@forgesworn/fold-kit 0.4.0 → 0.5.0

package/dist/member-epoch.js

@@ -0,0 +1,643 @@
+import { hkdf } from '@noble/hashes/hkdf';
+import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha2';
+import { base64urlnopad } from '@scure/base';
+import { nip44 } from 'nostr-tools';
+import { finalizeEvent, generateSecretKey, getPublicKey } from 'nostr-tools/pure';
+import { hexEquals, normaliseHex } from './hex.js';
+import { verifyDeviceCredential } from './credential.js';
+import { evaluateAccess } from './access.js';
+import { verifyEventUncached } from './verify.js';
+import { withExpiration } from './expiration.js';
+import { epochCommitment } from './epoch-commit.js';
+import { KINDS } from './kinds.js';
+import { MAX_EPOCH, deriveEpoch, epochRequestAdmission, peekRekeyEvent, } from './epoch.js';
+/**
+ * Member-to-member epoch catch-up: any current member can bring an
+ * admitted, non-removed member up to date.
+ *
+ * `hostRoomEpoch` answers an epoch request only where the authority's key
+ * is, and the request is ephemeral, so a device that missed a rekey - a
+ * phone that came back with a new device key, which no stored rekey seals
+ * to - recovers only while the authority's device is online with the room
+ * open. Every other member at the current epoch holds the secret and, until
+ * now, could not pass it on in a form the requester could check.
+ *
+ * It can now, because the requester does not trust the member at all. The
+ * grant carries the authority-signed rekey events from the requester's
+ * epoch to the current one, and the secret of every epoch in between:
+ *
+ * - each rekey's signature is the authority's (`peekRekeyEvent`);
+ * - each rekey decrypts under the key of the epoch before it, starting from
+ *   the requester's own - and NIP-44's MAC verifies under no other key, so
+ *   a decrypting rekey j+1 proves the secret offered for epoch j is the one
+ *   the authority encrypted under;
+ * - the last epoch, which has no successor to vouch for it, is checked
+ *   against the commitment the authority wrote into its rekey body
+ *   (`epochCommitment`, `encodeRekeyEvent({ commit: true })`). A last rekey
+ *   with no commitment - every rekey written before this existed - is not
+ *   accepted from a member: that epoch stays authority-only.
+ *
+ * The removed and closed facts come from the same authority-signed bodies,
+ * so a member can neither hide a removal from the requester nor invent
+ * one. Answerers refuse the removed and a closed room by not answering at
+ * all; only the authority's refusal is something a requester can believe.
+ * See `docs/member-epoch-catch-up.md` for the threat model.
+ */
+/** The member path's two kinds. Ephemeral, like 20468/20469: a live
+ *  handshake, never a record. */
+export const MEMBER_EPOCH_KINDS = {
+    /** A device behind the room asking any current member for the epochs it
+     *  missed. Encrypted under a key from the epoch-0 room key, so any
+     *  admitted device can read it and a relay cannot. */
+    REQUEST: 20471,
+    /** A member's answer, signed by a one-time key made for that grant and
+     *  sealed to the asking device: secrets plus the authority-signed rekeys
+     *  that prove them. */
+    GRANT: 20472,
+};
+/** HKDF info for the key a member epoch request's body is sealed under. */
+export const MEMBER_EPOCH_REQUEST_KEY_INFO = 'kithmoot/v1/member-epoch-request-key';
+/** The most epochs one member grant will carry. A device further behind
+ *  than this asks the authority. */
+export const MAX_MEMBER_EPOCH_CHAIN = 32;
+const MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 90;
+const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
+const DEFAULT_RETRY_MS = 4_000;
+const DEFAULT_JITTER_MS = 1_500;
+/** How long a requester waits for its relays to finish replaying the room's
+ *  rekeys before it asks anyway. */
+const REKEY_REPLAY_WAIT_MS = 1_500;
+/** Many relays refuse events much over 64 KiB. A grant inlines whole rekey
+ *  events, each with a seal per device, so a long chain in a big room can
+ *  pass that; a desk does not send one that would. */
+const DEFAULT_MAX_GRANT_BYTES = 60_000;
+const HEX64 = /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i;
+function requireHex32(value, what) {
+    if (typeof value !== 'string' || !HEX64.test(value))
+        throw new Error(`${what} must be 32-byte hex`);
+    return normaliseHex(value);
+}
+/** Equality that does not leak where two proofs first differ. */
+function constantTimeEquals(presented, expected) {
+    const a = normaliseHex(presented);
+    if (a.length !== expected.length)
+        return false;
+    let diff = 0;
+    for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i += 1)
+        diff |= a.charCodeAt(i) ^ expected.charCodeAt(i);
+    return diff === 0;
+}
+/** The key a member epoch request is sealed under: the epoch-0 room key,
+ *  expanded under its own info string. */
+export function deriveMemberEpochRequestKey(roomKey) {
+    if (roomKey.length !== 32)
+        throw new Error('room key must be 32 bytes');
+    return hkdf(sha256, roomKey, undefined, MEMBER_EPOCH_REQUEST_KEY_INFO, 32);
+}
+/**
+ * Read an authority-signed rekey with the key of the epoch it leaves,
+ * without needing a seal of one's own. Null for anything that does not
+ * check out: not the authority, not this room, not epoch `previous.epoch
+ * + 1`, or not encrypted under `previous.key`. What both sides of a member
+ * grant use to check the chain.
