@geekmidas/db 10.0.0-alpha.6 → 10.0.0-alpha.60

package/dist/pg/roles.cjs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-
+Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
 //#region src/pg/roles.ts
 /**
 * Everything one tenant's roles need, in dependency order.
@@ -8,18 +8,20 @@
 * leaving a half-granted role that looks complete.
 */
 function roleStatements(spec) {
-	const { runtime, owner, schema, passwords } = spec;
+	const { runtime, owner, schema, passwords, database } = spec;
 	return [
 		{
 			describe: `role ${owner}`,
 			exists: roleExists(owner),
 			sql: `CREATE ROLE ${ident(owner)} LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(passwords.owner)}`
 		},
+		passwordStatement(owner, passwords.owner),
 		{
 			describe: `role ${runtime}`,
 			exists: roleExists(runtime),
 			sql: `CREATE ROLE ${ident(runtime)} LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(passwords.runtime)}`
 		},
+		passwordStatement(runtime, passwords.runtime),
 		{
 			describe: `${owner} granted to the connecting role`,
 			sql: `GRANT ${ident(owner)} TO CURRENT_USER`
@@ -36,6 +38,10 @@ function roleStatements(spec) {
 			describe: `${schema} is owned by ${owner}`,
 			sql: `ALTER SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} OWNER TO ${ident(owner)}`
 		},
+		...database ? [{
+			describe: `${owner} may create in database ${database}`,
+			sql: `GRANT CREATE ON DATABASE ${ident(database)} TO ${ident(owner)}`
+		}] : [],
 		{
 			describe: `${runtime} may use ${schema}`,
 			sql: `GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} TO ${ident(runtime)}`
@@ -68,6 +74,21 @@ function roleStatements(spec) {
 	];
 }
 /**
+* The role's password, set to what the caller supplied — every time.
+*
+* `CREATE ROLE` only runs for a role that is not there, so on its own a role
+* keeps the password it was born with, and an app handed a different one is
+* locked out. Setting it on every apply is what lets the supplied password be
+* the truth: rotated, or re-derived, the role follows. Idempotent, so it needs
+* no check.
+*/
+function passwordStatement(role, password) {
+	return {
+		describe: `${role} has its current password`,
+		sql: `ALTER ROLE ${ident(role)} WITH LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(password)}`
+	};
+}
+/**
 * A role that may read and nothing else.
 *
 * `SELECT` and no more, on what exists and on what the owner creates later. No
@@ -85,6 +106,7 @@ function readerStatements(spec, reader) {
 			exists: roleExists(reader),
 			sql: `CREATE ROLE ${ident(reader)} LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(password)}`
 		},
+		passwordStatement(reader, password),
 		{
 			describe: `${reader} may use ${schema}`,
 			sql: `GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} TO ${ident(reader)}`
@@ -105,6 +127,7 @@ function readerStatements(spec, reader) {
 }
 /** A reader role was named and no password was supplied for it. */
 var ReaderNeedsPassword = class extends Error {
+	role;
 	constructor(role) {
 		super(`'${role}' is a reader role and no password was supplied for it. This module composes DDL and invents no secrets: pass passwords.reader alongside the role name.`);
 		this.role = role;
@@ -145,10 +168,10 @@ function ident(name) {
 function literal(value) {
 	return `'${value.replace(/'/g, "''")}'`;
 }
-
 //#endregion
 exports.ReaderNeedsPassword = ReaderNeedsPassword;
 exports.ownerRole = ownerRole;
 exports.readerRole = readerRole;
 exports.roleStatements = roleStatements;
+
 //# sourceMappingURL=roles.cjs.map

