@ftptech/canton-agent-wallet 0.7.3 → 0.8.0

package/dist/verify-prepared.d.ts

@@ -1,250 +1,5 @@
-interface DecodedExercise {
-    choiceId: string;
-    chosenValue: Uint8Array;
-    /** The exercised contract id (Exercise.contract_id, field 2), UTF-8 decoded.
-     *  Pinned by the arms ONLY when the caller supplies an expected value
-     *  (defense-in-depth: closes the resolve→prepare TOCTOU where a relay points
-     *  the choice at a contract other than the one it resolved to the agent).
-     *  undefined if the node carried no decodable contract_id. */
-    contractId?: string | undefined;
-    /** The exercised contract's template, as a `module:entity` qualified name (the
-     *  package id is dropped because it changes across package upgrades). Used to
-     *  pin WHICH template the validated choice runs against, so a relay cannot
-     *  point a same-named choice at a confusable/attacker template. undefined if
-     *  the node carried no decodable template_id. */
-    templateQualifiedName?: string | undefined;
-}
-/** The recognized `transaction.v1.Node` node-type oneof members. Anything not
- *  in this set is treated as PRESENT-AND-UNVALIDATED (reject), never skipped. */
-type NodeKind = "create" | "fetch" | "exercise" | "rollback" | "query_by_key";
-/**
- * One fully-accounted node of the prepared transaction. EVERY entry in
- * DamlTransaction.nodes produces exactly one of these — a node we cannot fully
- * recognize is recorded with `recognized=false` rather than silently dropped, so
- * the invariant layer can fail closed on it (this is the fix for the bypass
- * where a sibling node carried under a non-1000 node version, or as a
- * non-exercise node type, was invisible to verify).
- */
-interface DecodedNode {
-    /** DamlTransaction.Node.node_id (the id `roots`/`children` reference). */
-    nodeId: string;
-    /** False ⇒ the node version was not the known `v1` (1000) oneof member, or it
-     *  set an unknown/extra versioned_node member. Such a node is opaque: a
-     *  participant understanding that version could execute it under our signature,
-     *  so we must refuse to sign. */
-    recognizedVersion: boolean;
-    /** The v1 node-type oneof member, or undefined if !recognizedVersion or the
-     *  inner node set no/unknown node_type member. undefined ⇒ reject. */
-    kind?: NodeKind | undefined;
-    /** For exercise nodes: the choice id + chosen value (money-critical args). */
-    exercise?: DecodedExercise | undefined;
-    /** For create nodes: the created template's `module:entity` qualified name
-     *  (package-id dropped — it changes across upgrades) + the raw `Create.argument`
-     *  Value bytes. Lets an arm pin a NUMERIC (non-party) field of a CONSEQUENCE
-     *  create — e.g. the `amount` recorded on a created `X402Escrow` — which the
-     *  party-leaf backstop cannot see. undefined for non-create nodes / a create
-     *  carrying no decodable template / argument. */
-    create?: {
-        templateQualifiedName?: string | undefined;
-        argument?: Uint8Array | undefined;
-    } | undefined;
-    /** node_id references this node declares as its children (Exercise.children /
-     *  Rollback.children). Used to prove reachability from the single root so no
-     *  orphan (extra-leg) node can hide in DamlTransaction.nodes. */
-    children: string[];
-    /** Every `Value`-typed payload this node introduces (exercise chosen_value &
-     *  exercise_result, create argument). The foreign-party backstop scans the
-     *  UNION of these across ALL nodes, not just the matched root exercise — so a
-     *  party/recipient introduced by ANY sibling/consequence node surfaces. */
-    values: Uint8Array[];
-    /** Node-level `repeated string party` fields that are NOT carried inside a
-     *  Daml `Value` tree: Create.signatories/stakeholders,
-     *  Exercise.signatories/stakeholders/acting_parties/choice_observers,
-     *  Fetch.signatories/stakeholders/acting_parties, and a QueryByKey's key
-     *  maintainers. The foreign-party backstop scans these too, so an attacker
-     *  party placed as e.g. a consequence contract's stakeholder/observer (a
-     *  position invisible to the Value-leaf walk) still surfaces. */
-    partyMeta: string[];
-}
-interface DecodedPrepared {
-    /** `act_as` parties from Metadata.submitter_info (authoritative submitter). */
-    actAs: string[];
-    /** DamlTransaction.roots — node_ids declared as transaction roots. */
-    roots: string[];
-    /** EVERY node in DamlTransaction.nodes, fully accounted (recognized or not). */
-    nodes: DecodedNode[];
-    /** Convenience view: every recognized Exercise node's choice id + chosen value
