@gendigital/sage-openclaw 0.10.0 → 0.12.0

package/resources/threats/dummy.yaml

@@ -2,8 +2,13 @@
 # Author: Test — NOT real threats
 #
 # Canary rules that match completely harmless, highly-specific marker strings.
-# The "__sage_test_" prefix would never appear in real-world code,
-# making false positives essentially impossible.
+# The markers are deliberately OPAQUE (e.g. "diagmark_cmd_a75bf229", not
+# "__sage_test_deny_cmd_..."): a self-describing name reads as a security probe, and
+# a safety-trained model given security context (e.g. OpenCode, which injects Sage's
+# scan findings into the prompt) will REFUSE to run it — so the artifact never
+# reaches Sage and the E2E deny/ask test can't fire. Opaque markers run as rote yet
+# stay unique random strings, so false positives are essentially impossible. The
+# rule id/title carry the human-readable meaning; the hex suffix aids traceability.
 #
 # Coverage matrix:
 #   Tool           match_on    block(deny)  require_approval(ask)  log(allow)
@@ -24,8 +29,7 @@
   category: testing
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.95
-  action: block
-  pattern: "__sage_test_deny_cmd_a75bf229__"
+  pattern: "diagmark_cmd_a75bf229"
   match_on: command
   title: "[TEST] Canary deny command (alpha)"
   expires_at: null
@@ -35,8 +39,7 @@
   category: testing
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.95
-  action: block
-  pattern: "__sage_test_deny_run_c3d91e4a__"
+  pattern: "diagmark_run_c3d91e4a"
   match_on: command
   title: "[TEST] Canary deny command (bravo)"
   expires_at: null
@@ -44,10 +47,9 @@
 
 - id: "DUMMY-CMD-ASK-001"
   category: testing
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.90
-  action: require_approval
-  pattern: "__sage_test_ask_cmd_8f2e6b71__"
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
+  pattern: "diagmark_cmd_8f2e6b71"
   match_on: command
   title: "[TEST] Canary approval command (alpha)"
   expires_at: null
@@ -55,10 +57,9 @@
 
 - id: "DUMMY-CMD-ASK-002"
   category: testing
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.90
-  action: require_approval
-  pattern: "__sage_test_ask_run_d4a09c53__"
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
+  pattern: "diagmark_run_d4a09c53"
   match_on: command
   title: "[TEST] Canary approval command (bravo)"
   expires_at: null
@@ -66,14 +67,14 @@
 
 - id: "DUMMY-CMD-LOG-001"
   category: testing
-  severity: low
-  confidence: 0.90
-  action: log
-  pattern: "__sage_test_log_cmd_1b7e3f82__"
+  severity: info
+  confidence: 0.10
+  pattern: "diagmark_cmd_1b7e3f82"
   match_on: command
   title: "[TEST] Canary log-only command"
   expires_at: null
   revoked: false
+  flags: ["report"]
 
 # ─── File-path patterns (Write / Edit / Read / Delete tools) ────────
 
@@ -81,8 +82,7 @@
   category: testing
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.95
-  action: block
-  pattern: "__sage_test_deny_file_e6c4a918__"
+  pattern: "diagmark_file_e6c4a918"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "[TEST] Canary deny file path"
   expires_at: null
@@ -90,10 +90,9 @@
 
 - id: "DUMMY-FILE-ASK-001"
   category: testing
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.90
-  action: require_approval
-  pattern: "__sage_test_ask_file_52fd7b36__"
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
+  pattern: "diagmark_file_52fd7b36"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "[TEST] Canary approval file path"
   expires_at: null
@@ -101,14 +100,14 @@
 
 - id: "DUMMY-FILE-LOG-001"
   category: testing
-  severity: low
-  confidence: 0.90
-  action: log
-  pattern: "__sage_test_log_file_9a13de74__"
+  severity: info
+  confidence: 0.10
+  pattern: "diagmark_file_9a13de74"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "[TEST] Canary log-only file path"
   expires_at: null
   revoked: false
+  flags: ["report"]
 
 # ─── Content patterns (Write / Edit tools — file body) ──────────────
 
@@ -116,8 +115,7 @@
   category: testing
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.95
-  action: block
-  pattern: "__SAGE_TEST_DENY_CONTENT_3c8f15b7__"
+  pattern: "diagmark_content_3c8f15b7"
   match_on: content
   title: "[TEST] Canary deny content"
   expires_at: null
@@ -125,10 +123,9 @@
 
 - id: "DUMMY-CONTENT-ASK-001"
   category: testing
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.90
-  action: require_approval
-  pattern: "__SAGE_TEST_ASK_CONTENT_7d4ea2c9__"
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
+  pattern: "diagmark_content_7d4ea2c9"
   match_on: content
   title: "[TEST] Canary approval content"
   expires_at: null
@@ -136,14 +133,14 @@
 