package/dist/pg/roles.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"roles.cjs","names":["spec: RoleSpec","reader: string","role: string","runtime: string","name: string","value: string"],"sources":["../../src/pg/roles.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * The role DDL — an owner, a runtime role, and the grants between them.\n *\n * Generation only. The same statements have to run in-process from `gkm dev`\n * and from a provisioner inside a VPC at deploy, and one implementation is what\n * stops \"works locally, fails deployed\" — so this composes SQL and applies\n * none of it.\n *\n * **What the split is for.** A handler connects as the runtime role, which can\n * read and write rows and cannot create, alter, or drop anything. A migrator\n * connects as the owner, which can. That is a security property rather than a\n * convention — a compromised handler cannot `DROP TABLE` because its role holds\n * no such grant — and it is only a property at all once these statements have\n * actually run. Until then a schema is a namespace, not a boundary.\n *\n * **Passwords are an input.** This module invents no secrets: a caller derives\n * or fetches them and passes them in, because where a password comes from is\n * the one part that legitimately differs between a laptop and a deploy.\n */\n\n/** The roles and schema one tenant needs. */\nexport interface RoleSpec {\n\t/** The role a handler connects as. Reads and writes rows; owns nothing. */\n\truntime: string;\n\t/** The role a migrator connects as. Owns the schema and everything in it. */\n\towner: string;\n\t/**\n\t * A third role that may only read, for a reader endpoint.\n\t *\n\t * Optional because it is only worth creating where something points at it.\n\t * Read-only is enforced *here*, by the grants, rather than by which endpoint\n\t * a URL happens to name — which is what makes falling back to the writer's\n\t * endpoint safe when a cluster has no replica.\n\t */\n\treader?: string;\n\t/** The schema they operate in, pinned on every role's `search_path`. */\n\tschema: string;\n\t/** Supplied, never generated here. */\n\tpasswords: { runtime: string; owner: string; reader?: string };\n}\n\n/** One statement, and how to tell whether it still needs running. */\nexport interface RoleStatement {\n\t/** What it does, for the line a reconciler prints. */\n\tdescribe: string;\n\t/**\n\t * Answers \"does this already exist\", parameterised.\n\t *\n\t * Absent means the statement is idempotent in itself and is run every time —\n\t * a `GRANT` re-granting what is already granted is a no-op, and checking\n\t * would cost a round trip to learn nothing.\n\t */\n\texists?: { sql: string; values: unknown[] };\n\tsql: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Everything one tenant's roles need, in dependency order.\n *\n * The owner before the schema it owns, the schema before the grants on it. A\n * caller applies them in sequence and may stop at the first failure without\n * leaving a half-granted role that looks complete.\n */\nexport function roleStatements(spec: RoleSpec): RoleStatement[] {\n\tconst { runtime, owner, schema, passwords } = spec;\n\n\treturn [\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `role ${owner}`,\n\t\t\texists: roleExists(owner),\n\t\t\tsql: `CREATE ROLE ${ident(owner)} LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(passwords.owner)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `role ${runtime}`,\n\t\t\texists: roleExists(runtime),\n\t\t\tsql: `CREATE ROLE ${ident(runtime)} LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(passwords.runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// Postgres will not let you create an object owned by a role you are\n\t\t\t// not a member of, and an RDS master is not a superuser — so\n\t\t\t// `CREATE SCHEMA … AUTHORIZATION` fails with \"must be able to SET\n\t\t\t// ROLE\" unless the connected role is granted membership first.\n\t\t\t//\n\t\t\t// Granting is idempotent and needs no check. It also leaves the master\n\t\t\t// able to administer the schema, which is what you want from the one\n\t\t\t// credential that exists before any role does.\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${owner} granted to the connecting role`,\n\t\t\tsql: `GRANT ${ident(owner)} TO CURRENT_USER`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `schema ${schema}`,\n\t\t\texists: {\n\t\t\t\tsql: 'SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.schemata WHERE schema_name = $1',\n\t\t\t\tvalues: [schema],\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t// Owned by the owner from the moment it exists. Creating it as the\n\t\t\t// cluster master and granting afterwards leaves a window where the\n\t\t\t// master owns objects the owner is supposed to.\n\t\t\tsql: `CREATE SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} AUTHORIZATION ${ident(owner)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// And the schema that was already there, which the guard above skips.\n\t\t\t// A schema created before its roles existed is owned by whoever\n\t\t\t// created it — the cluster master — and nothing below fixes that, so\n\t\t\t// the owner cannot create in the schema it is supposed to own. The\n\t\t\t// failure is `no schema has been selected to create in`, which names\n\t\t\t// neither the schema nor the owner and reads like a missing\n\t\t\t// `search_path`.\n\t\t\t//\n\t\t\t// Idempotent when the owner is already right, so it costs a statement\n\t\t\t// rather than a check.\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${schema} is owned by ${owner}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `ALTER SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} OWNER TO ${ident(owner)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} may use ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} TO ${ident(runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// The important half: *future* tables. A grant on what exists today\n\t\t\t// covers nothing the next migration creates, which is how a runtime\n\t\t\t// role silently loses access one deploy later.\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} may read and write future tables in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql:\n\t\t\t\t`ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE ${ident(owner)} IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} ` +\n\t\t\t\t`GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON TABLES TO ${ident(runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} may use future sequences in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql:\n\t\t\t\t`ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE ${ident(owner)} IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} ` +\n\t\t\t\t`GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON SEQUENCES TO ${ident(runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// And the tables that are already there, for a schema that existed\n\t\t\t// before its roles did.\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} may read and write existing tables in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql:\n\t\t\t\t`GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} ` +\n\t\t\t\t`TO ${ident(runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} may use existing sequences in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON ALL SEQUENCES IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} TO ${ident(runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// Pinned on the role rather than carried in every URL. A connection\n\t\t\t// string that has to remember `search_path` is one that eventually\n\t\t\t// forgets, and the forgetting looks like an empty database.\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} resolves names in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `ALTER ROLE ${ident(runtime)} SET search_path TO ${ident(schema)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${owner} resolves names in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `ALTER ROLE ${ident(owner)} SET search_path TO ${ident(schema)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t...(spec.reader ? readerStatements(spec, spec.reader) : []),\n\t];\n}\n\n/**\n * A role that may read and nothing else.\n *\n * `SELECT` and no more, on what exists and on what the owner creates later. No\n * `INSERT`, no `UPDATE`, no `DELETE`, and no sequence `USAGE` — a reader that\n * could take a sequence value could not write the row it was for, so granting\n * it would be surface with no use.\n */\nfunction readerStatements(spec: RoleSpec, reader: string): RoleStatement[] {\n\tconst { owner, schema, passwords } = spec;\n\tconst password = passwords.reader;\n\n\tif (!password) throw new ReaderNeedsPassword(reader);\n\n\treturn [\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `role ${reader}`,\n\t\t\texists: roleExists(reader),\n\t\t\tsql: `CREATE ROLE ${ident(reader)} LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(password)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${reader} may use ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} TO ${ident(reader)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${reader} may read future tables in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql:\n\t\t\t\t`ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE ${ident(owner)} IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} ` +\n\t\t\t\t`GRANT SELECT ON TABLES TO ${ident(reader)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${reader} may read existing tables in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `GRANT SELECT ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} TO ${ident(reader)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${reader} resolves names in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `ALTER ROLE ${ident(reader)} SET search_path TO ${ident(schema)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t];\n}\n\n/** A reader role was named and no password was supplied for it. */\nexport class ReaderNeedsPassword extends Error {\n\tconstructor(readonly role: string) {\n\t\tsuper(\n\t\t\t`'${role}' is a reader role and no password was supplied for it. ` +\n\t\t\t\t`This module composes DDL and invents no secrets: pass ` +\n\t\t\t\t`passwords.reader alongside the role name.`,\n\t\t);\n\t\tthis.name = 'ReaderNeedsPassword';\n\t}\n}\n\n/** The read-only role's name for a given runtime role. */\nexport function readerRole(runtime: string): string {\n\treturn `${runtime}_reader`;\n}\n\n/** The owner role's name for a given runtime role. */\nexport function ownerRole(runtime: string): string {\n\treturn `${runtime}_owner`;\n}\n\nfunction roleExists(role: string): { sql: string; values: unknown[] } {\n\treturn { sql: 'SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = $1', values: [role] };\n}\n\n/**\n * Quote an identifier for use in DDL.\n *\n * Names reaching here are already canonical, so this is defence rather than\n * sanitisation — but DDL cannot be parameterised, and an unquoted identifier is\n * the one place a name could ever be more than a name.\n */\nfunction ident(name: string): string {\n\treturn `\"${name.replace(/\"/g, '\"\"')}\"`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Quote a string literal.\n *\n * A password cannot be a bind parameter in `CREATE ROLE`, which is the one\n * place in this module where a value rather than a name is interpolated — so it\n * is escaped rather than trusted, whatever the caller believes it derived.\n */\nfunction literal(value: string): string {\n\treturn `'${value.replace(/'/g, \"''\")}'`;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;AA+DA,SAAgB,eAAeA,MAAiC;CAC/D,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG;AAE9C,QAAO;EACN;GACC,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM;GACxB,QAAQ,WAAW,MAAM;GACzB,MAAM,cAAc,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,kBAAkB,QAAQ,UAAU,MAAM,CAAC;EAC5E;EACD;GACC,WAAW,OAAO,QAAQ;GAC1B,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAQ;GAC3B,MAAM,cAAc,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,kBAAkB,QAAQ,UAAU,QAAQ,CAAC;EAChF;EACD;GASC,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM;GACnB,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC;EAC3B;EACD;GACC,WAAW,SAAS,OAAO;GAC3B,QAAQ;IACP,KAAK;IACL,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAO;GAChB;GAID,MAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,iBAAiB,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC;EAClE;EACD;GAWC,WAAW,EAAE,OAAO,eAAe,MAAM;GACzC,MAAM,eAAe,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC;EAC5D;EACD;GACC,WAAW,EAAE,QAAQ,WAAW,OAAO;GACvC,MAAM,wBAAwB,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;EACjE;EACD;GAIC,WAAW,EAAE,QAAQ,uCAAuC,OAAO;GACnE,MACE,oCAAoC,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,aAAa,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,qDACxB,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;EACrE;EACD;GACC,WAAW,EAAE,QAAQ,+BAA+B,OAAO;GAC3D,MACE,oCAAoC,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,aAAa,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,uCACtC,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;EACvD;EACD;GAGC,WAAW,EAAE,QAAQ,yCAAyC,OAAO;GACrE,MACE,+DAA+D,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,MACxE,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;EACtB;EACD;GACC,WAAW,EAAE,QAAQ,iCAAiC,OAAO;GAC7D,MAAM,iDAAiD,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;EAC1F;EACD;GAIC,WAAW,EAAE,QAAQ,qBAAqB,OAAO;GACjD,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,sBAAsB,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC;EACtE;EACD;GACC,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,qBAAqB,OAAO;GAC/C,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,sBAAsB,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC;EACpE;EACD,GAAI,KAAK,SAAS,iBAAiB,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,GAAG,CAAE;CAC1D;AACD;;;;;;;;;AAUD,SAAS,iBAAiBA,MAAgBC,QAAiC;CAC1E,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG;CACrC,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU;AAE3B,MAAK,SAAU,OAAM,IAAI,oBAAoB;AAE7C,QAAO;EACN;GACC,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;GACzB,QAAQ,WAAW,OAAO;GAC1B,MAAM,cAAc,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,kBAAkB,QAAQ,SAAS,CAAC;EACtE;EACD;GACC,WAAW,EAAE,OAAO,WAAW,OAAO;GACtC,MAAM,wBAAwB,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC;EAChE;EACD;GACC,WAAW,EAAE,OAAO,6BAA6B,OAAO;GACxD,MACE,oCAAoC,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,aAAa,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,6BAChD,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC;EAC5C;EACD;GACC,WAAW,EAAE,OAAO,+BAA+B,OAAO;GAC1D,MAAM,uCAAuC,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC;EAC/E;EACD;GACC,WAAW,EAAE,OAAO,qBAAqB,OAAO;GAChD,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,sBAAsB,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC;EACrE;CACD;AACD;;AAGD,IAAa,sBAAb,cAAyC,MAAM;CAC9C,YAAqBC,MAAc;AAClC,SACE,GAAG,KAAK,yJAGT;EALmB;AAMpB,OAAK,OAAO;CACZ;AACD;;AAGD,SAAgB,WAAWC,SAAyB;AACnD,SAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ;AAClB;;AAGD,SAAgB,UAAUA,SAAyB;AAClD,SAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ;AAClB;AAED,SAAS,WAAWD,MAAkD;AACrE,QAAO;EAAE,KAAK;EAA6C,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAK;CAAE;AAC3E;;;;;;;;AASD,SAAS,MAAME,MAAsB;AACpC,SAAQ,GAAG,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM,OAAK,CAAC;AACpC;;;;;;;;AASD,SAAS,QAAQC,OAAuB;AACvC,SAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AACrC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"roles.cjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/pg/roles.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * The role DDL — an owner, a runtime role, and the grants between them.\n *\n * Generation only. The same statements have to run in-process from `gkm dev`\n * and from a provisioner inside a VPC at deploy, and one implementation is what\n * stops \"works locally, fails deployed\" — so this composes SQL and applies\n * none of it.\n *\n * **What the split is for.** A handler connects as the runtime role, which can\n * read and write rows and cannot create, alter, or drop anything. A migrator\n * connects as the owner, which can. That is a security property rather than a\n * convention — a compromised handler cannot `DROP TABLE` because its role holds\n * no such grant — and it is only a property at all once these statements have\n * actually run. Until then a schema is a namespace, not a boundary.