@gendigital/sage-opencode 0.9.0

package/resources/threats/commands.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+# Command threat patterns for Sage
+# Author: Gen Digital Inc.
+# License: DRL-1.1 (see threats/LICENSE)
+# Schema: id, category, severity, confidence, action, pattern, match_on, title, expires_at, revoked
+
+# --- Pipe to shell (Remote Code Execution) ---
+- id: "CLT-CMD-001"
+  category: tool
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.95
+  action: block
+  pattern: "curl\\s[^|]*\\|\\s*(bash|sh|zsh|ksh|dash)"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Remote code execution via curl pipe to shell"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "CLT-CMD-002"
+  category: tool
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.95
+  action: block
+  pattern: "wget\\s[^|]*\\|\\s*(bash|sh|zsh|ksh|dash)"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Remote code execution via wget pipe to shell"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- Reverse shells ---
+- id: "CLT-CMD-003"
+  category: tool
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.90
+  action: block
+  pattern: "/dev/tcp/"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Reverse shell via /dev/tcp"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "CLT-CMD-004"
+  category: tool
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.90
+  action: block
+  pattern: "\\bnc\\b.*\\s-e\\s"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Reverse shell via netcat -e"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "CLT-CMD-005"
+  category: tool
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.85
+  action: block
+  pattern: "bash\\s+-i\\s+>\\s*&\\s*/dev/"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Interactive reverse shell via bash"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- Destructive operations ---
+- id: "CLT-CMD-006"
+  category: tool
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.95
+  action: block
+  pattern: "\\brm\\s+(-[a-zA-Z]*f[a-zA-Z]*\\s+)?(-[a-zA-Z]*r[a-zA-Z]*\\s+)?/(\\s|$|[;&|*])|\\brm\\s+(-[a-zA-Z]*r[a-zA-Z]*\\s+)?(-[a-zA-Z]*f[a-zA-Z]*\\s+)?/(\\s|$|[;&|*])|\\brm\\s+-[a-zA-Z]*rf[a-zA-Z]*\\s+/(\\s|$|[;&|*])"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Recursive forced deletion from root"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "CLT-CMD-007"
+  category: tool
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.95
+  action: block
+  pattern: "\\bmkfs\\b"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Filesystem format command"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "CLT-CMD-008"
+  category: tool
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.85
+  action: block
+  pattern: "\\bdd\\s+if=.*of=/dev/"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Direct disk write via dd"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "CLT-CMD-009"
+  category: tool
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.90
+  action: block
+  pattern: "\\bshred\\b"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Secure file destruction via shred"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- Download + execute chains ---
+- id: "CLT-CMD-010"
+  category: tool
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.90
+  action: block
+  pattern: "(curl|wget)\\s[\\s\\S]*?(&&|;)\\s*chmod\\s+\\+x"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Download and execute chain"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- Privilege escalation ---
+- id: "CLT-CMD-011"
+  category: tool
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.80
+  action: require_approval
+  pattern: "\\bchmod\\s+777\\b"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Overly permissive file permissions"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "CLT-CMD-012"
+  category: tool
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.80
+  action: require_approval
+  pattern: "NOPASSWD"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Passwordless sudo configuration"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- Data exfiltration ---
+- id: "CLT-CMD-013"
+  category: network_egress
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.80
+  action: require_approval
+  pattern: "curl\\s[^|;]*(-d|--data|--data-binary)\\s\\S*(/etc/passwd|/etc/shadow|\\.ssh/|id_rsa|credentials|secrets)"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Possible data exfiltration of sensitive files"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- Privileged pipe to shell ---
+- id: "CLT-CMD-014"
+  category: tool
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.95
+  action: block
+  pattern: "\\bsudo\\s+(curl|wget)\\s[^|]*\\|\\s*(bash|sh|zsh|ksh|dash)"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Privileged pipe-to-shell (sudo curl/wget piped to shell)"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- Python one-liner with dangerous calls ---
+# Matches actual call sites (`name(`) rather than bare imports — `import
+# subprocess` alone is harmless; `subprocess.run(...)` is what we care about.
