@foldrun/core 9.2.1 → 9.4.0

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ export * from "./src/package.ts";
 export * from "./src/storage.ts";
 export * from "./src/secrets.ts";
 export * from "./src/oauth-presets.ts";
+export * from "./src/oauth-token.ts";
+export * from "./src/oauth-discovery.ts";
 export * from "./src/secret-files.ts";
 export * from "./src/notify.ts";
 export * from "./src/webhook.ts";

package/dist/index.js

@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ export * from "./src/package.js";
 export * from "./src/storage.js";
 export * from "./src/secrets.js";
 export * from "./src/oauth-presets.js";
+export * from "./src/oauth-token.js";
+export * from "./src/oauth-discovery.js";
 export * from "./src/secret-files.js";
 export * from "./src/notify.js";
 export * from "./src/webhook.js";

package/dist/src/oauth-discovery.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+import type { TokenAuth } from "./oauth-token.ts";
+/** What foldrun reads from a metadata document. */
+export interface OAuthServerMetadata {
+    issuer: string;
+    authorization_endpoint?: string;
+    token_endpoint?: string;
+    revocation_endpoint?: string;
+    device_authorization_endpoint?: string;
+    pushed_authorization_request_endpoint?: string;
+    require_pushed_authorization_requests?: boolean;
+    token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported?: string[];
+    code_challenge_methods_supported?: string[];
+    authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported?: boolean;
+    dpop_signing_alg_values_supported?: string[];
+    scopes_supported?: string[];
+    jwks_uri?: string;
+}
+/** A discovered server, as the fields a saved app and an oauth2 secret take. */
+export interface DiscoveredClientConfig {
+    issuer: string;
+    authorize_url?: string;
+    token_url: string;
+    revocation_url?: string;
+    device_url?: string;
+    par_url?: string;
+    /** The server requires PAR: an authorize URL without a request_uri fails. */
+    par_required?: boolean;
+    /** Whether the server sends `iss` with every authorization response
+     *  (RFC 9207): when true, one that comes back without it is refused. */
+    iss_parameter: boolean;
+    /** How the client should authenticate at the token URL, given whether it
+     *  has a secret and what the server supports; absent is the form body. */
+    token_auth?: TokenAuth;
+    /** Where the metadata was read from. */
+    metadata_url: string;
+    metadata: OAuthServerMetadata;
+}
+/** Loopback is exempt: a server on this machine (tests, a local Keycloak)
+ *  crosses no wire for http to leak on. Judged on the parsed URL, never on
+ *  how it starts: `http://localhost:80@evil.example` is evil.example
+ *  (Codex review, 1 Nov 2026). */
+export declare function isSecureUrl(url: string): boolean;
+/** Every URL the metadata may be at, in the order to try. */
+export declare function metadataUrls(issuer: string): string[];
+/** Why an issuer cannot be discovered from, or null. */
+export declare function issuerProblem(issuer: string): string | null;
+type Fetcher = (url: string, init?: RequestInit) => Promise<Response>;
+/**
+ * Read the authorization server's metadata. `fetcher` is how the caller
+ * reaches the network (the platform's SSRF-guarded fetchPublic, the CLI's
+ * fetch). Throws with every place tried when none answers.
+ */
+export declare function fetchOAuthMetadata(issuer: string, fetcher: Fetcher): Promise<{
+    url: string;
+    metadata: OAuthServerMetadata;
+}>;
+/**
+ * What a client config should say for this server. `hasSecret`: the app
+ * has a client secret; `pkce`: false when the caller turned PKCE off;
+ * `tokenAuth`: one the caller chose, which wins over the server's list.
+ */
+export declare function clientConfigFromMetadata(found: {
+    url: string;
+    metadata: OAuthServerMetadata;
+}, opts?: {
+    hasSecret: boolean;
+    pkce?: boolean;
+    tokenAuth?: TokenAuth;
+    needsAuthorize?: boolean;
+}): DiscoveredClientConfig;
+/**
+ * The token_auth to use. A choice the caller made is kept. Otherwise, with a
+ * secret: the form body when the server lists it (what every secret did
+ * before), else Basic — which is also the RFC 8414 default when the server
+ * lists nothing. Without a secret: none (a public client).