\n *\n * **Passwords are an input.** This module invents no secrets: a caller derives\n * or fetches them and passes them in, because where a password comes from is\n * the one part that legitimately differs between a laptop and a deploy.\n */\n\n/** The roles and schema one tenant needs. */\nexport interface RoleSpec {\n\t/** The role a handler connects as. Reads and writes rows; owns nothing. */\n\truntime: string;\n\t/** The role a migrator connects as. Owns the schema and everything in it. */\n\towner: string;\n\t/**\n\t * A third role that may only read, for a reader endpoint.\n\t *\n\t * Optional because it is only worth creating where something points at it.\n\t * Read-only is enforced *here*, by the grants, rather than by which endpoint\n\t * a URL happens to name — which is what makes falling back to the writer's\n\t * endpoint safe when a cluster has no replica.\n\t */\n\treader?: string;\n\t/** The schema they operate in, pinned on every role's `search_path`. */\n\tschema: string;\n\t/**\n\t * The database itself, when these are a database construct's roles rather\n\t * than a schema tenant's.\n\t *\n\t * Its owner may then create in the database — which is what a migration\n\t * needs to create a trusted extension (`citext`, `pg_trgm`): Postgres asks\n\t * for `CREATE` on the database for that, not on the schema. A tenant's owner\n\t * is not given it, so it stays confined to its own schema.\n\t */\n\tdatabase?: string;\n\t/** Supplied, never generated here. */\n\tpasswords: { runtime: string; owner: string; reader?: string };\n}\n\n/** One statement, and how to tell whether it still needs running. */\nexport interface RoleStatement {\n\t/** What it does, for the line a reconciler prints. */\n\tdescribe: string;\n\t/**\n\t * Answers \"does this already exist\", parameterised.\n\t *\n\t * Absent means the statement is idempotent in itself and is run every time —\n\t * a `GRANT` re-granting what is already granted is a no-op, and checking\n\t * would cost a round trip to learn nothing.\n\t */\n\texists?: { sql: string; values: unknown[] };\n\tsql: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Everything one tenant's roles need, in dependency order.\n *\n * The owner before the schema it owns, the schema before the grants on it. A\n * caller applies them in sequence and may stop at the first failure without\n * leaving a half-granted role that looks complete.\n */\nexport function roleStatements(spec: RoleSpec): RoleStatement[] {\n\tconst { runtime, owner, schema, passwords, database } = spec;\n\n\treturn [\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `role ${owner}`,\n\t\t\texists: roleExists(owner),\n\t\t\tsql: `CREATE ROLE ${ident(owner)} LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(passwords.owner)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\tpasswordStatement(owner, passwords.owner),\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `role ${runtime}`,\n\t\t\texists: roleExists(runtime),\n\t\t\tsql: `CREATE ROLE ${ident(runtime)} LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(passwords.runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\tpasswordStatement(runtime, passwords.runtime),\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// Postgres will not let you create an object owned by a role you are\n\t\t\t// not a member of, and an RDS master is not a superuser — so\n\t\t\t// `CREATE SCHEMA … AUTHORIZATION` fails with \"must be able to SET\n\t\t\t// ROLE\" unless the connected role is granted membership first.\n\t\t\t//\n\t\t\t// Granting is idempotent and needs no check. It also leaves the master\n\t\t\t// able to administer the schema, which is what you want from the one\n\t\t\t// credential that exists before any role does.\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${owner} granted to the connecting role`,\n\t\t\tsql: `GRANT ${ident(owner)} TO CURRENT_USER`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `schema ${schema}`,\n\t\t\texists: {\n\t\t\t\tsql: 'SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.schemata WHERE schema_name = $1',\n\t\t\t\tvalues: [schema],\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t// Owned by the owner from the moment it exists. Creating it as the\n\t\t\t// cluster master and granting afterwards leaves a window where the\n\t\t\t// master owns objects the owner is supposed to.\n\t\t\tsql: `CREATE SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} AUTHORIZATION ${ident(owner)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// And the schema that was already there, which the guard above skips.\n\t\t\t// A schema created before its roles existed is owned by whoever\n\t\t\t// created it — the cluster master — and nothing below fixes that, so\n\t\t\t// the owner cannot create in the schema it is supposed to own. The\n\t\t\t// failure is `no schema has been selected to create in`, which names\n\t\t\t// neither the schema nor the owner and reads like a missing\n\t\t\t// `search_path`.\n\t\t\t//\n\t\t\t// Idempotent when the owner is already right, so it costs a statement\n\t\t\t// rather than a check.\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${schema} is owned by ${owner}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `ALTER SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} OWNER TO ${ident(owner)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t...(database\n\t\t\t? [\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// The migrator of a database, not of a tenant inside one: it may\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// create trusted extensions, which Postgres grants on the\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// database rather than the schema. Idempotent, so no check.\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdescribe: `${owner} may create in database ${database}`,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsql: `GRANT CREATE ON DATABASE ${ident(database)} TO ${ident(owner)}`,\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t]\n\t\t\t: []),\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} may use ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} TO ${ident(runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// The important half: *future* tables. A grant on what exists today\n\t\t\t// covers nothing the next migration creates, which is how a runtime\n\t\t\t// role silently loses access one deploy later.\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} may read and write future tables in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql:\n\t\t\t\t`ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE ${ident(owner)} IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} ` +\n\t\t\t\t`GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON TABLES TO ${ident(runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} may use future sequences in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql:\n\t\t\t\t`ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE ${ident(owner)} IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} ` +\n\t\t\t\t`GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON SEQUENCES TO ${ident(runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// And the tables that are already there, for a schema that existed\n\t\t\t// before its roles did.\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} may read and write existing tables in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql:\n\t\t\t\t`GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} ` +\n\t\t\t\t`TO ${ident(runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} may use existing sequences in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON ALL SEQUENCES IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} TO ${ident(runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// Pinned on the role rather than carried in every URL. A connection\n\t\t\t// string that has to remember `search_path` is one that eventually\n\t\t\t// forgets, and the forgetting looks like an empty database.\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} resolves names in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `ALTER ROLE ${ident(runtime)} SET search_path TO ${ident(schema)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${owner} resolves names in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `ALTER ROLE ${ident(owner)} SET search_path TO ${ident(schema)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t...(spec.reader ? readerStatements(spec, spec.reader) : []),\n\t];\n}\n\n/**\n * The role's password, set to what the caller supplied — every time.\n *\n * `CREATE ROLE` only runs for a role that is not there, so on its own a role\n * keeps the password it was born with, and an app handed a different one is\n * locked out. Setting it on every apply is what lets the supplied password be\n * the truth: rotated, or re-derived, the role follows. Idempotent, so it needs\n * no check.\n */\nfunction passwordStatement(role: string, password: string): RoleStatement {\n\treturn {\n\t\tdescribe: `${role} has its current password`,\n\t\tsql: `ALTER ROLE ${ident(role)} WITH LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(password)}`,\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * A role that may read and nothing else.\n *\n * `SELECT` and no more, on what exists and on what the owner creates later. No\n * `INSERT`, no `UPDATE`, no `DELETE`, and no sequence `USAGE` — a reader that\n * could take a sequence value could not write the row it was for, so granting\n * it would be surface with no use.\n */\nfunction readerStatements(spec: RoleSpec, reader: string): RoleStatement[] {\n\tconst { owner, schema, passwords } = spec;\n\tconst password = passwords.reader;\n\n\tif (!password) throw new ReaderNeedsPassword(reader);\n\n\treturn [\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `role ${reader}`,\n\t\t\texists: roleExists(reader),\n\t\t\tsql: `CREATE ROLE ${ident(reader)} LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(password)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\tpasswordStatement(reader, password),\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${reader} may use ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} TO ${ident(reader)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${reader} may read future tables in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql:\n\t\t\t\t`ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE ${ident(owner)} IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} ` +\n\t\t\t\t`GRANT SELECT ON TABLES TO ${ident(reader)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${reader} may read existing tables in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `GRANT SELECT ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} TO ${ident(reader)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${reader} resolves names in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `ALTER ROLE ${ident(reader)} SET search_path TO ${ident(schema)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t];\n}\n\n/** A reader role was named and no password was supplied for it. */\nexport class ReaderNeedsPassword extends Error {\n\tconstructor(readonly role: string) {\n\t\tsuper(\n\t\t\t`'${role}' is a reader role and no password was supplied for it. ` +\n\t\t\t\t`This module composes DDL and invents no secrets: pass ` +\n\t\t\t\t`passwords.reader alongside the role name.`,\n\t\t);\n\t\tthis.name = 'ReaderNeedsPassword';\n\t}\n}\n\n/** The read-only role's name for a given runtime role. */\nexport function readerRole(runtime: string): string {\n\treturn `${runtime}_reader`;\n}\n\n/** The owner role's name for a given runtime role. */\nexport function ownerRole(runtime: string): string {\n\treturn `${runtime}_owner`;\n}\n\nfunction roleExists(role: string): { sql: string; values: unknown[] } {\n\treturn { sql: 'SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = $1', values: [role] };\n}\n\n/**\n * Quote an identifier for use in DDL.\n *\n * Names reaching here are already canonical, so this is defence rather than\n * sanitisation — but DDL cannot be parameterised, and an unquoted identifier is\n * the one place a name could ever be more than a name.\n */\nfunction ident(name: string): string {\n\treturn `\"${name.replace(/\"/g, '\"\"')}\"`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Quote a string literal.\n *\n * A password cannot be a bind parameter in `CREATE ROLE`, which is the one\n * place in this module where a value rather than a name is interpolated — so it\n * is escaped rather than trusted, whatever the caller believes it derived.\n */\nfunction literal(value: string): string {\n\treturn `'${value.replace(/'/g, \"''\")}'`;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;AAyEA,SAAgB,eAAe,MAAiC;CAC/D,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,aAAa;CAExD,OAAO;EACN;GACC,UAAU,QAAQ;GAClB,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK;GACxB,KAAK,eAAe,MAAM,KAAK,EAAE,kBAAkB,QAAQ,UAAU,KAAK;EAC3E;EACA,kBAAkB,OAAO,UAAU,KAAK;EACxC;GACC,UAAU,QAAQ;GAClB,QAAQ,WAAW,OAAO;GAC1B,KAAK,eAAe,MAAM,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,QAAQ,UAAU,OAAO;EAC/E;EACA,kBAAkB,SAAS,UAAU,OAAO;EAC5C;GASC,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM;GACnB,KAAK,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,EAAE;EAC5B;EACA;GACC,UAAU,UAAU;GACpB,QAAQ;IACP,KAAK;IACL,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM;GAChB;GAIA,KAAK,iBAAiB,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,iBAAiB,MAAM,KAAK;EACjE;EACA;GAWC,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO,eAAe;GACnC,KAAK,gBAAgB,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,YAAY,MAAM,KAAK;EAC3D;EACA,GAAI,WACD,CACA;GAIC,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM,0BAA0B;GAC7C,KAAK,4BAA4B,MAAM,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK;EACnE,CACD,IACC,CAAC;EACJ;GACC,UAAU,GAAG,QAAQ,WAAW;GAChC,KAAK,yBAAyB,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO;EAChE;EACA;GAIC,UAAU,GAAG,QAAQ,uCAAuC;GAC5D,KACC,qCAAqC,MAAM,KAAK,EAAE,aAAa,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,qDACxB,MAAM,OAAO;EACpE;EACA;GACC,UAAU,GAAG,QAAQ,+BAA+B;GACpD,KACC,qCAAqC,MAAM,KAAK,EAAE,aAAa,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,uCACtC,MAAM,OAAO;EACtD;EACA;GAGC,UAAU,GAAG,QAAQ,yCAAyC;GAC9D,KACC,gEAAgE,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,MACxE,MAAM,OAAO;EACrB;EACA;GACC,UAAU,GAAG,QAAQ,iCAAiC;GACtD,KAAK,kDAAkD,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO;EACzF;EACA;GAIC,UAAU,GAAG,QAAQ,qBAAqB;GAC1C,KAAK,cAAc,MAAM,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB,MAAM,MAAM;EACrE;EACA;GACC,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM,qBAAqB;GACxC,KAAK,cAAc,MAAM,KAAK,EAAE,sBAAsB,MAAM,MAAM;EACnE;EACA,GAAI,KAAK,SAAS,iBAAiB,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;CAC1D;AACD;;;;;;;;;;AAWA,SAAS,kBAAkB,MAAc,UAAiC;CACzE,OAAO;EACN,UAAU,GAAG,KAAK;EAClB,KAAK,cAAc,MAAM,IAAI,EAAE,uBAAuB,QAAQ,QAAQ;CACvE;AACD;;;;;;;;;AAUA,SAAS,iBAAiB,MAAgB,QAAiC;CAC1E,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,QAAQ,cAAc;CACrC,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU;CAE3B,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,MAAM,IAAI,oBAAoB,MAAM;CAEnD,OAAO;EACN;GACC,UAAU,QAAQ;GAClB,QAAQ,WAAW,MAAM;GACzB,KAAK,eAAe,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,kBAAkB,QAAQ,QAAQ;EACrE;EACA,kBAAkB,QAAQ,QAAQ;EAClC;GACC,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO,WAAW;GAC/B,KAAK,yBAAyB,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM;EAC/D;EACA;GACC,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO,6BAA6B;GACjD,KACC,qCAAqC,MAAM,KAAK,EAAE,aAAa,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,6BAChD,MAAM,MAAM;EAC3C;EACA;GACC,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO,+BAA+B;GACnD,KAAK,wCAAwC,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM;EAC9E;EACA;GACC,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO,qBAAqB;GACzC,KAAK,cAAc,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,sBAAsB,MAAM,MAAM;EACpE;CACD;AACD;;AAGA,IAAa,sBAAb,cAAyC,MAAM;CACzB;CAArB,YAAY,MAAuB;EAClC,MACC,IAAI,KAAK,wJAGV;EALoB,KAAA,OAAA;EAMpB,KAAK,OAAO;CACb;AACD;;AAGA,SAAgB,WAAW,SAAyB;CACnD,OAAO,GAAG,QAAQ;AACnB;;AAGA,SAAgB,UAAU,SAAyB;CAClD,OAAO,GAAG,QAAQ;AACnB;AAEA,SAAS,WAAW,MAAkD;CACrE,OAAO;EAAE,KAAK;EAA6C,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI;CAAE;AAC3E;;;;;;;;AASA,SAAS,MAAM,MAAsB;CACpC,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAI,EAAE;AACrC;;;;;;;;AASA,SAAS,QAAQ,OAAuB;CACvC,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,EAAE;AACtC"}

