@foldrun/core 9.3.0 → 9.5.0

package/dist/src/secrets.js

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import { dataRoot } from "./paths.js";
 import { platform } from "./platform.js";
 import { fetchUntrusted } from "./untrusted-fetch.js";
 import { oauthTokenRequest, readTokenResponse, tokenAuthProblem } from "./oauth-token.js";
+import { isSecureUrl } from "./oauth-discovery.js";
 /**
  * GCM's auth tag, pinned to its full 16 bytes at every cipher call. Without
  * `authTagLength`, Node accepts whatever length `setAuthTag` is handed — 4, 8,
@@ -822,12 +823,15 @@ export function setOAuth2Secret(tenant, name, config, workspace, limit = {}) {
     if (config.grant_type !== "client_credentials" && !config.refresh_token?.trim()) {
         throw new Error("oauth2 secret needs refresh_token (or grant_type: client_credentials)");
     }
+    if (config.revocation_url !== undefined && (typeof config.revocation_url !== "string" || !isSecureUrl(config.revocation_url))) {
+        throw new Error("revocation_url must be https");
+    }
     const authProblem = tokenAuthProblem(config);
     if (authProblem)
         throw new Error(`oauth2 secret: ${authProblem}`);
     // Loopback is exempt: a token endpoint on this same machine (tests, a
     // local mock, a sidecar) crosses no wire for http to leak on.
-    if (!/^https:\/\//.test(config.token_url) && !/^http:\/\/(127\.0\.0\.1|localhost)[:/]/.test(config.token_url)) {
+    if (!isSecureUrl(config.token_url)) {
         throw new Error("token_url must be https — a refresh token over http is a leaked one");
     }
     setSecret(tenant, name, OAUTH2_PREFIX + JSON.stringify(config), workspace, "oauth2", limit);
@@ -961,6 +965,129 @@ async function exchange(config, cacheKey) {
         oauthFlight.delete(cacheKey);
     }
 }
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------- revocation
+/** The oauth2 recipe stored at exactly this scope — never the account copy a
+ *  workspace would fall back to: revoking is about the copy being removed. */
+export function oauth2ValueAt(tenant, name, workspace) {
+    const v = openRecord(tenant, workspace, name, read(tenant, workspace)[name]);
+    return v !== null && isOAuth2Value(v) ? v : null;
+}
+/** The workspaces with a vault file of their own (current and legacy layout). */
+function workspacesWithSecrets(tenant) {
+    const out = new Set();
+    for (const dir of ["workspaces", "projects"]) {
+        const base = path.join(dataRoot(), tenant, dir);
+        let names = [];
+        try {
+            names = fs.readdirSync(base);
+        }
+        catch {
+            continue;
+        }
+        for (const n of names)
+            if (fs.existsSync(path.join(base, n, "secrets.json")))
+                out.add(n);
+    }
+    return [...out];
+}
+/**
+ * Another stored secret of this account holds a grant revoking this one could
+ * end: the same refresh token (a copy made by hand, or one rotation reached),
+ * or any grant from the same app (token URL and client id). Providers such as
+ * Google revoke every token of a user's grant to an app together, so deleting
+ * the Ads connection would take down the Search Console one made with the
+ * same app (Codex review, 1 Nov 2026). Such a grant is left alone.
+ */
+export function oauthGrantSharedElsewhere(tenant, name, workspace, refreshToken, app) {
+    for (const scope of [undefined, ...workspacesWithSecrets(tenant)]) {
+        for (const [other, rec] of Object.entries(read(tenant, scope))) {
+            if (other === name && scope === workspace)
+                continue;
+            // By the value, not the optional kind tag: a recipe copied with a
+            // plain setSecret is still one materializeSecrets refreshes.
+            const v = openRecord(tenant, scope, other, rec);
+            if (!v || !isOAuth2Value(v))
+                continue;
+            try {
+                const other = JSON.parse(v.slice(OAUTH2_PREFIX.length));
+                if (other.refresh_token === refreshToken)
+                    return true;
+                if (app && other.grant_type !== "client_credentials" && other.token_url === app.token_url && other.client_id === app.client_id)
+                    return true;
+            }
+            catch {
+                continue;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+/**
+ * Revoke what an oauth2 recipe holds at its provider (RFC 7009): the refresh
+ * token, then the access token this process has cached for it. The client
+ * authenticates as at the token URL (its token_auth). A 200 is success —
+ * the RFC answers 200 for a token already invalid too; anything else is
+ * reported in `error`, and the next token is still tried. `replacement`: the
+ * recipe taking this one's place; one from the same app (token URL and client
+ * id) means nothing is revoked, since a provider that revokes per app would
+ * end the new grant with the old.
