@gaunt-sloth/core 2.0.0-alpha.9 → 2.0.0-beta.0

package/dist/core/GthAgentRunner.js

@@ -1,15 +1,117 @@
-import { getEffectiveDevToolsConfig, getShellJudgeSettings, isShellAllowlistEnabled, isShellAllowlistPersisted, isShellJudgeEnabled, } from '#src/config.js';
+import { DEFAULT_APPROVAL_RUNG, describeGrantedBuiltInTools, isNegotiatingRung, isRatedRung, isToolGatedAtRung, resolveApprovals, resolveGatedToolNames, resolveShellApprovalGate, SHELL_TOOL_NAME, TOOL_ANNOTATION_HINTS, } from '#src/config.js';
+import { StatusLevel, } from '#src/core/types.js';
 import { GthLangChainAgent } from '#src/core/GthLangChainAgent.js';
-import { AllowlistStore, PersistedAllowlist, matchesApproval, } from '#src/core/shell/allowlist.js';
+import { annotationWeakenings, ApprovalGrantStore, describeWeakenedGrant, PersistedApprovalGrants, shellGrantEntry, toolGrantEntry, trustWithdrawalWeakens, } from '#src/core/approvals/grants.js';
+import { renderApprovalEntryObject } from '#src/config/schema.js';
 import { classifyCommand } from '#src/core/shell/arity.js';
+import { describeAbstention } from '#src/core/shell/abstention.js';
 import { normalizeCommand } from '#src/core/shell/normalize.js';
-import { judgeShellCommand, mapVerdictToAction, } from '#src/core/shell/judge.js';
+import { ApprovalStopError, AttackHaltError, NonInteractiveEscalationError, } from '#src/core/shell/approvalStop.js';
+import { applyDestructiveFloor, isBelowDestructiveFloor, isRaterTimeout, mapAllowMatchedVerdictToAction, mapVerdictToAction, openWorldToolFloorReason, preflightFloorFinding, RATER_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS, rateShellCommand, } from '#src/core/shell/rater.js';
+import { ApprovalCaptureLog, } from '#src/core/shell/approvalCapture.js';
+import { buildHardlineRefusal, checkHardline } from '#src/core/shell/hardline.js';
+import { renderNegotiationTranscript, ShellNegotiationState } from '#src/core/shell/negotiation.js';
+import { buildRejectionMessage } from '#src/core/shell/rejection.js';
+import { describeApprovalEntry, resolveApprovalRules, } from '#src/core/approvals/matcher.js';
+import { createEffectiveToolAnnotationSource, trustedAnnotationHints, } from '#src/core/approvals/annotations.js';
+import { approvalSubjectForToolName } from '#src/core/approvals/mcpSubjects.js';
+import { toolCallHosts } from '#src/core/approvals/toolHost.js';
+import { builtInToolAnnotations, mcpDeclaredAnnotationLookup, } from '#src/core/approvals/toolAnnotationSources.js';
+import { resolveRaterModel } from '#src/core/shell/raterModel.js';
 import { env } from '#src/utils/systemUtils.js';
 import { getGslothConfigWritePath } from '#src/utils/fileUtils.js';
 import { SHELL_ALLOWLIST_FILE } from '#src/constants.js';
 import { enhanceVertexUnauthorizedMessage } from '#src/utils/vertexaiUtils.js';
 import { getNewRunnableConfig } from '#src/utils/llmUtils.js';
 import { initDebugLogging, debugLog, debugLogError, debugLogObject, } from '#src/utils/debugUtils.js';
+import { updateCrashContext } from '#src/utils/crashHandler.js';
+import { setToolDisplayConfig } from '#src/core/toolDisplay.js';
+/**
+ * GS2-48 — how many trailing messages of the in-flight turn to hand the crash handler as the
+ * transcript tail. A crash file is triage, not the full session, so only the last few messages are
+ * kept; they are redacted (GS2-47) by the crash snapshot writer before anything reaches disk.
+ */
+const CRASH_TRANSCRIPT_TAIL_MESSAGES = 8;
+/**
+ * A private copy of a rule entry, for handing to a display. `pattern` is the one field that can be
+ * an object (a `hint` pattern, §3.1), so it is copied too — a shallow spread alone would leave the
+ * displayed entry sharing the very object the matcher compares against.
+ */
+function copyApprovalEntry(entry) {
+    if (entry.type === 'shell' || typeof entry.pattern === 'string')
+        return { ...entry };
+    return { ...entry, pattern: { ...entry.pattern } };
+}
+/**
+ * [[EXT-29]] §5.1 — the `justification` argument of a `run_shell_command` call, when the model
+ * supplied a usable one.
+ *
+ * Read defensively for the same reason `command` is: these are model-authored arguments arriving
+ * through a schema the graph validated but that this method does not re-validate, so a non-string
+ * or a whitespace-only value is *absent* rather than a second spelling of empty.
+ *
+ * **What the trim buys is the RECORDED ROUND, not the prompt.** The rating prompt is already safe
+ * without it — `buildNegotiationContextBlock` drops a blank justification before it renders a fence,
+ * and `renderNegotiationTranscript` drops one before it renders a line. What only this can do is
+ * keep the round itself honest at the point it is written: a round carrying a whitespace-only
+ * justification asserts that the agent argued something it did not, to everything that later reads
+ * the transcript rather than a rendering of it. Both downstream guards then stay defence in depth
+ * instead of being the only thing between a blank string and that claim.
+ */
+function shellJustification(args) {
+    const value = args?.justification;
+    if (typeof value !== 'string')
+        return undefined;
+    return value.trim().length === 0 ? undefined : value;
+}
+/**
+ * [[EXT-29]] §5.1 — the text of the human messages in a turn's input, for the rater's last-5 window.
+ *
+ * Structural and fail-soft, like `runStats`'s accumulator: the runner is handed `BaseMessage`s from
+ * several surfaces (readline, TUI, ACP, AG-UI) and a multimodal turn's `content` is an array of
+ * blocks rather than a string. Only the text is taken — §4.3 admits no file contents, no tool
+ * output and no fetched pages, and an image block is none of the three.
+ */
+function humanMessageTexts(messages) {
+    const texts = [];
+    for (const message of messages) {
+        try {
+            const type = message?.getType?.();
+            if (type !== 'human')
+                continue;
+            const content = message.content;
+            if (typeof content === 'string') {
+                texts.push(content);
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (!Array.isArray(content))
+                continue;
+            const parts = content
+                .filter((block) => typeof block === 'object' &&
+                block !== null &&
+                block.type === 'text' &&
+                typeof block.text === 'string')
+                .map((block) => block.text);
+            if (parts.length > 0)
+                texts.push(parts.join('\n'));
+        }
+        catch {
+            /* fail-soft: an odd message shape just means that message contributes nothing */
+        }
+    }
+    return texts;
+}
+/**
+ * EXT-114 — the page describing the `subagents` config key, pointed at rather than paraphrased in
+ * the notice itself.
+ *
+ * **A GitHub blob URL, matching the other user-facing runtime doc links in this repo** (the
+ * approvals-protection pointer in `config/shell-policy.ts` and the 2.0 migration pointer in
+ * `config/schema.ts`) — a running CLI's user has no checkout for a relative path to resolve in.
+ * `subagentScope.spec.ts` pins that this URL's anchor still resolves to a real heading in the page
+ * it names, because a doc link that silently rots is worse than no link.
+ */
+export const SUBAGENTS_DOCS_URL = 'https://github.com/pukeko-robotics/gaunt-sloth/blob/main/docs/configuration/profiles.md#named-profile-subagents-subagents';
 /**
  * Agent simplifies interaction with LLM and reduces it to calling a few methods
  * {@link GthAgentRunner#init} and {@link GthAgentRunner#processMessages}.
@@ -28,6 +130,14 @@ export class GthAgentRunner {
      * for non-interactive entrypoints (a scripted `exec` run with no TTY to prompt on).
      */
     toolApprovalCallback = null;
+    /**
+     * [[TUI-C68]] §6.1 — consumer hook invoked when the rater rates a command an `attack`, so an
+     * interactive surface can show the red banner before the run ends. Set via
+     * {@link setAttackHaltCallback}; **when unset the runner halts immediately**, which is the
+     * behaviour every surface had before a banner existed. A surface that forgets to wire it
+     * therefore keeps the halt rather than losing it.
+     */
+    attackHaltCallback = null;
     /** The command the runner was initialized for; selects which `devTools` config applies. */
     command = undefined;
     /**
@@ -38,33 +148,73 @@ export class GthAgentRunner {
      */
     lastRunStats = { tools: [] };
     /**
-     * EXT-12 — runtime, session-scoped yolo flag toggled by the `/yolo` slash command. Distinct
-     * from the static `devTools.shellYolo` config flag (which omits the tool from `interruptOn` at
-     * agent-build time and cannot be changed mid-session). Because the tool stays gated (in
-     * `interruptOn`), this flag is consulted at the TOP of {@link decideToolApproval}: when ON, a
-     * gated `run_shell_command` is auto-approved WITHOUT prompting (yolo behaviour) for the rest of
-     * this runner's life. Never persisted; defaults OFF. It does NOT disable the hardline floor —
-     * catastrophic commands are still refused at exec time in `GthDevToolkit.executeCommand`.
+     * CFG-27 — the runtime, session-scoped approvals posture, seeded at {@link init} from
+     * {@link resolveApprovals} and thereafter switchable for the session by `/approvals <rung>`.
+     * **This field, not the interrupt wiring, is where the rung lives.** The backends wire the
+     * interrupt rung-independently, so every tool any rung could gate arrives at the top of
+     * {@link decideToolApproval} and is judged against the rung recorded here — which is what makes
+     * `/approvals manual` take effect mid-session, and what keeps a config that pre-selects
+     * `bypass` switchable back. Never persisted.
+     *
+     * It does NOT disable the hardline floor — catastrophic commands are still refused at exec time
+     * in `GthDevToolkit.executeCommand` under every rung.
+     */
+    sessionApprovals = {
+        rung: DEFAULT_APPROVAL_RUNG,
+        allow: [],
+        deny: [],
+        escalate: [],
+    };
+    /**
+     * CFG-26 — the model the AI rater rates with, when `approvals.rater.profile` names an identity
+     * profile. Resolved ONCE at {@link init} (never mid-turn) and handed to `rateShellCommand`;
+     * `undefined` means no profile is configured and the rater uses the session model.
+     */
+    raterModel;
+    /**
+     * EXT-66 — how many rating calls this session gave up on. Counted so the notice can say "3 times
+     * this session" rather than repeating an identical line, and so a silent drift toward
+     * escalate-everything has a number attached to it.
+     */
+    raterTimeouts = 0;
+    /**
+     * EXT-71 §3.1/§6 — what the escalation menu granted at run time, for the life of THIS runner
+     * instance: {@link ApprovalEntry} objects, never prefixes, and never anything from config (the
+     * declared lists are read-only input consulted straight from the posture). Instance-scoped so
+     * concurrent sessions (ACP / AG-UI multi-session) cannot stomp each other's approvals.
+     */
+    sessionGrants = new ApprovalGrantStore();
+    /**
+     * CFG-27 §3 — what the escalation menu's *always reject* choice adds at run time, in the same
+     * grammar ([[TUI-C26]] wires that writer; the store speaks it already). The entries DECLARED in
+     * `approvals.deny` are not here — they are read-only config input, matched from the posture — and
+     * both are handed to the same matcher, so a runtime refusal and a declared one are one list.
+     */
+    denyGrants = new ApprovalGrantStore();
+    /**
+     * The persisted (`always`) grant store, loaded lazily on first use from
+     * `.gsloth/.gsloth-settings/shell-allowlist.json`. Null until a gated call actually needs it, and
+     * null when the file cannot be loaded at all (in which case `always` grants degrade to session).
      */
-    sessionYolo = false;
+    persistedGrants = null;
+    persistedGrantsLoaded = false;
     /**
-     * EXT-9 Tier-2 session allow-list — approved command prefixes that auto-approve for the
-     * life of THIS runner instance. Instance-scoped (not module-global) so concurrent
-     * sessions (ACP / AG-UI multi-session) cannot stomp each other's approvals.
+     * [[EXT-29]] §5 — the state of the agent↔rater negotiation at `auto`: the transcript, §5.3's
+     * consecutive-rejection counter and the reachability bound. Instance-scoped for the same reason
+     * the grant stores are — a concurrent ACP / AG-UI session must not inherit another's argument.
      */
-    sessionAllowlist = new AllowlistStore();
+    negotiation = new ShellNegotiationState();
     /**
-     * EXT-9 Tier-2 persisted (`always`) allow-list, loaded lazily on first use from
-     * `.gsloth/.gsloth-settings/shell-allowlist.json`. Null until the shell tool is gated
-     * and the allow-list is enabled; null also when persistence is disabled by config.
+     * [[TUI-C27]] — the diagnostic record of every gated decision this session made, for
+     * `/debug-dump`. Instance-scoped for the same reason the negotiation and the grant stores are: a
+     * concurrent ACP / AG-UI session must not inherit another's approvals history, and a dump taken
+     * in one must not describe the other.
