@fuzdev/fuz_app 0.64.0 → 0.66.0

package/dist/http/CLAUDE.md

@@ -9,41 +9,40 @@ guards live in `auth/` and consume these primitives. Routes and actions in
 other domains should do the same — extend, don't special-case.
 
 For the design rationale behind declarative routes, DEV-only output
-validation, the three-layer error-schema merge, and fire-and-forget effects,
-see ../../docs/architecture.md.
+validation, the three-layer error-schema merge, and fire-and-forget
+effects, see ../../docs/architecture.md.
 
 ## Module Map
 
-| File                 | Role                                                                                                   |
-| -------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
-| `route_spec.ts`      | `RouteSpec` + `apply_route_specs`, validation pipeline, transactions                                   |
-| `auth_shape.ts`      | Canonical `RouteAuth` Zod schema + cross-axis invariants + predicates                                  |
-| `error_schemas.ts`   | `ERROR_*` constants, standard error shapes, `derive_error_schemas`                                     |
-| `schema_helpers.ts`  | Shared Zod introspection (null/strict/surface/merge/middleware-applies)                                |
-| `middleware_spec.ts` | `MiddlewareSpec` interface                                                                             |
-| `surface.ts`         | `AppSurface`, `AppSurfaceSpec`, `generate_app_surface`, diagnostics                                    |
-| `surface_query.ts`   | Pure filters/groupings over `AppSurface`                                                               |
-| `proxy.ts`           | Trusted-proxy middleware, CIDR parsing, rightmost-first XFF resolution                                 |
-| `ip_canonical.ts`    | RFC 5952 IPv6 canonicalization + IPv4-mapped collapse; `IP_LITERAL_CHARS` regex                        |
-| `origin.ts`          | Origin allowlist middleware with wildcard patterns (Origin-only)                                       |
-| `jsonrpc.ts`         | JSON-RPC 2.0 envelope schemas (MCP superset), `JsonrpcErrorCode`, `_meta`                              |
-| `jsonrpc_errors.ts`  | `ThrownJsonrpcError`, `jsonrpc_errors` throwers, HTTP-status mappings                                  |
-| `jsonrpc_helpers.ts` | Message builders, type guards, input/result normalizers                                                |
-| `common_routes.ts`   | Health check + authenticated server-status + surface route specs                                       |
-| `db_routes.ts`       | Generic keeper-only table browser route specs (public schema)                                          |
-| `pending_effects.ts` | `emit_after_commit` + `flush_pending_effects` + `flush_post_commit_effects` + `EmitAfterCommitContext` |
+- `http/route_spec.ts` — `RouteSpec` + `apply_route_specs`, validation pipeline, transactions.
+- `http/auth_shape.ts` — canonical `RouteAuth` Zod schema + cross-axis invariants + predicates.
+- `http/error_schemas.ts` — `ERROR_*` constants, standard error shapes, `derive_error_schemas`.
+- `http/schema_helpers.ts` — shared Zod introspection (null/strict/surface/merge/middleware-applies).
+- `http/middleware_spec.ts` — `MiddlewareSpec` interface.
+- `http/surface.ts` — `AppSurface`, `AppSurfaceSpec`, `generate_app_surface`, diagnostics.
+- `http/surface_query.ts` — pure filters/groupings over `AppSurface`.
+- `http/proxy.ts` — trusted-proxy middleware, CIDR parsing, rightmost-first XFF resolution.
+- `http/ip_canonical.ts` — RFC 5952 IPv6 canonicalization + IPv4-mapped collapse; `IP_LITERAL_CHARS` regex.
+- `http/origin.ts` — origin allowlist middleware with wildcard patterns (Origin-only).
+- `http/jsonrpc.ts` — JSON-RPC 2.0 envelope schemas (MCP superset), `JsonrpcErrorCode`, `_meta`.
+- `http/jsonrpc_errors.ts` — `ThrownJsonrpcError`, `jsonrpc_errors` throwers, HTTP-status mappings.
+- `http/jsonrpc_helpers.ts` — message builders, type guards, input/result normalizers.
+- `http/common_routes.ts` — health check + authenticated server-status + surface route specs.
+- `http/db_routes.ts` — generic keeper-only table browser route specs (public schema).
+- `http/pending_effects.ts` — `emit_after_commit` + `flush_pending_effects` + `flush_post_commit_effects` + `EmitAfterCommitContext`.
 
 ## Route Spec System
 
-`RouteSpec` (in `route_spec.ts`) is the unit of the attack surface — routes
-are **data**, registered with Hono by `apply_route_specs`, and introspected
-by `generate_app_surface`. Same-shaped data, different consumers.
+`RouteSpec` (in `http/route_spec.ts`) is the unit of the attack surface —
+routes are **data**, registered with Hono by `apply_route_specs` and
+introspected by `generate_app_surface`. Same-shaped data, different
+consumers.
 