+ */
+export async function revokeOAuth2Value(value, opts = {}) {
+    let config;
+    try {
+        config = JSON.parse(value.slice(OAUTH2_PREFIX.length));
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { skipped: "unreadable", revoked: [] };
+    }
+    if (!config.revocation_url)
+        return { skipped: "no-revocation-url", revoked: [] };
+    if (opts.replacement && opts.replacement.token_url === config.token_url && opts.replacement.client_id === config.client_id) {
+        return { skipped: "same-app", revoked: [] };
+    }
+    if (config.grant_type !== "client_credentials" && opts.tenant && opts.name
+        && oauthGrantSharedElsewhere(opts.tenant, opts.name, opts.workspace, config.refresh_token ?? "", { token_url: config.token_url, client_id: config.client_id })) {
+        return { skipped: "shared-grant", revoked: [] };
+    }
+    // No redirect is followed: a 3xx is not ok, so a revocation endpoint that
+    // sends us to a login page is reported, never counted as revoked.
+    const fetcher = opts.fetcher ?? ((url, init) => fetchUntrusted(url, init, { sameOrigin: true, noRedirects: true }));
+    const key = tokenCacheKey("oauth2", value, opts.tenant);
+    const access = oauthCache.get(key)?.token;
+    const tokens = [];
+    if (config.grant_type !== "client_credentials" && config.refresh_token)
+        tokens.push(["refresh_token", config.refresh_token]);
+    if (access)
+        tokens.push(["access_token", access]);
+    const out = { revoked: [] };
+    for (const [hint, token] of tokens) {
+        try {
+            const request = oauthTokenRequest(config, { token, token_type_hint: hint });
+            const res = await fetcher(config.revocation_url, { method: "POST", headers: request.headers, body: request.body, redirect: "error", signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000) });
+            if (res.ok) {
+                await res.body?.cancel().catch(() => { });
+                out.revoked.push(hint);
+            }
+            else {
+                // Reported, and the next token is still tried: a provider that will
+                // not revoke refresh tokens may still revoke the access token.
+                const why = readTokenResponse(await res.text().catch(() => ""), res.headers.get("content-type") ?? "");
+                out.error ??= `the provider refused to revoke the ${hint.replace("_", " ")} (${res.status}${why.error ? `: ${why.error_description ?? why.error}` : ""})`;
+            }
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            out.error ??= `revoking the ${hint.replace("_", " ")} failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`;
+        }
+    }
+    // Every entry serving that access token goes: after a rotation the same
+    // token is cached under the recipe before and after it (Codex review).
+    oauthCache.delete(key);
+    if (access)
+        for (const [k, v] of oauthCache)
+            if (v.token === access)
+                oauthCache.delete(k);
+    return out;
+}
 /**
  * Swap every oauth2 recipe in an env map for a live access token. The one
  * async moment in secret resolution, kept out of the sync paths: callers

package/dist/src/untrusted-fetch.d.ts

@@ -24,4 +24,8 @@ export declare function fetchUntrusted(url: string, init?: RequestInit, opts?: {
     sameOrigin?: boolean;
     /** The most the answer may be, read; MAX_BYTES unless said. */
     maxBytes?: number;
+    /** Follow no redirect at all: a 3xx comes back as the answer, for the
+     *  caller to treat as the failure it is (a revocation that redirects to
+     *  a login page did not revoke anything). */
+    noRedirects?: boolean;
 }): Promise<Response>;

package/dist/src/untrusted-fetch.js

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ export async function fetchUntrusted(url, init = {}, opts = {}) {
     for (let hop = 0;; hop++) {
         const res = await platform.fetchUntrusted(current, { ...req, redirect: "manual" }, { maxBytes });
         const location = REDIRECT.has(res.status) ? res.headers.get("location") : null;
-        if (!location)
+        if (!location || opts.noRedirects)
             return capBody(res, maxBytes, current);
         // The body of a redirect is never read; free the socket.
