@frockbot/plugin-mcp 0.0.0 → 0.1.1

package/src/agent.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,516 @@
+/**
+ * The runtime Contribution: one enabled Assignment of `mcp-tools` becomes one
+ * remote MCP server's tools in the Bot's tool registry.
+ *
+ * Everything the Bot ever sees of a server passes through here, and every byte
+ * of it is bounded. The server is contacted with the Package's own `fetch`, so
+ * the outbound seam the deployment controls is the only way out; the API key,
+ * when there is one, arrives as an opaque credential lease and is opened
+ * against the keyring the Bot's own host holds.
+ */
+import {
+  openCredentialV1,
+  parseCredentialKeyringV1,
+  type CredentialLeaseV1,
+} from "@frockbot/connection-core";
+import type { ConnectionView } from "@frockbot/configuration-core";
+import type { ToolDefinition, TurnTypeV1 } from "@frockbot/kernel-contracts";
+import type { Context, Plugin } from "cordis";
+import {
+  McpClient,
+  MAX_MCP_RESPONSE_BYTES,
+  MAX_MCP_TOOLS_PER_SERVER,
+  type McpFetch,
+  type McpToolDeclarationV1,
+  type McpTransportV1,
+} from "./mcp-client.js";
+import { mcpAuthorizationRequiredV1 } from "./oauth.js";
+import { decodeOutboundMcpUrlV1 } from "./ssrf.js";
+import {
+  mcpAssignmentResolutionKeyV1,
+  mcpFailureCodeV1,
+  MAX_MCP_INSTRUCTIONS_BYTES_V1,
+  type McpFailureCodeV1,
+  type McpServerStatusViewV1,
+} from "./records.js";
+
+/**
+ * The global `fetch`, bound. A bare reference to it throws "Illegal
+ * invocation" inside a Durable Object, where the built-in checks its
+ * receiver.
+ */
+const boundFetch: McpFetch = (input, init) => fetch(input, init);
+
+export const MCP_PACKAGE_ID = "mcp";
+export const MCP_CAPABILITY_ID = "mcp-tools";
+export const MCP_CONNECTION_TYPE_ID = "mcp-remote";
+export const MCP_KEYED_CONNECTION_TYPE_ID = "mcp-remote-key";
+export const MCP_OAUTH_CONNECTION_TYPE_ID = "mcp-remote-oauth";
+
+/** The manifest's admission ceiling, restated where registration happens. */
+export const MCP_TOOL_TURN_TYPES: readonly TurnTypeV1[] = [
+  "chat",
+  "automation",
+  "subagent",
+];
+
+/**
+ * A remote MCP server's tools are general work tools: an `executor` subagent
+ * gets them, and the narrow roles do not.
+ */
+export const MCP_TOOL_SUBAGENT_ROLES: readonly string[] = ["executor"];
+
+/**
+ * The durable per-User ceiling on remote MCP servers. Counted over the enabled
+ * Assignments of this Package, so a Bot cannot be handed a seventeenth server
+ * by adding one more Assignment.
+ */
+export const MAX_MCP_SERVERS_PER_USER_V1 = 16;
+
+/** What one mount of a server found, as the durable record records it. */
+export interface McpMountOutcomeV1 {
+  connectionId: string;
+  serverEpoch?: number;
+  state: "ready" | "needs-auth" | "error";
+  failure?: { code: McpFailureCodeV1; message: string };
+  protocolVersion?: string;
+  toolCount?: number;
+  toolsHash?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The server's durable lifecycle fields as they reach the Bot: mirrored onto
+ * the Connection's `safeMetadata` by the User Durable Object, which owns the
+ * record. The Bot never invents them, and an absent mirror is a server that
+ * has not been through the lifecycle yet, not a failure.
