@ftptech/canton-agent-wallet 0.1.15 → 0.1.16
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/cli-args.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/cli-args.js +4 -0
- package/dist/cli-args.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/cli.js +41 -2
- package/dist/cli.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/onboard.d.ts +8 -0
- package/dist/onboard.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/onboard.js +13 -4
- package/dist/onboard.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/pay.d.ts +27 -0
- package/dist/pay.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/pay.js +33 -12
- package/dist/pay.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/relay-client.d.ts +102 -0
- package/dist/relay-client.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/relay-client.js +42 -0
- package/dist/relay-client.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/relay-signer.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/relay-signer.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/relay-signer.js +127 -1
- package/dist/relay-signer.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tx.d.ts +228 -0
- package/dist/tx.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tx.js +416 -1
- package/dist/tx.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/verify-prepared.d.ts +231 -0
- package/dist/verify-prepared.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/verify-prepared.js +1046 -13
- package/dist/verify-prepared.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +2 -2
package/dist/relay-signer.js
CHANGED
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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1
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import { RelayClient } from "./relay-client.js";
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2
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-
import { transfer, createTransferCommand } from "./tx.js";
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2
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+
import { transfer, createTransferCommand, allocate, createSenderConsent } from "./tx.js";
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import { resolveHashBinding } from "./hash-binding.js";
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import { resolveTrustedDsoParty } from "./trusted-dso.js";
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export function makeRelaySigner(wallet, opts = {}) {
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@@ -17,9 +17,41 @@ export function makeRelaySigner(wallet, opts = {}) {
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// auto-DSO then works for any mainnet payment no matter how the wallet was
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// created. Without a resolvable DSO, value-moving prepared bytes carrying it
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// outside the root choice arg are refused (fail-closed).
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// Spend breaker — applied at the TOP of BOTH signer arms, fail-CLOSED, BEFORE
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// any relay call. Refuses to sign a merchant-quoted amount above the caller's
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// ceiling or to a payee the caller did not authorize. Both pins are OPTIONAL;
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// unset means the corresponding check is skipped (legacy behavior preserved).
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// The amount is compared as a Number in the SAME unit as `input.amount`,
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// matching the existing balance fast-fail (`Number(bal.cc) < Number(amount)`).
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const enforceSpendLimits = (to, amount) => {
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if (opts.expectedPayTo !== undefined && to !== opts.expectedPayTo) {
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throw new Error(`refusing to sign: payee ${to} does not match the expected payTo ` +
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`${opts.expectedPayTo} (a merchant cannot redirect this payment)`);
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}
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if (opts.maxPaymentValue !== undefined) {
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const want = Number(amount);
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const cap = Number(opts.maxPaymentValue);
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// A configured-but-broken ceiling must FAIL CLOSED, never silently disable
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// the cap: `want > NaN` is always false, so a non-finite cap would wave
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// every amount through. Refuse to sign instead.
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if (!Number.isFinite(cap)) {
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throw new Error(`refusing to sign: configured max payment value ` +
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`${JSON.stringify(opts.maxPaymentValue)} is not a finite number`);
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}
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if (!Number.isFinite(want)) {
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throw new Error(`refusing to sign: payment amount ${JSON.stringify(amount)} is not a ` +
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`finite number`);
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}
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if (want > cap) {
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throw new Error(`refusing to sign: payment amount ${amount} exceeds the max ` +
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`payment value ${opts.maxPaymentValue} (the merchant over-quoted)`);
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}
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}
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};
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return {
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party: wallet.party,
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async signCip56Transfer(input) {
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enforceSpendLimits(input.receiver, input.amount);
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const trustedDso = opts.trustedDso ?? resolveTrustedDsoParty(process.env, wallet.network);
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const updateId = await transfer(relay, wallet, {
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receiver: input.receiver,
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@@ -30,7 +62,101 @@ export function makeRelaySigner(wallet, opts = {}) {
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});
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return { payerParty: wallet.party, updateId, transferInstructionCid: null };
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},
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async signAllocation(input) {
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// Spend breaker FIRST (fail-closed, before any relay call), exactly like
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// the other arms.
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enforceSpendLimits(input.receiver, input.amount);
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const trustedDso = opts.trustedDso ?? resolveTrustedDsoParty(process.env, wallet.network);
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const r = await allocate(relay, wallet, {
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receiver: input.receiver,
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amount: input.amount,
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executor: input.executor,
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synchronizerId: input.synchronizerId,
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allocateBeforeSeconds: input.allocateBeforeSeconds,
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settleBeforeSeconds: input.settleBeforeSeconds,
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...(input.transferMeta ? { transferMeta: input.transferMeta } : {}),
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hashBinding,
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...(trustedDso !== undefined ? { expectInstrumentAdmin: trustedDso } : {}),
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});
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return {
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payerParty: r.payerParty,
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allocationCid: r.allocationCid,
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allocationInstructionCid: r.allocationInstructionCid,
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updateId: r.updateId,
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};
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},
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async signAllocationDirect(input) {
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// Spend breaker FIRST (fail-closed, before any relay call), exactly like
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// the other arms.