 ### `RouteSpec` fields
 
 - `method` — `'GET' | 'POST' | 'PUT' | 'DELETE' | 'PATCH'`
 - `path` — Hono path (supports `:param` segments)
-- `auth: RouteAuth` — flat record `{account, actor, roles?, credential_types?}` from `auth_shape.ts`. Each axis is `'none' | 'optional' | 'required'`. Same shape governs `ActionSpec.auth` (see `actions/CLAUDE.md`).
+- `auth: RouteAuth` — flat record `{account, actor, roles?, credential_types?}` from `http/auth_shape.ts`. Each axis is `'none' | 'optional' | 'required'`. Same shape governs `ActionSpec.auth` (see `actions/CLAUDE.md`).
 - `handler: RouteHandler` — `(c: Context, route: RouteContext) => Response | Promise<Response>`
 - `description` — free-text, surfaced in `AppSurface`
 - `params?: z.ZodObject` — strict-object schema for URL path params
@@ -70,25 +69,15 @@ interface RouteContext {
 }
 ```
 
-- **`route.db`** — use for the handler's main DB work. Wrapped in a transaction
-  when `transaction: true` (the default for non-GET); routes that opt out
-  (`transaction: false`, e.g. signup / bootstrap) get the pool here directly
-  and may call `route.db.transaction(...)` for their own scope.
-- **`route.pending_effects`** — direct push for eager fire-and-forget pool
-  writes (audit, session touch, api-token usage tracking). Push the in-flight
-  `Promise<void>` to register it for test-mode flushing.
-- **`route.post_commit_effects`** — do not push directly; reach for
-  `emit_after_commit` from `pending_effects.ts`. The helper pushes a
-  thunk that the flush middleware invokes after the handler returns,
-  closing the microtask-ordering window that an eager
-  `Promise.resolve().then(fn)` leaves open inside the wrapping
-  `db.transaction`.
+- **`route.db`** — handler's main DB work. Wrapped in a transaction when `transaction: true` (default for non-GET); routes that opt out (`transaction: false`, e.g. signup / bootstrap) get the pool here directly and may call `route.db.transaction(...)` for their own scope.
+- **`route.pending_effects`** — direct push for eager fire-and-forget pool writes (audit, session touch, api-token usage tracking).
+- **`route.post_commit_effects`** — do not push directly; reach for `emit_after_commit` from `http/pending_effects.ts`. The helper pushes a thunk that the flush middleware invokes after the handler returns, closing the microtask-ordering window that an eager `Promise.resolve().then(fn)` leaves open inside the wrapping `db.transaction`.
 
 Pool-level fire-and-forget writes (audit logs, etc.) run through the bound
-`AppDeps.audit` capability — see `auth/CLAUDE.md` §Deps. Handlers that
-need rollback-resilient writes call `deps.audit.emit(route, input)`, which
-captures the pool inside the bound emitter so the row lands even when
-the handler's transaction rolls back.
+`AppDeps.audit` capability — see `auth/CLAUDE.md` §AppDeps split. Handlers
+that need rollback-resilient writes call `deps.audit.emit(route, input)`,
+which captures the pool inside the bound emitter so the row lands even
+when the handler's transaction rolls back.
 
 ### Declarative transactions
 
@@ -105,74 +94,30 @@ wrapper). See `auth/signup_routes.ts`.
 
 `apply_route_specs` assembles the following middleware chain per spec:
 
-1. **Params validation** — `spec.params` → `validated_params` context
-   var; mismatch returns 400 `ERROR_INVALID_ROUTE_PARAMS` with Zod
-   `issues`
-2. **Query validation** — `spec.query` → `validated_query`; mismatch
-   returns 400 `ERROR_INVALID_QUERY_PARAMS`
-3. **Pre-validation auth guards** — `require_auth` (401
-   `ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED`) when `auth.account === 'required'`
-   or `auth.actor === 'required'`. Fires before any body parsing so
-   unauthenticated callers never see route-shape information from
-   input parse failures. The `AuthGuardResolver` (e.g.
-   `fuz_auth_guard_resolver` from `auth/auth_guard_resolver.ts`) returns
-   this set as `pre_validation: Array<MiddlewareHandler>`.
-4. **Input validation** — JSON body parsed + validated; mismatch returns
-   400 `ERROR_INVALID_JSON_BODY` (not JSON) or `ERROR_INVALID_REQUEST_BODY`
-   (schema failure with `issues`). Skipped on GET and `z.null()` inputs.
-   The validated input lands on `c.var.validated_input` so the
-   authorization phase reads `acting` as a typed Zod field.
-5. **Authorization phase** — when `spec.auth.actor !== 'none'`,
-   resolves the acting actor against `c.var.account_id` (set by the
-   auth middleware) plus `validated_input.acting` (or
-   `validated_query.acting` for GET routes), builds `RequestContext`
-   via `build_request_context`, and sets `REQUEST_CONTEXT_KEY`. When
-   `auth.account !== 'none' && auth.actor === 'none'`, an account-only
-   context is built. Resolution failures return 400
-   `ERROR_ACTOR_REQUIRED` (with `available[]`) or
-   `ERROR_ACTOR_NOT_ON_ACCOUNT` (or 500 `ERROR_NO_ACTORS_ON_ACCOUNT`
-   on signup-invariant violation, 500 `ERROR_ACCOUNT_VANISHED` on
-   torn account/actor reads after a successful resolve). Public
-   routes (`account: 'none' && actor: 'none'`) skip this phase
-   entirely.
-6. **Post-authorization auth guards** — `require_credential_types(types)`
-   (403 `ERROR_CREDENTIAL_TYPE_REQUIRED` with `required_credential_types: ReadonlyArray<string>`)
-   fires first when `auth.credential_types?.length`; `require_role(roles)` (403
-   `ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS` with `required_roles: ReadonlyArray<string>`)
-   fires next when `auth.roles?.length`. Both read
-   `REQUEST_CONTEXT_KEY` populated by step 5. Multi-role specs admit
-   any-of via `has_any_scoped_role(ctx, roles, null)`.
-7. **Handler** — wrapped in transaction when `use_transaction` (see
-   above), receives `RouteContext`
+1. **Params validation** — `spec.params` → `validated_params` context var; mismatch returns 400 `ERROR_INVALID_ROUTE_PARAMS` with Zod `issues`
+2. **Query validation** — `spec.query` → `validated_query`; mismatch returns 400 `ERROR_INVALID_QUERY_PARAMS`
+3. **Pre-validation auth guards** — `require_auth` (401 `ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED`) when `auth.account === 'required'` or `auth.actor === 'required'`. Fires before any body parsing so unauthenticated callers never see route-shape information from input parse failures. The `AuthGuardResolver` (e.g. `fuz_auth_guard_resolver` from `auth/auth_guard_resolver.ts`) returns this set as `pre_validation: Array<MiddlewareHandler>`.
+4. **Input validation** — JSON body parsed + validated; mismatch returns 400 `ERROR_INVALID_JSON_BODY` (not JSON) or `ERROR_INVALID_REQUEST_BODY` (schema failure with `issues`). Skipped on GET and `z.null()` inputs. The validated input lands on `c.var.validated_input` so the authorization phase reads `acting` as a typed Zod field.
+5. **Authorization phase** — when `spec.auth.actor !== 'none'`, resolves the acting actor against `c.var.account_id` (set by the auth middleware) plus `validated_input.acting` (or `validated_query.acting` for GET routes), builds `RequestContext` via `build_request_context`, and sets `REQUEST_CONTEXT_KEY`. When `auth.account !== 'none' && auth.actor === 'none'`, an account-only context is built. Resolution failures return 400 `ERROR_ACTOR_REQUIRED` (with `available[]`) or `ERROR_ACTOR_NOT_ON_ACCOUNT` (or 500 `ERROR_NO_ACTORS_ON_ACCOUNT` on signup-invariant violation, 500 `ERROR_ACCOUNT_VANISHED` on torn account/actor reads after a successful resolve). Public routes (`account: 'none' && actor: 'none'`) skip this phase entirely.
+6. **Post-authorization auth guards** — `require_credential_types(types)` (403 `ERROR_CREDENTIAL_TYPE_REQUIRED` with `required_credential_types: ReadonlyArray<string>`) fires first when `auth.credential_types?.length`; `require_role(roles)` (403 `ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS` with `required_roles: ReadonlyArray<string>`) fires next when `auth.roles?.length`. Both read `REQUEST_CONTEXT_KEY` populated by step 5. Multi-role specs admit any-of via `has_any_scoped_role(ctx, roles, null)`.
+7. **Handler** — wrapped in transaction when `use_transaction` (see above), receives `RouteContext`
 8. **DEV-only output + error validation** — wraps the handler (see below)
-9. **Error catch** — catches `ThrownJsonrpcError` → maps to HTTP status +
-   the flat REST `ApiError` body (`{error: <reason>, message?, ...rest_data}`);
-   catches generic `Error` → 500 `{error: 'internal_error', message?}`
-   (message only included in DEV). The reason string comes from
-   `err.data.reason` when set (consumer-supplied canonical reason
-   override) or from `jsonrpc_error_code_to_name(err.code)` (e.g.
-   `-32003 → 'not_found'`). The flat shape matches what middleware
-   and direct handlers emit (`c.json({error: ERROR_FOO}, status)`,
-   `c.json(failure.body, status)` from the dispatcher's authorization
-   phase) — REST callers see one envelope across every emit site, while
-   the JSON-RPC dispatcher keeps its own `{jsonrpc, id, error: {code,
-message, data}}` envelope on the RPC mount
-
-Ordering: **401 → 400 → 403 → handler**. Mirrors the RPC dispatcher
-(`actions/action_rpc.ts`) so HTTP RPC and REST fail with the same
-priority. The alternative (403-before-400) was rejected because
-defense-in-depth via attack-surface obscurity is illusory when the
-surface is published in `library.json` codegen anyway. The trade-off
-is that an authenticated-but-unauthorized caller can distinguish 400
-from 403.
+9. **Error catch** — catches `ThrownJsonrpcError` → maps to HTTP status + the flat REST `ApiError` body (`{error: <reason>, message?, ...rest_data}`); catches generic `Error` → 500 `{error: 'internal_error', message?}` (message only in DEV). The reason string comes from `err.data.reason` when set (consumer-supplied canonical reason override) or from `jsonrpc_error_code_to_name(err.code)` (e.g. `-32003 → 'not_found'`). The flat shape matches what middleware and direct handlers emit — REST callers see one envelope across every emit site, while the JSON-RPC dispatcher keeps its own `{jsonrpc, id, error: {code, message, data}}` envelope on the RPC mount.
