@forestrie/receipt-verify 2.2.0 → 3.0.1

package/dist/build-receipt-offline.d.ts

@@ -31,10 +31,14 @@ export type ParsedCheckpoint = {
     /**
      * Sealed tree size: the SIGNED `tree-size-2` from the checkpoint's
      * PROTECTED header (ADR-0066 D1 as amended, label -65933), not the
-     * unprotected consistency proof's declared value. `null` when the
-     * checkpoint carries no embedded consistency proof or no signed
-     * tree-size-2 — such a checkpoint is not verifiable and callers must
-     * treat it exactly as they would a checkpoint with no proof at all.
+     * unprotected consistency proof's declared value. `null` ONLY when the
+     * checkpoint is genuinely unsealed — no embedded consistency proof, or a
+     * well-formed protected header with no signed tree-size-2 label — and
+     * callers must treat that the same as a checkpoint with no proof at all.
+     * A structurally malformed consistency proof, or a protected header that
+     * is not deterministically encoded (ADR-0066 D9), is a DIFFERENT
+     * condition — {@link parseCheckpoint} throws for those rather than
+     * folding them into this `null` (review finding O3).
      */
     mmrSize: bigint | null;
     delegationCert: Uint8Array | null;

package/dist/build-receipt-offline.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"build-receipt-offline.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/build-receipt-offline.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AASH,OAAO,EAIL,mBAAmB,EAEnB,KAAK,eAAe,EAErB,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAC9B,OAAO,EAIL,KAAK,SAAS,EACf,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAO5B;;;;GAIG;AACH,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC;AAC/B,YAAY,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;AAEhC,MAAM,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG;IAC7B,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC;IACrB,WAAW,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IAClC,oEAAoE;IACpE,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IAC/B;;;;;;;OAOG;IACH,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IACvB,cAAc,EAAE,UAAU,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;CACnC,CAAC;AAEF,wDAAwD;AACxD,wBAAgB,eAAe,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,UAAU,GAAG,gBAAgB,CAqB7E;AAED,MAAM,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAAG;IACrC,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;IACxB,eAAe,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;IAC5B,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAClB,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;GAKG;AACH,wBAAgB,mBAAmB,CACjC,KAAK,EAAE,wBAAwB,GAC9B,UAAU,CAyCZ;AAED;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,wBAAgB,wBAAwB,CACtC,UAAU,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAC5B,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAChB,KAAK,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,GAClB,UAAU,CA4CZ;AAED,MAAM,MAAM,uBAAuB,GAAG;IACpC,mEAAmE;IACnE,IAAI,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;IACjB,+DAA+D;IAC/D,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,KAAK,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;IACpB,SAAS,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;CACvB,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,wBAAsB,sBAAsB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;IACjD,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;IACxB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACjB,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC,CAwBnC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"build-receipt-offline.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/build-receipt-offline.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AASH,OAAO,EAIL,mBAAmB,EAEnB,KAAK,eAAe,EAErB,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAC9B,OAAO,EAIL,KAAK,SAAS,EACf,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAO5B;;;;GAIG;AACH,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC;AAC/B,YAAY,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;AAEhC,MAAM,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG;IAC7B,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC;IACrB,WAAW,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IAClC,oEAAoE;IACpE,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IAC/B;;;;;;;;;;;OAWG;IACH,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IACvB,cAAc,EAAE,UAAU,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;CACnC,CAAC;AAEF,wDAAwD;AACxD,wBAAgB,eAAe,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,UAAU,GAAG,gBAAgB,CAqB7E;AAED,MAAM,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAAG;IACrC,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;IACxB,eAAe,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;IAC5B,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAClB,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;GAKG;AACH,wBAAgB,mBAAmB,CACjC,KAAK,EAAE,wBAAwB,GAC9B,UAAU,CAyCZ;AAED;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,wBAAgB,wBAAwB,CACtC,UAAU,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAC5B,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAChB,KAAK,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,GAClB,UAAU,CA4CZ;AAED,MAAM,MAAM,uBAAuB,GAAG;IACpC,mEAAmE;IACnE,IAAI,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;IACjB,+DAA+D;IAC/D,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,KAAK,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;IACpB,SAAS,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;CACvB,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,wBAAsB,sBAAsB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;IACjD,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;IACxB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACjB,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC,CAwBnC"}

package/dist/build-receipt-offline.js

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 import { COSE_LABEL_PEAK_RECEIPTS, COSE_LABEL_VDP, decodeCborDeterministic, encodeCborDeterministic, readProtectedTreeSize2, } from "@forestrie/encoding";
 import { calculateRoot, inclusionProof, massifIndexFromMMRIndex, openMassifNodeStore, peakIndexForLeafProof, } from "@forestrie/merklelog";
 import { requireCoseSign1, toHeaderMap, unwrapCoseSign1Tag, } from "./parse-receipt.js";
-import { decodeConsistencyProofFromUnprotected } from "./decode-checkpoint-consistency-proof.js";
+import { decodeConsistencyProofsFromUnprotected } from "./decode-checkpoint-consistency-proof.js";
 import { SubtleHasher } from "./subtle-hasher.js";
 /** Not in scope for the shared cose-labels module (FOR-568 §4.1). */
 const DELEGATION_CERT_LABEL = 1000;
@@ -158,30 +158,29 @@ function cborBytes(value) {
  * (ADR-0066 D1 as amended, label -65933) from the PROTECTED header — not the
  * unprotected consistency proof's declared value, which a checkpoint without
  * a signing key could freely restate (ADR-0066's "keyless first checkpoint"
- * case). A consistency proof must still be present (an unsigned checkpoint
- * with no proof is not sealed at all); its declared sizes are not otherwise
- * used here — {@link checkpointConsistencyProof} in `checkpoint-chain.ts`
- * is the validating decode that requires the two to agree.
