@gajae-code/ai 0.15.4 → 0.15.6

package/src/utils/oauth/index.ts

@@ -180,6 +180,11 @@ const builtInOAuthProviders: OAuthProviderInfo[] = [
 		name: "OpenCode Go",
 		available: true,
 	},
+	{
+		id: "commandcode-goat",
+		name: "Command Code GOAT",
+		available: true,
+	},
 	{
 		id: "openrouter",
 		name: "OpenRouter",
@@ -400,6 +405,7 @@ export async function refreshOAuthToken(
 		case "huggingface":
 		case "opencode-zen":
 		case "opencode-go":
+		case "commandcode-goat":
 		case "cerebras":
 		case "deepinfra":
 		case "fireworks":
@@ -534,10 +540,19 @@ export function resolveOAuthStorageProvider(provider: OAuthProviderId): OAuthPro
  * Get list of OAuth providers.
  */
 export function getOAuthProviders(): OAuthProviderInfo[] {
-	const customProviders = Array.from(customOAuthProviders.values(), provider => ({
-		id: provider.id,
-		name: provider.name,
-		available: true,
-	}));
+	const builtInIds = new Set(builtInOAuthProviders.map(provider => provider.id));
+	// A custom provider colliding with a built-in id (e.g. an external
+	// integration mistakenly registering "kiro") must never produce a
+	// duplicate list entry: AuthStorage.login()'s switch statement always
+	// dispatches a matched built-in `case` before falling through to the
+	// custom-provider registry, so the built-in always wins the route and
+	// the advertised list must reflect that, not double-list the id.
+	const customProviders = Array.from(customOAuthProviders.values())
+		.filter(provider => !builtInIds.has(provider.id))
+		.map(provider => ({
+			id: provider.id,
+			name: provider.name,
+			available: true,
+		}));
 	return [...builtInOAuthProviders, ...customProviders];
 }

package/src/utils/oauth/types.d.ts

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ export type OAuthCredentials = {
     email?: string;
     accountId?: string;
 };
-export type OAuthProvider = "kiro" | "alibaba-token-plan" | "anthropic" | "bizrouter" | "mara" | "cerebras" | "cloudflare-ai-gateway" | "cursor" | "deepseek" | "deepinfra" | "fireworks" | "firepass" | "fugu" | "github-copilot" | "google-gemini-cli" | "google-antigravity" | "gitlab-duo" | "huggingface" | "kimi-code" | "kilo" | "kagi" | "litellm" | "lm-studio" | "minimax-code" | "minimax-code-cn" | "moonshot" | "nvidia" | "nanogpt" | "ollama" | "ollama-cloud" | "openai-codex" | "openai-codex-device" | "opencode-go" | "opencode-zen" | "opengateway" | "openrouter" | "parallel" | "perplexity" | "qianfan" | "qwen-portal" | "sglang" | "synthetic" | "tavily" | "together" | "venice" | "vercel-ai-gateway" | "vllm" | "xai" | "glm-zcode" | "xiaomi" | "xiaomi-token-plan-sgp" | "xiaomi-token-plan-ams" | "xiaomi-token-plan-cn" | "zenmux" | "opencodex" | "zai";
+export type OAuthProvider = "kiro" | "alibaba-token-plan" | "anthropic" | "bizrouter" | "mara" | "cerebras" | "cloudflare-ai-gateway" | "cursor" | "deepseek" | "deepinfra" | "fireworks" | "firepass" | "fugu" | "github-copilot" | "google-gemini-cli" | "google-antigravity" | "gitlab-duo" | "huggingface" | "kimi-code" | "kilo" | "kagi" | "litellm" | "lm-studio" | "minimax-code" | "minimax-code-cn" | "moonshot" | "nvidia" | "nanogpt" | "ollama" | "ollama-cloud" | "openai-codex" | "openai-codex-device" | "opencode-go" | "opencode-zen" | "commandcode-goat" | "opengateway" | "openrouter" | "parallel" | "perplexity" | "qianfan" | "qwen-portal" | "sglang" | "synthetic" | "tavily" | "together" | "venice" | "vercel-ai-gateway" | "vllm" | "xai" | "glm-zcode" | "xiaomi" | "xiaomi-token-plan-sgp" | "xiaomi-token-plan-ams" | "xiaomi-token-plan-cn" | "zenmux" | "opencodex" | "zai";
 export type OAuthProviderId = OAuthProvider | (string & {});
 export type OAuthPrompt = {
     message: string;

