@fluojs/jwt 1.0.3 → 1.1.0

package/README.ko.md

@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ const verifier = new DefaultJwtVerifier({
 
 `jwksRequestTimeoutMs`의 기본값은 `5_000`이며, 예산을 넘기면 진행 중인 JWKS fetch를 abort합니다.
 
-JWKS key는 `jwksCacheTtl` 밀리초 동안 cache되며 기본값은 `600_000`입니다. in-memory cache는 `jwksCacheMaxEntries`로 제한되고 기본값은 `100`입니다. lookup 전 만료된 entry를 정리하고, 제한을 넘으면 가장 오래 보관된 key를 제거합니다. `JwtModule`은 관리 중인 `DefaultJwtVerifier` shutdown hook을 호출하므로 module teardown 중 보관 중인 remote key material이 정리됩니다. 수동으로 생성한 verifier나 client는 수동 shutdown 또는 identity-provider 재설정 시 여전히 `JwksClient.dispose()` / `DefaultJwtVerifier.dispose()`를 호출해야 합니다. `jwksCacheTtl`을 `0`으로 설정하면 bounded fetch timeout은 유지하면서 key 보관만 비활성화합니다.
+JWKS key는 `jwksCacheTtl` 밀리초 동안 cache되며 기본값은 `600_000`입니다. in-memory cache는 `jwksCacheMaxEntries`로 제한되고 기본값은 `100`입니다. lookup 전 만료된 entry를 정리하고, 제한을 넘으면 가장 오래 보관된 key를 제거합니다. `JwtModule`은 관리 중인 `DefaultJwtVerifier` shutdown hook을 호출하므로 module teardown 중 보관 중인 remote key material이 정리됩니다. 수동으로 생성한 verifier나 client는 수동 shutdown 또는 identity-provider 재설정 시 여전히 `JwksClient.dispose()` / `DefaultJwtVerifier.dispose()`를 호출해야 합니다. 이 dispose method들은 보관 중인 JWKS key material을 정리하고 진행 중인 JWKS fetch를 abort합니다. `jwksCacheTtl`을 `0`으로 설정하면 bounded fetch timeout은 유지하면서 key 보관만 비활성화합니다.
 
 `JwtService.verify(token, options)`는 호출 단위의 알고리즘/클레임 정책 재정의(`issuer`, `audience`, `clockSkewSeconds`, `maxAge`, `requireExp`)를 적용하더라도, 내부 JWKS client나 정적 key-resolution cache를 다시 만들지 않습니다. 호출 단위 검증은 `jwksUri`, `keys[]`, `publicKey`, `secret`, `secretOrKeyProvider` 같은 구성된 key source 자체를 교체하지는 않습니다.
 
@@ -160,7 +160,9 @@ JWKS key는 `jwksCacheTtl` 밀리초 동안 cache되며 기본값은 `600_000`
 
 ### 리프레시 토큰
 
-`RefreshTokenService`는 전용 HMAC refresh-token 경로를 사용합니다. `refreshToken.secret`은 access-token 서명 키와 별도로 설정하세요. Rotation은 `RefreshTokenStore.rotate(...)`를 사용해 현재 토큰을 소비 처리하고 대체 토큰을 같은 durable store 작업 안에서 저장할 수 있습니다. 따라서 성공한 rotation은 저장된 후속 토큰 없이 기존 토큰만 소비하지 않습니다. 기존 atomic `consume(...)` hook만 구현한 store도 계속 지원하지만, 대체 토큰 저장의 내구성은 store가 소유한 `rotate(...)` 작업에 달려 있습니다.
+`RefreshTokenService`는 전용 HMAC refresh-token 경로를 사용합니다. `refreshToken.secret`은 access-token 서명 키와 별도로 설정하세요. Rotation은 `RefreshTokenStore.rotate(...)`를 사용해 현재 토큰을 소비 처리하고 대체 토큰을 같은 durable store 작업 안에서 저장할 수 있습니다. 따라서 성공한 rotation은 저장된 후속 토큰 없이 기존 토큰만 소비하지 않습니다. 기존 atomic `consume(...)` hook만 구현한 store도 계속 지원합니다. Consume이 성공하면 service가 `save(...)`로 대체 토큰을 저장하지만, 두 쓰기를 원자적으로 만드는 경로는 store 소유의 `rotate(...)`뿐입니다.
+
+재사용을 감지하면 optional `revokeByFamily(family)` capability를 구현한 store는 침해된 token family만 revoke합니다. 기존 store는 source-compatible 상태를 유지합니다. `revokeByFamily(...)`가 없으면 `RefreshTokenService`는 보수적으로 `revokeBySubject(subject)`로 fallback하며, 이 경우 해당 subject의 독립적인 refresh-token family도 함께 revoke됩니다. 다른 family가 침해된 뒤에도 별도 device 또는 session family를 유지해야 하는 production store는 `revokeByFamily(...)`를 구현하세요.
 