+ */
+export declare function pickTokenAuth(supported: unknown, opts: {
+    hasSecret: boolean;
+    tokenAuth?: TokenAuth;
+}): {
+    token_auth?: TokenAuth;
+};
+/** Discover and turn into a client config in one call. */
+export declare function discoverOAuth(issuer: string, fetcher: Fetcher, opts: {
+    hasSecret: boolean;
+    pkce?: boolean;
+    tokenAuth?: TokenAuth;
+    needsAuthorize?: boolean;
+}): Promise<DiscoveredClientConfig>;
+export {};

package/dist/src/oauth-discovery.js

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+// Discovery from an issuer: give foldrun the provider's issuer URL and it
+// reads the authorization server's own metadata (RFC 8414, OpenID Connect
+// Discovery 1.0) instead of a person typing the authorize, token and
+// revocation URLs by hand — where a typo costs a consent, and an endpoint
+// on the wrong host is a mix-up attack waiting to happen.
+//
+// Where the metadata lives, in the order tried (RFC 8414 §3.1 and §5):
+//   https://host/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server{/path}
+//   https://host/.well-known/openid-configuration{/path}
+//   https://host{/path}/.well-known/openid-configuration   (OIDC's own spelling)
+// The document's `issuer` must equal the issuer asked for, exactly (RFC 8414
+// §3.3) — a document that names another issuer is refused, not trusted.
+/** Loopback is exempt: a server on this machine (tests, a local Keycloak)
+ *  crosses no wire for http to leak on. Judged on the parsed URL, never on
+ *  how it starts: `http://localhost:80@evil.example` is evil.example
+ *  (Codex review, 1 Nov 2026). */
+export function isSecureUrl(url) {
+    let u;
+    try {
+        u = new URL(url);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+    if (u.username || u.password)
+        return false;
+    if (u.protocol === "https:")
+        return true;
+    return u.protocol === "http:" && ["127.0.0.1", "localhost", "[::1]"].includes(u.hostname);
+}
+/** Every URL the metadata may be at, in the order to try. */
+export function metadataUrls(issuer) {
+    const u = new URL(issuer);
+    const pathPart = u.pathname.replace(/\/+$/, "");
+    const origin = u.origin;
+    const urls = [
+        `${origin}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server${pathPart}`,
+        `${origin}/.well-known/openid-configuration${pathPart}`,
+    ];
+    if (pathPart)
+        urls.push(`${origin}${pathPart}/.well-known/openid-configuration`);
+    return [...new Set(urls)];
+}
+/** Why an issuer cannot be discovered from, or null. */
+export function issuerProblem(issuer) {
+    let u;
+    try {
+        u = new URL(issuer);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return "issuer must be a URL, like https://login.example.com";
+    }
+    if (!isSecureUrl(issuer))
+        return "issuer must be https";
+    if (u.search || u.hash)
+        return "issuer has no query or fragment (RFC 8414 §2)";
+    return null;
+}
+/**
+ * Read the authorization server's metadata. `fetcher` is how the caller
+ * reaches the network (the platform's SSRF-guarded fetchPublic, the CLI's
+ * fetch). Throws with every place tried when none answers.
+ */
+export async function fetchOAuthMetadata(issuer, fetcher) {
+    const problem = issuerProblem(issuer);
+    if (problem)
+        throw new Error(problem);
+    const tried = [];
+    for (const url of metadataUrls(issuer)) {
+        let res;
+        try {
+            res = await fetcher(url, { headers: { accept: "application/json" }, redirect: "error", signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000) });
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            tried.push(`${url} (${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)})`);
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (!res.ok) {
+            await res.body?.cancel().catch(() => { });
+            tried.push(`${url} (${res.status})`);
+            continue;
+        }
+        let doc;
+        try {
+            doc = await res.json();
+        }
+        catch {
+            tried.push(`${url} (not JSON)`);
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (!doc || typeof doc !== "object" || Array.isArray(doc)) {
+            tried.push(`${url} (not a metadata document)`);
+            continue;
+        }
+        const metadata = doc;
+        // RFC 8414 §3.3: the issuer in the document is the one asked for, or
+        // the document is not used. Trailing-slash differences are not forgiven.
