@gearbox-protocol/sdk 16.4.0-next.6 → 16.4.0-next.8

package/dist/cjs/onchain/accounts/CreditAccountsServiceV310.js

@@ -213,7 +213,6 @@ var CreditAccountsServiceV310 = class extends require_onchain_base_SDKConstruct.
 			}),
 			...callsAfter ?? []
 		];
-		calls = await this.#prependMidasReceiveGreenlist(cm.address, calls);
 		calls = await this.prependPriceUpdates(cm.address, calls);
 		const tx = reopenCreditAccount ? cmSuite.multicallTx(reopenCreditAccount, calls, rwaOptions) : cmSuite.openCreditAccountTx(to, calls, referralCode, rwaOptions);
 		tx.value = ethAmount.toString(10);

package/dist/cjs/onchain/accounts/intents/index.js

@@ -136,21 +136,24 @@ var CreditAccountOperationsService = class extends require_onchain_base_SDKConst
 	}
 	/**
 	* Largest loan a given collateral supports at `targetHF`, in the payout
-	* token's units — the ceiling a borrow form should offer, and the amount
-	* {@link borrowIntent} will accept at the top of its range.
+	* token's units — the ceiling a borrow form should offer.
 	*
 	* Reads no account, like {@link leverageBand}: the borrow opens one. The
 	* collateral is valued the way the transaction will be judged, at safe
 	* prices and under the quota the borrow buys, and the answer is then held to
 	* what the market will lend.
 	*
+	* A ceiling, not a verdict: the facade's `minDebt` is a floor and is not
+	* applied here, so collateral too small for this market still answers with
+	* what it carries and {@link borrowIntent} is the one that refuses the loan.
+	*
 	* The default is {@link MIN_HF_LIMITED}, the threshold a form holds an
 	* account to.
 	*
 	* @param props - The manager, the SDK holding its market, the collateral put
 	* up, the token to be paid in, and optionally the health factor to land at
 	* @returns Amount in the payout token's units; `0n` where no loan of this
-	* shape can be funded
+	* shape can be funded at any size
 	*/
 	maxBorrow(props) {
 		const { targetHF = require_onchain_validation_helpers_health_factor_limits.MIN_HF_LIMITED, ...rest } = props;

package/dist/cjs/onchain/accounts/intents/maxBorrow.js

@@ -24,14 +24,21 @@ const require_onchain_accounts_intents_collateral_valuation = require("./collate
 * liquidity, the manager's own allowance and the facade's `maxDebt`, whichever
 * binds first.
 *
+* The facade's `minDebt` is deliberately not applied. It is a floor, and a
+* ceiling answered as `0n` because the collateral is too small for this market
+* would tell a form nothing about what it is holding — the number a user needs
+* to see is the one they are short of. Collateral that carries something
+* therefore answers with it, whether or not the market would lend that little;
+* a loan under the floor is refused by `borrow` itself, with `debtOutOfRange`
+* naming both ends.
+*
 * Nothing is fetched or simulated — the account does not exist yet and every
 * input is loaded market state, so a form can call this on each keystroke.
 *
 * @param props - {@link MaxBorrowProps}
-* @returns Amount in the payout token's units; `0n` when this market will fund
-* no loan of this shape — including a debt that would land under `minDebt`, a
-* collateral that backs nothing at safe prices, and a manager the SDK does not
-* hold yet
+* @returns Amount in the payout token's units; `0n` where no loan of this
+* shape exists at any size — a collateral that backs nothing at safe prices, a
+* market with nothing left to lend, and a manager the SDK does not hold yet
 **/
 function maxBorrow(props) {
 	const { sdk, creditManager, collateralAmount, targetHF, quotaReserve } = props;
@@ -76,10 +83,7 @@ function maxBorrow(props) {
 	if (backed <= 0n) return 0n;
 	const ceiling = require_onchain_utils_bigint_math.BigIntMath.min(priceOracle.safeConvertFromUSD(underlying, backed / targetHF).value, suite.maxBorrowAmount().amount.value);
 	const unwrapsPayout = !!rwaAsset && require_onchain_accounts_intents_utils_common.eq(borrowToken, rwaAsset);
-	const intoPayout = (value) => unwrapsPayout ? require_onchain_accounts_intents_utils_common.toTargetDecimals(value, underlying, borrowToken, sdk) : priceOracle.safeConvert(underlying, borrowToken, value).value;
-	const intoUnderlying = (value) => unwrapsPayout ? require_onchain_accounts_intents_utils_common.toTargetDecimals(value, borrowToken, underlying, sdk) : priceOracle.safeConvert(borrowToken, underlying, value).value;
-	const amount = require_onchain_accounts_intents_utils_common.eq(borrowToken, underlying) ? ceiling : intoPayout(ceiling);
-	return (require_onchain_accounts_intents_utils_common.eq(borrowToken, underlying) ? amount : intoUnderlying(amount)) < suite.creditFacade.minDebt ? 0n : amount;
+	return require_onchain_accounts_intents_utils_common.eq(borrowToken, underlying) ? ceiling : unwrapsPayout ? require_onchain_accounts_intents_utils_common.toTargetDecimals(ceiling, underlying, borrowToken, sdk) : priceOracle.safeConvert(underlying, borrowToken, ceiling).value;
 }
 //#endregion
 exports.maxBorrow = maxBorrow;