         await res.body?.cancel().catch(() => { });

package/index.ts

@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ export * from "./src/storage.ts";
 export * from "./src/secrets.ts";
 export * from "./src/oauth-presets.ts";
 export * from "./src/oauth-token.ts";
+export * from "./src/oauth-discovery.ts";
 export * from "./src/secret-files.ts";
 export * from "./src/notify.ts";
 export * from "./src/webhook.ts";

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@foldrun/core",
-  "version": "9.3.0",
+  "version": "9.5.0",
   "description": "Agents are just folders. The format, the runner, the checks.",
   "license": "FSL-1.1-ALv2",
   "type": "module",

package/src/oauth-capabilities.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+// Every kind of OAuth foldrun meets, in each role, and what foldrun does
+// about it: supported (with the tests that prove it), planned, refused (with
+// the reason a person sees), or not needed. The single source the customer
+// page `foldrun-docs/oauth.md` is generated from (`node scripts/oauth-doc.mjs`)
+// — the same pattern as frontmatter-fields.ts. tests/oauth-capabilities.test.ts
+// fails when a supported row names a test that does not exist, or the page is
+// stale.
+//
+// The roles:
+//   client   an agent reaches Google, Slack, a bank — foldrun holds the token
+//   server   an AI app signs in to /api/mcp — foldrun issues the token
+
+export type OAuthRole = "client" | "server";
+export type OAuthStatus = "supported" | "planned" | "refused" | "not-needed";
+
+/** A test that proves a row: the repo, the file in it, and the test's name
+ *  as written (a substring of the title is enough). */
+export interface OAuthProof {
+  repo: "foldrun-core" | "foldrun-platform" | "foldrun-web" | "foldrun-cli";
+  file: string;
+  test: string;
+}
+
+export interface OAuthCapability {
+  id: string;
+  role: OAuthRole;
+  /** What it is, in a person's words. */
+  title: string;
+  /** The RFC or spec that defines it. */
+  spec: string;
+  status: OAuthStatus;
+  /** How to use it (supported), what is coming (planned), or why not. */
+  note: string;
+  proof?: OAuthProof[];
+}
+
+const core = (file: string, test: string): OAuthProof => ({ repo: "foldrun-core", file, test });
+const platform = (file: string, test: string): OAuthProof => ({ repo: "foldrun-platform", file, test });
+const web = (file: string, test: string): OAuthProof => ({ repo: "foldrun-web", file, test });
+const cli = (file: string, test: string): OAuthProof => ({ repo: "foldrun-cli", file, test });
+const KC = "tests/e2e-oauth-keycloak.test.ts";
+
+export const OAUTH_CAPABILITIES: OAuthCapability[] = [
+  // ------------------------------------------------------------ client
+  {
+    id: "client.authorization-code-pkce", role: "client", title: "Authorization code with PKCE (S256)", spec: "RFC 6749 §4.1, RFC 7636",
+    status: "supported", note: "Settings → Connections or `foldrun connect`. PKCE is on for every connection.",
+    proof: [platform("tests/oauth-connect.test.ts", "PKCE: on by default"), platform(KC, "authorization code + PKCE S256 + PAR"), cli("tests/cli-connect.test.ts", "connect: PKCE by default")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "client.refresh-rotation", role: "client", title: "Refresh, and refresh-token rotation", spec: "RFC 6749 §6, RFC 9700 §2.2.2",
+    status: "supported", note: "Refreshed before every use; a rotated refresh token replaces the stored one.",
+    proof: [core("tests/secret-types.test.ts", "a rotated refresh token is saved where the old one was"), core("tests/oauth-provider-fixtures.test.ts", "rotating refresh tokens: every refresh returns a new one"), platform(KC, "the refresh works and rotates")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "client.client-credentials", role: "client", title: "Client credentials (machine to machine)", spec: "RFC 6749 §4.4",
+    status: "supported", note: "The \"OAuth — client credentials\" connection, or `foldrun secrets set NAME --kind m2m`.",
+    proof: [platform(KC, "client credentials (machine to machine)")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "client.secret-post", role: "client", title: "Client secret in the form body", spec: "RFC 6749 §2.3.1",
+    status: "supported", note: "The default (`token_auth: client_secret_post`).",
+    proof: [core("tests/oauth-token.test.ts", "client_secret_post (and absent with a secret)"), platform(KC, "client_secret_post")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "client.secret-basic", role: "client", title: "Client secret as HTTP Basic", spec: "RFC 6749 §2.3.1",