package/dist/pg/roles.d.cts

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
  * the one part that legitimately differs between a laptop and a deploy.
  */
 /** The roles and schema one tenant needs. */
-interface RoleSpec {
+export interface RoleSpec {
   /** The role a handler connects as. Reads and writes rows; owns nothing. */
   runtime: string;
   /** The role a migrator connects as. Owns the schema and everything in it. */
@@ -35,6 +35,16 @@ interface RoleSpec {
   reader?: string;
   /** The schema they operate in, pinned on every role's `search_path`. */
   schema: string;
+  /**
+   * The database itself, when these are a database construct's roles rather
+   * than a schema tenant's.
+   *
+   * Its owner may then create in the database — which is what a migration
+   * needs to create a trusted extension (`citext`, `pg_trgm`): Postgres asks
+   * for `CREATE` on the database for that, not on the schema. A tenant's owner
+   * is not given it, so it stays confined to its own schema.
+   */
+  database?: string;
   /** Supplied, never generated here. */
   passwords: {
     runtime: string;
@@ -43,7 +53,7 @@ interface RoleSpec {
   };
 }
 /** One statement, and how to tell whether it still needs running. */
-interface RoleStatement {
+export interface RoleStatement {
   /** What it does, for the line a reconciler prints. */
   describe: string;
   /**
@@ -66,17 +76,15 @@ interface RoleStatement {
  * caller applies them in sequence and may stop at the first failure without
  * leaving a half-granted role that looks complete.
  */
-declare function roleStatements(spec: RoleSpec): RoleStatement[];
+export declare function roleStatements(spec: RoleSpec): RoleStatement[];
 /** A reader role was named and no password was supplied for it. */
-declare class ReaderNeedsPassword extends Error {
+export declare class ReaderNeedsPassword extends Error {
   readonly role: string;
   constructor(role: string);
 }
 /** The read-only role's name for a given runtime role. */
-declare function readerRole(runtime: string): string;
+export declare function readerRole(runtime: string): string;
 /** The owner role's name for a given runtime role. */
-declare function ownerRole(runtime: string): string;
-//# sourceMappingURL=roles.d.ts.map
+export declare function ownerRole(runtime: string): string;
 //#endregion
-export { ReaderNeedsPassword, RoleSpec, RoleStatement, ownerRole, readerRole, roleStatements };
 //# sourceMappingURL=roles.d.cts.map