      */
-    persistedAllowlist = null;
-    persistedAllowlistLoaded = false;
+    approvalCaptures = new ApprovalCaptureLog();
     /**
      * @param agentFactory Produces the {@link GthAgentInterface} the runner drives.
-     *   Defaults to the lean {@link GthLangChainAgent} (core). `@gaunt-sloth/agent`
-     *   passes a factory returning a deep `GthDeepAgent` so the same runner can drive a
-     *   `createDeepAgent` graph without core depending on deepagents.
+     *   Defaults to the lean {@link GthLangChainAgent} (core). The seam stays parameterised so a
+     *   caller can drive the runner with a different graph builder without core depending on it.
      */
     constructor(statusUpdate, resolvers, agentFactory) {
         this.statusUpdate = statusUpdate;
@@ -81,38 +231,335 @@ export class GthAgentRunner {
         this.toolApprovalCallback = callback;
     }
     /**
-     * EXT-12 — flip the runtime, session-scoped yolo flag (the `/yolo` slash command). When ON,
-     * gated `run_shell_command` calls auto-approve without prompting for the rest of this session;
-     * the hardline floor still applies at exec time. Returns the NEW state so the caller can render
-     * a notice. Session-scoped only — nothing is written to config.
+     * [[TUI-C68]] §6.1 — register the handler that shows the **attack banner**, the one way a human
+     * gets past an `attack` verdict. Pass `null` to clear.
+     *
+     * Separate from {@link setToolApprovalCallback} because it is a separate question with an
+     * inverted default: an absent approval callback means *this session has nobody to ask*, and an
+     * absent one here means *end the run*. Wiring it is what an interactive surface opts into; every
+     * other surface keeps the halt (see {@link attackHaltCallback}).
+     */
+    setAttackHaltCallback(callback) {
+        this.attackHaltCallback = callback;
+    }
+    /**
+     * §6.1 — **the single seam between an `attack` verdict and the end of the run.** Both rating
+     * paths — the §3.2 allow-match tripwire and the ordinary rater decision — go through here, so the
+     * banner cannot be present on one and missing on the other, which is the shape of bug that leaves
+     * a halt answerable in some sessions and not others with nothing on screen to tell them apart.
+     *
+     * It returns a decision for the one answer that grants and throws for everything else:
+     *
+     * - **no callback → throw**, immediately and unchanged. §6.2's rule is that a run with nobody to
+     *   ask never blocks and never times out into a grant; the way that is guaranteed is that waiting
+     *   is something only a wired surface can cause.
+     * - **`run-anyway` → approve, scope `once`.** Exactly one command runs. `once` is not a default
+     *   restated: it is what keeps §6.1's three "never"s true. Returning here is also returning from
+     *   *before* the block that records a sticky grant, so no allow-list entry and no session grant
+     *   can be written on this path — the next identical call is rated again and reaches this banner
+     *   again. Nothing here touches the rung, and nothing disables the rater, the escalation or the
+     *   halt for anything else.
+     * - **anything else → throw.** `stop`, and equally a value a surface invents or forgets to
+     *   return: the grant is one exact answer and everything else is a refusal.
+     */
+    async haltOrRunAnyway(command, reason, 
+    /** [[TUI-C27]] — this decision's record; the banner's answer is a HUMAN's answer. */
+    record) {
+        if (this.attackHaltCallback) {
+            const answer = await this.attackHaltCallback({ command, reason });
+            // [[TUI-C27]] — **recorded here, or a run-anyway is indistinguishable from a `safe`
+            // rating.** The banner returns an ordinary approval, so without this line the archive would
+            // show `approve` at the `rater` stage with nobody named — i.e. the rater appearing to have
+            // approved a command it called an attack. That is precisely the misattribution this node
+            // exists to remove, on the branch where it costs the most.
+            record.humanAnswer = answer === 'run-anyway' ? 'approve' : 'reject';
+            if (answer === 'run-anyway')
+                return { type: 'approve', scope: 'once' };
+        }
+        else {
+            // §6.2 — no surface wired the banner, so nobody was asked and the run ends.
+            record.humanAnswer = 'no-human';
+        }
+        throw new AttackHaltError(command, reason);
+    }
+    /**
+     * CFG-27 — switch the session-scoped rung (`/approvals <rung>`). Idempotent; returns the NEW
+     * rung so the caller can render a notice. Session-scoped only — nothing is written to config,
+     * and the declared allow/deny lists are unaffected (they are config input, not session state).
+     */
+    setSessionApprovalRung(rung) {
+        this.sessionApprovals = { ...this.sessionApprovals, rung };
+        return this.sessionApprovals.rung;
+    }
+    /** CFG-27 — the session's current approvals posture (rung + rater profile + declared lists). */
+    getSessionApprovals() {
+        return this.sessionApprovals;
+    }
+    /**
+     * [[TUI-C27]] — every gated decision this session made, oldest first, for the `/debug-dump`
+     * archive.
+     *
+     * Threaded by each surface into `writeDebugDump`, exactly as `agent.lastModelRequest` is: the
+     * writer redacts it with the same pass it applies to every other artifact, and a surface that
+     * does not thread it simply omits the file.
+     */
+    getApprovalCaptures() {
+        return this.approvalCaptures.snapshot();
+    }
+    /**
+     * CFG-26 — the allow-list sizes for the `/approvals` display: how many command prefixes the
+     * human has trusted this session, and how many are persisted in the project file.
+     *
+     * READ-ONLY BY CONSTRUCTION: it reports the persisted count only when the store has ALREADY
+     * been loaded (or persistence is on and it can be read), and never through a path that would
+     * CREATE the store as a side effect of showing a display — a status command must not mutate
+     * session state. `always: undefined` therefore means "not loaded / persistence off", which the
+     * caller renders as `—` rather than a misleading `0`.
      */
-    toggleSessionYolo() {
-        this.sessionYolo = !this.sessionYolo;
-        return this.sessionYolo;
+    getAllowlistCounts() {
+        const always = this.persistedGrantsLoaded
+            ? (this.persistedGrants?.size() ?? undefined)
+            : undefined;
+        // EXT-71 §3 — every list MUST be inspectable, and the declared entries are in force for this
+        // session exactly as the human's own grants are. They are counted alongside them rather than
+        // hidden, which is what the count meant before the declared lists stopped seeding the store.
+        const session = this.sessionGrants.size() + this.sessionApprovals.allow.length;
+        return { session, always };
+    }
+    /**
+     * CFG-27 — the session's deny entries for display: the declared `approvals.deny` entries
+     * (rendered one line each) followed by whatever the escalation menu's *always reject* added at
+     * run time. Both refuse a call, so both are shown.
+     */
+    getDenylist() {
+        return [...this.sessionApprovals.deny, ...this.denyGrants.entries()].map(describeApprovalEntry);
+    }
+    /**
+     * §3/§4.7.4 — **the grants themselves**, for an approvals view that shows *what* was granted,
+     * *when*, and *under which effective annotations*. The counterpart of {@link getAllowlistCounts},
+     * which answers only how many.
+     *
+     * The declared config lists are deliberately NOT here. They are something a human wrote and
+     * reviewed, they carry no `grantedAt` and no scope, and `getAllowlistCounts` already counts them
+     * alongside these; mixing them in would present a config line as something the session granted.
+     *
+     * **Read-only in both senses.** It never loads the persisted store — same rule as
+     * {@link getAllowlistCounts}: a display must not create the store in order to show it, so a
+     * session that has not yet needed the file lists its session grants alone. And every grant is
+     * **deep-copied on the way out**, because the stores hand back their live records: the copy on the
+     * way in is what makes a snapshot private to its grant, and handing the same object to a renderer
+     * would put what the gate matches against one property assignment away from any consumer.
+     */
+    getGrants() {
+        const held = [
+            ...this.sessionGrants.list(),
+            ...(this.persistedGrantsLoaded ? (this.persistedGrants?.list() ?? []) : []),
+        ];
+        const seen = new Set();
+        const grants = [];
+        for (const grant of held) {
+            // An `always` grant is written to BOTH stores, so identity de-duplication is what keeps it
+            // from being displayed twice. The same question `ApprovalGrantStore.add` asks.
+            const key = renderApprovalEntryObject(grant.entry);
+            if (seen.has(key))
+                continue;
+            seen.add(key);
+            grants.push({
+                ...grant,
+                entry: copyApprovalEntry(grant.entry),
+                ...(grant.annotations ? { annotations: { ...grant.annotations } } : {}),
+            });
+        }
+        return grants;
     }
-    /** EXT-12 — current state of the runtime session-scoped yolo flag (see {@link toggleSessionYolo}). */
-    isSessionYolo() {
-        return this.sessionYolo;
+    /**
+     * §4.7.1 — **which of each server's annotation hints this session believes**, for display.
+     *
+     * Every key either side names is listed: a configured `mcpServers` key with no policy of its own
+     * (which resolves through `defaults`), and a policy key naming a server the config does not have
+     * (which is what a typo looks like). Resolution is {@link trustedAnnotationHints}, the same
+     * function the gate derives effective annotations through, so the display cannot claim a
+     * relationship the gate does not act on.
+     */
+    getMcpAnnotationTrust() {
+        const mcp = this.sessionApprovals.mcp;
+        const configured = new Set(this.configuredMcpServerKeys());
+        const named = Object.keys(mcp?.servers ?? {});
+        const keys = [...new Set([...configured, ...named])];
+        return {
+            defaults: [...(mcp?.defaults?.trustAnnotations ?? [])],
+            servers: keys.map((server) => ({
+                server,
+                trusted: [...trustedAnnotationHints(mcp, server)],
+                configured: configured.has(server),
+            })),
+        };
+    }
+    /**
+     * §4.7.1 — **believe, or stop believing, specific hints from one server**, for the life of this
+     * session. The runtime half of `approvals.mcp.servers.<key>.trustAnnotations` (§9), so a user can
+     * do from the TUI what they can do in config.
+     *
+     * **Per hint, never per server.** `hints` names the hints this call moves and leaves every other
+     * hint of that server's exactly as it was, because believing a server's `readOnlyHint` while
+     * disbelieving its `openWorldHint` is a coherent position and the common one. A "trust this
+     * server" flag is the design §4.7.1 rejects.
+     *
+     * **The previous set is what was IN FORCE, resolved through `defaults`.** A server not named
+     * under `servers` inherits `defaults`, and naming it makes it state its relationship in full (§9)
+     * — so seeding from the empty set would mean that believing one more hint silently withdrew every
+     * hint `defaults` had granted, which is a weakening the user did not ask for and would invalidate
+     * their grants.
+     *
+     * **Session-scoped only.** Nothing is written to config: the declared block is read-only input
+     * (§9.1), exactly as the rung is.
+     *
+     * A trusted external annotation still never grants more than the same annotation grants one of
+     * our own built-ins — that holds in `core/approvals/annotations.ts` by construction, and this
+     * changes only which hints are read.
+     */
+    setMcpAnnotationTrust(server, hints, believe) {
+        const mcp = this.sessionApprovals.mcp;
+        const before = trustedAnnotationHints(mcp, server);
+        const requested = new Set(hints);
+        const after = believe
+            ? TOOL_ANNOTATION_HINTS.filter((hint) => before.includes(hint) || requested.has(hint))
+            : TOOL_ANNOTATION_HINTS.filter((hint) => before.includes(hint) && !requested.has(hint));
+        const added = after.filter((hint) => !before.includes(hint));
+        const removed = before.filter((hint) => !after.includes(hint));
+        const nextMcp = {
+            ...mcp,
+            servers: {
+                ...mcp?.servers,
+                [server]: { ...mcp?.servers?.[server], trustAnnotations: after },
+            },
+        };
+        // A fresh posture object, and fresh nested ones above: the resolved posture may share its `mcp`
+        // block with the loaded config, and a session change must not rewrite what the user configured.
+        this.sessionApprovals = { ...this.sessionApprovals, mcp: nextMcp };
+        return {
+            server,
+            configured: this.configuredMcpServerKeys().includes(server),
+            trusted: [...after],
+            added,
+            removed,
+            weakening: removed.filter(trustWithdrawalWeakens),
+            invalidates: this.grantsWeakenedByCurrentTrust(server),
+        };
+    }
+    /**
+     * §4.7.4 — which of this server's saved approvals the trust now in force weakens, for the notice
+     * that reports a trust change. **It predicts; it never removes.** The removal stays where Task
+     * 4 put it — at the call being decided — because that is the only moment the tool's declaration
+     * can be read for certain; here a server that is merely offline declares nothing and would read
+     * as having weakened everything.
+     *
+     * It compares through the same two functions the gate does: the effective-annotation source built
+     * from the posture as it stands *after* the change, and `annotationWeakenings`. A second
+     * comparison written for the display is how a warning comes to describe a rule the gate does not
+     * have.
+     */
+    grantsWeakenedByCurrentTrust(server) {
+        const source = this.effectiveToolAnnotationSource();
+        return this.getGrants()
+            .filter((grant) => grant.entry.type === 'mcpTool' &&
+            grant.entry.server === server &&
+            typeof grant.entry.pattern === 'string' &&
+            grant.annotations !== undefined)
+            .filter((grant) => {
+            // `EffectiveToolAnnotationSource` admits `undefined` for a source that genuinely cannot
+            // answer; `createEffectiveToolAnnotationSource` never returns it — a tool nothing has
+            // declared for resolves to the fail-closed constant, which for a grant made under anything
+            // softer reads as a weakening. The guard is therefore a type-level obligation and not a
+            // live branch: it discharges the union the contract declares, and nothing reaches it.