package/src/utils/oauth/types.ts

@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ export type OAuthProvider =
 	| "openai-codex-device"
 	| "opencode-go"
 	| "opencode-zen"
+	| "commandcode-goat"
 	| "opengateway"
 	| "openrouter"
 	| "parallel"

package/src/utils/retry.d.ts

@@ -24,4 +24,6 @@ export declare function callWithCopilotModelRetry<T>(fn: () => Promise<T>, optio
     signal?: AbortSignal;
     retryBaseDelayMs?: number;
     fallbackManaged?: boolean;
+    requestMaxRetries?: number;
+    disableProviderRetries?: boolean;
 }): Promise<T>;

package/src/utils/retry.ts

@@ -34,9 +34,22 @@ const COPILOT_MODEL_RETRY_BASE_DELAY_MS = 400;
  */
 export async function callWithCopilotModelRetry<T>(
 	fn: () => Promise<T>,
-	options: { provider: string; signal?: AbortSignal; retryBaseDelayMs?: number; fallbackManaged?: boolean },
+	options: {
+		provider: string;
+		signal?: AbortSignal;
+		retryBaseDelayMs?: number;
+		fallbackManaged?: boolean;
+		requestMaxRetries?: number;
+		disableProviderRetries?: boolean;
+	},
 ): Promise<T> {
-	if (options.provider !== "github-copilot" || options.fallbackManaged) return fn();
+	if (
+		options.provider !== "github-copilot" ||
+		options.fallbackManaged ||
+		options.requestMaxRetries === 0 ||
+		options.disableProviderRetries
+	)
+		return fn();
 
 	let lastError: unknown;
 	const retryBaseDelayMs = options.retryBaseDelayMs ?? COPILOT_MODEL_RETRY_BASE_DELAY_MS;

package/src/utils/tool-call-healing.d.ts

@@ -22,10 +22,10 @@ export interface HealedToolCall {
     readonly name: string;
     readonly arguments: string;
     /**
-     * Whether the raw leaked payload spelled a printable non-ASCII character as a
-     * `\uXXXX` escape. Captured BEFORE the normalizing round-trip below, which
-     * decodes escapes into literal characters and would otherwise erase the only
-     * evidence that the text is unverifiable.
+     * Whether the raw leaked payload carried unsafe Unicode argument data.
+     * Captured before the normalizing round-trip below, which would otherwise
+     * erase malformed escape evidence. Valid `\uXXXX` spellings decode
+     * canonically and leave this false.
      */
     readonly escapedNonAsciiArguments: boolean;
     readonly escapedUnicodeArgumentEvidence?: UnicodeEscapeEvidence;

package/src/utils/tool-call-healing.ts

@@ -40,10 +40,10 @@ export interface HealedToolCall {
 	readonly name: string;
 	readonly arguments: string;
 	/**
-	 * Whether the raw leaked payload spelled a printable non-ASCII character as a
-	 * `\uXXXX` escape. Captured BEFORE the normalizing round-trip below, which
-	 * decodes escapes into literal characters and would otherwise erase the only
-	 * evidence that the text is unverifiable.
+	 * Whether the raw leaked payload carried unsafe Unicode argument data.
+	 * Captured before the normalizing round-trip below, which would otherwise
+	 * erase malformed escape evidence. Valid `\uXXXX` spellings decode
+	 * canonically and leave this false.
 	 */
 	readonly escapedNonAsciiArguments: boolean;
 	readonly escapedUnicodeArgumentEvidence?: UnicodeEscapeEvidence;