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enforceSpendLimits(input.receiver, input.amount);
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// Ensure the standing both-party DirectSettlementConsent {sender, merchant}
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// exists (facilitator-alone mint off the two once-total consents). On the
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// first DIRECT payment the agent's own SenderConsent may not be onboarded
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// yet — `mintDirectConsent` then throws; create it ONCE and retry. If the
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// retry still throws, the MERCHANT has not onboarded its MerchantConsent (the
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// agent cannot create that on the merchant's behalf), so surface a clear,
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// actionable error preserving the original relay error as `cause`.
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let directConsentCid;
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try {
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const mint = await relay.mintDirectConsent({
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sender: wallet.party,
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merchant: input.receiver,
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});
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directConsentCid = mint.directConsentCid;
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}
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catch (firstErr) {
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// The agent's own SenderConsent is the only standing consent it can mint.
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// Create it once (verify-before-sign, the agent's own key) then retry.
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await createSenderConsent(relay, wallet, {
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facilitator: input.executor,
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synchronizerId: input.synchronizerId,
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hashBinding,
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});
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try {
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const mint = await relay.mintDirectConsent({
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sender: wallet.party,
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merchant: input.receiver,
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});
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directConsentCid = mint.directConsentCid;
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}
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catch (retryErr) {
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// Still failing after the sender side is onboarded → the merchant has
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// not onboarded its MerchantConsent. The agent cannot pay direct to a
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// merchant that has not opted into the direct path.
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throw new Error(`cannot pay merchant ${input.receiver} via allocation-direct: it has ` +
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`not onboarded a MerchantConsent with this facilitator yet (the agent ` +
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`created its own SenderConsent but the both-party consent still cannot ` +
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`be minted). The merchant must run merchant-onboard once before it can ` +
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`receive direct payments.`, { cause: retryErr instanceof Error ? retryErr : firstErr });
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}
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}
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const trustedDso = opts.trustedDso ?? resolveTrustedDsoParty(process.env, wallet.network);
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// The on-ledger lock is IDENTICAL to the allocation-api arm (same
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// AllocationFactory_Allocate, receiver = merchant, executor = facilitator);
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// verify-before-sign in `allocate` re-checks every money-critical field.
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const r = await allocate(relay, wallet, {
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receiver: input.receiver,
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amount: input.amount,
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executor: input.executor,
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synchronizerId: input.synchronizerId,
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allocateBeforeSeconds: input.allocateBeforeSeconds,
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settleBeforeSeconds: input.settleBeforeSeconds,
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...(input.transferMeta ? { transferMeta: input.transferMeta } : {}),
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hashBinding,
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...(trustedDso !== undefined ? { expectInstrumentAdmin: trustedDso } : {}),
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});
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return {
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payerParty: r.payerParty,
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allocationCid: r.allocationCid,
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allocationInstructionCid: r.allocationInstructionCid,
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updateId: r.updateId,
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directConsentCid,
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};
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},
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async signTransferCommand(input) {
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// Spend breaker FIRST — before even the balance pre-check, so a refused
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// amount/payee never touches the relay (no network, no info leak).
