@ftptech/canton-agent-wallet 0.1.0

package/dist/tx.js

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+/**
+ * Transfer primitives for the agent's self-custody wallet, all routed through
+ * the relay: resolve the factory / accept context (the agent has no Scan
+ * access), build the choice, sign the prepared-tx hash LOCALLY with the agent's
+ * key, execute via the relay. The relay only prepares + forwards; it can never
+ * sign, so it can never move the agent's funds.
+ */
+import { signHashB64 } from "./keys.js";
+import { resolveHashBinding } from "./hash-binding.js";
+import { assertHashBinding, assertPreparedTransferMatches, assertPreparedCreateTransferCommandMatches, assertPreparedAcceptMatches, } from "./verify-prepared.js";
+const TI_IFACE = "#splice-api-token-transfer-instruction-v1:Splice.Api.Token.TransferInstructionV1:TransferInstruction";
+/**
+ * The instrument id the agent's self-custody wallet pays in: Canton Coin is the
+ * Splice "Amulet" instrument. This is CALLER INTENT — a fixed value the agent
+ * knows independently of the relay — so it can be used as a trust anchor when
+ * verifying the relay-prepared transfer. We deliberately do NOT anchor on the
+ * relay-resolved instrument ADMIN (the DSO party), because trusting a
+ * relay-supplied party as a whitelist is exactly the trust-boundary inversion a
+ * compromised relay would exploit. The recipient is pinned to caller intent and
+ * the instrument id to this constant; the admin is validated only positionally.
+ */
+const EXPECTED_INSTRUMENT_ID = "Amulet";
+function rid(prefix) {
+    return `${prefix}-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
+}
+/**
+ * prepare (relay) → VERIFY → sign hash (local key) → execute (relay) → updateId.
+ *
+ * When `verify` is supplied (any command that MOVES the agent's funds), the
+ * EXACT `preparedTransaction` bytes that will be submitted to `execute` are
+ * structurally decoded and checked to encode exactly the intended
+ * sender/receiver/amount/(instrument|delegate) BEFORE the agent signs its hash,
+ * and the hash is bound to those same bytes. This is the self-custody guarantee:
+ * a compromised relay cannot get the agent to sign a command it did not author —
+ * any tamper either fails structural validation here, or (since the participant
+ * recomputes the hash from the submitted bytes on execute) produces a signature
+ * that the participant rejects. We fail closed: if validation or hash binding
+ * does not pass, we never sign. See `verify-prepared.ts`.
+ *
+ * SECURITY: `verify` is REQUIRED for EVERY path — no caller can reach
+ * `signHashB64` without a structural gate. The claim path (accepting incoming
+ * transfers) is NOT exempt: it passes `kind: "accept"`, which structurally
+ * proves the prepared transaction is a single `TransferInstruction_Accept`
+ * submitted by the agent and NOT a relay-injected outbound drain. `hashBinding`
+ * is likewise threaded on every path and enforced fail-closed.
+ */
+async function prepareSignExecute(relay, wallet, commands, disclosedContracts, verify, hashBinding, 
+/** Caller-intent synchronizer id to PREPARE on. When supplied we send it in
+ *  the prepare body so the relay cannot silently fill its own — and the verify
+ *  arm pins the SIGNED Metadata.synchronizer_id to it. Omitted for the claim
+ *  (funds-in) path, whose accept carries no caller-intent domain. */
+synchronizerId) {
+    const prep = await relay.submitPrepare({
+        userId: "agent", // relay overrides with the participant (m2m) user
+        commandId: rid("agent"),
+        actAs: [wallet.party],
+        commands,
+        disclosedContracts,
+        packageIdSelectionPreference: [],
+        verboseHashing: false,
+        // Pin the synchronizer to caller intent so the relay cannot prepare on (and
+        // sign the agent onto) a domain of its choosing. The verify arm additionally
+        // asserts the SIGNED Metadata.synchronizer_id equals this.
+        ...(synchronizerId !== undefined ? { synchronizerId } : {}),
+    });
+    // Bind to the EXACT bytes we will submit (single source `prep`, no TOCTOU).
+    const preparedTransaction = prep.preparedTransaction;
+    // VERIFY-BEFORE-SIGN: never sign a relay-prepared command we didn't author.
+    // `verify` is required on EVERY path (transfer/createTransferCommand/accept),
+    // so there is no branch that reaches signHashB64 ungated.