 - id: "DUMMY-CONTENT-LOG-001"
   category: testing
-  severity: low
-  confidence: 0.90
-  action: log
-  pattern: "__SAGE_TEST_LOG_CONTENT_f0b683d1__"
+  severity: info
+  confidence: 0.10
+  pattern: "diagmark_content_f0b683d1"
   match_on: content
   title: "[TEST] Canary log-only content"
   expires_at: null
   revoked: false
+  flags: ["report"]
 
 # ─── URL patterns (WebFetch / Bash / Write content) ─────────────────
 # Uses .test TLD (RFC 2606 reserved, never resolves) for safety.
@@ -152,8 +149,7 @@
   category: testing
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.95
-  action: block
-  pattern: "sage-canary-deny-4e91ca37\\.test"
+  pattern: "diaghost-4e91ca37\\.test"
   match_on: url
   title: "[TEST] Canary deny URL"
   expires_at: null
@@ -161,10 +157,9 @@
 
 - id: "DUMMY-URL-ASK-001"
   category: testing
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.90
-  action: require_approval
-  pattern: "sage-canary-ask-b26d80f5\\.test"
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
+  pattern: "diaghost-b26d80f5\\.test"
   match_on: url
   title: "[TEST] Canary approval URL"
   expires_at: null
@@ -172,14 +167,14 @@
 
 - id: "DUMMY-URL-LOG-001"
   category: testing
-  severity: low
-  confidence: 0.90
-  action: log
-  pattern: "sage-canary-log-65f3d7a4\\.test"
+  severity: info
+  confidence: 0.10
+  pattern: "diaghost-65f3d7a4\\.test"
   match_on: url
   title: "[TEST] Canary log-only URL"
   expires_at: null
   revoked: false
+  flags: ["report"]
 
 # ─── Domain pattern (verifies domain→url routing in heuristics) ─────
 
@@ -187,8 +182,7 @@
   category: testing
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.95
-  action: block
-  pattern: "sage-canary-domain-0c82eb16\\.test"
+  pattern: "diaghost-0c82eb16\\.test"
   match_on: domain
   title: "[TEST] Canary deny domain"
   expires_at: null

package/resources/threats/files.yaml

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
   category: secrets
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.95
-  action: block
   pattern: "(/etc/passwd|/etc/shadow|/etc/sudoers)"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "Access system authentication file"
@@ -20,7 +19,6 @@
   category: secrets
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.95
-  action: block
   pattern: "\\.ssh/authorized_keys"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "Access SSH authorized_keys (unauthorized access persistence)"
@@ -30,9 +28,8 @@
 # --- SSH private keys and config ---
 - id: "CLT-FILE-003"
   category: secrets
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.90
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "\\.ssh/(id_rsa|id_ed25519|id_ecdsa|id_dsa|config)$"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "Access SSH key or config file"
@@ -42,9 +39,8 @@
 # --- Shell RC files ---
 - id: "CLT-FILE-004"
   category: tool
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "\\.(bashrc|zshrc|profile|bash_profile|zprofile|zshenv)$"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "Access shell RC file (persistence mechanism)"
@@ -54,9 +50,8 @@
 # --- Cron directories ---
 - id: "CLT-FILE-006"
   category: tool
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "(/etc/cron\\.(d|daily|hourly|weekly|monthly)/|/var/spool/cron/)"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "Access cron directory"
@@ -66,9 +61,8 @@
 # --- systemd unit files ---
 - id: "CLT-FILE-007"
   category: tool
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "/etc/systemd/system/"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "Access systemd service unit file"
@@ -82,9 +76,8 @@
 # targeted than command-string matching.
 - id: "CLT-FILE-008"
   category: secrets