+    status: "supported", note: "`token_auth: client_secret_basic`, or `--token-auth basic`. Notion, Spotify, Reddit and Zoom need it.",
+    proof: [core("tests/oauth-token.test.ts", "a Basic-only token endpoint"), platform("tests/oauth-connect.test.ts", "token_auth client_secret_basic"), platform(KC, "client_secret_basic"), cli("tests/cli-connect.test.ts", "connect --token-auth basic")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "client.public", role: "client", title: "Public app (no secret), PKCE only", spec: "RFC 9700 §2.1.1",
+    status: "supported", note: "Leave the client secret empty.",
+    proof: [platform("tests/oauth-connect.test.ts", "a public app (no secret) connects with PKCE"), platform(KC, "a public app (no secret)")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "client.discovery", role: "client", title: "Metadata discovery from an issuer", spec: "RFC 8414, OpenID Connect Discovery",
+    status: "supported", note: "The Issuer field's Discover, or `--issuer`.",
+    proof: [core("tests/oauth-discovery-revoke.test.ts", "an RFC 8414 server"), core("tests/oauth-discovery-revoke.test.ts", "refused: a document naming another issuer"), platform(KC, "discovery (RFC 8414 / OIDC)"), cli("tests/cli-connect.test.ts", "connect --issuer: the metadata fills the URLs")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "client.iss-parameter", role: "client", title: "Issuer in the authorization response (mix-up defence)", spec: "RFC 9207",
+    status: "supported", note: "With an issuer, the `iss` that comes back must be it.",
+    proof: [platform("tests/oauth-connect.test.ts", "iss: a pinned issuer must come back exactly"), platform(KC, "a callback whose iss is not the realm is refused"), cli("tests/cli-connect.test.ts", "a callback whose iss is another server is refused")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "client.revocation", role: "client", title: "Revocation when a connection ends", spec: "RFC 7009",
+    status: "supported", note: "Deleting a connection, or reconnecting it with another app, revokes the old grant.",
+    proof: [core("tests/oauth-discovery-revoke.test.ts", "revoking: the refresh token, then the cached access token"), web("tests/secrets-revoke.test.ts", "deleting revokes"), platform(KC, "revocation (RFC 7009)")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "client.par", role: "client", title: "Pushed authorization requests", spec: "RFC 9126",
+    status: "supported", note: "Used whenever the provider has a PAR endpoint.",
+    proof: [platform("tests/oauth-connect.test.ts", "PAR (RFC 9126)"), platform(KC, "authorization code + PKCE S256 + PAR"), cli("tests/cli-connect.test.ts", "with a PAR endpoint")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "client.token-response", role: "client", title: "Token responses as providers send them", spec: "RFC 6749 §5.1",
+    status: "supported", note: "JSON or form-encoded, `expires_in` as a string, Slack's `authed_user`.",
+    proof: [core("tests/oauth-token.test.ts", "Slack: a user token alone"), core("tests/oauth-token.test.ts", "a form-encoded answer"), core("tests/oauth-provider-fixtures.test.ts", "no expires_in; instance_url the agent needs"), core("tests/oauth-provider-fixtures.test.ts", "form-encoded unless asked for JSON")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "client.jwt-bearer", role: "client", title: "JWT bearer grant (service accounts)", spec: "RFC 7523 §2.1",
+    status: "supported", note: "The service-account connection (`--kind service-account`).",
+    proof: [core("tests/secret-types.test.ts", "service account with a subject")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "client.rar", role: "client", title: "Rich authorization requests", spec: "RFC 9396",
+    status: "supported", note: "`authorization_details` as an extra authorize parameter (a JSON value).",
+    proof: [platform("tests/oauth-connect.test.ts", "authorization_details (RFC 9396)")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "client.private-key-jwt", role: "client", title: "Signed client assertion (private_key_jwt)", spec: "RFC 7523 §2.2",
+    status: "planned", note: "Part E: Entra certificates, Okta, FAPI.",
+  },
+  {
+    id: "client.device", role: "client", title: "Device authorization", spec: "RFC 8628",
+    status: "planned", note: "Part F: `foldrun connect --device`.",
+  },
+  {
+    id: "client.token-exchange", role: "client", title: "Token exchange", spec: "RFC 8693",
+    status: "planned", note: "Part I: a `token-exchange` secret kind. Cloud STS is covered today by the keyless identity kind.",
+  },
+  {
+    id: "client.dpop", role: "client", title: "DPoP sender-constrained tokens", spec: "RFC 9449",