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enforceSpendLimits(input.receiver, input.amount);
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// Fast-fail an underfunded wallet: without this, an unfunded agent's pay
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// loops the client re-pay retries (each settle just rejects "no inputs")
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// for ~30s and then returns an opaque "rejected" — surface a clear
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package/dist/relay-signer.js.map
CHANGED
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@@ -1 +1 @@
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1
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{"version":3,"file":"relay-signer.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/relay-signer.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAqBA,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAChD,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;
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|
+
{"version":3,"file":"relay-signer.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/relay-signer.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAqBA,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAChD,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AACzF,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AACvD,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAI1D,MAAM,UAAU,eAAe,CAC7B,MAAmB,EACnB,OAuBI,EAAE;IAEN,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IAClF,6EAA6E;IAC7E,2DAA2D;IAC3D,+EAA+E;IAC/E,qCAAqC;IACrC,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;IAC7D,gFAAgF;IAChF,4EAA4E;IAC5E,4EAA4E;IAC5E,6EAA6E;IAC7E,6EAA6E;IAC7E,2EAA2E;IAC3E,6EAA6E;IAC7E,yDAAyD;IACzD,8EAA8E;IAC9E,8EAA8E;IAC9E,8EAA8E;IAC9E,8EAA8E;IAC9E,yEAAyE;IACzE,+EAA+E;IAC/E,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAG,CAAC,EAAU,EAAE,MAAc,EAAQ,EAAE;QAC9D,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;YAClE,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACb,2BAA2B,EAAE,qCAAqC;gBAChE,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,4CAA4C,CACpE,CAAC;QACJ,CAAC;QACD,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACvC,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;YAC5B,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC;YACzC,2EAA2E;YAC3E,wEAAwE;YACxE,gDAAgD;YAChD,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;gBAC1B,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACb,iDAAiD;oBAC/C,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,yBAAyB,CACnE,CAAC;YACJ,CAAC;YACD,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;gBAC3B,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACb,oCAAoC,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,YAAY;oBACpE,eAAe,CAClB,CAAC;YACJ,CAAC;YACD,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;gBACf,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACb,oCAAoC,MAAM,mBAAmB;oBAC3D,iBAAiB,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,6BAA6B,CACrE,CAAC;YACJ,CAAC;QACH,CAAC;IACH,CAAC,CAAC;IACF,OAAO;QACL,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK;QACnB,KAAK,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,KAAK;YAC3B,kBAAkB,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;YACjD,MAAM,UAAU,GACd,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,IAAI,sBAAsB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;YACzE,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE;gBAC7C,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ;gBACxB,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM;gBACpB,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;gBAC3D,WAAW;gBACX,GAAG,CAAC,UAAU,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;aAC3E,CAAC,CAAC;YACH,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;QAC9E,CAAC;QACD,KAAK,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,KAAK;YACxB,yEAAyE;YACzE,kBAAkB;YAClB,kBAAkB,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;YACjD,MAAM,UAAU,GACd,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,IAAI,sBAAsB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;YACzE,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE;gBACtC,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ;gBACxB,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM;gBACpB,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ;gBACxB,cAAc,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,cAAc;gBACpC,qBAAqB,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,qBAAqB;gBAClD,mBAAmB,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,mBAAmB;gBAC9C,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;gBACnE,WAAW;gBACX,GAAG,CAAC,UAAU,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;aAC3E,CAAC,CAAC;YACH,OAAO;gBACL,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU;gBACxB,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,aAAa;gBAC9B,wBAAwB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,wBAAwB;gBACpD,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ;aACrB,CAAC;QACJ,CAAC;QACD,KAAK,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,KAAK;YAC9B,yEAAyE;YACzE,kBAAkB;YAClB,kBAAkB,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;YACjD,4EAA4E;YAC5E,0EAA0E;YAC1E,0EAA0E;YAC1E,0EAA0E;YAC1E,8EAA8E;YAC9E,0EAA0E;YAC1E,mEAAmE;YACnE,IAAI,gBAAwB,CAAC;YAC7B,IAAI,CAAC;gBACH,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC;oBACzC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK;oBACpB,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ;iBACzB,CAAC,CAAC;gBACH,gBAAgB,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC;YAC3C,CAAC;YAAC,OAAO,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;gBAClB,0EAA0E;gBAC1E,uEAAuE;gBACvE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE;oBACvC,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAC3B,cAAc,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,cAAc;oBACpC,WAAW;iBACZ,CAAC,CAAC;gBACH,IAAI,CAAC;oBACH,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC;wBACzC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK;wBACpB,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ;qBACzB,CAAC,CAAC;oBACH,gBAAgB,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC;gBAC3C,CAAC;gBAAC,OAAO,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;oBAClB,sEAAsE;oBACtE,sEAAsE;oBACtE,oDAAoD;oBACpD,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACb,uBAAuB,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ,iCAAiC;wBACpE,uEAAuE;wBACvE,wEAAwE;wBACxE,wEAAwE;wBACxE,0BAA0B,EAC5B,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,YAAY,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAC3D,CAAC;gBACJ,CAAC;YACH,CAAC;YACD,MAAM,UAAU,GACd,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,IAAI,sBAAsB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;YACzE,kEAAkE;YAClE,4EAA4E;YAC5E,yEAAyE;YACzE,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE;gBACtC,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ;gBACxB,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM;gBACpB,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ;gBACxB,cAAc,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,cAAc;gBACpC,qBAAqB,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,qBAAqB;gBAClD,mBAAmB,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,mBAAmB;gBAC9C,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;gBACnE,WAAW;gBACX,GAAG,CAAC,UAAU,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;aAC3E,CAAC,CAAC;YACH,OAAO;gBACL,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,UAA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|
package/dist/tx.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -79,6 +79,110 @@ export declare function createTransferCommand(relay: RelayClient, wallet: AgentW
|
|
|
79
79
|
nonce: number;
|
|
80
80
|
createUpdateId: string;
|
|
81
81
|
}>;
|
|
82
|
+
/**
|
|
83
|
+
* allocation-api (CIP-56 DVP) — exercise `AllocationFactory_Allocate` to LOCK
|
|
84
|
+
* the agent's funds into an Allocation naming the facilitator as
|
|
85
|
+
* settlement.executor. The facilitator later submits Allocation_ExecuteTransfer
|
|
86
|
+
* (sponsored gas) to settle. The agent signs only the lock here (its own key;
|
|
87
|
+
* the choice's sole controller is transferLeg.sender = the agent) — no gas, no
|
|
88
|
+
* nonce, no merchant preapproval.