+            const current = source({
+                kind: 'mcpTool',
+                server,
+                name: grant.entry.pattern,
+                ...(grant.entry.host !== undefined ? { host: grant.entry.host } : {}),
+            });
+            return current !== undefined && annotationWeakenings(grant.annotations, current).length > 0;
+        })
+            .map((grant) => describeApprovalEntry(grant.entry));
     }
     /**
      * Init is split into a separate method. This may create a number of connections,
      * and we'd better have an instance by that moment, for the case things will go wrong,
      * so we can wrap init into try-catch and then call {@link #cleanup} within finally.
      */
-    async init(command, configIn, checkpointSaver) {
+    async init(command, configIn, checkpointSaver, options) {
         this.config = configIn;
         this.command = command;
+        // GS2-48 — register the effective config with the crash handler so an uncaughtException /
+        // unhandledRejection mid-run captures it in the (redacted) snapshot. Pure data hand-off; no
+        // behaviour change.
+        updateCrashContext({ config: configIn, modelDisplayName: configIn.modelDisplayName });
+        // TUI-C32 residual a — register the live config with the shared tool-display redactor so its
+        // secret-literal collection walks INLINE config secrets (a pasted `apiKey`/`token` value), not
+        // only env-derived ones. Both surfaces (plain observer + Ink TUI) render through this module.
+        setToolDisplayConfig(configIn);
+        // CFG-27 — seed the session posture from config, so a config that pre-selects `bypass` starts
+        // there while the shell tool stays gated (see `resolveShellApprovalGate`) and therefore
+        // remains switchable (`/approvals write`). Resolved per-command, mirroring where the shell
+        // tool is actually emitted; no effect where the tool is ungated.
+        this.sessionApprovals = resolveApprovals(configIn, command);
+        // §3/§9.1 — the DECLARED lists are read-only config input, consulted through the EXT-71 rule
+        // matcher (`core/approvals/matcher.ts`) and NEVER copied into the runtime stores, which hold
+        // only what the escalation menu grants at run time. Both are handed to the same matcher, so
+        // there is one grammar and one comparison, not a config path and a runtime path.
+        this.denyGrants = new ApprovalGrantStore();
+        // CFG-26 — resolve the rater's own model when a profile is named, so the documented mitigation
+        // for a weak model ("point approvals.rater at a stronger one") actually takes effect.
+        //
+        // EAGERLY, here, rather than lazily at first use: `initConfig` re-runs discovery and prints
+        // "Activating profile: …", which mid-turn would write raw over the Ink TUI's managed frame,
+        // and a broken profile should fail at startup rather than three turns in. It deliberately does
+        // NOT catch — a named-but-unusable rater profile is an error, never a silent fallback to the
+        // session model (GS2-62).
+        //
+        // Loaded whenever a profile is NAMED, without a second "will the rater actually run?" gate:
+        // naming a rater profile at an unrated rung is a config the user can hold (they may switch to
+        // `assisted` mid-session with `/approvals`), and a broken profile should still fail loudly at
+        // startup rather than at the moment they switch.
+        const raterProfile = this.sessionApprovals.rater;
+        this.raterModel = raterProfile ? await resolveRaterModel(raterProfile) : undefined;
         // Initialize debug logging
         initDebugLogging(configIn.debugLog ?? false);
         debugLog(`Initializing GthAgentRunner with command: ${command || 'default'}`);
         this.runConfig = getNewRunnableConfig();
         debugLogObject('Runnable Config', this.runConfig);
+        this.warnIfSubagentsCannotBeHonored(configIn, command ?? options?.owningCommand);
         this.agent = this.agentFactory(this.statusUpdate, this.resolvers);
         // Initialize the agent
         debugLog('Initializing agent...');
-        await this.agent.init(command, configIn, checkpointSaver);
+        await this.agent.init(command, configIn, checkpointSaver, {
+            displayCommand: options?.displayCommand,
+        });
         debugLog('Agent initialization complete');
     }
+    /**
+     * EXT-114 — `subagents` is configurable but not yet dispatched, and a run that declares them must
+     * say so rather than start with a quietly smaller toolset than the config describes.
+     *
+     * The `task` tool that spawned them belonged to the deepagents runtime, which is gone; the lean
+     * primitive that replaces it is GS2-25. Until then a declared subagent is inert. Keeping the key
+     * valid is deliberate — a config written for GS2-25 should not have to be un-written and
+     * re-written — but inert-and-silent is the failure this notice exists to prevent: the parent
+     * simply does the work itself, on the parent's model, and the only visible symptom is the bill.
+     *
+     * Fires on EVERY run rather than only where a backend could once have honoured it, because there
+     * is no longer any run that can.
+     */
+    warnIfSubagentsCannotBeHonored(config, command) {
+        if (!config.subagents || config.subagents.length === 0) {
+            return;
+        }
+        const scope = command ? `the ${command} command` : 'this run';
+        const names = config.subagents.map((spec) => spec.name).join(', ');
+        this.statusUpdate(StatusLevel.WARNING, `Config declares subagents (${names}), but no agent backend dispatches subagents yet, so ` +
+            `${scope} runs without them. See ` +
+            SUBAGENTS_DOCS_URL);
+    }
     /**
      * processMessages deals with both streaming and non-streaming approaches.
      */
@@ -122,6 +569,14 @@ export class GthAgentRunner {
         }
         // GS2-16: start this turn's analytics tally from zero (the runner is reused across turns).
         this.resetRunStats();
+        // GS2-48 — record this turn's transcript tail for the crash handler.
+        updateCrashContext({ transcriptTail: messages.slice(-CRASH_TRANSCRIPT_TAIL_MESSAGES) });
+        // [[EXT-29]] §5 — a new user turn is the human being reached, so it ends any negotiation still
+        // standing from the previous one and clears BOTH bounds. The turn's own messages then enter
+        // §5.1's last-5 window, which is what makes "just the last two" reach the rater at all — the
+        // reply that narrows what the agent proposes is worthless to the gate if only the agent hears it.
+        this.negotiation.humanReached();
+        this.negotiation.noteUserMessages(humanMessageTexts(messages));
         debugLog('Processing messages...');
         debugLogObject('Input Messages', messages);
         try {
@@ -139,11 +594,36 @@ export class GthAgentRunner {
                     result += await this.resolveToolInterrupts();
                 }
                 catch (streamError) {
+                    // CFG-27 — an approvals STOP is not a stream failure: it is the gate deliberately
+                    // ending the run, and its message IS the explanation the spec requires it to carry.
+                    // Re-thrown unchanged (the outer catch does the same) so nothing buries it.
+                    if (streamError instanceof ApprovalStopError)
+                        throw streamError;
                     // Handle streaming-specific errors
                     debugLogError('Stream processing', streamError);
                     throw new Error(`Stream processing failed: ${streamError instanceof Error ? streamError.message : String(streamError)}`);
                 }
                 debugLog(`Stream completed. Total response length: ${result.length}`);
+                // EXT-37: a content-policy refusal (OpenAI content_filter / Anthropic stop_reason=refusal /
+                // Bedrock guardrail_intervened) is detected one layer down in GthAbstractAgent — the only
+                // place a message's response_metadata is visible — and surfaced there as a clear, non-empty
+                // terminal answer. That non-empty result intentionally bypasses this empty-response retry:
+                // a refusal is deterministic, so re-invoking the SAME model would only burn a paid call and
+                // fail identically. Only a genuinely empty turn reaches the retry below.
+                //
+                // Fallback-model EXTENSION POINT: hermes tries a *different* model once on refusal (a
+                // different model may not refuse). gaunt-sloth has no runtime fallback-model config today
+                // (`getCuratedFallbackModel` is init-time per-provider defaulting, not runtime failover), so
+                // per YAGNI none is built. When such a config is added, the one-shot fallback belongs where
+                // the refusal is detected (GthAbstractAgent.surfaceRefusal): try the fallback model ONCE
+                // before surfacing, and never retry the same model.
+                // GS2-72: the GS2-36 retry-budget's terminal notice — injected via a jumpTo:'end' STATE
+                // update on the lean createAgent graph — is streamed as an AIMessage chunk under
+                // streamMode:'messages' (verified on langchain 1.5.x), so it already arrives as a NON-empty
+                // `result` above and does NOT reach this fallback. Only a genuinely empty model turn falls
+                // through here, where the single retry invoke is the intended recovery. (If a future
+                // langchain stops streaming jumpTo-injected messages, the budget notice would drain empty
+                // and hit this fallback; GthAbstractAgentTerminalNotice.spec pins the current behaviour.)
                 if (result.trim().length === 0) {
                     debugLog('Stream produced empty response, retrying once with non-streaming invoke.');
                     const fallback = await this.agent.invoke(messages, this.runConfig);
@@ -158,7 +638,15 @@ export class GthAgentRunner {
             else {
                 // Use non-streaming
                 debugLog('Using non-streaming mode');
-                const result = await this.agent.invoke(messages, this.runConfig);
+                let result = await this.agent.invoke(messages, this.runConfig);
+                // EXT-52 — the SAME interrupt drain the streaming branch does above. A gated
+                // `run_shell_command` suspends the graph, so `invoke` returns with the tool-calling
+                // AIMessage (empty content) as the last message and the command not yet run. Draining here
+                // — BEFORE the empty-response check — is what makes the approval prompt fire and the
+                // approved command's output reach the caller on `streamOutput: false`; without it the turn
+                // died with the misleading empty-response error, so the check may only see a genuinely
+                // empty turn.
+                result += await this.resolveToolInterrupts();
                 debugLog(`Non-stream response length: ${result.length}`);
                 if (result.trim().length === 0) {
                     throw new Error('Model returned an empty response. Try again or switch to a more stable model.');
@@ -167,6 +655,12 @@ export class GthAgentRunner {
             }
         }
         catch (error) {
+            // CFG-27 §4.2/§6.2 — an approvals STOP is not an agent failure and must reach the user with
+            // its own words: the command, the rating and its reason are the whole point of it. Wrapping
+            // it as "Agent processing failed: …" would bury the explanation the spec requires it to
+            // carry, so it is re-thrown unchanged.
+            if (error instanceof ApprovalStopError)
+                throw error;
             // Handle agent invocation errors
             debugLogError('Agent processing', error);
             const originalMessage = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
@@ -196,7 +690,10 @@ export class GthAgentRunner {
      * streamed across all resume turns (empty when nothing was resumed).
      *
      * No-ops (returns '') when the agent does not support interrupts (`getPendingToolInterrupts`/
-     * `streamResume` absent), so the lean agent and non-HITL configs are unaffected.
+     * `streamResume` absent) — that is the only exemption. As of EXT-52 BOTH backends gate
+     * `run_shell_command` and expose the interrupt surface, so the lean (default) agent is now
+     * exactly the agent this loop serves; only an agent implementation without those methods
+     * (e.g. a test double) skips it.
      */
     async resolveToolInterrupts() {
         const agent = this.agent;
@@ -221,140 +718,982 @@ export class GthAgentRunner {
         return resumedText;
     }
     /**
-     * Decide a single pending tool call (EXT-9 Tier-2). For the opt-in `run_shell_command`,
-     * consult the scoped allow-list FIRST: if the command's classified prefix is already
-     * approved (session or persisted `always`) and survives the safe-bin anti-widening
-     * re-validation, auto-approve SILENTLY (no human prompt). Otherwise fall through to the
-     * human callback; when the human grants `session`/`always` scope, record the command's
-     * classified prefix into the matching store so future flag-variants stop re-prompting.
+     * EXT-71 §3.1/§3.2, EXT-70 §4.7.5 — the subject a pending tool call presents to the rule matcher.
+     *
+     * A gated `run_shell_command` is a **shell** subject and nothing else: it is matched by `shell`
+     * entries, against the command. It is deliberately NOT also offered as a `tool` subject named
+     * `run_shell_command`, which would create a second allow path to every shell command carrying a
+     * different §3.2 `rate` default and a match that never saw the command it was approving.
+     *
+     * **Everything else splits by provenance**, which is the distinction §4.7.1 rests on: `tool` is
+     * the TRUSTED provenance, read verbatim, so an MCP tool arriving as one would be asking the
+     * trusted path for a third party's annotations — a gate any server can opt itself out of. Every
+     * MCP-namespaced name therefore becomes an `mcpTool` subject carrying the user's own `mcpServers`
+     * key, and one whose server cannot be resolved stays an `mcpTool` subject under an unnameable
+     * server rather than falling back to `tool` (see `approvalSubjectForToolName`).
      *
-     * When no human callback is wired (non-TTY exec run) and nothing is allow-listed, reject —
-     * never auto-approve. Non-shell tools (or any tool when the allow-list is disabled) skip the
-     * allow-list and go straight to the human callback / default-reject, preserving prior behaviour.
