@gearbox-protocol/sdk 16.2.0 → 16.3.0-next.2

package/dist/types/preview/validate/checkOperation.d.ts

@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-import { Bps } from "../../model/primitives.js";
-import { AccountHoldings, AccountMetrics, AccountProjection, OperationPreview } from "../../model/previews.js";
-import "../../model/index.js";
-import { AddressMap } from "../../onchain/utils/AddressMap.js";
-import { CreditSuite } from "../../onchain/market/credit/CreditSuite.js";
-import { OnchainSDK } from "../../onchain/OnchainSDK.js";
-import { PreviewIssue } from "../../onchain/validation/refusal.js";
-import "../../onchain/index.js";
-//#region src/preview/validate/checkOperation.d.ts
-/** Omitting a bar switches its check off — there is no single right one. */
-interface CheckOperationOptions {
-  /** Lowest acceptable health factor at main prices, in bps. */
-  minHealthFactor?: Bps;
-  /** Lowest acceptable health factor at safe prices, in bps. */
-  minSafeHealthFactor?: Bps;
-  /**
-   * Balances the operation is funded from, by token. Given, the wallet's side
-   * is checked offline; omitted, funding is left to `checkPrerequisites`.
-   */
-  balances?: AddressMap<bigint>;
-  /**
-   * The factor the account stands at now. Given, an operation that raises it
-   * passes even from under the bar — the top-ups that rescue a position would
-   * otherwise be refused by the very check meant to protect it.
-   */
-  currentHealthFactor?: Bps;
-}
-/**
- * Whether a parsed operation may be signed at all — the protocol state that
- * `checkPrerequisites` leaves out, since that one covers only what the sender
- * can fix themselves.
- *
- * Synchronous: the preview carries the numbers and the market is attached.
- * Reports the most fundamental issue it finds and stops there, which is the one
- * a caller acts on.
- */
-declare function checkOperation(input: {
-  sdk: OnchainSDK;
-  preview: OperationPreview;
-}, options?: CheckOperationOptions): PreviewIssue | null;
-/** What the market itself refuses, whatever the operation does. */
-declare function marketIssues(suite: CreditSuite): PreviewIssue | null;
-/**
- * A bar that reads nothing but the projected account, so a parsed transaction
- * and a simulated one are held to it by the same code.
- *
- * These stay separate functions rather than one block because the order the
- * checks run in is the answer: `checkOperation` interleaves the checks that
- * need an operation's *delta* between them, and the caller acts on the first
- * issue reported.
- */
-declare function quotaCountIssue(suite: CreditSuite, account: Pick<AccountProjection, "quotas">): PreviewIssue | null;
-/**
- * An account's factors, in whichever branch of a routed leg the caller means to
- * be held to: `prepare` reports the outcome the router expects, `preview` the
- * floor its calldata guarantees. The bar is indifferent — it weighs the numbers
- * it is handed — and passing them one by one is what makes the choice visible
- * where it is made.
- */
-interface WeighedFactors extends Pick<AccountHoldings, "totalDebt">, Pick<AccountMetrics, "healthFactor" | "safeHealthFactor"> {}
-/**
- * The account against whichever bars the caller holds it to.
- *
- * A loan-free account is nothing to weigh: the health factor reports its
- * zero-debt sentinel and no bar applies.
- *
- * {@inheritDoc quotaCountIssue}
- */
-declare function collateralIssue(account: WeighedFactors, options: CheckOperationOptions): PreviewIssue | null;
-//#endregion
-export { CheckOperationOptions, WeighedFactors, checkOperation, collateralIssue, marketIssues, quotaCountIssue };

package/dist/types/preview/validate/checkSimulation.d.ts

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-import { OnchainSDK } from "../../onchain/OnchainSDK.js";
-import { PreviewIssue } from "../../onchain/validation/refusal.js";
-import { OperationState } from "../../onchain/accounts/intents/types.js";
-import "../../onchain/index.js";
-import { CheckOperationOptions } from "./checkOperation.js";
-//#region src/preview/validate/checkSimulation.d.ts
-/**
- * Whether a simulated operation clears the caller's own bars.