+ */
+export function readRekeyEvidence(event, opts) {
+    try {
+        const epoch = peekRekeyEvent(event, opts);
+        if (epoch === null || epoch !== opts.previous.epoch + 1)
+            return null;
+        const body = JSON.parse(nip44.v2.decrypt(event.content, opts.previous.key));
+        if (body.v !== 1 || body.epoch !== epoch)
+            return null;
+        if (!Array.isArray(body.removed) || !body.removed.every((p) => typeof p === 'string' && HEX64.test(p)))
+            return null;
+        const evidence = {
+            epoch,
+            removed: [...new Set(body.removed.map(normaliseHex))].sort(),
+            closed: body.closed === true,
+        };
+        if (typeof body.commit === 'string' && HEX64.test(body.commit))
+            evidence.commit = normaliseHex(body.commit);
+        return evidence;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+/** Ask any current member for the epochs after `have`. */
+export function encodeMemberEpochRequest(opts) {
+    if (opts.deviceSk.length !== 32)
+        throw new Error('device secret key must be 32 bytes');
+    const roomId = requireHex32(opts.roomId, 'room id');
+    const authority = requireHex32(opts.authority, 'authority pubkey');
+    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(opts.have) || opts.have < 0 || opts.have > MAX_EPOCH)
+        throw new Error('have must be a small non-negative integer');
+    const admission = epochRequestAdmission({ roomKey: opts.roomKey, roomId, authority, device: getPublicKey(opts.deviceSk), createdAt: opts.now });
+    const body = {
+        v: 1,
+        credential: opts.credential,
+        ...(opts.proof ? { proof: opts.proof } : {}),
+        admission,
+        have: opts.have,
+    };
+    return finalizeEvent({
+        kind: MEMBER_EPOCH_KINDS.REQUEST,
+        created_at: opts.now,
+        tags: withExpiration([['d', roomId]], opts.expiresAt),
+        content: nip44.v2.encrypt(JSON.stringify(body), deriveMemberEpochRequestKey(opts.roomKey)),
+    }, opts.deviceSk);
+}
+/** Null for anything malformed, stale, from a device that cannot prove
+ *  which participant it speaks for, or that cannot prove admission. */
+export function decodeMemberEpochRequest(event, opts) {
+    try {
+        if (event.kind !== MEMBER_EPOCH_KINDS.REQUEST)
+            return null;
+        if (!verifyEventUncached(event))
+            return null;
+        if (Math.abs(opts.now - event.created_at) > (opts.maxAgeSeconds ?? MAX_AGE_SECONDS))
+            return null;
+        const roomId = requireHex32(opts.roomId, 'room id');
+        if (event.tags.find((t) => t[0] === 'd')?.[1]?.toLowerCase() !== roomId)
+            return null;
+        const body = JSON.parse(nip44.v2.decrypt(event.content, deriveMemberEpochRequestKey(opts.roomKey)));
+        if (body.v !== 1 || typeof body.credential !== 'object' || body.credential === null)
+            return null;
+        if (!Number.isSafeInteger(body.have) || body.have < 0 || body.have > MAX_EPOCH)
+            return null;
+        const verdict = verifyDeviceCredential(body.credential, { roomId, now: opts.now });
+        if (!verdict.ok || !hexEquals(verdict.device, event.pubkey))
+            return null;
+        if (typeof body.admission !== 'string')
+            return null;
+        const expected = epochRequestAdmission({
+            roomKey: opts.roomKey,
+            roomId,
+            authority: requireHex32(opts.authority, 'authority pubkey'),
+            device: verdict.device,
+            createdAt: event.created_at,
+        });
+        if (!constantTimeEquals(body.admission, expected))
+            return null;
+        if (opts.policy) {
+            const proof = body.proof && typeof body.proof === 'object' ? body.proof : undefined;
+            if (!evaluateAccess(opts.policy, verdict.participant, proof, opts.now, roomId).admitted)
+                return null;
+        }
+        return { device: verdict.device, participant: verdict.participant, request: event.id, have: body.have };
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+function plainEvent(event) {
+    const { id, pubkey, created_at, kind, tags, content, sig } = event;
+    return { id, pubkey, created_at, kind, tags, content, sig };
+}
+/**
+ * Answer one member epoch request with the epochs it missed.