+
+**Ordering: 401 → 400 → 403 → handler.** Mirrors the RPC dispatcher
+(`actions/action_rpc.ts`) so HTTP RPC and REST fail with the same priority.
+The alternative (403-before-400) was rejected because defense-in-depth via
+attack-surface obscurity is illusory when the surface is published in
+`library.json` codegen anyway. The trade-off is that an
+authenticated-but-unauthorized caller can distinguish 400 from 403.
 
 Duplicate `method path` pairs throw at registration.
 
 Validated values are accessed via `get_route_input(c, schema)`,
 `get_route_params(c, schema)`, `get_route_query(c, schema)` — pass the
-matching Zod schema and the return type infers as `z.infer<typeof
-schema>`. Each helper also has a `<T>(c)` overload (no schema arg) for
-callers who don't have the schema in scope.
+matching Zod schema and the return type infers as `z.infer<typeof schema>`.
+Each helper has a `<T>(c)` overload (no schema arg) for callers without the
+schema in scope.
 
 ### DEV-only output + error validation
 
@@ -182,77 +127,56 @@ are the contract with external callers.
 **Output and error schemas are validated DEV-only** via `DEV` from
 `esm-env`. `wrap_output_validation`:
 
-- Skips streaming responses (non-`application/json` Content-Type) so SSE
-  doesn't hang on `.json()`
+- Skips streaming responses (non-`application/json` Content-Type) so SSE doesn't hang on `.json()`
 - On 2xx JSON: validates body against `spec.output`
-- On non-2xx JSON: validates body against the merged error schema for
-  that HTTP status
-- **Logs on mismatch, returns the response unchanged** — never throws,
-  never mutates the body
+- On non-2xx JSON: validates body against the merged error schema for that HTTP status
+- **Logs on mismatch, returns the response unchanged** — never throws, never mutates the body
 
-The production behavior short-circuits to the unwrapped handler — no
-parse work on the hot path. Uniform across all three action-handler
-surfaces (REST, RPC, WS); see ../../docs/architecture.md §DEV-only
-Output Validation.
+Production short-circuits to the unwrapped handler — no parse work on the
+hot path. Uniform across all three action-handler surfaces (REST, RPC,
+WS); see ../../docs/architecture.md §DEV-only Output Validation.
 
 ### Helpers
 
-- `apply_middleware_specs(app, specs)` — registers middleware specs on
-  Hono by `{name, path, handler}`
-- `prefix_route_specs(prefix, specs)` — prepends a path prefix to every
-  spec; `/` collapses to the bare prefix
+- `apply_middleware_specs(app, specs)` — registers middleware specs on Hono by `{name, path, handler}`
+- `prefix_route_specs(prefix, specs)` — prepends a path prefix to every spec; `/` collapses to the bare prefix
 
 ## Error Schemas
 
-`error_schemas.ts` is the **declarative** error surface:
+`http/error_schemas.ts` is the **declarative** error surface:
 
-- `ERROR_*` `snake_case` string constants — single source of truth; use
-  `.literal(ERROR_*)` in Zod schemas and inline checks in handlers
-- `ApiError`, `ValidationError`, `PermissionError`,
-  `CredentialTypeRequiredError`, `RateLimitError`, `PayloadTooLargeError`,
-  `ForeignKeyError` — standard shapes
+- `ERROR_*` `snake_case` string constants — single source of truth; use `.literal(ERROR_*)` in Zod schemas and inline checks in handlers
+- `ApiError`, `ValidationError`, `PermissionError`, `CredentialTypeRequiredError`, `RateLimitError`, `PayloadTooLargeError`, `ForeignKeyError` — standard shapes
 - `RouteErrorSchemas = Partial<Record<number, z.ZodType>>`
 - `RateLimitKey = 'ip' | 'account' | 'both'`
 
 All standard shapes use `z.looseObject` — intentional because multiple
 producers (middleware + handler) can emit different extra fields at the
 same status code. The `error` string literal is the contract; extra keys
-(`required_roles`, `required_credential_types`, `retry_after`, `detail`)
-are diagnostic.
+(`required_roles`, `required_credential_types`, `retry_after`, `detail`) are diagnostic.
 
-Pair every schema with the `z.infer` type export (`export type ApiError = z.infer<typeof ApiError>`).
+Pair every schema with the `z.infer` type export.
 
 ### Three-layer error-schema merge
 
-`merge_error_schemas(spec, middleware_errors?)` (in `schema_helpers.ts`)
+`merge_error_schemas(spec, middleware_errors?)` (in `http/schema_helpers.ts`)
 merges three layers, later overrides earlier at the same status code:
 
 1. **Derived** — from `derive_error_schemas({auth, has_input?, has_params?, has_query?, rate_limit?})`:
    - `has_input || has_params || has_query` → 400 `ValidationError`
    - `auth.account === 'required'` or `auth.actor === 'required'` → 401 `ApiError`
-   - `auth.roles?.length` → 403 `PermissionError` (carries `required_roles: ReadonlyArray<string>`)
-   - `auth.credential_types?.length` → 403 `CredentialTypeRequiredError`
-     (carries `required_credential_types: ReadonlyArray<string>` echoing
-     the spec's allowlist — symmetric with `PermissionError`'s
-     `required_roles`; literal is `ERROR_CREDENTIAL_TYPE_REQUIRED`; both
-     gates set yields a `z.union([PermissionError, CredentialTypeRequiredError])`)
+   - `auth.roles?.length` → 403 `PermissionError` (carries `required_roles`)
+   - `auth.credential_types?.length` → 403 `CredentialTypeRequiredError` (carries `required_credential_types`; both gates set yields `z.union([PermissionError, CredentialTypeRequiredError])`)
    - `rate_limit` → 429 `RateLimitError`
-   - `auth.actor !== 'none'` → widens 400 to a union with `ActorRequiredError` /
-     `ActorNotOnAccountError` and adds 500 union of `NoActorsOnAccountError`
-     / `AccountVanishedError`. Mirrors what the dispatcher's authorization
-     phase actually emits on routes whose input declares `acting?: ActingActor`
-     (per registry-time invariant 2) — so DEV-mode error-schema validation in
-     `wrap_output_validation` doesn't reject the auth phase's body.
-2. **Middleware** — from `MiddlewareSpec.errors` that apply to the route's
-   path (via `middleware_applies`)
+   - `auth.actor !== 'none'` → widens 400 to a union with `ActorRequiredError` / `ActorNotOnAccountError` and adds 500 union of `NoActorsOnAccountError` / `AccountVanishedError`. Mirrors what the dispatcher's authorization phase actually emits on routes whose input declares `acting?: ActingActor` (per registry-time invariant 2) — so DEV-mode error-schema validation doesn't reject the auth phase's body.
+2. **Middleware** — from `MiddlewareSpec.errors` that apply to the route's path (via `middleware_applies`)
 3. **Explicit** — `RouteSpec.errors` — always wins
 
 Routes typically only need `errors` for handler-specific codes (404, 409, 422).
 
-Actor-failure folding reads `spec.auth.actor !== 'none'` directly —
-per registry-time invariant 2 (`actor !== 'none' ⟺ input declares
-acting?: ActingActor`), the auth-shape axis is the single source of
-truth.
+Actor-failure folding reads `spec.auth.actor !== 'none'` directly — per
+registry-time invariant 2 (`actor !== 'none' ⟺ input declares acting?: ActingActor`),
+the auth-shape axis is the single source of truth.
 
 **Framework-emitted vs consumer-authored.** The error-schema derivation
 above is sound because the framework authors the errors at fixed
@@ -262,104 +186,70 @@ middleware sites — 401 from `require_auth`, 400 from
 documents the framework's own emissions; consumers tighten via
 `RouteSpec.errors` when their handler narrows the surface.
 
-The same auto-derivation pattern is **not** appropriate for consumer-
-authored inputs (or handler outputs). A consumer's spec declares the
-exact `acting?: ActingActor` slot, and the framework reads it back via
+The same auto-derivation pattern is **not** appropriate for
+consumer-authored inputs (or handler outputs). A consumer's spec declares
+the exact `acting?: ActingActor` slot, and the framework reads it back via
 reference-equality to drive the authorization phase — auto-extending
-schemas at registration time would obscure the source of truth ("did
-the spec declare this, or did the framework graft it on?") and quietly
-shadow consumer fields named `acting` that aren't the canonical
-`ActingActor`. The asymmetry is the design rule: derive what the
-framework emits, never what the consumer authors. The keeper
-`db_routes` bug (an early consumer registration failure caught by
-invariant 2's throw) was the empirical confirmation.
+schemas at registration time would obscure the source of truth ("did the
+spec declare this, or did the framework graft it on?") and quietly shadow
+consumer fields named `acting` that aren't the canonical `ActingActor`.
+The asymmetry is the design rule: derive what the framework emits, never
+what the consumer authors. The keeper `db_routes` bug (an early consumer
+registration failure caught by invariant 2's throw) was the empirical
+confirmation.
 
 ### `ERROR_*` constants by category
 
-- **Validation**: `ERROR_INVALID_REQUEST_BODY`, `ERROR_INVALID_JSON_BODY`,
-  `ERROR_INVALID_ROUTE_PARAMS`, `ERROR_INVALID_QUERY_PARAMS`
-- **Auth**: `ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED`, `ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS`,
-  `ERROR_CREDENTIAL_TYPE_REQUIRED`, `ERROR_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED`,
-  `ERROR_INVALID_CREDENTIALS`, `ERROR_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE`
-- **Origin + bearer**: `ERROR_FORBIDDEN_ORIGIN`, `ERROR_FORBIDDEN_REFERER` (retained for consumer compat; no longer emitted),
-  `ERROR_BEARER_REJECTED_BROWSER`, `ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN`, `ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND`
-- **Keeper/daemon**: `ERROR_INVALID_DAEMON_TOKEN`,
-  `ERROR_KEEPER_ACCOUNT_NOT_CONFIGURED`, `ERROR_KEEPER_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND`
-- **Bootstrap**: `ERROR_ALREADY_BOOTSTRAPPED`, `ERROR_TOKEN_FILE_MISSING`,
-  `ERROR_BOOTSTRAP_NOT_CONFIGURED`
-- **Signup/invites**: `ERROR_NO_MATCHING_INVITE`, `ERROR_SIGNUP_CONFLICT`,