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "((^|[\\/\\\\])\\.env(\\.local|\\.production|\\.prod|\\.staging|\\.stage|\\.development|\\.dev|\\.test)?|\\.aws/credentials|\\.netrc|\\.pgpass)$"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "Access credential or environment file"
@@ -94,9 +87,8 @@
 # --- Git hooks ---
 - id: "CLT-FILE-009"
   category: tool
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "\\.git/hooks/"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "Access git hook (potential code execution on git events)"
@@ -106,9 +98,8 @@
 # --- Android signing files ---
 - id: "CLT-FILE-010"
   category: secrets
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "(key\\.properties|release\\.keystore|\\.jks|\\.keystore)$"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "Access Android signing file"
@@ -118,9 +109,8 @@
 # --- Firebase config files ---
 - id: "CLT-FILE-011"
   category: secrets
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "(google-services\\.json|GoogleService-Info\\.plist)$"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "Access Firebase configuration file"
@@ -130,9 +120,8 @@
 # --- Cloud provider credential files ---
 - id: "CLT-FILE-012"
   category: secrets
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "(application_default_credentials\\.json|\\.azure/(accessTokens|msal_token_cache)\\.json|\\.config/doctl/config\\.yaml)$"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "Access cloud provider credential file"
@@ -142,9 +131,8 @@
 # --- Package manager tokens ---
 - id: "CLT-FILE-013"
   category: secrets
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "(\\.npmrc|\\.pypirc|\\.gem/credentials|\\.cargo/credentials\\.toml|\\.docker/config\\.json)$"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "Access package manager credential file"
@@ -154,9 +142,8 @@
 # --- Terraform state files ---
 - id: "CLT-FILE-014"
   category: secrets
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "\\.(tfstate(\\.backup)?|tfvars(\\.json)?)$"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "Access Terraform state or variables file"
@@ -166,9 +153,8 @@
 # --- Secrets/vault files ---
 - id: "CLT-FILE-015"
   category: secrets
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "(master\\.key|credentials\\.yml\\.enc|secrets\\.yml|vault\\.yml|\\.vault-pass|\\.vault-token)$"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "Access secrets or vault file"
@@ -181,9 +167,8 @@
 # would miss private key exfiltration.
 - id: "CLT-FILE-016"
   category: secrets
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "\\.(pem|p12|pfx|p8)$"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "Access private key or certificate file"
@@ -193,9 +178,8 @@
 # --- Kubeconfig ---
 - id: "CLT-FILE-017"
   category: secrets
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "(\\.kube/config|kubeconfig(\\.yaml|\\.yml)?)$"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "Access Kubernetes configuration file"
@@ -205,9 +189,8 @@
 # --- Build system credential files ---
 - id: "CLT-FILE-018"
   category: secrets
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "(\\.m2/settings\\.xml|gradle\\.properties)$"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "Access build system credential file"
@@ -217,9 +200,8 @@
 # --- Shell/REPL history files ---
 - id: "CLT-FILE-019"
   category: secrets
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "\\.(bash_history|zsh_history|mysql_history|python_history|node_repl_history|psql_history|irb_history)$"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "Access shell or REPL history file"
@@ -229,9 +211,8 @@
 # --- JetBrains IDE database credentials ---
 - id: "CLT-FILE-020"
   category: secrets
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "\\.idea/dataSources(\\.xml|/)"
   match_on: file_path
   title: "Access JetBrains IDE database credential file"

