@fonderie/auth 7.15.0 → 7.16.0

package/dist/index.js

@@ -280,7 +280,10 @@ var EVENT_KEYS = {
   // Emitted by purgeSoftDeletedUsers (given a bus) once the row is hard-deleted.
   userPurged: "fonderie.user.purged",
   emailVerified: "fonderie.user.email_verified",
-  passwordChanged: "fonderie.user.password_changed"
+  passwordChanged: "fonderie.user.password_changed",
+  // A session the server revoked — today: a refresh token reused after its
+  // grace (theft signal). { userId, sessionId, reason }.
+  sessionRevoked: "fonderie.session.revoked"
 };
 
 // src/services/jwt.ts
@@ -310,16 +313,19 @@ function issueTokenPair(userId, config, options) {
   const accessDuration = config.accessTokenDuration ?? "24h";
   const loginMethod = options.loginMethod;
   const phoneVerified = options.phoneVerified ?? false;
-  const sid = randomUUID();
+  const sid = options.sid ?? randomUUID();
   const accessToken = jwt.sign(
     { sub: userId, type: "access", loginMethod, phoneVerified, sid },
     config.jwtSecret,
-    { expiresIn: accessDuration, keyid: keyIdOf(config.jwtSecret) }
+    // jwtid: every token is unique. With the session id kept across rotations,
+    // two tokens issued in the same second would otherwise be byte-identical —
+    // and a rotated-away token indistinguishable from the live one.
+    { expiresIn: accessDuration, keyid: keyIdOf(config.jwtSecret), jwtid: randomUUID() }
   );
   const refreshToken = jwt.sign(
     { sub: userId, type: "refresh", loginMethod, phoneVerified, sid },
     config.jwtSecret,
-    { expiresIn: duration, keyid: keyIdOf(config.jwtSecret) }
+    { expiresIn: duration, keyid: keyIdOf(config.jwtSecret), jwtid: randomUUID() }
   );
   return { accessToken, refreshToken, sid };
 }
@@ -863,6 +869,9 @@ var UserModel = class {
 };
 var MAX_LIST_LIMIT = 200;
 
+// src/models/session.model.ts
+import { createHash as createHash2 } from "crypto";
+
 // src/services/request-location.ts
 var LOCATION_TIMEOUT_MS = 500;
 var TEXT_MAX = 128;
@@ -945,6 +954,10 @@ async function resolveOnce(resolver, req, timeoutMs) {
 }
 