+ * case). At least one consistency proof must still be present (an unsigned
+ * checkpoint with no proof is not sealed at all) — one or more, since a
+ * checkpoint may relay a chain of sealed steps under one signature
+ * (ADR-0066 D2). Their declared sizes are not otherwise used here;
+ * {@link checkpointConsistencyProof} in `checkpoint-chain.ts` is the
+ * validating decode that requires the signed size and the last relayed
+ * proof's to agree.
  *
- * Lenient by design: an absent proof, a malformed proof, or an absent or
- * malformed signed tree-size-2 all yield `null` rather than a throw, so a
- * caller of {@link parseCheckpoint} sees exactly the same "not verifiable"
- * outcome either way.
+ * Lenient only for an ABSENT proof or an absent signed tree-size-2: both
+ * yield `null`, so a caller of {@link parseCheckpoint} sees the same "not
+ * verifiable" outcome for either. A proof or protected header that IS
+ * present but malformed is a different condition and is not swallowed here
+ * — {@link decodeConsistencyProofsFromUnprotected} throws for a structurally
+ * malformed proof (including an empty consistency-proofs array), and
+ * {@link readProtectedTreeSize2} throws for a protected header that is not
+ * deterministically encoded (ADR-0066 D9); both propagate rather than
+ * folding into `null` (review finding O3: a D9 conformance failure is a
+ * sealer-side defect worth attributing, not the ordinary "no proof yet"
+ * case).
  */
 function sealedSizeFromCheckpoint(coseSign1, unprotected) {
-    let declared;
-    try {
-        declared = decodeConsistencyProofFromUnprotected(unprotected);
-    }
-    catch {
-        return null;
-    }
+    const declared = decodeConsistencyProofsFromUnprotected(unprotected);
     if (declared === null)
         return null;
-    try {
-        return readProtectedTreeSize2(coseSign1[0]);
-    }
-    catch {
-        return null;
-    }
+    return readProtectedTreeSize2(coseSign1[0]);
 }

package/dist/checkpoint-chain.d.ts

@@ -1,19 +1,50 @@
-/** Draft-bryce consistency proof embedded in a v3 checkpoint. `treeSize2` is
- * cross-checked against the checkpoint's SIGNED tree-size-2 (ADR-0066 D1 as
- * amended); `treeSize1` is unsigned prover context, not cross-checked here —
- * see {@link verifyCheckpointChain}, which compares it with the trusted
- * origin instead. */
+import { EmptyConsistencyProofsError, type DecodedConsistencyProof } from "./decode-checkpoint-consistency-proof.js";
+/**
+ * The draft-bryce consistency proofs embedded in a v3 checkpoint: one or
+ * more, in relay order (`consistency-proofs = [ + consistency-proof ]`,
+ * ADR-0066 D2). A checkpoint sealing a single step carries the chain of
+ * one; there is no separate single-proof shape.
+ *
+ * {@link treeSize2} — the LAST proof's — is cross-checked against the
+ * checkpoint's SIGNED tree-size-2 (ADR-0066 D1 as amended, D5.5).
+ * {@link treeSize1} — the FIRST proof's — is unsigned prover context, not
+ * cross-checked here; see {@link verifyCheckpointChain}, which compares it
+ * with the trusted origin instead. The sizes between the two are named by
+ * no signature: {@link computeCheckpointAccumulator} holds the chain
+ * together by requiring each proof to continue the one before it.
+ */
 export type CheckpointConsistencyProof = {
+    /** The relayed proofs, in chain order; never empty. */
+    proofs: DecodedConsistencyProof[];
+    /** `tree-size-1` of the FIRST proof: the size the chain continues from. */
     treeSize1: bigint;
+    /** `tree-size-2` of the LAST proof: the size the chain reaches. */
     treeSize2: bigint;
     /** Signed `tree-size-2` (protected header label -65933); equal to
      * {@link treeSize2} — {@link checkpointConsistencyProof} enforces this. */
     signedTreeSize2: bigint;
-    /** One inclusion path per tree-size-1 peak, proven at tree-size-2. */
-    paths: Uint8Array[][];
-    /** New peaks not covered by the proven roots (draft `right-peaks`). */
-    rightPeaks: Uint8Array[];
 };
+/**
+ * A relayed consistency-proof chain does not join up: a proof's declared
+ * `tree-size-1` is not the size the fold has reached — the caller's trusted
+ * size for the first proof, the previous proof's `tree-size-2` after that —
+ * or, having applied every proof, the fold reaches a size other than the
+ * chain link's own declared `tree-size-2` (F3: a caller-assembled link —
+ * `freshenReceipt` callers build these from on-chain calldata, never
+ * through {@link checkpointConsistencyProof} — can set `proofs` and
+ * `treeSize2` independently, which `checkpointConsistencyProof` itself
+ * never allows to disagree). go-merklelog reuses its equivalent
+ * `ErrProofChainNotContiguous` for this same end-of-chain comparison
+ * (`checkpointverify.go:245-251`, folded size vs. signed size). Reported as
+ * `"size_mismatch"` by {@link verifyCheckpointChain}, the same as any other
+ * size disagreement, because the sizes it names are unsigned (ADR-0066 D2):
+ * nothing distinguishes a relay assembled in the wrong order from one
+ * assembled over a different log.