+        if (metadata.issuer !== issuer) {
+            throw new Error(`the metadata at ${url} names the issuer ${JSON.stringify(metadata.issuer ?? null)}, not ${issuer} — refused (RFC 8414 §3.3)`);
+        }
+        return { url, metadata };
+    }
+    throw new Error(`no OAuth metadata for ${issuer} — tried ${tried.join(", ")}`);
+}
+const ENDPOINTS = [
+    "authorization_endpoint", "token_endpoint", "revocation_endpoint",
+    "device_authorization_endpoint", "pushed_authorization_request_endpoint", "jwks_uri",
+];
+/**
+ * What a client config should say for this server. `hasSecret`: the app
+ * has a client secret; `pkce`: false when the caller turned PKCE off;
+ * `tokenAuth`: one the caller chose, which wins over the server's list.
+ */
+export function clientConfigFromMetadata(found, opts = { hasSecret: true }) {
+    const m = found.metadata;
+    for (const k of ENDPOINTS) {
+        const v = m[k];
+        if (v !== undefined && (typeof v !== "string" || !isSecureUrl(v)))
+            throw new Error(`the server's ${k} is not an https URL: ${String(v)}`);
+    }
+    if (!m.token_endpoint)
+        throw new Error(`${m.issuer} publishes no token_endpoint`);
+    if ((opts.needsAuthorize ?? true) && !m.authorization_endpoint)
+        throw new Error(`${m.issuer} publishes no authorization_endpoint — it does not do browser sign-in`);
+    // PKCE S256 is required of every connection (RFC 9700 §2.1.1). A server
+    // that lists its methods and leaves S256 out would ignore our challenge.
+    if (opts.pkce !== false && Array.isArray(m.code_challenge_methods_supported) && !m.code_challenge_methods_supported.includes("S256")) {
+        throw new Error(`${m.issuer} does not support PKCE S256 (it lists ${m.code_challenge_methods_supported.join(", ") || "none"}) — refused; turn PKCE off only if you are sure (--no-pkce)`);
+    }
+    return {
+        issuer: m.issuer,
+        ...(m.authorization_endpoint ? { authorize_url: m.authorization_endpoint } : {}),
+        token_url: m.token_endpoint,
+        ...(m.revocation_endpoint ? { revocation_url: m.revocation_endpoint } : {}),
+        ...(m.device_authorization_endpoint ? { device_url: m.device_authorization_endpoint } : {}),
+        ...(m.pushed_authorization_request_endpoint ? { par_url: m.pushed_authorization_request_endpoint } : {}),
+        ...(m.require_pushed_authorization_requests === true ? { par_required: true } : {}),
+        iss_parameter: m.authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported === true,
+        ...pickTokenAuth(m.token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported, opts),
+        metadata_url: found.url,
+        metadata: m,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * The token_auth to use. A choice the caller made is kept. Otherwise, with a
+ * secret: the form body when the server lists it (what every secret did
+ * before), else Basic — which is also the RFC 8414 default when the server
+ * lists nothing. Without a secret: none (a public client).
+ */
+export function pickTokenAuth(supported, opts) {
+    if (opts.tokenAuth)
+        return { token_auth: opts.tokenAuth };
+    const list = Array.isArray(supported) ? supported.filter((s) => typeof s === "string") : null;
+    // A public client sends no secret. Not refused when the list leaves out
+    // `none`: Keycloak takes public clients and lists only secret methods,
+    // so the list is not the last word on it (found by the conformance suite).
+    if (!opts.hasSecret)
+        return {};
+    if (list && list.includes("client_secret_post"))
+        return {};
+    if (!list || list.includes("client_secret_basic"))
+        return { token_auth: "client_secret_basic" };
+    throw new Error(`the server takes none of the ways foldrun signs in at its token URL (it lists ${list.join(", ") || "nothing"}; foldrun sends the secret in the form body or as HTTP Basic)`);
+}
+/** Discover and turn into a client config in one call. */
+export async function discoverOAuth(issuer, fetcher, opts) {
+    return clientConfigFromMetadata(await fetchOAuthMetadata(issuer, fetcher), opts);
+}

package/dist/src/oauth-token.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+export declare const TOKEN_AUTH_METHODS: readonly ["client_secret_post", "client_secret_basic", "none"];
+export type TokenAuth = (typeof TOKEN_AUTH_METHODS)[number];
+/** The short spellings a person types (`--token-auth basic`), to the RFC names. */
+export declare function parseTokenAuth(value: string): TokenAuth | null;
+export interface TokenClient {
+    client_id: string;
+    client_secret?: string;
+    token_auth?: TokenAuth;
+}
+/** Why a client's token_auth cannot work, or null. */
+export declare function tokenAuthProblem(client: {
+    client_secret?: string;
+    token_auth?: unknown;
+}): string | null;
+/**
+ * The headers and body of one token request. `params` is the grant's own
+ * fields (grant_type, code, refresh_token, …); the client's identity is
+ * added here, by its token_auth. Fields in `params` named client_id or
+ * client_secret are dropped — the method decides those, never an `extra`.