 // src/models/session.model.ts
+function hashRefreshToken(token) {
+  return createHash2("sha256").update(token).digest("hex");
+}
+var REFRESH_GRACE_MS = 3e4;
 var SessionModel = class {
   // `locate` is IAuthConfig.location. Absent ⇒ sessions carry no location.
   constructor(store, locate) {
@@ -956,12 +969,12 @@ var SessionModel = class {
   async create(userId, token, expiresAt, sid, meta) {
     const location = this.locate && meta?.headers ? await resolveLocation(this.locate, { ip: meta.ipAddress, headers: meta.headers }) : null;
     await this.store.query(
-      `INSERT INTO fonderie_sessions (user_id, token, expires_at, sid, user_agent, ip_address, location)
-			VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7)
+      `INSERT INTO fonderie_sessions (user_id, token, expires_at, sid, user_agent, ip_address, location, last_used_at)
+			VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, now())
 			ON CONFLICT (token) DO NOTHING`,
       [
         userId,
-        token,
+        hashRefreshToken(token),
         expiresAt,
         sid ?? null,
         meta?.userAgent ?? null,
@@ -971,7 +984,56 @@ var SessionModel = class {
     );
   }
   async delete(token) {
-    await this.store.query(`DELETE FROM fonderie_sessions WHERE token = $1`, [token]);
+    await this.store.query(`DELETE FROM fonderie_sessions WHERE token IN ($1, $2)`, [hashRefreshToken(token), token]);
+  }
+  /**
+   * Where a presented refresh token stands: the session's current token, its
+   * previous one within the grace (a retry or race), its previous one AFTER
+   * the grace (reuse — a theft signal), or nothing known.
+   */
+  async match(token) {
+    const hash = hashRefreshToken(token);
+    const [current] = await this.store.query(
+      `SELECT id, user_id, sid, token FROM fonderie_sessions WHERE token IN ($1, $2) AND expires_at > now() LIMIT 1`,
+      [hash, token]
+    );
+    if (current) return { kind: "current", row: toRow(current) };
+    const [previous] = await this.store.query(
+      `SELECT id, user_id, sid, token, (previous_valid_until > now()) AS in_grace
+			   FROM fonderie_sessions WHERE previous_token_hash = $1 AND expires_at > now() LIMIT 1`,
+      [hash]
+    );
+    if (!previous) return { kind: "unknown" };
+    return { kind: previous.in_grace ? "grace" : "reused", row: toRow(previous) };
+  }
+  /**
+   * Rotate a session in place to a new refresh token: same row, same device.
+   * From the CURRENT token it is optimistic — only if the stored token is
+   * still the one matched; a concurrent rotation makes it return false and the
+   * caller re-matches (and now finds the token as the previous one). The old
+   * token becomes the previous, valid for the grace. From the PREVIOUS token
+   * (within the grace) it is authorised by that hash and deadline alone, so
+   * racing retries never starve; the previous and its deadline are kept.
+   */
+  async rotate(row, presented, next, from) {
+    const rows = await this.store.query(
+      `UPDATE fonderie_sessions
+			    SET previous_token_hash  = CASE WHEN $5 THEN $6 ELSE previous_token_hash END,
+			        previous_valid_until = CASE WHEN $5 THEN now() + ($7 || ' milliseconds')::interval ELSE previous_valid_until END,
+			        token        = $3,
+			        expires_at   = $4,
+			        last_used_at = now()
+			  WHERE id = $1
+			    AND CASE WHEN $5 THEN token = $2
+			             ELSE previous_token_hash = $6 AND previous_valid_until > now() END
+			RETURNING id`,
+      [row.id, row.stored, hashRefreshToken(next.token), next.expiresAt, from === "current", hashRefreshToken(presented), String(REFRESH_GRACE_MS)]
+    );
+    return rows.length === 1;
+  }
+  /** Revoke one session by its row id (any user) — reuse detection, admin. */
+  async revokeById(id) {
+    await this.store.query(`DELETE FROM fonderie_sessions WHERE id = $1`, [id]);
   }
   // Delete the session an access token is bound to (by its sid claim). Lets
   // logout revoke the current session without the client resending the refresh
@@ -1037,8 +1099,8 @@ var SessionModel = class {
   }
   async exists(token) {
     const rows = await this.store.query(
-      `SELECT id FROM fonderie_sessions WHERE token = $1 AND expires_at > now()`,
-      [token]
+      `SELECT id FROM fonderie_sessions WHERE token IN ($1, $2) AND expires_at > now()`,
+      [hashRefreshToken(token), token]
     );
     return rows.length > 0;
   }
@@ -1051,6 +1113,9 @@ var SessionModel = class {
     return rows.length > 0;
   }
 };
+function toRow(r) {
+  return { id: r.id, userId: r.user_id, sid: r.sid, stored: r.token };
+}
 
 // src/models/backup-code.model.ts
 var BackupCodeModel = class {
@@ -1432,8 +1497,8 @@ function normalizeEmailSafe(email2) {
 }
 
