@geekmidas/cli 10.0.0-alpha.10 → 10.0.0-alpha.100

package/dist/local-BwC2v2Y8.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+import { n as CommandTimedOut } from "./run-BJLIerMM.mjs";
+import { a as assertSecretNames, o as confineCwd, t as SECRETS_DIR_ENV } from "./sandbox-CbVB7uOD.mjs";
+import { join, resolve } from "node:path";
+import { mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
+//#region src/sandbox/env.ts
+/**
+* What of the host's environment a local sandbox passes on.
+*
+* An allowlist, not a denylist: a credential's variable has any name its
+* owner chose (`DOKPLOY_TOKEN`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, `MY_VAULT_TOKEN`), so
+* the only safe default is to name what a program needs to *run* and pass
+* nothing else.
+*/
+/**
+* Variables a command needs to find programs, write temp files, print in the
+* user's locale and reach the network through the host's proxy — and nothing
+* that authenticates as anyone.
+*
+* Deliberately left out:
+* - `NODE_OPTIONS`: it can `--require` or `--import` code into every node
+*   process, and CI often holds `--import tsx` there. A step that needs a
+*   loader passes its own.
+* - `NODE_AUTH_TOKEN`, `NPM_TOKEN`, `npm_config_*`: registry tokens
+*   (`actions/setup-node` writes `NODE_AUTH_TOKEN`), which is why there is no
+*   `NODE_*` wildcard.
+* - `AWS_*`, `DOCKER_*`, `DOKPLOY_*`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, `TURBO_TOKEN`, `GKM_*`:
+*   credentials, or where the deploy keeps them.
+* - `SHELL`, `EDITOR` and the rest of a login session: nothing here starts a
+*   shell.
+*
+* Proxies are passed: behind one, nothing installs or builds without it. A
+* proxy URL with a password in it reaches the command too — a host that keeps
+* one there and builds code it does not trust should pass a sandbox of its
+* own.
+*/
+const SANDBOX_ENV_ALLOWLIST = [
+	"PATH",
+	"HOME",
+	"USER",
+	"LOGNAME",
+	"TMPDIR",
+	"TMP",
+	"TEMP",
+	"LANG",
+	"LANGUAGE",
+	"TZ",
+	/^LC_[A-Z]+$/,
+	"TERM",
+	"COLORTERM",
+	"NO_COLOR",
+	"FORCE_COLOR",
+	"CI",
+	"NODE_ENV",
+	"NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS",
+	"COREPACK_HOME",
+	"PNPM_HOME",
+	"XDG_CACHE_HOME",
+	"XDG_DATA_HOME",
+	"HTTP_PROXY",
+	"HTTPS_PROXY",
+	"NO_PROXY",
+	"http_proxy",
+	"https_proxy",
+	"no_proxy",
+	"SystemRoot",
+	"SYSTEMROOT",
+	"windir",
+	"WINDIR",
+	"ComSpec",
+	"COMSPEC",
+	"PATHEXT",
+	"USERPROFILE",
+	"APPDATA",
+	"LOCALAPPDATA"
+];
+function allowed(name) {
+	return SANDBOX_ENV_ALLOWLIST.some((entry) => typeof entry === "string" ? entry === name : entry.test(name));
+}
+/**
+* The allowlisted part of `source`, plus each of `extra` the host chose to
+* pass on by name.
+*/
+function allowlistedEnv(source = process.env, extra = []) {
+	const env = {};
+	for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(source)) {
+		if (value === void 0) continue;
+		if (allowed(name) || extra.includes(name)) env[name] = value;
+	}
+	return env;
+}
+//#endregion
+//#region src/sandbox/local.ts
+/** How long a timed-out command has to exit on SIGTERM before SIGKILL. */
+const KILL_GRACE_MS = 5e3;
+/** Where `output` sends a child's streams. */
+const STDIO = {
+	capture: [
+		"ignore",
+		"pipe",
+		"pipe"
+	],
+	inherit: "inherit",
+	stderr: [
+		"ignore",
+		2,
+		2
+	],
+	ignore: "ignore"
+};
+/**
+* A child process on this machine, as this user, with an allowlisted
+* environment.
+*
+* What it withholds from the command: the host's environment beyond
+* {@link SANDBOX_ENV_ALLOWLIST}, a shell, a working directory outside the
+* project, and any time past the timeout. What it does not: the host's
+* filesystem, which the command can read and write as the user running the
+* deploy. So it is not `isolating`, and it is the default for projects the
+* host already trusts — the developer's own, a team's own CI. Code nobody
+* vetted belongs in a sandbox that is.
+*
+* A timed-out command is sent SIGTERM, then SIGKILL; processes it started
+* itself are its to stop.
+*/
+var LocalSandbox = class {
+	root;
+	isolating = false;
+	env;
+	constructor(options) {
+		this.root = resolve(options.root);
+		this.env = {
+			...allowlistedEnv(options.hostEnv ?? process.env, options.passEnv),
+			...options.home ? {
+				HOME: options.home,
+				USERPROFILE: options.home
+			} : {}
+		};
+	}
+	async exec(command, args, options) {
+		const cwd = confineCwd(this.root, options.cwd);
+		assertSecretNames(options.secrets);
+		options.signal?.throwIfAborted();
+		const secretsDir = await mountSecrets(options.secrets);
+		try {
+			return await spawnConfined(command, args, {
+				...options,
+				cwd,
+				env: secretsDir ? {
+					...options.env,
+					[SECRETS_DIR_ENV]: secretsDir
+				} : options.env
+			});
+		} finally {
+			if (secretsDir) await rm(secretsDir, {
+				recursive: true,
+				force: true
+			});
+		}
+	}
+};
+/**
+* Each secret as a 0600 file in a fresh 0700 directory outside the project —
+* where nothing the build writes, packs or commits will pick it up.