+ */
+export declare class ConsistencyChainNotContiguousError extends Error {
+    constructor(message: string);
+}
+export { EmptyConsistencyProofsError };
 /**
  * The checkpoint's SIGNED `tree-size-2` (protected header, ADR-0066 D1 as
  * amended) differs from the declared `tree-size-2` of its embedded
@@ -55,12 +86,14 @@ export declare class CheckpointProtectedHeaderAlgError extends Error {
     constructor(message: string);
 }
 /**
- * Decode the embedded consistency proof (`vdp` 396 key -2) and require its
- * declared `tree-size-2` to equal the checkpoint's SIGNED `tree-size-2` from
- * the protected header (ADR-0066 D1 as amended, D5.5, label -65933).
- * `tree-size-1` is not signed and is not checked here (D2 is withdrawn); see
- * {@link verifyCheckpointChain} for its comparison against the trusted
- * origin.
+ * Decode the embedded consistency proofs (`vdp` 396 key -2, one or more in
+ * relay order) and require the LAST proof's declared `tree-size-2` to equal
+ * the checkpoint's SIGNED `tree-size-2` from the protected header (ADR-0066
+ * D1 as amended, D2, D5.5, label -65933). The earlier proofs' sizes are not
+ * signed: the fold checks them against each other
+ * ({@link computeCheckpointAccumulator}). `tree-size-1` is not signed
+ * either; see {@link verifyCheckpointChain} for its comparison against the
+ * trusted origin.
  *
  * Also rejects a malleable high-s ES256 signature (see
  * {@link CheckpointHighSSignatureError}) before any fold or WebCrypto verify
@@ -68,12 +101,14 @@ export declare class CheckpointProtectedHeaderAlgError extends Error {
  * subject to this check, since it does not go through the P-256 WebCrypto
  * path this guards.
  *
- * @throws {Error} when the protected header carries no consistency proof,
- *   the proof is structurally malformed (see
- *   {@link decodeConsistencyProofFromUnprotected}), or the protected header
+ * @throws {Error} when the unprotected header carries no consistency proof,
+ *   a proof is structurally malformed (see
+ *   {@link decodeConsistencyProofsFromUnprotected}), or the protected header
  *   carries no signed tree-size-2 label
+ * @throws {EmptyConsistencyProofsError} when the consistency-proofs array is
+ *   present but empty
  * @throws {CheckpointSignedSizeMismatchError} when the signed tree-size-2
- *   differs from the declared proof's tree-size-2
+ *   differs from the LAST declared proof's tree-size-2
  * @throws {CheckpointHighSSignatureError} when the checkpoint is ES256-signed
  *   with a high-s (malleable) signature
  * @throws {CheckpointProtectedHeaderAlgError} when the protected header
@@ -81,25 +116,45 @@ export declare class CheckpointProtectedHeaderAlgError extends Error {
  */
 export declare function checkpointConsistencyProof(checkpointBytes: Uint8Array): CheckpointConsistencyProof;
 /**
- * One fold step: from the CALLER-TRUSTED accumulator at `sizeFrom`, produce
- * the `proof.treeSize2` accumulator via the size-driven
- * {@link consistentRootsForSizes} (ADR-0066 D5) — `roots` (the proven
- * prefix) followed by the proof's supplied right-peaks (the target peaks no
- * path reaches).
+ * Fold a checkpoint's relayed consistency proofs, in order, from the
+ * CALLER-TRUSTED accumulator at `sizeFrom` to the accumulator at the last
+ * proof's `tree-size-2` — the value the checkpoint's signature covers.
+ *
+ * Each proof is applied by the size-driven {@link consistentRootsForSizes}
+ * (ADR-0066 D5), which yields `roots` (the proven prefix); the proof's own
+ * right-peaks (the target peaks no path reaches) complete that step's
+ * accumulator, and it becomes the next step's input. A checkpoint sealing
+ * one step carries the chain of one and runs the same loop once.
+ *
+ * `sizeFrom` is a parameter, not read off the proofs, because the fold must
+ * start from a size the CALLER already trusts (the previous checkpoint's
+ * verified `treeSize2`, or the caller's anchor for a first link) — reading
+ * it from the relay instead would let an unsigned or substituted proof
+ * dictate its own starting point (ADR-0066 D5.4). Every proof after the
+ * first is held to the size the previous one reached for the same reason:
+ * only the last step's size is signed, so the intermediate sizes are worth
+ * no more than their agreement with each other.