package/dist/cjs/onchain/validation/bundles/checkMidasAccountGreenlist.js

@@ -7,13 +7,11 @@ require("../helpers/index.js");
 //#region src/onchain/validation/bundles/checkMidasAccountGreenlist.ts
 /**
 * Whether the credit account already holds the Midas greenlisted role
-* this permissioned mToken requires of its holder, or the transaction
-* grants it via `receiveGreenlist()`.
+* this permissioned mToken requires of its holder.
 */
 async function checkMidasAccountGreenlist(input) {
 	const { sdk, preview, nft, tokens } = input;
 	if (nft.protocol !== "midas") return [];
-	if (preview.midasGreenlistsAccount) return [];
 	if (tokens.length === 0) return [];
 	const account = preview.creditAccount;
 	if (!account) return tokens.map((token) => require_model_errors_operation_errors.accountNotMidasGreenlisted({

package/dist/esm/onchain/accounts/CreditAccountsServiceV310.js

@@ -212,7 +212,6 @@ var CreditAccountsServiceV310 = class extends SDKConstruct {
 			}),
 			...callsAfter ?? []
 		];
-		calls = await this.#prependMidasReceiveGreenlist(cm.address, calls);
 		calls = await this.prependPriceUpdates(cm.address, calls);
 		const tx = reopenCreditAccount ? cmSuite.multicallTx(reopenCreditAccount, calls, rwaOptions) : cmSuite.openCreditAccountTx(to, calls, referralCode, rwaOptions);
 		tx.value = ethAmount.toString(10);

package/dist/esm/onchain/accounts/intents/index.js

@@ -135,21 +135,24 @@ var CreditAccountOperationsService = class extends SDKConstruct {
 	}
 	/**
 	* Largest loan a given collateral supports at `targetHF`, in the payout
-	* token's units — the ceiling a borrow form should offer, and the amount
-	* {@link borrowIntent} will accept at the top of its range.
+	* token's units — the ceiling a borrow form should offer.
 	*
 	* Reads no account, like {@link leverageBand}: the borrow opens one. The
 	* collateral is valued the way the transaction will be judged, at safe
 	* prices and under the quota the borrow buys, and the answer is then held to
 	* what the market will lend.
 	*
+	* A ceiling, not a verdict: the facade's `minDebt` is a floor and is not
+	* applied here, so collateral too small for this market still answers with
+	* what it carries and {@link borrowIntent} is the one that refuses the loan.
+	*
 	* The default is {@link MIN_HF_LIMITED}, the threshold a form holds an
 	* account to.
 	*
 	* @param props - The manager, the SDK holding its market, the collateral put
 	* up, the token to be paid in, and optionally the health factor to land at
 	* @returns Amount in the payout token's units; `0n` where no loan of this
-	* shape can be funded
+	* shape can be funded at any size
 	*/
 	maxBorrow(props) {
 		const { targetHF = MIN_HF_LIMITED, ...rest } = props;