 ## 설정 가드레일
 
@@ -170,8 +172,18 @@ JWT 서명과 검증에는 `algorithms`에 지원되는 알고리즘이 하나
 
 검증은 잘못된 시간 정책에 대해 fail closed로 동작합니다. 검증에 참여하는 `exp`, `nbf`, `iat` 클레임은 유한한 JWT NumericDate 숫자여야 하며, `clockSkewSeconds`도 음수가 아닌 유한 숫자여야 합니다. 유한하지 않은 값은 expiration, not-before, age check를 늘리는 대신 거부됩니다. verifier 시간이 `exp` NumericDate에 도달하면 토큰은 만료된 것으로 처리되며, 양수 clock skew가 경계를 덮지 않는 한 equality도 만료로 간주합니다.
 
+### Node 런타임 경계
+
 루트 `@fluojs/jwt` import surface는 runtime-specific 인증 경로를 선택하기 전에도 안전하게 로드할 수 있습니다. Node.js `node:crypto` primitive는 서명, 검증, JWKS key parsing, refresh-token id 생성이 실제로 실행될 때만 lazy load됩니다. 이 방식은 기존 public export를 유지하면서 module import 시점의 Node-specific crypto 작업을 피합니다.
 
+Lazy loading은 import-time 안전성 속성일 뿐입니다. 서명이나 검증을 runtime 간 이식 가능하게 만들지는 **않습니다**. 서명, 검증, JWKS key parsing, refresh-token id 생성 경로가 실행되면 해당 경로는 Node.js 호환 `node:crypto` 구현(`createHmac`, `createSign`, `createVerify`, `createPublicKey`, `timingSafeEqual`, `randomUUID`)을 필요로 합니다. Bun은 Node 호환성 레이어로 이를 만족하지만, Deno와 Cloudflare Workers는 이러한 연산에 호환되는 `node:crypto` surface를 제공하지 않으므로 지원되는 JWT 서명/검증 runtime이 아닙니다. `@fluojs/jwt`를 Node-runtime auth 패키지로 취급하세요. import-time 로딩은 lazy로 유지하되, 호환되는 `node:crypto` polyfill 없이 non-Node runtime에서 토큰을 서명하거나 검증할 수 있다고 가정하지 마세요.
+
+### `decode()` trust boundary
+
+`JwtService.decode(token)`는 서명, `alg`, `exp`, `nbf`, `iss`, `aud` 또는 기타 클레임을 검증하지 않고 JWT payload segment를 읽습니다. 반환된 객체는 **검증되지 않은 입력(unverified input)**이며, 권한 결정(authorization decisions), 신원 확인(identity resolution), 또는 접근을 허가하는 모든 코드 경로에 사용해서는 안 됩니다. 먼저 `JwtService.verify(token, options)`(또는 `DefaultJwtVerifier.verifyAccessToken(token)`)를 호출하고, 검증이 반환하는 정규화된 `JwtPrincipal`에서 신원을 읽으세요.
+
+`decode()`는 진단(diagnostics) 및 비권위적 검사(non-authoritative inspection)에만 사용됩니다. 예를 들어 로깅을 위해 토큰 메타데이터를 읽거나 `verify()` 호출 전에 검증 키를 선택할 때 사용할 수 있습니다. `decode()` 출력에서 읽은 모든 클레임 값 — `sub`, `roles`, `scopes`, `iss`, `aud`, `exp` 포함 — 은 `verify()`가 성공하기 전까지 공격자가 제어한 값으로 취급해야 합니다. `decode()` 출력을 기준으로 요청을 허가하거나 거부하는 분기를 만들지 말고, 검증되지 않은 클레임을 검증된 것처럼 downstream 코드에 노출하지 마세요.
+
 ## 공개 API 개요
 