+ */
+export function mcpConnectionLifecycleV1(connection: {
+  safeMetadata?: Record<string, unknown>;
+}): { serverEpoch?: number; instructions?: string } {
+  const metadata = connection.safeMetadata ?? {};
+  const epoch = metadata.serverEpoch;
+  const instructions = metadata.instructions;
+  return {
+    ...(typeof epoch === "number" && Number.isInteger(epoch) && epoch >= 0
+      ? { serverEpoch: epoch }
+      : {}),
+    ...(typeof instructions === "string" &&
+    instructions.length > 0 &&
+    instructions.length <= MAX_MCP_INSTRUCTIONS_BYTES_V1
+      ? { instructions }
+      : {}),
+  };
+}
+
+export interface McpConnectionSettingsV1 {
+  url: URL;
+  transport: McpTransportV1;
+  headerName: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decode the Connection-scoped settings the manifest declares. Anything the
+ * SSRF rules refuse, or a transport this build does not speak, is a refusal
+ * here rather than a request that leaves the Durable Object.
+ */
+export function decodeMcpConnectionSettingsV1(
+  settings: Record<string, unknown> | undefined,
+): McpConnectionSettingsV1 {
+  const url = decodeOutboundMcpUrlV1(settings?.url);
+  const transport = settings?.transport ?? "streamable-http";
+  if (transport !== "streamable-http" && transport !== "sse") {
+    throw new Error("MCP transport is unsupported");
+  }
+  const headerName = settings?.["header-name"] ?? "Authorization";
+  if (
+    typeof headerName !== "string" ||
+    !/^[A-Za-z0-9-]{1,128}$/.test(headerName)
+  ) {
+    throw new Error("MCP key header name is invalid");
+  }
+  return { url, transport, headerName };
+}
+
+export interface McpOAuthConnectionSettingsV1 {
+  /** The scopes to request; absent takes the server's advertised default. */
+  scope?: string;
+  /** A pre-registered *public* client id, for a server without RFC 7591. */
+  clientId?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The two settings only the `mcp-remote-oauth` Connection Type declares.
+ *
+ * There is deliberately no `client-secret`. A confidential client's secret
+ * would have to live in `ConnectionView.settings`, which is a projection every
+ * client of this User reads; the driver refuses such a server durably instead.
+ */
+export function decodeMcpOAuthSettingsV1(
+  settings: Record<string, unknown> | undefined,
+): McpOAuthConnectionSettingsV1 {
+  const scope = settings?.scope;
+  if (
+    scope !== undefined &&
+    (typeof scope !== "string" || scope.length > 1_024)
+  ) {
+    throw new Error("MCP OAuth scope is invalid");
+  }
+  const clientId = settings?.["client-id"];
+  if (
+    clientId !== undefined &&
+    (typeof clientId !== "string" ||
+      clientId.length === 0 ||
+      clientId.length > 512)
+  ) {
+    throw new Error("MCP OAuth client-id is invalid");
+  }
+  return {
+    ...(typeof scope === "string" && scope.length > 0 ? { scope } : {}),
+    ...(typeof clientId === "string" ? { clientId } : {}),
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The name one server's tool is offered to the model under:
+ * `mcp__<server>__<tool>`. The server segment comes from the Connection's own
+ * label, so a User who renames a server renames its tools; the tool segment is
+ * the server's name with everything a model tool name may not carry replaced.
+ */
+export function mcpToolNameV1(serverSlug: string, toolName: string): string {
+  const tool = toolName.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/g, "_").slice(0, 64);
+  return `mcp__${serverSlug}__${tool}`;
+}
+
+/** The server segment of a tool name, derived from the Connection. */
+export function mcpServerSlugV1(connection: {
+  connectionId: string;
+  displayName?: string;
+}): string {
+  const fromLabel = (connection.displayName ?? "")
+    .toLowerCase()
+    .replace(/[^a-z0-9]+/g, "-")
+    .replace(/^-+|-+$/g, "")
+    .slice(0, 32);
+  if (fromLabel) return fromLabel.replace(/-/g, "_");
+  return connection.connectionId.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9]/g, "_").slice(0, 32);
+}
+
+function isObject(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
+  return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
+
+export interface McpRuntimeContributionConfig {
+  assignment: {
+    packageId: string;
+    capabilityId: string;
+    connectionId?: string;
+    state: string;
+  };
+  /**
+   * This Assignment's ordinal among the enabled Assignments of this Package,
+   * which is what makes the per-User server ceiling countable from inside a
+   * per-Assignment factory.
