@geml/geml 1.3.2 → 1.4.2

package/codemap/recipe-trust.mjs

@@ -1,103 +1,103 @@
-// Shared TRUST GATE for codemap recipes (security fix C2 — RCE).
-//
-// A codemap's _index/refresh.json is COMMITTED DATA whose `steps[]` are run
-// through a shell by `geml codemap refresh` (spawnSync(step,{shell:true})).
-// Cloning a hostile repo and running `geml codemap refresh` — which the
-// geml-code-graph skill, `serve --watch`, and a PostToolUse hook all trigger —
-// would otherwise execute arbitrary commands. The old "up-to-date" guard is
-// bypassable and does not gate execution.
-//
-// The fix content-addresses each recipe (a stable fingerprint of its steps)
-// and records which fingerprints the user has EXPLICITLY approved in a store
-// kept OUTSIDE any repo (so a repo can never pre-approve itself). refresh
-// refuses to execute a recipe whose fingerprint is not in the store; build
-// auto-trusts the recipe it just authored (the user ran it locally).
-//
-// Trust gates WHO may run a recipe. Security fix R2-1 additionally changed HOW
-// steps are stored: a step is now a STRUCTURED object { cwd?, env?, argv:[...] }
-// so attacker-controllable paths are never interpolated into a shell string at
-// rest, and refresh executes them without an attacker-influenced command line.
-// The fingerprint below canonicalizes that structured form.
-import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
-import { homedir } from "node:os";
-import { join, dirname } from "node:path";
-import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from "node:fs";
-
-export const RECIPE_VERSION = 1;   // on-disk step schema; bump ONLY on a real format change
-
-// Canonicalize ONE recipe step for fingerprinting. Since security fix R2-1 a
-// step is a STRUCTURED object { cwd?, env?, argv:[...] } (no shell string is
-// ever stored). We emit a FIXED key order (cwd, env, argv), env keys SORTED so
-// the fingerprint is independent of how the env map was built, and every value
-// coerced to a string. Anything that is NOT a structured step (a legacy
-// pre-R2-1 shell string, or a malformed entry) coerces to its String() form, so
-// pre-existing string recipes keep the EXACT fingerprint they had before this
-// change (backward compatible), while structured recipes get a stable identity.
-function canonicalStep(step) {
-  if (step && typeof step === "object" && Array.isArray(step.argv)) {
-    const out = {};
-    if (step.cwd != null) out.cwd = String(step.cwd);
-    if (step.env && typeof step.env === "object") {
-      const env = {};
-      for (const k of Object.keys(step.env).sort()) env[k] = String(step.env[k]);
-      out.env = env;
-    }
-    out.argv = step.argv.map((a) => String(a));
-    return out;
-  }
-  return String(step);
-}
-
-// Fingerprint = sha256 over a canonical JSON of {root, steps}. build (when it
-// records refresh.json) and refresh (when it is about to run it) both call
-// this on the same parsed recipe object, so they agree exactly. `root` is
-// included because it is the base dir every step runs under — the same steps
-// under a different root are a different execution and deserve a different
-// identity. Deterministic: fixed key order, canonicalized steps, no timestamps.
-export function recipeFingerprint(recipe) {
-  const steps = Array.isArray(recipe?.steps) ? recipe.steps.map(canonicalStep) : [];
-  const root = recipe?.root == null ? "" : String(recipe.root);
-  const canonical = JSON.stringify({ root, steps });
-  return createHash("sha256").update(canonical, "utf8").digest("hex");
-}
-
-// Where the trust store lives — NEVER inside a repo. GEML_TRUST_STORE is an
-// explicit override (test isolation / unusual homes). Otherwise it sits under
-// the XDG config dir, falling back to ~/.config/geml, which is a sane
-// cross-platform home (on Windows homedir() is C:\Users\<name>).
-export function trustStorePath() {
-  if (process.env.GEML_TRUST_STORE) return process.env.GEML_TRUST_STORE;
-  const cfgHome = process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME || join(homedir(), ".config");
-  return join(cfgHome, "geml", "trusted-recipes.json");
-}
-
-// Read the store DEFENSIVELY: a missing, unreadable, or malformed store means
-// "nothing is trusted". A broken store must never silently trust a recipe.
-export function readTrustStore() {
-  try {
-    const obj = JSON.parse(readFileSync(trustStorePath(), "utf8"));
-    if (obj && typeof obj === "object" && obj.recipes && typeof obj.recipes === "object") {
-      return { version: obj.version || 1, recipes: obj.recipes };
-    }
-  } catch { /* missing / unreadable / malformed: treat as empty */ }
-  return { version: 1, recipes: {} };
-}
-
-// True only when this exact recipe fingerprint has been approved.
-export function isRecipeTrusted(fingerprint) {
-  const store = readTrustStore();
-  return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(store.recipes, fingerprint);
-}
-
-// Record a fingerprint as trusted, MERGING into any existing store (never
-// clobbering other approvals). Creates parent dirs. Returns the store path.
-// THROWS on write failure: a caller that meant to trust must learn it did NOT,
-// rather than proceed on the false belief that the recipe is now safe.
-export function trustRecipe(fingerprint, graphDir) {
-  const store = readTrustStore();
-  store.recipes[fingerprint] = { graphDir: graphDir ? String(graphDir) : undefined, addedAt: Date.now() };
-  const p = trustStorePath();
-  mkdirSync(dirname(p), { recursive: true });
-  writeFileSync(p, JSON.stringify(store, null, 2) + "\n");
-  return p;
-}
+// Shared TRUST GATE for codemap recipes (security fix C2 — RCE).
