@fluxpointstudios/orynq-sdk-tool-receipts 0.2.0

package/dist/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,503 @@
+import { addEvent, verifyBundle } from '@fluxpointstudios/orynq-sdk-process-trace';
+import { canonicalize, sha256StringHex } from '@fluxpointstudios/orynq-sdk-core/utils';
+import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual, verify, createPublicKey, createPrivateKey, sign } from 'crypto';
+
+// src/record.ts
+async function hashToolPayload(value) {
+  const serialized = typeof value === "string" ? value : canonicalize(value);
+  return sha256StringHex(serialized);
+}
+async function addToolReceipt(run, spanId, opts) {
+  if (!opts.toolId) throw new Error("addToolReceipt: toolId is required");
+  if (!opts.receipt) throw new Error("addToolReceipt: receipt is required");
+  const event = {
+    kind: "tool-receipt",
+    visibility: opts.visibility ?? "private",
+    toolId: opts.toolId,
+    request: opts.request,
+    response: opts.response,
+    receipt: opts.receipt
+  };
+  const recorded = await addEvent(run, spanId, event);
+  return recorded;
+}
+var textEncoder = new TextEncoder();
+function utf8(s) {
+  return Buffer.from(textEncoder.encode(s));
+}
+function constantTimeEqualHex(a, b) {
+  const ab = Buffer.from(a.toLowerCase(), "hex");
+  const bb = Buffer.from(b.toLowerCase(), "hex");
+  if (ab.length === 0 || ab.length !== bb.length) return false;
+  return timingSafeEqual(ab, bb);
+}
+async function resolveKey(event, ctx, { allowEmbedded }) {
+  if (ctx?.resolveKey) {
+    const k = await ctx.resolveKey(event);
+    if (k !== void 0) return k;
+  }
+  if (ctx?.keys && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(ctx.keys, event.receipt.signer)) {
+    return ctx.keys[event.receipt.signer];
+  }
+  if (allowEmbedded && ctx?.trustEmbeddedKeys === true) {
+    const p = event.receipt.params;
+    if (p && typeof p.publicKey === "string") return p.publicKey;
+  }
+  return void 0;
+}
+function keyToString(key) {
+  return typeof key === "string" ? key : Buffer.from(key).toString("utf8");
+}
+var SPKI_ALG_OIDS = [
+  // rsaEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1
+  [42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 1],
+  // id-ecPublicKey 1.2.840.10045.2.1
+  [42, 134, 72, 206, 61, 2, 1],
+  // id-Ed25519 1.3.101.112
+  [43, 101, 112],
+  // id-Ed448 1.3.101.113
+  [43, 101, 113]
+];
+function looksLikeDerPublicKey(bytes) {
+  if (bytes.length < 8 || bytes[0] !== 48) return false;
+  const lenByte = bytes[1];
+  let contentStart;
+  let contentLen;
+  if (lenByte < 128) {
+    contentStart = 2;
+    contentLen = lenByte;
+  } else if (lenByte === 129) {
+    contentStart = 3;
+    contentLen = bytes[2];
+  } else if (lenByte === 130) {
+    contentStart = 4;
+    contentLen = bytes[2] << 8 | bytes[3];
+  } else {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (contentStart + contentLen !== bytes.length) return false;
+  return SPKI_ALG_OIDS.some((oid) => indexOfBytes(bytes, oid) !== -1);
+}
+function indexOfBytes(haystack, needle) {
+  outer: for (let i = 0; i + needle.length <= haystack.length; i++) {
+    for (let j = 0; j < needle.length; j++) {
+      if (haystack[i + j] !== needle[j]) continue outer;
+    }
+    return i;
+  }
+  return -1;
+}
+function looksLikeAsymmetricPublicKey(key) {
+  if (typeof key !== "string" && looksLikeDerPublicKey(key)) return true;
+  const s = keyToString(key).trim();
+  if (s.includes("-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----") || s.includes("-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----")) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (s.startsWith("{")) {
+    try {
+      const jwk = JSON.parse(s);
+      const kty = typeof jwk.kty === "string" ? jwk.kty.toUpperCase() : "";
+      return kty === "RSA" || kty === "EC" || kty === "OKP";
+    } catch {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+function assertSymmetricSecret(key, algLabel) {
+  if (looksLikeAsymmetricPublicKey(key)) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `${algLabel}: refusing to HMAC with an asymmetric public key (algorithm confusion). Provide the signer's symmetric secret out-of-band, or pin the asymmetric alg via keyAlgs.`
+    );
+  }
+}
+function assertAlgAllowed(event, ctx, alg) {
+  const allow = ctx?.keyAlgs?.[event.receipt.signer];
+  if (allow && !allow.includes(alg)) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `alg "${alg}" is not in the expected-algorithm allow-list for signer "${event.receipt.signer}"`
+    );
+  }
+}
+function parseStripeSignature(raw, params) {
+  if (raw.includes("v1=") || raw.includes("t=")) {
+    const parts = raw.split(",").map((p) => p.trim());
+    let t2;
+    const v1 = [];
+    for (const part of parts) {
+      const eq = part.indexOf("=");
+      if (eq === -1) continue;
+      const k = part.slice(0, eq);
+      const v = part.slice(eq + 1);
+      if (k === "t") t2 = v;
+      else if (k === "v1") v1.push(v);
+    }
+    return t2 !== void 0 ? { t: t2, v1 } : { v1 };
+  }
+  const t = typeof params?.timestamp === "string" ? params.timestamp : void 0;
+  return t !== void 0 ? { t, v1: [raw] } : { v1: [raw] };
+}
+async function verifyStripeReceipt(event, ctx) {
+  const secret = await resolveKey(event, ctx, { allowEmbedded: false });
+  if (secret === void 0) {
+    throw new Error(
+      "stripe-webhook: signing secret not found \u2014 provide it via verify context (keys/resolveKey), not the trace"
+    );
+  }
+  const { t, v1 } = parseStripeSignature(event.receipt.signature, event.receipt.params);
+  if (t === void 0) throw new Error("stripe-webhook: missing timestamp (t)");
+  if (v1.length === 0) throw new Error("stripe-webhook: missing v1 signature");
+  const toleranceSec = ctx?.toleranceSec ?? 300;
+  const now = ctx?.nowSec ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
+  const ts = Number(t);
+  if (!Number.isFinite(ts)) throw new Error("stripe-webhook: invalid timestamp");
+  if (Math.abs(now - ts) > toleranceSec) {
+    throw new Error(`stripe-webhook: timestamp outside tolerance (${toleranceSec}s)`);
+  }
+  const signedBase = `${t}.${event.receipt.signedPayload}`;
+  const expected = createHmac("sha256", keyToString(secret)).update(signedBase).digest("hex");
+  return v1.some((candidate) => constantTimeEqualHex(expected, candidate));
+}
+async function verifyGitHubReceipt(event, ctx) {
+  const secret = await resolveKey(event, ctx, { allowEmbedded: false });
+  if (secret === void 0) {
+    throw new Error(
+      "github-webhook: signing secret not found \u2014 provide it via verify context (keys/resolveKey)"
+    );
+  }
+  const ts = event.receipt.params?.timestamp;
+  if (typeof ts === "string" || typeof ts === "number") {
+    const tsNum = Number(ts);
+    if (!Number.isFinite(tsNum)) throw new Error("github-webhook: invalid timestamp");
+    const toleranceSec = ctx?.toleranceSec ?? 300;
+    const now = ctx?.nowSec ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
+    if (Math.abs(now - tsNum) > toleranceSec) {
+      throw new Error(`github-webhook: timestamp outside tolerance (${toleranceSec}s)`);
+    }
+  }
+  const provided = event.receipt.signature.startsWith("sha256=") ? event.receipt.signature.slice("sha256=".length) : event.receipt.signature;
+  const expected = createHmac("sha256", keyToString(secret)).update(event.receipt.signedPayload).digest("hex");
+  return constantTimeEqualHex(expected, provided);
+}
+function parseJws(event) {
+  const sp = event.receipt.signedPayload;
+  const segments = sp.split(".");
+  let signingInput;
+  let sigB64;
+  if (segments.length === 3) {
+    signingInput = `${segments[0]}.${segments[1]}`;
+    sigB64 = segments[2];
+  } else if (segments.length === 2) {
+    signingInput = sp;
+    sigB64 = event.receipt.signature;
+  } else {
+    throw new Error("jws: signedPayload must be a compact JWS (h.p.s) or signing input (h.p)");
+  }
+  const headerJson = Buffer.from(segments[0], "base64url").toString("utf8");
+  const header = JSON.parse(headerJson);
+  return { signingInput, signature: Buffer.from(sigB64, "base64url"), header };
+}
+async function verifyJwsReceipt(event, ctx) {
+  const { signingInput, signature, header } = parseJws(event);
+  const alg = header.alg;
+  if (!alg || alg === "none") throw new Error(`jws: unsupported alg "${alg}"`);
+  assertAlgAllowed(event, ctx, alg);
+  const data = utf8(signingInput);
+  if (alg.startsWith("HS")) {
+    const secret = await resolveKey(event, ctx, { allowEmbedded: false });
+    if (secret === void 0) throw new Error(`jws(${alg}): HMAC secret not found in verify context`);
+    assertSymmetricSecret(secret, `jws(${alg})`);
+    const hashAlg = `sha${alg.slice(2)}`;
+    const expected = createHmac(hashAlg, keyToString(secret)).update(data).digest();
+    return expected.length === signature.length && timingSafeEqual(expected, signature);
+  }
+  const keyMaterial = await resolveKey(event, ctx, { allowEmbedded: true });
+  if (keyMaterial === void 0) throw new Error(`jws(${alg}): public key not found`);
+  const publicKey = toPublicKey(keyMaterial);
+  if (alg.startsWith("RS")) {
+    return verify(`sha${alg.slice(2)}`, data, publicKey, signature);
+  }
+  if (alg.startsWith("PS")) {
+    const bits = alg.slice(2);
+    return verify(
+      `sha${bits}`,
+      data,
+      { key: publicKey, padding: 6, saltLength: Number(bits) / 8 },
+      signature
+    );
+  }
+  if (alg.startsWith("ES")) {
+    return verify(
+      `sha${alg.slice(2)}`,
+      data,
+      { key: publicKey, dsaEncoding: "ieee-p1363" },
+      signature
+    );
+  }
+  if (alg === "EdDSA") {
+    return verify(null, data, publicKey, signature);
+  }
+  throw new Error(`jws: unsupported alg "${alg}"`);
+}
+var RFC9421_HASH = {
+  "rsa-pss-sha512": "sha512",
+  "rsa-v1_5-sha256": "sha256",
+  "ecdsa-p256-sha256": "sha256",
+  "ecdsa-p384-sha384": "sha384"
+};
+async function verifyHttpMessageReceipt(event, ctx) {
+  const params = event.receipt.params ?? {};
+  const alg = typeof params.alg === "string" ? params.alg : void 0;
+  if (!alg) {
+    throw new Error("http-message-signatures: receipt.params.alg is required (RFC 9421 alg id)");
+  }
+  assertAlgAllowed(event, ctx, alg);
+  const data = utf8(event.receipt.signedPayload);
+  const signature = decodeSignature(event.receipt.signature);
+  if (alg === "ed25519") {
+    const keyMaterial2 = await resolveKey(event, ctx, { allowEmbedded: true });
+    if (keyMaterial2 === void 0) throw new Error("http-message-signatures(ed25519): public key not found");
+    return verify(null, data, toPublicKey(keyMaterial2), signature);
+  }
+  if (alg === "hmac-sha256") {
+    const secret = await resolveKey(event, ctx, { allowEmbedded: false });
+    if (secret === void 0) throw new Error("http-message-signatures(hmac-sha256): secret not found");
+    assertSymmetricSecret(secret, "http-message-signatures(hmac-sha256)");
+    const expected = createHmac("sha256", keyToString(secret)).update(data).digest();
+    return expected.length === signature.length && timingSafeEqual(expected, signature);
+  }
+  const hash = RFC9421_HASH[alg];
+  if (!hash) throw new Error(`http-message-signatures: unsupported alg "${alg}"`);
+  const keyMaterial = await resolveKey(event, ctx, { allowEmbedded: true });