+   */
+  assignmentIndex?: number;
+  userId: string;
+  readSecret(name: string): string | undefined;
+  authorizeConnection(): Promise<ConnectionView>;
+  /** The Package's own outbound seam. */
+  fetch?: McpFetch;
+  /** The credential lease for a keyed server, from the User's authority. */
+  leaseCredential?(
+    effectId: string,
+    expectedGeneration?: string,
+  ): Promise<CredentialLeaseV1>;
+  settleCredential?(effectId: string): Promise<void>;
+  /**
+   * Where a mount failure goes in-process: a Bot whose server is unreachable
+   * is offered no tools rather than a broken one.
+   */
+  onFailure?(reason: string): void;
+  /**
+   * Where a mount outcome goes durably. The User Durable Object owns the
+   * server record, so this is how an unreachable server or a refused
+   * credential becomes a visible `error`/`needs-auth` on the User's own
+   * surface instead of a Bot that quietly lost its tools.
+   */
+  onOutcome?(outcome: McpMountOutcomeV1): Promise<void> | void;
+  now?: () => number;
+  randomId?: () => string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve one Assignment into a mounted runtime Plugin. The handshake and
+ * `tools/list` happen here, before the Plugin mounts, so a server that cannot
+ * be reached contributes nothing instead of half-registering.
+ */
+export async function createConfiguredMcpRuntimeContribution(
+  config: McpRuntimeContributionConfig,
+): Promise<Plugin.Function | undefined> {
+  if (
+    config.assignment.packageId !== MCP_PACKAGE_ID ||
+    config.assignment.capabilityId !== MCP_CAPABILITY_ID ||
+    config.assignment.state !== "enabled" ||
+    !config.assignment.connectionId
+  ) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  if ((config.assignmentIndex ?? 0) >= MAX_MCP_SERVERS_PER_USER_V1) {
+    config.onFailure?.(
+      `A User may assign at most ${MAX_MCP_SERVERS_PER_USER_V1} MCP servers`,
+    );
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  const fetchImpl = config.fetch ?? boundFetch;
+  let client: McpClient | undefined;
+  let lifecycle: { serverEpoch?: number; instructions?: string } = {};
+  const connectionId = config.assignment.connectionId;
+  try {
+    const connection = await config.authorizeConnection();
+    lifecycle = mcpConnectionLifecycleV1(connection);
+    if (connection.state !== "ready") {
+      throw new Error("MCP Connection is not ready");
+    }
+    const settings = decodeMcpConnectionSettingsV1(connection.settings);
+    const apiKey =
+      connection.connectionTypeId === MCP_KEYED_CONNECTION_TYPE_ID ||
+      connection.connectionTypeId === MCP_OAUTH_CONNECTION_TYPE_ID
+        ? await openAssignedCredential(config, connection)
+        : undefined;
+    client = new McpClient({
+      url: settings.url,
+      transport: settings.transport,
+      fetch: fetchImpl,
+      ...(apiKey
+        ? {
+            apiKey,
+            // An OAuth access token is a bearer token by definition; only a
+            // keyed server gets to name the header its key travels in.
