before anything touches the queue. A worker that
3392
- * never hears the abort still cannot install data afterwards, because every
3393
- * finalize site runs its fenced job update inside the swap transaction and
3394
- * ``require_ingest_job_update`` raises on the cancelled row, rolling the
3395
- * swap back. The Procrastinate ``abort=True`` request afterwards is
3396
- * best-effort acceleration only.
3449
+ * The database marks the job and any bound refresh run as cancelled before
3450
+ * requesting a queue abort. Transaction fencing prevents a worker from
3451
+ * installing data after cancellation even if it misses the abort request.
3397
3452
  *
3398
- * Authorization: the job's creator, a holder of the cross-user job
3399
- * capability (same arm view/retry use), or — wider than retry, on purpose —
3400
- * anyone with write access to the job's dataset, so a dataset's owner can
3401
- * always unblock their own dataset from a run someone else started.
3453
+ * The job creator, a user with cross-user job permission, or anyone with
3454
+ * write access to the job's dataset may cancel it.
3402
3455
  */
3403
3456
  export const cancelJobJobsJobIdCancelPost = (options) => (options.client ?? client).post({
3404
3457
  security: [
@@ -3529,9 +3582,8 @@ export const renameColumnEndpointLayersDatasetIdColumnsColumnNameNamePatch = (op
3529
3582
  *
3530
3583
  * Count saved maps whose layer config references a column.
3531
3584
  *
3532
- * fix(#458): surfaced in the schema editor before a rename/drop so the
3533
- * editor knows how many saved maps depend on the column. Count only — map
3534
- * titles may belong to other users and are not exposed here.
3585
+ * The schema editor uses this count before a rename or drop. Map titles are
3586
+ * omitted because they may belong to other users.
3535
3587
  */
3536
3588
  export const columnReferencesEndpointLayersDatasetIdColumnsColumnNameReferencesGet = (options) => (options.client ?? client).get({
3537
3589
  security: [
@@ -3578,6 +3630,7 @@ export const alterColumnTypeEndpointLayersDatasetIdColumnsColumnNameTypePatch =
3578
3630
  *
3579
3631
  * Supports search (ILIKE on name+description), sort_by (name/created_at/updated_at),
3580
3632
  * sort_dir (asc/desc), and visibility filter (private/internal/public).
3633
+ * owned_only restricts results to the caller's maps; anonymous callers get no maps.
3581
3634
  */
3582
3635
  export const listMapsEndpointMapsGet = (options) => (options?.client ?? client).get({
3583
3636
  security: [
@@ -3707,8 +3760,7 @@ export const importMapStyleEndpointMapsImportPost = (options) => (options.client
3707
3760
  * empty, defaults to ``frame-ancestors 'self'``. The SecurityHeadersMiddleware
3708
3761
  * respects this route-level CSP and skips emitting X-Frame-Options: DENY.
3709
3762
  *
3710
- * fix(#394): accepts ``X-Embed-Token`` so embed viewers get the layers the
3711
- * token's scope authorizes, as a capability rather than a role.
3763
+ * ``X-Embed-Token`` grants access to layers in the token's scope.
3712
3764
  */
3713
3765
  export const getSharedMapEndpointMapsSharedTokenGet = (options) => (options.client ?? client).get({
3714
3766
  security: [
@@ -5400,11 +5452,11 @@ export const searchPostStacSearchPost = (options) => (options.client ?? client).
5400
5452
  *
5401
5453
  * A tile holding no features answers 204, and a repeat request whose
5402
5454
  * ``If-None-Match`` matches answers 304. Where a deployment runs cold storage,
5403
- * a dataset still being restored answers 202 with a job id to poll. Three
5404
- * cases answer 429 with ``Retry-After``: waiting past the tile pool's
5405
- * connection budget, a tile query that outruns the pool's per-command
5406
- * timeout, and exceeding a configured per-tenant concurrency limit. Any other
5407
- * failure serving the tile answers 503.
5455
+ * a dataset still being restored answers 202 with a job id to poll. Requests
5456
+ * answer 429 with ``Retry-After`` when the per-process capacity for uncached
5457
+ * renders is full, tile-pool acquisition times out, a tile query exceeds the
5458
+ * pool's per-command timeout, or the configured per-tenant concurrency limit
5459
+ * is exceeded. Any other failure serving the tile answers 503.
5408
5460
  */
5409
5461
  export const clusterTileEndpointTilesClustersTablePathZXYPbfGet = (options) => (options.client ?? client).get({
5410
5462
  security: [
@@ -5556,7 +5608,8 @@ export const getTileTokensBatchTilesTokensPost = (options) => (options.client ??
5556
5608
  * public dataset that is not yet published is readable by its owner, by an
5557
5609
  * admin, with an embed token, or with valid signature parameters, and answers
5558
5610
  * 404 to other callers, so a refusal keeps its existence undisclosed. An
5559
- * unknown table is 404 too.
5611
+ * unknown table is 404 too, and so is a dataset without vector tiles, such as
5612
+ * a raster, once the caller is authorized to see it.
5560
5613
  *
5561
5614
  * A request that no capability authorized and that carried a credential which
5562
5615
  * did not resolve is refused with 401 rather than served as an anonymous
@@ -5574,11 +5627,11 @@ export const getTileTokensBatchTilesTokensPost = (options) => (options.client ??
5574
5627
  * A malformed table path or an out-of-range tile coordinate answers 400. A
5575
5628
  * tile holding no features answers 204, and a repeat request whose
5576
5629
  * ``If-None-Match`` matches answers 304. Where a deployment runs cold storage,
5577
- * a dataset still being restored answers 202 with a job id to poll. Three
5578
- * cases answer 429 with ``Retry-After``: waiting past the tile pool's
5579
- * connection budget, a tile query that outruns the pool's per-command
5580
- * timeout, and exceeding a configured per-tenant concurrency limit. Any other
5581
- * failure serving the tile answers 503.
5630
+ * a dataset still being restored answers 202 with a job id to poll. Requests
5631
+ * answer 429 with ``Retry-After`` when the per-process capacity for uncached
5632
+ * renders is full, tile-pool acquisition times out, a tile query exceeds the
5633
+ * pool's per-command timeout, or the configured per-tenant concurrency limit
5634
+ * is exceeded. Any other failure serving the tile answers 503.
5582
5635
  */
5583
5636
  export const tileEndpointTilesTablePathZXYPbfGet = (options) => (options.client ?? client).get({
5584
5637
  security: [