+ *
+ * The grant is signed, and sealed to the asking device, by a fresh key made
+ * for it alone and then dropped, not by the answering member's device key.
+ * Nothing about a grant is trusted on its signer (the authority's
+ * signatures are what the requester checks), so the member's key would add
+ * nothing but a public line from that device to the room id in the `d` tag.
+ */
+export function encodeMemberEpochGrant(opts) {
+    const roomId = requireHex32(opts.roomId, 'room id');
+    const device = requireHex32(opts.device, 'device pubkey');
+    const request = requireHex32(opts.request, 'request id');
+    if (opts.epochs.length < 1 || opts.epochs.length > MAX_MEMBER_EPOCH_CHAIN)
+        throw new Error('a member grant carries 1 to 32 epochs');
+    if (opts.rekeys.length !== opts.epochs.length)
+        throw new Error('one rekey per epoch');
+    for (let i = 0; i < opts.epochs.length; i += 1) {
+        const e = opts.epochs[i];
+        if (e.secret.length !== 32)
+            throw new Error('epoch secret must be 32 bytes');
+        if (i > 0 && e.epoch !== opts.epochs[i - 1].epoch + 1)
+            throw new Error('epochs must be consecutive');
+        if (e.epoch < 1)
+            throw new Error('a member grant never carries epoch 0');
+    }
+    // Drawn before anything else, so a vector records it first.
+    const signerSk = generateSecretKey();
+    const body = {
+        v: 1,
+        request,
+        epoch: opts.epochs[opts.epochs.length - 1].epoch,
+        secrets: opts.epochs.map((e) => base64urlnopad.encode(e.secret)),
+        rekeys: opts.rekeys.map(plainEvent),
+    };
+    return finalizeEvent({
+        kind: MEMBER_EPOCH_KINDS.GRANT,
+        created_at: opts.now,
+        tags: withExpiration([
+            ['d', roomId],
+            ['p', device],
+        ], opts.expiresAt),
+        content: nip44.v2.encrypt(JSON.stringify(body), nip44.v2.utils.getConversationKey(signerSk, device)),
+    }, signerSk);
+}
+/**
+ * Verify a member's answer to one of this device's member requests. Null
+ * for anything that does not check out - see the module comment and
+ * `docs/member-epoch-catch-up.md` "Verification rules" for each check.