-     *  (backwards-compatible with callers that only inspected exercises). */
-    exercises: DecodedExercise[];
-    /** Metadata.synchronizer_id (proto field 3, in the SIGNED block). undefined if
-     *  absent. Pinned to caller intent by the arms when supplied. */
-    synchronizerId?: string | undefined;
-    /** SIGNED Metadata timing fields, microseconds since the Unix epoch, as
-     *  BigInts (undefined if absent). All in the proto's "needs to be signed"
-     *  block, so the agent's signature covers them; the arms sanity-bound them. */
-    preparationTime?: bigint | undefined;
-    minLedgerEffectiveTime?: bigint | undefined;
-    maxLedgerEffectiveTime?: bigint | undefined;
-    maxRecordTime?: bigint | undefined;
-    /** Every Create `argument` Value carried in Metadata.input_contracts (proto
-     *  field 7, SIGNED): the authenticated input-contract set. Scanned by the
-     *  foreign-party backstop so a party that appears ONLY inside an input
-     *  contract's payload (never in a transaction node) still surfaces. */
-    inputContractValues: Uint8Array[];
-    /** The node-level `repeated string party` fields of each Metadata.input_contracts
-     *  Create — signatories (field 6) + stakeholders (field 7) + any contract-key
-     *  parties (field 8). The V2 metadata hasher binds disclosed/input contracts via
-     *  `hashNode(toCreateNode)` → addCreateNode, which hashes argument + signatories
-     *  + stakeholders, so these party fields ARE covered by the agent's signature;
-     *  the backstop scans them so a foreign party placed ONLY as an input-contract
-     *  signatory/stakeholder (not in its argument) still surfaces. */
-    inputContractPartyMeta: string[];
-    /** The SAME authenticated input contracts, GROUPED and carrying identity +
-     *  template. The flattened lists above are unchanged and remain the generic
-     *  backstop's input; this grouped view exists so a party occurrence can be
-     *  related to the contract that explains it (provenance) instead of being
-     *  accepted by value. */
-    inputContracts: DecodedInputContract[];
-}
-/**
- * Decode a base64 `PreparedTransaction` into the bits we validate.
- *
- * Enumerates EVERY node in DamlTransaction.nodes — every node-version member and
- * every node-type oneof member — recording unrecognized ones as
- * present-but-unvalidated (never silently skipping them). The single allowed
- * root exercise, no-orphan reachability, and the all-nodes value backstop are
- * enforced by the per-arm invariant (`assertSingleAllowedRootExercise`).
- */
-export declare function decodePrepared(preparedTransactionB64: string): DecodedPrepared;
-/**
- * Party leaves split by WHERE they appear, for the position-aware foreign-party
- * backstop (the fix for the unpinned-admin/dso neutralization bypass):
- *   - `rootArg`     : party leaves inside the validated root exercise's
- *                     chosen_value (where the admin/dso legitimately sits, at a
- *                     known field position).
- *   - `elsewhere`   : EVERY other party occurrence anywhere else in the signed
- *                     message — sibling/consequence node Value payloads, the
- *                     node-level `repeated string party` metadata
- *                     (signatories/stakeholders/acting_parties/choice_observers/
- *                     key-maintainers) of ANY node, and the Create arguments of
- *                     Metadata.input_contracts. The admin/dso is NOT auto-allowed
- *                     here just because it equals the relay-supplied value at its
- *                     root position (that value-global exemption is exactly the
- *                     neutralization hole); it is allowed here ONLY if pinned to
- *                     an independently-trusted value. Without a trusted pin a
- *                     relay-controlled admin/dso appearing here is FOREIGN (fail
- *                     closed) — a value-moving caller must plumb a trusted pin.
- */
-/** One authenticated `Metadata.input_contracts` entry, grouped (see
- *  {@link DecodedPrepared.inputContracts}). */
-export interface DecodedInputContract {
-    contractId?: string;
-    templateQualifiedName?: string;
-    argument?: Uint8Array;
-    signatories: string[];
-    stakeholders: string[];
-}
-interface ExtractedTransfer {
-    sender: string;
-    receiver: string;
-    amount: string;
-    instrumentAdmin: string;
-    instrumentId: string;
-}
-/**
- * Extract the transfer body (sender/receiver/amount/instrument) from a
- * TransferFactory_Transfer choice argument, BY TYPE at its structural position.