  *
- * `sizeFrom` is a parameter, not read off `proof`, because the fold must run
- * against a size the CALLER already trusts (the previous link's verified
- * `treeSize2`, or the caller's anchor for a first link) — reading it from
- * the proof instead would let an unsigned or substituted proof dictate its
- * own starting point. `proof.treeSize1` must equal it regardless: the two
- * disagreeing means this proof does not continue from the state being
- * folded, not a mere shape defect, so it is checked before any fold work.
+ * `proof.proofs` must hold at least one step and, once every step has been
+ * applied, the fold must have reached exactly `proof.treeSize2` (F3).
+ * `checkpointConsistencyProof` already guarantees both — the decode rejects
+ * an empty `consistency-proofs` array (`EmptyConsistencyProofsError`) and
+ * sets `treeSize2` from the last decoded proof — but a caller-assembled
+ * link (`freshenReceipt` callers building from on-chain calldata) is not
+ * decoded through it, so both are re-checked here rather than trusted from
+ * the type.
  *
- * @throws {Error} when `proof.treeSize1 !== sizeFrom`, or when the proof
- *   supplies a right-peaks count other than
+ * @throws {EmptyConsistencyProofsError} when `proof.proofs` is empty — an
+ *   already-decoded link the caller assembled themselves rather than one
+ *   `checkpointConsistencyProof` produced, which never returns one
+ * @throws {ConsistencyChainNotContiguousError} when the first proof's
+ *   `treeSize1` is not `sizeFrom`, a later proof's `treeSize1` is not the
+ *   previous proof's `treeSize2`, or the size the fold reaches after every
+ *   proof is not `proof.treeSize2`
+ * @throws {Error} when a proof supplies a right-peaks count other than
  *   {@link consistentRootsForSizes}'s `expectedRight`
- * @throws {ConsistencyShapeError} (`@forestrie/merklelog`) when the proof
- *   does not have the shape MMR(sizeFrom) -> MMR(proof.treeSize2) implies
+ * @throws {ConsistencyShapeError} (`@forestrie/merklelog`) when a proof does
+ *   not have the shape its two sizes imply
  */
 export declare function computeCheckpointAccumulator(proof: CheckpointConsistencyProof, accumulatorFrom: Uint8Array[], sizeFrom: bigint): Promise<Uint8Array[]>;
 /** Detached payload the checkpoint signature covers (ADR-0046): the raw
@@ -135,8 +190,10 @@ export type CheckpointChainResult = {
      * `tree-size-2` (ADR-0066 D1 as amended, D5.5), or a link's declared
      * `tree-size-1` disagrees with the size the fold starts from — the
      * caller's `trustedBase.size` (0 with no `trustedBase`) for the
-     * first link, the previous link's `tree-size-2` after that.
-     * `detail` names both sizes.
+     * first link, the previous link's `tree-size-2` after that — or a
+     * relayed proof WITHIN a checkpoint disagrees with the size the
+     * proof before it reached ({@link
+     * ConsistencyChainNotContiguousError}). `detail` names both sizes.
      */
      | "size_mismatch";
     /** Index of the offending checkpoint. */
@@ -164,15 +221,20 @@ export type CheckpointChainResult = {
  * - The first link's declared `tree-size-1` must equal that trusted
  *   starting size, and every subsequent link's must equal the previous
  *   link's sealed `tree-size-2`; either disagreement is `size_mismatch`.
- *   `tree-size-1` itself is never compared with a signed value (D2 is
- *   withdrawn): only this trusted-origin comparison applies. Because it is
+ *   `tree-size-1` itself is never compared with a signed value (the signed
+ *   origin ADR-0066 D2 first proposed was withdrawn): only this
+ *   trusted-origin comparison applies. Because it is
  *   unsigned, the reason it produces carries no more meaning than the size
  *   disagreement itself (ADR-0066 D6: no pre-FOR-410 state is supported, so
  *   there is no drift condition to fall back from).
- * - Each checkpoint's SIGNED `tree-size-2` (ADR-0066 D1 as amended) must
- *   equal its declared consistency-proof `tree-size-2`
- *   ({@link checkpointConsistencyProof}); a disagreement is
- *   `size_mismatch`.
+ * - A checkpoint may relay SEVERAL consistency proofs under one signature
+ *   (ADR-0066 D2; draft `consistency-proofs = [ + consistency-proof ]`).
+ *   Its SIGNED `tree-size-2` (ADR-0066 D1 as amended) must equal the LAST
+ *   proof's declared `tree-size-2` ({@link checkpointConsistencyProof}),
+ *   and each relayed proof must continue the one before it
+ *   ({@link computeCheckpointAccumulator}); either disagreement is
+ *   `size_mismatch`. A checkpoint sealing one step is the relay of one and
+ *   takes the same path.