 ### 주요 클래스
@@ -187,7 +199,8 @@ JWT 서명과 검증에는 `algorithms`에 지원되는 알고리즘이 하나
 - `JwtVerifierOptions`: 알고리즘, 키, 검증 정책 설정을 위한 타입입니다.
 - `SignOptions`, `VerifyOptions`: 호출 단위 서명 및 검증 재정의 타입입니다.
 - `JwtClaims`, `JwtSigner`, `JwtVerifier`, `JwtKeyEntry`, `JwtAlgorithm`: 공개 서명 및 검증 계약입니다.
-- `RefreshTokenOptions`, `RefreshTokenStore`, `RefreshTokenRecord`, `RefreshTokenConsumeInput`, `RefreshTokenRotateInput`, `RefreshTokenConsumeResult`: refresh-token 저장, rotation, replay detection 계약입니다.
+- `RefreshTokenOptions`, `RefreshTokenStore`, `RefreshTokenRecord`, `RefreshTokenConsumeInput`, `RefreshTokenRotateInput`, `RefreshTokenConsumeResult`: refresh-token 저장, rotation, family-scoped revocation, replay detection 계약입니다. `RefreshTokenStore.revokeByFamily(...)`는 subject-revocation store와의 호환성을 위해 optional입니다.
+- `JwtPlatformStatusSnapshot`, `JwtStatusAdapterInput`: platform diagnostic helper와 함께 export되는 status snapshot 및 adapter input 타입입니다.
 
 ### 에러와 diagnostics
 - `JwtVerificationError`, `JwtInvalidTokenError`, `JwtExpiredTokenError`, `JwtConfigurationError`: 타입이 지정된 JWT 실패입니다.

package/README.md

@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ const verifier = new DefaultJwtVerifier({
 
 `jwksRequestTimeoutMs` defaults to `5_000` and aborts the outbound JWKS fetch once that budget is exceeded.
 
-JWKS keys are cached for `jwksCacheTtl` milliseconds (`600_000` by default) and the in-memory cache is bounded by `jwksCacheMaxEntries` (`100` by default). Expired entries are pruned before lookups, the oldest retained key is evicted when the bound is exceeded, and `JwtModule` calls the managed `DefaultJwtVerifier` shutdown hook so retained remote key material is cleared during module teardown. Manually constructed verifiers or clients should still call `JwksClient.dispose()` / `DefaultJwtVerifier.dispose()` during manual shutdown or identity-provider reconfiguration. A `jwksCacheTtl` of `0` disables key retention while still using bounded fetch timeouts.
+JWKS keys are cached for `jwksCacheTtl` milliseconds (`600_000` by default) and the in-memory cache is bounded by `jwksCacheMaxEntries` (`100` by default). Expired entries are pruned before lookups, the oldest retained key is evicted when the bound is exceeded, and `JwtModule` calls the managed `DefaultJwtVerifier` shutdown hook so retained remote key material is cleared during module teardown. Manually constructed verifiers or clients should still call `JwksClient.dispose()` / `DefaultJwtVerifier.dispose()` during manual shutdown or identity-provider reconfiguration. These dispose methods clear retained JWKS key material and abort active JWKS fetches. A `jwksCacheTtl` of `0` disables key retention while still using bounded fetch timeouts.
 