+     * **The host (§4.7.4)** is attached here, so the one subject the whole decision runs on carries
+     * it: the rule matcher treats a `host` on an entry as an additional exact-match condition, and a
+     * grant the menu writes records it. A call naming no single host has none, which fails toward a
+     * prompt at both sites.
+     *
+     * Widening which tools the gate actually suspends on is still [[EXT-30]]; this decides what a
+     * suspended call *is* whenever one arrives.
+     *
+     * @param hosts Every distinct host the call's arguments name ({@link toolCallHosts}).
+     */
+    approvalSubjectFor(tool, command, hosts) {
+        if (tool.name === SHELL_TOOL_NAME && command !== null)
+            return { kind: 'shell', command };
+        const subject = approvalSubjectForToolName(tool.name, this.configuredMcpServerKeys());
+        return hosts.length === 1 ? { ...subject, host: hosts[0] } : subject;
+    }
+    /**
+     * §4.7.5 — the user's own `mcpServers` keys, the only identity a server has here. Own enumerable
+     * keys via `Object.keys`, so nothing inherited can pose as a configured server.
+     */
+    configuredMcpServerKeys() {
+        const servers = this.config?.mcpServers;
+        return servers && typeof servers === 'object' ? Object.keys(servers) : [];
+    }
+    /**
+     * EXT-70 §4.7.1 — the source a `hint` entry reads a call's EFFECTIVE annotations through, built
+     * from the session's `approvals.mcp` block and the two declared-annotation lookups.
+     *
+     * Built per decision rather than cached at {@link init}, for two reasons that both bite: the
+     * agent registers its tools *inside* `agent.init()`, so an init-time snapshot would be empty; and
+     * a re-init re-resolves the tool list, which for MCP may hand back different declarations.
+     *
+     * The two lookups are deliberately different in kind. `builtIn` reads OUR OWN authored table and
+     * never the bound tool list — the bound list contains every server's tools, and a `builtIn`
+     * lookup over it would read a third party's declaration through the trusted-verbatim path.
+     * `mcp` reads what the servers declared, keyed by the registered tool name so the server key is
+     * never split apart and re-joined differently.
+     */
+    effectiveToolAnnotationSource() {
+        return createEffectiveToolAnnotationSource({
+            mcp: this.sessionApprovals.mcp,
+            declared: {
+                builtIn: builtInToolAnnotations,
+                mcp: mcpDeclaredAnnotationLookup(this.agent?.getDeclaredMcpToolAnnotations?.()),
+            },
+        });
+    }
+    /**
+     * Decide a single pending tool call. Spec order — **deny → bypass → escalate → allow → rater →
+     * human prompt**, with the hardline floor at exec time regardless. The two adjacencies that carry
+     * the design are that deny comes BEFORE `bypass` and escalate comes AFTER it:
+     *
+     * 1. **deny** (§3) — a declared entry or a runtime *always reject* grant is refused with no
+     *    prompt and no rating call. It is consulted FIRST, and it is the one
+     *    check that **still applies under `bypass`**: choosing `bypass` says *"stop asking me"*, not
+     *    *"forget what I told you never to do"*. A deny entry MAY match a compound command, because a
+     *    prohibition that catches something unresolvable errs in the direction that costs nothing.
+     * 2. **`bypass`** — the gate is off for this session; approve at scope `once`.
+     * 3. **escalate** (§3.2) — a declared entry always asks the human, whatever the rung would have
+     *    done, **including outranking the automatic grants of `manual` and `write`** and any allow
+     *    entry that also matched. It goes straight to the human with **no rating call**, and it never
+     *    enters the `auto` negotiation. It is **inert at `bypass`**, which is why it sits below
+     *    the rung check: the rung chosen for this session wins, and a stop that must survive `bypass`
+     *    is a deny entry and only that.
+     * 4. **allow** (§3, §3.2) — a declared entry or a grant the human made at an earlier prompt this
+     *    session (or persisted), matched against the whole normalized command and only when that
+     *    command statically resolves. An allow match settles the human's part: no prompt. Whether the rater
+     *    still reviews the call is the entry's own `rate` (§3.2) — honored at the rater rungs and
+     *    inert at the deterministic ones, so no entry can smuggle a model call into `manual` or
+     *    `write` — and a rated allow match is a TRIPWIRE, not a re-adjudication
+     *    ({@link mapAllowMatchedVerdictToAction}).
+     * 5. **auto-rater** (`assisted` / `auto` only) — `safe` approves, `destructive` and
+     *    `catastrophic` escalate, and `attack` HALTS the run ({@link AttackHaltError}). The other
+     *    three rungs consult no model at all. A command whose target the gate cannot statically
+     *    resolve is rated **exactly like any other** ([[EXT-81]]), with a neutral note in the rating
+     *    prompt naming the shape the parser saw. It used to skip the call and be refused straight
+     *    back to the model instead; §6.1's rule is that a deterministic layer fires only where it is
+     *    confident something is a threat, and a parser reporting it could not read a string has
+     *    detected nothing. At those same two rungs a **tool**
+     *    call is instead floored deterministically by §4.7.3's open-world rule
+     *    ({@link openWorldToolFloorReason} into {@link applyDestructiveFloor} — the one floor the
+     *    shell path also reaches): a call whose effective `openWorldHint` is true is `destructive`,
+     *    whatever its `readOnlyHint` says.
+     * 6. **human prompt** — the approval callback; when the human grants `session`/`always` scope,
+     *    **that command** is recorded as an `exact` entry (§3.1/§6 — the menu never widens), so the
+     *    same command stops re-prompting and a longer variant of it still asks.
+     *
+     * §6.2 — where no human can answer (CI, a one-shot run, a server), an escalation is **not** a
+     * rejection handed back to the model: it is an immediate non-zero exit
+     * ({@link NonInteractiveEscalationError}) carrying the command, the rating and its reason. No
+     * prompt, no waiting, and never a timeout into approval. Declaring commands in `approvals.allow`
+     * is the supported way to make a pipeline pass.
      *
      * Hardline catastrophic commands remain refused at exec time regardless of any approval here
      * (defense in depth in `GthDevToolkit.executeCommand`), so an allow-listed `rm -rf /` still
      * cannot run.
+     *
+     * **Step 0 is the rung.** The backends wire the interrupt over every tool ANY rung could gate,
+     * because the graph is built once and `/approvals <rung>` moves the rung under it for the rest of
+     * the session. So a call arriving here has not yet been judged against the rung in force: this is
+     * where that happens, on `sessionApprovals.rung`, which a mid-session switch has already updated.
+     * A call the live rung does not gate is approved on the spot — no rule matching, no rating, no
+     * prompt — which is what keeps `assisted`, `auto` and `bypass` behaving exactly as they did
+     * when the interrupt held the shell alone. It sits ABOVE the deny check for the same reason: an
+     * ungated call never reached this method at all before, so a deny entry could not fire on one, and
+     * a security fix for two rungs is not the place to change that. (The shell is gated at every rung
+     * whenever the shell gate is on, so §2.5's rule that the deny list survives `bypass` is untouched.)
      */
     async decideToolApproval(tool) {
+        // [[TUI-C27]] — the record is opened (and already in the log) BEFORE the decision runs, and
+        // filled in as it goes. Assembling it at the end would lose the calls most worth keeping: an
+        // `attack` verdict throws `AttackHaltError` out of the decision, so a halted run would carry no
+        // record of the rating that halted it — and an approval, which relays nothing to anyone, is
+        // exactly the branch that used to leave no trace at all.
+        const record = this.approvalCaptures.begin({
+            at: new Date().toISOString(),
+            tool: tool.name,
+            ...(typeof tool.args?.command === 'string' ? { command: tool.args.command } : {}),
+            rung: this.sessionApprovals.rung,
+            budget: this.negotiation.counters(),
+        });
+        const decision = await this.recordedDecision(tool, record);
+        // [[EXT-29]] §5.3 — **the reset, at the one site that sees every approval.** "A successful
+        // intervening tool call — the agent going away to gather information and returning better
+        // informed — resets [the count], because that is progress, not ping-pong." Every way a call can
+        // be let through arrives here: the rung not gating it, an allow entry, the §3.2 tripwire, a
+        // `safe` rating, the human saying yes. Wrapping is what makes that exhaustive — an approval
+        // added below cannot forget to reset, and the alternative (a call at each of the six `approve`
+        // returns) is a §5.3 hole that is invisible the day it opens.
+        //
+        // Nothing else resets: a `reject` (the negotiation's own rounds, and the §8 floor's refusal)
+        // must not, or the bound it is counted against could never be reached.
+        if (decision.type === 'approve')
+            this.negotiation.noteProgress();
+        return decision;
+    }
+    /**
+     * [[TUI-C27]] — {@link decideToolApprovalInner} with the record closed off on EVERY exit.
+     *
+     * The final action is written here rather than at each of the decision's many returns, because
+     * "what became of the call" is one fact with one source: what this method returns or throws. A
+     * per-return assignment is a list that a new branch joins without noticing, and the branch that
+     * would be forgotten is the one that ends the run.
+     */
+    async recordedDecision(tool, record) {
+        try {
+            const decision = await this.decideToolApprovalInner(tool, record);
+            record.action = decision.type === 'approve' ? 'approve' : 'reject';
+            if (decision.type === 'approve' && decision.scope)
+                record.scope = decision.scope;
+            return decision;
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            if (error instanceof AttackHaltError) {
+                record.action = 'halt';
+            }
+            else if (error instanceof NonInteractiveEscalationError) {
+                // §6.2 — there was nobody to ask, so the escalation ended the run instead of reaching one.
+                record.action = 'escalate';
+                record.humanAnswer = 'no-human';
+            }
+            else {
+                record.action = 'error';
+            }
+            record.error = error instanceof Error ? `${error.name}: ${error.message}` : String(error);
+            throw error;
+        }
+    }
+    /** The decision itself; {@link decideToolApproval} wraps it with §5.3's reset. */
+    async decideToolApprovalInner(tool, record) {
         const command = typeof tool.args?.command === 'string' ? tool.args.command : null;
-        const isShellCommand = tool.name === 'run_shell_command' && command !== null;
-        const allowlistApplies = isShellCommand && this.isShellAllowlistOn();
-        // EXT-12 — runtime session yolo (`/yolo`): when ON, auto-approve a gated shell command WITHOUT
-        // prompting, judging, or persisting. Scope `once` so nothing is written to the allow-list (the
-        // bypass is intentionally ephemeral and reversible). The hardline floor is NOT bypassed here —
-        // it is enforced at exec time in GthDevToolkit.executeCommand regardless of this decision, so a
-        // catastrophic command is still refused even under yolo.
-        if (isShellCommand && this.sessionYolo) {
-            return { type: 'approve', scope: 'once' };
-        }
-        // Auto-approve from the allow-list without prompting. The allow-list ALWAYS wins over the
-        // judge: a human-trusted prefix shouldn't pay for an LLM call on every variant.
-        if (allowlistApplies && this.isApprovedByAllowlist(command)) {
-            return { type: 'approve', scope: 'session' };
-        }
-        // EXT-10 — LLM-as-judge safety gate (default OFF). Runs BEFORE the human callback for a
-        // `run_shell_command` not already allow-listed: auto-approve clearly-safe (fatigue reducer),
-        // reject clearly-catastrophic (only when blockHigh), otherwise fall through to the human with
-        // the verdict attached. When disabled this is a no-op and behaviour is exactly EXT-9.
-        let safetyVerdict;
-        if (isShellCommand && command !== null && this.isShellJudgeOn()) {
-            const settings = getShellJudgeSettings(getEffectiveDevToolsConfig(this.config ?? undefined, this.command));
-            const verdict = await judgeShellCommand(command, this.config, {
-                home: env?.HOME,
-            });
-            const action = mapVerdictToAction(command, verdict, {
-                autoApproveLow: settings.autoApproveLow,
-                blockHigh: settings.blockHigh,
+        const isShellCommand = tool.name === SHELL_TOOL_NAME && command !== null;
+        const approvals = this.sessionApprovals;
+        // (0) Does the rung IN FORCE gate this tool at all? Same shared predicate the backends built the
+        // interrupt from, asked about this one call, so the wiring and the decision cannot disagree.
+        // Scope `once`, so nothing is written to any allow-list: this is not a grant, it is the absence
+        // of a gate.
+        const { gateShell } = resolveShellApprovalGate(this.config ?? undefined, this.command);
+        if (!isToolGatedAtRung({ toolName: tool.name, rung: approvals.rung, gateShell })) {
+            return this.stage(record, 'not-gated', { type: 'approve', scope: 'once' });
+        }
+        // [[TUI-C27]] — [[EXT-81]]'s surviving observable: what the gate's own parser made of the
+        // command, recorded whether or not a rating follows. Computed once here rather than at the
+        // rating site, so a call the floor or a list settles still says whether the command was one the
+        // parser could resolve.
+        if (isShellCommand && command !== null) {
+            const defect = describeAbstention(command);
+            if (defect)
+                record.parserUnresolved = defect;
+        }
+        // ONE subject and ONE annotation source per decision, shared by the rule matcher and the
+        // §4.7.3 floor below. Building a second source for the floor would let a `hint` entry and the
+        // floor read different effective values for the same call — the two-derivations-disagreeing
+        // failure `core/approvals/annotations.ts` exists to prevent.