package/dist/esm/onchain/accounts/intents/maxBorrow.js

@@ -23,14 +23,21 @@ import { collateralValuation } from "./collateral-valuation.js";
 * liquidity, the manager's own allowance and the facade's `maxDebt`, whichever
 * binds first.
 *
+* The facade's `minDebt` is deliberately not applied. It is a floor, and a
+* ceiling answered as `0n` because the collateral is too small for this market
+* would tell a form nothing about what it is holding — the number a user needs
+* to see is the one they are short of. Collateral that carries something
+* therefore answers with it, whether or not the market would lend that little;
+* a loan under the floor is refused by `borrow` itself, with `debtOutOfRange`
+* naming both ends.
+*
 * Nothing is fetched or simulated — the account does not exist yet and every
 * input is loaded market state, so a form can call this on each keystroke.
 *
 * @param props - {@link MaxBorrowProps}
-* @returns Amount in the payout token's units; `0n` when this market will fund
-* no loan of this shape — including a debt that would land under `minDebt`, a
-* collateral that backs nothing at safe prices, and a manager the SDK does not
-* hold yet
+* @returns Amount in the payout token's units; `0n` where no loan of this
+* shape exists at any size — a collateral that backs nothing at safe prices, a
+* market with nothing left to lend, and a manager the SDK does not hold yet
 **/
 function maxBorrow(props) {
 	const { sdk, creditManager, collateralAmount, targetHF, quotaReserve } = props;
@@ -74,10 +81,7 @@ function maxBorrow(props) {
 	if (backed <= 0n) return 0n;
 	const ceiling = BigIntMath.min(priceOracle.safeConvertFromUSD(underlying, backed / targetHF).value, suite.maxBorrowAmount().amount.value);
 	const unwrapsPayout = !!rwaAsset && eq(borrowToken, rwaAsset);
-	const intoPayout = (value) => unwrapsPayout ? toTargetDecimals(value, underlying, borrowToken, sdk) : priceOracle.safeConvert(underlying, borrowToken, value).value;
-	const intoUnderlying = (value) => unwrapsPayout ? toTargetDecimals(value, borrowToken, underlying, sdk) : priceOracle.safeConvert(borrowToken, underlying, value).value;
-	const amount = eq(borrowToken, underlying) ? ceiling : intoPayout(ceiling);
-	return (eq(borrowToken, underlying) ? amount : intoUnderlying(amount)) < suite.creditFacade.minDebt ? 0n : amount;
+	return eq(borrowToken, underlying) ? ceiling : unwrapsPayout ? toTargetDecimals(ceiling, underlying, borrowToken, sdk) : priceOracle.safeConvert(underlying, borrowToken, ceiling).value;
 }
 //#endregion
 export { maxBorrow };

package/dist/esm/onchain/validation/bundles/checkMidasAccountGreenlist.js

@@ -6,13 +6,11 @@ import "../helpers/index.js";
 //#region src/onchain/validation/bundles/checkMidasAccountGreenlist.ts
 /**
 * Whether the credit account already holds the Midas greenlisted role
-* this permissioned mToken requires of its holder, or the transaction
-* grants it via `receiveGreenlist()`.
+* this permissioned mToken requires of its holder.
 */
 async function checkMidasAccountGreenlist(input) {
 	const { sdk, preview, nft, tokens } = input;
 	if (nft.protocol !== "midas") return [];
-	if (preview.midasGreenlistsAccount) return [];
 	if (tokens.length === 0) return [];
 	const account = preview.creditAccount;
 	if (!account) return tokens.map((token) => accountNotMidasGreenlisted({