package/dist/pg/roles.d.cts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"roles.d.cts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/pg/roles.ts"],"sourcesContent":[],"mappings":";;AAqBA;AAqBA;AAqBA;;;;AAA6D;AA2I7D;AAYA;AAKA;;;;;;;;;;UAtMiB,QAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;UAqBA,aAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAqBD,cAAA,OAAqB,WAAW;;cA2InC,mBAAA,SAA4B,KAAK;;;;;iBAY9B,UAAA;;iBAKA,SAAA"}
+{"version":3,"file":"roles.d.cts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/pg/roles.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAqBiB;;EAEhB;;EAEA;;;;;;;;;EASA;;EAEA;;;;;;;;;;EAUA;;EAEA;IAAa;IAAiB;IAAe;;;;iBAI7B;;EAEhB;;;;;;;;EAQA;IAAW;IAAa;;EACxB;;;;;;;;;wBAUe,eAAe,MAAM,WAAW;;qBAyKnC,4BAA4B;WACnB;EAArB,YAAqB;;;wBAWN,WAAW;;wBAKX,UAAU"}

package/dist/pg/roles.d.mts

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
  * the one part that legitimately differs between a laptop and a deploy.
  */
 /** The roles and schema one tenant needs. */
-interface RoleSpec {
+export interface RoleSpec {
   /** The role a handler connects as. Reads and writes rows; owns nothing. */
   runtime: string;
   /** The role a migrator connects as. Owns the schema and everything in it. */
@@ -35,6 +35,16 @@ interface RoleSpec {
   reader?: string;
   /** The schema they operate in, pinned on every role's `search_path`. */
   schema: string;
+  /**
+   * The database itself, when these are a database construct's roles rather
+   * than a schema tenant's.
+   *
+   * Its owner may then create in the database — which is what a migration
+   * needs to create a trusted extension (`citext`, `pg_trgm`): Postgres asks
+   * for `CREATE` on the database for that, not on the schema. A tenant's owner
+   * is not given it, so it stays confined to its own schema.
+   */
+  database?: string;
   /** Supplied, never generated here. */
   passwords: {
     runtime: string;
@@ -43,7 +53,7 @@ interface RoleSpec {
   };
 }
 /** One statement, and how to tell whether it still needs running. */
-interface RoleStatement {
+export interface RoleStatement {
   /** What it does, for the line a reconciler prints. */
   describe: string;
   /**
@@ -66,17 +76,15 @@ interface RoleStatement {
  * caller applies them in sequence and may stop at the first failure without
  * leaving a half-granted role that looks complete.
  */
-declare function roleStatements(spec: RoleSpec): RoleStatement[];
+export declare function roleStatements(spec: RoleSpec): RoleStatement[];
 /** A reader role was named and no password was supplied for it. */
-declare class ReaderNeedsPassword extends Error {
+export declare class ReaderNeedsPassword extends Error {
   readonly role: string;
   constructor(role: string);
 }
 /** The read-only role's name for a given runtime role. */
-declare function readerRole(runtime: string): string;
+export declare function readerRole(runtime: string): string;
 /** The owner role's name for a given runtime role. */
-declare function ownerRole(runtime: string): string;
-//# sourceMappingURL=roles.d.ts.map
+export declare function ownerRole(runtime: string): string;
 //#endregion
-export { ReaderNeedsPassword, RoleSpec, RoleStatement, ownerRole, readerRole, roleStatements };
 //# sourceMappingURL=roles.d.mts.map

package/dist/pg/roles.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"roles.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/pg/roles.ts"],"sourcesContent":[],"mappings":";;AAqBA;AAqBA;AAqBA;;;;AAA6D;AA2I7D;AAYA;AAKA;;;;;;;;;;UAtMiB,QAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;UAqBA,aAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAqBD,cAAA,OAAqB,WAAW;;cA2InC,mBAAA,SAA4B,KAAK;;;;;iBAY9B,UAAA;;iBAKA,SAAA"}
+{"version":3,"file":"roles.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/pg/roles.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAqBiB;;EAEhB;;EAEA;;;;;;;;;EASA;;EAEA;;;;;;;;;;EAUA;;EAEA;IAAa;IAAiB;IAAe;;;;iBAI7B;;EAEhB;;;;;;;;EAQA;IAAW;IAAa;;EACxB;;;;;;;;;wBAUe,eAAe,MAAM,WAAW;;qBAyKnC,4BAA4B;WACnB;EAArB,YAAqB;;;wBAWN,WAAW;;wBAKX,UAAU"}

package/dist/pg/roles.mjs

@@ -7,18 +7,20 @@
 * leaving a half-granted role that looks complete.
 */
 function roleStatements(spec) {
-	const { runtime, owner, schema, passwords } = spec;
+	const { runtime, owner, schema, passwords, database } = spec;
 	return [
 		{
 			describe: `role ${owner}`,
 			exists: roleExists(owner),
 			sql: `CREATE ROLE ${ident(owner)} LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(passwords.owner)}`
 		},
+		passwordStatement(owner, passwords.owner),
 		{
 			describe: `role ${runtime}`,
 			exists: roleExists(runtime),
 			sql: `CREATE ROLE ${ident(runtime)} LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(passwords.runtime)}`
 		},
+		passwordStatement(runtime, passwords.runtime),
 		{
 			describe: `${owner} granted to the connecting role`,
 			sql: `GRANT ${ident(owner)} TO CURRENT_USER`
@@ -35,6 +37,10 @@ function roleStatements(spec) {
 			describe: `${schema} is owned by ${owner}`,
 			sql: `ALTER SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} OWNER TO ${ident(owner)}`
 		},
+		...database ? [{
+			describe: `${owner} may create in database ${database}`,
+			sql: `GRANT CREATE ON DATABASE ${ident(database)} TO ${ident(owner)}`
+		}] : [],
 		{
 			describe: `${runtime} may use ${schema}`,
 			sql: `GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} TO ${ident(runtime)}`
@@ -67,6 +73,21 @@ function roleStatements(spec) {
 	];
 }
 /**
+* The role's password, set to what the caller supplied — every time.
+*
+* `CREATE ROLE` only runs for a role that is not there, so on its own a role
+* keeps the password it was born with, and an app handed a different one is
+* locked out. Setting it on every apply is what lets the supplied password be
+* the truth: rotated, or re-derived, the role follows. Idempotent, so it needs
+* no check.
+*/
+function passwordStatement(role, password) {
+	return {
+		describe: `${role} has its current password`,
+		sql: `ALTER ROLE ${ident(role)} WITH LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(password)}`
+	};
+}
+/**
 * A role that may read and nothing else.
 *
 * `SELECT` and no more, on what exists and on what the owner creates later. No
@@ -84,6 +105,7 @@ function readerStatements(spec, reader) {
 			exists: roleExists(reader),
 			sql: `CREATE ROLE ${ident(reader)} LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(password)}`
 		},
+		passwordStatement(reader, password),
 		{
 			describe: `${reader} may use ${schema}`,
 			sql: `GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} TO ${ident(reader)}`
@@ -104,6 +126,7 @@ function readerStatements(spec, reader) {
 }
 /** A reader role was named and no password was supplied for it. */
 var ReaderNeedsPassword = class extends Error {
+	role;
 	constructor(role) {
 		super(`'${role}' is a reader role and no password was supplied for it. This module composes DDL and invents no secrets: pass passwords.reader alongside the role name.`);
 		this.role = role;
@@ -144,7 +167,7 @@ function ident(name) {
 function literal(value) {
 	return `'${value.replace(/'/g, "''")}'`;
 }
-
 //#endregion
 export { ReaderNeedsPassword, ownerRole, readerRole, roleStatements };
+
 //# sourceMappingURL=roles.mjs.map