+        // §4.7.4 — the hosts this call names, read ONCE. The subject carries the single host where
+        // there is exactly one; the sticky-grant decision needs the count as well, because "named no
+        // host" and "named several" are the same absent `host` on the subject and are not the same
+        // question for the menu.
+        const hosts = tool.name === SHELL_TOOL_NAME && command !== null ? [] : toolCallHosts(tool.args);
+        const subject = this.approvalSubjectFor(tool, command, hosts);
+        const annotationSource = this.effectiveToolAnnotationSource();
+        // ONE read of that source per decision as well, so the §4.7.4 invalidation below, the §4.7.3
+        // floor and the snapshot a grant records are all the same set. A shell subject has none — a
+        // command carries no tool annotations.
+        const effective = subject.kind === 'shell' ? undefined : annotationSource(subject);
+        // §4.7.4 — **before any rule is resolved**, so a grant the tool has since weakened out from
+        // under cannot auto-approve the very call that revealed the weakening.
+        if (subject.kind !== 'shell' && effective)
+            this.invalidateWeakenedGrants(subject, effective);
+        // The declared lists AND the runtime grant stores, resolved most-restrictive-wins in ONE pass
+        // through the ONE comparison engine, so author order and the order the lists were concatenated
+        // in cannot change the outcome — and a grant the menu wrote is compared exactly as a line the
+        // user typed into their config is.
+        const rule = resolveApprovalRules(subject, this.approvalRuleLists(), {
+            // EXT-70 §4.7.1 — a `hint` entry reads EFFECTIVE annotations, which is where per-server,
+            // per-hint trust is applied. Without this the matcher falls back to the fail-closed source,
+            // where no tool is ever read-only and a `hint` entry could only ever describe the default.
+            annotations: annotationSource,
+            onNotice: (notice) => this.statusUpdate(notice.level, notice.message),
+        });
+        // (1) Deny — before everything, including `bypass`.
+        if (rule?.action === 'deny') {
+            // [[TUI-C26]] §6 — the message names the refusal the user actually made. A deny entry now has
+            // two possible authors: a line in `approvals.deny`, and the escalation menu's *always reject*
+            // choice earlier in this session. Telling the model (and, through it, the user) to edit a
+            // config file that the second kind was never written to is the same class of wrongness as
+            // confirming a persistence that did not happen. The declared list is checked FIRST so an
+            // entry a user wrote is described as theirs even when the menu recorded the identical one.
+            const declared = this.sessionApprovals.deny.some((entry) => renderApprovalEntryObject(entry) === renderApprovalEntryObject(rule.entry));
+            const described = describeApprovalEntry(rule.entry);
+            record.ruleMatch = { action: 'deny', entry: described };
+            return this.stage(record, 'deny-list', {
+                type: 'reject',
+                message: declared
+                    ? `Refused: your deny list forbids this call (matched "${described}"). ` +
+                        'Remove the entry from approvals.deny if you want it to run.'
+                    : `Refused: the user chose to always refuse this earlier in this session (matched ` +
+                        `"${described}"). That refusal lasts until the session ends; ask the user if you ` +
+                        'believe it should be lifted.',
             });
-            if (action === 'auto-approve') {
-                // Scope `once`: judge approvals are NEVER persisted to the allow-list.
-                return { type: 'approve', scope: 'once' };
+        }
+        // (2) `bypass` (config or `/approvals bypass`): approve a gated shell command WITHOUT
+        // prompting or rating. Scope `once` so nothing is written to the allow-list (the bypass is
+        // intentionally ephemeral and reversible). The hardline floor is NOT bypassed here — it is
+        // enforced at exec time in GthDevToolkit.executeCommand regardless of this decision.
+        if (isShellCommand && approvals.rung === 'bypass') {
+            return this.stage(record, 'bypass', { type: 'approve', scope: 'once' });
+        }
+        // (2b) [[EXT-29]] §4.2/§8 — **the hardline floor, consulted BEFORE anything opens.** "If the
+        // deterministic floor matches, the command is refused at execution regardless of rating, rung,
+        // or approval — so it MUST NOT be negotiated and SHOULD NOT be escalated."
+        //
+        // **This is a second call site, not the exec-time one, and the promise is different.** The
+        // toolkit's check guarantees such a command never RUNS; it does nothing about what happens on
+        // the way there, so without this line `auto` spends three rating calls and a human dialog
+        // arguing about a fork bomb that was never going to run, and `manual` puts a wipe-the-disk
+        // command in front of a person who answers it — and "asking a human to approve something that
+        // is then refused anyway teaches them their answer does not count, which is worse than a flat
+        // refusal". The exec-time check stays exactly where it is: it is the guarantee, this is the
+        // courtesy of not wasting a decision on it.
+        //
+        // It sits above the allow branch because the floor is unappealable — an allow entry cannot buy
+        // past it — and below the deny check because a deny match refuses the same call for the user's
+        // own reason.
+        //
+        // **`checkHardline` is asked, not `catastrophic`.** They are different predicates and the
+        // difference is measured: EXT-60 recorded `chown -R /` as missing from the floor, so "the floor
+        // matched" and "the rater said catastrophic" name overlapping, non-identical sets. A
+        // `catastrophic` rating still escalates (§4.2 settled that deliberately); only a floor match
+        // refuses here.
+        //
+        // **A floor match refuses; it never halts, whichever of §8's two subsets matched.** The floor is
+        // a lexical test with no notion of direction or role, so it fires on ordinary work — the deploy
+        // authenticated by an identity file, the fetch that writes a credential INBOUND — and ending the
+        // session on one leaves a restart as the only recovery. The run-ending halt stays where a model
+        // has actually said the command is an attack (the rating path below): a floor match is a
+        // model-free assertion, and the model-free consequence is the floor's own refusal, reached
+        // earlier here than at exec and without spending a prompt on it.
+        //
+        // **Every rung that reaches this line, deliberately** — `assisted` and `auto`, and the two
+        // deterministic rungs alike (`bypass` returned above). §4.2 is a statement about the COMMAND,
+        // not about who was going to be asked about it: `assisted` gets the refusal without a prompt
+        // for the same reason `auto` gets it without a round, and `manual`/`write` for the same reason
+        // again. Those two are where the harm bites hardest, because they are the rungs a user picks in
+        // order to answer every call themselves — so they are the rungs whose answers a refusal after
+        // the fact teaches them not to trust.
+        if (isShellCommand && command !== null) {
+            const floor = checkHardline(command);
+            if (floor) {
+                // [[TUI-C27]] — **the archive names the matched pattern; the refusal below does not.**
+                // §8.1 ("the floor is never advertised") and [[CFG-31]] bind USER-FACING rung copy —
+                // text inviting someone to feel safe — and the resolution taken here is that a diagnostic
+                // archive a user opens about their own session is not that surface: "a floor matched"
+                // without saying which rule leaves nobody able to act on it. `buildHardlineRefusal` is
+                // untouched and still carries only the description.
+                record.hardline = { description: floor.description, pattern: floor.pattern };
+                const refusal = buildHardlineRefusal(command, floor);
+                // Visible, because the exec-time refusal is: a refusal the user never sees reads as the
+                // agent quietly deciding not to do what it was asked.
+                this.statusUpdate(StatusLevel.WARNING, `\n⛔ ${refusal}`);
+                // §7's moves are deliberately absent — see `buildHardlineRefusal`. Neither bound moves
+                // either: this refusal opens no round, so counting it would walk an unappealable refusal
+                // toward the human escalation §4.2 says it must not reach. It follows that a model spamming
+                // a floor-matching command is bounded only by the tool-loop guard and `recursionLimit`,
+                // which is the right place for "the model did something unproductive" to end and the wrong
+                // place for a fork bomb to acquire an audience.
+                return this.stage(record, 'hardline-floor', { type: 'reject', message: refusal });
             }
-            if (action === 'reject') {
-                return {
-                    type: 'reject',
-                    message: `Safety judge blocked the command: ${verdict.reason}`,
-                };
+        }
+        // (3) Escalate — §3.2 sends it straight to the human with no rating call, outranking any allow
+        // entry that also matched.
+        //
+        // The `bypass` term is deliberate and not redundant with the early return above. That return
+        // only covers a SHELL call, so without this term a non-shell subject would still carry an
+        // escalate match into the prompt at `bypass`, and §2.5's rule is about the rung, not about which
+        // tool asked. Non-shell subjects do reach this line — the deterministic rungs gate the write
+        // built-ins, MCP and custom tools — so the term is doing work rather than guarding a hypothesis.
+        const escalatedBy = rule?.action === 'escalate' && approvals.rung !== 'bypass'
+            ? describeApprovalEntry(rule.entry)
+            : undefined;
+        if (escalatedBy) {
+            record.ruleMatch = { action: 'escalate', entry: escalatedBy };
+            record.stage = 'escalate-entry';
+        }
+        // (4) Approve from the allow list without prompting. It ALWAYS wins over the rater — a
+        // human-trusted call shouldn't pay for an LLM call on every variant — but never over escalate.
+        const allowlistApplies = approvals.rung !== 'bypass' && escalatedBy === undefined;
+        let safetyVerdict;
+        if (allowlistApplies && rule?.action === 'allow') {
+            record.ruleMatch = {
+                action: 'allow',
+                entry: describeApprovalEntry(rule.entry),
+                rate: rule.rate === true,
+            };
+            // §3.2 — `rate` is honored at the rater rungs and INERT at the deterministic ones, so an
+            // entry can never smuggle a model call into `manual` or `write`. A tool subject is not
+            // rated either: the rater's first implementation covers the shell only (§4.3, [[EXT-30]]).
+            if (!rule.rate || !isRatedRung(approvals.rung) || !isShellCommand || command === null) {
+                return this.stage(record, 'allow-list', { type: 'approve', scope: 'session' });
+            }
+            // Attributed once, before the call, for the reason the rater path below is: the tripwire's
+            // own `attack` arm throws, and a second writer on the return would make this one unfalsifiable.
+            record.stage = 'allow-tripwire';
+            const verdict = await this.rateCommand(command, { allowMatched: true }, record);
+            const tripwire = mapAllowMatchedVerdictToAction(verdict);
+            if (tripwire.action === 'approve') {
+                return { type: 'approve', scope: 'session' };
+            }
+            if (tripwire.action === 'halt') {
+                // §3.2/§4.2 — `attack` halts exactly as it would have without the match. A standing human
+                // grant answers "may this run"; it does not answer "is this command's structure hostile".
+                //
+                // §6.1 — and it halts through the SAME seam as the rater's own path below, so an allow
+                // entry does not decide whether the banner appears. The entry has already been overruled by
+                // the time this line is reached; letting it also silence the one way out would make the
+                // recovery depend on a match the human cannot see from the banner.
+                return await this.haltOrRunAnyway(command, tripwire.verdict?.reason ?? '', record);
             }
-            // Escalate: carry the verdict to the human approval surface.
-            safetyVerdict = verdict;
+            // `catastrophic` — the one outcome the tripwire escalates. Fall through to the human.
+            safetyVerdict = tripwire.verdict;
         }
+        // (5) What the gate makes of the call itself, at the two rated rungs only. Skipped entirely
+        // for an escalate match (§3.2: the user pre-decided that a human answers, so a rating would
+        // decorate a mandatory prompt) and for a call the tripwire above already rated. The rung test
+        // is the SAME one `mapVerdictToAction` applies, so both arms below floor exactly where the
+        // shell does and nowhere else: `bypass` and the two deterministic rungs consult neither the
+        // rater nor a preflight, and at those rungs the human is asked regardless.
+        if (isRatedRung(approvals.rung) && escalatedBy === undefined && safetyVerdict === undefined) {
+            // **The SUBJECT is what splits the two arms, not a second reading of the tool name.**
+            // `approvalSubjectFor` returns `kind: 'shell'` under exactly the condition `isShellCommand`
+            // states, so branching on the discriminant says the same thing once instead of twice — and
+            // any future divergence in that function sends the call to the FLOOR (fail-closed) rather
+            // than silently past it. It is also what carries the command as a non-null string.
+            if (subject.kind === 'shell') {
+                // The auto-rater. `safe` is approved (the fatigue reducer), `destructive` and
+                // `catastrophic` fall through to the human with the verdict attached, and `attack` ends the
+                // run outright. §4.6's deterministic preflights are applied inside `mapVerdictToAction`,
+                // ahead of the `safe` check.
+                //
+                // **[[EXT-81]] — EVERY shell command reaches this call, including the ones the gate's own
+                // parser cannot resolve.** There used to be a branch above it that skipped the rating for a
+                // composed, substituting or redirecting command and refused the call instead. Two things
+                // followed from that skip, and both are gone with it: `attack` and `catastrophic` were
+                // UNREACHABLE for that entire class (nobody rated, so nobody could say worse than
+                // `destructive`), and the party that heard about it was the parser's, not the rater's — a
+                // component that has just announced it could not read a command is in no position to say
+                // how to rewrite it, and the rewrite it named turned `cd src && ls` into a no-op plus a
+                // listing of the wrong directory, both exit 0. The parser's finding is now a neutral note
+                // in the rating prompt (`buildRaterPrompt`) and nothing else.