  * - Each link's signature is checked over its computed accumulator via
  *   the injected verifier (the caller owns trust resolution — genesis
  *   roots, caller-known keys, or the label-1000 delegation path). A link

package/dist/checkpoint-chain.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"checkpoint-chain.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/checkpoint-chain.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAyDA;;;;qBAIqB;AACrB,MAAM,MAAM,0BAA0B,GAAG;IACvC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB;+EAC2E;IAC3E,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACxB,sEAAsE;IACtE,KAAK,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;IACtB,uEAAuE;IACvE,UAAU,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;CAC1B,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,qBAAa,iCAAkC,SAAQ,KAAK;gBAC9C,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM;CAI5B;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,qBAAa,6BAA8B,SAAQ,KAAK;gBAC1C,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM;CAI5B;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,qBAAa,iCAAkC,SAAQ,KAAK;gBAC9C,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM;CAI5B;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAwBG;AACH,wBAAgB,0BAA0B,CACxC,eAAe,EAAE,UAAU,GAC1B,0BAA0B,CA6C5B;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAoBG;AACH,wBAAsB,4BAA4B,CAChD,KAAK,EAAE,0BAA0B,EACjC,eAAe,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,EAC7B,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,GACf,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAoBvB;AAED;+DAC+D;AAC/D,wBAAgB,kBAAkB,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,UAAU,CAQxE;AAED,MAAM,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAAG;IAChC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB;mBACe;IACf,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACxB,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;IAC1B,2EAA2E;IAC3E,WAAW,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;CACtB,CAAC;AAEF,MAAM,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAC7B;IAAE,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;IAAC,KAAK,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC;IAAC,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAA;CAAE,GACrE;IACE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC;IACV,MAAM,EACF,aAAa,GACb,WAAW;IACb;;;;;OAKG;OACD,qBAAqB,GACrB,iBAAiB;IACnB;;;;;;;;OAQG;OACD,eAAe,CAAC;IACpB,yCAAyC;IACzC,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACX,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,KAAK,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC;CAC9B,CAAC;AAEN;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAmCG;AACH,wBAAsB,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;IAChD,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;IAC1B,eAAe,EAAE,CACf,eAAe,EAAE,UAAU,EAC3B,eAAe,EAAE,UAAU,KACxB,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IACtB;+EAC2E;IAC3E,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE;QAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAA;KAAE,CAAC;CAC3D,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAuJjC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"checkpoint-chain.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/checkpoint-chain.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AA2DA,OAAO,EAEL,2BAA2B,EAC3B,KAAK,uBAAuB,EAC7B,MAAM,0CAA0C,CAAC;AAElD;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,0BAA0B,GAAG;IACvC,uDAAuD;IACvD,MAAM,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,CAAC;IAClC,2EAA2E;IAC3E,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,mEAAmE;IACnE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB;+EAC2E;IAC3E,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACzB,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgBG;AACH,qBAAa,kCAAmC,SAAQ,KAAK;gBAC/C,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM;CAI5B;AAED,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,CAAC;AAEvC;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,qBAAa,iCAAkC,SAAQ,KAAK;gBAC9C,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM;CAI5B;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,qBAAa,6BAA8B,SAAQ,KAAK;gBAC1C,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM;CAI5B;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,qBAAa,iCAAkC,SAAQ,KAAK;gBAC9C,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM;CAI5B;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA4BG;AACH,wBAAgB,0BAA0B,CACxC,eAAe,EAAE,UAAU,GAC1B,0BAA0B,CAgD5B;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAwCG;AACH,wBAAsB,4BAA4B,CAChD,KAAK,EAAE,0BAA0B,EACjC,eAAe,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,EAC7B,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,GACf,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CA+CvB;AAED;+DAC+D;AAC/D,wBAAgB,kBAAkB,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,UAAU,CAQxE;AAED,MAAM,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAAG;IAChC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB;mBACe;IACf,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACxB,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;IAC1B,2EAA2E;IAC3E,WAAW,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;CACtB,CAAC;AAEF,MAAM,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAC7B;IAAE,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;IAAC,KAAK,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC;IAAC,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAA;CAAE,GACrE;IACE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC;IACV,MAAM,EACF,aAAa,GACb,WAAW;IACb;;;;;OAKG;OACD,qBAAqB,GACrB,iBAAiB;IACnB;;;;;;;;;;OAUG;OACD,eAAe,CAAC;IACpB,yCAAyC;IACzC,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACX,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,KAAK,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC;CAC9B,CAAC;AAEN;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAwCG;AACH,wBAAsB,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;IAChD,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;IAC1B,eAAe,EAAE,CACf,eAAe,EAAE,UAAU,EAC3B,eAAe,EAAE,UAAU,KACxB,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IACtB;+EAC2E;IAC3E,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE;QAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAA;KAAE,CAAC;CAC3D,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CA6JjC"}

package/dist/checkpoint-chain.js

@@ -20,11 +20,15 @@
  * "keyless first checkpoint" case). `tree-size-1` stays unsigned prover
  * context: the publisher relays several sealed steps and may re-base a step
  * under the head checkpoint's signature, so the declared base of a
- * checkpoint can differ from what the sealer had (D2 chain semantics is
- * withdrawn) — a signed size-1 comparison would reject every re-based
- * publish and every multi-link catch-up. A checkpoint without the signed
- * size-2 label, or whose signed size-2 disagrees with its declared proof,
- * is rejected before any fold is attempted.
+ * checkpoint can differ from what the sealer had (the signed origin
+ * ADR-0066 D2 first proposed was withdrawn) — a signed size-1 comparison
+ * would reject every re-based publish and every multi-link catch-up. One
+ * checkpoint may itself relay SEVERAL sealed steps (ADR-0066 D2): the
+ * draft carries them under vdp key -2 as
+ * `consistency-proofs = [ + consistency-proof ]`, folded here in order,
+ * with only the last step's size signed. A checkpoint without the signed
+ * size-2 label, or whose signed size-2 disagrees with the last proof it
+ * relays, is rejected before any fold is attempted.