+ */
+export function decodeMemberEpochGrant(event, opts) {
+    try {
+        if (event.kind !== MEMBER_EPOCH_KINDS.GRANT)
+            return null;
+        if (!verifyEventUncached(event))
+            return null;
+        if (Math.abs(opts.now - event.created_at) > (opts.maxAgeSeconds ?? MAX_AGE_SECONDS))
+            return null;
+        const roomId = requireHex32(opts.roomId, 'room id');
+        if (event.tags.find((t) => t[0] === 'd')?.[1]?.toLowerCase() !== roomId)
+            return null;
+        const device = getPublicKey(opts.deviceSk);
+        const addressed = event.tags.find((t) => t[0] === 'p')?.[1];
+        if (addressed === undefined || !hexEquals(addressed, device))
+            return null;
+        const body = JSON.parse(nip44.v2.decrypt(event.content, nip44.v2.utils.getConversationKey(opts.deviceSk, event.pubkey)));
+        if (body.v !== 1 || typeof body.request !== 'string' || !HEX64.test(body.request))
+            return null;
+        if (![...opts.requests].some((r) => hexEquals(r, body.request)))
+            return null;
+        if (!Array.isArray(body.secrets) || !Array.isArray(body.rekeys))
+            return null;
+        const length = body.secrets.length;
+        if (length < 1 || length > MAX_MEMBER_EPOCH_CHAIN || body.rekeys.length !== length)
+            return null;
+        const top = opts.current.epoch + length;
+        if (body.epoch !== top || top > MAX_EPOCH)
+            return null;
+        if (opts.expected !== undefined && top < opts.expected)
+            return null;
+        const participant = normaliseHex(opts.participant);
+        const removed = new Set([...(opts.removed ?? [])].map(normaliseHex));
+        let previous = opts.current;
+        let secret;
+        for (let i = 0; i < length; i += 1) {
+            const evidence = readRekeyEvidence(body.rekeys[i], { roomId, authority: opts.authority, previous });
+            if (!evidence)
+                return null;
+            if (evidence.closed)
+                return null;
+            if (evidence.removed.includes(participant))
+                return null;
+            for (const p of evidence.removed)
+                removed.add(p);
+            const raw = body.secrets[i];
+            if (typeof raw !== 'string')
+                return null;
+            secret = base64urlnopad.decode(raw);
+            if (secret.length !== 32)
+                return null;
+            // Every secret but the last is proven by the next rekey decrypting
+            // under it, on the next turn of this loop. The last has no next rekey:
+            // the authority's commitment is the only thing that can vouch for it.
+            if (i === length - 1) {
+                if (evidence.commit === undefined)
+                    return null;
+                if (!constantTimeEquals(evidence.commit, epochCommitment(roomId, evidence.epoch, secret)))
+                    return null;
+            }
+            previous = deriveEpoch({ epoch: evidence.epoch, secret });
+        }
+        return { epoch: { epoch: top, secret: secret }, removed: [...removed].sort() };
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Answer member epoch requests for as long as the handle is open: what any
+ * member at the current epoch runs beside its session. It answers only an
+ * admitted, credentialled device that is not removed, in a room that is not
+ * closed, and only when it can hand over the whole chain from the
+ * requester's epoch to its own with the authority's rekeys to prove it.
+ *
+ * Anti-amplification: each answer waits a random `[0, jitterMs)`, and is
+ * dropped if another member's grant to the same device appears meanwhile.
+ * It is dropped at most once per requesting device: the requester asks again
+ * with a fresh request if what it got did not verify, and the second time
+ * every desk answers, so a stranger posting junk grants costs one round.
+ */
+export function hostMemberEpochDesk(opts) {
+    if (opts.deviceSk.length !== 32)
+        throw new Error('device secret key must be 32 bytes');
+    if (opts.roomKey.length !== 32)
+        throw new Error('room key must be 32 bytes');
+    const roomId = requireHex32(opts.roomId, 'room id');
+    const authority = requireHex32(opts.authority, 'authority pubkey');
+    const self = getPublicKey(opts.deviceSk);
+    const now = opts.now ?? (() => Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));
+    const random = opts.random ?? Math.random;
+    const jitterMs = Math.max(0, opts.jitterMs ?? DEFAULT_JITTER_MS);
+    const answered = new Set();
+    /** Requesting devices another member's grant was seen for, since their
+     *  latest request reached this desk. */
+    const grantSeen = new Set();
+    /** Requesting devices this desk has already stood down for once. */
+    const stoodDown = new Set();
+    /** Ids of the grants this desk published: each is signed by a one-time
+     *  key, so its own grants are told apart by id, not by signer. */
+    const mine = new Set();
+    const timers = new Set();
+    let closed = false;
+    const bound = (set) => {
+        if (set.size > 256)
+            set.delete(set.values().next().value);
+    };
+    const chainFor = (have, current) => {
+        if (current.epoch - have > MAX_MEMBER_EPOCH_CHAIN)
+            return null;
+        const epochs = [];
+        const rekeys = [];
+        for (let n = have + 1; n <= current.epoch; n += 1) {
+            const secret = n === current.epoch ? current.secret : opts.secretAt?.(n);
+            const rekey = opts.rekeyAt(n);
+            if (!secret || secret.length !== 32 || !rekey)
+                return null;
+            if (peekRekeyEvent(rekey, { roomId, authority }) !== n)
+                return null;
+            epochs.push({ epoch: n, secret });
+            rekeys.push(rekey);
+        }
+        // When this device can read the last rekey itself, it checks the
+        // commitment is there: a legacy epoch is the authority's to hand on, and
+        // a grant the requester will refuse is noise. One it cannot read (it
+        // joined at this epoch) it sends, and the requester decides.