|
|
89
|
+
*
|
|
90
|
+
* Mirrors the cip56 `transfer` flow: resolve the allocation factory via the
|
|
91
|
+
* relay → build the allocate exercise → VERIFY-before-sign over the EXACT
|
|
92
|
+
* prepared bytes (pinning sender/receiver/amount/instrument + the executor +
|
|
93
|
+
* the deadline window) → sign locally → execute via relay → read back the
|
|
94
|
+
* created Allocation cid from THIS transaction's events.
|
|
95
|
+
*
|
|
96
|
+
* SECURITY: every money/escrow-critical field the verifier pins (sender == own
|
|
97
|
+
* party, receiver == merchant payTo, amount == required, instrument == intent,
|
|
98
|
+
* settlement.executor == facilitatorParty) is CALLER INTENT passed in `opts`,
|
|
99
|
+
* NOT taken from the relay's resolve response. The relay-resolved factory
|
|
100
|
+
* refs/admin/context are used only to BUILD the exercise; they widen nothing the
|
|
101
|
+
* agent will sign. The cid returned moves no funds on its own — the facilitator
|
|
102
|
+
* independently re-validates every field at /verify + /settle, and only the
|
|
103
|
+
* executor (+ baked-in sender/receiver auth) can ever move the locked funds.
|
|
104
|
+
*/
|
|
105
|
+
export declare function allocate(relay: RelayClient, wallet: AgentWallet, opts: {
|
|
106
|
+
/** Merchant party id (PaymentRequirements.payTo). CALLER INTENT. */
|
|
107
|
+
receiver: string;
|
|
108
|
+
/** Daml Decimal amount string (PaymentRequirements.amount). CALLER INTENT. */
|
|
109
|
+
amount: string;
|
|
110
|
+
/** The facilitator party that MUST be settlement.executor
|
|
111
|
+
* (extra.executor = extra.facilitatorParty). CALLER INTENT — pinned by
|
|
112
|
+
* exact equality at the allocation's executor position. */
|
|
113
|
+
executor: string;
|
|
114
|
+
/** Synchronizer id (extra.synchronizerId). CALLER INTENT — pins the prepare's
|
|
115
|
+
* synchronizer + the SIGNED Metadata.synchronizer_id. */
|
|
116
|
+
synchronizerId: string;
|
|
117
|
+
/** Relative allocateBefore deadline (extra.allocateBeforeSeconds). */
|
|
118
|
+
allocateBeforeSeconds: number;
|
|
119
|
+
/** Relative settleBefore deadline (extra.settleBeforeSeconds). MUST be
|
|
120
|
+
* strictly greater than allocateBeforeSeconds. */
|
|
121
|
+
settleBeforeSeconds: number;
|
|
122
|
+
/** Instrument id the agent expects (default "Amulet"). CALLER INTENT. */
|
|
123
|
+
expectInstrumentId?: string;
|
|
124
|
+
/** Optional, independently-trusted instrument admin (DSO) to pin. */
|
|
125
|
+
expectInstrumentAdmin?: string;
|
|
126
|
+
/** x402 reconciliation metadata stamped into transferLeg.meta (paymentId,
|
|
127
|
+
* resourceUrl, version, memo?). */
|
|
128
|
+
transferMeta?: Record<string, string>;
|
|
129
|
+
/** Hash-binding policy; defaults to fail-closed (see HashBindingOptions). */
|
|
130
|
+
hashBinding?: HashBindingOptions;
|
|
131
|
+
}): Promise<{
|
|
132
|
+
payerParty: string;
|
|
133
|
+
/** The Allocation cid (the _Completed case — Amulet creates it synchronously). */
|
|
134
|
+
allocationCid: string | null;
|
|
135
|
+
/** The AllocationInstruction cid (the _Pending case). Track A rejects pending,
|
|
136
|
+
* but the relay surfaces it so the facilitator can return the right error. */
|
|
137
|
+
allocationInstructionCid: string | null;
|
|
138
|
+
/** updateId of the AllocationFactory_Allocate exercise. */
|
|
139
|
+
updateId: string;
|
|
140
|
+
}>;
|
|
141
|
+
/**
|
|
142
|
+
* x402-direct "Design B" onboarding (SENDER side, ONCE-TOTAL). Create the standing
|
|
143
|
+
* `SenderConsent {sender = self, facilitator}` the facilitator later uses to MINT
|
|
144
|
+
* the both-party DirectSettlementConsent for ANY merchant it names. The choice's
|
|
145
|
+
* sole signatory is the SENDER = the agent, so the agent signs only its own create
|
|
146
|
+
* (its own key; no gas, no facilitator signature). Creating the consent MOVES NO
|
|
147
|
+
* FUNDS — it only durably captures the sender's one-time authorization.