package/dist/pg/roles.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"roles.mjs","names":["spec: RoleSpec","reader: string","role: string","runtime: string","name: string","value: string"],"sources":["../../src/pg/roles.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * The role DDL — an owner, a runtime role, and the grants between them.\n *\n * Generation only. The same statements have to run in-process from `gkm dev`\n * and from a provisioner inside a VPC at deploy, and one implementation is what\n * stops \"works locally, fails deployed\" — so this composes SQL and applies\n * none of it.\n *\n * **What the split is for.** A handler connects as the runtime role, which can\n * read and write rows and cannot create, alter, or drop anything. A migrator\n * connects as the owner, which can. That is a security property rather than a\n * convention — a compromised handler cannot `DROP TABLE` because its role holds\n * no such grant — and it is only a property at all once these statements have\n * actually run. Until then a schema is a namespace, not a boundary.\n *\n * **Passwords are an input.** This module invents no secrets: a caller derives\n * or fetches them and passes them in, because where a password comes from is\n * the one part that legitimately differs between a laptop and a deploy.\n */\n\n/** The roles and schema one tenant needs. */\nexport interface RoleSpec {\n\t/** The role a handler connects as. Reads and writes rows; owns nothing. */\n\truntime: string;\n\t/** The role a migrator connects as. Owns the schema and everything in it. */\n\towner: string;\n\t/**\n\t * A third role that may only read, for a reader endpoint.\n\t *\n\t * Optional because it is only worth creating where something points at it.\n\t * Read-only is enforced *here*, by the grants, rather than by which endpoint\n\t * a URL happens to name — which is what makes falling back to the writer's\n\t * endpoint safe when a cluster has no replica.\n\t */\n\treader?: string;\n\t/** The schema they operate in, pinned on every role's `search_path`. */\n\tschema: string;\n\t/** Supplied, never generated here. */\n\tpasswords: { runtime: string; owner: string; reader?: string };\n}\n\n/** One statement, and how to tell whether it still needs running. */\nexport interface RoleStatement {\n\t/** What it does, for the line a reconciler prints. */\n\tdescribe: string;\n\t/**\n\t * Answers \"does this already exist\", parameterised.\n\t *\n\t * Absent means the statement is idempotent in itself and is run every time —\n\t * a `GRANT` re-granting what is already granted is a no-op, and checking\n\t * would cost a round trip to learn nothing.\n\t */\n\texists?: { sql: string; values: unknown[] };\n\tsql: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Everything one tenant's roles need, in dependency order.\n *\n * The owner before the schema it owns, the schema before the grants on it. A\n * caller applies them in sequence and may stop at the first failure without\n * leaving a half-granted role that looks complete.\n */\nexport function roleStatements(spec: RoleSpec): RoleStatement[] {\n\tconst { runtime, owner, schema, passwords } = spec;\n\n\treturn [\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `role ${owner}`,\n\t\t\texists: roleExists(owner),\n\t\t\tsql: `CREATE ROLE ${ident(owner)} LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(passwords.owner)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `role ${runtime}`,\n\t\t\texists: roleExists(runtime),\n\t\t\tsql: `CREATE ROLE ${ident(runtime)} LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(passwords.runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// Postgres will not let you create an object owned by a role you are\n\t\t\t// not a member of, and an RDS master is not a superuser — so\n\t\t\t// `CREATE SCHEMA … AUTHORIZATION` fails with \"must be able to SET\n\t\t\t// ROLE\" unless the connected role is granted membership first.\n\t\t\t//\n\t\t\t// Granting is idempotent and needs no check. It also leaves the master\n\t\t\t// able to administer the schema, which is what you want from the one\n\t\t\t// credential that exists before any role does.\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${owner} granted to the connecting role`,\n\t\t\tsql: `GRANT ${ident(owner)} TO CURRENT_USER`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `schema ${schema}`,\n\t\t\texists: {\n\t\t\t\tsql: 'SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.schemata WHERE schema_name = $1',\n\t\t\t\tvalues: [schema],\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t// Owned by the owner from the moment it exists. Creating it as the\n\t\t\t// cluster master and granting afterwards leaves a window where the\n\t\t\t// master owns objects the owner is supposed to.\n\t\t\tsql: `CREATE SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} AUTHORIZATION ${ident(owner)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// And the schema that was already there, which the guard above skips.\n\t\t\t// A schema created before its roles existed is owned by whoever\n\t\t\t// created it — the cluster master — and nothing below fixes that, so\n\t\t\t// the owner cannot create in the schema it is supposed to own. The\n\t\t\t// failure is `no schema has been selected to create in`, which names\n\t\t\t// neither the schema nor the owner and reads like a missing\n\t\t\t// `search_path`.\n\t\t\t//\n\t\t\t// Idempotent when the owner is already right, so it costs a statement\n\t\t\t// rather than a check.\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${schema} is owned by ${owner}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `ALTER SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} OWNER TO ${ident(owner)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} may use ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} TO ${ident(runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// The important half: *future* tables. A grant on what exists today\n\t\t\t// covers nothing the next migration creates, which is how a runtime\n\t\t\t// role silently loses access one deploy later.\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} may read and write future tables in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql:\n\t\t\t\t`ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE ${ident(owner)} IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} ` +\n\t\t\t\t`GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON TABLES TO ${ident(runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} may use future sequences in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql:\n\t\t\t\t`ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE ${ident(owner)} IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} ` +\n\t\t\t\t`GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON SEQUENCES TO ${ident(runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// And the tables that are already there, for a schema that existed\n\t\t\t// before its roles did.\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} may read and write existing tables in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql:\n\t\t\t\t`GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} ` +\n\t\t\t\t`TO ${ident(runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} may use existing sequences in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON ALL SEQUENCES IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} TO ${ident(runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// Pinned on the role rather than carried in every URL. A connection\n\t\t\t// string that has to remember `search_path` is one that eventually\n\t\t\t// forgets, and the forgetting looks like an empty database.\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} resolves names in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `ALTER ROLE ${ident(runtime)} SET search_path TO ${ident(schema)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${owner} resolves names in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `ALTER ROLE ${ident(owner)} SET search_path TO ${ident(schema)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t...(spec.reader ? readerStatements(spec, spec.reader) : []),\n\t];\n}\n\n/**\n * A role that may read and nothing else.\n *\n * `SELECT` and no more, on what exists and on what the owner creates later. No\n * `INSERT`, no `UPDATE`, no `DELETE`, and no sequence `USAGE` — a reader that\n * could take a sequence value could not write the row it was for, so granting\n * it would be surface with no use.\n */\nfunction readerStatements(spec: RoleSpec, reader: string): RoleStatement[] {\n\tconst { owner, schema, passwords } = spec;\n\tconst password = passwords.reader;\n\n\tif (!password) throw new ReaderNeedsPassword(reader);\n\n\treturn [\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `role ${reader}`,\n\t\t\texists: roleExists(reader),\n\t\t\tsql: `CREATE ROLE ${ident(reader)} LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(password)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${reader} may use ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} TO ${ident(reader)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${reader} may read future tables in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql:\n\t\t\t\t`ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE ${ident(owner)} IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} ` +\n\t\t\t\t`GRANT SELECT ON TABLES TO ${ident(reader)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${reader} may read existing tables in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `GRANT SELECT ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} TO ${ident(reader)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${reader} resolves names in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `ALTER ROLE ${ident(reader)} SET search_path TO ${ident(schema)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t];\n}\n\n/** A reader role was named and no password was supplied for it. */\nexport class ReaderNeedsPassword extends Error {\n\tconstructor(readonly role: string) {\n\t\tsuper(\n\t\t\t`'${role}' is a reader role and no password was supplied for it. ` +\n\t\t\t\t`This module composes DDL and invents no secrets: pass ` +\n\t\t\t\t`passwords.reader alongside the role name.`,\n\t\t);\n\t\tthis.name = 'ReaderNeedsPassword';\n\t}\n}\n\n/** The read-only role's name for a given runtime role. */\nexport function readerRole(runtime: string): string {\n\treturn `${runtime}_reader`;\n}\n\n/** The owner role's name for a given runtime role. */\nexport function ownerRole(runtime: string): string {\n\treturn `${runtime}_owner`;\n}\n\nfunction roleExists(role: string): { sql: string; 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+{"version":3,"file":"roles.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/pg/roles.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * The role DDL — an owner, a runtime role, and the grants between them.\n *\n * Generation only. The same statements have to run in-process from `gkm dev`\n * and from a provisioner inside a VPC at deploy, and one implementation is what\n * stops \"works locally, fails deployed\" — so this composes SQL and applies\n * none of it.\n *\n * **What the split is for.** A handler connects as the runtime role, which can\n * read and write rows and cannot create, alter, or drop anything. A migrator\n * connects as the owner, which can. That is a security property rather than a\n * convention — a compromised handler cannot `DROP TABLE` because its role holds\n * no such grant — and it is only a property at all once these statements have\n * actually run. Until then a schema is a namespace, not a boundary.\n *\n * **Passwords are an input.** This module invents no secrets: a caller derives\n * or fetches them and passes them in, because where a password comes from is\n * the one part that legitimately differs between a laptop and a deploy.\n */\n\n/** The roles and schema one tenant needs. */\nexport interface RoleSpec {\n\t/** The role a handler connects as. Reads and writes rows; owns nothing. */\n\truntime: string;\n\t/** The role a migrator connects as. Owns the schema and everything in it. */\n\towner: string;\n\t/**\n\t * A third role that may only read, for a reader endpoint.\n\t *\n\t * Optional because it is only worth creating where something points at it.\n\t * Read-only is enforced *here*, by the grants, rather than by which endpoint\n\t * a URL happens to name — which is what makes falling back to the writer's\n\t * endpoint safe when a cluster has no replica.\n\t */\n\treader?: string;\n\t/** The schema they operate in, pinned on every role's `search_path`. */\n\tschema: string;\n\t/**\n\t * The database itself, when these are a database construct's roles rather\n\t * than a schema tenant's.\n\t *\n\t * Its owner may then create in the database — which is what a migration\n\t * needs to create a trusted extension (`citext`, `pg_trgm`): Postgres asks\n\t * for `CREATE` on the database for that, not on the schema. A tenant's owner\n\t * is not given it, so it stays confined to its own schema.\n\t */\n\tdatabase?: string;\n\t/** Supplied, never generated here. */\n\tpasswords: { runtime: string; owner: string; reader?: string };\n}\n\n/** One statement, and how to tell whether it still needs running. */\nexport interface RoleStatement {\n\t/** What it does, for the line a reconciler prints. */\n\tdescribe: string;\n\t/**\n\t * Answers \"does this already exist\", parameterised.\n\t *\n\t * Absent means the statement is idempotent in itself and is run every time —\n\t * a `GRANT` re-granting what is already granted is a no-op, and checking\n\t * would cost a round trip to learn nothing.\n\t */\n\texists?: { sql: string; values: unknown[] };\n\tsql: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Everything one tenant's roles need, in dependency order.\n *\n * The owner before the schema it owns, the schema before the grants on it. A\n * caller applies them in sequence and may stop at the first failure without\n * leaving a half-granted role that looks complete.\n */\nexport function roleStatements(spec: RoleSpec): RoleStatement[] {\n\tconst { runtime, owner, schema, passwords, database } = spec;\n\n\treturn [\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `role ${owner}`,\n\t\t\texists: roleExists(owner),\n\t\t\tsql: `CREATE ROLE ${ident(owner)} LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(passwords.owner)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\tpasswordStatement(owner, passwords.owner),\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `role ${runtime}`,\n\t\t\texists: roleExists(runtime),\n\t\t\tsql: `CREATE ROLE ${ident(runtime)} LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(passwords.runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\tpasswordStatement(runtime, passwords.runtime),\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// Postgres will not let you create an object owned by a role you are\n\t\t\t// not a member of, and an RDS master is not a superuser — so\n\t\t\t// `CREATE SCHEMA … AUTHORIZATION` fails with \"must be able to SET\n\t\t\t// ROLE\" unless the connected role is granted membership first.\n\t\t\t//\n\t\t\t// Granting is idempotent and needs no check. It also leaves the master\n\t\t\t// able to administer the schema, which is what you want from the one\n\t\t\t// credential that exists before any role does.\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${owner} granted to the connecting role`,\n\t\t\tsql: `GRANT ${ident(owner)} TO CURRENT_USER`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `schema ${schema}`,\n\t\t\texists: {\n\t\t\t\tsql: 'SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.schemata WHERE schema_name = $1',\n\t\t\t\tvalues: [schema],\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t// Owned by the owner from the moment it exists. Creating it as the\n\t\t\t// cluster master and granting afterwards leaves a window where the\n\t\t\t// master owns objects the owner is supposed to.\n\t\t\tsql: `CREATE SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} AUTHORIZATION ${ident(owner)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// And the schema that was already there, which the guard above skips.\n\t\t\t// A schema created before its roles existed is owned by whoever\n\t\t\t// created it — the cluster master — and nothing below fixes that, so\n\t\t\t// the owner cannot create in the schema it is supposed to own. The\n\t\t\t// failure is `no schema has been selected to create in`, which names\n\t\t\t// neither the schema nor the owner and reads like a missing\n\t\t\t// `search_path`.\n\t\t\t//\n\t\t\t// Idempotent when the owner is already right, so it costs a statement\n\t\t\t// rather than a check.\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${schema} is owned by ${owner}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `ALTER SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} OWNER TO ${ident(owner)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t...(database\n\t\t\t? [\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// The migrator of a database, not of a tenant inside one: it may\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// create trusted extensions, which Postgres grants on the\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// database rather than the schema. Idempotent, so no check.\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdescribe: `${owner} may create in database ${database}`,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsql: `GRANT CREATE ON DATABASE ${ident(database)} TO ${ident(owner)}`,\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t]\n\t\t\t: []),\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} may use ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} TO ${ident(runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// The important half: *future* tables. A grant on what exists today\n\t\t\t// covers nothing the next migration creates, which is how a runtime\n\t\t\t// role silently loses access one deploy later.\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} may read and write future tables in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql:\n\t\t\t\t`ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE ${ident(owner)} IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} ` +\n\t\t\t\t`GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON TABLES TO ${ident(runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} may use future sequences in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql:\n\t\t\t\t`ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE ${ident(owner)} IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} ` +\n\t\t\t\t`GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON SEQUENCES TO ${ident(runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// And the tables that are already there, for a schema that existed\n\t\t\t// before its roles did.\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} may read and write existing tables in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql:\n\t\t\t\t`GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} ` +\n\t\t\t\t`TO ${ident(runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} may use existing sequences in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON ALL SEQUENCES IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} TO ${ident(runtime)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// Pinned on the role rather than carried in every URL. A connection\n\t\t\t// string that has to remember `search_path` is one that eventually\n\t\t\t// forgets, and the forgetting looks like an empty database.\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${runtime} resolves names in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `ALTER ROLE ${ident(runtime)} SET search_path TO ${ident(schema)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${owner} resolves names in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `ALTER ROLE ${ident(owner)} SET search_path TO ${ident(schema)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t...(spec.reader ? readerStatements(spec, spec.reader) : []),\n\t];\n}\n\n/**\n * The role's password, set to what the caller supplied — every time.\n *\n * `CREATE ROLE` only runs for a role that is not there, so on its own a role\n * keeps the password it was born with, and an app handed a different one is\n * locked out. Setting it on every apply is what lets the supplied password be\n * the truth: rotated, or re-derived, the role follows. Idempotent, so it needs\n * no check.\n */\nfunction passwordStatement(role: string, password: string): RoleStatement {\n\treturn {\n\t\tdescribe: `${role} has its current password`,\n\t\tsql: `ALTER ROLE ${ident(role)} WITH LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(password)}`,\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * A role that may read and nothing else.\n *\n * `SELECT` and no more, on what exists and on what the owner creates later. No\n * `INSERT`, no `UPDATE`, no `DELETE`, and no sequence `USAGE` — a reader that\n * could take a sequence value could not write the row it was for, so granting\n * it would be surface with no use.\n */\nfunction readerStatements(spec: RoleSpec, reader: string): RoleStatement[] {\n\tconst { owner, schema, passwords } = spec;\n\tconst password = passwords.reader;\n\n\tif (!password) throw new ReaderNeedsPassword(reader);\n\n\treturn [\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `role ${reader}`,\n\t\t\texists: roleExists(reader),\n\t\t\tsql: `CREATE ROLE ${ident(reader)} LOGIN PASSWORD ${literal(password)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\tpasswordStatement(reader, password),\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${reader} may use ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} TO ${ident(reader)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${reader} may read future tables in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql:\n\t\t\t\t`ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE ${ident(owner)} IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} ` +\n\t\t\t\t`GRANT SELECT ON TABLES TO ${ident(reader)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${reader} may read existing tables in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `GRANT SELECT ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA ${ident(schema)} TO ${ident(reader)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdescribe: `${reader} resolves names in ${schema}`,\n\t\t\tsql: `ALTER ROLE ${ident(reader)} SET search_path TO ${ident(schema)}`,\n\t\t},\n\t];\n}\n\n/** A reader role was named and no password was supplied for it. */\nexport class ReaderNeedsPassword extends Error {\n\tconstructor(readonly role: string) {\n\t\tsuper(\n\t\t\t`'${role}' is a reader role and no password was supplied for it. ` +\n\t\t\t\t`This module composes DDL and invents no secrets: pass ` +\n\t\t\t\t`passwords.reader alongside the role name.`,\n\t\t);\n\t\tthis.name = 'ReaderNeedsPassword';\n\t}\n}\n\n/** The read-only role's name for a given runtime role. */\nexport function readerRole(runtime: string): string {\n\treturn `${runtime}_reader`;\n}\n\n/** The owner role's name for a given runtime role. */\nexport function ownerRole(runtime: string): string {\n\treturn `${runtime}_owner`;\n}\n\nfunction roleExists(role: string): { sql: string; values: unknown[] } {\n\treturn { sql: 'SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = $1', values: [role] };\n}\n\n/**\n * Quote an identifier for use in DDL.\n *\n * Names reaching here are already canonical, so this is defence rather than\n * sanitisation — but DDL cannot be parameterised, and an unquoted identifier is\n * the one place a name could ever be more than a name.\n */\nfunction ident(name: string): string {\n\treturn `\"${name.replace(/\"/g, '\"\"')}\"`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Quote a string literal.\n *\n * A password cannot be a bind parameter in `CREATE ROLE`, which is the one\n * place in this module where a value rather than a name is interpolated — so it\n * is escaped rather than trusted, whatever the caller believes it derived.\n */\nfunction literal(value: string): string {\n\treturn `'${value.replace(/'/g, \"''\")}'`;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;AAyEA,SAAgB,eAAe,MAAiC;CAC/D,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,aAAa;CAExD,OAAO;EACN;GACC,UAAU,QAAQ;GAClB,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK;GACxB,KAAK,eAAe,MAAM,KAAK,EAAE,kBAAkB,QAAQ,UAAU,KAAK;EAC3E;EACA,kBAAkB,OAAO,UAAU,KAAK;EACxC;GACC,UAAU,QAAQ;GAClB,QAAQ,WAAW,OAAO;GAC1B,KAAK,eAAe,MAAM,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,QAAQ,UAAU,OAAO;EAC/E;EACA,kBAAkB,SAAS,UAAU,OAAO;EAC5C;GASC,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM;GACnB,KAAK,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,EAAE;EAC5B;EACA;GACC,UAAU,UAAU;GACpB,QAAQ;IACP,KAAK;IACL,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM;GAChB;GAIA,KAAK,iBAAiB,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,iBAAiB,MAAM,KAAK;EACjE;EACA;GAWC,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO,eAAe;GACnC,KAAK,gBAAgB,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,YAAY,MAAM,KAAK;EAC3D;EACA,GAAI,WACD,CACA;GAIC,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM,0BAA0B;GAC7C,KAAK,4BAA4B,MAAM,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK;EACnE,CACD,IACC,CAAC;EACJ;GACC,UAAU,GAAG,QAAQ,WAAW;GAChC,KAAK,yBAAyB,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO;EAChE;EACA;GAIC,UAAU,GAAG,QAAQ,uCAAuC;GAC5D,KACC,qCAAqC,MAAM,KAAK,EAAE,aAAa,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,qDACxB,MAAM,OAAO;EACpE;EACA;GACC,UAAU,GAAG,QAAQ,+BAA+B;GACpD,KACC,qCAAqC,MAAM,KAAK,EAAE,aAAa,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,uCACtC,MAAM,OAAO;EACtD;EACA;GAGC,UAAU,GAAG,QAAQ,yCAAyC;GAC9D,KACC,gEAAgE,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,MACxE,MAAM,OAAO;EACrB;EACA;GACC,UAAU,GAAG,QAAQ,iCAAiC;GACtD,KAAK,kDAAkD,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO;EACzF;EACA;GAIC,UAAU,GAAG,QAAQ,qBAAqB;GAC1C,KAAK,cAAc,MAAM,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB,MAAM,MAAM;EACrE;EACA;GACC,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM,qBAAqB;GACxC,KAAK,cAAc,MAAM,KAAK,EAAE,sBAAsB,MAAM,MAAM;EACnE;EACA,GAAI,KAAK,SAAS,iBAAiB,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;CAC1D;AACD;;;;;;;;;;AAWA,SAAS,kBAAkB,MAAc,UAAiC;CACzE,OAAO;EACN,UAAU,GAAG,KAAK;EAClB,KAAK,cAAc,MAAM,IAAI,EAAE,uBAAuB,QAAQ,QAAQ;CACvE;AACD;;;;;;;;;AAUA,SAAS,iBAAiB,MAAgB,QAAiC;CAC1E,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,QAAQ,cAAc;CACrC,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU;CAE3B,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,MAAM,IAAI,oBAAoB,MAAM;CAEnD,OAAO;EACN;GACC,UAAU,QAAQ;GAClB,QAAQ,WAAW,MAAM;GACzB,KAAK,eAAe,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,kBAAkB,QAAQ,QAAQ;EACrE;EACA,kBAAkB,QAAQ,QAAQ;EAClC;GACC,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO,WAAW;GAC/B,KAAK,yBAAyB,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM;EAC/D;EACA;GACC,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO,6BAA6B;GACjD,KACC,qCAAqC,MAAM,KAAK,EAAE,aAAa,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,6BAChD,MAAM,MAAM;EAC3C;EACA;GACC,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO,+BAA+B;GACnD,KAAK,wCAAwC,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM;EAC9E;EACA;GACC,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO,qBAAqB;GACzC,KAAK,cAAc,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,sBAAsB,MAAM,MAAM;EACpE;CACD;AACD;;AAGA,IAAa,sBAAb,cAAyC,MAAM;CACzB;CAArB,YAAY,MAAuB;EAClC,MACC,IAAI,KAAK,wJAGV;EALoB,KAAA,OAAA;EAMpB,KAAK,OAAO;CACb;AACD;;AAGA,SAAgB,WAAW,SAAyB;CACnD,OAAO,GAAG,QAAQ;AACnB;;AAGA,SAAgB,UAAU,SAAyB;CAClD,OAAO,GAAG,QAAQ;AACnB;AAEA,SAAS,WAAW,MAAkD;CACrE,OAAO;EAAE,KAAK;EAA6C,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI;CAAE;AAC3E;;;;;;;;AASA,SAAS,MAAM,MAAsB;CACpC,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAI,EAAE;AACrC;;;;;;;;AASA,SAAS,QAAQ,OAAuB;CACvC,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,EAAE;AACtC"}