+  if (keyMaterial === void 0) throw new Error(`http-message-signatures(${alg}): public key not found`);
+  const publicKey = toPublicKey(keyMaterial);
+  if (alg === "rsa-pss-sha512") {
+    return verify(hash, data, { key: publicKey, padding: 6, saltLength: 64 }, signature);
+  }
+  if (alg === "rsa-v1_5-sha256") {
+    return verify(hash, data, publicKey, signature);
+  }
+  return verify(hash, data, { key: publicKey, dsaEncoding: "ieee-p1363" }, signature);
+}
+function toPublicKey(material) {
+  if (typeof material === "string") {
+    const trimmed = material.trim();
+    if (trimmed.startsWith("{")) {
+      return createPublicKey({ key: JSON.parse(trimmed), format: "jwk" });
+    }
+    return createPublicKey(material);
+  }
+  return createPublicKey(Buffer.from(material));
+}
+function decodeSignature(sig) {
+  if (sig.startsWith("0x")) return Buffer.from(sig.slice(2), "hex");
+  if (/[-_]/.test(sig)) return Buffer.from(sig, "base64url");
+  return Buffer.from(sig, "base64");
+}
+async function responseCommitmentHash(event) {
+  const { scheme, signedPayload } = event.receipt;
+  switch (scheme) {
+    case "jws": {
+      const segs = signedPayload.split(".");
+      if (segs.length < 2 || !segs[1]) return null;
+      const body = Buffer.from(segs[1], "base64url").toString("utf8");
+      return sha256StringHex(body);
+    }
+    case "stripe-webhook":
+    case "github-webhook":
+      return sha256StringHex(signedPayload);
+    case "http-message-signatures":
+      return contentDigestSha256Hex(signedPayload);
+    default:
+      return null;
+  }
+}
+function jwsBindingContext(event) {
+  if (event.receipt.scheme !== "jws") return null;
+  const seg0 = event.receipt.signedPayload.split(".")[0];
+  if (!seg0) return null;
+  try {
+    const header = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(seg0, "base64url").toString("utf8"));
+    const b = header.orynqBinding;
+    if (!b || typeof b.runId !== "string") return null;
+    return typeof b.requestHash === "string" ? { runId: b.runId, requestHash: b.requestHash } : { runId: b.runId };
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+function contentDigestSha256Hex(signatureBase) {
+  for (const line of signatureBase.split("\n")) {
+    const m = /^"content-digest":\s*(.+)$/i.exec(line.trim());
+    if (!m) continue;
+    const d = /sha-256=:([A-Za-z0-9+/=]+):/.exec(m[1]);
+    if (!d || !d[1]) return null;
+    return Buffer.from(d[1], "base64").toString("hex");
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+var BUILTIN_TOOL_RECEIPT_VERIFIERS = {
+  "stripe-webhook": verifyStripeReceipt,
+  "github-webhook": verifyGitHubReceipt,
+  jws: verifyJwsReceipt,
+  "http-message-signatures": verifyHttpMessageReceipt
+};
+function hexEq(a, b) {
+  const na = a.startsWith("0x") ? a.slice(2) : a;
+  const nb = b.startsWith("0x") ? b.slice(2) : b;
+  return na.toLowerCase() === nb.toLowerCase();
+}
+function extractToolReceipts(bundle) {
+  return bundle.privateRun.events.filter(
+    (e) => e.kind === "tool-receipt"
+  );
+}
+async function verifyToolReceipt(event, ctx) {
+  const scheme = event.receipt.scheme;
+  const base = {
+    eventId: event.id,
+    toolId: event.toolId,
+    scheme,
+    signer: event.receipt.signer
+  };
+  const callBound = false;
+  const verifier = ctx?.verifiers?.[scheme] ?? BUILTIN_TOOL_RECEIPT_VERIFIERS[scheme];
+  if (!verifier) {
+    return {
+      ...base,
+      callBound,
+      verified: false,
+      error: `no verifier registered for scheme "${scheme}"`
+    };
+  }
+  try {
+    const sigValid = await verifier(event, ctx);
+    if (!sigValid) return { ...base, callBound, verified: false, reason: "signature-invalid" };
+    const commit = await responseCommitmentHash(event);
+    if (commit === null) {
+      return { ...base, callBound, verified: false, reason: "response-not-bound" };
+    }
+    if (!hexEq(commit, event.response.hash)) {
+      return { ...base, callBound, verified: false, reason: "response-binding-mismatch" };
+    }
+    if (event.response.payload !== void 0) {
+      const payloadHash = await hashToolPayload(event.response.payload);
+      if (!hexEq(payloadHash, event.response.hash)) {
+        return { ...base, callBound, verified: false, reason: "response-payload-mismatch" };
+      }
+    }
+    let provenCallBound = false;
+    if (scheme === "jws") {
+      const bound = jwsBindingContext(event);
+      if (bound !== null) {
+        if (ctx?.runId !== void 0 && bound.runId !== ctx.runId) {
+          return { ...base, callBound, verified: false, reason: "call-binding-mismatch" };
+        }
+        if (bound.requestHash !== void 0 && !hexEq(bound.requestHash, event.request.hash)) {
+          return { ...base, callBound, verified: false, reason: "call-binding-mismatch" };
+        }
+        provenCallBound = bound.requestHash !== void 0 && hexEq(bound.requestHash, event.request.hash) && ctx?.runId !== void 0 && bound.runId === ctx.runId;
+      }
+    }
+    if (ctx?.requireCallBinding && !provenCallBound) {
+      return { ...base, callBound: provenCallBound, verified: false, reason: "call-binding-required" };
+    }
+    return { ...base, callBound: provenCallBound, verified: true };
+  } catch (error) {
+    return {
+      ...base,
+      callBound,
+      verified: false,
+      error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)
+    };
+  }
+}
+async function verifyToolReceipts(bundle, ctx) {
+  const events = extractToolReceipts(bundle);
+  const boundCtx = {
+    ...ctx,
+    runId: ctx?.runId ?? bundle.privateRun.id
+  };
+  const results = [];
+  for (const event of events) {
+    results.push(await verifyToolReceipt(event, boundCtx));
+  }
+  const failed = results.filter((r) => !r.verified);
+  return {
+    valid: failed.length === 0,
+    errors: failed.map(
+      (f) => `tool-receipt "${f.toolId}" (${f.scheme}) failed${f.reason ? ` [${f.reason}]` : ""}${f.error ? `: ${f.error}` : ""}`
+    ),
+    results
+  };
+}
+async function verifyTrace(bundle, ctx) {
+  const outcome = await verifyToolReceipts(bundle, ctx);
+  const result = await verifyBundle(bundle, {
+    toolReceipts: () => ({ valid: outcome.valid, errors: outcome.errors })
+  });
+  return { ...result, toolReceipts: outcome };
+}
+function b64url(input) {
+  return Buffer.from(input).toString("base64url");
+}
+function signJws(opts, signingInput) {
+  const data = Buffer.from(signingInput, "utf8");
+  if (opts.alg === "HS256") {
+    if (!opts.secret) throw new Error("createSigningProxy(HS256): `secret` is required");
+    return createHmac("sha256", opts.secret).update(data).digest();
+  }
+  if (!opts.privateKey) {
+    throw new Error(`createSigningProxy(${opts.alg}): \`privateKey\` is required`);
+  }
+  const key = typeof opts.privateKey === "string" ? createPrivateKey(opts.privateKey) : opts.privateKey;
+  if (opts.alg === "EdDSA") return sign(null, data, key);
+  if (opts.alg.startsWith("ES")) {
+    return sign(`sha${opts.alg.slice(2)}`, data, { key, dsaEncoding: "ieee-p1363" });
+  }
+  if (opts.alg.startsWith("PS")) {
+    return sign(`sha${opts.alg.slice(2)}`, data, {
+      key,
+      padding: 6,
+      saltLength: Number(opts.alg.slice(2)) / 8
+    });
+  }
+  if (opts.alg.startsWith("RS")) {
+    return sign(`sha${opts.alg.slice(2)}`, data, key);
+  }
+  throw new Error(`createSigningProxy: unsupported alg "${opts.alg}"`);
+}
+function createSigningProxy(opts) {
+  if (!opts.signer) throw new Error("createSigningProxy: `signer` is required");
+  return {
+    sign(payload) {
+      const header = { alg: opts.alg, typ: "JWT", kid: opts.signer };
+      if (opts.binding) {
+        header.orynqBinding = {
+          runId: opts.binding.runId,
+          ...opts.binding.requestHash !== void 0 ? { requestHash: opts.binding.requestHash } : {}
+        };
+      }
+      const h = b64url(JSON.stringify(header));
+      const body = typeof payload === "string" ? payload : canonicalize(payload);
+      const p = b64url(body);
+      const signingInput = `${h}.${p}`;
+      const sigB64 = b64url(signJws(opts, signingInput));
+      return {
+        // signedPayload is the JWS *signing input* (the bytes actually signed);
+        // the signature is carried separately so it is independently checkable.
+        scheme: "jws",
+        signer: opts.signer,
+        signature: sigB64,
+        signedPayload: signingInput,
+        ...opts.publicKey ? { params: { publicKey: opts.publicKey } } : {}
+      };
+    }
+  };
+}
+
+// src/index.ts
+var VERSION = "0.1.0";
+
+export { BUILTIN_TOOL_RECEIPT_VERIFIERS, VERSION, addToolReceipt, createSigningProxy, extractToolReceipts, hashToolPayload, jwsBindingContext, verifyGitHubReceipt, verifyHttpMessageReceipt, verifyJwsReceipt, verifyStripeReceipt, verifyToolReceipt, verifyToolReceipts, verifyTrace };
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/index.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/record.ts","../src/schemes.ts","../src/verify.ts","../src/signing-proxy.ts","../src/index.ts"],"names":["t","cryptoVerify","keyMaterial","sha256StringHex","createHmac","cryptoSign","canonicalize"],"mappings":";;;;;AAkBA,eAAsB,gBAAgB,KAAA,EAAiC;AACrE,EAAA,MAAM,aAAa,OAAO,KAAA,KAAU,QAAA,GAAW,KAAA,GAAQ,aAAa,KAAK,CAAA;AACzE,EAAA,OAAO,gBAAgB,UAAU,CAAA;AACnC;AAmBA,eAAsB,cAAA,CACpB,GAAA,EACA,MAAA,EACA,IAAA,EAC2B;AAC3B,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,IAAA,CAAK,MAAA,EAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,oCAAoC,CAAA;AACtE,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,IAAA,CAAK,OAAA,EAAS,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,qCAAqC,CAAA;AAExE,EAAA,MAAM,KAAA,GAAqE;AAAA,IACzE,IAAA,EAAM,cAAA;AAAA,IACN,UAAA,EAAY,KAAK,UAAA,IAAc,SAAA;AAAA,IAC/B,QAAQ,IAAA,CAAK,MAAA;AAAA,IACb,SAAS,IAAA,CAAK,OAAA;AAAA,IACd,UAAU,IAAA,CAAK,QAAA;AAAA,IACf,SAAS,IAAA,CAAK;AAAA,GAChB;AAEA,EAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAuB,MAAM,QAAA,CAAS,GAAA,EAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,CAAA;AAC9D,EAAA,OAAO,QAAA;AACT;ACDA,IAAM,WAAA,GAAc,IAAI,WAAA,EAAY;AAEpC,SAAS,KAAK,CAAA,EAAmB;AAC/B,EAAA,OAAO,MAAA,CAAO,IAAA,CAAK,WAAA,CAAY,MAAA,CAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA;AAC1C;AAEA,SAAS,oBAAA,CAAqB,GAAW,CAAA,EAAoB;AAC3D,EAAA,MAAM,KAAK,MAAA,CAAO,IAAA,CAAK,CAAA,CAAE,WAAA,IAAe,KAAK,CAAA;AAC7C,EAAA,MAAM,KAAK,MAAA,CAAO,IAAA,CAAK,CAAA,CAAE,WAAA,IAAe,KAAK,CAAA;AAC7C,EAAA,IAAI,GAAG,MAAA,KAAW,CAAA,IAAK,GAAG,MAAA,KAAW,EAAA,CAAG,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAA;AACvD,EAAA,OAAO,eAAA,CAAgB,IAAI,EAAE,CAAA;AAC/B;AAEA,eAAe,UAAA,CACb,KAAA,EACA,GAAA,EACA,EAAE,eAAc,EAC0B;AAC1C,EAAA,IAAI,KAAK,UAAA,EAAY;AACnB,IAAA,MAAM,CAAA,GAAI,MAAM,GAAA,CAAI,UAAA,CAAW,KAAK,CAAA;AACpC,IAAA,IAAI,CAAA,KAAM,QAAW,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,EAC9B;AACA,EAAA,IAAI,GAAA,EAAK,IAAA,IAAQ,MAAA,CAAO,SAAA,CAAU,cAAA,CAAe,IAAA,CAAK,GAAA,CAAI,IAAA,EAAM,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAM,CAAA,EAAG;AACrF,IAAA,OAAO,GAAA,CAAI,IAAA,CAAK,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAM,CAAA;AAAA,EACtC;AAIA,EAAA,IAAI,aAAA,IAAiB,GAAA,EAAK,iBAAA,KAAsB,IAAA,EAAM;AACpD,IAAA,MAAM,CAAA,GAAI,MAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAA;AACxB,IAAA,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO,CAAA,CAAE,SAAA,KAAc,QAAA,SAAiB,CAAA,CAAE,SAAA;AAAA,EACrD;AACA,EAAA,OAAO,MAAA;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,YAAY,GAAA,EAAkC;AACrD,EAAA,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAA,GAAW,GAAA,GAAM,OAAO,IAAA,CAAK,GAAG,CAAA,CAAE,QAAA,CAAS,MAAM,CAAA;AACzE;AAGA,IAAM,aAAA,GAAgD;AAAA;AAAA,EAEpD,CAAC,IAAM,GAAA,EAAM,EAAA,EAAM,KAAM,GAAA,EAAM,EAAA,EAAM,CAAA,EAAM,CAAA,EAAM,CAAI,CAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAErD,CAAC,EAAA,EAAM,GAAA,EAAM,IAAM,GAAA,EAAM,EAAA,EAAM,GAAM,CAAI,CAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEzC,CAAC,EAAA,EAAM,GAAA,EAAM,GAAI,CAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEjB,CAAC,EAAA,EAAM,GAAA,EAAM,GAAI;AACnB,CAAA;AAUA,SAAS,sBAAsB,KAAA,EAA4B;AACzD,EAAA,IAAI,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,CAAA,IAAK,MAAM,CAAC,CAAA,KAAM,IAAM,OAAO,KAAA;AAClD,EAAA,MAAM,OAAA,GAAU,MAAM,CAAC,CAAA;AACvB,EAAA,IAAI,YAAA;AACJ,EAAA,IAAI,UAAA;AACJ,EAAA,IAAI,UAAU,GAAA,EAAM;AAClB,IAAA,YAAA,GAAe,CAAA;AACf,IAAA,UAAA,GAAa,OAAA;AAAA,EACf,CAAA,MAAA,IAAW,YAAY,GAAA,EAAM;AAC3B,IAAA,YAAA,GAAe,CAAA;AACf,IAAA,UAAA,GAAa,MAAM,CAAC,CAAA;AAAA,EACtB,CAAA,MAAA,IAAW,YAAY,GAAA,EAAM;AAC3B,IAAA,YAAA,GAAe,CAAA;AACf,IAAA,UAAA,GAAc,KAAA,CAAM,CAAC,CAAA,IAAM,CAAA,GAAK,MAAM,CAAC,CAAA;AAAA,EACzC,CAAA,MAAO;AACL,IAAA,OAAO,KAAA;AAAA,EACT;AAGA,EAAA,IAAI,YAAA,GAAe,UAAA,KAAe,KAAA,CAAM,MAAA,EAAQ,OAAO,KAAA;AACvD,EAAA,OAAO,aAAA,CAAc,KAAK,CAAC,GAAA,KAAQ,aAAa,KAAA,EAAO,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,CAAA;AACpE;AAGA,SAAS,YAAA,CAAa,UAAsB,MAAA,EAAmC;AAC7E,EAAA,KAAA,EAAO,KAAA,IAAS,IAAI,CAAA,EAAG,CAAA,GAAI,OAAO,MAAA,IAAU,QAAA,CAAS,QAAQ,CAAA,EAAA,EAAK;AAChE,IAAA,KAAA,IAAS,CAAA,GAAI,CAAA,EAAG,CAAA,GAAI,MAAA,CAAO,QAAQ,CAAA,EAAA,EAAK;AACtC,MAAA,IAAI,SAAS,CAAA,GAAI,CAAC,MAAM,MAAA,CAAO,CAAC,GAAG,SAAS,KAAA;AAAA,IAC9C;AACA,IAAA,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,EACT;AACA,EAAA,OAAO,EAAA;AACT;AAUA,SAAS,6BAA6B,GAAA,EAAmC;AACvE,EAAA,IAAI,OAAO,GAAA,KAAQ,QAAA,IAAY,qBAAA,CAAsB,GAAG,GAAG,OAAO,IAAA;AAClE,EAAA,MAAM,CAAA,GAAI,WAAA,CAAY,GAAG,CAAA,CAAE,IAAA,EAAK;AAChC,EAAA,IACE,EAAE,QAAA,CAAS,4BAA4B,KACvC,CAAA,CAAE,QAAA,CAAS,gCAAgC,CAAA,EAC3C;AACA,IAAA,OAAO,IAAA;AAAA,EACT;AACA,EAAA,IAAI,CAAA,CAAE,UAAA,CAAW,GAAG,CAAA,EAAG;AACrB,IAAA,IAAI;AACF,MAAA,MAAM,GAAA,GAAM,IAAA,CAAK,KAAA,CAAM,CAAC,CAAA;AACxB,MAAA,MAAM,GAAA,GAAM,OAAO,GAAA,CAAI,GAAA,KAAQ,WAAW,GAAA,CAAI,GAAA,CAAI,aAAY,GAAI,EAAA;AAClE,MAAA,OAAO,GAAA,KAAQ,KAAA,IAAS,GAAA,KAAQ,IAAA,IAAQ,GAAA,KAAQ,KAAA;AAAA,IAClD,CAAA,CAAA,MAAQ;AACN,MAAA,OAAO,KAAA;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,EACF;AACA,EAAA,OAAO,KAAA;AACT;AAOA,SAAS,qBAAA,CAAsB,KAA0B,QAAA,EAAwB;AAC/E,EAAA,IAAI,4BAAA,CAA6B,GAAG,CAAA,EAAG;AACrC,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,KAAA;AAAA,MACR,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAA,iKAAA;AAAA,KAEb;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAMA,SAAS,gBAAA,CACP,KAAA,EACA,GAAA,EACA,GAAA,EACM;AACN,EAAA,MAAM,KAAA,GAAQ,GAAA,EAAK,OAAA,GAAU,KAAA,CAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,CAAA;AACjD,EAAA,IAAI,KAAA,IAAS,CAAC,KAAA,CAAM,QAAA,CAAS,GAAG,CAAA,EAAG;AACjC,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,KAAA;AAAA,MACR,CAAA,KAAA,EAAQ,GAAG,CAAA,0DAAA,EAA6D,KAAA,CAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,CAAA,CAAA;AAAA,KAC9F;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAOA,SAAS,oBAAA,CACP,KACA,MAAA,EAC8B;AAC9B,EAAA,IAAI,IAAI,QAAA,CAAS,KAAK,KAAK,GAAA,CAAI,QAAA,CAAS,IAAI,CAAA,EAAG;AAC7C,IAAA,MAAM,KAAA,GAAQ,GAAA,CAAI,KAAA,CAAM,GAAG,CAAA,CAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAA,KAAM,CAAA,CAAE,IAAA,EAAM,CAAA;AAChD,IAAA,IAAIA,EAAAA;AACJ,IAAA,MAAM,KAAe,EAAC;AACtB,IAAA,KAAA,MAAW,QAAQ,KAAA,EAAO;AACxB,MAAA,MAAM,EAAA,GAAK,IAAA,CAAK,OAAA,CAAQ,GAAG,CAAA;AAC3B,MAAA,IAAI,OAAO,EAAA,EAAI;AACf,MAAA,MAAM,CAAA,GAAI,IAAA,CAAK,KAAA,CAAM,CAAA,EAAG,EAAE,CAAA;AAC1B,MAAA,MAAM,CAAA,GAAI,IAAA,CAAK,KAAA,CAAM,EAAA,GAAK,CAAC,CAAA;AAC3B,MAAA,IAAI,CAAA,KAAM,GAAA,EAAKA,EAAAA,GAAI,CAAA;AAAA,WAAA,IACV,CAAA,KAAM,IAAA,EAAM,EAAA,CAAG,IAAA,CAAK,CAAC,CAAA;AAAA,IAChC;AACA,IAAA,OAAOA,EAAAA,KAAM,SAAY,EAAE,CAAA,EAAAA,IAAG,EAAA,EAAG,GAAI,EAAE,EAAA,EAAG;AAAA,EAC5C;AAEA,EAAA,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,MAAA,EAAQ,SAAA,KAAc,QAAA,GAAY,OAAO,SAAA,GAAuB,MAAA;AACjF,EAAA,OAAO,CAAA,KAAM,MAAA,GAAY,EAAE,CAAA,EAAG,EAAA,EAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAA,EAAE,GAAI,EAAE,EAAA,EAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAA,EAAE;AAC1D;AAEA,eAAsB,mBAAA,CACpB,OACA,GAAA,EACkB;AAClB,EAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,MAAM,UAAA,CAAW,KAAA,EAAO,KAAK,EAAE,aAAA,EAAe,OAAO,CAAA;AACpE,EAAA,IAAI,WAAW,MAAA,EAAW;AACxB,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,KAAA;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,KACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,EAAA,MAAM,EAAE,CAAA,EAAG,EAAA,EAAG,GAAI,oBAAA,CAAqB,MAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,SAAA,EAAW,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAM,CAAA;AACpF,EAAA,IAAI,CAAA,KAAM,MAAA,EAAW,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,uCAAuC,CAAA;AAC5E,EAAA,IAAI,GAAG,MAAA,KAAW,CAAA,EAAG,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,sCAAsC,CAAA;AAE3E,EAAA,MAAM,YAAA,GAAe,KAAK,YAAA,IAAgB,GAAA;AAC1C,EAAA,MAAM,GAAA,GAAM,KAAK,MAAA,IAAU,IAAA,CAAK,MAAM,IAAA,CAAK,GAAA,KAAQ,GAAI,CAAA;AACvD,EAAA,MAAM,EAAA,GAAK,OAAO,CAAC,CAAA;AACnB,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,QAAA,CAAS,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,mCAAmC,CAAA;AAC7E,EAAA,IAAI,IAAA,CAAK,GAAA,CAAI,GAAA,GAAM,EAAE,IAAI,YAAA,EAAc;AACrC,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,KAAA,CAAM,CAAA,6CAAA,EAAgD,YAAY,CAAA,EAAA,CAAI,CAAA;AAAA,EAClF;AAEA,EAAA,MAAM,aAAa,CAAA,EAAG,CAAC,CAAA,CAAA,EAAI,KAAA,CAAM,QAAQ,aAAa,CAAA,CAAA;AACtD,EAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAW,UAAA,CAAW,QAAA,EAAU,WAAA,CAAY,MAAM,CAAC,CAAA,CAAE,MAAA,CAAO,UAAU,CAAA,CAAE,MAAA,CAAO,KAAK,CAAA;AAC1F,EAAA,OAAO,GAAG,IAAA,CAAK,CAAC,cAAc,oBAAA,CAAqB,QAAA,EAAU,SAAS,CAAC,CAAA;AACzE;AAMA,eAAsB,mBAAA,CACpB,OACA,GAAA,EACkB;AAClB,EAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,MAAM,UAAA,CAAW,KAAA,EAAO,KAAK,EAAE,aAAA,EAAe,OAAO,CAAA;AACpE,EAAA,IAAI,WAAW,MAAA,EAAW;AACxB,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,KAAA;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,KACF;AAAA,EACF;AAKA,EAAA,MAAM,EAAA,GAAK,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAA,EAAQ,SAAA;AACjC,EAAA,IAAI,OAAO,EAAA,KAAO,QAAA,IAAY,OAAO,OAAO,QAAA,EAAU;AACpD,IAAA,MAAM,KAAA,GAAQ,OAAO,EAAE,CAAA;AACvB,IAAA,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,QAAA,CAAS,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,mCAAmC,CAAA;AAChF,IAAA,MAAM,YAAA,GAAe,KAAK,YAAA,IAAgB,GAAA;AAC1C,IAAA,MAAM,GAAA,GAAM,KAAK,MAAA,IAAU,IAAA,CAAK,MAAM,IAAA,CAAK,GAAA,KAAQ,GAAI,CAAA;AACvD,IAAA,IAAI,IAAA,CAAK,GAAA,CAAI,GAAA,GAAM,KAAK,IAAI,YAAA,EAAc;AACxC,MAAA,MAAM,IAAI,KAAA,CAAM,CAAA,6CAAA,EAAgD,YAAY,CAAA,EAAA,CAAI,CAAA;AAAA,IAClF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,EAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAW,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,SAAA,CAAU,WAAW,SAAS,CAAA,GACzD,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,UAAU,KAAA,CAAM,SAAA,CAAU,MAAM,CAAA,GAC9C,MAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,SAAA;AAClB,EAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAW,UAAA,CAAW,QAAA,EAAU,WAAA,CAAY,MAAM,CAAC,CAAA,CACtD,MAAA,CAAO,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,aAAa,CAAA,CAClC,OAAO,KAAK,CAAA;AACf,EAAA,OAAO,oBAAA,CAAqB,UAAU,QAAQ,CAAA;AAChD;AAYA,SAAS,SAAS,KAAA,EAAmC;AACnD,EAAA,MAAM,EAAA,GAAK,MAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,aAAA;AACzB,EAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAW,EAAA,CAAG,KAAA,CAAM,GAAG,CAAA;AAC7B,EAAA,IAAI,YAAA;AACJ,EAAA,IAAI,MAAA;AACJ,EAAA,IAAI,QAAA,CAAS,WAAW,CAAA,EAAG;AAEzB,IAAA,YAAA,GAAe,GAAG,QAAA,CAAS,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA,CAAA,EAAI,QAAA,CAAS,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA,CAAA;AAC5C,IAAA,MAAA,GAAS,SAAS,CAAC,CAAA;AAAA,EACrB,CAAA,MAAA,IAAW,QAAA,CAAS,MAAA,KAAW,CAAA,EAAG;AAEhC,IAAA,YAAA,GAAe,EAAA;AACf,IAAA,MAAA,GAAS,MAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,SAAA;AAAA,EACzB,CAAA,MAAO;AACL,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,yEAAyE,CAAA;AAAA,EAC3F;AACA,EAAA,MAAM,UAAA,GAAa,OAAO,IAAA,CAAK,QAAA,CAAS,CAAC,CAAA,EAAI,WAAW,CAAA,CAAE,QAAA,CAAS,MAAM,CAAA;AACzE,EAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,IAAA,CAAK,KAAA,CAAM,UAAU,CAAA;AACpC,EAAA,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,SAAA,EAAW,MAAA,CAAO,KAAK,MAAA,EAAQ,WAAW,GAAG,MAAA,EAAO;AAC7E;AAEA,eAAsB,gBAAA,CACpB,OACA,GAAA,EACkB;AAClB,EAAA,MAAM,EAAE,YAAA,EAAc,SAAA,EAAW,MAAA,EAAO,GAAI,SAAS,KAAK,CAAA;AAC1D,EAAA,MAAM,MAAM,MAAA,CAAO,GAAA;AACnB,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,GAAA,KAAQ,MAAA,QAAc,IAAI,KAAA,CAAM,CAAA,sBAAA,EAAyB,GAAG,CAAA,CAAA,CAAG,CAAA;AAC3E,EAAA,gBAAA,CAAiB,KAAA,EAAO,KAAK,GAAG,CAAA;AAChC,EAAA,MAAM,IAAA,GAAO,KAAK,YAAY,CAAA;AAE9B,EAAA,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,UAAA,CAAW,IAAI,CAAA,EAAG;AACxB,IAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,MAAM,UAAA,CAAW,KAAA,EAAO,KAAK,EAAE,aAAA,EAAe,OAAO,CAAA;AACpE,IAAA,IAAI,WAAW,MAAA,EAAW,MAAM,IAAI,KAAA,CAAM,CAAA,IAAA,EAAO,GAAG,CAAA,0CAAA,CAA4C,CAAA;AAGhG,IAAA,qBAAA,CAAsB,MAAA,EAAQ,CAAA,IAAA,EAAO,GAAG,CAAA,CAAA,CAAG,CAAA;AAC3C,IAAA,MAAM,OAAA,GAAU,CAAA,GAAA,EAAM,GAAA,CAAI,KAAA,CAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA,CAAA;AAClC,IAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAW,UAAA,CAAW,OAAA,EAAS,WAAA,CAAY,MAAM,CAAC,CAAA,CAAE,MAAA,CAAO,IAAI,CAAA,CAAE,MAAA,EAAO;AAC9E,IAAA,OAAO,SAAS,MAAA,KAAW,SAAA,CAAU,MAAA,IAAU,eAAA,CAAgB,UAAU,SAAS,CAAA;AAAA,EACpF;AAGA,EAAA,MAAM,WAAA,GAAc,MAAM,UAAA,CAAW,KAAA,EAAO,KAAK,EAAE,aAAA,EAAe,MAAM,CAAA;AACxE,EAAA,IAAI,gBAAgB,MAAA,EAAW,MAAM,IAAI,KAAA,CAAM,CAAA,IAAA,EAAO,GAAG,CAAA,uBAAA,CAAyB,CAAA;AAClF,EAAA,MAAM,SAAA,GAAY,YAAY,WAAW,CAAA;AAEzC,EAAA,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,UAAA,CAAW,IAAI,CAAA,EAAG;AACxB,IAAA,OAAOC,MAAA,CAAa,MAAM,GAAA,CAAI,KAAA,CAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA,CAAA,EAAI,IAAA,EAAM,SAAA,EAAW,SAAS,CAAA;AAAA,EACtE;AACA,EAAA,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,UAAA,CAAW,IAAI,CAAA,EAAG;AACxB,IAAA,MAAM,IAAA,GAAO,GAAA,CAAI,KAAA,CAAM,CAAC,CAAA;AACxB,IAAA,OAAOA,MAAA;AAAA,MACL,MAAM,IAAI,CAAA,CAAA;AAAA,MACV,IAAA;AAAA,MACA,EAAE,KAAK,SAAA,EAAW,OAAA,EAAS,GAA+B,UAAA,EAAY,MAAA,CAAO,IAAI,CAAA,GAAI,CAAA,EAAE;AAAA,MACvF;AAAA,KACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,EAAA,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,UAAA,CAAW,IAAI,CAAA,EAAG;AAExB,IAAA,OAAOA,MAAA;AAAA,MACL,CAAA,GAAA,EAAM,GAAA,CAAI,KAAA,CAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA,CAAA;AAAA,MAClB,IAAA;AAAA,MACA,EAAE,GAAA,EAAK,SAAA,EAAW,WAAA,EAAa,YAAA,EAAa;AAAA,MAC5C;AAAA,KACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,EAAA,IAAI,QAAQ,OAAA,EAAS;AACnB,IAAA,OAAOA,MAAA,CAAa,IAAA,EAAM,IAAA,EAAM,SAAA,EAAW,SAAS,CAAA;AAAA,EACtD;AACA,EAAA,MAAM,IAAI,KAAA,CAAM,CAAA,sBAAA,EAAyB,GAAG,CAAA,CAAA,CAAG,CAAA;AACjD;AAOA,IAAM,YAAA,GAAuC;AAAA,EAC3C,gBAAA,EAAkB,QAAA;AAAA,EAClB,iBAAA,EAAmB,QAAA;AAAA,EACnB,mBAAA,EAAqB,QAAA;AAAA,EACrB,mBAAA,EAAqB;AACvB,CAAA;AAEA,eAAsB,wBAAA,CACpB,OACA,GAAA,EACkB;AAClB,EAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAA,IAAU,EAAC;AACxC,