+ * `clientIdInBody`: client_id goes in the form whatever the method — a
+ * pushed authorization request carries it as a parameter of the request it
+ * describes even when the client authenticates with Basic (RFC 9126 §2.1).
+ */
+export declare function oauthTokenRequest(client: TokenClient, params: Record<string, string>, opts?: {
+    clientIdInBody?: boolean;
+}): {
+    headers: Record<string, string>;
+    body: string;
+};
+/** A token endpoint's answer, read the ways providers actually write it. */
+export interface TokenResponse {
+    access_token?: string;
+    refresh_token?: string;
+    /** Seconds; a string "3600" (some providers) is read as the number. */
+    expires_in?: number;
+    refresh_token_expires_in?: number;
+    token_type?: string;
+    scope?: string;
+    error?: string;
+    error_description?: string;
+    /** The other plain fields beside the token — Salesforce's instance_url,
+     *  Slack's team — kept for the caller; never a token. */
+    fields: Record<string, string>;
+}
+/**
+ * Read a token endpoint's body: JSON, or form-encoded (GitHub without an
+ * Accept header, some older servers), whatever the content type claims.
+ * Slack's user-token install nests the token under `authed_user` and says
+ * `ok: false` with a 200 when it refuses; both are read here.
+ */
+export declare function readTokenResponse(text: string, contentType?: string): TokenResponse;

package/dist/src/oauth-token.js

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+// Every request to an OAuth token endpoint, and every answer read from one,
+// goes through here: core's refresh (refresh_token, client_credentials), the
+// platform's code exchange after a consent, and the CLI's own loopback
+// connect. Three hand-written bodies had already drifted — none could send
+// the client secret any way but in the form body, which is the one way RFC
+// 6749 §2.3.1 lets a server refuse (Notion, Spotify, Reddit, Zoom do).
+//
+// How the client proves itself at the token endpoint (`token_auth`):
+//   client_secret_post   id and secret in the form body (the default — what
+//                        every stored secret did before 1 Nov 2026)
+//   client_secret_basic  HTTP Basic, the id and secret each form-urlencoded
+//                        first (RFC 6749 §2.3.1, Appendix B) — not plain
+//                        base64 of the raw pair, which breaks on a secret
+//                        holding ':' or '%'
+//   none                 a public client: client_id in the body, no secret
+//
+// Absent means the old behaviour: the body, with the secret if there is one.
+export const TOKEN_AUTH_METHODS = ["client_secret_post", "client_secret_basic", "none"];
+/** The short spellings a person types (`--token-auth basic`), to the RFC names. */
+export function parseTokenAuth(value) {
+    const v = value.trim().toLowerCase();
+    if (TOKEN_AUTH_METHODS.includes(v))
+        return v;
+    if (v === "post" || v === "body")
+        return "client_secret_post";
+    if (v === "basic")
+        return "client_secret_basic";
+    return null;
+}
+/** Why a client's token_auth cannot work, or null. */
+export function tokenAuthProblem(client) {
+    const auth = client.token_auth;
+    if (auth === undefined)
+        return null;
+    if (typeof auth !== "string" || !TOKEN_AUTH_METHODS.includes(auth)) {
+        return `token_auth must be one of ${TOKEN_AUTH_METHODS.join(", ")}`;
+    }
+    const hasSecret = !!client.client_secret?.trim();
+    if (auth === "client_secret_basic" && !hasSecret)
+        return "token_auth client_secret_basic needs a client_secret";
+    if (auth === "client_secret_post" && !hasSecret)
+        return "token_auth client_secret_post needs a client_secret — a public app is token_auth none";
+    if (auth === "none" && hasSecret)
+        return "token_auth none is a public client — it sends no client_secret; leave the secret empty or pick client_secret_post or client_secret_basic";
+    return null;
+}
+/** The form-urlencoding RFC 6749 Appendix B asks for: space as '+'. */
+const formEncode = (s) => new URLSearchParams({ x: s }).toString().slice(2);
+/**
+ * The headers and body of one token request. `params` is the grant's own
+ * fields (grant_type, code, refresh_token, …); the client's identity is
+ * added here, by its token_auth. Fields in `params` named client_id or
+ * client_secret are dropped — the method decides those, never an `extra`.