+*/
+async function mountSecrets(secrets) {
+	if (!secrets || Object.keys(secrets).length === 0) return void 0;
+	const dir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "gkm-secrets-"));
+	for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(secrets)) await writeFile(join(dir, name), value, { mode: 384 });
+	return dir;
+}
+function spawnConfined(command, args, options) {
+	const { output = "capture", signal, timeoutMs } = options;
+	return new Promise((resolvePromise, reject) => {
+		const child = spawn(command, [...args], {
+			cwd: options.cwd,
+			env: { ...options.env },
+			stdio: STDIO[output],
+			shell: false,
+			...signal ? { signal } : {}
+		});
+		let stdout = "";
+		let stderr = "";
+		child.stdout?.on("data", (chunk) => {
+			stdout += chunk.toString();
+		});
+		child.stderr?.on("data", (chunk) => {
+			stderr += chunk.toString();
+		});
+		let timedOut = false;
+		let killer;
+		const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+			timedOut = true;
+			child.kill("SIGTERM");
+			killer = setTimeout(() => child.kill("SIGKILL"), KILL_GRACE_MS);
+			killer.unref?.();
+		}, timeoutMs);
+		timer.unref?.();
+		const settle = () => {
+			clearTimeout(timer);
+			if (killer) clearTimeout(killer);
+		};
+		child.on("error", (error) => {
+			settle();
+			reject(signal?.aborted ? signal.reason : error);
+		});
+		child.on("close", (code, killedBy) => {
+			settle();
+			if (signal?.aborted) reject(signal.reason);
+			else if (timedOut) reject(new CommandTimedOut(command, args, timeoutMs));
+			else resolvePromise({
+				exitCode: code,
+				signal: killedBy ?? null,
+				stdout,
+				stderr
+			});
+		});
+	});
+}
+//#endregion
+export { SANDBOX_ENV_ALLOWLIST as n, allowlistedEnv as r, LocalSandbox as t };
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=local-BwC2v2Y8.mjs.map

package/dist/local-BwC2v2Y8.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"local-BwC2v2Y8.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/sandbox/env.ts","../src/sandbox/local.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * What of the host's environment a local sandbox passes on.\n *\n * An allowlist, not a denylist: a credential's variable has any name its\n * owner chose (`DOKPLOY_TOKEN`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, `MY_VAULT_TOKEN`), so\n * the only safe default is to name what a program needs to *run* and pass\n * nothing else.\n */\n\n/**\n * Variables a command needs to find programs, write temp files, print in the\n * user's locale and reach the network through the host's proxy — and nothing\n * that authenticates as anyone.\n *\n * Deliberately left out:\n * - `NODE_OPTIONS`: it can `--require` or `--import` code into every node\n *   process, and CI often holds `--import tsx` there. A step that needs a\n *   loader passes its own.\n * - `NODE_AUTH_TOKEN`, `NPM_TOKEN`, `npm_config_*`: registry tokens\n *   (`actions/setup-node` writes `NODE_AUTH_TOKEN`), which is why there is no\n *   `NODE_*` wildcard.\n * - `AWS_*`, `DOCKER_*`, `DOKPLOY_*`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, `TURBO_TOKEN`, `GKM_*`:\n *   credentials, or where the deploy keeps them.\n * - `SHELL`, `EDITOR` and the rest of a login session: nothing here starts a\n *   shell.\n *\n * Proxies are passed: behind one, nothing installs or builds without it. A\n * proxy URL with a password in it reaches the command too — a host that keeps\n * one there and builds code it does not trust should pass a sandbox of its\n * own.\n */\nexport const SANDBOX_ENV_ALLOWLIST: readonly (string | RegExp)[] = [\n\t// Finding programs and a home to cache in.\n\t'PATH',\n\t'HOME',\n\t'USER',\n\t'LOGNAME',\n\t'TMPDIR',\n\t'TMP',\n\t'TEMP',\n\t// Locale and terminal: output a person reads should look the same.\n\t'LANG',\n\t'LANGUAGE',\n\t'TZ',\n\t/^LC_[A-Z]+$/,\n\t'TERM',\n\t'COLORTERM',\n\t'NO_COLOR',\n\t'FORCE_COLOR',\n\t'CI',\n\t// Node: the mode a build runs in, and the CAs a corporate network adds.\n\t'NODE_ENV',\n\t'NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS',\n\t// Package managers' own homes, so a build reuses the host's store.\n\t'COREPACK_HOME',\n\t'PNPM_HOME',\n\t'XDG_CACHE_HOME',\n\t'XDG_DATA_HOME',\n\t// The network, through the host's proxy.\n\t'HTTP_PROXY',\n\t'HTTPS_PROXY',\n\t'NO_PROXY',\n\t'http_proxy',\n\t'https_proxy',\n\t'no_proxy',\n\t// Windows: without these, nothing starts.\n\t'SystemRoot',\n\t'SYSTEMROOT',\n\t'windir',\n\t'WINDIR',\n\t'ComSpec',\n\t'COMSPEC',\n\t'PATHEXT',\n\t'USERPROFILE',\n\t'APPDATA',\n\t'LOCALAPPDATA',\n];\n\nfunction allowed(name: string): boolean {\n\treturn SANDBOX_ENV_ALLOWLIST.some((entry) =>\n\t\ttypeof entry === 'string' ? entry === name : entry.test(name),\n\t);\n}\n\n/**\n * The allowlisted part of `source`, plus each of `extra` the host chose to\n * pass on by name.