 // src/models/password-reset.model.ts
-import { createHash as createHash2 } from "crypto";
-var hashSecret = (value) => createHash2("sha256").update(value).digest("hex");
+import { createHash as createHash3 } from "crypto";
+var hashSecret = (value) => createHash3("sha256").update(value).digest("hex");
 var PasswordResetModel = class {
   constructor(store) {
     this.store = store;
@@ -1893,24 +1958,35 @@ function authController(store, config, bus, locales = defineLocales()) {
       if (!payload || payload.type !== "refresh") {
         return setApiResponse3(HTTP3.UNAUTHORIZED, "TOKEN_REFRESH_FAILED", "Invalid refresh token");
       }
-      const valid = await sessions.exists(token);
-      if (!valid) {
-        return setApiResponse3(
-          HTTP3.UNAUTHORIZED,
-          "TOKEN_REFRESH_FAILED",
-          "Session expired or already revoked"
-        );
+      let issued = null;
+      for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 3 && !issued; attempt++) {
+        const found = await sessions.match(token);
+        if (found.kind === "unknown") {
+          return setApiResponse3(HTTP3.UNAUTHORIZED, "TOKEN_REFRESH_FAILED", "Session expired or already revoked");
+        }
+        if (found.kind === "reused") {
+          await sessions.revokeById(found.row.id);
+          await background3(
+            bus?.emit(EVENT_KEYS.sessionRevoked, { userId: found.row.userId, sessionId: found.row.id, reason: "refresh-reuse" })
+          );
+          return setApiResponse3(HTTP3.UNAUTHORIZED, "TOKEN_REFRESH_FAILED", "Session expired or already revoked");
+        }
+        const user = await users.findById(found.row.userId);
+        if (!user || user.suspended || user.deletedAt || user.id !== payload.sub) {
+          return setApiResponse3(HTTP3.UNAUTHORIZED, "UNAUTHORIZED", "Unauthorized");
+        }
+        const pair = issueTokenPair(user.id, config, {
+          loginMethod: payload.loginMethod ?? "email",
+          phoneVerified: payload.phoneVerified ?? false,
+          ...found.row.sid ? { sid: found.row.sid } : {}
+        });
+        const next = { token: pair.refreshToken, expiresAt: refreshTokenExpiry(pair.refreshToken) };
+        if (await sessions.rotate(found.row, token, next, found.kind)) issued = pair;
       }
-      const user = await users.findById(payload.sub);
-      if (!user || user.suspended || user.deletedAt) {
-        return setApiResponse3(HTTP3.UNAUTHORIZED, "UNAUTHORIZED", "Unauthorized");
+      if (!issued) {
+        return setApiResponse3(HTTP3.UNAUTHORIZED, "TOKEN_REFRESH_FAILED", "Session expired or already revoked");
       }
-      await sessions.delete(token);
-      const { accessToken, refreshToken, sid } = issueTokenPair(user.id, config, {
-        loginMethod: payload.loginMethod ?? "email",
-        phoneVerified: payload.phoneVerified ?? false
-      });
-      await sessions.create(user.id, refreshToken, refreshTokenExpiry(refreshToken), sid, requestMeta(ctx));
+      const { accessToken, refreshToken } = issued;
       return Response.json(
         {
           reason: "TOKENS_REFRESHED",
@@ -2600,7 +2676,7 @@ function userController(store, config, bus) {
 }
 
 // src/controllers/oauth.controller.ts
-import { randomBytes as randomBytes4, createPublicKey, createHash as createHash3 } from "crypto";
+import { randomBytes as randomBytes4, createPublicKey, createHash as createHash4 } from "crypto";
 import jwt2 from "jsonwebtoken";
 import { setApiResponse as setApiResponse5, HTTP as HTTP5, constantTimeEqual as constantTimeEqual2, background as background5 } from "@fonderie/core";
 import { NOTIFICATION_EVENT as NOTIFICATION_EVENT4 } from "@fonderie/events";
@@ -3077,7 +3153,7 @@ function oauthController(store, config, bus) {
         });
         return setApiResponse5(HTTP5.UNAUTHORIZED, "APPLE_AUTH_FAILED", "Invalid Apple identity token");
       }
-      const tokenHash = createHash3("sha256").update(identityToken).digest("hex");
+      const tokenHash = createHash4("sha256").update(identityToken).digest("hex");
       const expMs = typeof claims.exp === "number" ? claims.exp * 1e3 : Date.now() + 5 * 60 * 1e3;
       const firstUse = await consumedTokens.consumeOnce(tokenHash, new Date(expMs));
       if (!firstUse) {
@@ -3534,7 +3610,7 @@ var AuthModule = class {
   name = "@fonderie/auth";
   // Baked in at build time by tsup.base, so the operator's Modules page can
   // say what is actually deployed rather than 'not reported'.
-  version = "7.15.0";
+  version = "7.16.0";
   // Users, sessions, login history, suspend — only through @fonderie/admin.
   describeAdmin() {
     return { routes: describeAuthAdminRoutes(this.store) };