package/dist/pg/url.cjs

@@ -1,6 +1,21 @@
-const require_errors = require('../errors-Cs5jlAv-.cjs');
-
+Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
+const require_errors = require("../errors.cjs");
 //#region src/pg/url.ts
+/**
+* Composing a `postgres://` connection string.
+*
+* One direction only. Parsing exists in `pg` already — every consumer hands the
+* string straight to `new Pool({ connectionString })` — so a parser here would
+* be surface whose only caller is its own round-trip test.
+*
+* What is *not* already solved is composition: a provisioned instance exposes
+* host, port, database, username, and password as five separate values, and the
+* construct reads one URL. Doing that join by hand is where `search_path`
+* quietly goes missing.
+*
+* A URL built here is a secret — it carries the role's password. See
+* {@link redactDatabaseUrl} before writing one anywhere.
+*/
 const SCHEME = "postgres:";
 const DEFAULT_PORT = 5432;
 /**
@@ -27,7 +42,7 @@ function build(address) {
 	if (ssl === false) url.searchParams.set("sslmode", "disable");
 	return url.toString();
 }
-
 //#endregion
 exports.build = build;
+
 //# sourceMappingURL=url.cjs.map

package/dist/pg/url.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"url.cjs","names":["schema: string","address: PostgresAddress","MissingDatabaseHost","MissingDatabaseName"],"sources":["../../src/pg/url.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Composing a `postgres://` connection string.\n *\n * One direction only. Parsing exists in `pg` already — every consumer hands the\n * string straight to `new Pool({ connectionString })` — so a parser here would\n * be surface whose only caller is its own round-trip test.\n *\n * What is *not* already solved is composition: a provisioned instance exposes\n * host, port, database, username, and password as five separate values, and the\n * construct reads one URL. Doing that join by hand is where `search_path`\n * quietly goes missing.\n *\n * A URL built here is a secret — it carries the role's password. See\n * {@link redactDatabaseUrl} before writing one anywhere.\n */\n\nimport { MissingDatabaseHost, MissingDatabaseName } from '../errors';\n\n/** What a Postgres connection string addresses. */\nexport interface PostgresAddress {\n\thost: string;\n\tport?: number;\n\t/** The logical database. */\n\tdatabase: string;\n\t/** The role connecting — which is what decides DDL versus DML. */\n\tusername?: string;\n\tpassword?: string;\n\t/**\n\t * The schema to resolve unqualified names against.\n\t *\n\t * Normally pinned on the *role* instead (`ALTER ROLE … SET search_path`), so\n\t * it does not appear in the URL at all. It is carried here for the one case\n\t * with no role of its own to pin — connecting as the cluster master under\n\t * `roles: false` — where without it every query looks in `public`.\n\t *\n\t * Postgres-specific by nature, not just by spelling: it becomes a libpq\n\t * connection option, and no other engine accepts one. MySQL has no schemas\n\t * distinct from databases at all.\n\t */\n\tsearchPath?: string;\n\t/** Off only for local development, where there is no certificate to verify. */\n\tssl?: boolean;\n}\n\nconst SCHEME = 'postgres:';\n\nconst DEFAULT_PORT = 5432;\n\n/**\n * `search_path` travels as a libpq connection option, not a query parameter.\n * The server reads `options`; a plain `?search_path=app` is accepted by the URL\n * parser, ignored by the server, and produces a database that looks empty.\n * The `-c` prefix is what makes it a runtime configuration setting.\n */\nfunction searchPathOption(schema: string): string {\n\treturn `-c search_path=${schema}`;\n}\n\n/** Compose an address into a connection string. */\nexport function build(address: PostgresAddress): string {\n\tconst { host, port, database, username, password, searchPath, ssl } = address;\n\n\tif (!host) throw new MissingDatabaseHost();\n\tif (!database) throw new MissingDatabaseName();\n\n\tconst url = new URL(`${SCHEME}//`);\n\turl.hostname = host;\n\tif (port && port !== DEFAULT_PORT) url.port = String(port);\n\t// Username before password: WHATWG URL drops a password set without one.\n\tif (username) url.username = encodeURIComponent(username);\n\tif (password) url.password = encodeURIComponent(password);\n\turl.pathname = `/${database}`;\n\n\tif (searchPath) url.searchParams.set('options', searchPathOption(searchPath));\n\tif (ssl === false) url.searchParams.set('sslmode', 'disable');\n\n\treturn url.toString();\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;AA4CA,MAAM,SAAS;AAEf,MAAM,eAAe;;;;;;;AAQrB,SAAS,iBAAiBA,QAAwB;AACjD,SAAQ,iBAAiB,OAAO;AAChC;;AAGD,SAAgB,MAAMC,SAAkC;CACvD,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,YAAY,KAAK,GAAG;AAEtE,MAAK,KAAM,OAAM,IAAIC;AACrB,MAAK,SAAU,OAAM,IAAIC;CAEzB,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO;AAC9B,KAAI,WAAW;AACf,KAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,aAAc,KAAI,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK;AAE1D,KAAI,SAAU,KAAI,WAAW,mBAAmB,SAAS;AACzD,KAAI,SAAU,KAAI,WAAW,mBAAmB,SAAS;AACzD,KAAI,YAAY,GAAG,SAAS;AAE5B,KAAI,WAAY,KAAI,aAAa,IAAI,WAAW,iBAAiB,WAAW,CAAC;AAC7E,KAAI,QAAQ,MAAO,KAAI,aAAa,IAAI,WAAW,UAAU;AAE7D,QAAO,IAAI,UAAU;AACrB"}
+{"version":3,"file":"url.cjs","names":["MissingDatabaseHost","MissingDatabaseName"],"sources":["../../src/pg/url.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Composing a `postgres://` connection string.\n *\n * One direction only. Parsing exists in `pg` already — every consumer hands the\n * string straight to `new Pool({ connectionString })` — so a parser here would\n * be surface whose only caller is its own round-trip test.\n *\n * What is *not* already solved is composition: a provisioned instance exposes\n * host, port, database, username, and password as five separate values, and the\n * construct reads one URL. Doing that join by hand is where `search_path`\n * quietly goes missing.\n *\n * A URL built here is a secret — it carries the role's password. See\n * {@link redactDatabaseUrl} before writing one anywhere.\n */\n\nimport { MissingDatabaseHost, MissingDatabaseName } from '../errors';\n\n/** What a Postgres connection string addresses. */\nexport interface PostgresAddress {\n\thost: string;\n\tport?: number;\n\t/** The logical database. */\n\tdatabase: string;\n\t/** The role connecting — which is what decides DDL versus DML. */\n\tusername?: string;\n\tpassword?: string;\n\t/**\n\t * The schema to resolve unqualified names against.\n\t *\n\t * Normally pinned on the *role* instead (`ALTER ROLE … SET search_path`), so\n\t * it does not appear in the URL at all. It is carried here for the one case\n\t * with no role of its own to pin — connecting as the cluster master under\n\t * `roles: false` — where without it every query looks in `public`.\n\t *\n\t * Postgres-specific by nature, not just by spelling: it becomes a libpq\n\t * connection option, and no other engine accepts one. MySQL has no schemas\n\t * distinct from databases at all.\n\t */\n\tsearchPath?: string;\n\t/** Off only for local development, where there is no certificate to verify. */\n\tssl?: boolean;\n}\n\nconst SCHEME = 'postgres:';\n\nconst DEFAULT_PORT = 5432;\n\n/**\n * `search_path` travels as a libpq connection option, not a query parameter.\n * The server reads `options`; a plain `?search_path=app` is accepted by the URL\n * parser, ignored by the server, and produces a database that looks empty.\n * The `-c` prefix is what makes it a runtime configuration setting.\n */\nfunction searchPathOption(schema: string): string {\n\treturn `-c search_path=${schema}`;\n}\n\n/** Compose an address into a connection string. */\nexport function build(address: PostgresAddress): string {\n\tconst { host, port, database, username, password, searchPath, ssl } = address;\n\n\tif (!host) throw new MissingDatabaseHost();\n\tif (!database) throw new MissingDatabaseName();\n\n\tconst url = new URL(`${SCHEME}//`);\n\turl.hostname = host;\n\tif (port && port !== DEFAULT_PORT) url.port = String(port);\n\t// Username before password: WHATWG URL drops a password set without one.\n\tif (username) url.username = encodeURIComponent(username);\n\tif (password) url.password = encodeURIComponent(password);\n\turl.pathname = `/${database}`;\n\n\tif (searchPath) url.searchParams.set('options', searchPathOption(searchPath));\n\tif (ssl === false) url.searchParams.set('sslmode', 'disable');\n\n\treturn url.toString();\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA4CA,MAAM,SAAS;AAEf,MAAM,eAAe;;;;;;;AAQrB,SAAS,iBAAiB,QAAwB;CACjD,OAAO,kBAAkB;AAC1B;;AAGA,SAAgB,MAAM,SAAkC;CACvD,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,YAAY,QAAQ;CAEtE,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,MAAM,IAAIA,eAAAA,oBAAoB;CACzC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,MAAM,IAAIC,eAAAA,oBAAoB;CAE7C,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,GAAG;CACjC,IAAI,WAAW;CACf,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,cAAc,IAAI,OAAO,OAAO,IAAI;CAEzD,IAAI,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW,mBAAmB,QAAQ;CACxD,IAAI,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW,mBAAmB,QAAQ;CACxD,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI;CAEnB,IAAI,YAAY,IAAI,aAAa,IAAI,WAAW,iBAAiB,UAAU,CAAC;CAC5E,IAAI,QAAQ,OAAO,IAAI,aAAa,IAAI,WAAW,SAAS;CAE5D,OAAO,IAAI,SAAS;AACrB"}

package/dist/pg/url.d.cts

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
  * {@link redactDatabaseUrl} before writing one anywhere.
  */
 /** What a Postgres connection string addresses. */
-interface PostgresAddress {
+export interface PostgresAddress {
   host: string;
   port?: number;
   /** The logical database. */
@@ -40,8 +40,6 @@ interface PostgresAddress {
   ssl?: boolean;
 }
 /** Compose an address into a connection string. */
-declare function build(address: PostgresAddress): string;
-//# sourceMappingURL=url.d.ts.map
+export declare function build(address: PostgresAddress): string;
 //#endregion
-export { PostgresAddress, build };
 //# sourceMappingURL=url.d.cts.map