EAAA,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,MAAA,CAAO,GAAA,KAAQ,QAAA,GAAY,OAAO,GAAA,GAAiB,MAAA;AACtE,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,GAAA,EAAK;AACR,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,2EAA2E,CAAA;AAAA,EAC7F;AACA,EAAA,gBAAA,CAAiB,KAAA,EAAO,KAAK,GAAG,CAAA;AAEhC,EAAA,MAAM,IAAA,GAAO,IAAA,CAAK,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,aAAa,CAAA;AAC7C,EAAA,MAAM,SAAA,GAAY,eAAA,CAAgB,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,SAAS,CAAA;AAEzD,EAAA,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAA,EAAW;AACrB,IAAA,MAAMC,YAAAA,GAAc,MAAM,UAAA,CAAW,KAAA,EAAO,KAAK,EAAE,aAAA,EAAe,MAAM,CAAA;AACxE,IAAA,IAAIA,YAAAA,KAAgB,MAAA,EAAW,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,wDAAwD,CAAA;AACvG,IAAA,OAAOD,OAAa,IAAA,EAAM,IAAA,EAAM,WAAA,CAAYC,YAAW,GAAG,SAAS,CAAA;AAAA,EACrE;AAEA,EAAA,IAAI,QAAQ,aAAA,EAAe;AACzB,IAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,MAAM,UAAA,CAAW,KAAA,EAAO,KAAK,EAAE,aAAA,EAAe,OAAO,CAAA;AACpE,IAAA,IAAI,MAAA,KAAW,MAAA,EAAW,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,wDAAwD,CAAA;AAGlG,IAAA,qBAAA,CAAsB,QAAQ,sCAAsC,CAAA;AACpE,IAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAW,UAAA,CAAW,QAAA,EAAU,WAAA,CAAY,MAAM,CAAC,CAAA,CAAE,MAAA,CAAO,IAAI,CAAA,CAAE,MAAA,EAAO;AAC/E,IAAA,OAAO,SAAS,MAAA,KAAW,SAAA,CAAU,MAAA,IAAU,eAAA,CAAgB,UAAU,SAAS,CAAA;AAAA,EACpF;AAEA,EAAA,MAAM,IAAA,GAAO,aAAa,GAAG,CAAA;AAC7B,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,IAAA,EAAM,MAAM,IAAI,KAAA,CAAM,CAAA,0CAAA,EAA6C,GAAG,CAAA,CAAA,CAAG,CAAA;AAC9E,EAAA,MAAM,WAAA,GAAc,MAAM,UAAA,CAAW,KAAA,EAAO,KAAK,EAAE,aAAA,EAAe,MAAM,CAAA;AACxE,EAAA,IAAI,gBAAgB,MAAA,EAAW,MAAM,IAAI,KAAA,CAAM,CAAA,wBAAA,EAA2B,GAAG,CAAA,uBAAA,CAAyB,CAAA;AACtG,EAAA,MAAM,SAAA,GAAY,YAAY,WAAW,CAAA;AAEzC,EAAA,IAAI,QAAQ,gBAAA,EAAkB;AAC5B,IAAA,OAAOD,MAAA,CAAa,IAAA,EAAM,IAAA,EAAM,EAAE,GAAA,EAAK,SAAA,EAAW,OAAA,EAAS,CAAA,EAAG,UAAA,EAAY,EAAA,EAAG,EAAG,SAAS,CAAA;AAAA,EAC3F;AACA,EAAA,IAAI,QAAQ,iBAAA,EAAmB;AAC7B,IAAA,OAAOA,MAAA,CAAa,IAAA,EAAM,IAAA,EAAM,SAAA,EAAW,SAAS,CAAA;AAAA,EACtD;AAEA,EAAA,OAAOA,MAAA,CAAa,MAAM,IAAA,EAAM,EAAE,KAAK,SAAA,EAAW,WAAA,EAAa,YAAA,EAAa,EAAG,SAAS,CAAA;AAC1F;AAMA,SAAS,YAAY,QAAA,EAA0C;AAC7D,EAAA,IAAI,OAAO,aAAa,QAAA,EAAU;AAChC,IAAA,MAAM,OAAA,GAAU,SAAS,IAAA,EAAK;AAC9B,IAAA,IAAI,OAAA,CAAQ,UAAA,CAAW,GAAG,CAAA,EAAG;AAC3B,MAAA,OAAO,eAAA,CAAgB,EAAE,GAAA,EAAK,IAAA,CAAK,MAAM,OAAO,CAAA,EAAG,MAAA,EAAQ,KAAA,EAAO,CAAA;AAAA,IACpE;AACA,IAAA,OAAO,gBAAgB,QAAQ,CAAA;AAAA,EACjC;AACA,EAAA,OAAO,eAAA,CAAgB,MAAA,CAAO,IAAA,CAAK,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAA;AAC9C;AAMA,SAAS,gBAAgB,GAAA,EAAqB;AAC5C,EAAA,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,UAAA,CAAW,IAAI,CAAA,EAAG,OAAO,MAAA,CAAO,IAAA,CAAK,GAAA,CAAI,KAAA,CAAM,CAAC,CAAA,EAAG,KAAK,CAAA;AAChE,EAAA,IAAI,MAAA,CAAO,KAAK,GAAG,CAAA,SAAU,MAAA,CAAO,IAAA,CAAK,KAAK,WAAW,CAAA;AACzD,EAAA,OAAO,MAAA,CAAO,IAAA,CAAK,GAAA,EAAK,QAAQ,CAAA;AAClC;AAaA,eAAsB,uBAAuB,KAAA,EAAiD;AAC5F,EAAA,MAAM,EAAE,MAAA,EAAQ,aAAA,EAAc,GAAI,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA;AACxC,EAAA,QAAQ,MAAA;AAAQ,IACd,KAAK,KAAA,EAAO;AAGV,MAAA,MAAM,IAAA,GAAO,aAAA,CAAc,KAAA,CAAM,GAAG,CAAA;AACpC,MAAA,IAAI,KAAK,MAAA,GAAS,CAAA,IAAK,CAAC,IAAA,CAAK,CAAC,GAAG,OAAO,IAAA;AACxC,MAAA,MAAM,IAAA,GAAO,OAAO,IAAA,CAAK,IAAA,CAAK,CAAC,CAAA,EAAG,WAAW,CAAA,CAAE,QAAA,CAAS,MAAM,CAAA;AAC9D,MAAA,OAAOE,gBAAgB,IAAI,CAAA;AAAA,IAC7B;AAAA,IACA,KAAK,gBAAA;AAAA,IACL,KAAK,gBAAA;AAEH,MAAA,OAAOA,gBAAgB,aAAa,CAAA;AAAA,IACtC,KAAK,yBAAA;AAGH,MAAA,OAAO,uBAAuB,aAAa,CAAA;AAAA,IAC7C;AACE,MAAA,OAAO,IAAA;AAAA;AAEb;AAQO,SAAS,kBACd,KAAA,EACgD;AAChD,EAAA,IAAI,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAA,KAAW,KAAA,EAAO,OAAO,IAAA;AAC3C,EAAA,MAAM,OAAO,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,cAAc,KAAA,CAAM,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,CAAA;AACrD,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,OAAO,IAAA;AAClB,EAAA,IAAI;AACF,IAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,IAAA,CAAK,KAAA,CAAM,MAAA,CAAO,IAAA,CAAK,MAAM,WAAW,CAAA,CAAE,QAAA,CAAS,MAAM,CAAC,CAAA;AAGzE,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,MAAA,CAAO,YAAA;AACjB,IAAA,IAAI,CAAC,CAAA,IAAK,OAAO,CAAA,CAAE,KAAA,KAAU,UAAU,OAAO,IAAA;AAC9C,IAAA,OAAO,OAAO,CAAA,CAAE,WAAA,KAAgB,QAAA,GAC5B,EAAE,KAAA,EAAO,CAAA,CAAE,KAAA,EAAO,WAAA,EAAa,EAAE,WAAA,EAAY,GAC7C,EAAE,KAAA,EAAO,EAAE,KAAA,EAAM;AAAA,EACvB,CAAA,CAAA,MAAQ;AACN,IAAA,OAAO,IAAA;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,uBAAuB,aAAA,EAAsC;AACpE,EAAA,KAAA,MAAW,IAAA,IAAQ,aAAA,CAAc,KAAA,CAAM,IAAI,CAAA,EAAG;AAC5C,IAAA,MAAM,CAAA,GAAI,6BAAA,CAA8B,IAAA,CAAK,IAAA,CAAK,MAAM,CAAA;AACxD,IAAA,IAAI,CAAC,CAAA,EAAG;AACR,IAAA,MAAM,CAAA,GAAI,6BAAA,CAA8B,IAAA,CAAK,CAAA,CAAE,CAAC,CAAE,CAAA;AAClD,IAAA,IAAI,CAAC,CAAA,IAAK,CAAC,CAAA,CAAE,CAAC,GAAG,OAAO,IAAA;AACxB,IAAA,OAAO,MAAA,CAAO,KAAK,CAAA,CAAE,CAAC,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAA,CAAE,SAAS,KAAK,CAAA;AAAA,EACnD;AACA,EAAA,OAAO,IAAA;AACT;AC3fO,IAAM,8BAAA,GAA4E;AAAA,EACvF,gBAAA,EAAkB,mBAAA;AAAA,EAClB,gBAAA,EAAkB,mBAAA;AAAA,EAClB,GAAA,EAAK,gBAAA;AAAA,EACL,yBAAA,EAA2B;AAC7B;AA2BA,SAAS,KAAA,CAAM,GAAW,CAAA,EAAoB;AAC5C,EAAA,MAAM,EAAA,GAAK,EAAE,UAAA,CAAW,IAAI,IAAI,CAAA,CAAE,KAAA,CAAM,CAAC,CAAA,GAAI,CAAA;AAC7C,EAAA,MAAM,EAAA,GAAK,EAAE,UAAA,CAAW,IAAI,IAAI,CAAA,CAAE,KAAA,CAAM,CAAC,CAAA,GAAI,CAAA;AAC7C,EAAA,OAAO,EAAA,CAAG,WAAA,EAAY,KAAM,EAAA,CAAG,WAAA,EAAY;AAC7C;AAwBO,SAAS,oBAAoB,MAAA,EAAyC;AAC3E,EAAA,OAAO,MAAA,CAAO,WAAW,MAAA,CAAO,MAAA;AAAA,IAC9B,CAAC,CAAA,KAA6B,CAAA,CAAE,IAAA,KAAS;AAAA,GAC3C;AACF;AAGA,eAAsB,iBAAA,CACpB,OACA,GAAA,EACwC;AACxC,EAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,MAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAA;AAC7B,EAAA,MAAM,IAAA,GAAO;AAAA,IACX,SAAS,KAAA,CAAM,EAAA;AAAA,IACf,QAAQ,KAAA,CAAM,MAAA;AAAA,IACd,MAAA;AAAA,IACA,MAAA,EAAQ,MAAM,OAAA,CAAQ;AAAA,GACxB;AAKA,EAAA,MAAM,SAAA,GAAY,KAAA;AAClB,EAAA,MAAM,WAAW,GAAA,EAAK,SAAA,GAAY,MAAM,CAAA,IAAK,+BAA+B,MAAM,CAAA;AAClF,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,QAAA,EAAU;AACb,IAAA,OAAO;AAAA,MACL,GAAG,IAAA;AAAA,MACH,SAAA;AAAA,MACA,QAAA,EAAU,KAAA;AAAA,MACV,KAAA,EAAO,sCAAsC,MAAM,CAAA,CAAA;AAAA,KACrD;AAAA,EACF;AACA,EAAA,IAAI;AACF,IAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAW,MAAM,QAAA,CAAS,KAAA,EAAO,GAAG,CAAA;AAC1C,IAAA,IAAI,CAAC,QAAA,EAAU,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,SAAA,EAAW,QAAA,EAAU,KAAA,EAAO,MAAA,EAAQ,mBAAA,EAAoB;AAIzF,IAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,MAAM,sBAAA,CAAuB,KAAK,CAAA;AACjD,IAAA,IAAI,WAAW,IAAA,EAAM;AACnB,MAAA,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,IAAA,EAAM,WAAW,QAAA,EAAU,KAAA,EAAO,QAAQ,oBAAA,EAAqB;AAAA,IAC7E;AACA,IAAA,IAAI,CAAC,KAAA,CAAM,MAAA,EAAQ,KAAA,CAAM,QAAA,CAAS,IAAI,CAAA,EAAG;AACvC,MAAA,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,IAAA,EAAM,WAAW,QAAA,EAAU,KAAA,EAAO,QAAQ,2BAAA,EAA4B;AAAA,IACpF;AAIA,IAAA,IAAI,KAAA,CAAM,QAAA,CAAS,OAAA,KAAY,KAAA,CAAA,EAAW;AACxC,MAAA,MAAM,WAAA,GAAc,MAAM,eAAA,CAAgB,KAAA,CAAM,SAAS,OAAO,CAAA;AAChE,MAAA,IAAI,CAAC,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,EAAa,KAAA,CAAM,QAAA,CAAS,IAAI,CAAA,EAAG;AAC5C,QAAA,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,IAAA,EAAM,WAAW,QAAA,EAAU,KAAA,EAAO,QAAQ,2BAAA,EAA4B;AAAA,MACpF;AAAA,IACF;AAQA,IAAA,IAAI,eAAA,GAAkB,KAAA;AACtB,IAAA,IAAI,WAAW,KAAA,EAAO;AACpB,MAAA,MAAM,KAAA,GAAQ,kBAAkB,KAAK,CAAA;AACrC,MAAA,IAAI,UAAU,IAAA,EAAM;AAGlB,QAAA,IAAI,KAAK,KAAA,KAAU,KAAA,CAAA,IAAa,KAAA,CAAM,KAAA,KAAU,IAAI,KAAA,EAAO;AACzD,UAAA,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,IAAA,EAAM,WAAW,QAAA,EAAU,KAAA,EAAO,QAAQ,uBAAA,EAAwB;AAAA,QAChF;AACA,QAAA,IAAI,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,KAAgB,KAAA,CAAA,IAAa,CAAC,KAAA,CAAM,MAAM,WAAA,EAAa,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,IAAI,CAAA,EAAG;AACpF,UAAA,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,IAAA,EAAM,WAAW,QAAA,EAAU,KAAA,EAAO,QAAQ,uBAAA,EAAwB;AAAA,QAChF;AAIA,QAAA,eAAA,GACE,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,KAAgB,KAAA,CAAA,IACtB,KAAA,CAAM,MAAM,WAAA,EAAa,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,IAAI,KAC3C,GAAA,EAAK,KAAA,KAAU,KAAA,CAAA,IACf,KAAA,CAAM,UAAU,GAAA,CAAI,KAAA;AAAA,MACxB;AAAA,IACF;AACA,IAAA,IAAI,GAAA,EAAK,kBAAA,IAAsB,CAAC,eAAA,EAAiB;AAC/C,MAAA,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,IAAA,EAAM,SAAA,EAAW,iBAAiB,QAAA,EAAU,KAAA,EAAO,QAAQ,uBAAA,EAAwB;AAAA,IACjG;AACA,IAAA,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,IAAA,EAAM,SAAA,EAAW,eAAA,EAAiB,UAAU,IAAA,EAAK;AAAA,EAC/D,SAAS,KAAA,EAAO;AACd,IAAA,OAAO;AAAA,MACL,GAAG,IAAA;AAAA,MACH,SAAA;AAAA,MACA,QAAA,EAAU,KAAA;AAAA,MACV,OAAO,KAAA,YAAiB,KAAA,GAAQ,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,GAAU,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,KAC9D;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAUA,eAAsB,kBAAA,CACpB,QACA,GAAA,EACoC;AACpC,EAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,oBAAoB,MAAM,CAAA;AAGzC,EAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAsC;AAAA,IAC1C,GAAG,GAAA;AAAA,IACH,KAAA,EAAO,GAAA,EAAK,KAAA,IAAS,MAAA,CAAO,UAAA,CAAW;AAAA,GACzC;AACA,EAAA,MAAM,UAA2C,EAAC;AAClD,EAAA,KAAA,MAAW,SAAS,MAAA,EAAQ;AAC1B,IAAA,OAAA,CAAQ,IAAA,CAAK,MAAM,iBAAA,CAAkB,KAAA,EAAO,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAA;AAAA,EACvD;AACA,EAAA,MAAM,SAAS,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAA,CAAO,CAAC,CAAA,KAAM,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAA;AAChD,EAAA,OAAO;AAAA,IACL,KAAA,EAAO,OAAO,MAAA,KAAW,CAAA;AAAA,IACzB,QAAQ,MAAA,CAAO,GAAA;AAAA,MACb,CAAC,MACC,CAAA,cAAA,EAAiB,CAAA,CAAE,MAAM,CAAA,GAAA,EAAM,CAAA,CAAE,MAAM,CAAA,QAAA,EAAW,CAAA,CAAE,MAAA,GAAS,KAAK,CAAA,CAAE,MAAM,CAAA,CAAA,CAAA,GAAM,EAAE,CAAA,EAAG,CAAA,CAAE,QAAQ,CAAA,EAAA,EAAK,CAAA,CAAE,KAAK,CAAA,CAAA,GAAK,EAAE,CAAA;AAAA,KACtH;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,GACF;AACF;AAYA,eAAsB,WAAA,CACpB,QACA,GAAA,EAC4B;AAC5B,EAAA,MAAM,OAAA,GAAU,MAAM,kBAAA,CAAmB,MAAA,EAAQ,GAAG,CAAA;AACpD,EAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,MAAM,YAAA,CAAa,MAAA,EAAQ;AAAA,IACxC,YAAA,EAAc,OAAO,EAAE,KAAA,EAAO,QAAQ,KAAA,EAAO,MAAA,EAAQ,QAAQ,MAAA,EAAO;AAAA,GACrE,CAAA;AACD,EAAA,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,MAAA,EAAQ,YAAA,EAAc,OAAA,EAAQ;AAC5C;AC/KA,SAAS,OAAO,KAAA,EAAgC;AAC9C,EAAA,OAAO,MAAA,CAAO,IAAA,CAAK,KAAK,CAAA,CAAE,SAAS,WAAW,CAAA;AAChD;AAEA,SAAS,OAAA,CAAQ,MAA2B,YAAA,EAA8B;AACxE,EAAA,MAAM,IAAA,GAAO,MAAA,CAAO,IAAA,CAAK,YAAA,EAAc,MAAM,CAAA;AAE7C,EAAA,IAAI,IAAA,CAAK,QAAQ,OAAA,EAAS;AACxB,IAAA,IAAI,CAAC,IAAA,CAAK,MAAA,EAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,iDAAiD,CAAA;AACnF,IAAA,OAAOC,UAAAA,CAAW,UAAU,IAAA,CAAK,MAAM,EAAE,MAAA,CAAO,IAAI,EAAE,MAAA,EAAO;AAAA,EAC/D;AAEA,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,UAAA,EAAY;AACpB,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,KAAA,CAAM,CAAA,mBAAA,EAAsB,IAAA,CAAK,GAAG,CAAA,6BAAA,CAA+B,CAAA;AAAA,EAC/E;AACA,EAAA,MAAM,GAAA,GACJ,OAAO,IAAA,CAAK,UAAA,KAAe,WAAW,gBAAA,CAAiB,IAAA,CAAK,UAAU,CAAA,GAAI,IAAA,CAAK,UAAA;AAEjF,EAAA,IAAI,KAAK,GAAA,KAAQ,OAAA,SAAgBC,IAAA,CAAW,IAAA,EAAM,MAAM,GAAG,CAAA;AAC3D,EAAA,IAAI,IAAA,CAAK,GAAA,CAAI,UAAA,CAAW,IAAI,CAAA,EAAG;AAC7B,IAAA,OAAOA,IAAA,CAAW,CAAA,GAAA,EAAM,IAAA,CAAK,GAAA,CAAI,KAAA,CAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA,CAAA,EAAI,IAAA,EAAM,EAAE,GAAA,EAAK,WAAA,EAAa,cAAc,CAAA;AAAA,EACvF;AACA,EAAA,IAAI,IAAA,CAAK,GAAA,CAAI,UAAA,CAAW,IAAI,CAAA,EAAG;AAC7B,IAAA,OAAOA,IAAA,CAAW,MAAM,IAAA,CAAK,GAAA,CAAI,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