+                // [[EXT-29]] §5.1 — the negotiation this rating is a round of. At `assisted` the context is
+                // empty and `negotiable` is false, so the whole call is byte-identical to what it was.
+                const negotiable = isNegotiatingRung(approvals.rung);
+                const justification = negotiable ? shellJustification(tool.args) : undefined;
+                const context = negotiable
+                    ? this.negotiation.contextFor(justification)
+                    : undefined;
+                // [[TUI-C27]] — attributed BEFORE the call, and ONCE. Before, because `attack` throws out
+                // of the decision below and a record left unattributed would say a halt came from nowhere.
+                // Once, because a second assignment on each `return` would make the first unfalsifiable:
+                // deleting either would leave the other still writing 'rater', and a fact with two writers
+                // is one no test can pin.
+                record.stage = 'rater';
+                const verdict = await this.rateCommand(subject.command, {
+                    allowMatched: false,
+                    negotiation: context,
+                    negotiable,
+                }, record);
+                const decision = mapVerdictToAction(subject.command, verdict, { rung: approvals.rung });
+                // [[TUI-C27]] — WHICH deterministic preflight fired, and whether it actually rewrote the
+                // rating. The two are separate facts: a preflight only ever RAISES, and only `safe` sits
+                // below the floor, so a finding on a `destructive` verdict is the floor AGREEING with the
+                // rater rather than overriding it — and attributing the decision to the floor in that case
+                // would be wrong. Recomputed from the same raw command `mapVerdictToAction` recomputes it
+                // from, through the same one function, so the two cannot disagree.
+                const preflight = preflightFloorFinding(subject.command);
+                if (preflight) {
+                    record.preflight = {
+                        ...preflight,
+                        rewroteRating: isBelowDestructiveFloor(verdict.outcome),
+                    };
+                }
+                if (decision.action === 'approve') {
+                    // Scope `once`: rater approvals are NEVER persisted to the allow-list.
+                    return { type: 'approve', scope: 'once' };
+                }
+                if (decision.action === 'halt') {
+                    // §4.2 — not a rejection the model can respond to. It ends the agent loop.
+                    //
+                    // **`neg-04d`: a negotiation already in flight ends here too**, mid-way and without a
+                    // further round. `attack` is exempt from the whole mechanism (§5.1), so the counter, the
+                    // transcript and the loop all stop together rather than the argument continuing around a
+                    // halt that only ended one call.
+                    //
+                    // The reset itself is defence in depth: the throw ends `processMessages`, and a later
+                    // turn would clear the negotiation on its own first line anyway. **No PRODUCTION reader
+                    // sees this state again — which is not the same as it being unobservable**, and the
+                    // difference decides whether the line is pinned. `neg-04d` asserts both halves through
+                    // the spec harness's private-state cast: the cleared transcript, and `sinceHuman` back at
+                    // zero. That second one is what distinguishes this call from `noteProgress()`, which
+                    // clears the transcript and the consecutive count and deliberately leaves the
+                    // reachability bound standing.
+                    this.negotiation.humanReached();
+                    // §6.1 — the banner, when an interactive surface wired one, and the halt otherwise. It
+                    // sits AFTER the reset above on purpose: a human is reached either way (that is what the
+                    // banner is), so the negotiation ends here whichever answer comes back, and neither
+                    // answer leaves a transcript behind for a later turn to argue from.
+                    return await this.haltOrRunAnyway(subject.command, decision.verdict?.reason ?? '', record);
+                }
+                if (decision.action === 'reject') {
+                    // §5 — `destructive` at `auto`. The round is recorded first, so the attempt being ruled
+                    // on is itself on the transcript the human sees (§5.6).
+                    const outcome = this.negotiation.recordRejection({
+                        command: subject.command,
+                        ...(justification ? { justification } : {}),
+                        outcome: decision.verdict?.outcome ?? 'destructive',
+                        reason: decision.verdict?.reason ?? '',
+                    });
+                    if (outcome === 'reject') {
+                        // §7 — the refusal PLUS the moves: re-call with a justification (the tool argument
+                        // exists for this), call a different command, or ask the user. Rendered through the
+                        // one builder the human's own "no" uses, differing only in who refused, so the model
+                        // never meets two shapes of the same event.
+                        return {
+                            type: 'reject',
+                            message: buildRejectionMessage({
+                                source: 'rater',
+                                toolName: tool.name,
+                                verdict: decision.verdict,
+                            }),
+                        };
+                    }
+                    // A bound is spent — the agent and the rater cannot agree, and that is a human's call.
+                    // Falls through to the escalation below, carrying this last round's verdict.
+                }
+                // Escalate: carry the verdict (the honest one — see mapVerdictToAction) to the human.
+                safetyVerdict = decision.verdict;
+            }
+            else {
+                // EXT-70 §4.7.2/§4.7.3 — a tool call whose EFFECTIVE `openWorldHint` is true is floored at
+                // `destructive`, through the SAME `applyDestructiveFloor` the shell path reaches via
+                // `mapVerdictToAction`. No rating call: §4.3's scope boundary keeps the rater on the shell
+                // until [[EXT-30]], and the floor is deterministic anyway — §4.6 states it as coming
+                // *before* any model call, so it does not wait for one.
+                //
+                // **This is the branch a malformed `run_shell_command` lands in**, and it is the one shape
+                // that reaches this floor under today's gate: a call with no `command` argument, or one
+                // that is not a string, has nothing to rate, so it presents as a `tool` subject — and
+                // `run_shell_command` carries no authored annotations, so its effective set is the
+                // fail-closed one and it floors. That is the right direction: a shell call whose command
+                // cannot even be read is not one anything can say something reassuring about.
+                //
+                // The annotations are the effective set (§4.7.1), read through the same source the `hint`
+                // matcher just used, so an untrusted server's `openWorldHint: false` has already collapsed
+                // to the fail-closed `true` and cannot buy its way past this.
+                //
+                // Reached only when no allow entry claimed the call: §4.6's fourth bullet makes an allow
+                // match lift this floor, and step (4) above has already returned in that case.
+                const toolFloor = openWorldToolFloorReason(effective);
+                if (toolFloor !== null)
+                    record.stage = 'tool-open-world-floor';
+                safetyVerdict = applyDestructiveFloor(safetyVerdict, toolFloor);
+            }
+        }
+        // [[EXT-29]] §6 — **the human is shown the whole negotiation, not the last attempt.** Snapshot
+        // it BEFORE the state is cleared, because "that the agent proposed the same command three times
+        // unchanged, against two rejections that each told it what to fix, is itself the most important
+        // thing on the screen". Empty for every escalation that had no negotiation — `catastrophic`
+        // (which §4.2 gives no rounds at all), a declared escalate entry, an unrated rung, a tool
+        // subject — so nothing renders a heading over an argument that never happened.
+        // [[TUI-C27]] — everything that reaches a person has an attribution by now EXCEPT the plainest
+        // case of all: a deterministic rung, no rule matched, no rating made. That is a decision the
+        // rung itself made, so it is named rather than left blank — a record with no stage reads as the
+        // recorder having failed, which is the opposite of what happened.
+        record.stage ??= 'unrated-rung';
+        const negotiationRounds = this.negotiation.transcript();
+        // §5.3 — **the count the human is given, and it is NOT the transcript's length.** An approved
+        // call clears the transcript, so the rounds above are the attempts since the last approval
+        // while the fact the reader is weighing is how hard the agent pushed since the last person:
+        // the agent that stashed between refusals had five refused attempts and three surviving
+        // rounds. Read HERE, one line before `humanReached()` spends it — after, it is zero.
+        const negotiationAttempts = this.negotiation.counters().rejectionsSinceHuman;
+        // Reaching a person ends the negotiation (§5.3) and is the ONE thing that clears the
+        // reachability bound: an escalation the human is about to answer is exactly the event that
+        // bound exists to make happen, so it is spent here rather than accumulated across it.
+        this.negotiation.humanReached();
         if (!this.toolApprovalCallback) {
-            // No interactive handler (e.g. non-TTY exec run): reject rather than auto-approve.
-            return {
-                type: 'reject',
-                message: 'Tool call rejected: no interactive approval handler available.',
-            };
+            // §6.2 — no one to ask. Exit non-zero with everything a person needs, rather than handing
+            // the model a rejection it would just work around. The transcript goes into the message
+            // because that message is the only thing anyone sees on this path.
+            throw new NonInteractiveEscalationError(command ?? tool.name, safetyVerdict?.outcome, safetyVerdict?.reason, escalatedBy, renderNegotiationTranscript(negotiationRounds, negotiationAttempts) ?? undefined);
         }
-        // Surface the judge's verdict to the human prompt (if the judge escalated) without mutating
-        // the original interrupt object the caller holds.
-        const pending = safetyVerdict ? { ...tool, safetyVerdict } : tool;
+        // §4.2 — **a `catastrophic` approval is NEVER sticky.** "The human may approve this one
+        // invocation, and only this one": no always-allow, and no session-scoped allow either. The
+        // surface withdraws the affordance ([[TUI-C26]] drops `always approve` from the menu for this
+        // outcome), but the allow-list WRITE is decided here, and §3 has the allow-list consulted
+        // *before* the rater — so one sticky grant would remove the command from rating permanently,
+        // and the next `terraform destroy` would never be rated at all. Clamping here means the policy
+        // does not depend on which surface asked, or on a surface that has not been built yet.
+        const catastrophic = safetyVerdict?.outcome === 'catastrophic';
+        // §6 — **the menu must display what it is about to store**, at the moment of the choice, on
+        // every surface. It is rendered from the very grant {@link recordApproval} will write, because a
+        // menu that describes a grant one way and stores it another is the drift this design cannot
+        // afford. Absent exactly where no sticky grant is available — a `catastrophic` outcome (§4.2
+        // withdraws the persistent grants for EVERY subject, not only the shell one), or a call nothing
+        // would remember — so the prompt never advertises a control that has already been withdrawn.
+        const grant = catastrophic ? undefined : this.stickyGrantFor(subject, effective, hosts);
+        const grantPreview = grant ? renderApprovalEntryObject(grant.entry) : undefined;
+        // §6 — the same grant in the words the menu's *always approve* control is written in, through
+        // the one-liner the §4.7.4 withdrawal notice also uses, so the two cannot describe one grant
+        // two ways. For a tool call this is where "the stored thing is the tool, not the arguments"
+        // becomes visible: it names the tool, its server and the host bound, and nothing else.
+        const grantSummary = grant ? describeApprovalEntry(grant.entry) : undefined;
+        // [[TUI-C26]] §6 — the deny half, computed SEPARATELY rather than read off the grant. The two
+        // are available under different conditions and `grant === undefined` is the wrong test for
+        // both: a command that does not statically resolve, and every `catastrophic` verdict, have no
+        // grant on offer and a perfectly good deny entry.
+        const denyEntry = this.denyEntryFor(subject);
+        const denyPreview = denyEntry ? renderApprovalEntryObject(denyEntry) : undefined;
+        const denySummary = denyEntry ? describeApprovalEntry(denyEntry) : undefined;
+        // Surface the rater's verdict, the escalate entry that fired as provenance (§3.2), and what
+        // each sticky choice would store (§6) — without mutating the original interrupt object the
+        // caller holds.
+        //
+        // **`denyPreview` belongs in this condition, and leaving it out is a silent hole rather than a
+        // tidiness question.** The most ordinary prompt in the system — a deterministic rung, no
+        // rating, no escalate entry, no negotiation, a command that does not statically resolve — has
+        // none of the other four, so without this term the interrupt would pass through unchanged and
+        // the *always reject* control would vanish from exactly the case it exists for.
+        //
+        // [[TUI-C67]] — **the subject is attached unconditionally**, outside every optional term above,
+        // because the terminal surfaces render the prompt's opening sentence from it and there is no
+        // call this question does not have an answer for. (The ACP server does not read it yet, and
+        // titles its permission request from its own classifier — [[TUI-C89]]. That narrows who
+        // consumes the field, never whether it has to be set.) It cannot be one more
+        // `...(x ? {x} : {})`:
+        // an `mcpTool` call whose server could not be attributed has neither a grant nor a deny entry
+        // (§4.7.4 / the entry grammar's non-empty `server`), so at an unrated rung with no escalate
+        // entry it is exactly the call that would fall through to a bare `tool` — and it is exactly
+        // the call the new header exists for.
+        const pending = {
+            ...tool,
+            subject,
+            ...(safetyVerdict ? { safetyVerdict } : {}),
+            ...(escalatedBy ? { escalatedBy } : {}),
+            ...(grantPreview ? { grantPreview } : {}),
+            ...(grantSummary ? { grantSummary } : {}),
+            ...(denyPreview ? { denyPreview } : {}),
+            ...(denySummary ? { denySummary } : {}),
+            ...(negotiationRounds.length > 0 ? { negotiationRounds, negotiationAttempts } : {}),
+        };
         const decision = await this.toolApprovalCallback(pending);
-        // Persist the human's scoped grant so future variants of the same operation skip the prompt.