package/resources/threats/mac-commands.yaml

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@
   category: tool
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.95
-  action: block
   pattern: "\\bosascript\\b.*-e.*do shell script"
   case_insensitive: true
   match_on: command
@@ -23,7 +22,6 @@
   category: tool
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.90
-  action: block
   pattern: "\\bosascript\\b.*-l\\s+JavaScript"
   case_insensitive: true
   match_on: command
@@ -36,7 +34,6 @@
   category: tool
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.90
-  action: block
   pattern: "\\|\\s*osascript"
   match_on: command
   title: "Piped input to osascript (stdin AppleScript execution)"
@@ -48,7 +45,6 @@
   category: tool
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.90
-  action: block
   pattern: "(curl|wget).*\\|.*osascript|osascript.*(curl|wget)"
   case_insensitive: true
   match_on: command
@@ -61,9 +57,8 @@
 # open -a Terminal (launch Terminal with script)
 - id: "CLT-MAC-CMD-005"
   category: tool
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.80
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "\\bopen\\s+-a\\s+Terminal"
   match_on: command
   title: "Launch Terminal application via open -a"
@@ -73,9 +68,8 @@
 # open with hidden/background flags
 - id: "CLT-MAC-CMD-006"
   category: tool
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "\\bopen\\s+(-[jg]|--hide|--background)"
   match_on: command
   title: "Launch application hidden/background via open"
@@ -87,9 +81,8 @@
 # dscl user/group manipulation
 - id: "CLT-MAC-CMD-007"
   category: tool
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "\\bdscl\\b.*(-create|-delete|-passwd|-append)"
   match_on: command
   title: "Directory Services user/group manipulation via dscl"
@@ -99,9 +92,8 @@
 # networksetup proxy/DNS manipulation
 - id: "CLT-MAC-CMD-008"
   category: tool
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "\\bnetworksetup\\b.*(-setwebproxy|-setsocksfirewallproxy|-setdnsservers|-setautoproxyurl)"
   case_insensitive: true
   match_on: command
@@ -114,7 +106,6 @@
   category: tool
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.90
-  action: block
   pattern: "\\bsystemsetup\\b.*(-setremotelogin\\s+on|-setwakeonnetworkaccess\\s+on)"
   case_insensitive: true
   match_on: command
@@ -127,7 +118,6 @@
   category: tool
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.90
-  action: block
   pattern: "kickstart.*-activate.*-configure"
   case_insensitive: true
   match_on: command
@@ -138,9 +128,8 @@
 # installer -pkg -target / (silent package install)
 - id: "CLT-MAC-CMD-011"
   category: tool
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "\\binstaller\\b.*-pkg.*-target"
   case_insensitive: true
   match_on: command
@@ -151,9 +140,8 @@
 # hdiutil mount remote DMG
 - id: "CLT-MAC-CMD-012"
   category: tool
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "\\bhdiutil\\b.*\\b(attach|mount)\\b.*https?://"
   case_insensitive: true
   match_on: command
@@ -164,9 +152,8 @@
 # pkgutil --forget (package receipt manipulation)
 - id: "CLT-MAC-CMD-013"
   category: tool
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.80
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "\\bpkgutil\\b.*--forget"
   match_on: command
   title: "Package receipt removal via pkgutil --forget"
@@ -180,7 +167,6 @@
   category: tool
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.95
-  action: block
   pattern: "\\bdiskutil\\b.*\\b(eraseDisk|partitionDisk|secureErase)\\b"
   match_on: command
   title: "Disk erase/partition via diskutil"
@@ -192,7 +178,6 @@
   category: tool
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.95
-  action: block
   pattern: "\\btmutil\\b.*\\b(delete|disable)\\b"
   match_on: command
   title: "Time Machine backup deletion/disable via tmutil (ransomware indicator)"
@@ -206,7 +191,6 @@
   category: tool
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.95
-  action: block
   pattern: "\\bspctl\\b.*--master-disable"
   match_on: command
   title: "Gatekeeper disable via spctl --master-disable"
@@ -218,7 +202,6 @@
   category: tool
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.95
-  action: block
   pattern: "\\bcsrutil\\b.*\\bdisable\\b"
   match_on: command
   title: "System Integrity Protection disable via csrutil"
@@ -230,7 +213,6 @@
   category: tool
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.90
-  action: block
   pattern: "\\bdefaults\\b.*\\bwrite\\b.*LSQuarantine"
   case_insensitive: true
   match_on: command
@@ -241,9 +223,8 @@
 # xattr -d com.apple.quarantine (quarantine removal)
 - id: "CLT-MAC-CMD-019"
   category: tool
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.85
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "\\bxattr\\b.*-d.*com\\.apple\\.quarantine"
   match_on: command
   title: "Quarantine attribute removal via xattr"
@@ -255,7 +236,6 @@
   category: tool
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.90
-  action: block
   pattern: "\\bpfctl\\b.*\\s-d\\b"
   match_on: command
   title: "Packet filter (firewall) disable via pfctl -d"
@@ -267,7 +247,6 @@
   category: tool
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.90
-  action: block
   pattern: "\\btccutil\\b.*\\breset\\b"
   match_on: command
   title: "TCC privacy permissions reset via tccutil"
@@ -279,7 +258,6 @@
   category: tool
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.90
-  action: block
   pattern: "\\blaunchctl\\b.*\\b(unload|bootout)\\b.*(com\\.apple\\.MRT|com\\.apple\\.XProtect|com\\.apple\\.security)"
   case_insensitive: true
   match_on: command
@@ -292,7 +270,6 @@
   category: tool
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.90
-  action: block
   pattern: "\\bdefaults\\b.*\\bwrite\\b.*(com\\.apple\\.Finder\\s+AppleShowAllFiles|com\\.apple\\.LaunchServices\\s+LSQuarantine|com\\.apple\\.loginwindow)"
   case_insensitive: true
   match_on: command
@@ -307,7 +284,6 @@
   category: tool
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.90
-  action: block
   pattern: "\\bdscl\\b.*\\s-passwd\\b"
   match_on: command
   title: "User password change via dscl"
@@ -319,7 +295,6 @@
   category: tool
   severity: critical
   confidence: 0.95
-  action: block
   pattern: "\\bdseditgroup\\b.*-o\\s+edit.*-a.*admin"
   match_on: command
   title: "Add user to admin group via dseditgroup"
@@ -329,9 +304,8 @@
 # createhomedir — create home directory for arbitrary user
 - id: "CLT-MAC-CMD-026"
   category: tool
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.80
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "\\bcreatehomedir\\b"
   match_on: command
   title: "Create home directory for user via createhomedir"
@@ -345,9 +319,8 @@
 # screencapture to remote or hidden location
 - id: "CLT-MAC-CMD-027"
   category: tool
-  severity: high
-  confidence: 0.80
-  action: require_approval
+  severity: warning
+  confidence: 0.60
   pattern: "\\bscreencapture\\b.*(-x|-C)"
   match_on: command
   title: "Silent screen capture via screencapture"