-  `ERROR_INVITE_NOT_FOUND`,
-  `ERROR_INVITE_DUPLICATE`, `ERROR_INVITE_ACCOUNT_EXISTS_USERNAME`,
-  `ERROR_INVITE_ACCOUNT_EXISTS_EMAIL`
-- **Admin**: `ERROR_ROLE_NOT_WEB_GRANTABLE`, `ERROR_ROLE_GRANT_NOT_FOUND`,
-  `ERROR_INVALID_EVENT_TYPE`
-- **DB browser**: `ERROR_FOREIGN_KEY_VIOLATION`, `ERROR_TABLE_NOT_FOUND`,
-  `ERROR_TABLE_NO_PRIMARY_KEY`, `ERROR_ROW_NOT_FOUND`
+- **Validation**: `ERROR_INVALID_REQUEST_BODY`, `ERROR_INVALID_JSON_BODY`, `ERROR_INVALID_ROUTE_PARAMS`, `ERROR_INVALID_QUERY_PARAMS`
+- **Auth**: `ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED`, `ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS`, `ERROR_CREDENTIAL_TYPE_REQUIRED`, `ERROR_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED`, `ERROR_INVALID_CREDENTIALS`, `ERROR_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE`
+- **Origin + bearer**: `ERROR_FORBIDDEN_ORIGIN`, `ERROR_BEARER_REJECTED_BROWSER`, `ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN`, `ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND`
+- **Keeper/daemon**: `ERROR_INVALID_DAEMON_TOKEN`, `ERROR_KEEPER_ACCOUNT_NOT_CONFIGURED`, `ERROR_KEEPER_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND`
+- **Bootstrap**: `ERROR_ALREADY_BOOTSTRAPPED`, `ERROR_TOKEN_FILE_MISSING`
+- **Signup/invites**: `ERROR_NO_MATCHING_INVITE`, `ERROR_SIGNUP_CONFLICT`, `ERROR_INVITE_NOT_FOUND`, `ERROR_INVITE_DUPLICATE`, `ERROR_INVITE_ACCOUNT_EXISTS_USERNAME`, `ERROR_INVITE_ACCOUNT_EXISTS_EMAIL`
+- **Admin**: `ERROR_ROLE_NOT_WEB_GRANTABLE`, `ERROR_ROLE_GRANT_NOT_FOUND`, `ERROR_INVALID_EVENT_TYPE`
+- **DB browser**: `ERROR_FOREIGN_KEY_VIOLATION`, `ERROR_TABLE_NOT_FOUND`, `ERROR_TABLE_NO_PRIMARY_KEY`, `ERROR_ROW_NOT_FOUND`
 
 ## Schema Helpers
 
-`schema_helpers.ts` is the canonical home for shared Zod introspection —
-extracted to break a circular dependency between `route_spec.ts` (uses
-them for input validation) and `surface.ts` (uses them for surface
-generation).
+`http/schema_helpers.ts` is the canonical home for shared Zod introspection
+— extracted to break a circular dependency between `http/route_spec.ts`
+(input validation) and `http/surface.ts` (surface generation).
 
 **Import `is_null_schema`, `is_strict_object_schema`, `schema_to_surface`,
-`middleware_applies`, and `merge_error_schemas` from `schema_helpers.ts`,
-not from `surface.ts`.** The helpers were moved; `surface.ts` only imports
-and re-uses them for generation logic.
+`middleware_applies`, and `merge_error_schemas` from `http/schema_helpers.ts`,
+not from `http/surface.ts`.** The helpers were moved; `http/surface.ts`
+only imports and re-uses them for generation logic.
 
 Key helpers:
 
-- `is_null_schema(schema)` — `instanceof z.ZodNull`. Uses `instanceof`, not
-  parse-null, to avoid false positives from `z.nullable(z.string())`
-- `is_strict_object_schema(schema)` — detects `z.strictObject()` by
-  checking `schema.def.catchall instanceof z.ZodNever`
-- `schema_to_surface(schema)` — Zod → JSON Schema, with `$schema` and
-  `default` keys stripped recursively (defaults may be non-deterministic
-  and `$schema` is snapshot noise)
-- `middleware_applies(mw_path, route_path)` — Hono pattern matching:
-  `'*'`, exact, `'/api/*'` prefix (handles `prefix.slice(0, -1)` so
-  `/api/*` also matches the bare `/api`)
-- `merge_error_schemas(spec, middleware_errors?)` — three-layer merge
-  described above.
+- `is_null_schema(schema)` — `instanceof z.ZodNull` (not parse-null, to avoid false positives from `z.nullable(z.string())`)
+- `is_strict_object_schema(schema)` — detects `z.strictObject()` by checking `schema.def.catchall instanceof z.ZodNever`
+- `schema_to_surface(schema)` — Zod → JSON Schema, with `$schema` and `default` keys stripped recursively (defaults may be non-deterministic; `$schema` is snapshot noise)
+- `middleware_applies(mw_path, route_path)` — Hono pattern matching: `'*'`, exact, `'/api/*'` prefix (handles `prefix.slice(0, -1)` so `/api/*` also matches the bare `/api`)
+- `merge_error_schemas(spec, middleware_errors?)` — the three-layer merge described above
 
 ## Surface Generation
 
-`surface.ts` produces a JSON-serializable attack surface from middleware
-
-- route + RPC + env + event specs. Used for startup logging, snapshot
-  testing, surface explorer UI, adversarial test generation, and policy
-  invariants.
+`http/surface.ts` produces a JSON-serializable attack surface from
+middleware + route + RPC + env + event specs. Used for startup logging,
+snapshot testing, surface explorer UI, adversarial test generation, and
+policy invariants.
 
 ### Types
 
-- `AppSurface` — JSON-serializable output (`middleware`, `routes`,
-  `rpc_endpoints`, `env`, `events`, `diagnostics`)
-- `AppSurfaceSpec` — the surface bundled with the **source specs** that
-  produced it (`surface`, `route_specs`, `middleware_specs`, `rpc_endpoints`).
-  Runtime-only — use for tests and introspection
-- `AppSurfaceRoute`, `AppSurfaceMiddleware`, `AppSurfaceEnv`,
-  `AppSurfaceEvent`, `AppSurfaceRpcEndpoint`, `AppSurfaceRpcMethod` —
-  per-entity entries
+- `AppSurface` — JSON-serializable output (`middleware`, `routes`, `rpc_endpoints`, `env`, `events`, `diagnostics`)
+- `AppSurfaceSpec` — the surface bundled with the **source specs** (`surface`, `route_specs`, `middleware_specs`, `rpc_endpoints`). Runtime-only — use for tests and introspection
+- `AppSurfaceRoute`, `AppSurfaceMiddleware`, `AppSurfaceEnv`, `AppSurfaceEvent`, `AppSurfaceRpcEndpoint`, `AppSurfaceRpcMethod` — per-entity entries
 - `AppSurfaceDiagnostic` — `{level: 'warning' | 'info'; category; message; source?}`
-- `RpcEndpointSpec` — `{path, actions: Array<RpcAction>}`; fed into
-  `generate_app_surface` so RPC endpoints appear in the surface without
-  coupling to `create_rpc_endpoint`
+- `RpcEndpointSpec` — `{path, actions: Array<RpcAction>}`; fed into `generate_app_surface` so RPC endpoints appear in the surface without coupling to `create_rpc_endpoint`
 - `GenerateAppSurfaceOptions` — `{route_specs, middleware_specs, env_schema?, event_specs?, rpc_endpoints?}`
 
-### `generate_app_surface(options)` behavior
-
-- Emits a `warning` diagnostic for every input schema that's not strict —
-  unknown keys silently strip under `z.object()`
-- Per-route error schemas: runs the three-layer merge (derived + middleware
-  - explicit) via `merge_error_schemas` + `collect_middleware_errors`
-- Per-route `is_mutation` = `method !== 'GET'`
-- Per-route `transaction` mirrors the handler default (`spec.transaction ?? method !== 'GET'`)
-- `env_schema_to_surface(schema)` reads `SchemaFieldMeta` from `.meta()`
-  — `description`, `sensitivity`, and probes `safeParse(undefined)` to
-  detect `optional` + `has_default`
-- `events_to_surface(event_specs)` — SSE events surface as `{method, description, channel, params_schema}`
-- RPC methods surface their `RouteAuth` directly — same shape on both `ActionSpec.auth` and `RouteSpec.auth`, no translation step.
+`generate_app_surface(options)` emits a `warning` diagnostic for every
+input schema that's not strict (unknown keys silently strip under
+`z.object()`), runs the three-layer merge per route, derives `is_mutation`
+and `transaction` from method/spec, and surfaces RPC methods with their
+`RouteAuth` directly (same shape on both `ActionSpec.auth` and
+`RouteSpec.auth`, no translation step).
 
 `create_app_surface_spec(options)` = `generate_app_surface(options)` plus
 the source specs, for tests that need to iterate over raw specs.
@@ -370,30 +260,25 @@ No side effects, no state — filters and groupings over `AppSurface`:
 
 - `filter_protected_routes` / `filter_public_routes`
 - `filter_role_routes` / `filter_authenticated_routes` / `filter_keeper_routes` / `filter_routes_for_role(role)`
-- `filter_routes_by_prefix(prefix)` / `filter_routes_with_input` /
-  `filter_routes_with_params` / `filter_routes_with_query` /
-  `filter_mutation_routes` / `filter_rate_limited_routes`
-- `routes_by_auth_type(surface)` — `Map<RouteAuthCategory, Array<AppSurfaceRoute>>` where `RouteAuthCategory = 'none' | 'authenticated' | 'optional' | 'keeper' | 'role:<name>' | 'other'`. Multi-role specs appear under each of their role buckets; the `'optional'` and `'other'` buckets exist for shapes that don't fit the four-axis categorical view.
+- `filter_routes_by_prefix(prefix)` / `filter_routes_with_input` / `filter_routes_with_params` / `filter_routes_with_query` / `filter_mutation_routes` / `filter_rate_limited_routes`
+- `routes_by_auth_type(surface)` — `Map<RouteAuthCategory, Array<AppSurfaceRoute>>` where `RouteAuthCategory = 'none' | 'authenticated' | 'optional' | 'keeper' | 'role:<name>' | 'other'`. Multi-role specs appear under each role bucket
 - `format_route_key(route)` → `'METHOD /path'`
-- `surface_auth_summary(surface)` — counts per auth type, roles broken
-  out by name
+- `surface_auth_summary(surface)` — counts per auth type, roles broken out by name
 
 The per-route auth predicates these filters compose over (`is_public_auth`,
 `is_role_auth`, `is_credential_gated_auth`, `is_keeper_auth`,
-`is_plain_authenticated_auth`, plus `needs_actor` / `needs_account`)
-live in `auth_shape.ts` next to the canonical `RouteAuth` schema —
-import them from there, not from this module. Same predicates back the
+`is_plain_authenticated_auth`, plus `needs_actor` / `needs_account`) live
+in `http/auth_shape.ts` next to the canonical `RouteAuth` schema — import
+them from there, not from this module. Same predicates back the
 dispatcher's authorization phase, the route-spec auth-guard resolver,
-`derive_error_schemas`'s actor-failure folding, and the testing
-harnesses, so every consumer that branches on the four-axis shape
-shares one source of truth.
+`derive_error_schemas`'s actor-failure folding, and the testing harnesses.
 
 Consumer code (tests, attack-surface helpers, `SurfaceExplorer.svelte`)
 should reach for these rather than inlining `.filter` chains.
 
 ## Middleware Infrastructure
 
-### `MiddlewareSpec`
+`MiddlewareSpec` (in `http/middleware_spec.ts`):
 