\n */\nexport function allowlistedEnv(\n\tsource: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,\n\textra: readonly string[] = [],\n): Record<string, string> {\n\tconst env: Record<string, string> = {};\n\tfor (const [name, value] of Object.entries(source)) {\n\t\tif (value === undefined) continue;\n\t\tif (allowed(name) || extra.includes(name)) env[name] = value;\n\t}\n\treturn env;\n}\n","import { type SpawnOptions, spawn } from 'node:child_process';\nimport { mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';\nimport { tmpdir } from 'node:os';\nimport { join, resolve } from 'node:path';\nimport { CommandTimedOut } from '../run';\nimport { allowlistedEnv } from './env';\nimport {\n\tassertSecretNames,\n\tconfineCwd,\n\ttype Sandbox,\n\ttype SandboxExecOptions,\n\ttype SandboxOutput,\n\ttype SandboxResult,\n\tSECRETS_DIR_ENV,\n} from './sandbox';\n\n/** How long a timed-out command has to exit on SIGTERM before SIGKILL. */\nconst KILL_GRACE_MS = 5_000;\n\nexport interface LocalSandboxOptions {\n\t/** The project. Every command runs at or below it. */\n\troot: string;\n\t/**\n\t * `HOME` for every command. Defaults to the host's, because a build\n\t * reuses the caches kept there — the pnpm store, corepack's package\n\t * managers, turbo's cache — and a cold one re-downloads all of them.\n\t * Point it at an empty directory to keep `~/.aws`, `~/.npmrc` and\n\t * `~/.docker` out of reach of an SDK's default lookup — though, sharing\n\t * the host's filesystem, a command that goes looking still finds them.\n\t */\n\thome?: string;\n\t/**\n\t * Host variables to pass on beyond the allowlist, by name — a remote\n\t * cache's `TURBO_TOKEN`, for a build the host trusts with it.\n\t */\n\tpassEnv?: readonly string[];\n\t/** Where the allowlisted variables are read from. Defaults to `process.env`. */\n\thostEnv?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n}\n\n/** Where `output` sends a child's streams. */\nconst STDIO: Record<SandboxOutput, SpawnOptions['stdio']> = {\n\tcapture: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],\n\tinherit: 'inherit',\n\tstderr: ['ignore', 2, 2],\n\tignore: 'ignore',\n};\n\n/**\n * A child process on this machine, as this user, with an allowlisted\n * environment.\n *\n * What it withholds from the command: the host's environment beyond\n * {@link SANDBOX_ENV_ALLOWLIST}, a shell, a working directory outside the\n * project, and any time past the timeout. What it does not: the host's\n * filesystem, which the command can read and write as the user running the\n * deploy. So it is not `isolating`, and it is the default for projects the\n * host already trusts — the developer's own, a team's own CI. Code nobody\n * vetted belongs in a sandbox that is.\n *\n * A timed-out command is sent SIGTERM, then SIGKILL; processes it started\n * itself are its to stop.\n */\nexport class LocalSandbox implements Sandbox {\n\treadonly root: string;\n\treadonly isolating = false;\n\treadonly env: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;\n\n\tconstructor(options: LocalSandboxOptions) {\n\t\tthis.root = resolve(options.root);\n\t\tthis.env = {\n\t\t\t...allowlistedEnv(options.hostEnv ?? process.env, options.passEnv),\n\t\t\t...(options.home\n\t\t\t\t? { HOME: options.home, USERPROFILE: options.home }\n\t\t\t\t: {}),\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\tasync exec(\n\t\tcommand: string,\n\t\targs: readonly string[],\n\t\toptions: SandboxExecOptions,\n\t): Promise<SandboxResult> {\n\t\tconst cwd = confineCwd(this.root, options.cwd);\n\t\tassertSecretNames(options.secrets);\n\t\toptions.signal?.throwIfAborted();\n\n\t\tconst secretsDir = await mountSecrets(options.secrets);\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\treturn await spawnConfined(command, args, {\n\t\t\t\t...options,\n\t\t\t\tcwd,\n\t\t\t\tenv: secretsDir\n\t\t\t\t\t? { ...options.env, [SECRETS_DIR_ENV]: secretsDir }\n\t\t\t\t\t: options.env,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t} finally {\n\t\t\tif (secretsDir) await rm(secretsDir, { recursive: true, force: true });\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Each secret as a 0600 file in a fresh 0700 directory outside the project —\n * where nothing the build writes, packs or commits will pick it up.\n */\nasync function mountSecrets(\n\tsecrets: Readonly<Record<string, string>> | undefined,\n): Promise<string | undefined> {\n\tif (!secrets || Object.keys(secrets).length === 0) return undefined;\n\n\tconst dir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'gkm-secrets-'));\n\tfor (const [name, value] of Object.entries(secrets)) {\n\t\tawait writeFile(join(dir, name), value, { mode: 0o600 });\n\t}\n\treturn dir;\n}\n\nfunction spawnConfined(\n\tcommand: string,\n\targs: readonly string[],\n\toptions: SandboxExecOptions,\n): Promise<SandboxResult> {\n\tconst { output = 'capture', signal, timeoutMs } = options;\n\n\treturn new Promise<SandboxResult>((resolvePromise, reject) => {\n\t\tconst child = spawn(command, [...args], {\n\t\t\tcwd: options.cwd,\n\t\t\t// The whole environment, as given. `spawn` reads `process.env` only\n\t\t\t// when this is left out.\n\t\t\tenv: { ...options.env },\n\t\t\tstdio: STDIO[output],\n\t\t\tshell: false,\n\t\t\t...(signal ? { signal } : {}),\n\t\t});\n\n\t\tlet stdout = '';\n\t\tlet stderr = '';\n\t\tchild.stdout?.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {\n\t\t\tstdout += chunk.toString();\n\t\t});\n\t\tchild.stderr?.