package/dist/pg/url.d.cts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"url.d.cts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/pg/url.ts"],"sourcesContent":[],"mappings":";;AAmBA;AAwCA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;UAxCiB,eAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAwCD,KAAA,UAAe"}
+{"version":3,"file":"url.d.cts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/pg/url.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAmBiB;EAChB;EACA;;EAEA;;EAEA;EACA;;;;;;;;;;;;;EAaA;;EAEA;;;wBAkBe,MAAM,SAAS"}

package/dist/pg/url.d.mts

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
  * {@link redactDatabaseUrl} before writing one anywhere.
  */
 /** What a Postgres connection string addresses. */
-interface PostgresAddress {
+export interface PostgresAddress {
   host: string;
   port?: number;
   /** The logical database. */
@@ -40,8 +40,6 @@ interface PostgresAddress {
   ssl?: boolean;
 }
 /** Compose an address into a connection string. */
-declare function build(address: PostgresAddress): string;
-//# sourceMappingURL=url.d.ts.map
+export declare function build(address: PostgresAddress): string;
 //#endregion
-export { PostgresAddress, build };
 //# sourceMappingURL=url.d.mts.map

package/dist/pg/url.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"url.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/pg/url.ts"],"sourcesContent":[],"mappings":";;AAmBA;AAwCA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;UAxCiB,eAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAwCD,KAAA,UAAe"}
+{"version":3,"file":"url.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/pg/url.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAmBiB;EAChB;EACA;;EAEA;;EAEA;EACA;;;;;;;;;;;;;EAaA;;EAEA;;;wBAkBe,MAAM,SAAS"}

package/dist/pg/url.mjs

@@ -1,6 +1,20 @@
-import { MissingDatabaseHost, MissingDatabaseName } from "../errors-CfFCan-X.mjs";
-
+import { MissingDatabaseHost, MissingDatabaseName } from "../errors.mjs";
 //#region src/pg/url.ts
+/**
+* Composing a `postgres://` connection string.
+*
+* One direction only. Parsing exists in `pg` already — every consumer hands the
+* string straight to `new Pool({ connectionString })` — so a parser here would
+* be surface whose only caller is its own round-trip test.
+*
+* What is *not* already solved is composition: a provisioned instance exposes
+* host, port, database, username, and password as five separate values, and the
+* construct reads one URL. Doing that join by hand is where `search_path`
+* quietly goes missing.
+*
+* A URL built here is a secret — it carries the role's password. See
+* {@link redactDatabaseUrl} before writing one anywhere.
+*/
 const SCHEME = "postgres:";
 const DEFAULT_PORT = 5432;
 /**
@@ -27,7 +41,7 @@ function build(address) {
 	if (ssl === false) url.searchParams.set("sslmode", "disable");
 	return url.toString();
 }
-
 //#endregion
 export { build };
+
 //# sourceMappingURL=url.mjs.map

package/dist/pg/url.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"url.mjs","names":["schema: string","address: PostgresAddress"],"sources":["../../src/pg/url.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Composing a `postgres://` connection string.\n *\n * One direction only. Parsing exists in `pg` already — every consumer hands the\n * string straight to `new Pool({ connectionString })` — so a parser here would\n * be surface whose only caller is its own round-trip test.\n *\n * What is *not* already solved is composition: a provisioned instance exposes\n * host, port, database, username, and password as five separate values, and the\n * construct reads one URL. Doing that join by hand is where `search_path`\n * quietly goes missing.\n *\n * A URL built here is a secret — it carries the role's password. See\n * {@link redactDatabaseUrl} before writing one anywhere.\n */\n\nimport { MissingDatabaseHost, MissingDatabaseName } from '../errors';\n\n/** What a Postgres connection string addresses. */\nexport interface PostgresAddress {\n\thost: string;\n\tport?: number;\n\t/** The logical database. */\n\tdatabase: string;\n\t/** The role connecting — which is what decides DDL versus DML. */\n\tusername?: string;\n\tpassword?: string;\n\t/**\n\t * The schema to resolve unqualified names against.\n\t *\n\t * Normally pinned on the *role* instead (`ALTER ROLE … SET search_path`), so\n\t * it does not appear in the URL at all. It is carried here for the one case\n\t * with no role of its own to pin — connecting as the cluster master under\n\t * `roles: false` — where without it every query looks in `public`.\n\t *\n\t * Postgres-specific by nature, not just by spelling: it becomes a libpq\n\t * connection option, and no other engine accepts one. MySQL has no schemas\n\t * distinct from databases at all.\n\t */\n\tsearchPath?: string;\n\t/** Off only for local development, where there is no certificate to verify. */\n\tssl?: boolean;\n}\n\nconst SCHEME = 'postgres:';\n\nconst DEFAULT_PORT = 5432;\n\n/**\n * `search_path` travels as a libpq connection option, not a query parameter.\n * The server reads `options`; a plain `?search_path=app` is accepted by the URL\n * parser, ignored by the server, and produces a database that looks empty.\n * The `-c` prefix is what makes it a runtime configuration setting.\n */\nfunction searchPathOption(schema: string): string {\n\treturn `-c search_path=${schema}`;\n}\n\n/** Compose an address into a connection string. */\nexport function build(address: PostgresAddress): string {\n\tconst { host, port, database, username, password, searchPath, ssl } = address;\n\n\tif (!host) throw new MissingDatabaseHost();\n\tif (!database) throw new MissingDatabaseName();\n\n\tconst url = new URL(`${SCHEME}//`);\n\turl.hostname = host;\n\tif (port && port !== DEFAULT_PORT) url.port = String(port);\n\t// Username before password: WHATWG URL drops a password set without one.\n\tif (username) url.username = encodeURIComponent(username);\n\tif (password) url.password = encodeURIComponent(password);\n\turl.pathname = `/${database}`;\n\n\tif (searchPath) url.searchParams.set('options', searchPathOption(searchPath));\n\tif (ssl === false) url.searchParams.set('sslmode', 'disable');\n\n\treturn url.toString();\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;AA4CA,MAAM,SAAS;AAEf,MAAM,eAAe;;;;;;;AAQrB,SAAS,iBAAiBA,QAAwB;AACjD,SAAQ,iBAAiB,OAAO;AAChC;;AAGD,SAAgB,MAAMC,SAAkC;CACvD,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,YAAY,KAAK,GAAG;AAEtE,MAAK,KAAM,OAAM,IAAI;AACrB,MAAK,SAAU,OAAM,IAAI;CAEzB,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO;AAC9B,KAAI,WAAW;AACf,KAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,aAAc,KAAI,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK;AAE1D,KAAI,SAAU,KAAI,WAAW,mBAAmB,SAAS;AACzD,KAAI,SAAU,KAAI,WAAW,mBAAmB,SAAS;AACzD,KAAI,YAAY,GAAG,SAAS;AAE5B,KAAI,WAAY,KAAI,aAAa,IAAI,WAAW,iBAAiB,WAAW,CAAC;AAC7E,KAAI,QAAQ,MAAO,KAAI,aAAa,IAAI,WAAW,UAAU;AAE7D,QAAO,IAAI,UAAU;AACrB"}
+{"version":3,"file":"url.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/pg/url.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Composing a `postgres://` connection string.\n *\n * One direction only. Parsing exists in `pg` already — every consumer hands the\n * string straight to `new Pool({ connectionString })` — so a parser here would\n * be surface whose only caller is its own round-trip test.\n *\n * What is *not* already solved is composition: a provisioned instance exposes\n * host, port, database, username, and password as five separate values, and the\n * construct reads one URL. Doing that join by hand is where `search_path`\n * quietly goes missing.\n *\n * A URL built here is a secret — it carries the role's password. See\n * {@link redactDatabaseUrl} before writing one anywhere.\n */\n\nimport { MissingDatabaseHost, MissingDatabaseName } from '../errors';\n\n/** What a Postgres connection string addresses. */\nexport interface PostgresAddress {\n\thost: string;\n\tport?: number;\n\t/** The logical database. */\n\tdatabase: string;\n\t/** The role connecting — which is what decides DDL versus DML. */\n\tusername?: string;\n\tpassword?: string;\n\t/**\n\t * The schema to resolve unqualified names against.\n\t *\n\t * Normally pinned on the *role* instead (`ALTER ROLE … SET search_path`), so\n\t * it does not appear in the URL at all. It is carried here for the one case\n\t * with no role of its own to pin — connecting as the cluster master under\n\t * `roles: false` — where without it every query looks in `public`.\n\t *\n\t * Postgres-specific by nature, not just by spelling: it becomes a libpq\n\t * connection option, and no other engine accepts one. MySQL has no schemas\n\t * distinct from databases at all.\n\t */\n\tsearchPath?: string;\n\t/** Off only for local development, where there is no certificate to verify. */\n\tssl?: boolean;\n}\n\nconst SCHEME = 'postgres:';\n\nconst DEFAULT_PORT = 5432;\n\n/**\n * `search_path` travels as a libpq connection option, not a query parameter.\n * The server reads `options`; a plain `?search_path=app` is accepted by the URL\n * parser, ignored by the server, and produces a database that looks empty.\n * The `-c` prefix is what makes it a runtime configuration setting.\n */\nfunction searchPathOption(schema: string): string {\n\treturn `-c search_path=${schema}`;\n}\n\n/** Compose an address into a connection string. */\nexport function build(address: PostgresAddress): string {\n\tconst { host, port, database, username, password, searchPath, ssl } = address;\n\n\tif (!host) throw new MissingDatabaseHost();\n\tif (!database) throw new MissingDatabaseName();\n\n\tconst url = new URL(`${SCHEME}//`);\n\turl.hostname = host;\n\tif (port && port !== DEFAULT_PORT) url.port = String(port);\n\t// Username before password: WHATWG URL drops a password set without one.\n\tif (username) url.username = encodeURIComponent(username);\n\tif (password) url.password = encodeURIComponent(password);\n\turl.pathname = `/${database}`;\n\n\tif (searchPath) url.searchParams.set('options', searchPathOption(searchPath));\n\tif (ssl === false) url.searchParams.set('sslmode', 'disable');\n\n\treturn url.toString();\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA4CA,MAAM,SAAS;AAEf,MAAM,eAAe;;;;;;;AAQrB,SAAS,iBAAiB,QAAwB;CACjD,OAAO,kBAAkB;AAC1B;;AAGA,SAAgB,MAAM,SAAkC;CACvD,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,YAAY,QAAQ;CAEtE,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,oBAAoB;CACzC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,MAAM,IAAI,oBAAoB;CAE7C,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,GAAG;CACjC,IAAI,WAAW;CACf,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,cAAc,IAAI,OAAO,OAAO,IAAI;CAEzD,IAAI,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW,mBAAmB,QAAQ;CACxD,IAAI,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW,mBAAmB,QAAQ;CACxD,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI;CAEnB,IAAI,YAAY,IAAI,aAAa,IAAI,WAAW,iBAAiB,UAAU,CAAC;CAC5E,IAAI,QAAQ,OAAO,IAAI,aAAa,IAAI,WAAW,SAAS;CAE5D,OAAO,IAAI,SAAS;AACrB"}