- */
-export declare function extractTransfer(chosenValue: Uint8Array): ExtractedTransfer;
-export interface PreparedTransferExpectation {
-    /** The agent's own party — must be the transfer sender (caller intent). */
-    sender: string;
-    /** The intended recipient (merchant payTo / withdraw target) — caller intent. */
-    receiver: string;
-    /** The EXACT amount string the agent asked to transfer — caller intent. */
-    amount: string;
-    /**
-     * The instrument id the agent expects (e.g. "Amulet"). Caller intent — the
-     * agent chooses what asset to pay in. The instrument ADMIN (DSO party) is
-     * resolved by the relay and is deliberately NOT used as a trust anchor: we
-     * never whitelist a relay-supplied party. Pass it only if you have an
-     * independently-trusted value to additionally pin.
-     */
-    instrumentId: string;
-    /** Optional, independently-trusted instrument admin (the DSO party) to pin. When
-     *  supplied it is pinned by exact equality AND becomes the ONLY admin/dso value
-     *  the foreign-party backstop excludes outside its root position — closing the
-     *  "alias the unpinned admin to the attacker and inject it as a consequence
-     *  recipient" neutralization. Pass it whenever you have an out-of-band DSO. */
-    instrumentAdmin?: string;
-    /** Optional, caller-intent synchronizer id (the merchant-advertised domain).
-     *  When supplied, the SIGNED Metadata.synchronizer_id is pinned to it (fail-
-     *  closed if absent/different) so a relay cannot land the agent's signature on a
-     *  domain of its choosing. */
-    synchronizerId?: string;
-    /** Optional, caller-intent template `module:entity` qualified name of the
-     *  TransferFactory the choice runs against (e.g. the token-standard transfer
-     *  factory). When supplied, the exercise's template_id is pinned, closing the
-     *  template/contract-confusion surface. */
-    templateQualifiedName?: string;
-    /** Optional, caller-intent contract id of the factory the exercise targets.
-     *  When supplied, Exercise.contract_id is pinned by exact equality (fail-closed
-     *  on divergence) — defense-in-depth closing the resolve→prepare TOCTOU. No-op
-     *  when omitted (the all-nodes party backstop still contains any redirect). */
-    expectedContractId?: string;
-    /** Inject Date.now() for testability of the timing sanity checks. */
-    nowMs?: number;
-}
-export declare class PreparedDecodeError extends Error {
-    constructor(message: string);
-}
-export declare class PreparedTransferMismatchError extends Error {
-    constructor(message: string);
-}
-/**
- * Canonicalize a CC amount decimal string to a fixed 10-fractional-digit form
- * for VALUE-equality comparison. Canton encodes amounts at 10 decimals
- * ("0.0200000000"); a caller (e.g. `withdraw --amount 0.02`) may pass a short
- * form, so comparing the raw strings would spuriously fail verify-before-sign
- * even though the numeric value is identical. Pure string math (no float) so
- * large amounts keep full precision. A non-numeric input is returned as-is, so
- * it still mismatches (fail-closed).
- *
- * UNIT-BY-SCHEME invariant: BOTH sides of every amount compare here are
- * on-ledger Daml **Decimals** — `t.amount` is decoded from the prepared tx's
- * `Value.numeric` (always a ledger Decimal) and `expect.amount` is the caller's
- * INTENDED ledger Decimal (the relay/agent path sources `opts.amount` as the
- * Decimal, never the x402 wire atomic value). `canonicalAmount` therefore only
- * pads Decimals; it must NEVER be fed an atomic integer (an atomic "1" would
- * canonicalize to "1.0000000000" and silently mis-compare against the ledger
- * "0.0000000001"). If a future caller ever sources `expect.amount` from an
- * atomic-scheme wire, it MUST first convert via
- * `wireAmountToLedgerDecimal(scheme, amount)` from @ftptech/x402-canton-core.