-        if (decision.type === 'approve' && allowlistApplies && command) {
-            this.recordApproval(command, decision.scope ?? 'once');
+        // [[TUI-C27]] — a person was reached and answered. The STAGE stays whatever decided to ask
+        // them (a rating, an escalate entry, an unrated rung): "who decided to interrupt" and "what
+        // they said" are two different questions, and collapsing them into one field is what makes a
+        // dump unable to tell a rater escalation from a declared one.
+        record.humanAnswer = decision.type === 'approve' ? 'approve' : 'reject';
+        // Record the human's scoped grant so the same call stops re-prompting.
+        if (decision.type === 'approve' && grant) {
+            this.recordApproval(grant, decision.scope ?? 'once');
+        }
+        // §6 — and the mirror: *always reject* records the refusal, so the next identical call is
+        // refused by rule at step (1) without reaching a person. Scoped `session` and nothing else,
+        // because that is the only lifetime the store has (see {@link ToolRejectScope}).
+        if (decision.type === 'reject' && decision.scope === 'session' && denyEntry) {
+            this.recordDenial(denyEntry);
         }
         return decision;
     }
-    /** Whether the EXT-10 LLM-as-judge safety gate is enabled for the active command's config. */
-    isShellJudgeOn() {
-        if (!this.config)
-            return false;
-        const devTools = getEffectiveDevToolsConfig(this.config, this.command);
-        return isShellJudgeEnabled(devTools);
-    }
-    /** Whether the EXT-9 Tier-2 allow-list is enabled for the active command's devTools config. */
-    isShellAllowlistOn() {
-        const devTools = getEffectiveDevToolsConfig(this.config ?? undefined, this.command);
-        return isShellAllowlistEnabled(devTools);
+    /**
+     * [[TUI-C27]] — attribute the deciding stage and hand the decision straight back.
+     *
+     * A one-liner so a stage can be recorded ON the `return` that carries it rather than on the line
+     * above: two statements let an early return be added between them, and the record would then name
+     * a stage that did not decide.
+     */
+    stage(record, stage, decision) {
+        record.stage = stage;
+        return decision;
     }
     /**
-     * Lazily load (once per instance) the persisted `always` allow-list, unless persistence is
-     * disabled by config. Returns null when persistence is off so `always` grants behave as
-     * `session` (in-memory only).
+     * One rating call, with EXT-66's timeout reporting attached. Extracted so the §3.2 tripwire (a
+     * rated allow match) and the ordinary rater path cannot drift apart in WHAT they hand the rater —
+     * only in what they do with the answer.
      */
-    getPersistedAllowlist() {
-        if (this.persistedAllowlistLoaded)
-            return this.persistedAllowlist;
-        this.persistedAllowlistLoaded = true;
-        const devTools = getEffectiveDevToolsConfig(this.config ?? undefined, this.command);
-        if (!isShellAllowlistPersisted(devTools)) {
-            this.persistedAllowlist = null;
-            return null;
+    async rateCommand(command, opts, 
+    /** [[TUI-C27]] — the decision's record; the rating attaches itself to it at the send site. */
+    record) {
+        const approvals = this.sessionApprovals;
+        const verdict = await rateShellCommand(command, this.config, {
+            home: env?.HOME,
+            negotiation: opts.negotiation,
+            negotiable: opts.negotiable,
+            // [[TUI-C27]] — the sink fires BEFORE the model is invoked, with the prompt that is about to
+            // be sent, so the record carries what the rater was SHOWN rather than a later re-render of
+            // it. Assigning it here (rather than pushing a finished record afterwards) is what makes a
+            // hung, timed-out or halting call still leave the question behind.
+            onCapture: (capture) => {
+                record.rating = capture;
+            },
+            raterProfile: approvals.rater,
+            // The profile's model when one is configured; undefined lets rateShellCommand use the
+            // session model. `init` throws rather than leaving this undefined for a NAMED profile, so
+            // a configured profile can never silently degrade to the session model here.
+            model: this.raterModel,
+            // EXT-58 (§4.4) — the already-granted built-ins of the CURRENT rung, so a non-`safe`
+            // outcome can name one the model could call for free instead. Computed per rating rather
+            // than cached at init, because `/approvals <rung>` moves the rung mid-session and a stale
+            // list would offer a tool that is no longer granted.
+            grantedTools: this.getGrantedBuiltInTools(),
+            // EXT-66 — the user-owned budget for ONE rating call, `undefined` when unset so
+            // rateShellCommand applies RATER_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS. 30s is a hosted-model number and a
+            // local rater is knowably slower; without this a local `auto` session drifts toward
+            // escalating everything, which is the failure the rung exists to prevent.
+            timeoutMs: approvals.raterTimeoutMs,
+        });
+        // EXT-66 — a timeout is the gate giving up, not a judgement, and the two were previously
+        // indistinguishable in the action column. Say it once per occurrence: the only symptom
+        // otherwise is the gate becoming mysteriously more talkative, which reads as the rater
+        // working rather than as the rater never being heard from.
+        if (isRaterTimeout(verdict)) {
+            this.raterTimeouts += 1;
+            this.statusUpdate(StatusLevel.WARNING, `The command safety rater did not answer in time (${approvals.raterTimeoutMs ?? RATER_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS}ms), so this command ` +
+                // §3.2 — on an allow match the rating is a tripwire, so a timeout does not escalate: the
+                // human's standing grant still stands and the call runs. Saying "escalated" there would
+                // be simply false, and a notice that misreports the action it accompanies is worse than
+                // none.
+                (opts.allowMatched
+                    ? 'ran on its approvals.allow match alone, without the rating that entry asked for'
+                    : 'was escalated without being rated') +
+                (this.raterTimeouts > 1 ? ` — ${this.raterTimeouts} times this session` : '') +
+                '. Raise approvals.raterTimeoutMs if the rater is a local model.');
         }
+        return verdict;
+    }
+    /**
+     * EXT-58 (§4.3/§4.4) — the built-in tools already granted at the session's CURRENT rung, as
+     * names plus one-line locally-authored descriptions, for the rater prompt.
+     *
+     * Two filters make this safe to place outside the rater's fenced untrusted block:
+     * - the names come from what the agent actually registered
+     *   ({@link GthAgentInterface.getRegisteredToolNames}), so the rater can only ever offer a tool
+     *   this session has;
+     * - the descriptions come from core's own `BUILT_IN_TOOL_SUMMARIES` table, so no MCP, custom or
+     *   A2A tool's own (attacker-influenceable) description can reach the prompt.
+     *
+     * Empty when the agent does not expose its tools — the rater then gets no list and, per the
+     * prompt, offers nothing.
+     */
+    getGrantedBuiltInTools() {
+        const registered = this.agent?.getRegisteredToolNames?.() ?? [];
+        if (registered.length === 0)
+            return [];
+        // The LIVE gated set, from the SAME shared policy `decideToolApproval` decides on and the
+        // backends derive their interrupt from, so "granted" here means exactly what it means at
+        // tool-registration time (§4.5) and at the gate.
+        //
+        // EXT-80 makes this non-drift property load-bearing rather than incidental. At `manual` the
+        // write built-ins are gated, so they are NOT granted, and a summary still offering `write_file`
+        // there would tell the model a tool is free while the gate stops and asks for it — the rater
+        // suggesting the one thing guaranteed to interrupt the user. It is computed per rating from
+        // `sessionApprovals.rung`, so it follows a mid-session `/approvals` change — unlike the
+        // interrupt set, which is fixed when the graph is built and is rung-independent for exactly
+        // that reason.
+        const { gateShell } = resolveShellApprovalGate(this.config ?? undefined, this.command);
+        const gatedTools = resolveGatedToolNames({
+            rung: this.sessionApprovals.rung,
+            gateShell,
+            boundToolNames: registered,
+        });
+        return describeGrantedBuiltInTools(registered, this.sessionApprovals.rung, gatedTools);
+    }
+    /**
+     * §3/§3.3 — the three rule lists this session decides by: the DECLARED entries from config
+     * (read-only input) concatenated with the runtime grants the escalation menu made. One set of
+     * lists, handed to the one comparison engine; the concatenation cannot change any outcome
+     * because `resolveApprovalRules` consults every deny entry before any escalate entry and every
+     * escalate entry before any allow entry.
+     *
+     * The persisted store is loaded here rather than at {@link init} — lazily, once per instance, and
+     * NEVER at `bypass`, where the allow list is moot and a session that has switched the gate off
+     * should not be reading or rewriting the project's grant file.
+     */
+    approvalRuleLists() {
+        const approvals = this.sessionApprovals;
+        const persisted = approvals.rung === 'bypass' ? null : this.getPersistedGrants();
+        return {
+            deny: [...approvals.deny, ...this.denyGrants.entries()],
+            escalate: approvals.escalate,
+            allow: [...approvals.allow, ...this.sessionGrants.entries(), ...(persisted?.entries() ?? [])],
+        };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Lazily load (once per instance) the persisted `always` grant store.
+     *
+     * CFG-27 removed the `persistAllowlist` switch: §3 makes persistence a per-decision choice in
+     * the escalation menu (`approve` forgets, `always approve` persists), and a global "never
+     * persist" setting would only duplicate a keystroke. Returns null when the store cannot be
+     * loaded at all, in which case `always` grants degrade to `session` (in-memory only).
+     *
+     * The v1→v2 migration notice is routed to `statusUpdate` from here, which is the only place that
+     * knows how to reach the user.
+     */
+    getPersistedGrants() {
+        if (this.persistedGrantsLoaded)
+            return this.persistedGrants;
+        this.persistedGrantsLoaded = true;
         try {
             const filePath = getGslothConfigWritePath(SHELL_ALLOWLIST_FILE);
-            this.persistedAllowlist = new PersistedAllowlist(filePath);
+            this.persistedGrants = new PersistedApprovalGrants(filePath, {
+                onNotice: (notice) => this.statusUpdate(notice.level, notice.message),
+            });
         }
         catch (e) {
             // Path/IO failure → behave as no persisted store (still safe: just prompts more).
-            debugLogError('Loading persisted shell allow-list', e);
-            this.persistedAllowlist = null;
+            debugLogError('Loading persisted shell approvals', e);
+            this.persistedGrants = null;
         }
-        return this.persistedAllowlist;
+        return this.persistedGrants;
     }
-    /** Check the command against the session + persisted stores (with anti-widening re-validation). */
-    isApprovedByAllowlist(command) {
-        return matchesApproval(command, {
-            session: this.sessionAllowlist,
-            always: this.getPersistedAllowlist() ?? undefined,
-        });
+    /**
+     * §3.1/§4.7.4/§6 — **the grant a sticky choice would write for this call**, or `undefined` when
+     * none is on offer. The one place that question is answered, so the menu's *this is what will be
+     * stored* line (§6) and the store can never disagree.
+     *
+     * - **A shell call** records the command itself as an `exact` entry (§3.1) — never a prefix,
+     *   never a pattern. One that does not statically resolve (composition, substitution,
+     *   redirection) is not on offer: no allow entry of any matcher matches such a command, so the
+     *   entry would be inert, and an inert entry sitting in a list §3 requires to be inspectable
+     *   tells the user something is in force when nothing is.
+     * - **A tool call** records identity — the tool, its server, and the host where the call carries
+     *   one (§4.7.4, {@link toolGrantEntry}) — never arguments, which would produce a grant that
+     *   never matches twice. A call naming no host records the tool alone, which is §6's own example
+     *   (*always approve `mcp__jira__create_issue`*, where no host is involved); what keeps that from
+     *   being unbounded is §3.2's default that a tool entry is still `rate: true`, so the rater goes
+     *   on seeing every call's full arguments.
+     *
+     * Four cases have **no grant on offer at all**, each fail-closed:
+     *
+     * 1. **`bypass`** — the gate is off for this session and nothing is remembered from it.
+     * 2. **`run_shell_command` arriving as a tool subject.** That is what a shell call with no
+     *    readable `command` argument presents as, and it names no host, so without this it would take
+     *    the tool-only arm and write a `{"type":"tool","pattern":"run_shell_command"}` grant that
+     *    auto-approves every future call whose command cannot even be read. This exclusion is what
+     *    stops that, not a side effect of anything else, and it must survive [[EXT-30]] widening the
+     *    gate.
+     * 3. **A call naming more than one distinct host.** The grammar has no entry for it. `host` is a
+     *    single optional string on every tool arm of `approvalEntrySchema`, and every arm is a
+     *    `z.strictObject`, so recording the *set* is not a policy this code may choose — a `hosts`
+     *    array is an unrecognized-key error, and writing one would be a §3.1 grammar change. Of the
+     *    two entries that would parse, the host-bound one displays a bound the grant does not have,
+     *    which §6 forbids (the menu shows exactly what will be stored). And a grammar that did record
+     *    the set, matching only when all of it recurred, would fail §4.7.4's opening test anyway: a
+     *    tool whose host set varies per call would get a grant that never matches a second time — not
+     *    a narrower grant, the useless one §4.7.4 rejects by name.