  *
  * This rung depends only on the public log store — the complement of the
  * `CheckpointPublished` event scan (public chain data only); see the
@@ -42,7 +46,31 @@ import { COSE_ALG_ES256, ProtectedHeaderAlgError, isLowS, readProtectedAlg, read
 import { consistentRootsForSizes, mmrSizeForLeafCount, peakMMRIndexes, peaksBitmap, } from "@forestrie/merklelog";
 import { SubtleHasher } from "./subtle-hasher.js";
 import { parseCheckpoint } from "./build-receipt-offline.js";
-import { decodeConsistencyProofFromUnprotected } from "./decode-checkpoint-consistency-proof.js";
+import { decodeConsistencyProofsFromUnprotected, EmptyConsistencyProofsError, } from "./decode-checkpoint-consistency-proof.js";
+/**
+ * A relayed consistency-proof chain does not join up: a proof's declared
+ * `tree-size-1` is not the size the fold has reached — the caller's trusted
+ * size for the first proof, the previous proof's `tree-size-2` after that —
+ * or, having applied every proof, the fold reaches a size other than the
+ * chain link's own declared `tree-size-2` (F3: a caller-assembled link —
+ * `freshenReceipt` callers build these from on-chain calldata, never
+ * through {@link checkpointConsistencyProof} — can set `proofs` and
+ * `treeSize2` independently, which `checkpointConsistencyProof` itself
+ * never allows to disagree). go-merklelog reuses its equivalent
+ * `ErrProofChainNotContiguous` for this same end-of-chain comparison
+ * (`checkpointverify.go:245-251`, folded size vs. signed size). Reported as
+ * `"size_mismatch"` by {@link verifyCheckpointChain}, the same as any other
+ * size disagreement, because the sizes it names are unsigned (ADR-0066 D2):
+ * nothing distinguishes a relay assembled in the wrong order from one
+ * assembled over a different log.
+ */
+export class ConsistencyChainNotContiguousError extends Error {
+    constructor(message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = "ConsistencyChainNotContiguousError";
+    }
+}
+export { EmptyConsistencyProofsError };
 /**
  * The checkpoint's SIGNED `tree-size-2` (protected header, ADR-0066 D1 as
  * amended) differs from the declared `tree-size-2` of its embedded
@@ -93,12 +121,14 @@ export class CheckpointProtectedHeaderAlgError extends Error {
     }
 }
 /**
- * Decode the embedded consistency proof (`vdp` 396 key -2) and require its
- * declared `tree-size-2` to equal the checkpoint's SIGNED `tree-size-2` from
- * the protected header (ADR-0066 D1 as amended, D5.5, label -65933).
- * `tree-size-1` is not signed and is not checked here (D2 is withdrawn); see
- * {@link verifyCheckpointChain} for its comparison against the trusted
- * origin.
+ * Decode the embedded consistency proofs (`vdp` 396 key -2, one or more in
+ * relay order) and require the LAST proof's declared `tree-size-2` to equal
+ * the checkpoint's SIGNED `tree-size-2` from the protected header (ADR-0066
+ * D1 as amended, D2, D5.5, label -65933). The earlier proofs' sizes are not
+ * signed: the fold checks them against each other
+ * ({@link computeCheckpointAccumulator}). `tree-size-1` is not signed
+ * either; see {@link verifyCheckpointChain} for its comparison against the
+ * trusted origin.
  *
  * Also rejects a malleable high-s ES256 signature (see
  * {@link CheckpointHighSSignatureError}) before any fold or WebCrypto verify
@@ -106,12 +136,14 @@ export class CheckpointProtectedHeaderAlgError extends Error {
  * subject to this check, since it does not go through the P-256 WebCrypto
  * path this guards.
  *
- * @throws {Error} when the protected header carries no consistency proof,
- *   the proof is structurally malformed (see
- *   {@link decodeConsistencyProofFromUnprotected}), or the protected header
+ * @throws {Error} when the unprotected header carries no consistency proof,
+ *   a proof is structurally malformed (see
+ *   {@link decodeConsistencyProofsFromUnprotected}), or the protected header
  *   carries no signed tree-size-2 label
+ * @throws {EmptyConsistencyProofsError} when the consistency-proofs array is
+ *   present but empty
  * @throws {CheckpointSignedSizeMismatchError} when the signed tree-size-2
- *   differs from the declared proof's tree-size-2
+ *   differs from the LAST declared proof's tree-size-2
  * @throws {CheckpointHighSSignatureError} when the checkpoint is ES256-signed
  *   with a high-s (malleable) signature
  * @throws {CheckpointProtectedHeaderAlgError} when the protected header
@@ -137,56 +169,102 @@ export function checkpointConsistencyProof(checkpointBytes) {
         throw new CheckpointHighSSignatureError("checkpoint ES256 signature is not low-s canonical (s > n/2); rejected " +
             "to match the univocity contract's P-256 verifier and go-merklelog");
     }
-    const declared = decodeConsistencyProofFromUnprotected(unprotected);
-    if (declared === null) {
+    const proofs = decodeConsistencyProofsFromUnprotected(unprotected);
+    if (proofs === null) {
         throw new Error("checkpoint carries no consistency proof (vdp key -2)");
     }
+    const last = proofs[proofs.length - 1];
     const signedTreeSize2 = readProtectedTreeSize2(coseSign1[0]);
     if (signedTreeSize2 === null) {
         throw new Error("checkpoint protected header carries no signed tree-size-2 (-65933)");
     }
-    if (signedTreeSize2 !== declared.treeSize2) {
-        throw new CheckpointSignedSizeMismatchError(`signed tree-size-2 (-65933) ${signedTreeSize2} != declared consistency-proof tree-size-2 ${declared.treeSize2}`);
+    // The signature covers the size the LAST proof reaches, and only that
+    // size: a relay may hold any number of steps before it, none of them
+    // signed (ADR-0066 D2).