 ```typescript
 interface MiddlewareSpec {
@@ -404,226 +289,117 @@ interface MiddlewareSpec {
 }
 ```
 
-Declared in `middleware_spec.ts` (separate from `route_spec.ts` so
-middleware modules don't pull in route types).
+Declared separately from `http/route_spec.ts` so middleware modules don't
+pull in route types.
 
-### Trusted proxy — `proxy.ts`
+### Trusted proxy — `http/proxy.ts`
 
 Resolves the real client IP from `X-Forwarded-For` only when the TCP
 connection is from a configured trusted proxy. Without this middleware,
-`get_client_ip(c)` returns `'unknown'`.
-
-Must run **before** auth and rate-limiting middleware. See the root
-../../CLAUDE.md §Middleware Ordering.
-
-- `normalize_ip(ip)` — delegates to `canonicalize_ip` from `ip_canonical.ts`:
-  RFC 5952 IPv6 canonicalization (lowercase hex, longest-zero-run
-  compression), IPv4-mapped IPv6 emitted in dotted form and stripped of
-  the `::ffff:` prefix so the bucket collapses to plain IPv4. Idempotent;
-  safe on non-IP strings (`'unknown'` → `'unknown'`); strict char-set
-  filter (`IP_LITERAL_CHARS`) preserves malformed forms unchanged so
-  downstream `validate_ip_strict` can still reject them. Pure IPv6 like
-  `::ffff:1` (group[5]=0, not 0xffff — NOT IPv4-mapped) stays preserved.
-  Mirrors `zzz_server::proxy::normalize_ip`
-- `ProxyOptions` — `{trusted_proxies, get_connection_ip, log?}`
-- `ParsedProxy` — `{type: 'ip'; address}` or `{type: 'cidr'; network; prefix; address_type}`
-- `parse_proxy_entry(entry)` — accepts `'127.0.0.1'`, `'::1'`,
-  `'10.0.0.0/8'`, `'fe80::/10'`. Throws on invalid IPs, NaN/negative/
-  over-range prefix, non-network-aligned CIDRs, or bad input
-- **`validate_ip_strict(ip)`** — defensive validator for any IP string
-  read from an untrusted source. Hono's `distinctRemoteAddr` is lax —
-  classifies anything-with-colons as `'IPv6'`, and
-  `convertIPv6ToBinary` silently accepts `'[::1]:8080'`, `'::1\n'`,
-  etc. as binary-valid IPv6. The two-layer check here (character-set
-  pre-filter + round-trip through `convertIPv*ToBinary`) closes both
-  holes: returns `'IPv4' | 'IPv6'` on a strictly-valid bare literal,
-  `undefined` on anything else.
-- `is_trusted_ip(ip, proxies)` — normalizes before matching; uses
-  `validate_ip_strict` to reject malformed input up front (without it,
-  CIDR proxies would surface a 500 from a thrown
-  `convertIPv6ToBinary` on entries like `'203.0.113.1:8080'`); skips
-  mismatched address families for CIDR matches
-- `resolve_client_ip(forwarded_for, proxies)` — walks **right-to-left**,
-  skipping trusted entries AND any entry that fails strict validation
-  (closes the rate-limit-key poisoning surface where an attacker who
-  controls XFF and transits through a trusted proxy could rotate
-  garbage strings to evade per-IP limits). First untrusted +
-  strictly-valid wins. If everything is trusted-or-malformed, returns
-  the leftmost strictly-valid entry, or `undefined` to let the
-  middleware fall back to the connection IP
-- `create_proxy_middleware(options)` + `create_proxy_middleware_spec(options)` —
-  three-branch logic:
-  1. No XFF → use connection IP directly
-  2. XFF present + connection untrusted → ignore XFF (spoof-proof), use
-     connection IP, log debug
-  3. XFF present + connection trusted → resolve from header, log warn if
-     all XFF entries turn out to be trusted
-- `get_client_ip(c)` — returns `'unknown'` when the proxy middleware
-  hasn't run
-
-Tradeoff for the strict validation: legitimate non-standard proxies
-that include ports in XFF entries (`203.0.113.1:8080`) lose per-client
-distinction in rate limiting and collapse to the proxy's connection
-IP (one bucket for everyone behind that proxy). nginx + cloud LBs
-don't include ports — bounded by operator configuration in practice.
-
-### Origin allowlist — `origin.ts`
-
-Origin allowlisting for locally-running services — **not** the CSRF
-layer. CSRF is handled by `SameSite: strict` on session cookies (see
-`auth/session_middleware.ts`).
-
-- `parse_allowed_origins(env_value)` — comma-separated patterns → `Array<RegExp>`
-- `should_allow_origin(origin, patterns)` — case-insensitive match
-- `verify_request_source(allowed_patterns)` — Hono handler:
-  1. `Origin` header present → must match allowlist or 403 `ERROR_FORBIDDEN_ORIGIN`
-  2. No `Origin` → allow through (curl, CLI, token auth is primary control)
-
-**Origin-only by design.** Fetch spec mandates `Origin` on every unsafe
-method, so a real browser request on any state-changing surface always
-carries it. Non-browser clients (curl, server-to-server, CLI) don't
-ship auto-attached session cookies, so CSRF isn't the relevant threat
-there — auth (bearer / daemon token) is the actual control. A `Referer`
-fallback would only widen the accepted-shape envelope without closing
-a real CSRF hole. Mirrors `zzz_server::auth::is_request_origin_allowed`.
-
-`ERROR_FORBIDDEN_REFERER` stays exported from `error_schemas.ts` for
-consumers whose error-schema unions or test assertions still reference
-it — the emit site is gone, the constant is not.
-
-Pattern syntax:
+`get_client_ip(c)` returns `'unknown'`. Must run **before** auth and
+rate-limiting middleware (see root ../../CLAUDE.md §Middleware Ordering).
 
-- Exact: `https://api.fuz.dev`
-- Wildcard subdomain (complete label only): `https://*.fuz.dev` —
-  matches `api.fuz.dev`, NOT `fuz.dev`
-- Multiple wildcards: `https://*.*.corp.fuz.dev` matches `api.staging.corp.fuz.dev`
-- Port wildcard: `http://localhost:*` (optional port, matches with or without)
-- IPv6: `http://[::1]:3000`, `https://[2001:db8::1]` (no wildcards inside brackets)
-- Combined: `https://*.fuz.dev:*`
+Per-symbol semantics on TSDoc; the cross-cutting properties:
 
-Patterns normalize through the `URL` constructor — IPv4-mapped IPv6 like
-`[::ffff:127.0.0.1]` becomes `[::ffff:7f00:1]`. IPv6 zone identifiers
-(`%eth0`) are not supported. Throws on paths, partial wildcards
-(`*fuz.dev`), wildcards inside IPv6 brackets, or missing protocol.
+- **Rightmost-first XFF walk**, skipping trusted entries AND entries that fail strict validation. Closes a rate-limit-key-poisoning surface where an attacker who controls XFF and transits through a trusted proxy could rotate garbage strings to evade per-IP limits.
+- **`validate_ip_strict(ip)`** is defensive against Hono's lax `distinctRemoteAddr` (which classifies anything-with-colons as IPv6 and accepts `'[::1]:8080'`, `'::1\n'` as binary-valid). Two-layer check: character-set pre-filter + round-trip through `convertIPv*ToBinary`.
+- **`normalize_ip(ip)`** delegates to `canonicalize_ip` from `http/ip_canonical.ts` — RFC 5952 lowercase + longest-zero-run compression, IPv4-mapped IPv6 stripped to plain IPv4 so buckets collapse. Idempotent, safe on non-IP strings, strict char-set filter preserves malformed forms unchanged.
+- **Three-branch middleware logic**: no XFF → use connection IP; XFF + connection untrusted → ignore XFF, use connection IP (spoof-proof, debug log); XFF + connection trusted → resolve from header, warn if all entries turn out trusted.
 
-## JSON-RPC
+Tradeoff: legitimate non-standard proxies that include ports in XFF entries
+(`203.0.113.1:8080`) lose per-client distinction and collapse to the
+proxy's connection IP. nginx + cloud LBs don't include ports — bounded by
+operator configuration in practice.
 
-Three files, split by concern:
+### Origin allowlist — `http/origin.ts`
 
-- `jsonrpc.ts` — **declarative**: Zod schemas for the envelope and error codes
-- `jsonrpc_errors.ts` — **runtime**: throwable errors, named constructors,
-  HTTP-status mapping
-- `jsonrpc_helpers.ts` — **plumbing**: message builders, type guards, converters
+Origin allowlisting for locally-running services — **not** the CSRF layer.
+CSRF is handled by `SameSite: strict` on session cookies (`auth/session_middleware.ts`).
 
-Follows the JSON-RPC 2.0 spec and is an **MCP superset** — params and
-result are always object-only (no positional arrays), `_meta` and
-`progressToken` are first-class. The schemas are sourced from the MCP
-TypeScript SDK for compatibility.
-
-### `jsonrpc.ts` — envelope + code schemas
-
-`JSONRPC_VERSION = '2.0'` plus Zod schemas paired with inferred types:
+- `parse_allowed_origins(env_value)` — comma-separated patterns → `Array<RegExp>`
+- `should_allow_origin(origin, patterns)` — case-insensitive match
+- `verify_request_source(allowed_patterns)` — Hono handler: `Origin` present → must match allowlist or 403 `ERROR_FORBIDDEN_ORIGIN`; no `Origin` → allow through (curl, CLI, token auth is primary control)
 
-- `JsonrpcRequestId`, `JsonrpcMethod`, `JsonrpcProgressToken`
-- `JsonrpcMcpMeta` — `z.looseObject({})` — the MCP `_meta` extension point
-- `JsonrpcRequestParamsMeta` — `JsonrpcMcpMeta.extend({progressToken: ...})`
-- `JsonrpcRequestParams`, `JsonrpcNotificationParams`, `JsonrpcResult` — loose
-- `JsonrpcRequest`, `JsonrpcNotification`, `JsonrpcResponse`,
-  `JsonrpcErrorResponse`, `JsonrpcResponseOrError`, `JsonrpcMessage`
-- `JsonrpcMessageFromClientToServer`, `JsonrpcMessageFromServerToClient`
+**Origin-only by design.** Fetch spec mandates `Origin` on every unsafe
+method, so a real browser request on any state-changing surface always
+carries it. Non-browser clients don't ship auto-attached session cookies,
+so CSRF isn't the relevant threat there — auth (bearer / daemon token) is
+the actual control. A `Referer` fallback would only widen the
+accepted-shape envelope without closing a real CSRF hole. Mirrors
+`zzz_server::auth::is_request_origin_allowed`.
+
+Pattern syntax: exact `https://api.fuz.dev`; wildcard subdomain
+`https://*.fuz.dev` (matches `api.fuz.dev`, NOT `fuz.dev`); multiple