- *
- * The engine holds an account to the facade's `1.0`, because its guards answer
- * "would this revert". A form is wiser to ask for more, and the engine's own
- * note says so — a caller wanting the stricter bar applies it itself. This is
- * that second opinion, over the numbers the engine already reported.
- *
- * Three of the checks below the engine does not make at all: both health-factor
- * bars are its own `1.0`, and the quota count it never weighs. The other two run
- * against the same numbers the engine used, and are here so that a change in the
- * engine cannot pass silently.
- *
- * What is deliberately absent: the forbidden-token, quota-limit and funding
- * checks all need the *delta* an operation applies, and `OperationState` reports
- * only the state after it. Weighing them against absolutes would refuse a
- * forbidden token the account merely holds, or a quota the operation never
- * touched. The engine performed all three during the walk, so a simulation that
- * came back `ok` has already passed them.
- */
-declare function checkSimulation(input: {
-  sdk: OnchainSDK;
-  state: OperationState;
-}, options?: CheckOperationOptions): PreviewIssue | null;
-//#endregion
-export { checkSimulation };

package/dist/types/preview/validate/index.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-import { CheckOperationOptions, WeighedFactors, checkOperation, collateralIssue, marketIssues, quotaCountIssue } from "./checkOperation.js";
-import { checkSimulation } from "./checkSimulation.js";
-export { CheckOperationOptions, WeighedFactors, checkOperation, checkSimulation, collateralIssue, marketIssues, quotaCountIssue };

package/dist/types/sdk/prepare/errors.d.ts

@@ -1,343 +0,0 @@
-import { Bps, Token, TokenAmount } from "../../model/primitives.js";
-import { IGearboxError } from "../../model/errors.js";
-import { MalformedPreviewError } from "../../model/previews.js";
-import "../../model/index.js";
-import { BorrowLimitBinding, PreviewIssue } from "../../onchain/validation/refusal.js";
-import { RouteRefusals } from "../../onchain/accounts/intents/types.js";
-import "../../onchain/index.js";
-import { Address } from "viem";
-//#region src/sdk/prepare/errors.d.ts
-/**
- * Why a preparation was refused.
- *
- * One interface per reason, discriminated by `code`, each carrying the numbers
- * behind that reason — so a caller reads the limit that was missed off the
- * error instead of re-deriving it. Switch on `code` and the fields narrow with
- * it.
- *
- * Most codes are the engine's `PreviewErrorReason` members, which is what keeps
- * `prepare` and `preview` refusing in one vocabulary; what differs is where the
- * numbers sit. The engine keeps them one level down, in `detail`, because it
- * distributes them over `reason`; here they are stated outright, so it is
- * `error.maxDebt` rather than `error.detail.maxDebt`.
- *
- * There is deliberately no union of all of them: each `prepare` method names
- * exactly the codes its own flow can raise, see the signatures in
- * {@link IOpportunitiesPrepare}. What is shared is the plumbing every flow
- * goes through, and that is the two base unions below.
- **/
-/**
- * What ANY operation on an existing account can refuse with: the engine's
- * shared guards, the missing account, and a wrapped crash.
- **/
-type AccountFlowError = MarketPausedError | MarketExpiredError | ForbiddenTokenError | QuotaLimitReachedError | InsufficientCollateralError | InsufficientSourceBalanceError | CreditAccountNotFoundError | UnexpectedFailureError;
-/** Same guards for the account-less open flow. */
-type OpenFlowError = MarketPausedError | MarketExpiredError | ForbiddenTokenError | QuotaLimitReachedError | InsufficientCollateralError | InsufficientSourceBalanceError | UnexpectedFailureError;
-/** The debt the request implies falls outside the facade's band. */
-interface DebtOutOfRangeError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "debtOutOfRange";
-  /** All three in the market's underlying. */
-  requested: TokenAmount;
-  minDebt: TokenAmount;
-  maxDebt: TokenAmount;
-}
-/** The leverage asked for cannot be expressed as a plan at all. */
-interface LeverageOutOfRangeError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "leverageOutOfRange";
-  /**
-   * Scaled by `LEVERAGE_DECIMALS` (`100n` = 1x), as the intent states it — not
-   * the read model's `Leverage`. Both are absent where the floor is not fixed:
-   * the deposit planner's is a function of the deposit.