+# Uses `[\s\S]` to span newlines (loader does not set the `s` flag) and a
+# bounded non-greedy quantifier to avoid catastrophic backtracking.
+- id: "CLT-CMD-015"
+  category: tool
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.80
+  action: require_approval
+  pattern: "python[3]?\\s+-c\\s+[\"'][\\s\\S]{0,2048}?(?:os\\.(?:system|popen|exec[lv]?[ep]?e?)|subprocess\\.(?:run|call|Popen|check_output|check_call|getoutput|getstatusoutput)|__import__)\\s*\\("
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Python one-liner invoking shell/exec/subprocess call"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- Indirect execution patterns ---
+- id: "CLT-CMD-016"
+  category: tool
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.90
+  action: block
+  pattern: "\\bbash\\s+<\\(\\s*(curl|wget)\\b"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Process substitution executing remote content"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "CLT-CMD-017"
+  category: tool
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.85
+  action: block
+  pattern: "\\beval\\b[^;|]*\\b(curl|wget)\\b"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Eval executing remote download command"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "CLT-CMD-018"
+  category: tool
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.85
+  action: block
+  # The lookarounds prevent matching short-option flags like `du -sh` or
+  # identifiers like `shell`/`bashrc`; only standalone command invocations
+  # (preceded by whitespace, `/`, etc.) are flagged.
+  pattern: "\\bxargs\\b[^|;]*(?<![-\\w])(curl|wget|bash|sh)(?![-\\w])"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "xargs dispatching download or shell execution"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "CLT-CMD-019"
+  category: tool
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.85
+  action: block
+  pattern: "\\bfind\\b[^|;]*-exec\\s+(bash|sh|curl|wget)\\b"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "find -exec executing shell or download commands"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- DNS exfiltration ---
+- id: "CLT-CMD-020"
+  category: network_egress
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.80
+  action: block
+  pattern: "\\b(nslookup|dig|host)\\b[^|;]*\\$\\([^)]+\\)\\.[a-zA-Z]"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "DNS exfiltration via command substitution as subdomain label"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "CLT-CMD-021"
+  category: network_egress
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.80
+  action: block
+  pattern: "\\b(nslookup|dig|host)\\b[^|;]*`[^`]+`\\.[a-zA-Z]"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "DNS exfiltration via backtick substitution as subdomain label"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- Loop-based indirect execution ---
+- id: "CLT-CMD-022"
+  category: tool
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.80
+  action: block
+  pattern: "\\b(while|for)\\b[^;]*;\\s*do[^;]*(\\b(bash|sh)\\s+-c\\b|\\b(curl|wget)\\b[^;]*\\|\\s*(?:sudo\\s+)?(?:env\\s+)?(?:[^\\s\"']*[\\\\/])?(bash|sh|zsh|ksh|dash)\\b|\\b(curl|wget)\\b[^;]*(?:(-d|--data|--data-binary)\\s+['\\\"]?@\\S+|(--upload-file|-T)\\s+['\\\"]?\\S+))"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Loop executing shell or download commands"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- Cross-platform reverse shells (scripting languages) ---
+
+# Python socket reverse shell
+- id: "CLT-CMD-023"
+  category: tool
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.90
+  action: block
+  pattern: "python[23]?\\s+-c.*socket.*connect.*(\\/bin\\/zsh|\\/bin\\/sh|\\/bin\\/bash)"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Python reverse shell via socket"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# Ruby TCPSocket reverse shell
+- id: "CLT-CMD-024"
+  category: tool
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.90
+  action: block
+  pattern: "ruby\\s+-e.*TCPSocket.*exec.*(\\/bin\\/zsh|\\/bin\\/sh)"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Ruby reverse shell via TCPSocket"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# zsh -c reverse shell pattern