+    status: "planned", note: "Part H: Bluesky/atproto, Okta DPoP.",
+  },
+  {
+    id: "client.mtls", role: "client", title: "Mutual-TLS client auth and bound tokens", spec: "RFC 8705",
+    status: "planned", note: "Part H: the client-cert secret at the token endpoint.",
+  },
+  {
+    id: "client.ciba", role: "client", title: "Client-initiated backchannel authentication", spec: "OpenID CIBA",
+    status: "not-needed", note: "No provider an agent needs uses it.",
+  },
+  // ------------------------------------------------------------ server (/api/mcp)
+  {
+    id: "server.authorization-code-pkce", role: "server", title: "Authorization code with PKCE (S256)", spec: "OAuth 2.1, MCP authorization",
+    status: "supported", note: "How claude.ai and other AI apps sign in to /api/mcp.",
+    proof: [web("tests/mcp-oauth.test.ts", "the code: PKCE, once, for its own app and redirect"), web("tests/mcp-sdk-oauth.test.ts", "the MCP SDK: 401 → discovery → registration")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "server.refresh-rotation", role: "server", title: "Refresh rotation, reuse revokes", spec: "OAuth 2.1 §4.3.1",
+    status: "supported", note: "A refresh token used twice ends the connection.",
+    proof: [web("tests/mcp-oauth.test.ts", "refresh rotates; a refresh token used twice ends the connection")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "server.client-auth", role: "server", title: "Client secret (Basic or body), or a public app", spec: "RFC 6749 §2.3.1",
+    status: "supported", note: "Registered apps choose `none`, `client_secret_post` or `client_secret_basic`.",
+    proof: [web("tests/mcp-oauth.test.ts", "a confidential app proves itself with its secret")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "server.metadata", role: "server", title: "Authorization server and resource metadata", spec: "RFC 8414, RFC 9728",
+    status: "supported", note: "`/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server` and `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource`.",
+    proof: [web("tests/mcp-oauth.test.ts", "discovery: the resource names its server")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "server.registration", role: "server", title: "Dynamic registration and client metadata documents", spec: "RFC 7591, CIMD",
+    status: "supported", note: "An app registers itself, or names itself by an https URL.",
+    proof: [web("tests/mcp-oauth.test.ts", "registration: https or loopback redirect URIs only")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "server.resource-indicators", role: "server", title: "Resource indicators", spec: "RFC 8707",
+    status: "supported", note: "Tokens are bound to /api/mcp.",
+    proof: [web("tests/mcp-oauth.test.ts", "the access token opens /api/mcp and its tools")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "server.iss-parameter", role: "server", title: "Issuer in the authorization response", spec: "RFC 9207",
+    status: "supported", note: "Every answer carries `iss`.",
+    proof: [web("tests/mcp-oauth.test.ts", "the approval page's request")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "server.revocation", role: "server", title: "Revocation endpoint", spec: "RFC 7009",
+    status: "supported", note: "`POST /api/mcp/oauth/revoke`: an app ends its own connection.",
+    proof: [web("tests/mcp-oauth.test.ts", "revocation (RFC 7009): advertised")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "server.client-credentials", role: "server", title: "Client credentials for machine clients", spec: "RFC 6749 §4.4",
+    status: "planned", note: "Part G: machine MCP clients an admin registers.",
+  },
+  {
+    id: "server.private-key-jwt", role: "server", title: "Signed client assertion (private_key_jwt)", spec: "RFC 7523 §2.2",
+    status: "planned", note: "Part E: apps that declare `jwks` or `jwks_uri`.",
+  },
+  // ------------------------------------------------------------ refused, both roles
+  {
+    id: "refused.implicit", role: "client", title: "Implicit grant", spec: "RFC 9700 §2.1.2",
+    status: "refused", note: "Tokens in the browser's URL leak; OAuth 2.1 removes it.",
+  },
+  {
+    id: "refused.password", role: "client", title: "Resource owner password grant", spec: "RFC 9700 §2.4",
+    status: "refused", note: "foldrun never holds a person's password for another service.",
+  },
+  {
+    id: "refused.pkce-plain", role: "server", title: "PKCE `plain`", spec: "RFC 9700 §2.1.1",
+    status: "refused", note: "Only S256 is accepted: `plain` protects nothing if the request is seen.",