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {\n\t\t\tstderr += chunk.toString();\n\t\t});\n\n\t\tlet timedOut = false;\n\t\tlet killer: NodeJS.Timeout | undefined;\n\t\tconst timer = setTimeout(() => {\n\t\t\ttimedOut = true;\n\t\t\tchild.kill('SIGTERM');\n\t\t\t// A command that ignores SIGTERM would otherwise outlive its timeout.\n\t\t\tkiller = setTimeout(() => child.kill('SIGKILL'), KILL_GRACE_MS);\n\t\t\tkiller.unref?.();\n\t\t}, timeoutMs);\n\t\ttimer.unref?.();\n\n\t\tconst settle = () => {\n\t\t\tclearTimeout(timer);\n\t\t\tif (killer) clearTimeout(killer);\n\t\t};\n\n\t\tchild.on('error', (error) => {\n\t\t\tsettle();\n\t\t\t// Node reports an abort as its own `AbortError`; the caller asked\n\t\t\t// with a reason, and that is what it gets back.\n\t\t\treject(signal?.aborted ? signal.reason : error);\n\t\t});\n\n\t\tchild.on('close', (code: number | null, killedBy: string | null) => {\n\t\t\tsettle();\n\t\t\tif (signal?.aborted) reject(signal.reason);\n\t\t\telse if (timedOut) reject(new CommandTimedOut(command, args, timeoutMs));\n\t\t\telse\n\t\t\t\tresolvePromise({\n\t\t\t\t\texitCode: code,\n\t\t\t\t\tsignal: killedBy ?? null,\n\t\t\t\t\tstdout,\n\t\t\t\t\tstderr,\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t});\n\t});\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA+BA,MAAa,wBAAsD;CAElE;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CAEA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CAEA;CACA;CAEA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CAEA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CAEA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;AACD;AAEA,SAAS,QAAQ,MAAuB;CACvC,OAAO,sBAAsB,MAAM,UAClC,OAAO,UAAU,WAAW,UAAU,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,CAC7D;AACD;;;;;AAMA,SAAgB,eACf,SAA4B,QAAQ,KACpC,QAA2B,CAAC,GACH;CACzB,MAAM,MAA8B,CAAC;CACrC,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG;EACnD,IAAI,UAAU,KAAA,GAAW;EACzB,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,QAAQ;CACxD;CACA,OAAO;AACR;;;;ACjFA,MAAM,gBAAgB;;AAwBtB,MAAM,QAAsD;CAC3D,SAAS;EAAC;EAAU;EAAQ;CAAM;CAClC,SAAS;CACT,QAAQ;EAAC;EAAU;EAAG;CAAC;CACvB,QAAQ;AACT;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAiBA,IAAa,eAAb,MAA6C;CAC5C;CACA,YAAqB;CACrB;CAEA,YAAY,SAA8B;EACzC,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI;EAChC,KAAK,MAAM;GACV,GAAG,eAAe,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,OAAO;GACjE,GAAI,QAAQ,OACT;IAAE,MAAM,QAAQ;IAAM,aAAa,QAAQ;GAAK,IAChD,CAAC;EACL;CACD;CAEA,MAAM,KACL,SACA,MACA,SACyB;EACzB,MAAM,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG;EAC7C,kBAAkB,QAAQ,OAAO;EACjC,QAAQ,QAAQ,eAAe;EAE/B,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM,aAAa,QAAQ,OAAO;EACrD,IAAI;GACH,OAAO,MAAM,cAAc,SAAS,MAAM;IACzC,GAAG;IACH;IACA,KAAK,aACF;KAAE,GAAG,QAAQ;MAAM,kBAAkB;IAAW,IAChD,QAAQ;GACZ,CAAC;EACF,UAAU;GACT,IAAI,YAAY,MAAM,GAAG,YAAY;IAAE,WAAW;IAAM,OAAO;GAAK,CAAC;EACtE;CACD;AACD;;;;;AAMA,eAAe,aACd,SAC8B;CAC9B,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,GAAG,OAAO,KAAA;CAE1D,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,GAAG,cAAc,CAAC;CACxD,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GACjD,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,IAAM,CAAC;CAExD,OAAO;AACR;AAEA,SAAS,cACR,SACA,MACA,SACyB;CACzB,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,WAAW,QAAQ,cAAc;CAElD,OAAO,IAAI,SAAwB,gBAAgB,WAAW;EAC7D,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG;GACvC,KAAK,QAAQ;GAGb,KAAK,EAAE,GAAG,QAAQ,IAAI;GACtB,OAAO,MAAM;GACb,OAAO;GACP,GAAI,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;EAC5B,CAAC;EAED,IAAI,SAAS;EACb,IAAI,SAAS;EACb,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,SAAS,UAAkB;GAC3C,UAAU,MAAM,SAAS;EAC1B,CAAC;EACD,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,SAAS,UAAkB;GAC3C,UAAU,MAAM,SAAS;EAC1B,CAAC;EAED,IAAI,WAAW;EACf,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM,QAAQ,iBAAiB;GAC9B,WAAW;GACX,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS;GAEpB,SAAS,iBAAiB,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG,aAAa;GAC9D,OAAO,QAAQ;EAChB,GAAG,SAAS;EACZ,MAAM,QAAQ;EAEd,MAAM,eAAe;GACpB,aAAa,KAAK;GAClB,IAAI,QAAQ,aAAa,MAAM;EAChC;EAEA,MAAM,GAAG,UAAU,UAAU;GAC5B,OAAO;GAGP,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK;EAC/C,CAAC;EAED,MAAM,GAAG,UAAU,MAAqB,aAA4B;GACnE,OAAO;GACP,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM;QACpC,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO,IAAI,gBAAgB,SAAS,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;QAEtE,eAAe;IACd,UAAU;IACV,QAAQ,YAAY;IACpB;IACA;GACD,CAAC;EACH,CAAC;CACF,CAAC;AACF"}

package/dist/local-DNhnkugT.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+const require_run = require("./run-fVZ-rLnc.cjs");
+const require_sandbox = require("./sandbox-CHv3OYXg.cjs");
+let node_path = require("node:path");
+let node_fs_promises = require("node:fs/promises");
+let node_os = require("node:os");
+let node_child_process = require("node:child_process");
+//#region src/sandbox/env.ts
+/**
+* What of the host's environment a local sandbox passes on.
+*
+* An allowlist, not a denylist: a credential's variable has any name its
+* owner chose (`DOKPLOY_TOKEN`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, `MY_VAULT_TOKEN`), so
+* the only safe default is to name what a program needs to *run* and pass
+* nothing else.