+- id: "CLT-CMD-025"
+  category: tool
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.90
+  action: block
+  pattern: "\\bzsh\\s+-c\\b.*\\b(exec|socket|/dev/tcp)\\b"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Zsh reverse shell pattern"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- Recursive deletion of critical system directories ---
+- id: "CLT-CMD-026"
+  category: tool
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.95
+  action: block
+  pattern: "\\brm\\s+(-[a-zA-Z]+\\s+)*-[a-zA-Z]*[rR][a-zA-Z]*(\\s+-[a-zA-Z]+)*\\s+/(home|Users|etc|usr|var|boot|bin|sbin|lib|lib64|opt|root|System|Applications|Library|Volumes|private|mnt)\\b/?(\\s|$|[;&|])"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Recursive deletion of critical system directory"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- Deletion of .env files ---
+- id: "CLT-CMD-027"
+  category: tool
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.85
+  action: require_approval
+  pattern: "\\brm\\s+(-{1,2}[\\w-]+(=\\S+)?\\s+)*(\\S+[\\\\/])?\\.env(?!\\S*\\.(example|sample|template|dist)\\b)(\\.(local|production|prod|staging|stage|development|dev|test))?\\b"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Deletion of .env file"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- Deletion of database files ---
+- id: "CLT-CMD-028"
+  category: tool
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.85
+  action: require_approval
+  pattern: "\\brm\\s+(-{1,2}[\\w-]+(=\\S+)?\\s+)*\\S+\\.(db|sqlite|sqlite3)\\b"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Deletion of database file"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- Deletion of .git directory ---
+- id: "CLT-CMD-029"
+  category: tool
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.90
+  action: require_approval
+  pattern: "\\b(rm|del|rmdir|rd|Remove-Item|unlink)\\b.*(\\s|[\\\\/])\\.git(\\s|[\\\\/]|$)"
+  case_insensitive: true
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Deletion of .git directory"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false

package/resources/threats/credentials.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+# Credential exposure threat patterns for Sage
+# Author: Gen Digital Inc.
+# License: DRL-1.1 (see threats/LICENSE)
+
+# --- Known API key prefixes ---
+- id: "CLT-CRED-001"
+  category: secrets
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.80
+  action: block
+  pattern: "(sk-[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}|sk-proj-[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}|ghp_[0-9a-zA-Z]{36}|gho_[0-9a-zA-Z]{36}|glpat-[0-9a-zA-Z_-]{20,}|xox[baprs]-[0-9a-zA-Z-]+)"
+  match_on: [command, content]
+  title: "Known API key prefix detected"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- Export of credential env vars ---
+- id: "CLT-CRED-002"
+  category: secrets
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.80
+  action: require_approval
+  pattern: "\\bexport\\s+[A-Z_]*(API_KEY|SECRET|TOKEN|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|AUTH)[A-Z_]*="
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Export of environment variable with credential keyword"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- .env file writes ---
+- id: "CLT-CRED-003"
+  category: secrets
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.80
+  action: require_approval
+  pattern: "(>>|>)\\s*\\.env(?!\\S*\\.(example|sample|template|dist)\\b)(\\.local|\\.production|\\.prod|\\.staging|\\.stage|\\.development|\\.dev|\\.test)?\\b"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Write/append to .env file (potential credential exposure)"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- Reading credential files ---
+- id: "CLT-CRED-004"
+  category: secrets
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.80
+  action: require_approval