+    proof: [web("tests/mcp-oauth.test.ts", "the approval page's request")],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "refused.wildcard-redirect", role: "server", title: "Wildcard or prefix redirect matching", spec: "RFC 9700 §4.1",
+    status: "refused", note: "Redirect URIs match exactly (a loopback port may vary).",
+    proof: [web("tests/mcp-oauth.test.ts", "the approval page's request")],
+  },
+];

package/src/oauth-discovery.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+// Discovery from an issuer: give foldrun the provider's issuer URL and it
+// reads the authorization server's own metadata (RFC 8414, OpenID Connect
+// Discovery 1.0) instead of a person typing the authorize, token and
+// revocation URLs by hand — where a typo costs a consent, and an endpoint
+// on the wrong host is a mix-up attack waiting to happen.
+//
+// Where the metadata lives, in the order tried (RFC 8414 §3.1 and §5):
+//   https://host/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server{/path}
+//   https://host/.well-known/openid-configuration{/path}
+//   https://host{/path}/.well-known/openid-configuration   (OIDC's own spelling)
+// The document's `issuer` must equal the issuer asked for, exactly (RFC 8414
+// §3.3) — a document that names another issuer is refused, not trusted.
+
+import type { TokenAuth } from "./oauth-token.ts";
+
+/** What foldrun reads from a metadata document. */
+export interface OAuthServerMetadata {
+  issuer: string;
+  authorization_endpoint?: string;
+  token_endpoint?: string;
+  revocation_endpoint?: string;
+  device_authorization_endpoint?: string;
+  pushed_authorization_request_endpoint?: string;
+  require_pushed_authorization_requests?: boolean;
+  token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported?: string[];
+  code_challenge_methods_supported?: string[];
+  authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported?: boolean;
+  dpop_signing_alg_values_supported?: string[];
+  scopes_supported?: string[];
+  jwks_uri?: string;
+}
+
+/** A discovered server, as the fields a saved app and an oauth2 secret take. */
+export interface DiscoveredClientConfig {
+  issuer: string;
+  authorize_url?: string;
+  token_url: string;
+  revocation_url?: string;
+  device_url?: string;
+  par_url?: string;
+  /** The server requires PAR: an authorize URL without a request_uri fails. */
+  par_required?: boolean;
+  /** Whether the server sends `iss` with every authorization response
+   *  (RFC 9207): when true, one that comes back without it is refused. */
+  iss_parameter: boolean;
+  /** How the client should authenticate at the token URL, given whether it
+   *  has a secret and what the server supports; absent is the form body. */
+  token_auth?: TokenAuth;
+  /** Where the metadata was read from. */
+  metadata_url: string;
+  metadata: OAuthServerMetadata;
+}
+
+/** Loopback is exempt: a server on this machine (tests, a local Keycloak)
+ *  crosses no wire for http to leak on. Judged on the parsed URL, never on
+ *  how it starts: `http://localhost:80@evil.example` is evil.example
+ *  (Codex review, 1 Nov 2026). */
+export function isSecureUrl(url: string): boolean {
+  let u: URL;
+  try {
+    u = new URL(url);
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (u.username || u.password) return false;
+  if (u.protocol === "https:") return true;
+  return u.protocol === "http:" && ["127.0.0.1", "localhost", "[::1]"].includes(u.hostname);
+}
+
+/** Every URL the metadata may be at, in the order to try. */
+export function metadataUrls(issuer: string): string[] {
+  const u = new URL(issuer);
+  const pathPart = u.pathname.replace(/\/+$/, "");
+  const origin = u.origin;
+  const urls = [
+    `${origin}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server${pathPart}`,
+    `${origin}/.well-known/openid-configuration${pathPart}`,
+  ];
+  if (pathPart) urls.push(`${origin}${pathPart}/.well-known/openid-configuration`);
+  return [...new Set(urls)];
+}
+
+/** Why an issuer cannot be discovered from, or null. */
+export function issuerProblem(issuer: string): string | null {
+  let u: URL;
+  try {
+    u = new URL(issuer);
+  } catch {
+    return "issuer must be a URL, like https://login.example.com";
+  }
+  if (!isSecureUrl(issuer)) return "issuer must be https";
+  if (u.search || u.hash) return "issuer has no query or fragment (RFC 8414 §2)";
+  return null;
+}
+
+type Fetcher = (url: string, init?: RequestInit) => Promise<Response>;
+
+/**
+ * Read the authorization server's metadata. `fetcher` is how the caller
+ * reaches the network (the platform's SSRF-guarded fetchPublic, the CLI's
+ * fetch). Throws with every place tried when none answers.