+*/
+/**
+* Variables a command needs to find programs, write temp files, print in the
+* user's locale and reach the network through the host's proxy — and nothing
+* that authenticates as anyone.
+*
+* Deliberately left out:
+* - `NODE_OPTIONS`: it can `--require` or `--import` code into every node
+*   process, and CI often holds `--import tsx` there. A step that needs a
+*   loader passes its own.
+* - `NODE_AUTH_TOKEN`, `NPM_TOKEN`, `npm_config_*`: registry tokens
+*   (`actions/setup-node` writes `NODE_AUTH_TOKEN`), which is why there is no
+*   `NODE_*` wildcard.
+* - `AWS_*`, `DOCKER_*`, `DOKPLOY_*`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, `TURBO_TOKEN`, `GKM_*`:
+*   credentials, or where the deploy keeps them.
+* - `SHELL`, `EDITOR` and the rest of a login session: nothing here starts a
+*   shell.
+*
+* Proxies are passed: behind one, nothing installs or builds without it. A
+* proxy URL with a password in it reaches the command too — a host that keeps
+* one there and builds code it does not trust should pass a sandbox of its
+* own.
+*/
+const SANDBOX_ENV_ALLOWLIST = [
+	"PATH",
+	"HOME",
+	"USER",
+	"LOGNAME",
+	"TMPDIR",
+	"TMP",
+	"TEMP",
+	"LANG",
+	"LANGUAGE",
+	"TZ",
+	/^LC_[A-Z]+$/,
+	"TERM",
+	"COLORTERM",
+	"NO_COLOR",
+	"FORCE_COLOR",
+	"CI",
+	"NODE_ENV",
+	"NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS",
+	"COREPACK_HOME",
+	"PNPM_HOME",
+	"XDG_CACHE_HOME",
+	"XDG_DATA_HOME",
+	"HTTP_PROXY",
+	"HTTPS_PROXY",
+	"NO_PROXY",
+	"http_proxy",
+	"https_proxy",
+	"no_proxy",
+	"SystemRoot",
+	"SYSTEMROOT",
+	"windir",
+	"WINDIR",
+	"ComSpec",
+	"COMSPEC",
+	"PATHEXT",
+	"USERPROFILE",
+	"APPDATA",
+	"LOCALAPPDATA"
+];
+function allowed(name) {
+	return SANDBOX_ENV_ALLOWLIST.some((entry) => typeof entry === "string" ? entry === name : entry.test(name));
+}
+/**
+* The allowlisted part of `source`, plus each of `extra` the host chose to
+* pass on by name.
+*/
+function allowlistedEnv(source = process.env, extra = []) {
+	const env = {};
+	for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(source)) {
+		if (value === void 0) continue;
+		if (allowed(name) || extra.includes(name)) env[name] = value;
+	}
+	return env;
+}
+//#endregion
+//#region src/sandbox/local.ts
+/** How long a timed-out command has to exit on SIGTERM before SIGKILL. */
+const KILL_GRACE_MS = 5e3;
+/** Where `output` sends a child's streams. */
+const STDIO = {
+	capture: [
+		"ignore",
+		"pipe",
+		"pipe"
+	],
+	inherit: "inherit",
+	stderr: [
+		"ignore",
+		2,
+		2
+	],
+	ignore: "ignore"
+};
+/**
+* A child process on this machine, as this user, with an allowlisted
+* environment.
+*
+* What it withholds from the command: the host's environment beyond
+* {@link SANDBOX_ENV_ALLOWLIST}, a shell, a working directory outside the
+* project, and any time past the timeout. What it does not: the host's
+* filesystem, which the command can read and write as the user running the
+* deploy. So it is not `isolating`, and it is the default for projects the
+* host already trusts — the developer's own, a team's own CI. Code nobody
+* vetted belongs in a sandbox that is.
+*
+* A timed-out command is sent SIGTERM, then SIGKILL; processes it started
+* itself are its to stop.
+*/
+var LocalSandbox = class {
+	root;
+	isolating = false;
+	env;
+	constructor(options) {
+		this.root = (0, node_path.resolve)(options.root);
+		this.env = {
+			...allowlistedEnv(options.hostEnv ?? process.env, options.passEnv),
+			...options.home ? {
+				HOME: options.home,
+				USERPROFILE: options.home
+			} : {}
+		};
+	}
+	async exec(command, args, options) {
+		const cwd = require_sandbox.confineCwd(this.root, options.cwd);
+		require_sandbox.assertSecretNames(options.secrets);
+		options.signal?.throwIfAborted();
+		const secretsDir = await mountSecrets(options.secrets);
+		try {
+			return await spawnConfined(command, args, {
+				...options,
+				cwd,
+				env: secretsDir ? {
+					...options.env,
+					[require_sandbox.SECRETS_DIR_ENV]: secretsDir
+				} : options.env
+			});
+		} finally {
+			if (secretsDir) await (0, node_fs_promises.rm)(secretsDir, {
+				recursive: true,
+				force: true
+			});
+		}
+	}
+};
+/**
+* Each secret as a 0600 file in a fresh 0700 directory outside the project —
+* where nothing the build writes, packs or commits will pick it up.