|
|
148
|
+
*
|
|
149
|
+
* Mirrors the cip56/v1/allocate flows: build the create exercise → VERIFY-before-sign
|
|
150
|
+
* over the EXACT prepared bytes (pinning the created template + the consent's
|
|
151
|
+
* {sender == self, facilitator} principals + act_as == self, and the foreign-party
|
|
152
|
+
* backstop allowing ONLY {self, facilitator}) → sign locally → execute via the relay
|
|
153
|
+
* → return the create's updateId.
|
|
154
|
+
*
|
|
155
|
+
* SECURITY: every pinned field is CALLER INTENT passed in `opts`, never taken from
|
|
156
|
+
* the relay. A relay-substituted facilitator (which could later mint a both-party
|
|
157
|
+
* consent and settle the agent's allocations) is rejected by the [1] facilitator pin
|
|
158
|
+
* + the foreign-party backstop; a relay-injected value-moving exercise / extra leg /
|
|
159
|
+
* foreign submitter is rejected by the create-root invariant. The cid moves no funds
|
|
160
|
+
* on its own — the facilitator's later DirectSettlementConsent_Execute re-validates
|
|
161
|
+
* every term against the live allocation.
|
|
162
|
+
*/
|
|
163
|
+
export declare function createSenderConsent(relay: RelayClient, wallet: AgentWallet, opts: {
|
|
164
|
+
/** The facilitator party the consent grants (extra.facilitatorParty). CALLER
|
|
165
|
+
* INTENT — pinned by exact equality at the consent's [1] facilitator position. */
|
|
166
|
+
facilitator: string;
|
|
167
|
+
/** Caller-intent synchronizer id to PREPARE on + pin the SIGNED
|
|
168
|
+
* Metadata.synchronizer_id to. The consent lives on a specific synchronizer. */
|
|
169
|
+
synchronizerId: string;
|
|
170
|
+
/** Hash-binding policy; defaults to fail-closed (see HashBindingOptions). */
|
|
171
|
+
hashBinding?: HashBindingOptions;
|
|
172
|
+
}): Promise<string>;
|
|
173
|
+
/**
|
|
174
|
+
* x402-direct "Design B" onboarding (MERCHANT side, ONCE-TOTAL). Symmetric to
|
|
175
|
+
* `createSenderConsent`: create the standing `MerchantConsent {merchant = self,
|
|
176
|
+
* facilitator}` the facilitator later uses to MINT the both-party
|
|
177
|
+
* DirectSettlementConsent (MerchantConsent_Accept) from ANY sender it names. The
|
|
178
|
+
* choice's sole signatory is the MERCHANT = the agent. Creating the consent MOVES NO
|
|
179
|
+
* FUNDS. Same verify-before-sign guarantees as the sender side.
|
|
180
|
+
*/
|
|
181
|
+
export declare function createMerchantConsent(relay: RelayClient, wallet: AgentWallet, opts: {
|
|
182
|
+
facilitator: string;
|
|
183
|
+
synchronizerId: string;
|
|
184
|
+
hashBinding?: HashBindingOptions;
|
|
185
|
+
}): Promise<string>;
|
|
82
186
|
/**
|
|
83
187
|
* Accept every pending incoming transfer (e.g. the agent's initial funding).
|
|
84
188
|
*
|
|
@@ -99,4 +203,128 @@ export declare function claimAll(relay: RelayClient, wallet: AgentWallet, opts?:
|
|
|
99
203
|
claimed: number;
|
|
100
204
|
updateIds: string[];
|
|
101
205
|
}>;
|
|
206
|
+
/**
|
|
207
|
+
* Reclaim a locked allocation: exercise `Allocation_Withdraw` on the agent's own
|
|
208
|
+
* `AmuletAllocation`, returning its locked funds to the agent (Track B — "locked
|
|
209
|
+
* funds always recoverable"). The choice's sole controller is
|
|
210
|
+
* `allocation.transferLeg.sender` = the agent, and `Allocation_Withdraw` returns
|
|
211
|
+
* the funds to the sender BY CONSTRUCTION — there is no attacker-controllable
|
|
212
|
+
* destination in the choice argument.