+            headerName:
+              connection.connectionTypeId === MCP_OAUTH_CONNECTION_TYPE_ID
+                ? "Authorization"
+                : settings.headerName,
+          }
+        : {}),
+      maxResponseBytes: MAX_MCP_RESPONSE_BYTES,
+      maxTools: MAX_MCP_TOOLS_PER_SERVER,
+    });
+    const handshake = await client.connect();
+    const tools = await client.listTools();
+    try {
+      await config.onOutcome?.({
+        connectionId,
+        ...(lifecycle.serverEpoch === undefined
+          ? {}
+          : { serverEpoch: lifecycle.serverEpoch }),
+        state: "ready",
+        protocolVersion: handshake.protocolVersion,
+        toolCount: tools.length,
+      });
+    } catch {
+      // The record is a projection, not the authority for this mount: a User
+      // Durable Object that cannot be reached must not cost the Bot the tools
+      // its server just listed.
+    }
+    return createMcpToolPlugin({
+      client,
+      serverSlug: mcpServerSlugV1(connection),
+      serverLabel: connection.displayName,
+      tools,
+      // A server that revokes a token mid-Turn answers the *call* with a 401,
+      // not the mount. Without this the Bot would see one failed tool result
+      // and the User would see a healthy server: the durable record has to
+      // learn about it from wherever it happens.
+      onCallFailure: async (error) => {
+        if (!mcpAuthorizationRequiredV1(error)) return;
+        try {
+          await config.onOutcome?.({
+            connectionId,
+            ...(lifecycle.serverEpoch === undefined
+              ? {}
+              : { serverEpoch: lifecycle.serverEpoch }),
+            state: "needs-auth",
+            failure: {
+              code: "unauthorized",
+              message:
+                error instanceof Error
+                  ? error.message
+                  : "MCP server requires authorization",
+            },
+          });
+        } catch {
+          // Best effort from inside a Turn: a User Durable Object that cannot
+          // be reached must not turn a failed tool call into a failed Turn.
+        }
+      },
+      ...(lifecycle.instructions
+        ? { instructions: lifecycle.instructions }
+        : {}),
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    await client?.close().catch(() => undefined);
+    const message =
+      error instanceof Error ? error.message : "MCP server is unavailable";
+    config.onFailure?.(message);
+    const code = mcpFailureCodeV1(error);
+    try {
+      await config.onOutcome?.({
+        connectionId,
+        ...(lifecycle.serverEpoch === undefined
+          ? {}
+          : { serverEpoch: lifecycle.serverEpoch }),
+        state: code === "unauthorized" ? "needs-auth" : "error",
+        failure: { code, message },
+      });
+    } catch {
+      // The record is best-effort from inside a mount: a User Durable Object
+      // that cannot be reached must not turn a missing tool into a failed
+      // Turn.
+    }
+    return undefined;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * What one Assignment of `mcp-tools` resolves to, including the server's
+ * `serverEpoch`. A restart bumps the epoch, so this key changes, so the next
+ * admitted Turn resolves a different mount and re-handshakes — while the
+ * in-flight Turn, holding the client it already mounted, is untouched.
+ */
+export function mcpAssignmentResolutionV1(config: {
+  assignment: { connectionId?: string };
+  connection: { generation?: string; safeMetadata?: Record<string, unknown> };
+}): string {
+  const lifecycle = mcpConnectionLifecycleV1(config.connection);
+  return mcpAssignmentResolutionKeyV1({
+    connectionId: config.assignment.connectionId ?? "",
+    ...(config.connection.generation === undefined
+      ? {}
+      : { connectionGeneration: config.connection.generation }),
+    ...(lifecycle.serverEpoch === undefined
+      ? {}
+      : { serverEpoch: lifecycle.serverEpoch }),
+  });
+}
+
+async function openAssignedCredential(
+  config: McpRuntimeContributionConfig,
+  connection: ConnectionView,
+): Promise<string> {
+  if (!config.leaseCredential) {
+    throw new Error("MCP credential lease is unavailable");
+  }
+  const serialized = config.readSecret("CREDENTIAL_KEYRING");
+  if (!serialized) throw new Error("Credential keyring is unavailable");
+  const effectId = `mcp-mount:${connection.connectionId}:${
+    config.randomId?.() ?? crypto.randomUUID()
+  }`;
+  const lease = await config.leaseCredential(effectId, connection.generation);
+  // The lease the User Durable Object issued names the credential generation
+  // it actually opened — which for a refreshed OAuth token is not the
+  // Connection's generation. The mount takes the lease's word for it, because
+  // the User Durable Object is the authority for which generation is current.