-   **/
-  requested?: bigint;
-  min?: bigint;
-}
-/** Nothing on the account or in the wallet can fund what was asked. */
-interface InsufficientSourceBalanceError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "insufficientSourceBalance";
-  /**
-   * Both absent where the request never got as far as naming an amount, which
-   * is most of the sites that raise this.
-   **/
-  required?: TokenAmount;
-  held?: TokenAmount;
-}
-/** Input token is not accepted by the flow (e.g. deposit of a non-underlying). */
-interface UnsupportedCollateralTokenError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "unsupportedCollateralToken";
-  token: Token;
-}
-/**
- * No route for the trade the plan needs: no pool pair between the tokens
- * requested, several and none was picked, or the pathfinder itself found no
- * path for the amounts involved.
- **/
-interface UnsupportedTokenPairError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "unsupportedTokenPair";
-  /**
-   * `to` is absent where the market named no output for `from`; both are absent
-   * when the pathfinder reverted rather than answered.
-   **/
-  from?: Token;
-  to?: Token;
-}
-/**
- * The intent cannot settle with a delay: the source has no redemption config,
- * the chain has no compressor, or the payout is one the tail cannot serve.
- **/
-interface NoDelayedRouteError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "noDelayedRoute";
-  /** Absent where the refusal is the intent's, not the token's. */
-  token?: Token;
-}
-/** Several redemption venues for the source, and nothing says which. */
-interface MultipleDelayedWithdrawalsError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "multipleDelayedWithdrawals";
-  token: Token;
-  venues: number;
-}
-/** A redemption of the same asset is already in flight. */
-interface WithdrawalInProgressError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "withdrawalInProgress";
-  /** The phantom token standing for the redemption already in flight. */
-  inFlight: TokenAmount;
-}
-/**
- * The claim names no operation to resume: requested without an intent, or read
- * through a compressor too old to report one.
- **/
-interface NoRecordedIntentError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "noRecordedIntent";
-}
-/** The facade is paused: nothing can be done at all. */
-interface MarketPausedError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "marketPaused";
-  /**
-   * The paused credit manager. Always present from `prepare`: the engine's
-   * shared guards check the manager, and the pool-paused variant is raised
-   * only by the preview-side `checkOperation` — it never reaches this union.
-   **/
-  creditManager: Address;
-}
-/** The facade is past its expiration date and takes no more multicalls. */
-interface MarketExpiredError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "marketExpired";
-  creditManager: Address;
-  /** Unix seconds, as the facade reports it. */
-  expirationDate: number;
-}
-/**
- * The pool cannot lend what the plan draws right now — its free liquidity, the
- * manager's debt limit or the per-block cap stands in the way.
- **/
-interface InsufficientPoolLiquidityError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "insufficientPoolLiquidity";
-  /** Both in the market's underlying. */
-  requested: TokenAmount;
-  available: TokenAmount;
-  /**
-   * Which of the four ceilings ran out first, so a caller can say what would
-   * fix it — waiting for lenders and asking governance are opposite answers.
-   **/
-  binding: BorrowLimitBinding;
-  /**
-   * The largest position still openable, absent when even the minimum debt does
-   * not fit.
-   **/
-  solutionAmount?: TokenAmount;
-}
-/** The market takes no more quota for a token the plan wants to hold. */
-interface QuotaLimitReachedError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "quotaLimitReached";
-  /** The token whose quota is asked for. */
-  token: Token;
-  /**
-   * In the **underlying**, which is what a quota is measured in. `requested` is
-   * absent for a token the market opened no quota for at all — nothing was
-   * weighed against a limit.