+*/
+async function mountSecrets(secrets) {
+	if (!secrets || Object.keys(secrets).length === 0) return void 0;
+	const dir = await (0, node_fs_promises.mkdtemp)((0, node_path.join)((0, node_os.tmpdir)(), "gkm-secrets-"));
+	for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(secrets)) await (0, node_fs_promises.writeFile)((0, node_path.join)(dir, name), value, { mode: 384 });
+	return dir;
+}
+function spawnConfined(command, args, options) {
+	const { output = "capture", signal, timeoutMs } = options;
+	return new Promise((resolvePromise, reject) => {
+		const child = (0, node_child_process.spawn)(command, [...args], {
+			cwd: options.cwd,
+			env: { ...options.env },
+			stdio: STDIO[output],
+			shell: false,
+			...signal ? { signal } : {}
+		});
+		let stdout = "";
+		let stderr = "";
+		child.stdout?.on("data", (chunk) => {
+			stdout += chunk.toString();
+		});
+		child.stderr?.on("data", (chunk) => {
+			stderr += chunk.toString();
+		});
+		let timedOut = false;
+		let killer;
+		const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+			timedOut = true;
+			child.kill("SIGTERM");
+			killer = setTimeout(() => child.kill("SIGKILL"), KILL_GRACE_MS);
+			killer.unref?.();
+		}, timeoutMs);
+		timer.unref?.();
+		const settle = () => {
+			clearTimeout(timer);
+			if (killer) clearTimeout(killer);
+		};
+		child.on("error", (error) => {
+			settle();
+			reject(signal?.aborted ? signal.reason : error);
+		});
+		child.on("close", (code, killedBy) => {
+			settle();
+			if (signal?.aborted) reject(signal.reason);
+			else if (timedOut) reject(new require_run.CommandTimedOut(command, args, timeoutMs));
+			else resolvePromise({
+				exitCode: code,
+				signal: killedBy ?? null,
+				stdout,
+				stderr
+			});
+		});
+	});
+}
+//#endregion
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "LocalSandbox", {
+	enumerable: true,
+	get: function() {
+		return LocalSandbox;
+	}
+});
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "SANDBOX_ENV_ALLOWLIST", {
+	enumerable: true,
+	get: function() {
+		return SANDBOX_ENV_ALLOWLIST;
+	}
+});
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "allowlistedEnv", {
+	enumerable: true,
+	get: function() {
+		return allowlistedEnv;
+	}
+});
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=local-DNhnkugT.cjs.map

package/dist/local-DNhnkugT.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"local-DNhnkugT.cjs","names":["resolve","confineCwd","SECRETS_DIR_ENV","rm","mkdtemp","join","tmpdir","writeFile","spawn","CommandTimedOut"],"sources":["../src/sandbox/env.ts","../src/sandbox/local.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * What of the host's environment a local sandbox passes on.\n *\n * An allowlist, not a denylist: a credential's variable has any name its\n * owner chose (`DOKPLOY_TOKEN`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, `MY_VAULT_TOKEN`), so\n * the only safe default is to name what a program needs to *run* and pass\n * nothing else.\n */\n\n/**\n * Variables a command needs to find programs, write temp files, print in the\n * user's locale and reach the network through the host's proxy — and nothing\n * that authenticates as anyone.\n *\n * Deliberately left out:\n * - `NODE_OPTIONS`: it can `--require` or `--import` code into every node\n *   process, and CI often holds `--import tsx` there. A step that needs a\n *   loader passes its own.\n * - `NODE_AUTH_TOKEN`, `NPM_TOKEN`, `npm_config_*`: registry tokens\n *   (`actions/setup-node` writes `NODE_AUTH_TOKEN`), which is why there is no\n *   `NODE_*` wildcard.\n * - `AWS_*`, `DOCKER_*`, `DOKPLOY_*`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, `TURBO_TOKEN`, `GKM_*`:\n *   credentials, or where the deploy keeps them.\n * - `SHELL`, `EDITOR` and the rest of a login session: nothing here starts a\n *   shell.\n *\n * Proxies are passed: behind one, nothing installs or builds without it. A\n * proxy URL with a password in it reaches the command too — a host that keeps\n * one there and builds code it does not trust should pass a sandbox of its\n * own.\n */\nexport const SANDBOX_ENV_ALLOWLIST: readonly (string | RegExp)[] = [\n\t// Finding programs and a home to cache in.\n\t'PATH',\n\t'HOME',\n\t'USER',\n\t'LOGNAME',\n\t'TMPDIR',\n\t'TMP',\n\t'TEMP',\n\t// Locale and terminal: output a person reads should look the same.\n\t'LANG',\n\t'LANGUAGE',\n\t'TZ',\n\t/^LC_[A-Z]+$/,\n\t'TERM',\n\t'COLORTERM',\n\t'NO_COLOR',\n\t'FORCE_COLOR',\n\t'CI',\n\t// Node: the mode a build runs in, and the CAs a corporate network adds.\n\t'NODE_ENV',\n\t'NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS',\n\t// Package managers' own homes, so a build reuses the host's store.\n\t'COREPACK_HOME',\n\t'PNPM_HOME',\n\t'XDG_CACHE_HOME',\n\t'XDG_DATA_HOME',\n\t// The network, through the host's proxy.\n\t'HTTP_PROXY',\n\t'HTTPS_PROXY',\n\t'NO_PROXY',\n\t'http_proxy',\n\t'https_proxy',\n\t'no_proxy',\n\t// Windows: without these, nothing starts.\n\t'SystemRoot',\n\t'SYSTEMROOT',\n\t'windir',\n\t'WINDIR',\n\t'ComSpec',\n\t'COMSPEC',\n\t'PATHEXT',\n\t'USERPROFILE',\n\t'APPDATA',\n\t'LOCALAPPDATA',\n];\n\nfunction allowed(name: string): boolean {\n\treturn SANDBOX_ENV_ALLOWLIST.some((entry) =>\n\t\ttypeof entry === 'string' ? entry === name : entry.test(name),\n\t);\n}\n\n/**\n * The allowlisted part of `source`, plus each of `extra` the host chose to\n * pass on by name.