+    if (verify.kind === "cip56") {
+        assertPreparedTransferMatches(preparedTransaction, verify.expect);
+    }
+    else if (verify.kind === "v1") {
+        assertPreparedCreateTransferCommandMatches(preparedTransaction, verify.expect);
+    }
+    else {
+        // claim path: structurally prove the prepared tx is a single inbound
+        // TransferInstruction_Accept by the agent, not an outbound drain.
+        assertPreparedAcceptMatches(preparedTransaction, verify.expect);
+    }
+    // Hash binding: prove the hash we are about to sign is the hash OF THE BYTES
+    // we just validated, not an opaque relay-chosen value. Without this a
+    // compromised relay can return honest bytes + the hash of a tampered tx and
+    // swap the bytes on the way to the participant. Fail closed: if the binding
+    // cannot be established (no recompute available and no explicit opt-in to
+    // trust the relay hash) we never sign. See verify-prepared.ts.
+    await assertHashBinding(preparedTransaction, prep.hash, hashBinding ?? {});
+    const signature = signHashB64(prep.hash, wallet.privateKeyPkcs8Pem);
+    const exec = await relay.submitExecute({
+        submissionId: rid("agent-exec"),
+        preparedTransaction,
+        hashingSchemeVersion: "HASHING_SCHEME_VERSION_V2",
+        partySignatures: {
+            signatures: [
+                {
+                    party: wallet.party,
+                    signatures: [
+                        {
+                            format: "SIGNATURE_FORMAT_CONCAT",
+                            signature,
+                            signingAlgorithmSpec: "SIGNING_ALGORITHM_SPEC_ED25519",
+                            signedBy: wallet.publicKeyFingerprint,
+                        },
+                    ],
+                },
+            ],
+        },
+        deduplicationPeriod: { Empty: {} },
+    });
+    return exec.updateId;
+}
+/**
+ * Send CC from the agent to `receiver`. Returns the ledger updateId.
+ *
+ * `opts.expectInstrumentId` overrides the asset the verifier pins the prepared
+ * transfer to (defaults to Canton Coin / "Amulet"). It is CALLER INTENT, never
+ * taken from the relay.
+ */
+export async function transfer(relay, wallet, opts) {
+    const bal = await relay.balance(wallet.party);
+    const inputHoldingCids = bal.holdings.map((h) => h.cid);
+    const f = await relay.resolveTransferFactory({
+        sender: wallet.party,
+        receiver: opts.receiver,
+        amount: opts.amount,
+        ...(opts.meta ? { meta: opts.meta } : {}),
+    });
+    const now = Date.now();
+    const ex = {
+        ExerciseCommand: {
+            templateId: f.transferFactoryTemplateId,
+            contractId: f.factoryId,
+            choice: "TransferFactory_Transfer",
+            choiceArgument: {
+                expectedAdmin: f.instrumentId.admin,
+                transfer: {
+                    sender: wallet.party,
+                    receiver: opts.receiver,
+                    amount: opts.amount,
+                    instrumentId: f.instrumentId,
+                    requestedAt: new Date(now - 2000).toISOString(),
+                    executeBefore: new Date(now + 600_000).toISOString(),
+                    inputHoldingCids,
+                    meta: { values: opts.meta ?? {} },
+                },
+                extraArgs: { context: f.choiceContextData, meta: { values: {} } },
+            },
+        },
+    };
+    return prepareSignExecute(relay, wallet, [ex], f.disclosedContracts, {
+        kind: "cip56",
+        expect: {
+            // Trust anchors are CALLER INTENT only — never the relay's resolve response:
+            sender: wallet.party,
+            receiver: opts.receiver,
+            amount: opts.amount,
+            instrumentId: opts.expectInstrumentId ?? EXPECTED_INSTRUMENT_ID,
+            // Pin the exercise's target to the SAME factory cid we built the command
+            // against, so a relay cannot resolve one factory to us then prepare the
+            // exercise against another (resolve→prepare TOCTOU). Defense-in-depth on
+            // top of the all-nodes party backstop.
+            expectedContractId: f.factoryId,
+            // Optional caller-intent pins (off by default — the agent has no out-of-
+            // band DSO/domain in the base CC flow): the SIGNED synchronizer_id and
+            // the instrument admin (DSO). When supplied they close the relay-chosen-
+            // domain and unpinned-admin neutralization fully; always sanity-bound the
+            // SIGNED timing metadata via nowMs.