-   **/
-  requested: TokenAmount | undefined;
-  available: TokenAmount;
-}
-/** The plan would increase the balance of a token the market forbids. */
-interface ForbiddenTokenError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "forbiddenToken";
-  token: Token;
-}
-/**
- * The account would end the transaction owing more than its collateral is worth
- * under liquidation thresholds, which the facade refuses to allow.
- **/
-interface InsufficientCollateralError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "insufficientCollateral";
-  /**
-   * The factor that was compared, which for a call that hands funds over is the
-   * safe-price one; `safePrices` says which, since a projection always reports
-   * main prices.
-   **/
-  healthFactor: Bps;
-  /**
-   * The bar it was weighed against — the facade's own `1.0` for a check that
-   * asks whether the transaction lands, a form's higher bar for one that asks
-   * whether it is wise.
-   **/
-  required: Bps;
-  safePrices: boolean;
-}
-/** The pool is winding down: it still pays out, but takes no more deposits. */
-interface PoolSunsetError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "poolSunset";
-  pool: Address;
-}
-/**
- * The account would end up with more quoted tokens than the facade enables at
- * once. A count, not an amount — unlike {@link QuotaLimitReachedError}.
- **/
-interface QuotaCountExceededError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "quotaCountExceeded";
-  count: number;
-  max: number;
-}
-/**
- * The transaction could not be replayed: it is malformed, and every field
- * derived from replayed balances is guesswork.
- **/
-interface MalformedTransactionError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "malformedTransaction";
-  /**
-   * The SDK's own preview warning code (the `MalformedPreviewError`
-   * discriminant). Named apart from `code`, which every error in the
-   * envelope spells the same way.
-   **/
-  previewCode: MalformedPreviewError["code"];
-  /** What the replay reported, which is narrower than {@link message}. */
-  detail: string;
-}
-/**
- * Opening asked for no target token and the market names none of its own, so
- * there is nothing to put the position into.
- *
- * A market fact, not a bad argument: pass a `targetToken` to open against a
- * manager that has no default one.
- **/
-interface NoStrategyTargetCollateralError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "noStrategyTargetCollateral";
-  creditManager: Address;
-}
-/**
- * No account at that address in the markets this SDK is connected to — closed
- * since it was listed, or read on the wrong chain.
- **/
-interface CreditAccountNotFoundError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "creditAccountNotFound";
-  creditAccount: Address;
-}
-/**
- * The account named to open a position on carries debt or quotas.
- *
- * Growing a position that already exists is `depositStrategy`.
- **/
-interface CreditAccountNotEmptyError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "creditAccountNotEmpty";
-  creditAccount: Address;
-}
-/**
- * An empty opening was asked for with something to open it with: collateral to
- * spend, an account to reuse, or a leverage to reach.
- **/
-interface EmptyOpenTakesNothingError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "emptyOpenTakesNothing";
-}
-/**
- * The SDK could not answer at all: a read that failed, a chain it is not
- * connected to, a market or token address it knows nothing about, a contract
- * that reverted where nothing should, a bug of ours.
- *
- * The one code that is not a refusal of the request — everything above says
- * "this cannot be done", this one says "we do not know". It exists so that a
- * refusable `prepare` method always answers: the failure that used to escape
- * as an exception arrives here instead, whole, under `cause`.
- **/
-interface UnexpectedFailureError extends IGearboxError {
-  code: "unexpectedFailure";
-  /** What actually went wrong, for a log and a bug report. */
-  cause: Error;
-}
-/**
- * What every refusal of a two-route request carries on top of its own code,
- * see {@link StrategyRoutesResult}.
- *
- * `refused` says why each route is missing, which is the answer a form needs
- * even when neither exists: the error itself is the instant route's refusal —
- * the one a caller can usually act on — or the delayed route's when the instant
- * one did not get far enough to have a reason of its own.
- **/
-interface WithRouteRefusals {
-  refused: RouteRefusals;
-}
-/**
- * The error each engine reason maps to — the range of {@link toRefusalError},
- * spelled reason by reason so a narrow issue arrives as a narrow error.