\n */\nexport function allowlistedEnv(\n\tsource: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,\n\textra: readonly string[] = [],\n): Record<string, string> {\n\tconst env: Record<string, string> = {};\n\tfor (const [name, value] of Object.entries(source)) {\n\t\tif (value === undefined) continue;\n\t\tif (allowed(name) || extra.includes(name)) env[name] = value;\n\t}\n\treturn env;\n}\n","import { type SpawnOptions, spawn } from 'node:child_process';\nimport { mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';\nimport { tmpdir } from 'node:os';\nimport { join, resolve } from 'node:path';\nimport { CommandTimedOut } from '../run';\nimport { allowlistedEnv } from './env';\nimport {\n\tassertSecretNames,\n\tconfineCwd,\n\ttype Sandbox,\n\ttype SandboxExecOptions,\n\ttype SandboxOutput,\n\ttype SandboxResult,\n\tSECRETS_DIR_ENV,\n} from './sandbox';\n\n/** How long a timed-out command has to exit on SIGTERM before SIGKILL. */\nconst KILL_GRACE_MS = 5_000;\n\nexport interface LocalSandboxOptions {\n\t/** The project. Every command runs at or below it. */\n\troot: string;\n\t/**\n\t * `HOME` for every command. Defaults to the host's, because a build\n\t * reuses the caches kept there — the pnpm store, corepack's package\n\t * managers, turbo's cache — and a cold one re-downloads all of them.\n\t * Point it at an empty directory to keep `~/.aws`, `~/.npmrc` and\n\t * `~/.docker` out of reach of an SDK's default lookup — though, sharing\n\t * the host's filesystem, a command that goes looking still finds them.\n\t */\n\thome?: string;\n\t/**\n\t * Host variables to pass on beyond the allowlist, by name — a remote\n\t * cache's `TURBO_TOKEN`, for a build the host trusts with it.\n\t */\n\tpassEnv?: readonly string[];\n\t/** Where the allowlisted variables are read from. Defaults to `process.env`. */\n\thostEnv?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n}\n\n/** Where `output` sends a child's streams. */\nconst STDIO: Record<SandboxOutput, SpawnOptions['stdio']> = {\n\tcapture: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],\n\tinherit: 'inherit',\n\tstderr: ['ignore', 2, 2],\n\tignore: 'ignore',\n};\n\n/**\n * A child process on this machine, as this user, with an allowlisted\n * environment.\n *\n * What it withholds from the command: the host's environment beyond\n * {@link SANDBOX_ENV_ALLOWLIST}, a shell, a working directory outside the\n * project, and any time past the timeout. What it does not: the host's\n * filesystem, which the command can read and write as the user running the\n * deploy. So it is not `isolating`, and it is the default for projects the\n * host already trusts — the developer's own, a team's own CI. Code nobody\n * vetted belongs in a sandbox that is.\n *\n * A timed-out command is sent SIGTERM, then SIGKILL; processes it started\n * itself are its to stop.\n */\nexport class LocalSandbox implements Sandbox {\n\treadonly root: string;\n\treadonly isolating = false;\n\treadonly env: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;\n\n\tconstructor(options: LocalSandboxOptions) {\n\t\tthis.root = resolve(options.root);\n\t\tthis.env = {\n\t\t\t...allowlistedEnv(options.hostEnv ?? process.env, options.passEnv),\n\t\t\t...(options.home\n\t\t\t\t? { HOME: options.home, USERPROFILE: options.home }\n\t\t\t\t: {}),\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\tasync exec(\n\t\tcommand: string,\n\t\targs: readonly string[],\n\t\toptions: SandboxExecOptions,\n\t): Promise<SandboxResult> {\n\t\tconst cwd = confineCwd(this.root, options.cwd);\n\t\tassertSecretNames(options.secrets);\n\t\toptions.signal?.throwIfAborted();\n\n\t\tconst secretsDir = await mountSecrets(options.secrets);\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\treturn await spawnConfined(command, args, {\n\t\t\t\t...options,\n\t\t\t\tcwd,\n\t\t\t\tenv: secretsDir\n\t\t\t\t\t? { ...options.env, [SECRETS_DIR_ENV]: secretsDir }\n\t\t\t\t\t: options.env,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t} finally {\n\t\t\tif (secretsDir) await rm(secretsDir, { recursive: true, force: true });\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Each secret as a 0600 file in a fresh 0700 directory outside the project —\n * where nothing the build writes, packs or commits will pick it up.\n */\nasync function mountSecrets(\n\tsecrets: Readonly<Record<string, string>> | undefined,\n): Promise<string | undefined> {\n\tif (!secrets || Object.keys(secrets).length === 0) return undefined;\n\n\tconst dir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'gkm-secrets-'));\n\tfor (const [name, value] of Object.entries(secrets)) {\n\t\tawait writeFile(join(dir, name), value, { mode: 0o600 });\n\t}\n\treturn dir;\n}\n\nfunction spawnConfined(\n\tcommand: string,\n\targs: readonly string[],\n\toptions: SandboxExecOptions,\n): Promise<SandboxResult> {\n\tconst { output = 'capture', signal, timeoutMs } = options;\n\n\treturn new Promise<SandboxResult>((resolvePromise, reject) => {\n\t\tconst child = spawn(command, [...args], {\n\t\t\tcwd: options.cwd,\n\t\t\t// The whole environment, as given. `spawn` reads `process.env` only\n\t\t\t// when this is left out.