+        const before = current.epoch - 1;
+        const beforeSecret = before === 0 ? undefined : opts.secretAt?.(before);
+        const beforeKey = before === 0 ? opts.roomKey : beforeSecret?.length === 32 ? deriveEpoch({ epoch: before, secret: beforeSecret }).key : undefined;
+        if (beforeKey) {
+            const evidence = readRekeyEvidence(rekeys[rekeys.length - 1], {
+                roomId,
+                authority,
+                previous: { epoch: before, id: '', key: beforeKey },
+            });
+            if (!evidence || evidence.commit === undefined)
+                return null;
+        }
+        return { epochs, rekeys };
+    };
+    const answer = (request) => {
+        if (closed)
+            return;
+        if (grantSeen.has(request.device) && !stoodDown.has(request.device)) {
+            stoodDown.add(request.device);
+            bound(stoodDown);
+            return;
+        }
+        stoodDown.delete(request.device);
+        // Asked again, now that the wait is over: the room may have moved.
+        if (opts.closed?.())
+            return;
+        if ([...opts.removed()].some((p) => hexEquals(p, request.participant)))
+            return;
+        const current = opts.current();
+        if (!current || request.have >= current.epoch)
+            return;
+        const chain = chainFor(request.have, current);
+        if (!chain)
+            return;
+        let grant;
+        try {
+            grant = encodeMemberEpochGrant({
+                roomId,
+                device: request.device,
+                request: request.request,
+                epochs: chain.epochs,
+                rekeys: chain.rekeys,
+                now: now(),
+                expiresAt: opts.expiresAt,
+            });
+        }
+        catch {
+            return;
+        }
+        if (JSON.stringify(grant).length > (opts.maxGrantBytes ?? DEFAULT_MAX_GRANT_BYTES))
+            return;
+        mine.add(grant.id);
+        bound(mine);
+        opts.transport.publish(grant).catch(() => { });
+        opts.onGranted?.(request);
+    };
+    const unsubGrants = opts.transport.subscribe([{ kinds: [MEMBER_EPOCH_KINDS.GRANT], '#d': [roomId] }], (event) => {
+        if (closed || mine.has(event.id))
+            return;
+        const to = event.tags.find((t) => t[0] === 'p')?.[1];
+        if (to === undefined || !HEX64.test(to))
+            return;
+        grantSeen.add(normaliseHex(to));
+        bound(grantSeen);
+    });
+    const unsubRequests = opts.transport.subscribe([{ kinds: [MEMBER_EPOCH_KINDS.REQUEST], '#d': [roomId] }], (event) => {
+        if (closed || hexEquals(event.pubkey, self))
+            return;
+        const request = decodeMemberEpochRequest(event, { roomId, authority, roomKey: opts.roomKey, now: now(), policy: opts.policy });
+        if (!request || answered.has(request.request))
+            return;
+        answered.add(request.request);
+        bound(answered);
+        if (opts.closed?.()) {
+            opts.onRefused?.(request, 'closed');
+            return;
+        }
+        if ([...opts.removed()].some((p) => hexEquals(p, request.participant))) {
+            opts.onRefused?.(request, 'removed');
+            return;
+        }
+        const current = opts.current();
+        if (!current || request.have >= current.epoch)
+            return;
+        grantSeen.delete(request.device);
+        const delay = jitterMs === 0 ? 0 : Math.floor(random() * jitterMs);
+        if (delay === 0) {
+            answer(request);
+            return;
+        }
+        const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+            timers.delete(timer);
+            answer(request);
+        }, delay);
+        timer.unref?.();
+        timers.add(timer);
+    });
+    return {
+        close() {
+            if (closed)
+                return;
+            closed = true;
+            for (const timer of timers)
+                clearTimeout(timer);
+            timers.clear();
+            unsubRequests();
+            unsubGrants();
+        },
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * The member side of a catch-up, for `requestRoomEpoch({ members })`. Each
+ * round publishes a fresh request (a new id, so a desk that stood down once
+ * answers it), and the first grant that verifies is handed to `onGrant`.