|
|
213
|
+
*
|
|
214
|
+
* SECURITY: like every path, this is NOT exempt from verify-before-sign. A
|
|
215
|
+
* malicious relay could return a DIFFERENT choice that DOES move value to an
|
|
216
|
+
* attacker (Allocation_ExecuteTransfer / a TransferFactory_Transfer drain), a
|
|
217
|
+
* withdraw of a DIFFERENT allocation, an injected outbound transfer leg, or a
|
|
218
|
+
* foreign-party submission. We pass `kind: "allocation-withdraw"`, which
|
|
219
|
+
* structurally proves the prepared transaction is a single `Allocation_Withdraw`
|
|
220
|
+
* on EXACTLY `opts.allocationCid` (caller intent, REQUIRED contract-id pin),
|
|
221
|
+
* submitted by the agent (act_as == wallet.party), with NO foreign party
|
|
222
|
+
* anywhere — and binds the signed hash to those bytes (fail-closed by default,
|
|
223
|
+
* exactly like the accept/allocate paths). `opts.hashBinding` lets a programmatic
|
|
224
|
+
* caller supply a participant-conformant recompute; the CLI resolves it from the
|
|
225
|
+
* environment (default fail-closed).
|
|
226
|
+
*
|
|
227
|
+
* No caller-intent synchronizer is threaded (like the claim/accept path): the
|
|
228
|
+
* withdraw carries no caller-chosen domain — `prepareSignExecute` omits the
|
|
229
|
+
* synchronizerId arg.
|
|
230
|
+
*/
|
|
231
|
+
export declare function reclaimAllocation(relay: RelayClient, wallet: AgentWallet, opts: {
|
|
232
|
+
allocationCid: string;
|
|
233
|
+
hashBinding?: HashBindingOptions;
|
|
234
|
+
/** CALLER-INTENT reference parties for the lock-expiry withdraw: the
|
|
235
|
+
* allocation executor / lock holder (facilitator) and the instrument admin
|
|
236
|
+
* (DSO). Supply when the allocation was locked to a facilitator (Design A) so
|
|
237
|
+
* the verify foreign-party backstop permits the AmuletRules/round/unlock refs
|
|
238
|
+
* these two legitimately produce. Omit on the no-lock path. */
|
|
239
|
+
facilitator?: string;
|
|
240
|
+
instrumentAdmin?: string;
|
|
241
|
+
/** CALLER-INTENT allocation RECEIVER (the merchant). Supply for a "Design B"
|
|
242
|
+
* DIRECT allocation, where the receiver is the MERCHANT (not the facilitator)
|
|
243
|
+
* — the legitimate `Allocation_Withdraw` expire-lock choice-context then
|
|
244
|
+
* references the merchant party, so the verify foreign-party backstop must
|
|
245
|
+
* permit EXACTLY this caller-pinned party. Pass the allocation's known
|
|
246
|
+
* receiver (never a relay-supplied value). Omit for "Design A" escrow, where
|
|
247
|
+
* receiver == facilitator (already permitted) — behavior is then unchanged. */
|
|
248
|
+
receiver?: string;
|
|
249
|
+
}): Promise<string>;
|
|
250
|
+
/**
|
|
251
|
+
* x402-escrow "Design A" ACCEPT: the SENDER (the agent — an external party whose
|
|
252
|
+
* key the agent-wallet holds) exercises `X402EscrowOffer_Accept` on an
|
|
253
|
+
* `X402EscrowOffer` the facilitator created, to capture its one-time
|
|
254
|
+
* authorization. ACCEPTING MOVES NO FUNDS — it only archives the offer and creates
|
|
255
|
+
* the `X402Escrow` whose signatories are {facilitator, sender}; the facilitator
|
|
256
|
+
* later settles the locked allocation ALONE off the joint authority captured here.
|
|
257
|
+
* The choice's sole controller is the offer's `sender` = the agent, so the agent
|
|
258
|
+
* signs only its own accept (its own key; no gas, no merchant signature).