+  pattern: "\\b(cat|less|more|head|tail)\\s+.*(\\.(env(?!\\S*\\.(example|sample|template|dist)\\b)(\\.(local|production|prod|staging|stage|development|dev|test))?)|credentials|\\.aws/credentials|\\.ssh/id_rsa|\\.ssh/id_ed25519|\\.netrc|\\.pgpass)"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Reading credential or secret file"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- Plaintext credential assignment ---
+- id: "CLT-CRED-005"
+  category: secrets
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.85
+  action: require_approval
+  pattern: "\\b(PASSWORD|API_SECRET|SECRET_KEY|PRIVATE_KEY|DB_PASSWORD|MYSQL_PASSWORD|POSTGRES_PASSWORD)=[\"']?[^\\s\"']{8,}"
+  match_on: [command, content]
+  title: "Plaintext credential assignment detected"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- Long-form API key patterns ---
+- id: "CLT-CRED-006"
+  category: secrets
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.92
+  action: block
+  pattern: "(github_pat_[0-9a-zA-Z_]{22,}|SG\\.[0-9a-zA-Z_-]{22,}\\.[0-9a-zA-Z_-]{22,}|pk_live_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24,}|sk_live_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24,}|rk_live_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24,})"
+  match_on: [command, content]
+  title: "Long-form API key pattern detected (GitHub PAT, SendGrid, Stripe)"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- Copy/move/link secret files ---
+- id: "CLT-CRED-007"
+  category: secrets
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.80
+  action: require_approval
+  # Protected files: .env*, .aws/credentials, .ssh/(id_rsa|id_ed25519|id_ecdsa|id_dsa),
+  # .netrc, .pgpass, .npmrc, .pypirc, key.properties, .docker/config.json,
+  # kubeconfig, .kube/config, master.key, credentials.yml
+  pattern: "\\b(cp|mv|ln|rsync|install|ditto)\\s+.*(?<=[\\\\/\\s])(\\.env(?!\\S*\\.(example|sample|template|dist)\\b)(\\.\\w+)?(?=[\\s\\\\/]|$)|\\.aws/credentials|\\.ssh/(id_rsa|id_ed25519|id_ecdsa|id_dsa)|\\.netrc|\\.pgpass|\\.npmrc|\\.pypirc|key\\.properties|\\.docker/config\\.json|kubeconfig|\\.kube/config|master\\.key|credentials\\.yml)"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Copy/move/link of credential or secret file"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# --- Archive secret files ---
+- id: "CLT-CRED-008"
+  category: secrets
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.80
+  action: require_approval
+  # Protected files: .env*, .aws/credentials, .ssh/(id_rsa|id_ed25519|id_ecdsa|id_dsa),
+  # .netrc, .pgpass, .npmrc, .pypirc, key.properties, .docker/config.json,
+  # kubeconfig, .kube/config, master.key, credentials.yml
+  pattern: "\\b(tar|zip|7z|rar|gzip)\\s+.*(?<=[\\\\/\\s])(\\.env(?!\\S*\\.(example|sample|template|dist)\\b)(\\.\\w+)?(?=[\\s\\\\/]|$)|\\.aws/credentials|\\.ssh/(id_rsa|id_ed25519|id_ecdsa|id_dsa)|\\.netrc|\\.pgpass|\\.npmrc|\\.pypirc|key\\.properties|\\.docker/config\\.json|kubeconfig|\\.kube/config|master\\.key|credentials\\.yml)"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "Archiving credential or secret file"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false

package/resources/threats/dummy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+# Dummy threat patterns for Sage smoke-testing
+# Author: Test — NOT real threats
+#
+# Canary rules that match completely harmless, highly-specific marker strings.
+# The "__sage_test_" prefix would never appear in real-world code,
+# making false positives essentially impossible.
+#
+# Coverage matrix:
+#   Tool           match_on    block(deny)  require_approval(ask)  log(allow)
+#   ───────────    ────────    ───────────  ─────────────────────  ──────────
+#   Bash           command     ✓ ✓          ✓ ✓                    ✓
+#   Write/Edit     file_path   ✓            ✓                      ✓
+#   Write/Edit     content     ✓            ✓                      ✓
+#   WebFetch/Bash  url         ✓            ✓                      ✓
+#   WebFetch/Bash  domain      ✓            —                      —
+#
+# The file_path rules also cover Read, Delete, Glob, and LS tools
+# (they produce the same artifact type).
+# The url rules also cover URLs embedded in Bash commands and file content.