+            ...(opts.expectSynchronizerId !== undefined
+                ? { synchronizerId: opts.expectSynchronizerId }
+                : {}),
+            ...(opts.expectInstrumentAdmin !== undefined
+                ? { instrumentAdmin: opts.expectInstrumentAdmin }
+                : {}),
+            nowMs: Date.now(),
+        },
+    }, opts.hashBinding, opts.expectSynchronizerId);
+}
+/**
+ * v1 (external-party-amulet-rules) — create a Splice `TransferCommand` the
+ * facilitator will later settle (it pays the GS traffic fee). The agent signs
+ * only an INTENT here: no gas, no preapproval. Mirrors the cip56 `transfer`
+ * flow — resolve refs via relay → build the create exercise → VERIFY-before-sign
+ * over the EXACT prepared bytes → sign locally → execute via relay → read back
+ * the created cid (ACS-polled by the relay) — but produces the v1 payload the
+ * x402 client puts in PaymentPayload: `{transferCommandCid, payerParty, nonce}`.
+ *
+ * SECURITY: every money-critical field the verifier pins (sender == own party,
+ * receiver == merchant payTo, amount == required, delegate == facilitatorParty)
+ * is CALLER INTENT passed in `opts`, NOT taken from the relay's resolve
+ * response. The relay-resolved EPAR/exercise templateIds + expectedDso are used
+ * only to BUILD the exercise; they widen nothing the agent will sign. The cid
+ * returned by the relay moves no funds on its own — the facilitator independently
+ * re-validates sender/receiver/amount/delegate/nonce at /verify + /settle.
+ */
+export async function createTransferCommand(relay, wallet, opts) {
+    // Resolve the v1 ledger refs (EPAR disclosed + exercise templateId +
+    // expectedDso + the agent's next nonce). NONE of these is a verify trust
+    // anchor — the verifier pins sender/receiver/amount/delegate to caller intent.
+    const r = await relay.resolveTransferCommand({ payerParty: wallet.party });
+    // The agent pins the DELEGATE to its OWN intent (the 402's facilitatorParty),
+    // not the relay's `r.delegate`. If the relay disagrees with caller intent,
+    // fail fast BEFORE building/prepare rather than silently using the relay's.
+    if (r.delegate !== opts.delegate) {
+        throw new Error(`relay resolve/transfer-command returned delegate ${JSON.stringify(r.delegate)} ` +
+            `but caller intent (extra.facilitatorParty) is ${JSON.stringify(opts.delegate)} — ` +
+            `refusing to build a TransferCommand with a relay-chosen delegate`);
+    }
+    // Likewise pin the synchronizer to caller intent.
+    if (r.synchronizerId !== opts.synchronizerId) {
+        throw new Error(`relay resolve/transfer-command returned synchronizerId ${JSON.stringify(r.synchronizerId)} ` +
+            `but caller intent (extra.synchronizerId) is ${JSON.stringify(opts.synchronizerId)} — ` +
+            `refusing to prepare on a relay-chosen synchronizer`);
+    }
+    const nonceStr = r.nextNonce;
+    const expiresAtMs = opts.expiresAtMs ?? Date.now() + 60_000;
+    const expiresAt = new Date(expiresAtMs).toISOString();
+    // Build the CreateTransferCommand exercise. Choice argument shape + the
+    // EPAR-only disclosure mirror the PROVEN KeyfileSigner v1 flow exactly. The
+    // exercise targets the resolved current-package templateId; the disclosed
+    // contract carries the EPAR's OWN templateId (must match its blob's package).
+    const ex = {
+        ExerciseCommand: {
+            templateId: r.exerciseTemplateId,
+            contractId: r.externalPartyAmuletRules.contractId,
+            choice: "ExternalPartyAmuletRules_CreateTransferCommand",
+            choiceArgument: {
+                sender: wallet.party,
+                receiver: opts.receiver,
+                delegate: opts.delegate,
+                amount: opts.amount,
+                expiresAt,
+                nonce: nonceStr,
+                description: opts.description,
+                expectedDso: r.expectedDso,
+            },
+        },
+    };
+    const disclosedContracts = [
+        {
+            templateId: r.externalPartyAmuletRules.templateId,
+            contractId: r.externalPartyAmuletRules.contractId,
+            createdEventBlob: r.externalPartyAmuletRules.createdEventBlob,
+            synchronizerId: opts.synchronizerId,
+        },
+    ];
+    // prepare → VERIFY-before-sign (v1 arm) → sign locally → execute. The verifier
+    // asserts the EXACT prepared bytes encode sender==own, receiver==payTo,
+    // amount==required, delegate==facilitator, nonce==expected; fail-closed.