|
|
259
|
+
*
|
|
260
|
+
* Mirrors the reclaim (`reclaimAllocation` / `Allocation_Withdraw`) flow: build
|
|
261
|
+
* the exercise → VERIFY-before-sign over the EXACT prepared bytes → sign locally →
|
|
262
|
+
* execute via the relay → read back the created `X402Escrow` cid from THIS
|
|
263
|
+
* transaction's events (the agent is relay-only). The sender is an OBSERVER of the
|
|
264
|
+
* offer (not a stakeholder that has it in its ACS), so the offer contract is
|
|
265
|
+
* DISCLOSED via `opts.offerDisclosedContract` (the facilitator surfaces its
|
|
266
|
+
* created_event_blob).
|
|
267
|
+
*
|
|
268
|
+
* SECURITY: like every path, this is NOT exempt from verify-before-sign. A
|
|
269
|
+
* malicious relay could return a DIFFERENT, value-MOVING choice (an
|
|
270
|
+
* Allocation_ExecuteTransfer / TransferFactory_Transfer / CreateTransferCommand /
|
|
271
|
+
* Allocation_Withdraw drain), an accept of a DIFFERENT offer, an injected outbound
|
|
272
|
+
* transfer leg as a consequence, a relay-SUBSTITUTED facilitator (who could later
|
|
273
|
+
* settle the escrow to an attacker), or a foreign-party submission. We pass
|
|
274
|
+
* `kind: "escrow-accept"`, which structurally proves the prepared transaction is a
|
|
275
|
+
* single `X402EscrowOffer_Accept` on EXACTLY `opts.offerCid` (caller intent,
|
|
276
|
+
* REQUIRED contract-id pin), submitted by the agent (act_as == wallet.party),
|
|
277
|
+
* creating an escrow only among the caller-intended {sender, facilitator
|
|
278
|
+
* (+merchant/instrumentAdmin)} parties — and binds the signed hash to those bytes
|
|
279
|
+
* (fail-closed by default, exactly like the reclaim/accept paths). `opts.hashBinding`
|
|
280
|
+
* lets a programmatic caller supply a participant-conformant recompute; the CLI
|
|
281
|
+
* resolves it from the environment (default fail-closed).
|
|
282
|
+
*
|
|
283
|
+
* Returns `{ escrowCid, updateId }`. `escrowCid` is read back via the relay from
|
|
284
|
+
* the accept transaction's events; it is `null` if the relay could not resolve it
|
|
285
|
+
* within its poll budget (the cid moves no funds — the facilitator independently
|
|
286
|
+
* re-validates the escrow + allocation terms at settle).
|
|
287
|
+
*/
|
|
288
|
+
export declare function acceptEscrowOffer(relay: RelayClient, wallet: AgentWallet, opts: {
|
|
289
|
+
/** The `X402EscrowOffer` cid to accept. CALLER INTENT — REQUIRED contract-id
|
|
290
|
+
* pin (the verify arm refuses an accept of any other contract). */
|
|
291
|
+
offerCid: string;
|
|
292
|
+
/** The offer's resolved templateId for the exercise target. The choice is
|
|
293
|
+
* exercised THROUGH `#x402-escrow:X402Escrow:X402EscrowOffer` by default; pass
|
|
294
|
+
* a concrete (package-id-qualified) templateId to override. */
|
|
295
|
+
offerTemplateId?: string;
|
|
296
|
+
/** The facilitator party (offer signatory; settles alone). CALLER INTENT —
|
|
297
|
+
* pinned + added to the allowed-escrow-party set. REQUIRED. */
|
|
298
|
+
facilitator: string;
|
|
299
|
+
/** Optional merchant party recorded on the created escrow (reference-only).
|
|
300
|
+
* Supply when the honest escrow names a distinct merchant so the backstop
|
|
301
|
+
* allows it; omit when merchant collapses onto facilitator/sender. */
|
|
302
|
+
merchant?: string;
|
|
303
|
+
/** Optional instrument admin (DSO) recorded on the created escrow. */
|
|
304
|
+
instrumentAdmin?: string;
|
|
305
|
+
/** Optional Decimal amount the sender intends the escrow to settle. CALLER
|
|
306
|
+
* INTENT — when supplied, the verify arm pins the created `X402Escrow`'s
|
|
307
|
+
* recorded `amount` (a Numeric the party-leaf backstop cannot see) to it by
|
|
308
|
+
* canonical equality, closing the amount-swap gap where a malicious/buggy
|
|
309
|
+
* facilitator authored the offer with an inflated amount. Never taken from the
|
|
310
|
+
* relay. Omit only when the caller has no intended amount to assert. */
|
|
311
|
+
amount?: string;
|
|
312
|
+
/** The sender is an OBSERVER of the offer, so disclose the offer contract.