- *
- * A lookup table, not a vocabulary: nothing answers with `RefusalErrors[R]`
- * as a union. The unions callers see are the ones each method's signature
- * spells out.
- **/
-interface RefusalErrors {
-  debtOutOfRange: DebtOutOfRangeError;
-  leverageOutOfRange: LeverageOutOfRangeError;
-  insufficientSourceBalance: InsufficientSourceBalanceError;
-  unsupportedCollateralToken: UnsupportedCollateralTokenError;
-  unsupportedTokenPair: UnsupportedTokenPairError;
-  noDelayedRoute: NoDelayedRouteError;
-  multipleDelayedWithdrawals: MultipleDelayedWithdrawalsError;
-  withdrawalInProgress: WithdrawalInProgressError;
-  noRecordedIntent: NoRecordedIntentError;
-  marketPaused: MarketPausedError;
-  marketExpired: MarketExpiredError;
-  insufficientPoolLiquidity: InsufficientPoolLiquidityError;
-  quotaLimitReached: QuotaLimitReachedError;
-  forbiddenToken: ForbiddenTokenError;
-  insufficientCollateral: InsufficientCollateralError;
-  poolSunset: PoolSunsetError;
-  quotaCountExceeded: QuotaCountExceededError;
-  malformedTransaction: MalformedTransactionError;
-}
-/**
- * The engine's refusal, as the error the namespace answers with.
- *
- * One place does the lifting, so the two shapes cannot drift: `reason` becomes
- * `code`, the detail is spread onto the error, and the sentence comes from
- * {@link MESSAGES}. A malformed transaction is spelled out rather than spread,
- * because its detail names a `code` and a `message` of its own and they are not
- * the envelope's.
- *
- * Generic over the issue it is handed, so a call site that already knows the
- * reason gets that reason's error back rather than a union to narrow again.
- **/
-declare function toRefusalError<I extends PreviewIssue>(issue: I): RefusalErrors[I["reason"]];
-/**
- * {@inheritDoc NoStrategyTargetCollateralError}
- **/
-declare function noStrategyTargetCollateral(creditManager: Address): NoStrategyTargetCollateralError;
-/**
- * {@inheritDoc CreditAccountNotEmptyError}
- **/
-declare function creditAccountNotEmpty(creditAccount: Address): CreditAccountNotEmptyError;
-/**
- * {@inheritDoc CreditAccountNotFoundError}
- **/
-declare function creditAccountNotFound(creditAccount: Address): CreditAccountNotFoundError;
-/**
- * {@inheritDoc EmptyOpenTakesNothingError}
- **/
-declare function emptyOpenTakesNothing(): EmptyOpenTakesNothingError;
-/**
- * {@inheritDoc UnexpectedFailureError}
- *
- * Takes what was thrown, whatever that is: a `throw` is not obliged to raise an
- * `Error`, and `cause` promises one.
- **/
-declare function unexpectedFailure(thrown: unknown): UnexpectedFailureError;
-//#endregion
-export { AccountFlowError, CreditAccountNotEmptyError, CreditAccountNotFoundError, DebtOutOfRangeError, EmptyOpenTakesNothingError, ForbiddenTokenError, InsufficientCollateralError, InsufficientPoolLiquidityError, InsufficientSourceBalanceError, LeverageOutOfRangeError, MalformedTransactionError, MarketExpiredError, MarketPausedError, MultipleDelayedWithdrawalsError, NoDelayedRouteError, NoRecordedIntentError, NoStrategyTargetCollateralError, OpenFlowError, PoolSunsetError, QuotaCountExceededError, QuotaLimitReachedError, RefusalErrors, UnexpectedFailureError, UnsupportedCollateralTokenError, UnsupportedTokenPairError, WithRouteRefusals, WithdrawalInProgressError, creditAccountNotEmpty, creditAccountNotFound, emptyOpenTakesNothing, noStrategyTargetCollateral, toRefusalError, unexpectedFailure };