+  try {
+    if (
+      lease.effectId !== effectId ||
+      lease.connectionId !== connection.connectionId ||
+      Date.parse(lease.expiresAt) <= (config.now ?? Date.now)()
+    ) {
+      throw new Error("MCP credential lease is invalid");
+    }
+    return await openCredentialV1({
+      keyring: parseCredentialKeyringV1(serialized),
+      context: {
+        accountId: config.userId,
+        connectionId: connection.connectionId,
+        packageId: MCP_PACKAGE_ID,
+        credentialGeneration: lease.credentialGeneration,
+      },
+      envelope: lease.envelope,
+    });
+  } finally {
+    // The lease is a one-shot authorization to open the credential, not a
+    // handle held for the life of the mount: it is settled the moment the key
+    // is in hand, so an evicted Durable Object leaves nothing open.
+    await (config.settleCredential?.(effectId) ?? Promise.resolve()).catch(
+      () => undefined,
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+/** One tool's description, with the server's instructions attached to it. */
+export function mcpToolDescriptionV1(input: {
+  declaration: { name: string; description?: string };
+  serverLabel: string;
+  instructions?: string;
+}): string {
+  const base =
+    input.declaration.description ??
+    `${input.declaration.name} on the MCP server "${input.serverLabel}".`;
+  return input.instructions
+    ? `${base}\n\nInstructions for "${input.serverLabel}": ${input.instructions}`
+    : base;
+}
+
+export function createMcpToolPlugin(config: {
+  client: McpClient;
+  serverSlug: string;
+  serverLabel: string;
+  tools: readonly McpToolDeclarationV1[];
+  /**
+   * GrokBot's `SetMcpInstructions`. There is no "tool set" in a model
+   * request — `model/request.tools` is a flat list — so the instructions
+   * become the description every one of this server's tools carries. That
+   * puts them in the exact normalized request the session log records, which
+   * is the only place a User can prove the model was told.
+   */
+  instructions?: string;
+  /**
+   * Where a mid-Turn failure goes durably. Called for every failed call; the
+   * caller decides which ones are worth recording.
+   */
+  onCallFailure?(error: unknown): Promise<void> | void;
+}): Plugin.Function {
+  const plugin: Plugin.Function = (ctx: Context) => {
+    const disposers = config.tools.map((declaration) => {
+      const definition: ToolDefinition = {
+        name: mcpToolNameV1(config.serverSlug, declaration.name),
+        description: mcpToolDescriptionV1({
+          declaration,
+          serverLabel: config.serverLabel,
+          ...(config.instructions ? { instructions: config.instructions } : {}),
+        }),
+        inputSchema: declaration.inputSchema,
+        validate: (input: unknown) => input === undefined || isObject(input),
+        execute: async (input: unknown) => {
+          try {
+            const result = await config.client.callTool(
+              declaration.name,
+              isObject(input) ? input : {},
+            );
+            return { content: result.content, isError: result.isError };
+          } catch (error) {
+            await config.onCallFailure?.(error);
+            return {
+              content:
+                error instanceof Error ? error.message : "MCP tool call failed",
+              isError: true,
+            };
+          }
+        },
+      };
+      return ctx.tools.register(definition, {
+        admissionCeiling: MCP_TOOL_TURN_TYPES,
+        subagentRoleCeiling: MCP_TOOL_SUBAGENT_ROLES,
+      });
+    });
+    return () => {
+      for (const dispose of disposers.toReversed()) dispose();
+      void config.client.close();
+    };
+  };
+  plugin.inject = ["tools"];
+  return plugin;
+}
+
+export default createConfiguredMcpRuntimeContribution;