|
|
313
|
+
* Shape mirrors the v1 EPAR / allocation disclosed-contract envelope. */
|
|
314
|
+
offerDisclosedContract?: {
|
|
315
|
+
templateId: string;
|
|
316
|
+
contractId: string;
|
|
317
|
+
createdEventBlob: string;
|
|
318
|
+
synchronizerId: string;
|
|
319
|
+
};
|
|
320
|
+
/** Caller-intent synchronizer id to PREPARE on + pin the SIGNED
|
|
321
|
+
* Metadata.synchronizer_id to. REQUIRED (the accept carries a caller-chosen
|
|
322
|
+
* domain — the offer/escrow live on a specific synchronizer). */
|
|
323
|
+
synchronizerId: string;
|
|
324
|
+
/** Hash-binding policy; defaults to fail-closed (see HashBindingOptions). */
|
|
325
|
+
hashBinding?: HashBindingOptions;
|
|
326
|
+
}): Promise<{
|
|
327
|
+
escrowCid: string | null;
|
|
328
|
+
updateId: string;
|
|
329
|
+
}>;
|
|
102
330
|
//# sourceMappingURL=tx.d.ts.map
|
package/dist/tx.d.ts.map
CHANGED
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
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|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"tx.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/tx.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AASA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AACrD,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAC9C,OAAO,EASL,KAAK,kBAAkB,EAQxB,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAqM9B;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,wBAAsB,QAAQ,CAC5B,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAClB,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,EACnB,IAAI,EAAE;IACJ,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9B,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC5B;;6DAEyD;IACzD,oBAAoB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC9B;;;6EAGyE;IACzE,qBAAqB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC/B;;;;;OAKG;IACH,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC;CAClC,GACA,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAkEjB;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgBG;AACH,wBAAsB,qBAAqB,CACzC,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAClB,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,EACnB,IAAI,EAAE;IACJ,oEAAoE;IACpE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,wEAAwE;IACxE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf;gFAC4E;IAC5E,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB;oFACgF;IAChF,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB;iFAC6E;IAC7E,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB,wDAAwD;IACxD,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACrB;;;;;;8EAM0E;IAC1E,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACrB,6EAA6E;IAC7E,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC;CAClC,GACA,OAAO,CAAC;IAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAAC,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAAC,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAAE,CAAC,CAsHpG;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAsBG;AACH,wBAAsB,QAAQ,CAC5B,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAClB,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,EACnB,IAAI,EAAE;IACJ,oEAAoE;IACpE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,8EAA8E;IAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf;;gEAE4D;IAC5D,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB;8DAC0D;IAC1D,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,sEAAsE;IACtE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC9B;uDACmD;IACnD,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC5B,yEAAyE;IACzE,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC5B,qEAAqE;IACrE,qBAAqB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC/B;wCACoC;IACpC,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IACtC,6EAA6E;IAC7E,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC;CAClC,GACA,OAAO,CAAC;IACT,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACnB,kFAAkF;IAClF,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IAC7B;mFAC+E;IAC/E,wBAAwB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IACxC,2DAA2D;IAC3D,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAClB,CAAC,CA0GD;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AACH,wBAAsB,mBAAmB,CACvC,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAClB,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,EACnB,IAAI,EAAE;IACJ;uFACmF;IACnF,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB;qFACiF;IACjF,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,6EAA6E;IAC7E,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC;CAClC,GACA,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAUjB;AAED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,wBAAsB,qBAAqB,CACzC,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAClB,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,EACnB,IAAI,EAAE;IACJ,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC;CAClC,GACA,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAUjB;AA+CD;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AACH,wBAAsB,QAAQ,CAC5B,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAClB,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,EACnB,IAAI,GAAE;IAAE,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAA;CAAO,GAC9C,OAAO,CAAC;IAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAAC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAA;CAAE,CAAC,CA8BnD;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAwBG;AACH,wBAAsB,iBAAiB,CACrC,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAClB,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,EACnB,IAAI,EAAE;IACJ,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACtB,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC;IACjC;;;;oEAIgE;IAChE,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACrB,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACzB;;;;;;oFAMgF;IAChF,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACnB,GACA,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAyCjB;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqCG;AACH,wBAAsB,iBAAiB,CACrC,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAClB,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,EACnB,IAAI,EAAE;IACJ;wEACoE;IACpE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB;;oEAEgE;IAChE,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACzB;oEACgE;IAChE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB;;2EAEuE;IACvE,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,sEAAsE;IACtE,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACzB;;;;;6EAKyE;IACzE,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB;8EAC0E;IAC1E,sBAAsB,CAAC,EAAE;QACvB,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QACnB,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QACnB,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QACzB,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;KACxB,CAAC;IACF;;sEAEkE;IAClE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,6EAA6E;IAC7E,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC;CAClC,GACA,OAAO,CAAC;IAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAAE,CAAC,CAqEzD"}
|