+
+# ─── Command patterns (Bash tool) ───────────────────────────────────
+
+- id: "DUMMY-CMD-DENY-001"
+  category: testing
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.95
+  action: block
+  pattern: "__sage_test_deny_cmd_a75bf229__"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "[TEST] Canary deny command (alpha)"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "DUMMY-CMD-DENY-002"
+  category: testing
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.95
+  action: block
+  pattern: "__sage_test_deny_run_c3d91e4a__"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "[TEST] Canary deny command (bravo)"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "DUMMY-CMD-ASK-001"
+  category: testing
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.90
+  action: require_approval
+  pattern: "__sage_test_ask_cmd_8f2e6b71__"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "[TEST] Canary approval command (alpha)"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "DUMMY-CMD-ASK-002"
+  category: testing
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.90
+  action: require_approval
+  pattern: "__sage_test_ask_run_d4a09c53__"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "[TEST] Canary approval command (bravo)"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "DUMMY-CMD-LOG-001"
+  category: testing
+  severity: low
+  confidence: 0.90
+  action: log
+  pattern: "__sage_test_log_cmd_1b7e3f82__"
+  match_on: command
+  title: "[TEST] Canary log-only command"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# ─── File-path patterns (Write / Edit / Read / Delete tools) ────────
+
+- id: "DUMMY-FILE-DENY-001"
+  category: testing
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.95
+  action: block
+  pattern: "__sage_test_deny_file_e6c4a918__"
+  match_on: file_path
+  title: "[TEST] Canary deny file path"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "DUMMY-FILE-ASK-001"
+  category: testing
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.90
+  action: require_approval
+  pattern: "__sage_test_ask_file_52fd7b36__"
+  match_on: file_path
+  title: "[TEST] Canary approval file path"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "DUMMY-FILE-LOG-001"
+  category: testing
+  severity: low
+  confidence: 0.90
+  action: log
+  pattern: "__sage_test_log_file_9a13de74__"
+  match_on: file_path
+  title: "[TEST] Canary log-only file path"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# ─── Content patterns (Write / Edit tools — file body) ──────────────
+
+- id: "DUMMY-CONTENT-DENY-001"
+  category: testing
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.95
+  action: block
+  pattern: "__SAGE_TEST_DENY_CONTENT_3c8f15b7__"
+  match_on: content
+  title: "[TEST] Canary deny content"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "DUMMY-CONTENT-ASK-001"
+  category: testing
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.90
+  action: require_approval
+  pattern: "__SAGE_TEST_ASK_CONTENT_7d4ea2c9__"
+  match_on: content
+  title: "[TEST] Canary approval content"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "DUMMY-CONTENT-LOG-001"
+  category: testing
+  severity: low
+  confidence: 0.90
+  action: log
+  pattern: "__SAGE_TEST_LOG_CONTENT_f0b683d1__"
+  match_on: content
+  title: "[TEST] Canary log-only content"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# ─── URL patterns (WebFetch / Bash / Write content) ─────────────────
+# Uses .test TLD (RFC 2606 reserved, never resolves) for safety.
+
+- id: "DUMMY-URL-DENY-001"
+  category: testing
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.95
+  action: block
+  pattern: "sage-canary-deny-4e91ca37\\.test"
+  match_on: url
+  title: "[TEST] Canary deny URL"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "DUMMY-URL-ASK-001"
+  category: testing
+  severity: high
+  confidence: 0.90
+  action: require_approval
+  pattern: "sage-canary-ask-b26d80f5\\.test"
+  match_on: url
+  title: "[TEST] Canary approval URL"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+- id: "DUMMY-URL-LOG-001"
+  category: testing
+  severity: low
+  confidence: 0.90
+  action: log
+  pattern: "sage-canary-log-65f3d7a4\\.test"
+  match_on: url
+  title: "[TEST] Canary log-only URL"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false
+
+# ─── Domain pattern (verifies domain→url routing in heuristics) ─────
+
+- id: "DUMMY-DOMAIN-DENY-001"
+  category: testing
+  severity: critical
+  confidence: 0.95
+  action: block
+  pattern: "sage-canary-domain-0c82eb16\\.test"
+  match_on: domain
+  title: "[TEST] Canary deny domain"
+  expires_at: null
+  revoked: false