+ *
+ * It subscribes to the room's rekeys (kind 1462) before it asks, and refuses
+ * any grant that stops short of the newest one the authority signed: rule 3
+ * of `docs/member-epoch-catch-up.md`, enforced here rather than left to the
+ * caller, because a member removed at epoch E still holds E-1 and every
+ * rekey up to it, and would otherwise hold the requester on a key it shares.
+ */
+export function memberEpochSource(opts) {
+    const roomId = requireHex32(opts.roomId, 'room id');
+    const authority = requireHex32(opts.authority, 'authority pubkey');
+    const now = opts.now ?? (() => Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));
+    const device = getPublicKey(opts.deviceSk);
+    const current = () => (typeof opts.current === 'function' ? opts.current() : opts.current);
+    const expected = () => (typeof opts.expected === 'function' ? opts.expected() : opts.expected);
+    const knownRemoved = typeof opts.removed === 'function' || opts.removed === undefined ? undefined : [...opts.removed];
+    const removedNow = () => (typeof opts.removed === 'function' ? opts.removed() : knownRemoved);
+    const verdict = verifyDeviceCredential(opts.credential, { roomId, now: now() });
+    if (!verdict.ok)
+        throw new Error(`device credential refused: ${verdict.reason}`);
+    const participant = verdict.participant;
+    return {
+        start(onGrant) {
+            const requests = new Set();
+            let stopped = false;
+            let begun = false;
+            /** Set once everything below is wired up; EOSE can arrive before. */
+            let ready = false;
+            let replayed = false;
+            let retry;
+            let replayWait;
+            const stop = () => {
+                if (stopped)
+                    return;
+                stopped = true;
+                if (retry !== undefined)
+                    clearInterval(retry);
+                if (replayWait !== undefined)
+                    clearTimeout(replayWait);
+                unsub();
+                unsubRekeys();
+            };
+            // The floor: the newest epoch the authority has signed a rekey into, as
+            // the relays replay it. `peekRekeyEvent` checks the signer, the room and
+            // the signature, so nobody else can raise it.
+            let seen = 0;
+            // The first request waits for the relays to finish replaying them
+            // (EOSE), or for REKEY_REPLAY_WAIT_MS, so that a member answering
+            // faster than the replay cannot slip a stale chain in under the floor.
+            const unsubRekeys = opts.transport.subscribe([{ kinds: [KINDS.ROOM_REKEY], '#d': [roomId] }], (event) => {
+                const epoch = peekRekeyEvent(event, { roomId, authority });
+                if (epoch !== null && epoch > seen)
+                    seen = epoch;
+            }, () => {
+                replayed = true;
+                if (ready)
+                    begin();
+            });
+            const floor = () => {
+                const given = expected();
+                const top = Math.max(seen, given ?? 0);
+                return top > 0 ? top : undefined;
+            };
+            const unsub = opts.transport.subscribe([{ kinds: [MEMBER_EPOCH_KINDS.GRANT], '#d': [roomId], '#p': [device] }], (event) => {
+                if (stopped)
+                    return;
+                const grant = decodeMemberEpochGrant(event, {
+                    roomId,
+                    authority,
+                    deviceSk: opts.deviceSk,
+                    requests,
+                    current: current(),
+                    participant,
+                    removed: removedNow(),
+                    expected: floor(),
+                    now: now(),
+                });
+                if (!grant)
+                    return;
+                stop();
+                onGrant(grant);
+            });
+            const ask = () => {
+                if (stopped)
+                    return;
+                let request;
+                try {
+                    request = encodeMemberEpochRequest({
+                        roomId,
+                        authority,
+                        deviceSk: opts.deviceSk,
+                        roomKey: opts.roomKey,
+                        credential: opts.credential,
+                        proof: opts.proof,
+                        have: current().epoch,
+                        now: now(),
+                        expiresAt: opts.expiresAt,
+                    });
+                }
+                catch {
+                    return;
+                }
+                requests.add(request.id);