+wildcards `https://*.*.corp.fuz.dev`; port wildcard `http://localhost:*`
+(optional port); IPv6 `http://[::1]:3000`, `https://[2001:db8::1]` (no
+wildcards inside brackets). Patterns normalize through `URL` constructor.
+IPv6 zone identifiers (`%eth0`) not supported. Throws on paths, partial
+wildcards (`*fuz.dev`), wildcards inside IPv6 brackets, or missing
+protocol.
+
+## JSON-RPC (`http/jsonrpc.ts`, `http/jsonrpc_errors.ts`, `http/jsonrpc_helpers.ts`)
+
+Three files split by concern: `http/jsonrpc.ts` declarative (envelope
+schemas), `http/jsonrpc_errors.ts` runtime (throwable + map),
+`http/jsonrpc_helpers.ts` plumbing (builders, guards, converters).
+
+Follows JSON-RPC 2.0 spec with a partial **MCP superset** posture — params
+are object-only (no positional arrays) and `_meta` / `progressToken` are
+first-class; result is the full JSON-RPC §5 value space (object, array,
+string, number, boolean, null) since the per-action `spec.output` is the
+actual contract and the MCP object-only result constraint would reject any
+spec declaring `output: z.null()` / primitives on the wire. Schemas sourced
+from the MCP TypeScript SDK for compatibility on the params / `_meta` axis.
 
 `_meta` is intentionally **not** envelope-validated — that lives in
 per-action schemas so mismatches surface as `invalid_params` rather than
 `invalid_request`.
 
-Error codes:
-
-- Standard constants: `JSONRPC_PARSE_ERROR` (-32700), `JSONRPC_INVALID_REQUEST`
-  (-32600), `JSONRPC_METHOD_NOT_FOUND` (-32601), `JSONRPC_INVALID_PARAMS`
-  (-32602), `JSONRPC_INTERNAL_ERROR` (-32603)
-- Server-defined range: `JSONRPC_SERVER_ERROR_START = -32000`,
-  `JSONRPC_SERVER_ERROR_END = -32099`; `JsonrpcServerErrorCode` is a
-  branded Zod number in that range
-- `JsonrpcErrorCode` — union of the 5 literals + `JsonrpcServerErrorCode`
-- `JsonrpcErrorObject` — `{code, message, data?}`
-
-### `jsonrpc_errors.ts` — 15-code taxonomy
-
-Runtime complement to `error_schemas.ts`. Five standard codes + ten
-general application codes (consumers add their own by casting
-`as JsonrpcErrorCode`):
-
-| Name                  | Code   | HTTP | Use                                                    |
-| --------------------- | ------ | ---- | ------------------------------------------------------ |
-| `parse_error`         | -32700 | 400  | JSON parse failure                                     |
-| `invalid_request`     | -32600 | 400  | Envelope malformed                                     |
-| `method_not_found`    | -32601 | 404  | Unknown RPC method                                     |
-| `invalid_params`      | -32602 | 400  | Params schema failure                                  |
-| `internal_error`      | -32603 | 500  | Unhandled exception                                    |
-| `unauthenticated`     | -32001 | 401  | HTTP 401 renamed ("unauthorized" is wrong for 401)     |
-| `forbidden`           | -32002 | 403  | Authorized but denied                                  |
-| `not_found`           | -32003 | 404  | Resource not found                                     |
-| `conflict`            | -32004 | 409  | Uniqueness/state conflict                              |
-| `validation_error`    | -32005 | 422  | **Application-level** validation (business logic)      |
-| `rate_limited`        | -32006 | 429  | Server-side policy                                     |
-| `service_unavailable` | -32007 | 503  | Upstream down / maintenance                            |
-| `timeout`             | -32008 | 504  | Handler exceeded time budget                           |
-| `queue_overflow`      | -32009 | 429  | **Client-side** backpressure (WS reconnect queue full) |
-| `request_cancelled`   | -32010 | 499  | Caller-initiated cancellation (nginx "client closed")  |
-
-`invalid_params` vs `validation_error`: use `invalid_params` (standard
+### 15-code error taxonomy
+
+Five standard codes + ten general application codes (consumers add their
+own by casting `as JsonrpcErrorCode`):
+
+- `parse_error` (-32700, HTTP 400) — JSON parse failure.
+- `invalid_request` (-32600, HTTP 400) — envelope malformed.
+- `method_not_found` (-32601, HTTP 404) — unknown RPC method.
+- `invalid_params` (-32602, HTTP 400) — params schema failure.
+- `internal_error` (-32603, HTTP 500) — unhandled exception.
+- `unauthenticated` (-32001, HTTP 401) — HTTP 401 renamed ("unauthorized" is wrong for 401).
+- `forbidden` (-32002, HTTP 403) — authorized but denied.
+- `not_found` (-32003, HTTP 404) — resource not found.
+- `conflict` (-32004, HTTP 409) — uniqueness/state conflict.
+- `validation_error` (-32005, HTTP 422) — **application-level** validation (business logic).
+- `rate_limited` (-32006, HTTP 429) — server-side policy.
+- `service_unavailable` (-32007, HTTP 503) — upstream down / maintenance.
+- `timeout` (-32008, HTTP 504) — handler exceeded time budget.
+- `queue_overflow` (-32009, HTTP 429) — **client-side** backpressure (WS reconnect queue full).
+- `request_cancelled` (-32010, HTTP 499) — caller-initiated cancellation (nginx "client closed").
+
+**`invalid_params` vs `validation_error`** — use `invalid_params` (standard
 code) for Zod parse failures; reserve `validation_error` (app code) for
-business rules. `rate_limited` vs `queue_overflow`: both 429, but the
-reverse map `HTTP_STATUS_TO_JSONRPC_ERROR_CODE[429] = rate_limited`
-because rate limiting is the default interpretation when translating
-generic HTTP back to a JSON-RPC code.
+business rules.
+
+**`rate_limited` vs `queue_overflow`** — both 429; reverse map
+`HTTP_STATUS_TO_JSONRPC_ERROR_CODE[429] = rate_limited` because rate
+limiting is the default interpretation when translating generic HTTP back
+to a JSON-RPC code.
 
-APIs:
+### API map
 
-- `JSONRPC_ERROR_CODES` — `Record<JsonrpcErrorName, JsonrpcErrorCode>`
-  with the 15 entries above
+- `JSONRPC_ERROR_CODES` — `Record<JsonrpcErrorName, JsonrpcErrorCode>` (frozen)
 - `jsonrpc_error_messages` — named constructors returning `JsonrpcErrorObject`
-- `jsonrpc_errors` — named constructors returning `ThrownJsonrpcError`
-  (derived from `jsonrpc_error_messages` via `create_error_thrower`).
-  Usage: `throw jsonrpc_errors.not_found('user')`, `throw jsonrpc_errors.forbidden()`
+- `jsonrpc_errors` — named constructors returning `ThrownJsonrpcError` (derived from `jsonrpc_error_messages` via `create_error_thrower`). Usage: `throw jsonrpc_errors.not_found('user')`, `throw jsonrpc_errors.forbidden()`
 - `ThrownJsonrpcError` — `Error` subclass carrying `code` + optional `data`
-- `JSONRPC_ERROR_CODE_TO_HTTP_STATUS` / `HTTP_STATUS_TO_JSONRPC_ERROR_CODE`
-  and the `jsonrpc_error_code_to_http_status` / `http_status_to_jsonrpc_error_code`
-  accessors (fall back to 500 / `internal_error`)
+- `JSONRPC_ERROR_CODE_TO_HTTP_STATUS` / `HTTP_STATUS_TO_JSONRPC_ERROR_CODE` + `jsonrpc_error_code_to_http_status` / `http_status_to_jsonrpc_error_code` accessors (fall back to 500 / `internal_error`)
+- Envelope schemas in `http/jsonrpc.ts`: `JsonrpcRequest`, `JsonrpcNotification`, `JsonrpcResponse`, `JsonrpcErrorResponse`, `JsonrpcResponseOrError`, `JsonrpcMessage`, `JsonrpcMessageFromClientToServer`, `JsonrpcMessageFromServerToClient`. Also `JsonrpcRequestId`, `JsonrpcMethod`, `JsonrpcProgressToken`, `JsonrpcMcpMeta`, `JsonrpcRequestParamsMeta`
+- Builders in `http/jsonrpc_helpers.ts`: `create_jsonrpc_request`, `create_jsonrpc_notification`, `create_jsonrpc_response`, `create_jsonrpc_error_response`, `create_jsonrpc_error_response_from_thrown` (preserves code/message/data on `ThrownJsonrpcError`; plain `Error` → `internal_error` with `{stack}` in DEV)
+- Type guards: `is_jsonrpc_request_id` (rejects NaN/Infinity), `is_jsonrpc_object`, `is_jsonrpc_message`, `is_jsonrpc_request` / `_notification` / `_response` / `_error_response`
+- Converters: `to_jsonrpc_message_id`, `to_jsonrpc_params` (normalizes primitives to `{value}`), `to_jsonrpc_result` (null/undefined → `{}`, primitives → `{value}`)
 
 Handlers can `throw jsonrpc_errors.*` — `apply_route_specs`' error-catch
-layer converts them to `{error: JsonrpcErrorObject}` at the correct HTTP
-status. Generic `Error` maps to 500 `internal_error` (message in DEV only).
-
-### `jsonrpc_helpers.ts` — builders, guards, converters
-
-Used by the SAES runtime (`ActionEvent`, `ActionPeer`, transports) and
-the RPC endpoint dispatcher.
-
-Builders (all emit correctly-shaped messages with `jsonrpc: '2.0'`):
-
-- `create_jsonrpc_request(method, params, id)`
-- `create_jsonrpc_notification(method, params)`
-- `create_jsonrpc_response(id, result)`
-- `create_jsonrpc_error_response(id, error)`
-- `create_jsonrpc_error_response_from_thrown(id, error)` — `ThrownJsonrpcError`
-  → preserves code/message/data; plain `Error` → `internal_error`, includes
-  `{stack}` in `data` under DEV only
-
-Type guards:
-
-- `is_jsonrpc_request_id` — string or finite number (rejects NaN/Infinity)
-- `is_jsonrpc_object` — object with `jsonrpc: '2.0'` (not array)
-- `is_jsonrpc_message` — single message or non-empty batch array
-- `is_jsonrpc_request` / `is_jsonrpc_notification` / `is_jsonrpc_response` / `is_jsonrpc_error_response`
-
-Converters:
-
-- `to_jsonrpc_message_id(message_or_id)` — extracts a valid id or returns `null`
-- `to_jsonrpc_params(input)` — normalizes to `Record<string, any>` or
-  `undefined`; primitives wrap as `{value}`
-- `to_jsonrpc_result(output)` — normalizes for a response; null/undefined
-  becomes `{}`, primitives wrap as `{value}`
+layer converts to `{error: JsonrpcErrorObject}` at the correct HTTP status.
+Generic `Error` maps to 500 `internal_error` (message in DEV only).
 
 ## Pending Effects
 
@@ -640,40 +416,26 @@ interface EmitAfterCommitContext {
 //   post_commit_effects: Array<() => void | Promise<void>>
 ```
 