\n\t\t\tenv: { ...options.env },\n\t\t\tstdio: STDIO[output],\n\t\t\tshell: false,\n\t\t\t...(signal ? { signal } : {}),\n\t\t});\n\n\t\tlet stdout = '';\n\t\tlet stderr = '';\n\t\tchild.stdout?.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {\n\t\t\tstdout += chunk.toString();\n\t\t});\n\t\tchild.stderr?.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {\n\t\t\tstderr += chunk.toString();\n\t\t});\n\n\t\tlet timedOut = false;\n\t\tlet killer: NodeJS.Timeout | undefined;\n\t\tconst timer = setTimeout(() => {\n\t\t\ttimedOut = true;\n\t\t\tchild.kill('SIGTERM');\n\t\t\t// A command that ignores SIGTERM would otherwise outlive its timeout.\n\t\t\tkiller = setTimeout(() => child.kill('SIGKILL'), KILL_GRACE_MS);\n\t\t\tkiller.unref?.();\n\t\t}, timeoutMs);\n\t\ttimer.unref?.();\n\n\t\tconst settle = () => {\n\t\t\tclearTimeout(timer);\n\t\t\tif (killer) clearTimeout(killer);\n\t\t};\n\n\t\tchild.on('error', (error) => {\n\t\t\tsettle();\n\t\t\t// Node reports an abort as its own `AbortError`; the caller asked\n\t\t\t// with a reason, and that is what it gets back.\n\t\t\treject(signal?.aborted ? signal.reason : error);\n\t\t});\n\n\t\tchild.on('close', (code: number | null, killedBy: string | null) => {\n\t\t\tsettle();\n\t\t\tif (signal?.aborted) reject(signal.reason);\n\t\t\telse if (timedOut) reject(new CommandTimedOut(command, args, timeoutMs));\n\t\t\telse\n\t\t\t\tresolvePromise({\n\t\t\t\t\texitCode: code,\n\t\t\t\t\tsignal: killedBy ?? null,\n\t\t\t\t\tstdout,\n\t\t\t\t\tstderr,\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t});\n\t});\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA+BA,MAAa,wBAAsD;CAElE;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CAEA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CAEA;CACA;CAEA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CAEA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CAEA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;AACD;AAEA,SAAS,QAAQ,MAAuB;CACvC,OAAO,sBAAsB,MAAM,UAClC,OAAO,UAAU,WAAW,UAAU,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,CAC7D;AACD;;;;;AAMA,SAAgB,eACf,SAA4B,QAAQ,KACpC,QAA2B,CAAC,GACH;CACzB,MAAM,MAA8B,CAAC;CACrC,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG;EACnD,IAAI,UAAU,KAAA,GAAW;EACzB,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,QAAQ;CACxD;CACA,OAAO;AACR;;;;ACjFA,MAAM,gBAAgB;;AAwBtB,MAAM,QAAsD;CAC3D,SAAS;EAAC;EAAU;EAAQ;CAAM;CAClC,SAAS;CACT,QAAQ;EAAC;EAAU;EAAG;CAAC;CACvB,QAAQ;AACT;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAiBA,IAAa,eAAb,MAA6C;CAC5C;CACA,YAAqB;CACrB;CAEA,YAAY,SAA8B;EACzC,KAAK,QAAA,GAAOA,UAAAA,QAAAA,CAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI;EAChC,KAAK,MAAM;GACV,GAAG,eAAe,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,OAAO;GACjE,GAAI,QAAQ,OACT;IAAE,MAAM,QAAQ;IAAM,aAAa,QAAQ;GAAK,IAChD,CAAC;EACL;CACD;CAEA,MAAM,KACL,SACA,MACA,SACyB;EACzB,MAAM,MAAMC,gBAAAA,WAAW,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG;EAC7C,gBAAA,kBAAkB,QAAQ,OAAO;EACjC,QAAQ,QAAQ,eAAe;EAE/B,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM,aAAa,QAAQ,OAAO;EACrD,IAAI;GACH,OAAO,MAAM,cAAc,SAAS,MAAM;IACzC,GAAG;IACH;IACA,KAAK,aACF;KAAE,GAAG,QAAQ;MAAMC,gBAAAA,kBAAkB;IAAW,IAChD,QAAQ;GACZ,CAAC;EACF,UAAU;GACT,IAAI,YAAY,OAAA,GAAMC,iBAAAA,GAAAA,CAAG,YAAY;IAAE,WAAW;IAAM,OAAO;GAAK,CAAC;EACtE;CACD;AACD;;;;;AAMA,eAAe,aACd,SAC8B;CAC9B,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,GAAG,OAAO,KAAA;CAE1D,MAAM,MAAM,OAAA,GAAMC,iBAAAA,QAAAA,EAAAA,GAAQC,UAAAA,KAAAA,EAAAA,GAAKC,QAAAA,OAAAA,CAAO,GAAG,cAAc,CAAC;CACxD,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GACjD,OAAA,GAAMC,iBAAAA,UAAAA,EAAAA,GAAUF,UAAAA,KAAAA,CAAK,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,IAAM,CAAC;CAExD,OAAO;AACR;AAEA,SAAS,cACR,SACA,MACA,SACyB;CACzB,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,WAAW,QAAQ,cAAc;CAElD,OAAO,IAAI,SAAwB,gBAAgB,WAAW;EAC7D,MAAM,SAAA,GAAQG,mBAAAA,MAAAA,CAAM,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG;GACvC,KAAK,QAAQ;GAGb,KAAK,EAAE,GAAG,QAAQ,IAAI;GACtB,OAAO,MAAM;GACb,OAAO;GACP,GAAI,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;EAC5B,CAAC;EAED,IAAI,SAAS;EACb,IAAI,SAAS;EACb,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,SAAS,UAAkB;GAC3C,UAAU,MAAM,SAAS;EAC1B,CAAC;EACD,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,SAAS,UAAkB;GAC3C,UAAU,MAAM,SAAS;EAC1B,CAAC;EAED,IAAI,WAAW;EACf,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM,QAAQ,iBAAiB;GAC9B,WAAW;GACX,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS;GAEpB,SAAS,iBAAiB,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG,aAAa;GAC9D,OAAO,QAAQ;EAChB,GAAG,SAAS;EACZ,MAAM,QAAQ;EAEd,MAAM,eAAe;GACpB,aAAa,KAAK;GAClB,IAAI,QAAQ,aAAa,MAAM;EAChC;EAEA,MAAM,GAAG,UAAU,UAAU;GAC5B,OAAO;GAGP,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK;EAC/C,CAAC;EAED,MAAM,GAAG,UAAU,MAAqB,aAA4B;GACnE,OAAO;GACP,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM;QACpC,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO,IAAIC,YAAAA,gBAAgB,SAAS,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;QAEtE,eAAe;IACd,UAAU;IACV,QAAQ,YAAY;IACpB;IACA;GACD,CAAC;EACH,CAAC;CACF,CAAC;AACF"}