+                if (requests.size > 16)
+                    requests.delete(requests.values().next().value);
+                opts.transport.publish(request).catch(() => { });
+            };
+            function begin() {
+                if (begun || stopped)
+                    return;
+                begun = true;
+                if (replayWait !== undefined)
+                    clearTimeout(replayWait);
+                retry = setInterval(ask, opts.retryMs ?? DEFAULT_RETRY_MS);
+                retry.unref?.();
+                ask();
+            }
+            ready = true;
+            if (replayed)
+                begin();
+            else {
+                replayWait = setTimeout(begin, REKEY_REPLAY_WAIT_MS);
+                replayWait.unref?.();
+            }
+            return stop;
+        },
+    };
+}
+/** Ask the room's current members alone (no authority) for the epochs this
+ *  device missed. Rejects with a plain error when no verifiable answer comes
+ *  inside the timeout. Most callers want `requestRoomEpoch({ members })`. */
+export function requestMemberEpoch(opts) {
+    const source = memberEpochSource(opts);
+    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+        let settled = false;
+        let stop = () => { };
+        const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+            if (settled)
+                return;
+            settled = true;
+            stop();
+            reject(new Error('no current member answered with an epoch that checks out'));
+        }, opts.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS);
+        timer.unref?.();
+        stop = source.start((grant) => {
+            if (settled)
+                return;
+            settled = true;
+            clearTimeout(timer);
+            resolve(grant);
+        });
+        if (settled)
+            stop();
+    });
+}
+/** Every wire-format literal this module owns, frozen for `src/labels.test.ts`. */
+export const MEMBER_EPOCH_LABELS = [
+    "kithmoot/v1/member-epoch-request-key",
+];

package/llms.txt

@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ Not yet published to npm under this API. Until it is, pin an immutable Git commi
 - `encodeEpochGrant(opts)` / `decodeEpochGrant(event, opts)` - the authority's answer (secret, epoch-0, or a refusal `'removed' | 'closed'`)
 - `epochRequestAdmission(opts)`, `deriveEpochRequestKey(roomKey)`
 - `hostRoomEpoch(opts)` / `requestRoomEpoch(opts)` / `EpochRefusedError` - the live request/grant desk, both sides
+- Member epoch catch-up (see `docs/member-epoch-catch-up.md`): `encodeRekeyEvent({ ..., commit: true })` writes `epochCommitment(roomId, epoch, secret)` into the rekey body; `hostMemberEpochDesk(opts)` lets any current member answer; `requestRoomEpoch({ ..., members: memberEpochSource(opts) })` asks the authority and members, first verifiable answer wins; `requestMemberEpoch(opts)` asks members alone. Kinds `MEMBER_EPOCH_KINDS` = `{ REQUEST: 20471, GRANT: 20472 }`. A member grant carries the authority-signed rekeys from the asker's epoch to the current one; the asker verifies the chain itself (`decodeMemberEpochGrant`) and refuses a last epoch with no commitment (legacy: authority only), a chain that removes it or closes the room, and one that stops short of `expected`. Codecs: `encodeMemberEpochRequest`, `decodeMemberEpochRequest`, `encodeMemberEpochGrant`, `readRekeyEvidence`, `deriveMemberEpochRequestKey`, `MAX_MEMBER_EPOCH_CHAIN` (32)
 - `canonicalAdmins(admins)` / `signAdmins(opts)` / `verifyAdmins(opts)` - the authority's signed admin list
 - `canonicalChannels(channels)` / `signChannels(opts)` / `verifyChannels(opts)` - the authority's signed channel list; `CHANNEL_NAME`, `RESERVED_CHANNELS`
 

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@forgesworn/fold-kit",
-  "version": "0.4.0",
+  "version": "0.5.0",
   "description": "Circle primitives for private Nostr groups nobody operates: epoch keys, link invites, removal by rekey, device credentials.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
     "dist",
     "vectors/kithmoot-vectors.json",
     "vectors/circle-vectors.json",
+    "vectors/member-epoch-vectors.json",
     "LICENSE",
     "README.md",
     "llms.txt"
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@
     "typecheck": "tsc -p tsconfig.typecheck.json",
     "diff-source": "node scripts/diff-source.mjs",
     "generate-fold": "node scripts/generate-fold.mjs",
+    "generate-member-epoch": "node scripts/generate-member-epoch.mjs",
     "bundle-check": "node scripts/bundle-check.mjs",
     "tarball-smoke": "node scripts/tarball-smoke.mjs",
     "vectors": "vitest run vectors/",