+     *
+     *    **What this arm does not claim.** It is not a narrowing. A hostless entry imposes no host
+     *    condition at all (`resolveApprovalRules`), so the tool-only grant that any host-less call to
+     *    the same tool produces already auto-approves a multi-host one. Refusing here withholds a
+     *    grant; it does not close a hole, and the reason to keep it is the grammar above rather than
+     *    any breadth it prevents. Asserted, so this cannot drift back into a claim the system does not
+     *    support.
+     * 4. **An MCP call whose server could not be resolved** ({@link toolGrantEntry} returns `null`) —
+     *    a call nobody can attribute is not one anything can remember.
+     */
+    stickyGrantFor(subject, effective, hosts) {
+        if (this.sessionApprovals.rung === 'bypass')
+            return undefined;
+        if (subject.kind === 'shell') {
+            if (classifyCommand(subject.command, normalizeCommand) === null)
+                return undefined;
+            return { entry: shellGrantEntry(subject.command) };
+        }
+        if (subject.name === SHELL_TOOL_NAME)
+            return undefined;
+        // A snapshot is what invalidation compares against, so a grant with no readable effective set
+        // is a grant nothing could ever invalidate.
+        if (!effective)
+            return undefined;
+        if (hosts.length > 1)
+            return undefined;
+        const entry = toolGrantEntry(subject);
+        if (!entry)
+            return undefined;
+        // §4.7.4 — the effective set the human approved this tool AS. `annotationWeakenings` compares a
+        // later one against it, and the store copies it so the record is private to this grant.
+        return { entry, annotations: effective };
+    }
+    /**
+     * [[TUI-C26]] §6 — **the entry the escalation menu's *always reject* choice would record**, or
+     * `undefined` when the grammar cannot hold one. The deny mirror of {@link stickyGrantFor}, and a
+     * separate function rather than a flag on it, because the two answer different questions.
+     *
+     * **Nearly every reason an allow entry is withheld does not apply here.** §3 has one rule for
+     * this and it runs the other way — *undecidable is a non-match on the allow side and a match on
+     * the deny side* — so:
+     *
+     * - **A command that does not statically resolve gets an entry.** `stickyGrantFor` refuses one
+     *   because no allow entry of any matcher would ever match it, making the entry inert; a deny
+     *   entry for the same command is matched against the whole normalized command *and* every
+     *   segment a shell would run, so it is the opposite of inert.
+     * - **A `catastrophic` verdict changes nothing.** §4.2 withdraws the sticky grants there; it says
+     *   nothing about refusals, and refusing more is never the direction that needs withdrawing.
+     * - **`bypass` changes nothing either**, and that is a positive statement rather than a gap. Deny
+     *   is resolved at step (1) of {@link decideToolApprovalInner}, *before* the `bypass` return, so
+     *   a recorded refusal is in force at every rung — which is why this does not copy the allow
+     *   side's `bypass` guard.
+     * - **A call naming several hosts gets the host-less entry.** On the allow side that would show a
+     *   bound the grant does not have; here the entry covers every host of that tool, which is
+     *   broader than the call and safe in the direction breadth is safe. The menu shows exactly that
+     *   entry, so the breadth is on screen rather than inferred.
+     * - **`run_shell_command` arriving as a TOOL subject gets a tool entry** — a shell call whose
+     *   `command` argument cannot even be read. On the allow side that entry would auto-approve every
+     *   future unreadable shell call, which is why it is excluded there; as a refusal it stops the
+     *   shell tool for the session, and the dialog says so in the words the entry is written in.
+     *
+     * The one genuine exclusion is an **MCP call whose server could not be attributed**
+     * ({@link toolGrantEntry} returns `null`): the grammar's `server` cannot be the empty string, so
+     * the entry would be dropped by its own validator and the human would be told a refusal had been
+     * recorded when none was. A shell command that normalizes to nothing is excluded for the same
+     * reason — an empty `pattern` is not a legal entry.
+     */
+    denyEntryFor(subject) {
+        if (subject.kind === 'shell') {
+            const entry = shellGrantEntry(subject.command);
+            return entry.pattern.length > 0 ? entry : undefined;
+        }
+        return toolGrantEntry(subject) ?? undefined;
+    }
+    /**
+     * §6 — record the menu's *always reject* choice, for the life of this runner instance.
+     *
+     * It lands in the same store `approvals.deny` entries are matched from ({@link approvalRuleLists}
+     * concatenates the two), so a refusal the human made at the prompt and one they wrote in their
+     * config are one list to the matcher and one list to `/approvals`.
+     *
+     * **Session-lifetime, and there is nothing else to choose.** There is no persisted deny file;
+     * whether there should be is a question about a file users live with, not about this prompt. What
+     * the surfaces must not do is say otherwise — a confirmation promising a persistence that did not
+     * happen is §6's *offered and then refused* with the evidence hidden.
+     */
+    recordDenial(entry) {
+        this.denyGrants.add({ entry, grantedAt: new Date().toISOString(), scope: 'session' });
     }
     /**
-     * Record a human-granted approval at the given scope. `once` persists nothing. `session`
-     * adds the classified prefix to the in-memory store. `always` additionally persists it (or
-     * falls back to session-only when persistence is disabled).
+     * §3.1/§6 — record a human-granted approval at the given scope. `once` remembers nothing.
+     * `session` adds the entry to the in-memory store; `always` additionally persists it (falling
+     * back to session-only when the file cannot be written).
+     *
+     * What is recorded was decided by {@link stickyGrantFor} and shown to the human before they
+     * answered; this only stamps it with when and at what scope.
      */
-    recordApproval(command, scope) {
+    recordApproval(grant, scope) {
         if (scope === 'once')
             return;
-        const classification = classifyCommand(command, normalizeCommand);
-        if (!classification)
-            return; // unclassifiable (composition/redirection) → never remember.
-        this.sessionAllowlist.add(classification.prefix);
+        const grantScope = scope;
+        const record = {
+            ...grant,
+            grantedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+            scope: grantScope,
+        };
+        this.sessionGrants.add(record);
         if (scope === 'always') {
-            this.getPersistedAllowlist()?.add(classification.prefix);
+            this.getPersistedGrants()?.add(record);
+        }
+    }
+    /**
+     * §4.7.4 — **drop a tool grant the tool has since weakened out from under, with a notice naming
+     * the tool, the server and the hint that moved.**
+     *
+     * The human approved a tool *as annotated*; a tool that re-annotates itself into a more dangerous
+     * shape is a different proposition wearing the same name, so the grant is invalidated and the next
+     * call prompts again. Only a **trusted** server can produce a weakening — an untrusted server's
+     * effective set is the constant fail-closed default (§4.7.1) and cannot move — which is exactly
+     * where it matters, since the trusted server is the one whose rug-pull would otherwise ride an
+     * existing grant.
+     *
+     * **Scoped to the call being decided, never a sweep of the store.** A sweep would read every held
+     * grant against a source that can only answer for the tools registered right now, so a server that
+     * happened to be offline would read as having weakened everything it ever declared — and the
+     * grants would be deleted for it.
+     *
+     * **The scope is every grant that could auto-approve THIS call, which is at most two.** A grant
+     * with no `host` imposes no host condition, so it matches a call that carries one; looking up only
+     * the entry this call would grant (`host` included) would miss the tool-only grant that is about
+     * to auto-approve it, and the weakening would ride straight through — the exact failure §4.7.4
+     * exists to stop. The host-bound entry of a DIFFERENT host is deliberately not a candidate: it
+     * does not match this call either, so this call's annotations say nothing about it.
+     *
+     * **Only allow-side grants.** A weakening makes a tool more dangerous, so dropping an *always
+     * reject* over one would be the unsafe direction: the reason to withdraw an approval is the reason
+     * to keep a refusal.
+     */
+    invalidateWeakenedGrants(subject, effective) {
+        const candidates = [
+            toolGrantEntry(subject),
+            ...(subject.host !== undefined ? [toolGrantEntry({ ...subject, host: undefined })] : []),
+        ].filter((entry) => entry !== null);
+        if (candidates.length === 0)
+            return;
+        // Never at `bypass`, for the same reason `approvalRuleLists` does not read the file there: a
+        // session that has switched the gate off should not be rewriting the project's grant file.
+        const persisted = this.sessionApprovals.rung === 'bypass' ? null : this.getPersistedGrants();
+        for (const entry of candidates) {
+            // The session store wins, and a session grant with no snapshot therefore hides a persisted one
+            // that has one. Safe only because all three of these hold, and each is a premise a later change
+            // could break silently: (1) every tool grant this runner writes carries a snapshot — a call with
+            // no readable effective set is refused a grant at all ({@link stickyGrantFor}); (2) a `shell`
+            // subject, the one kind whose grant has no snapshot by design, never reaches this method; and
+            // (3) a persisted grant already in force auto-approves the call, so no prompt happens and no
+            // session grant is written over it. Break any one of them and this line starts skipping a
+            // weakening it should have caught — check both stores then, rather than the first that answers.
+            const held = this.sessionGrants.find(entry) ?? persisted?.find(entry);
+            if (!held?.annotations)
+                continue;
+            const weakened = annotationWeakenings(held.annotations, effective);
+            if (weakened.length === 0)
+                continue;
+            // Removed rather than skipped: the stores de-duplicate by entry identity, so a grant left in
+            // place would silently swallow the human's re-approval of the same tool.
+            this.sessionGrants.remove(entry);
+            persisted?.remove(entry);
+            this.statusUpdate(StatusLevel.WARNING, describeWeakenedGrant(entry, weakened, held.annotations, effective));
         }
     }
     /**
@@ -372,7 +1711,7 @@ export class GthAgentRunner {
      * leaves the graph suspended on a `humanInTheLoopMiddleware` interrupt rather than
      * completing. This is the event-stream counterpart to the readline path's
      * {@link resolveToolInterrupts}: it drains any pending interrupts through
-     * {@link decideToolApproval} (allow-list → judge → bridged human prompt), resumes via
+     * {@link decideToolApproval} (bypass → allow-list → rater → bridged human prompt), resumes via
      * `streamWithEventsResume({ decisions })`, and loops until the graph completes with no
      * pending interrupts — so the executed command's output renders into the TUI. Without
      * this the TUI silently finalized an empty turn (approval gate was dead code on the
@@ -384,6 +1723,14 @@ export class GthAgentRunner {
         }
         // GS2-16: start this turn's analytics tally from zero (the runner is reused across turns).
         this.resetRunStats();
+        // GS2-48 — record this turn's transcript tail for the crash handler.
+        updateCrashContext({ transcriptTail: messages.slice(-CRASH_TRANSCRIPT_TAIL_MESSAGES) });
+        // [[EXT-29]] §5 — a new user turn is the human being reached, so it ends any negotiation still
+        // standing from the previous one and clears BOTH bounds. The turn's own messages then enter
+        // §5.1's last-5 window, which is what makes "just the last two" reach the rater at all — the
+        // reply that narrows what the agent proposes is worthless to the gate if only the agent hears it.
+        this.negotiation.humanReached();
+        this.negotiation.noteUserMessages(humanMessageTexts(messages));
         debugLog('Processing messages (event stream)...');
         debugLogObject('Input Messages', messages);
         yield* this.agent.streamWithEvents(messages, this.runConfig, signal);
@@ -394,15 +1741,18 @@ export class GthAgentRunner {
      * resolve any tool-approval interrupts it suspended on, yielding the resumed run's typed
      * {@link AgentStreamEvent}s so the renderer (the Ink TUI) shows the executed command's
      * output. Each pending tool call is consulted via {@link decideToolApproval} — the SAME
-     * three-layer gate the readline path uses (allow-list auto-approve → EXT-10 judge →
+     * gate the readline path uses (bypass → allow-list approve → CFG-26 AI rater →
      * bridged human callback, defaulting to REJECT when no handler is wired) — and the
      * collected decisions are sent back via `streamWithEventsResume` as a LangChain HITL
      * resume (`{ decisions }`). Because a resumed run can suspend again on the next gated
      * tool call, this loops until the graph completes with no pending interrupts.
      *
      * No-ops (yields nothing) when the agent does not support interrupts
-     * (`getPendingToolInterrupts`/`streamWithEventsResume` absent), so the lean agent and
-     * non-HITL configs are unaffected. Aborts (`signal`) propagate through the resumed stream.
+     * (`getPendingToolInterrupts`/`streamWithEventsResume` absent) — that is the only exemption.
+     * As of EXT-52 BOTH backends gate `run_shell_command` and expose the interrupt surface, so the
+     * lean (default) agent is now exactly the agent this loop serves; only an agent implementation
+     * without those methods (e.g. a test double) skips it. Aborts (`signal`) propagate through the
+     * resumed stream.
      */
     async *resolveToolInterruptsWithEvents(signal) {
         const agent = this.agent;
@@ -477,6 +1827,10 @@ export class GthAgentRunner {
      * of any checkpointer-specific delete API, mirroring how `init()` mints the initial config.
      */
     resetThread() {
+        // [[EXT-29]] §5.1 — the negotiation goes with the thread, user messages included. The rater's
+        // last-5 window is conversation context; leaving it behind a `/clear` would quote the user's
+        // previous conversation into a rating made after they asked for it to be forgotten.
+        this.negotiation.clear();
         this.runConfig = getNewRunnableConfig();
         debugLogObject('Reset Runnable Config', this.runConfig);
     }