,IAAA,EAAM;AAAA,MACjD,GAAA;AAAA,MACA,OAAA,EAAS,CAAA;AAAA,MACT,YAAY,MAAA,CAAO,IAAA,CAAK,IAAI,KAAA,CAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA,GAAI;AAAA,KACzC,CAAA;AAAA,EACH;AACA,EAAA,IAAI,IAAA,CAAK,GAAA,CAAI,UAAA,CAAW,IAAI,CAAA,EAAG;AAC7B,IAAA,OAAOA,IAAA,CAAW,MAAM,IAAA,CAAK,GAAA,CAAI,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA,CAAA,EAAI,IAAA,EAAM,GAAG,CAAA;AAAA,EACxD;AACA,EAAA,MAAM,IAAI,KAAA,CAAM,CAAA,qCAAA,EAAwC,IAAA,CAAK,GAAG,CAAA,CAAA,CAAG,CAAA;AACrE;AAWO,SAAS,mBAAmB,IAAA,EAAyC;AAC1E,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,IAAA,CAAK,MAAA,EAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,0CAA0C,CAAA;AAC5E,EAAA,OAAO;AAAA,IACL,KAAK,OAAA,EAA+C;AAGlD,MAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAkC,EAAE,GAAA,EAAK,IAAA,CAAK,KAAK,GAAA,EAAK,KAAA,EAAO,GAAA,EAAK,IAAA,CAAK,MAAA,EAAO;AACtF,MAAA,IAAI,KAAK,OAAA,EAAS;AAChB,QAAA,MAAA,CAAO,YAAA,GAAe;AAAA,UACpB,KAAA,EAAO,KAAK,OAAA,CAAQ,KAAA;AAAA,UACpB,GAAI,IAAA,CAAK,OAAA,CAAQ,WAAA,KAAgB,MAAA,GAC7B,EAAE,WAAA,EAAa,IAAA,CAAK,OAAA,CAAQ,WAAA,EAAY,GACxC;AAAC,SACP;AAAA,MACF;AACA,MAAA,MAAM,CAAA,GAAI,MAAA,CAAO,IAAA,CAAK,SAAA,CAAU,MAAM,CAAC,CAAA;AACvC,MAAA,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,OAAA,KAAY,QAAA,GAAW,OAAA,GAAUC,aAAa,OAAO,CAAA;AACzE,MAAA,MAAM,CAAA,GAAI,OAAO,IAAI,CAAA;AACrB,MAAA,MAAM,YAAA,GAAe,CAAA,EAAG,CAAC,CAAA,CAAA,EAAI,CAAC,CAAA,CAAA;AAC9B,MAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,MAAA,CAAO,OAAA,CAAQ,IAAA,EAAM,YAAY,CAAC,CAAA;AACjD,MAAA,OAAO;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,QAGL,MAAA,EAAQ,KAAA;AAAA,QACR,QAAQ,IAAA,CAAK,MAAA;AAAA,QACb,SAAA,EAAW,MAAA;AAAA,QACX,aAAA,EAAe,YAAA;AAAA,QACf,GAAI,IAAA,CAAK,SAAA,GAAY,EAAE,MAAA,EAAQ,EAAE,SAAA,EAAW,IAAA,CAAK,SAAA,EAAU,EAAE,GAAI;AAAC,OACpE;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,GACF;AACF;;;ACjFO,IAAM,OAAA,GAAU","file":"index.js","sourcesContent":["/**\n * @fileoverview Helpers to record `tool-receipt` events into a trace (issue #60).\n */\n\nimport type {\n  TraceRun,\n  TraceEvent,\n  ToolReceiptEvent,\n  Visibility,\n} from \"@fluxpointstudios/orynq-sdk-process-trace\";\nimport { addEvent } from \"@fluxpointstudios/orynq-sdk-process-trace\";\nimport { sha256StringHex, canonicalize } from \"@fluxpointstudios/orynq-sdk-core/utils\";\n\n/**\n * Deterministically hash a request/response payload for the `request.hash` /\n * `response.hash` commitments (canonical JSON, SHA-256 hex). Strings are hashed\n * as-is; everything else is canonicalized first.\n */\nexport async function hashToolPayload(value: unknown): Promise<string> {\n  const serialized = typeof value === \"string\" ? value : canonicalize(value);\n  return sha256StringHex(serialized);\n}\n\nexport interface AddToolReceiptOptions {\n  toolId: string;\n  /** Commitment to the request (use {@link hashToolPayload}). */\n  request: { hash: string };\n  /** Commitment to the response, with an optional retained payload. */\n  response: { hash: string; payload?: unknown };\n  /** The independently-verifiable signed receipt. */\n  receipt: ToolReceiptEvent[\"receipt\"];\n  /** Event visibility (default \"private\" — responses may carry PII). */\n  visibility?: Visibility;\n}\n\n/**\n * Append a `tool-receipt` event to a span.\n *\n * @returns the recorded {@link ToolReceiptEvent} (with runtime fields).\n */\nexport async function addToolReceipt(\n  run: TraceRun,\n  spanId: string,\n  opts: AddToolReceiptOptions\n): Promise<ToolReceiptEvent> {\n  if (!opts.toolId) throw new Error(\"addToolReceipt: toolId is required\");\n  if (!opts.receipt) throw new Error(\"addToolReceipt: receipt is required\");\n\n  const event: Omit<ToolReceiptEvent, \"id\" | \"seq\" | \"timestamp\" | \"hash\"> = {\n    kind: \"tool-receipt\",\n    visibility: opts.visibility ?? \"private\",\n    toolId: opts.toolId,\n    request: opts.request,\n    response: opts.response,\n    receipt: opts.receipt,\n  };\n\n  const recorded: TraceEvent = await addEvent(run, spanId, event);\n  return recorded as ToolReceiptEvent;\n}\n","/**\n * @fileoverview Signature-scheme verifiers for tool-call receipts (issue #60).\n *\n * Each verifier checks that `receipt.signature` is a valid signature over\n * `receipt.signedPayload` for `receipt.signer`, per its scheme:\n *\n * - `http-message-signatures` — RFC 9421 (signature base provided as signedPayload)\n * - `stripe-webhook` — Stripe `Stripe-Signature` HMAC-SHA256 (timestamped; freshness-checked)\n * - `github-webhook` — GitHub `X-Hub-Signature-256` HMAC-SHA256 (no signed\n *   timestamp; freshness-checked only when `params.timestamp` is recorded,\n *   otherwise anti-replay rests on the bundle Merkle commitment)\n * - `jws` — compact JWS / JWT (HS*, RS*, PS*, ES*, EdDSA)\n *\n * Symmetric secrets (webhooks, HS*) MUST be supplied out-of-band via the\n * {@link ToolReceiptVerifyContext} — never embedded in the trace. Asymmetric\n * *public* keys may be embedded in `receipt.params.publicKey`.\n */\n\nimport {\n  createHmac,\n  createPublicKey,\n  timingSafeEqual,\n  verify as cryptoVerify,\n  type KeyObject,\n} from \"node:crypto\";\nimport type { ToolReceiptEvent } from \"@fluxpointstudios/orynq-sdk-process-trace\";\nimport { sha256StringHex } from \"@fluxpointstudios/orynq-sdk-core/utils\";\n\ntype MaybePromise<T> = T | Promise<T>;\n\n/** Key/secret resolution + policy context for receipt verification. */\nexport interface ToolReceiptVerifyContext {\n  /** Verification keys/secrets keyed by `receipt.signer`. */\n  keys?: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Dynamic key/secret resolver (takes precedence over `keys`). */\n  resolveKey?: (event: ToolReceiptEvent) => MaybePromise<string | Uint8Array | undefined>;\n  /** Max age (seconds) for replay-protected schemes (Stripe). Default 300. */\n  toleranceSec?: number;\n  /** Epoch-seconds clock override (testing). */\n  nowSec?: number;\n  /**\n   * Optional per-signer expected-algorithm allow-list (defense-in-depth against\n   * algorithm confusion). When present for a signer, any receipt whose resolved\n   * `alg` is not listed is rejected — e.g. `{ \"tee://oracle\": [\"EdDSA\"] }` pins\n   * that signer to EdDSA so an attacker-set `alg:HS256` is refused.\n   */\n  keyAlgs?: Record<string, string[]>;\n  /**\n   * Accept a public key embedded in `receipt.params.publicKey` when no\n   * out-of-band key is configured. This is a CONVENIENCE for internal\n   * consistency checks only — it is NOT an authenticity guarantee, because the\n   * trace (and therefore the embedded key) is attacker-controlled. Default\n   * false; supply the signer's key via `keys`/`resolveKey` for a trustworthy\n   * verdict.\n   */\n  trustEmbeddedKeys?: boolean;\n}\n\nconst textEncoder = new TextEncoder();\n\nfunction utf8(s: string): Buffer {\n  return Buffer.from(textEncoder.encode(s));\n}\n\nfunction constantTimeEqualHex(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  const ab = Buffer.from(a.toLowerCase(), \"hex\");\n  const bb = Buffer.from(b.toLowerCase(), \"hex\");\n  if (ab.length === 0 || ab.length !== bb.length) return false;\n  return timingSafeEqual(ab, bb);\n}\n\nasync function resolveKey(\n  event: ToolReceiptEvent,\n  ctx: ToolReceiptVerifyContext | undefined,\n  { allowEmbedded }: { allowEmbedded: boolean }\n): Promise<string | Uint8Array | undefined> {\n  if (ctx?.resolveKey) {\n    const k = await ctx.resolveKey(event);\n    if (k !== undefined) return k;\n  }\n  if (ctx?.keys && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(ctx.keys, event.receipt.signer)) {\n    return ctx.keys[event.receipt.signer];\n  }\n  // An embedded public key lives in the untrusted trace, so it is NOT trusted\n  // for a passing verdict unless the caller explicitly opts in. Prefer an\n  // out-of-band key via keys/resolveKey.\n  if (allowEmbedded && ctx?.trustEmbeddedKeys === true) {\n    const p = event.receipt.params;\n    if (p && typeof p.publicKey === \"string\") return p.publicKey;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nfunction keyToString(key: string | Uint8Array): string {\n  return typeof key === \"string\" ? key : Buffer.from(key).toString(\"utf8\");\n}\n\n/** Algorithm-OID DER byte sequences that appear inside a SubjectPublicKeyInfo. */\nconst SPKI_ALG_OIDS: readonly (readonly number[])[] = [\n  // rsaEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1\n  [0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01],\n  // id-ecPublicKey 1.2.840.10045.2.1\n  [0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01],\n  // id-Ed25519 1.3.101.112\n  [0x2b, 0x65, 0x70],\n  // id-Ed448 1.3.101.113\n  [0x2b, 0x65, 0x71],\n];\n\n/**\n * True when raw bytes are a DER-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo: an outer SEQUENCE\n * (`0x30`) whose DER length header (short-form `< 0x80`, or long-form `0x81`/\n * `0x82`) frames the whole buffer, carrying a known asymmetric algorithm OID.\n * Covers Ed25519 (`30 2a`), EC P-256/P-384 (`30 59`/`30 76`), and RSA\n * (`30 82 ..`). This catches a public key handed to the HMAC path as raw DER\n * (Uint8Array/Buffer), which the PEM/JWK string checks above miss.\n */\nfunction looksLikeDerPublicKey(bytes: Uint8Array): boolean {\n  if (bytes.length < 8 || bytes[0] !== 0x30) return false;\n  const lenByte = bytes[1]!;\n  let contentStart: number;\n  let contentLen: number;\n  if (lenByte < 0x80) {\n    contentStart = 2;\n    contentLen = lenByte;\n  } else if (lenByte === 0x81) {\n    contentStart = 3;\n    contentLen = bytes[2]!;\n  } else if (lenByte === 0x82) {\n    contentStart = 4;\n    contentLen = (bytes[2]! << 8) | bytes[3]!;\n  } else {\n    return false;\n  }\n  // The length header must frame exactly the remaining bytes — a genuine DER doc,\n  // not arbitrary secret bytes that happen to start with 0x30.\n  if (contentStart + contentLen !== bytes.length) return false;\n  return SPKI_ALG_OIDS.some((oid) => indexOfBytes(bytes, oid) !== -1);\n}\n\n/** Index of a byte subsequence in a byte array, or -1. */\nfunction indexOfBytes(haystack: Uint8Array, needle: readonly number[]): number {\n  outer: for (let i = 0; i + needle.length <= haystack.length; i++) {\n    for (let j = 0; j < needle.length; j++) {\n      if (haystack[i + j] !== needle[j]) continue outer;\n    }\n    return i;\n  }\n  return -1;\n}\n\n/**\n * True when the resolved key material is an ASYMMETRIC PUBLIC key — a PEM\n * SPKI/PKCS#1 public block, a JWK with an asymmetric `kty`, or raw DER-encoded\n * SubjectPublicKeyInfo bytes. Such material is public (known to an attacker), so\n * it must NEVER be fed into an HMAC branch: an attacker who sets `alg:HS256`\n * could HMAC with the public key and forge a \"valid\" symmetric signature (JWT\n * algorithm confusion).\n */\nfunction looksLikeAsymmetricPublicKey(key: string | Uint8Array): boolean {\n  if (typeof key !== \"string\" && looksLikeDerPublicKey(key)) return true;\n  const s = keyToString(key).trim();\n  if (\n    s.includes(\"-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\") ||\n    s.includes(\"-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\")\n  ) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  if (s.startsWith(\"{\")) {\n    try {\n      const jwk = JSON.parse(s) as { kty?: unknown };\n      const kty = typeof jwk.kty === \"string\" ? jwk.kty.toUpperCase() : \"\";\n      return kty === \"RSA\" || kty === \"EC\" || kty === \"OKP\";\n    } catch {\n      return false;\n    }\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Guard an HMAC/symmetric verification against a key that is actually an\n * asymmetric public key. Symmetric secrets are arbitrary bytes, so we only\n * refuse material that is unambiguously a public key.