-- **`pending_effects: Array<Promise<void>>`** — eager. Producers push the
-  in-flight `Promise<void>` for fire-and-forget pool writes already
-  running: audit emits via `AppDeps.audit`, session-touch UPDATE,
-  api-token usage tracking. The pool write is rollback-resilient by
-  virtue of running outside the request transaction; pushing the
-  in-flight handle lets test mode (`await_pending_effects: true`) await
-  it. Drain rule: `flush_pending_effects(effects, log, on_rejection?)`.
-- **`post_commit_effects: Array<() => void | Promise<void>>`** —
-  deferred. Producers go through `emit_after_commit(ctx, fn)` exclusively;
-  raw thunks should not be pushed directly. The flush middleware (in
-  `server/app_server.ts` and the per-message WS dispatcher in
-  `actions/register_action_ws.ts`) is the only site that invokes each
-  thunk, after the wrapping `db.transaction` (and the rest of the
-  handler chain) has resolved. Drain rule: `flush_post_commit_effects(effects, log)`.
+- **`pending_effects: Array<Promise<void>>`** — eager. Producers push the in-flight `Promise<void>` for fire-and-forget pool writes already running: audit emits via `AppDeps.audit`, session-touch UPDATE, api-token usage tracking. The pool write is rollback-resilient by virtue of running outside the request transaction; pushing the in-flight handle lets test mode (`await_pending_effects: true`) await it. Drain: `flush_pending_effects(effects, log, on_rejection?)`.
+- **`post_commit_effects: Array<() => void | Promise<void>>`** — deferred. Producers go through `emit_after_commit(ctx, fn)` exclusively; raw thunks should not be pushed directly. The flush middleware (in `server/app_server.ts` and the per-message WS dispatcher in `actions/register_action_ws.ts`) is the only site that invokes each thunk, after the wrapping `db.transaction` resolves. Drain: `flush_post_commit_effects(effects, log)`.
 