+ * `clientIdInBody`: client_id goes in the form whatever the method — a
+ * pushed authorization request carries it as a parameter of the request it
+ * describes even when the client authenticates with Basic (RFC 9126 §2.1).
+ */
+export function oauthTokenRequest(client, params, opts = {}) {
+    const problem = tokenAuthProblem(client);
+    if (problem)
+        throw new Error(problem);
+    const form = new URLSearchParams();
+    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(params)) {
+        if (k === "client_id" || k === "client_secret")
+            continue;
+        form.set(k, v);
+    }
+    const headers = {
+        "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+        // GitHub answers form-encoded unless asked; every server may answer JSON.
+        accept: "application/json",
+    };
+    const auth = client.token_auth ?? (client.client_secret ? "client_secret_post" : "none");
+    if (auth === "client_secret_basic") {
+        // One method per request (RFC 6749 §2.3): the id travels in the header,
+        // not the body as well.
+        const pair = `${formEncode(client.client_id)}:${formEncode(client.client_secret)}`;
+        headers.authorization = `Basic ${Buffer.from(pair, "utf8").toString("base64")}`;
+        if (opts.clientIdInBody)
+            form.set("client_id", client.client_id);
+    }
+    else {
+        form.set("client_id", client.client_id);
+        if (auth === "client_secret_post")
+            form.set("client_secret", client.client_secret);
+    }
+    return { headers, body: form.toString() };
+}
+/** Fields that are credentials or are read into their own slot above. */
+const NOT_FIELDS = new Set([
+    "access_token", "refresh_token", "id_token", "expires_in", "refresh_token_expires_in",
+    "error", "error_description", "error_uri", "authed_user", "ok",
+]);
+function seconds(v) {
+    const n = typeof v === "number" ? v : typeof v === "string" && v.trim() !== "" ? Number(v) : NaN;
+    return Number.isFinite(n) && n >= 0 ? n : undefined;
+}
+function str(v) {
+    return typeof v === "string" && v !== "" ? v : undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * Read a token endpoint's body: JSON, or form-encoded (GitHub without an
+ * Accept header, some older servers), whatever the content type claims.
+ * Slack's user-token install nests the token under `authed_user` and says
+ * `ok: false` with a 200 when it refuses; both are read here.
+ */
+export function readTokenResponse(text, contentType = "") {
+    let raw = {};
+    const trimmed = text.trim();
+    if (trimmed.startsWith("{")) {
+        try {
+            const parsed = JSON.parse(trimmed);
+            if (parsed && typeof parsed === "object" && !Array.isArray(parsed))
+                raw = parsed;
+        }
+        catch {
+            raw = {};
+        }
+    }
+    else if (trimmed && (/x-www-form-urlencoded|text\/plain/i.test(contentType) || /^[\w.-]+=/.test(trimmed))) {
+        raw = Object.fromEntries(new URLSearchParams(trimmed));
+    }
+    // Slack: a user token alone comes back under authed_user, with its own
+    // refresh token and expiry when rotation is on. The top-level token (a bot
+    // token) wins when there is one.
+    let source = raw;
+    const nested = raw.authed_user;
+    if (!str(raw.access_token) && nested && typeof nested === "object" && str(nested.access_token)) {
+        source = nested;
+    }
+    const fields = {};
+    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(raw)) {
+        if (NOT_FIELDS.has(k))
+            continue;
+        if (typeof v === "string" || typeof v === "number" || typeof v === "boolean")
+            fields[k] = String(v);
+    }
+    // From the nested object: its scope and type describe the token we took.
+    const scope = str(source.scope) ?? str(raw.scope);
+    const tokenType = str(source.token_type) ?? str(raw.token_type);
+    const out = { fields };
+    const access = str(source.access_token);
+    const refresh = str(source.refresh_token);
+    const expires = seconds(source.expires_in);
+    const refreshExpires = seconds(source.refresh_token_expires_in);
+    if (access)
+        out.access_token = access;
+    if (refresh)
+        out.refresh_token = refresh;
+    if (expires !== undefined)
+        out.expires_in = expires;
+    if (refreshExpires !== undefined)
+        out.refresh_token_expires_in = refreshExpires;
+    if (tokenType)
+        out.token_type = tokenType;
+    if (scope)
+        out.scope = scope;
+    const error = str(raw.error) ?? (raw.ok === false ? "refused" : undefined);
+    if (error) {
+        out.error = error;
+        // A refusal carries no token, whatever else the body held.