\n */\nfunction assertSymmetricSecret(key: string | Uint8Array, algLabel: string): void {\n  if (looksLikeAsymmetricPublicKey(key)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `${algLabel}: refusing to HMAC with an asymmetric public key (algorithm confusion). ` +\n        \"Provide the signer's symmetric secret out-of-band, or pin the asymmetric alg via keyAlgs.\"\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Enforce the optional per-signer expected-algorithm allow-list (defense in\n * depth). Throws when the signer is pinned and `alg` is not allowed.\n */\nfunction assertAlgAllowed(\n  event: ToolReceiptEvent,\n  ctx: ToolReceiptVerifyContext | undefined,\n  alg: string\n): void {\n  const allow = ctx?.keyAlgs?.[event.receipt.signer];\n  if (allow && !allow.includes(alg)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `alg \"${alg}\" is not in the expected-algorithm allow-list for signer \"${event.receipt.signer}\"`\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Stripe webhook (HMAC-SHA256 over `${t}.${payload}`)\n// =============================================================================\n\n/** Parse a `t=...,v1=...` Stripe-Signature header (or fall back to a bare hex sig). */\nfunction parseStripeSignature(\n  raw: string,\n  params: Record<string, unknown> | undefined\n): { t?: string; v1: string[] } {\n  if (raw.includes(\"v1=\") || raw.includes(\"t=\")) {\n    const parts = raw.split(\",\").map((p) => p.trim());\n    let t: string | undefined;\n    const v1: string[] = [];\n    for (const part of parts) {\n      const eq = part.indexOf(\"=\");\n      if (eq === -1) continue;\n      const k = part.slice(0, eq);\n      const v = part.slice(eq + 1);\n      if (k === \"t\") t = v;\n      else if (k === \"v1\") v1.push(v);\n    }\n    return t !== undefined ? { t, v1 } : { v1 };\n  }\n  // Bare signature: timestamp must come from params.\n  const t = typeof params?.timestamp === \"string\" ? (params.timestamp as string) : undefined;\n  return t !== undefined ? { t, v1: [raw] } : { v1: [raw] };\n}\n\nexport async function verifyStripeReceipt(\n  event: ToolReceiptEvent,\n  ctx?: ToolReceiptVerifyContext\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const secret = await resolveKey(event, ctx, { allowEmbedded: false });\n  if (secret === undefined) {\n    throw new Error(\n      \"stripe-webhook: signing secret not found — provide it via verify context (keys/resolveKey), not the trace\"\n    );\n  }\n  const { t, v1 } = parseStripeSignature(event.receipt.signature, event.receipt.params);\n  if (t === undefined) throw new Error(\"stripe-webhook: missing timestamp (t)\");\n  if (v1.length === 0) throw new Error(\"stripe-webhook: missing v1 signature\");\n\n  const toleranceSec = ctx?.toleranceSec ?? 300;\n  const now = ctx?.nowSec ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n  const ts = Number(t);\n  if (!Number.isFinite(ts)) throw new Error(\"stripe-webhook: invalid timestamp\");\n  if (Math.abs(now - ts) > toleranceSec) {\n    throw new Error(`stripe-webhook: timestamp outside tolerance (${toleranceSec}s)`);\n  }\n\n  const signedBase = `${t}.${event.receipt.signedPayload}`;\n  const expected = createHmac(\"sha256\", keyToString(secret)).update(signedBase).digest(\"hex\");\n  return v1.some((candidate) => constantTimeEqualHex(expected, candidate));\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// GitHub webhook (HMAC-SHA256, `sha256=...`)\n// =============================================================================\n\nexport async function verifyGitHubReceipt(\n  event: ToolReceiptEvent,\n  ctx?: ToolReceiptVerifyContext\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const secret = await resolveKey(event, ctx, { allowEmbedded: false });\n  if (secret === undefined) {\n    throw new Error(\n      \"github-webhook: signing secret not found — provide it via verify context (keys/resolveKey)\"\n    );\n  }\n  // GitHub's signature carries no timestamp, so freshness can't be enforced\n  // cryptographically — a timestamp-less receipt's anti-replay is the bundle\n  // Merkle commitment. When the recorder DID capture `params.timestamp`, hold it\n  // to the same tolerance window Stripe uses so a stale receipt is rejected.\n  const ts = event.receipt.params?.timestamp;\n  if (typeof ts === \"string\" || typeof ts === \"number\") {\n    const tsNum = Number(ts);\n    if (!Number.isFinite(tsNum)) throw new Error(\"github-webhook: invalid timestamp\");\n    const toleranceSec = ctx?.toleranceSec ?? 300;\n    const now = ctx?.nowSec ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n    if (Math.abs(now - tsNum) > toleranceSec) {\n      throw new Error(`github-webhook: timestamp outside tolerance (${toleranceSec}s)`);\n    }\n  }\n  const provided = event.receipt.signature.startsWith(\"sha256=\")\n    ? event.receipt.signature.slice(\"sha256=\".length)\n    : event.receipt.signature;\n  const expected = createHmac(\"sha256\", keyToString(secret))\n    .update(event.receipt.signedPayload)\n    .digest(\"hex\");\n  return constantTimeEqualHex(expected, provided);\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// JWS / JWT (compact)\n// =============================================================================\n\ninterface JwsParts {\n  signingInput: string;\n  signature: Buffer;\n  header: { alg?: string; [k: string]: unknown };\n}\n\nfunction parseJws(event: ToolReceiptEvent): JwsParts {\n  const sp = event.receipt.signedPayload;\n  const segments = sp.split(\".\");\n  let signingInput: string;\n  let sigB64: string;\n  if (segments.length === 3) {\n    // signedPayload is the full compact JWS.\n    signingInput = `${segments[0]}.${segments[1]}`;\n    sigB64 = segments[2]!;\n  } else if (segments.length === 2) {\n    // signedPayload is the signing input; signature carried separately.\n    signingInput = sp;\n    sigB64 = event.receipt.signature;\n  } else {\n    throw new Error(\"jws: signedPayload must be a compact JWS (h.p.s) or signing input (h.p)\");\n  }\n  const headerJson = Buffer.from(segments[0]!, \"base64url\").toString(\"utf8\");\n  const header = JSON.parse(headerJson) as { alg?: string };\n  return { signingInput, signature: Buffer.from(sigB64, \"base64url\"), header };\n}\n\nexport async function verifyJwsReceipt(\n  event: ToolReceiptEvent,\n  ctx?: ToolReceiptVerifyContext\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const { signingInput, signature, header } = parseJws(event);\n  const alg = header.alg;\n  if (!alg || alg === \"none\") throw new Error(`jws: unsupported alg \"${alg}\"`);\n  assertAlgAllowed(event, ctx, alg);\n  const data = utf8(signingInput);\n\n  if (alg.startsWith(\"HS\")) {\n    const secret = await resolveKey(event, ctx, { allowEmbedded: false });\n    if (secret === undefined) throw new Error(`jws(${alg}): HMAC secret not found in verify context`);\n    // The alg comes from the attacker-controlled JWS header. Refuse to HMAC with\n    // an asymmetric public key (JWT algorithm confusion).\n    assertSymmetricSecret(secret, `jws(${alg})`);\n    const hashAlg = `sha${alg.slice(2)}`;\n    const expected = createHmac(hashAlg, keyToString(secret)).update(data).digest();\n    return expected.length === signature.length && timingSafeEqual(expected, signature);\n  }\n\n  // Asymmetric — public key may be embedded.\n  const keyMaterial = await resolveKey(event, ctx, { allowEmbedded: true });\n  if (keyMaterial === undefined) throw new Error(`jws(${alg}): public key not found`);\n  const publicKey = toPublicKey(keyMaterial);\n\n  if (alg.startsWith(\"RS\")) {\n    return cryptoVerify(`sha${alg.slice(2)}`, data, publicKey, signature);\n  }\n  if (alg.startsWith(\"PS\")) {\n    const bits = alg.slice(2);\n    return cryptoVerify(\n      `sha${bits}`,\n      data,\n      { key: publicKey, padding: 6 /* RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING */, saltLength: Number(bits) / 8 },\n      signature\n    );\n  }\n  if (alg.startsWith(\"ES\")) {\n    // JWS ECDSA signatures are raw r||s (IEEE-P1363).\n    return cryptoVerify(\n      `sha${alg.slice(2)}`,\n      data,\n      { key: publicKey, dsaEncoding: \"ieee-p1363\" },\n      signature\n    );\n  }\n  if (alg === \"EdDSA\") {\n    return cryptoVerify(null, data, publicKey, signature);\n  }\n  throw new Error(`jws: unsupported alg \"${alg}\"`);\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// RFC 9421 — HTTP Message Signatures\n// =============================================================================\n\n/** RFC 9421 algorithm registry names we support. */\nconst RFC9421_HASH: Record<string, string> = {\n  \"rsa-pss-sha512\": \"sha512\",\n  \"rsa-v1_5-sha256\": \"sha256\",\n  \"ecdsa-p256-sha256\": \"sha256\",\n  \"ecdsa-p384-sha384\": \"sha384\",\n};\n\nexport async function verifyHttpMessageReceipt(\n  event: ToolReceiptEvent,\n  ctx?: ToolReceiptVerifyContext\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const params = event.receipt.params ?? {};\n  const alg = typeof params.alg === \"string\" ? (params.alg as string) : undefined;\n  if (!alg) {\n    throw new Error(\"http-message-signatures: receipt.params.alg is required (RFC 9421 alg id)\");\n  }\n  assertAlgAllowed(event, ctx, alg);\n  // The signature base is the canonical signed bytes.\n  const data = utf8(event.receipt.signedPayload);\n  const signature = decodeSignature(event.receipt.signature);\n\n  if (alg === \"ed25519\") {\n    const keyMaterial = await resolveKey(event, ctx, { allowEmbedded: true });\n    if (keyMaterial === undefined) throw new Error(\"http-message-signatures(ed25519): public key not found\");\n    return cryptoVerify(null, data, toPublicKey(keyMaterial), signature);\n  }\n\n  if (alg === \"hmac-sha256\") {\n    const secret = await resolveKey(event, ctx, { allowEmbedded: false });\n    if (secret === undefined) throw new Error(\"http-message-signatures(hmac-sha256): secret not found\");\n    // The alg is attacker-controlled — refuse to HMAC with an asymmetric public\n    // key (algorithm confusion).\n    assertSymmetricSecret(secret, \"http-message-signatures(hmac-sha256)\");\n    const expected = createHmac(\"sha256\", keyToString(secret)).update(data).digest();\n    return expected.length === signature.length && timingSafeEqual(expected, signature);\n  }\n\n  const hash = RFC9421_HASH[alg];\n  if (!hash) throw new Error(`http-message-signatures: unsupported alg \"${alg}\"`);\n  const keyMaterial = await resolveKey(event, ctx, { allowEmbedded: true });\n  if (keyMaterial === undefined) throw new Error(`http-message-signatures(${alg}): public key not found`);\n  const publicKey = toPublicKey(keyMaterial);\n\n  if (alg === \"rsa-pss-sha512\") {\n    return cryptoVerify(hash, data, { key: publicKey, padding: 6, saltLength: 64 }, signature);\n  }\n  if (alg === \"rsa-v1_5-sha256\") {\n    return cryptoVerify(hash, data, publicKey, signature);\n  }\n  // ECDSA — RFC 9421 uses raw (IEEE-P1363) signatures.