 ### Why split
 
 Both shapes used to coexist on a single `Array<PendingEffect>` discriminated
-union. The shapes encode different contracts — eager pushers say "wait
-for this work that's already started"; thunk pushers say "run this after
-the handler returns" — and burying both behind one field made
-`c.var.pending_effects.push(x)` ambiguous at the call site. Splitting
-turns the field name into the contract.
+union. The shapes encode different contracts — eager pushers say "wait for
+this work that's already started"; thunk pushers say "run this after the
+handler returns" — and burying both behind one field made
+`c.var.pending_effects.push(x)` ambiguous at the call site. Splitting turns the field name into the contract.
 
 ### Why `emit_after_commit` defers
 
 The thunk shape is **load-bearing for correctness**. Pushing
-`Promise.resolve().then(fn)` onto an eager queue — what
-`emit_after_commit` used to do — schedules `fn` as a microtask that
-drains _before_ the wrapping `await db.query('COMMIT')` resumes, so a
-rolled-back transaction would leak a notification for state that never
-landed. The thunk defers the work to flush time; the `try/finally` in the
-flush middleware runs after the handler (and any wrapping transaction)
-returns.
+`Promise.resolve().then(fn)` onto an eager queue — what `emit_after_commit`
+used to do — schedules `fn` as a microtask that drains _before_ the
+wrapping `await db.query('COMMIT')` resumes, so a rolled-back transaction
+would leak a notification for state that never landed. The thunk defers
+the work to flush time; the `try/finally` in the flush middleware runs
+after the handler (and any wrapping transaction) returns.
 
 ```typescript
 emit_after_commit(ctx, () => notification_sender.send_to_account(account_id, msg));
@@ -685,29 +447,10 @@ and any side effect that must run only after the transaction commits.
 
 ### Key properties
 
-- **The flush owns the safety net.** `flush_post_commit_effects` wraps
-  every thunk in `try/catch` and routes errors through `ctx.log.error`,
-  so one failing send cannot starve sibling effects in the same batch
-  nor corrupt the already-committed response. Per-thunk `try/catch`
-  inside `emit_after_commit` would skip directly-pushed thunks (e.g.
-  tests); centralizing the wrap in the flush closes that gap.
-- **Test mode (`await_pending_effects: true`) flushes both queues.**
-  Eager: `await flush_pending_effects(pending_effects, log)`. Deferred:
-  `await flush_post_commit_effects(post_commit_effects, log)`. Both
-  complete before the response returns. Production mode wraps the same
-  helpers in `void ...` and threads `on_effect_error` into
-  `flush_pending_effects`'s `on_rejection` callback for fan-out.
-- **Same drain location for both.** The outer flush middleware
-  (`server/app_server.ts`) and the per-message WS flush handle the two
-  queues adjacent to each other. The deferred queue does not drain inside
-  the route-spec wrapper / `perform_action` — that would tighten the
-  "post-commit" timing further but would force three drain sites (REST
-  wrapper, RPC dispatcher, WS dispatcher) to gain timing no current
-  consumer needs (the WS-fan-out use case is happy with post-handler).
-- Structurally satisfied by both `RouteContext` (HTTP) and
-  `ActionContext` (RPC + WS) — they share the `{log, post_commit_effects}`
-  shape, which is why this helper lives in `http/` rather than
-  `actions/` or `auth/`.
+- **The flush owns the safety net.** `flush_post_commit_effects` wraps every thunk in `try/catch` and routes errors through `ctx.log.error`, so one failing send cannot starve sibling effects in the same batch nor corrupt the already-committed response. Per-thunk `try/catch` inside `emit_after_commit` would skip directly-pushed thunks (e.g. tests); centralizing the wrap in the flush closes that gap.
+- **Test mode (`await_pending_effects: true`) flushes both queues.** Eager: `await flush_pending_effects(pending_effects, log)`. Deferred: `await flush_post_commit_effects(post_commit_effects, log)`. Both complete before the response returns. Production mode wraps the same helpers in `void ...` and threads `on_effect_error` into `flush_pending_effects`'s `on_rejection` callback for fan-out.
+- **Same drain location for both.** The outer flush middleware (`server/app_server.ts`) and the per-message WS flush handle the two queues adjacent to each other. The deferred queue does not drain inside the route-spec wrapper / `perform_action` — that would tighten the "post-commit" timing further but would force three drain sites (REST wrapper, RPC dispatcher, WS dispatcher) to gain timing no current consumer needs.
+- Structurally satisfied by both `RouteContext` (HTTP) and `ActionContext` (RPC + WS) — they share the `{log, post_commit_effects}` shape, which is why this helper lives in `http/` rather than `actions/` or `auth/`.
 
 WS sends are **not** wrapped by `create_validated_broadcaster` (that only
 guards SSE `broadcast(channel, data)`). Zod input schemas on
@@ -716,40 +459,31 @@ at send time.
 
 ## Common Routes
 
-`common_routes.ts` exposes three generic route-spec factories with no
+`http/common_routes.ts` exposes three generic route-spec factories with no
 auth-domain dependencies:
 
-- `create_health_route_spec()` — `GET /health`, public, returns
-  `{status: 'ok'}`. Infrastructure endpoint for uptime monitors
-- `create_server_status_route_spec({version, get_uptime_ms})` — `GET /api/server/status`,
-  authenticated, returns `{version, uptime_ms}`
-- `create_surface_route_spec({surface})` — `GET /api/surface`,
-  authenticated, serves the `AppSurface` JSON. Authenticated because
-  surface data reveals API structure (schemas, auth, routes)
+- `create_health_route_spec()` — `GET /health`, public, returns `{status: 'ok'}`. Infrastructure endpoint for uptime monitors
+- `create_server_status_route_spec({version, get_uptime_ms})` — `GET /api/server/status`, authenticated, returns `{version, uptime_ms}`
+- `create_surface_route_spec({surface})` — `GET /api/surface`, authenticated, serves the `AppSurface` JSON. Authenticated because surface data reveals API structure (schemas, auth, routes)
 
-Auth-aware variants (account status, bootstrap status) live in
-`auth/` — `common_routes.ts` stays generic.
+Auth-aware variants (account status, bootstrap status) live in `auth/` —
+`http/common_routes.ts` stays generic.
 
 ## DB Routes (Generic Browser)
 
-`db_routes.ts` creates keeper-only route specs for administering the
-`public` schema via `information_schema`. Wired by consumers that want
-a generic table browser; the factory is domain-agnostic.
+`http/db_routes.ts` creates keeper-only route specs for administering the
+`public` schema via `information_schema`. Wired by consumers that want a
+generic table browser; the factory is domain-agnostic.
 
 `create_db_route_specs({db_type, db_name, extra_stats?, log?})`:
 
-- `GET /health` — connected probe + table count + optional `extra_stats(db)`.
-  Returns `{connected: false}` at 503 on failure
+- `GET /health` — connected probe + table count + optional `extra_stats(db)`. Returns `{connected: false}` at 503 on failure
 - `GET /tables` — list public tables with row counts
-- `GET /tables/:name` — columns + rows (paginated via `?offset`/`?limit`,
-  limit clamped to `[1, 1000]` with default 100) + total count + primary key
-- `DELETE /tables/:name/rows/:id` — delete by PK. Returns 400 if table has
-  no PK (`ERROR_TABLE_NO_PRIMARY_KEY`), 404 if row missing (`ERROR_ROW_NOT_FOUND`)
-  or table missing (`ERROR_TABLE_NOT_FOUND`), 409 on FK violation (pg
-  error code `23503`)
-
-All four routes use the keeper auth shape (`{account: 'required', actor: 'required', roles: ['keeper'], credential_types: ['daemon_token']}`). Param schemas use
-`VALID_SQL_IDENTIFIER` regex, and every table name gets
+- `GET /tables/:name` — columns + rows (paginated via `?offset`/`?limit`, limit clamped to `[1, 1000]` with default 100) + total count + primary key
+- `DELETE /tables/:name/rows/:id` — delete by PK. Returns 400 if table has no PK (`ERROR_TABLE_NO_PRIMARY_KEY`), 404 if row missing (`ERROR_ROW_NOT_FOUND`) or table missing (`ERROR_TABLE_NOT_FOUND`), 409 on FK violation (pg error code `23503`)
+
+All four routes use the keeper auth shape (`{account: 'required', actor: 'required', roles: ['keeper'], credential_types: ['daemon_token']}`).
+Param schemas use `VALID_SQL_IDENTIFIER` regex, and every table name gets
 `assert_valid_sql_identifier()` before string-interpolating into SQL —
 the identifier validation is the only reason the interpolation is safe.
 
@@ -758,20 +492,7 @@ Interfaces exported for consumer use: `TableInfo`, `TableWithCount`,
 
 ## Cross-Module Notes
 
-- **Middleware ordering** is assembled by `create_app_server` — see the
-  root ../../CLAUDE.md §Middleware Ordering. The invariants `http/`
-  needs consumers to uphold: trusted-proxy runs before auth/rate-limit;
-  origin verification runs before session parsing; `client_ip` must be
-  set before any handler or rate limiter reads it
-- **No re-exports.** Import every symbol from its canonical source
-  module. `surface.ts` no longer re-exports schema helpers — go through
-  `schema_helpers.ts`
-- **Input/output schemas align with SAES.** When wiring RPC via
-  `actions/action_rpc.ts` or bridging to `RouteSpec` via
-  `actions/action_bridge.ts`, the same Zod types flow through unchanged
-  (see `actions/CLAUDE.md` §Single JSON-RPC 2.0 endpoint and §HTTP bridge)
-- **Error modules are complementary, not redundant.** `error_schemas.ts`
-  is Zod-first (for routes and surface); `jsonrpc_errors.ts` is
-  throw-first (for handlers and the catch layer). A single `ERROR_*`
-  code can be raised either way depending on whether the handler needs
-  to also attach diagnostic fields
+- **Middleware ordering** is assembled by `create_app_server` — see the root ../../CLAUDE.md §Middleware Ordering. The invariants `http/` needs consumers to uphold: trusted-proxy runs before auth/rate-limit; origin verification runs before session parsing; `client_ip` must be set before any handler or rate limiter reads it
+- **No re-exports.** Import every symbol from its canonical source module. `http/surface.ts` no longer re-exports schema helpers — go through `http/schema_helpers.ts`
+- **Input/output schemas align with SAES.** When wiring RPC via `actions/action_rpc.ts` or bridging to `RouteSpec` via `actions/action_bridge.ts`, the same Zod types flow through unchanged (see `actions/CLAUDE.md` §Single JSON-RPC 2.0 endpoint and §HTTP bridge)
+- **Error modules are complementary, not redundant.** `http/error_schemas.ts` is Zod-first (for routes and surface); `http/jsonrpc_errors.ts` is throw-first (for handlers and the catch layer). A single `ERROR_*` code can be raised either way depending on whether the handler needs to also attach diagnostic fields