+    if (signedTreeSize2 !== last.treeSize2) {
+        throw new CheckpointSignedSizeMismatchError(`signed tree-size-2 (-65933) ${signedTreeSize2} != declared consistency-proof tree-size-2 ${last.treeSize2}`);
     }
     return {
-        treeSize1: declared.treeSize1,
-        treeSize2: declared.treeSize2,
+        proofs,
+        treeSize1: proofs[0].treeSize1,
+        treeSize2: last.treeSize2,
         signedTreeSize2,
-        paths: declared.paths,
-        rightPeaks: declared.rightPeaks,
     };
 }
 /**
- * One fold step: from the CALLER-TRUSTED accumulator at `sizeFrom`, produce
- * the `proof.treeSize2` accumulator via the size-driven
- * {@link consistentRootsForSizes} (ADR-0066 D5) — `roots` (the proven
- * prefix) followed by the proof's supplied right-peaks (the target peaks no
- * path reaches).
+ * Fold a checkpoint's relayed consistency proofs, in order, from the
+ * CALLER-TRUSTED accumulator at `sizeFrom` to the accumulator at the last
+ * proof's `tree-size-2` — the value the checkpoint's signature covers.
  *
- * `sizeFrom` is a parameter, not read off `proof`, because the fold must run
- * against a size the CALLER already trusts (the previous link's verified
- * `treeSize2`, or the caller's anchor for a first link) — reading it from
- * the proof instead would let an unsigned or substituted proof dictate its
- * own starting point. `proof.treeSize1` must equal it regardless: the two
- * disagreeing means this proof does not continue from the state being
- * folded, not a mere shape defect, so it is checked before any fold work.
+ * Each proof is applied by the size-driven {@link consistentRootsForSizes}
+ * (ADR-0066 D5), which yields `roots` (the proven prefix); the proof's own
+ * right-peaks (the target peaks no path reaches) complete that step's
+ * accumulator, and it becomes the next step's input. A checkpoint sealing
+ * one step carries the chain of one and runs the same loop once.
  *
- * @throws {Error} when `proof.treeSize1 !== sizeFrom`, or when the proof
- *   supplies a right-peaks count other than
+ * `sizeFrom` is a parameter, not read off the proofs, because the fold must
+ * start from a size the CALLER already trusts (the previous checkpoint's
+ * verified `treeSize2`, or the caller's anchor for a first link) — reading
+ * it from the relay instead would let an unsigned or substituted proof
+ * dictate its own starting point (ADR-0066 D5.4). Every proof after the
+ * first is held to the size the previous one reached for the same reason:
+ * only the last step's size is signed, so the intermediate sizes are worth
+ * no more than their agreement with each other.
+ *
+ * `proof.proofs` must hold at least one step and, once every step has been
+ * applied, the fold must have reached exactly `proof.treeSize2` (F3).
+ * `checkpointConsistencyProof` already guarantees both — the decode rejects
+ * an empty `consistency-proofs` array (`EmptyConsistencyProofsError`) and
+ * sets `treeSize2` from the last decoded proof — but a caller-assembled
+ * link (`freshenReceipt` callers building from on-chain calldata) is not
+ * decoded through it, so both are re-checked here rather than trusted from
+ * the type.