\n  return cryptoVerify(hash, data, { key: publicKey, dsaEncoding: \"ieee-p1363\" }, signature);\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Helpers\n// =============================================================================\n\nfunction toPublicKey(material: string | Uint8Array): KeyObject {\n  if (typeof material === \"string\") {\n    const trimmed = material.trim();\n    if (trimmed.startsWith(\"{\")) {\n      return createPublicKey({ key: JSON.parse(trimmed), format: \"jwk\" });\n    }\n    return createPublicKey(material);\n  }\n  return createPublicKey(Buffer.from(material));\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode a signature string that may be 0x-hex, base64url, or standard base64\n * (the encodings used by RFC 9421 / JWS receipts in the wild).\n */\nfunction decodeSignature(sig: string): Buffer {\n  if (sig.startsWith(\"0x\")) return Buffer.from(sig.slice(2), \"hex\");\n  if (/[-_]/.test(sig)) return Buffer.from(sig, \"base64url\");\n  return Buffer.from(sig, \"base64\");\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Response binding — the signed content must commit to the recorded response\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * The sha-256 hex the signed material commits to, or `null` when the scheme's\n * signed bytes structurally cannot bind the response (e.g. an RFC 9421\n * signature base with no `content-digest` component). A `null` MUST cause\n * verification to fail: a valid signature that does not cover the recorded\n * response proves nothing about it.\n */\nexport async function responseCommitmentHash(event: ToolReceiptEvent): Promise<string | null> {\n  const { scheme, signedPayload } = event.receipt;\n  switch (scheme) {\n    case \"jws\": {\n      // signedPayload is the JWS signing input `h.p[.s]`; the payload segment\n      // is the exact bytes the tool signed (canonical response body).\n      const segs = signedPayload.split(\".\");\n      if (segs.length < 2 || !segs[1]) return null;\n      const body = Buffer.from(segs[1], \"base64url\").toString(\"utf8\");\n      return sha256StringHex(body);\n    }\n    case \"stripe-webhook\":\n    case \"github-webhook\":\n      // The signed webhook body IS the tool response.\n      return sha256StringHex(signedPayload);\n    case \"http-message-signatures\":\n      // RFC 9421 signs a signature base, not the body; the body is bound only\n      // via a `content-digest` component inside that base.\n      return contentDigestSha256Hex(signedPayload);\n    default:\n      return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the signed call-binding context ({runId, requestHash}) from a self-signed\n * JWS receipt's header, or `null` when the receipt is not a bound JWS. Because\n * the header is part of the JWS signing input, these values are covered by the\n * signature — lifting the receipt into another trace/request breaks the match.\n */\nexport function jwsBindingContext(\n  event: ToolReceiptEvent\n): { runId: string; requestHash?: string } | null {\n  if (event.receipt.scheme !== \"jws\") return null;\n  const seg0 = event.receipt.signedPayload.split(\".\")[0];\n  if (!seg0) return null;\n  try {\n    const header = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(seg0, \"base64url\").toString(\"utf8\")) as {\n      orynqBinding?: { runId?: unknown; requestHash?: unknown };\n    };\n    const b = header.orynqBinding;\n    if (!b || typeof b.runId !== \"string\") return null;\n    return typeof b.requestHash === \"string\"\n      ? { runId: b.runId, requestHash: b.requestHash }\n      : { runId: b.runId };\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/** Extract the sha-256 content-digest (hex) from an RFC 9421 signature base. */\nfunction contentDigestSha256Hex(signatureBase: string): string | null {\n  for (const line of signatureBase.split(\"\\n\")) {\n    const m = /^\"content-digest\":\\s*(.+)$/i.exec(line.trim());\n    if (!m) continue;\n    const d = /sha-256=:([A-Za-z0-9+/=]+):/.exec(m[1]!);\n    if (!d || !d[1]) return null;\n    return Buffer.from(d[1], \"base64\").toString(\"hex\");\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n","/**\n * @fileoverview Verification dispatch for tool-call receipts (issue #60).\n *\n * `verifyToolReceipts(bundle, ctx)` verifies every `tool-receipt` event in a\n * bundle; `verifyTrace(bundle, ctx)` additionally runs the full process-trace\n * `verifyBundle()` and folds the receipt result into its `checks` so a single\n * call gives auditors \"did the trace verify AND did every tool actually return\n * what the wrapper claims\".\n */\n\nimport type {\n  ToolReceiptEvent,\n  TraceBundle,\n  TraceVerificationResult,\n} from \"@fluxpointstudios/orynq-sdk-process-trace\";\nimport { verifyBundle } from \"@fluxpointstudios/orynq-sdk-process-trace\";\nimport {\n  verifyStripeReceipt,\n  verifyGitHubReceipt,\n  verifyJwsReceipt,\n  verifyHttpMessageReceipt,\n  responseCommitmentHash,\n  jwsBindingContext,\n  type ToolReceiptVerifyContext,\n} from \"./schemes.js\";\nimport { hashToolPayload } from \"./record.js\";\n\n/** A verifier for a single receipt scheme. */\nexport type ToolReceiptSchemeVerifier = (\n  event: ToolReceiptEvent,\n  ctx?: ToolReceiptVerifyContext\n) => Promise<boolean>;\n\n/** Built-in verifiers keyed by `receipt.scheme`. */\nexport const BUILTIN_TOOL_RECEIPT_VERIFIERS: Record<string, ToolReceiptSchemeVerifier> = {\n  \"stripe-webhook\": verifyStripeReceipt,\n  \"github-webhook\": verifyGitHubReceipt,\n  jws: verifyJwsReceipt,\n  \"http-message-signatures\": verifyHttpMessageReceipt,\n};\n\n/** Per-receipt verification result. */\nexport interface ToolReceiptVerificationResult {\n  eventId: string;\n  toolId: string;\n  scheme: string;\n  signer: string;\n  verified: boolean;\n  /**\n   * True ONLY when the signature cryptographically binds this receipt to THIS\n   * trace's runId AND the recorded request hash (self-signed JWS anti-lie path,\n   * with a signed `orynqBinding.{runId,requestHash}` that both matched). A JWS\n   * with no binding, or one that binds only the runId, is `false` — the request\n   * is not authenticated. Always `false` for external webhook schemes\n   * (stripe/github/rfc9421): those prove authenticity of the response body but\n   * cannot cover our runId/request, so call-binding is not provable by the\n   * signature and request-attribution must not be inferred — anti-replay for them\n   * relies on the bundle Merkle commitment + the scheme's own timestamp window.\n   */\n  callBound: boolean;\n  /** When not verified, a short machine-readable reason. */\n  reason?: string;\n  error?: string;\n}\n\n/** Case-insensitive, 0x-tolerant hex equality. */\nfunction hexEq(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  const na = a.startsWith(\"0x\") ? a.slice(2) : a;\n  const nb = b.startsWith(\"0x\") ? b.slice(2) : b;\n  return na.toLowerCase() === nb.toLowerCase();\n}\n\n/** Context for {@link verifyToolReceipts}; extends key resolution with custom schemes. */\nexport interface VerifyToolReceiptsContext extends ToolReceiptVerifyContext {\n  /** Register or override scheme verifiers (e.g. a custom/internal scheme). */\n  verifiers?: Record<string, ToolReceiptSchemeVerifier>;\n  /**\n   * The enclosing trace's run id. Self-signed JWS receipts commit to it (and to\n   * the request hash) so a genuine receipt cannot be lifted into another trace.\n   * {@link verifyToolReceipts} supplies it automatically from the bundle.\n   */\n  runId?: string;\n  /**\n   * When true, a receipt whose signature does not provably bind THIS call\n   * (runId + request hash) is `verified: false` with reason `call-binding-required`.\n   * Use this when request-attribution must be cryptographic: it rejects unbound\n   * JWS receipts and all webhook schemes (whose external signatures cannot cover\n   * our request). Default false — call-binding is reported via `callBound` but not\n   * required.\n   */\n  requireCallBinding?: boolean;\n}\n\n/** Extract all `tool-receipt` events from a bundle (ordered by seq). */\nexport function extractToolReceipts(bundle: TraceBundle): ToolReceiptEvent[] {\n  return bundle.privateRun.events.filter(\n    (e): e is ToolReceiptEvent => e.kind === \"tool-receipt\"\n  );\n}\n\n/** Verify a single tool-receipt event. Never throws — failures land in `error`. */\nexport async function verifyToolReceipt(\n  event: ToolReceiptEvent,\n  ctx?: VerifyToolReceiptsContext\n): Promise<ToolReceiptVerificationResult> {\n  const scheme = event.receipt.scheme;\n  const base = {\n    eventId: event.id,\n    toolId: event.toolId,\n    scheme,\n    signer: event.receipt.signer,\n  };\n  // `callBound` reflects PROVEN call-binding, computed after the checks below —\n  // never assumed from the scheme. Only a self-signed JWS carrying a signed\n  // `orynqBinding.{runId,requestHash}` that both match can be call-bound; external\n  // webhook schemes never can (their signature cannot cover our runId/request).\n  const callBound = false;\n  const verifier = ctx?.verifiers?.[scheme] ?? BUILTIN_TOOL_RECEIPT_VERIFIERS[scheme];\n  if (!verifier) {\n    return {\n      ...base,\n      callBound,\n      verified: false,\n      error: `no verifier registered for scheme \"${scheme}\"`,\n    };\n  }\n  try {\n    const sigValid = await verifier(event, ctx);\n    if (!sigValid) return { ...base, callBound, verified: false, reason: \"signature-invalid\" };\n    // A valid signature is necessary but NOT sufficient: the signed content\n    // must commit to the recorded response, else a genuine receipt for output\n    // A can be paired with a fabricated response B (issue #60's core guarantee).\n    const commit = await responseCommitmentHash(event);\n    if (commit === null) {\n      return { ...base, callBound, verified: false, reason: \"response-not-bound\" };\n    }\n    if (!hexEq(commit, event.response.hash)) {\n      return { ...base, callBound, verified: false, reason: \"response-binding-mismatch\" };\n    }\n    // Auditors read the retained human-readable `response.payload`; when present\n    // it MUST hash to the bound `response.hash`, else an honest signature can be\n    // paired with a fabricated payload the auditor sees.\n    if (event.response.payload !== undefined) {\n      const payloadHash = await hashToolPayload(event.response.payload);\n      if (!hexEq(payloadHash, event.response.hash)) {\n        return { ...base, callBound, verified: false, reason: \"response-payload-mismatch\" };\n      }\n    }\n    // Self-signed JWS receipts additionally commit to a binding context\n    // {runId, requestHash}. When present, the enclosing trace's runId AND the\n    // recorded request hash MUST both match — this authenticates the request and\n    // blocks lifting a genuine receipt into a different trace/request. A JWS that\n    // binds only runId (or nothing) is NOT call-bound: its request is\n    // unauthenticated. External webhooks can never cover runId/request, so their\n    // anti-replay is the bundle Merkle commitment + timestamp.\n    let provenCallBound = false;\n    if (scheme === \"jws\") {\n      const bound = jwsBindingContext(event);\n      if (bound !== null) {\n        // A signed binding is a commitment: any mismatch is a hard failure, not a\n        // downgrade to \"unbound\" — the signer attested to a specific call.