- */
-export declare function canonicalAmount(raw: string): string;
-export declare function assertPreparedTransferMatches(preparedTransactionB64: string, expect: PreparedTransferExpectation): void;
-/** Caller-intent expectation for a `TransferInstruction_Accept` (claim) prepare. */
-export interface PreparedAcceptExpectation {
-    /** The agent's own party — must be the authoritative submitter (act_as). */
-    selfParty: string;
-    /** Inject Date.now() for testability of the timing sanity checks. */
-    nowMs?: number;
-}
-/**
- * Assert the relay-returned `preparedTransaction` for the claim path encodes
- * EXACTLY a single `TransferInstruction_Accept` exercise submitted by the agent —
- * and is NOT an outbound transfer/create-transfer-command drain. Throws
- * `PreparedTransferMismatchError` on any mismatch and `PreparedDecodeError` if
- * the bytes are not a decodable PreparedTransaction. Call BEFORE signing the
- * hash. Fail-closed: anything not positively proven to be an inbound accept by
- * the agent throws.
- */
-export declare function assertPreparedAcceptMatches(preparedTransactionB64: string, expect: PreparedAcceptExpectation): void;
-/**
- * How to bind the relay-returned `hash` to the `preparedTransaction` bytes the
- * agent just structurally validated. Exactly one of these must hold for a
- * value-moving transfer, or we refuse to sign (fail-closed).
- */
+export { decodePrepared, extractTransfer, canonicalAmount, assertPreparedTransferMatches, assertPreparedAcceptMatches, PreparedDecodeError, PreparedTransferMismatchError, } from "@ftptech/x402-canton-core";
+export type { DecodedPrepared, DecodedNode, DecodedExercise, DecodedInputContract, PreparedTransferExpectation, PreparedAcceptExpectation, } from "@ftptech/x402-canton-core";
 export interface HashBindingOptions {
     /**
      * A function that recomputes the signing hash from the prepared-transaction
@@ -366,5 +121,4 @@ export declare function assertOnboardingTopologyBindsKey(onboardingTransactionsB
  * which #1 already prevents). Field-level pinning is the hardening follow-up.
  */
 export declare function assertPreparedSelfPreapproval(preparedTransactionB64: string, party: string): void;
-export {};
 //# sourceMappingURL=verify-prepared.d.ts.map

package/dist/verify-prepared.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"verify-prepared.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/verify-prepared.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAq1BA,UAAU,eAAe;IACvB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;IACxB;;;;kEAI8D;IAC9D,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;IAChC;;;;qDAIiD;IACjD,qBAAqB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;CAC5C;AAED;iFACiF;AACjF,KAAK,QAAQ,GAAG,QAAQ,GAAG,OAAO,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG,cAAc,CAAC;AAE9E;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,UAAU,WAAW;IACnB,0EAA0E;IAC1E,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf;;;qCAGiC;IACjC,iBAAiB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IAC3B;0EACsE;IACtE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;IAC5B,8EAA8E;IAC9E,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,eAAe,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;IACvC;;;;;qDAKiD;IACjD,MAAM,CAAC,EACH;QAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;QAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,GAAG,SAAS,CAAA;KAAE,GACjF,SAAS,CAAC;IACd;;qEAEiE;IACjE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACnB;;;+EAG2E;IAC3E,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;IACrB;;;;;;qEAMiE;IACjE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;CACrB;AAED,UAAU,eAAe;IACvB,+EAA+E;IAC/E,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAChB,sEAAsE;IACtE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAChB,gFAAgF;IAChF,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;IACrB;6EACyE;IACzE,SAAS,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;IAC7B;qEACiE;IACjE,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;IACpC;;mFAE+E;IAC/E,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;IACrC,sBAAsB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;IAC5C,sBAAsB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;IAC5C,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;IACnC;;;2EAGuE;IACvE,mBAAmB,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;IAClC;;;;;;sEAMkE;IAClE,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACjC;;;;6BAIyB;IACzB,cAAc,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,CAAC;CACxC;AA6LD;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,wBAAgB,cAAc,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,eAAe,CA2J9E;AA+YD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH;+CAC+C;AAC/C,MAAM,WAAW,oBAAoB;IACnC,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB,qBAAqB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC/B,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;IACtB,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACtB,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;CACxB;AAyYD,UAAU,iBAAiB;IACzB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACxB,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACtB;AAyED;;;GAGG;AACH,wBAAgB,eAAe,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,GAAG,iBAAiB,CAqE1E;AAMD,MAAM,WAAW,2BAA2B;IAC1C,2EAA2E;IAC3E,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,iFAAiF;IACjF,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,2EAA2E;IAC3E,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf;;;;;;OAMG;IACH,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACrB;;;;mFAI+E;IAC/E,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACzB;;;kCAG8B;IAC9B,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACxB;;;+CAG2C;IAC3C,qBAAqB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC/B;;;mFAG+E;IAC/E,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC5B,qEAAqE;IACrE,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAChB;AAED,qBAAa,mBAAoB,SAAQ,KAAK;gBAChC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM;CAI5B;AAED,qBAAa,6BAA8B,SAAQ,KAAK;gBAC1C,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM;CAI5B;AAuDD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAmBG;AACH,wBAAgB,eAAe,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAUnD;AAED,wBAAgB,6BAA6B,CAC3C,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,EAC9B,MAAM,EAAE,2BAA2B,GAClC,IAAI,CAsGN;AAyCD,oFAAoF;AACpF,MAAM,WAAW,yBAAyB;IACxC,4EAA4E;IAC5E,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,qEAAqE;IACrE,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAChB;AAED;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,wBAAgB,2BAA2B,CACzC,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,EAC9B,MAAM,EAAE,yBAAyB,GAChC,IAAI,CAyBN;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,kBAAkB;IACjC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAiBG;IACH,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;IAC7E;;;;;;;;;;;;OAYG;IACH,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;CAC1B;AAED,iFAAiF;AACjF,qBAAa,4BAA6B,SAAQ,KAAK;gBACzC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM;CAI5B;AAgBD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA2BG;AACH,wBAAsB,iBAAiB,CACrC,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,EAC9B,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EACf,IAAI,GAAE,kBAAuB,GAC5B,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CA4Df;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,wBAAgB,wBAAwB,CACtC,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,EAC9B,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GACd,OAAO,CAIT;AAoDD;6EAC6E;AAC7E,qBAAa,+BAAgC,SAAQ,KAAK;gBAC5C,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM;CAI5B;AAED,uEAAuE;AACvE,MAAM,WAAW,6BAA6B;IAC5C,+EAA+E;IAC/E,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACzB,iEAAiE;IACjE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACd,4EAA4E;IAC5E,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAC9B;AA+BD;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAgB,gCAAgC,CAC9C,yBAAyB,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,EACnC,MAAM,EAAE,6BAA6B,GACpC,IAAI,CA0EN;AAkND;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAwBG;AACH,wBAAgB,6BAA6B,CAC3C,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,EAC9B,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,GACZ,IAAI,CAwBN"}
+{"version":3,"file":"verify-prepared.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/verify-prepared.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AA+GA,OAAO,EACL,cAAc,EACd,eAAe,EACf,eAAe,EACf,6BAA6B,EAC7B,2BAA2B,EAC3B,mBAAmB,EACnB,6BAA6B,GAC9B,MAAM,2BAA2B,CAAC;AACnC,YAAY,EACV,eAAe,EACf,WAAW,EACX,eAAe,EACf,oBAAoB,EACpB,2BAA2B,EAC3B,yBAAyB,GAC1B,MAAM,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAMnC,MAAM,WAAW,kBAAkB;IACjC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAiBG;IACH,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;IAC7E;;;;;;;;;;;;OAYG;IACH,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;CAC1B;AAED,iFAAiF;AACjF,qBAAa,4BAA6B,SAAQ,KAAK;gBACzC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM;CAI5B;AAgBD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA2BG;AACH,wBAAsB,iBAAiB,CACrC,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,EAC9B,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EACf,IAAI,GAAE,kBAAuB,GAC5B,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CA4Df;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,wBAAgB,wBAAwB,CACtC,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,EAC9B,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GACd,OAAO,CAIT;AAoDD;6EAC6E;AAC7E,qBAAa,+BAAgC,SAAQ,KAAK;gBAC5C,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM;CAI5B;AAED,uEAAuE;AACvE,MAAM,WAAW,6BAA6B;IAC5C,+EAA+E;IAC/E,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACzB,iEAAiE;IACjE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACd,4EAA4E;IAC5E,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAC9B;AA+BD;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAgB,gCAAgC,CAC9C,yBAAyB,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,EACnC,MAAM,EAAE,6BAA6B,GACpC,IAAI,CA0EN;AAkND;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAwBG;AACH,wBAAgB,6BAA6B,CAC3C,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,EAC9B,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,GACZ,IAAI,CAwBN"}