+ */
+export async function fetchOAuthMetadata(issuer: string, fetcher: Fetcher): Promise<{ url: string; metadata: OAuthServerMetadata }> {
+  const problem = issuerProblem(issuer);
+  if (problem) throw new Error(problem);
+  const tried: string[] = [];
+  for (const url of metadataUrls(issuer)) {
+    let res: Response;
+    try {
+      res = await fetcher(url, { headers: { accept: "application/json" }, redirect: "error", signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000) });
+    } catch (err) {
+      tried.push(`${url} (${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)})`);
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!res.ok) {
+      await res.body?.cancel().catch(() => {});
+      tried.push(`${url} (${res.status})`);
+      continue;
+    }
+    let doc: unknown;
+    try {
+      doc = await res.json();
+    } catch {
+      tried.push(`${url} (not JSON)`);
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!doc || typeof doc !== "object" || Array.isArray(doc)) {
+      tried.push(`${url} (not a metadata document)`);
+      continue;
+    }
+    const metadata = doc as OAuthServerMetadata;
+    // RFC 8414 §3.3: the issuer in the document is the one asked for, or
+    // the document is not used. Trailing-slash differences are not forgiven.
+    if (metadata.issuer !== issuer) {
+      throw new Error(`the metadata at ${url} names the issuer ${JSON.stringify(metadata.issuer ?? null)}, not ${issuer} — refused (RFC 8414 §3.3)`);
+    }
+    return { url, metadata };
+  }
+  throw new Error(`no OAuth metadata for ${issuer} — tried ${tried.join(", ")}`);
+}
+
+const ENDPOINTS = [
+  "authorization_endpoint", "token_endpoint", "revocation_endpoint",
+  "device_authorization_endpoint", "pushed_authorization_request_endpoint", "jwks_uri",
+] as const;
+
+/**
+ * What a client config should say for this server. `hasSecret`: the app
+ * has a client secret; `pkce`: false when the caller turned PKCE off;
+ * `tokenAuth`: one the caller chose, which wins over the server's list.
+ */
+export function clientConfigFromMetadata(
+  found: { url: string; metadata: OAuthServerMetadata },
+  opts: { hasSecret: boolean; pkce?: boolean; tokenAuth?: TokenAuth; needsAuthorize?: boolean } = { hasSecret: true },
+): DiscoveredClientConfig {
+  const m = found.metadata;
+  for (const k of ENDPOINTS) {
+    const v = m[k];
+    if (v !== undefined && (typeof v !== "string" || !isSecureUrl(v))) throw new Error(`the server's ${k} is not an https URL: ${String(v)}`);
+  }
+  if (!m.token_endpoint) throw new Error(`${m.issuer} publishes no token_endpoint`);
+  if ((opts.needsAuthorize ?? true) && !m.authorization_endpoint) throw new Error(`${m.issuer} publishes no authorization_endpoint — it does not do browser sign-in`);
+  // PKCE S256 is required of every connection (RFC 9700 §2.1.1). A server
+  // that lists its methods and leaves S256 out would ignore our challenge.