package/dist/types/onchain/accounts/intents/index.d.ts

@@ -139,21 +139,24 @@ declare class CreditAccountOperationsService extends SDKConstruct {
   }): bigint;
   /**
    * Largest loan a given collateral supports at `targetHF`, in the payout
-   * token's units — the ceiling a borrow form should offer, and the amount
-   * {@link borrowIntent} will accept at the top of its range.
+   * token's units — the ceiling a borrow form should offer.
    *
    * Reads no account, like {@link leverageBand}: the borrow opens one. The
    * collateral is valued the way the transaction will be judged, at safe
    * prices and under the quota the borrow buys, and the answer is then held to
    * what the market will lend.
    *
+   * A ceiling, not a verdict: the facade's `minDebt` is a floor and is not
+   * applied here, so collateral too small for this market still answers with
+   * what it carries and {@link borrowIntent} is the one that refuses the loan.
+   *
    * The default is {@link MIN_HF_LIMITED}, the threshold a form holds an
    * account to.
    *
    * @param props - The manager, the SDK holding its market, the collateral put
    * up, the token to be paid in, and optionally the health factor to land at
    * @returns Amount in the payout token's units; `0n` where no loan of this
-   * shape can be funded
+   * shape can be funded at any size
    */
   maxBorrow(props: Omit<MaxBorrowProps, "targetHF"> & {
     targetHF?: bigint;

package/dist/types/onchain/accounts/intents/maxBorrow.d.ts

@@ -33,14 +33,21 @@ interface MaxBorrowProps {
  * liquidity, the manager's own allowance and the facade's `maxDebt`, whichever
  * binds first.
  *
+ * The facade's `minDebt` is deliberately not applied. It is a floor, and a
+ * ceiling answered as `0n` because the collateral is too small for this market
+ * would tell a form nothing about what it is holding — the number a user needs
+ * to see is the one they are short of. Collateral that carries something
+ * therefore answers with it, whether or not the market would lend that little;
+ * a loan under the floor is refused by `borrow` itself, with `debtOutOfRange`
+ * naming both ends.
+ *
  * Nothing is fetched or simulated — the account does not exist yet and every
  * input is loaded market state, so a form can call this on each keystroke.
  *
  * @param props - {@link MaxBorrowProps}
- * @returns Amount in the payout token's units; `0n` when this market will fund
- * no loan of this shape — including a debt that would land under `minDebt`, a
- * collateral that backs nothing at safe prices, and a manager the SDK does not
- * hold yet
+ * @returns Amount in the payout token's units; `0n` where no loan of this
+ * shape exists at any size — a collateral that backs nothing at safe prices, a
+ * market with nothing left to lend, and a manager the SDK does not hold yet
  **/
 declare function maxBorrow(props: MaxBorrowProps): bigint;
 //#endregion

package/dist/types/onchain/validation/bundles/checkMidasAccountGreenlist.d.ts

@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@ interface CheckMidasAccountGreenlistInput {
 }
 /**
  * Whether the credit account already holds the Midas greenlisted role
- * this permissioned mToken requires of its holder, or the transaction
- * grants it via `receiveGreenlist()`.
+ * this permissioned mToken requires of its holder.
  */
 declare function checkMidasAccountGreenlist(input: CheckMidasAccountGreenlistInput): Promise<(AccountNotMidasGreenlistedError | UnexpectedFailureError)[]>;
 //#endregion

package/dist/types/sdk/prepare/types.d.ts

@@ -784,10 +784,17 @@ interface IOpportunitiesPrepare {
    * account does not exist yet, so there is nothing to read and a form can ask
    * on every keystroke.
    *
-   * `0n` where this market funds no loan of this shape — a loan that would
-   * land under `minDebt`, a collateral worth nothing at safe prices, a payout
-   * token equal to the collateral, or a manager the SDK does not hold. Not the
-   * same as "any amount works", and a caller must not offer a Max for it.
+   * It is a ceiling and not a verdict: the facade's `minDebt` is a floor, and
+   * holding the answer to it would tell a form `0` for collateral that does
+   * carry a loan, only a smaller one than this market lends. So a Max offered
+   * from here can still be refused by {@link borrow} with `debtOutOfRange`,
+   * which names the floor the amount fell short of.
+   *
+   * `0n` where this market funds no loan of this shape at any size — a
+   * collateral worth nothing at safe prices, a payout token equal to the
+   * collateral, a market with nothing left to lend, or a manager the SDK does
+   * not hold. Not the same as "any amount works", and a caller must not offer
+   * a Max for it.
    **/
   maxBorrow(strategy: StrategyInput, params: MaxBorrowParams): bigint;
   /**

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@gearbox-protocol/sdk",
-  "version": "16.4.0-next.6",
+  "version": "16.4.0-next.8",
   "description": "Gearbox SDK",
   "license": "MIT",
   "repository": {