+//
+// A codemap's _index/refresh.json is COMMITTED DATA whose `steps[]` are run
+// through a shell by `geml codemap refresh` (spawnSync(step,{shell:true})).
+// Cloning a hostile repo and running `geml codemap refresh` — which the
+// geml-code-graph skill, `serve --watch`, and a PostToolUse hook all trigger —
+// would otherwise execute arbitrary commands. The old "up-to-date" guard is
+// bypassable and does not gate execution.
+//
+// The fix content-addresses each recipe (a stable fingerprint of its steps)
+// and records which fingerprints the user has EXPLICITLY approved in a store
+// kept OUTSIDE any repo (so a repo can never pre-approve itself). refresh
+// refuses to execute a recipe whose fingerprint is not in the store; build
+// auto-trusts the recipe it just authored (the user ran it locally).
+//
+// Trust gates WHO may run a recipe. Security fix R2-1 additionally changed HOW
+// steps are stored: a step is now a STRUCTURED object { cwd?, env?, argv:[...] }
+// so attacker-controllable paths are never interpolated into a shell string at
+// rest, and refresh executes them without an attacker-influenced command line.
+// The fingerprint below canonicalizes that structured form.
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { homedir } from "node:os";
+import { join, dirname } from "node:path";
+import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from "node:fs";
+
+export const RECIPE_VERSION = 1;   // on-disk step schema; bump ONLY on a real format change
+
+// Canonicalize ONE recipe step for fingerprinting. Since security fix R2-1 a
+// step is a STRUCTURED object { cwd?, env?, argv:[...] } (no shell string is
+// ever stored). We emit a FIXED key order (cwd, env, argv), env keys SORTED so
+// the fingerprint is independent of how the env map was built, and every value
+// coerced to a string. Anything that is NOT a structured step (a legacy
+// pre-R2-1 shell string, or a malformed entry) coerces to its String() form, so
+// pre-existing string recipes keep the EXACT fingerprint they had before this
+// change (backward compatible), while structured recipes get a stable identity.
+function canonicalStep(step) {
+  if (step && typeof step === "object" && Array.isArray(step.argv)) {
+    const out = {};
+    if (step.cwd != null) out.cwd = String(step.cwd);
+    if (step.env && typeof step.env === "object") {
+      const env = {};
+      for (const k of Object.keys(step.env).sort()) env[k] = String(step.env[k]);
+      out.env = env;
+    }
+    out.argv = step.argv.map((a) => String(a));
+    return out;
+  }
+  return String(step);
+}
+
+// Fingerprint = sha256 over a canonical JSON of {root, steps}. build (when it
+// records refresh.json) and refresh (when it is about to run it) both call
+// this on the same parsed recipe object, so they agree exactly. `root` is
+// included because it is the base dir every step runs under — the same steps
+// under a different root are a different execution and deserve a different
+// identity. Deterministic: fixed key order, canonicalized steps, no timestamps.
+export function recipeFingerprint(recipe) {
+  const steps = Array.isArray(recipe?.steps) ? recipe.steps.map(canonicalStep) : [];
+  const root = recipe?.root == null ? "" : String(recipe.root);
+  const canonical = JSON.stringify({ root, steps });
+  return createHash("sha256").update(canonical, "utf8").digest("hex");
+}
+
+// Where the trust store lives — NEVER inside a repo. GEML_TRUST_STORE is an
+// explicit override (test isolation / unusual homes). Otherwise it sits under
+// the XDG config dir, falling back to ~/.config/geml, which is a sane
+// cross-platform home (on Windows homedir() is C:\Users\<name>).
+export function trustStorePath() {
+  if (process.env.GEML_TRUST_STORE) return process.env.GEML_TRUST_STORE;
+  const cfgHome = process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME || join(homedir(), ".config");
+  return join(cfgHome, "geml", "trusted-recipes.json");
+}
+
+// Read the store DEFENSIVELY: a missing, unreadable, or malformed store means
+// "nothing is trusted". A broken store must never silently trust a recipe.
+export function readTrustStore() {
+  try {
+    const obj = JSON.parse(readFileSync(trustStorePath(), "utf8"));
+    if (obj && typeof obj === "object" && obj.recipes && typeof obj.recipes === "object") {
+      return { version: obj.version || 1, recipes: obj.recipes };
+    }
+  } catch { /* missing / unreadable / malformed: treat as empty */ }
+  return { version: 1, recipes: {} };
+}
+
+// True only when this exact recipe fingerprint has been approved.
+export function isRecipeTrusted(fingerprint) {
+  const store = readTrustStore();
+  return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(store.recipes, fingerprint);
+}
+
+// Record a fingerprint as trusted, MERGING into any existing store (never
+// clobbering other approvals). Creates parent dirs. Returns the store path.
+// THROWS on write failure: a caller that meant to trust must learn it did NOT,
+// rather than proceed on the false belief that the recipe is now safe.
+export function trustRecipe(fingerprint, graphDir) {
+  const store = readTrustStore();
+  store.recipes[fingerprint] = { graphDir: graphDir ? String(graphDir) : undefined, addedAt: Date.now() };
+  const p = trustStorePath();
+  mkdirSync(dirname(p), { recursive: true });
+  writeFileSync(p, JSON.stringify(store, null, 2) + "\n");
+  return p;
+}