+  if (opts.pkce !== false && Array.isArray(m.code_challenge_methods_supported) && !m.code_challenge_methods_supported.includes("S256")) {
+    throw new Error(`${m.issuer} does not support PKCE S256 (it lists ${m.code_challenge_methods_supported.join(", ") || "none"}) — refused; turn PKCE off only if you are sure (--no-pkce)`);
+  }
+  return {
+    issuer: m.issuer,
+    ...(m.authorization_endpoint ? { authorize_url: m.authorization_endpoint } : {}),
+    token_url: m.token_endpoint,
+    ...(m.revocation_endpoint ? { revocation_url: m.revocation_endpoint } : {}),
+    ...(m.device_authorization_endpoint ? { device_url: m.device_authorization_endpoint } : {}),
+    ...(m.pushed_authorization_request_endpoint ? { par_url: m.pushed_authorization_request_endpoint } : {}),
+    ...(m.require_pushed_authorization_requests === true ? { par_required: true } : {}),
+    iss_parameter: m.authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported === true,
+    ...pickTokenAuth(m.token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported, opts),
+    metadata_url: found.url,
+    metadata: m,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The token_auth to use. A choice the caller made is kept. Otherwise, with a
+ * secret: the form body when the server lists it (what every secret did
+ * before), else Basic — which is also the RFC 8414 default when the server
+ * lists nothing. Without a secret: none (a public client).
+ */
+export function pickTokenAuth(supported: unknown, opts: { hasSecret: boolean; tokenAuth?: TokenAuth }): { token_auth?: TokenAuth } {
+  if (opts.tokenAuth) return { token_auth: opts.tokenAuth };
+  const list = Array.isArray(supported) ? supported.filter((s): s is string => typeof s === "string") : null;
+  // A public client sends no secret. Not refused when the list leaves out
+  // `none`: Keycloak takes public clients and lists only secret methods,
+  // so the list is not the last word on it (found by the conformance suite).
+  if (!opts.hasSecret) return {};
+  if (list && list.includes("client_secret_post")) return {};
+  if (!list || list.includes("client_secret_basic")) return { token_auth: "client_secret_basic" };
+  throw new Error(`the server takes none of the ways foldrun signs in at its token URL (it lists ${list.join(", ") || "nothing"}; foldrun sends the secret in the form body or as HTTP Basic)`);
+}
+
+/** Discover and turn into a client config in one call. */
+export async function discoverOAuth(
+  issuer: string,
+  fetcher: Fetcher,
+  opts: { hasSecret: boolean; pkce?: boolean; tokenAuth?: TokenAuth; needsAuthorize?: boolean },
+): Promise<DiscoveredClientConfig> {
+  return clientConfigFromMetadata(await fetchOAuthMetadata(issuer, fetcher), opts);
+}

package/src/oauth-token.ts

@@ -56,8 +56,11 @@ const formEncode = (s: string) => new URLSearchParams({ x: s }).toString().slice
  * fields (grant_type, code, refresh_token, …); the client's identity is
  * added here, by its token_auth. Fields in `params` named client_id or
  * client_secret are dropped — the method decides those, never an `extra`.
+ * `clientIdInBody`: client_id goes in the form whatever the method — a
+ * pushed authorization request carries it as a parameter of the request it
+ * describes even when the client authenticates with Basic (RFC 9126 §2.1).
  */
-export function oauthTokenRequest(client: TokenClient, params: Record<string, string>): { headers: Record<string, string>; body: string } {
+export function oauthTokenRequest(client: TokenClient, params: Record<string, string>, opts: { clientIdInBody?: boolean } = {}): { headers: Record<string, string>; body: string } {
   const problem = tokenAuthProblem(client);
   if (problem) throw new Error(problem);
   const form = new URLSearchParams();
@@ -76,6 +79,7 @@ export function oauthTokenRequest(client: TokenClient, params: Record<string, st
     // not the body as well.
     const pair = `${formEncode(client.client_id)}:${formEncode(client.client_secret!)}`;
     headers.authorization = `Basic ${Buffer.from(pair, "utf8").toString("base64")}`;
+    if (opts.clientIdInBody) form.set("client_id", client.client_id);
   } else {
     form.set("client_id", client.client_id);
     if (auth === "client_secret_post") form.set("client_secret", client.client_secret!);