+    const createUpdateId = await prepareSignExecute(relay, wallet, [ex], disclosedContracts, {
+        kind: "v1",
+        expect: {
+            sender: wallet.party,
+            receiver: opts.receiver,
+            amount: opts.amount,
+            delegate: opts.delegate,
+            nonce: nonceStr,
+            // Pin the exercise target to the SAME EPAR cid we built against (the one
+            // the relay resolved), so a relay cannot resolve one EPAR to us then
+            // prepare against another (resolve→prepare TOCTOU). Defense-in-depth on
+            // top of the all-nodes party backstop.
+            expectedContractId: r.externalPartyAmuletRules.contractId,
+            // Pin the SIGNED Metadata.synchronizer_id to caller intent (the merchant-
+            // advertised domain). The relay PREPAREs with the synchronizer it chooses
+            // and embeds it into the signed Metadata; without this pin the agent would
+            // blind-sign a relay-chosen domain even though the v1 resolve-response
+            // synchronizer was cross-checked (a claim-vs-signed-bytes divergence).
+            synchronizerId: opts.synchronizerId,
+            // Optional out-of-band DSO pin (off by default; never the relay's value).
+            ...(opts.expectedDso !== undefined ? { expectedDso: opts.expectedDso } : {}),
+            nowMs: Date.now(),
+        },
+    }, opts.hashBinding, opts.synchronizerId);
+    // interactive execute is ASYNC — the create commits after execute returns. The
+    // agent is relay-only (no ledger/ACS access), so the relay ACS-polls the
+    // payer's TransferCommand at this (sender, nonce) and returns the cid. The cid
+    // alone moves no funds; the facilitator re-validates every field at settle.
+    const cidRes = await relay.transferCommandCid(wallet.party, nonceStr);
+    // Nonce as a number for the x402 v1 payload (CantonPaymentPayload.nonce: number).
+    // Counters in practice stay well within Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER.
+    return {
+        transferCommandCid: cidRes.transferCommandCid,
+        payerParty: wallet.party,
+        nonce: Number(nonceStr),
+        // The CreateTransferCommand execute updateId (burn #1, submitted via OUR
+        // node). Surfaced into the x402 v1 payload so the facilitator /settle links
+        // it to the Send burn (#2) for the Create+Send traffic attribution (PR #22).
+        createUpdateId,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Accept every pending incoming transfer (e.g. the agent's initial funding).
+ *
+ * SECURITY: even though this path is funds-IN, it is NOT exempt from
+ * verify-before-sign. A malicious relay returning an OUTBOUND drain
+ * (CreateTransferCommand / TransferFactory_Transfer sending the agent's balance
+ * to an attacker) instead of the accept the agent built would otherwise be
+ * blind-signed. We pass `kind: "accept"`, which structurally proves the prepared
+ * transaction is a single `TransferInstruction_Accept` submitted by the agent —
+ * any outbound leg is rejected — and we bind the signed hash to those bytes
+ * (fail-closed by default, exactly like the other paths). `opts.hashBinding`
+ * lets a programmatic caller supply a participant-conformant recompute; the CLI
+ * resolves it from the environment (default fail-closed).
+ */
+export async function claimAll(relay, wallet, opts = {}) {
+    const hashBinding = opts.hashBinding ?? resolveHashBinding();
+    const { pending } = await relay.pending(wallet.party);
+    const updateIds = [];
+    for (const p of pending) {
+        const ctx = await relay.resolveAccept({ instructionCid: p.cid });
+        const ex = {
+            ExerciseCommand: {
+                templateId: TI_IFACE,
+                contractId: p.cid,
+                choice: "TransferInstruction_Accept",
+                choiceArgument: {
+                    extraArgs: { context: ctx.choiceContextData, meta: { values: {} } },
+                },
+            },
+        };
+        updateIds.push(await prepareSignExecute(relay, wallet, [ex], ctx.disclosedContracts, 
+        // VERIFY-before-sign: the prepared tx MUST be a single inbound accept by
+        // the agent — never a relay-injected outbound drain.
+        { kind: "accept", expect: { selfParty: wallet.party, nowMs: Date.now() } }, hashBinding));
+    }
+    return { claimed: pending.length, updateIds };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=tx.js.map

package/dist/tx.js.map

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