+ *
+ * @throws {EmptyConsistencyProofsError} when `proof.proofs` is empty — an
+ *   already-decoded link the caller assembled themselves rather than one
+ *   `checkpointConsistencyProof` produced, which never returns one
+ * @throws {ConsistencyChainNotContiguousError} when the first proof's
+ *   `treeSize1` is not `sizeFrom`, a later proof's `treeSize1` is not the
+ *   previous proof's `treeSize2`, or the size the fold reaches after every
+ *   proof is not `proof.treeSize2`
+ * @throws {Error} when a proof supplies a right-peaks count other than
  *   {@link consistentRootsForSizes}'s `expectedRight`
- * @throws {ConsistencyShapeError} (`@forestrie/merklelog`) when the proof
- *   does not have the shape MMR(sizeFrom) -> MMR(proof.treeSize2) implies
+ * @throws {ConsistencyShapeError} (`@forestrie/merklelog`) when a proof does
+ *   not have the shape its two sizes imply
  */
 export async function computeCheckpointAccumulator(proof, accumulatorFrom, sizeFrom) {
-    if (proof.treeSize1 !== sizeFrom) {
-        throw new Error(`consistency proof base tree-size-1 ${proof.treeSize1} does not match the trusted size ${sizeFrom}`);
+    if (proof.proofs.length === 0) {
+        throw new EmptyConsistencyProofsError("consistency proof relays no proofs (empty proofs array); at least " +
+            "one is required to fold");
     }
     const hasher = new SubtleHasher();
-    const { roots, expectedRight } = await consistentRootsForSizes(hasher, sizeFrom, proof.treeSize2, accumulatorFrom, proof.paths);
-    if (proof.rightPeaks.length !== expectedRight) {
-        throw new Error(`checkpoint supplies ${proof.rightPeaks.length} right-peaks; size ${proof.treeSize2} requires ${expectedRight}`);
+    let accumulator = accumulatorFrom;
+    let size = sizeFrom;
+    for (let i = 0; i < proof.proofs.length; i++) {
+        const step = proof.proofs[i];
+        if (step.treeSize1 !== size) {
+            throw new ConsistencyChainNotContiguousError(i === 0
+                ? `consistency proof base tree-size-1 ${step.treeSize1} does not match the trusted size ${size}`
+                : `consistency-proofs entry ${i} declares tree-size-1 ${step.treeSize1}; the previous proof reached ${size}`);
+        }
+        const { roots, expectedRight } = await consistentRootsForSizes(hasher, size, step.treeSize2, accumulator, step.paths);
+        if (step.rightPeaks.length !== expectedRight) {
+            throw new Error(`checkpoint supplies ${step.rightPeaks.length} right-peaks; size ${step.treeSize2} requires ${expectedRight}`);
+        }
+        accumulator = [...roots, ...step.rightPeaks];
+        size = step.treeSize2;
+    }
+    // The fold must land exactly on the size the LINK itself declares —
+    // `proof.treeSize2` — not merely on whatever size its last proof happened
+    // to reach: a caller-assembled link can set the two independently (e.g.
+    // proofs folding 1 -> 3 alongside a declared treeSize2 of 7), which would
+    // otherwise fold to 3 and be reported as size 7 to every downstream
+    // caller reading the declared field instead of the fold. Mirrors
+    // go-merklelog's own end-of-chain check (checkpointverify.go:245-251).
+    if (size !== proof.treeSize2) {
+        throw new ConsistencyChainNotContiguousError(`consistency proof folds to tree-size-2 ${size}; the chain's declared tree-size-2 is ${proof.treeSize2}`);
     }
-    return [...roots, ...proof.rightPeaks];
+    return accumulator;
 }
 /** Detached payload the checkpoint signature covers (ADR-0046): the raw
  * concatenation of the accumulator peaks in contract order. */
@@ -219,15 +297,20 @@ export function accumulatorPayload(accumulator) {
  * - The first link's declared `tree-size-1` must equal that trusted
  *   starting size, and every subsequent link's must equal the previous
  *   link's sealed `tree-size-2`; either disagreement is `size_mismatch`.
- *   `tree-size-1` itself is never compared with a signed value (D2 is
- *   withdrawn): only this trusted-origin comparison applies. Because it is
+ *   `tree-size-1` itself is never compared with a signed value (the signed
+ *   origin ADR-0066 D2 first proposed was withdrawn): only this
+ *   trusted-origin comparison applies. Because it is
  *   unsigned, the reason it produces carries no more meaning than the size
  *   disagreement itself (ADR-0066 D6: no pre-FOR-410 state is supported, so
  *   there is no drift condition to fall back from).
- * - Each checkpoint's SIGNED `tree-size-2` (ADR-0066 D1 as amended) must
- *   equal its declared consistency-proof `tree-size-2`
- *   ({@link checkpointConsistencyProof}); a disagreement is
- *   `size_mismatch`.
+ * - A checkpoint may relay SEVERAL consistency proofs under one signature
+ *   (ADR-0066 D2; draft `consistency-proofs = [ + consistency-proof ]`).
+ *   Its SIGNED `tree-size-2` (ADR-0066 D1 as amended) must equal the LAST
+ *   proof's declared `tree-size-2` ({@link checkpointConsistencyProof}),
+ *   and each relayed proof must continue the one before it
+ *   ({@link computeCheckpointAccumulator}); either disagreement is
+ *   `size_mismatch`. A checkpoint sealing one step is the relay of one and
+ *   takes the same path.
  * - Each link's signature is checked over its computed accumulator via
  *   the injected verifier (the caller owns trust resolution — genesis
  *   roots, caller-known keys, or the label-1000 delegation path). A link
@@ -343,9 +426,14 @@ export async function verifyCheckpointChain(opts) {
             computed = await computeCheckpointAccumulator(proof, accumulator, expectedBase);
         }
         catch (err) {
+            // A relay that does not join up is a size disagreement like any
+            // other: every size it names but the last is unsigned, so the reason
+            // can say no more than that two sizes differ.
             return {
                 ok: false,
-                reason: "proof_malformed",
+                reason: err instanceof ConsistencyChainNotContiguousError
+                    ? "size_mismatch"
+                    : "proof_malformed",
                 at: i,
                 detail: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
                 links,