+        delete out.access_token;
+        delete out.refresh_token;
+    }
+    const description = str(raw.error_description);
+    if (description)
+        out.error_description = description;
+    return out;
+}

package/dist/src/secrets.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import { type TokenAuth } from "./oauth-token.ts";
 /** Which store a secret came from. */
 export type SecretScope = "account" | "workspace";
 /**
@@ -238,6 +239,15 @@ export interface OAuth2Config {
     grant_type?: "refresh_token" | "client_credentials";
     /** Extra form fields some providers want (audience, scope, …). */
     extra?: Record<string, string>;
+    /** How the client authenticates at the token endpoint (oauth-token.ts):
+     *  absent is the form body, with the secret when there is one. */
+    token_auth?: TokenAuth;
+    /** Plain fields the provider returned beside the first token (Salesforce's
+     *  instance_url) — kept with the recipe, never a credential. */
+    fields?: Record<string, string>;
+    /** The provider's revocation endpoint (RFC 7009): deleting or replacing
+     *  this secret revokes its tokens there (revokeOAuth2). */
+    revocation_url?: string;
 }
 /** Tries at a token endpoint before a refresh is called failed: the first,
  *  and two more after a short wait, for a network error, a 5xx or a 429. */
@@ -264,6 +274,54 @@ export declare function tokenCacheKey(kind: "oauth2" | "sa", storedValue: string
  * older token over a newer one. Returns whether a copy was replaced.
  */
 export declare function replaceOAuth2RefreshToken(tenant: string, name: string, workspace: string | undefined, usedValue: string, refreshToken: string): boolean;
+/** The oauth2 recipe stored at exactly this scope — never the account copy a
+ *  workspace would fall back to: revoking is about the copy being removed. */
+export declare function oauth2ValueAt(tenant: string, name: string, workspace?: string): string | null;
+/**
+ * Another stored secret of this account holds a grant revoking this one could
+ * end: the same refresh token (a copy made by hand, or one rotation reached),
+ * or any grant from the same app (token URL and client id). Providers such as
+ * Google revoke every token of a user's grant to an app together, so deleting
+ * the Ads connection would take down the Search Console one made with the
+ * same app (Codex review, 1 Nov 2026). Such a grant is left alone.
+ */
+export declare function oauthGrantSharedElsewhere(tenant: string, name: string, workspace: string | undefined, refreshToken: string, app?: {
+    token_url: string;
+    client_id: string;
+}): boolean;
+/** What revoking an oauth2 secret's tokens came to. */
+export interface OAuthRevokeResult {
+    /** Nothing was asked: no revocation endpoint; another secret holds the
+     *  same grant or one from the same app; the replacement is from the same
+     *  app (a reconnect: revoking would end the new grant too at providers
+     *  that revoke per app); or the stored recipe could not be read. */
+    skipped?: "no-revocation-url" | "shared-grant" | "same-app" | "unreadable";
+    /** The token types the provider accepted the revocation of. */
+    revoked: ("refresh_token" | "access_token")[];
+    /** Why one failed — reported, never a reason to keep a secret. */
+    error?: string;
+}
+type RevokeFetcher = (url: string, init: RequestInit) => Promise<Response>;
+/**
+ * Revoke what an oauth2 recipe holds at its provider (RFC 7009): the refresh
+ * token, then the access token this process has cached for it. The client
+ * authenticates as at the token URL (its token_auth). A 200 is success —
+ * the RFC answers 200 for a token already invalid too; anything else is
+ * reported in `error`, and the next token is still tried. `replacement`: the
+ * recipe taking this one's place; one from the same app (token URL and client
+ * id) means nothing is revoked, since a provider that revokes per app would
+ * end the new grant with the old.
+ */
+export declare function revokeOAuth2Value(value: string, opts?: {
+    tenant?: string;
+    name?: string;
+    workspace?: string;
+    fetcher?: RevokeFetcher;
+    replacement?: {
+        token_url: string;
+        client_id: string;
+    };
+}): Promise<OAuthRevokeResult>;
 /**
  * Swap every oauth2 recipe in an env map for a live access token. The one
  * async moment in secret resolution, kept out of the sync paths: callers