\n        if (ctx?.runId !== undefined && bound.runId !== ctx.runId) {\n          return { ...base, callBound, verified: false, reason: \"call-binding-mismatch\" };\n        }\n        if (bound.requestHash !== undefined && !hexEq(bound.requestHash, event.request.hash)) {\n          return { ...base, callBound, verified: false, reason: \"call-binding-mismatch\" };\n        }\n        // Call-binding is PROVEN only when the request hash was signed and matched\n        // AND the runId was verified against this trace. Binding only the runId\n        // leaves the request unauthenticated → not call-bound.\n        provenCallBound =\n          bound.requestHash !== undefined &&\n          hexEq(bound.requestHash, event.request.hash) &&\n          ctx?.runId !== undefined &&\n          bound.runId === ctx.runId;\n      }\n    }\n    if (ctx?.requireCallBinding && !provenCallBound) {\n      return { ...base, callBound: provenCallBound, verified: false, reason: \"call-binding-required\" };\n    }\n    return { ...base, callBound: provenCallBound, verified: true };\n  } catch (error) {\n    return {\n      ...base,\n      callBound,\n      verified: false,\n      error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),\n    };\n  }\n}\n\n/** Aggregate outcome over all tool receipts in a bundle. */\nexport interface ToolReceiptsVerifyOutcome {\n  valid: boolean;\n  errors: string[];\n  results: ToolReceiptVerificationResult[];\n}\n\n/** Verify every tool-receipt in a bundle. A trace with no receipts is `valid: true`. */\nexport async function verifyToolReceipts(\n  bundle: TraceBundle,\n  ctx?: VerifyToolReceiptsContext\n): Promise<ToolReceiptsVerifyOutcome> {\n  const events = extractToolReceipts(bundle);\n  // Bind receipt verification to THIS trace's run id (self-signed anti-replay).\n  // An explicit ctx.runId takes precedence for advanced callers.\n  const boundCtx: VerifyToolReceiptsContext = {\n    ...ctx,\n    runId: ctx?.runId ?? bundle.privateRun.id,\n  };\n  const results: ToolReceiptVerificationResult[] = [];\n  for (const event of events) {\n    results.push(await verifyToolReceipt(event, boundCtx));\n  }\n  const failed = results.filter((r) => !r.verified);\n  return {\n    valid: failed.length === 0,\n    errors: failed.map(\n      (f) =>\n        `tool-receipt \"${f.toolId}\" (${f.scheme}) failed${f.reason ? ` [${f.reason}]` : \"\"}${f.error ? `: ${f.error}` : \"\"}`\n    ),\n    results,\n  };\n}\n\n/** Combined result of {@link verifyTrace}. */\nexport interface VerifyTraceResult extends TraceVerificationResult {\n  toolReceipts: ToolReceiptsVerifyOutcome;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify the whole trace AND its tool receipts in one call. The receipt outcome\n * is folded into `checks.toolReceiptsValid` (so `valid` reflects receipts too)\n * and also returned in full under `toolReceipts`.\n */\nexport async function verifyTrace(\n  bundle: TraceBundle,\n  ctx?: VerifyToolReceiptsContext\n): Promise<VerifyTraceResult> {\n  const outcome = await verifyToolReceipts(bundle, ctx);\n  const result = await verifyBundle(bundle, {\n    toolReceipts: () => ({ valid: outcome.valid, errors: outcome.errors }),\n  });\n  return { ...result, toolReceipts: outcome };\n}\n","/**\n * @fileoverview Signing-proxy helper — the \"anti-lie\" pattern (issue #60).\n *\n * Tools that do not sign their responses natively can be wrapped in a TEE/HSM-\n * signed envelope so the wrapper's claim (\"the tool returned X\") becomes\n * independently verifiable. This helper produces a JWS-signed\n * {@link ToolReceiptEvent.receipt} from a tool response; pair it with\n * `addToolReceipt` to record the receipt, and `verifyToolReceipts` to check it.\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * import { generateKeyPairSync } from \"node:crypto\";\n * const { privateKey, publicKey } = generateKeyPairSync(\"ed25519\");\n * const proxy = createSigningProxy({\n *   signer: \"tee://pricing-proxy\",\n *   alg: \"EdDSA\",\n *   privateKey,\n *   publicKey: publicKey.export({ type: \"spki\", format: \"pem\" }).toString(),\n * });\n * const receipt = proxy.sign({ price: 4200, currency: \"usd\" });\n * await addToolReceipt(run, span.id, { toolId, request, response, receipt });\n * ```\n */\n\nimport {\n  createHmac,\n  createPrivateKey,\n  sign as cryptoSign,\n  type KeyObject,\n} from \"node:crypto\";\nimport { canonicalize } from \"@fluxpointstudios/orynq-sdk-core/utils\";\nimport type { ToolReceiptEvent } from \"@fluxpointstudios/orynq-sdk-process-trace\";\n\n/** JWS algorithms supported by the signing proxy. */\nexport type JwsAlg =\n  | \"EdDSA\"\n  | \"ES256\"\n  | \"ES384\"\n  | \"RS256\"\n  | \"RS512\"\n  | \"PS256\"\n  | \"PS512\"\n  | \"HS256\";\n\nexport interface SigningProxyOptions {\n  /** Verifier-resolvable identity recorded as `receipt.signer` (URL / DID / keyId). */\n  signer: string;\n  alg: JwsAlg;\n  /** Private key (PEM or KeyObject) for asymmetric algorithms. */\n  privateKey?: string | KeyObject;\n  /** Shared secret for HS256. */\n  secret?: string;\n  /**\n   * Public key (PEM or JWK string) to embed in `receipt.params.publicKey` so a\n   * verifier can resolve it without out-of-band material. Safe to embed\n   * (public keys only).\n   */\n  publicKey?: string;\n  /**\n   * Call-binding context signed into the receipt header so a genuine receipt\n   * cannot be lifted into a different trace/request. Any signed value that\n   * disagrees with the enclosing trace is a hard verification failure. To make a\n   * receipt `callBound` (request cryptographically attributed), sign BOTH `runId`\n   * AND `requestHash` — binding only the runId scopes the trace but leaves the\n   * request unauthenticated, so the receipt verifies but is NOT `callBound`.\n   */\n  binding?: { runId: string; requestHash?: string };\n}\n\nfunction b64url(input: string | Buffer): string {\n  return Buffer.from(input).toString(\"base64url\");\n}\n\nfunction signJws(opts: SigningProxyOptions, signingInput: string): Buffer {\n  const data = Buffer.from(signingInput, \"utf8\");\n\n  if (opts.alg === \"HS256\") {\n    if (!opts.secret) throw new Error(\"createSigningProxy(HS256): `secret` is required\");\n    return createHmac(\"sha256\", opts.secret).update(data).digest();\n  }\n\n  if (!opts.privateKey) {\n    throw new Error(`createSigningProxy(${opts.alg}): \\`privateKey\\` is required`);\n  }\n  const key =\n    typeof opts.privateKey === \"string\" ? createPrivateKey(opts.privateKey) : opts.privateKey;\n\n  if (opts.alg === \"EdDSA\") return cryptoSign(null, data, key);\n  if (opts.alg.startsWith(\"ES\")) {\n    return cryptoSign(`sha${opts.alg.slice(2)}`, data, { key, dsaEncoding: \"ieee-p1363\" });\n  }\n  if (opts.alg.startsWith(\"PS\")) {\n    return cryptoSign(`sha${opts.alg.slice(2)}`, data, {\n      key,\n      padding: 6 /* RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING */,\n      saltLength: Number(opts.alg.slice(2)) / 8,\n    });\n  }\n  if (opts.alg.startsWith(\"RS\")) {\n    return cryptoSign(`sha${opts.alg.slice(2)}`, data, key);\n  }\n  throw new Error(`createSigningProxy: unsupported alg \"${opts.alg}\"`);\n}\n\nexport interface SigningProxy {\n  /** Wrap a tool response in a JWS-signed receipt ready for `addToolReceipt`. */\n  sign(payload: unknown): ToolReceiptEvent[\"receipt\"];\n}\n\n/**\n * Create a signing proxy that turns unsigned tool responses into verifiable\n * JWS receipts. Use a TEE/HSM-held key in production.\n */\nexport function createSigningProxy(opts: SigningProxyOptions): SigningProxy {\n  if (!opts.signer) throw new Error(\"createSigningProxy: `signer` is required\");\n  return {\n    sign(payload: unknown): ToolReceiptEvent[\"receipt\"] {\n      // The call-binding lives in the (signed) header so the payload segment\n      // stays the canonical response body the response-hash commitment covers.\n      const header: Record<string, unknown> = { alg: opts.alg, typ: \"JWT\", kid: opts.signer };\n      if (opts.binding) {\n        header.orynqBinding = {\n          runId: opts.binding.runId,\n          ...(opts.binding.requestHash !== undefined\n            ? { requestHash: opts.binding.requestHash }\n            : {}),\n        };\n      }\n      const h = b64url(JSON.stringify(header));\n      const body = typeof payload === \"string\" ? payload : canonicalize(payload);\n      const p = b64url(body);\n      const signingInput = `${h}.${p}`;\n      const sigB64 = b64url(signJws(opts, signingInput));\n      return {\n        // signedPayload is the JWS *signing input* (the bytes actually signed);\n        // the signature is carried separately so it is independently checkable.\n        scheme: \"jws\",\n        signer: opts.signer,\n        signature: sigB64,\n        signedPayload: signingInput,\n        ...(opts.publicKey ? { params: { publicKey: opts.publicKey } } : {}),\n      };\n    },\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * @summary Main entry point for @fluxpointstudios/orynq-sdk-tool-receipts.\n *\n * Verifiable tool-call receipts for the Orynq process-trace SDK (issue #60).\n * Proves \"the tool actually returned this response\" — not just \"the agent says\n * the tool returned this response\" — by independently verifying signed receipts\n * recorded as `tool-receipt` events.\n *\n * Supported schemes: RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures, Stripe/GitHub webhook\n * signatures, and generic JWS. Plus a signing-proxy helper to wrap tools that\n * don't sign their responses natively (the \"anti-lie\" pattern).\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * import { addToolReceipt, hashToolPayload, verifyTrace } from \"@fluxpointstudios/orynq-sdk-tool-receipts\";\n *\n * await addToolReceipt(run, span.id, {\n *   toolId: \"stripe.charges.create\",\n *   request: { hash: await hashToolPayload(req) },\n *   response: { hash: await hashToolPayload(res), payload: res },\n *   receipt: { scheme: \"stripe-webhook\", signer: \"acct_123\", signature: sigHeader, signedPayload: rawBody },\n * });\n *\n * const result = await verifyTrace(bundle, { keys: { acct_123: process.env.STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET! } });\n * // result.valid && result.toolReceipts.results[0].verified\n * ```\n */\n\n// Recording helpers\nexport { addToolReceipt, hashToolPayload } from \"./record.js\";\nexport type { AddToolReceiptOptions } from \"./record.js\";\n\n// Scheme verifiers + key-resolution context\nexport {\n  verifyStripeReceipt,\n  verifyGitHubReceipt,\n  verifyJwsReceipt,\n  verifyHttpMessageReceipt,\n  jwsBindingContext,\n} from \"./schemes.js\";\nexport type { ToolReceiptVerifyContext } from \"./schemes.js\";\n\n// Verification dispatch\nexport {\n  BUILTIN_TOOL_RECEIPT_VERIFIERS,\n  extractToolReceipts,\n  verifyToolReceipt,\n  verifyToolReceipts,\n  verifyTrace,\n} from \"./verify.js\";\nexport type {\n  ToolReceiptSchemeVerifier,\n  ToolReceiptVerificationResult,\n  VerifyToolReceiptsContext,\n  ToolReceiptsVerifyOutcome,\n  VerifyTraceResult,\n} from \"./verify.js\";\n\n// Signing-proxy (anti-lie pattern)\nexport { createSigningProxy } from \"./signing-proxy.js\";\nexport type { SigningProxy, SigningProxyOptions, JwsAlg } from \"./signing-proxy.js\";\n\n/** Package version. */\nexport const VERSION = \"0.1.0\";\n"]}