 `JwtService.verify(token, options)` applies per-call algorithm and claim-policy overrides (`issuer`, `audience`, `clockSkewSeconds`, `maxAge`, `requireExp`) without rebuilding the underlying JWKS client or static key-resolution cache. Per-call verification does not replace configured key sources such as `jwksUri`, `keys[]`, `publicKey`, `secret`, or `secretOrKeyProvider`.
 
@@ -160,7 +160,9 @@ For multi-tenant systems, prefer putting a tenant-specific `kid` in issued token
 
 ### Refresh tokens
 
-`RefreshTokenService` uses a dedicated HMAC refresh-token path. Configure `refreshToken.secret` separately from access-token signing keys. Rotation can use `RefreshTokenStore.rotate(...)` to atomically mark the current token as consumed and persist the replacement token in the same durable store operation, so a successful rotation never consumes the old token without a stored successor. Stores that only implement the older atomic `consume(...)` hook remain supported, but durable replacement persistence depends on the store-owned `rotate(...)` operation.
+`RefreshTokenService` uses a dedicated HMAC refresh-token path. Configure `refreshToken.secret` separately from access-token signing keys. Rotation can use `RefreshTokenStore.rotate(...)` to atomically mark the current token as consumed and persist the replacement token in the same durable store operation, so a successful rotation never consumes the old token without a stored successor. Stores that only implement the older atomic `consume(...)` hook remain supported: after a successful consume, the service saves the replacement through `save(...)`, but only store-owned `rotate(...)` makes those two writes atomic.
+
+When reuse is detected, stores that implement the optional `revokeByFamily(family)` capability revoke only the compromised token family. Existing stores remain source-compatible: if `revokeByFamily(...)` is absent, `RefreshTokenService` conservatively falls back to `revokeBySubject(subject)`, which also revokes the subject's independent refresh-token families. Implement `revokeByFamily(...)` in production stores when separate device or session families must remain active after another family is compromised.
 
 ## Configuration Guardrails
 
@@ -170,8 +172,18 @@ Access-token TTL must also be a positive finite number. When `accessTokenTtlSeco
 
 Verification fails closed on malformed time policy. `exp`, `nbf`, and `iat` claims that participate in verification must be finite JWT NumericDate numbers, and `clockSkewSeconds` must be a non-negative finite number. Non-finite values are rejected instead of extending expiration, not-before, or age checks. A token is expired when verifier time reaches its `exp` NumericDate; equality is treated as expired unless positive clock skew still covers the boundary.
 
+### Node runtime boundary
+
 The root `@fluojs/jwt` import surface is safe to load before selecting a runtime-specific authentication path: Node.js `node:crypto` primitives are loaded lazily only when signing, verification, JWKS key parsing, or refresh-token id generation actually executes. This preserves the existing public exports while avoiding Node-specific crypto work at module import time.
 
+Lazy loading is an import-time safety property only. It does **not** make signing or verification portable across runtimes. Once a signing, verification, JWKS key-parsing, or refresh-token id-generation path executes, that path requires a Node.js-compatible `node:crypto` implementation (`createHmac`, `createSign`, `createVerify`, `createPublicKey`, `timingSafeEqual`, `randomUUID`). Bun satisfies this through its Node compatibility layer; Deno and Cloudflare Workers do not provide a compatible `node:crypto` surface for these operations and are not supported JWT signing/verification runtimes. Treat `@fluojs/jwt` as a Node-runtime auth package: keep import-time loading lazy, but do not assume the package can sign or verify tokens on non-Node runtimes without a compatible `node:crypto` polyfill.
+
+### `decode()` trust boundary
+
+`JwtService.decode(token)` reads the JWT payload segment without verifying the signature, `alg`, `exp`, `nbf`, `iss`, `aud`, or any other claim. The returned object is **unverified input** and must never be used for authorization decisions, identity resolution, or any code path that grants access. Use `JwtService.verify(token, options)` (or `DefaultJwtVerifier.verifyAccessToken(token)`) first, and read identity from the normalized `JwtPrincipal` that verification returns.
+
+`decode()` exists for diagnostics and non-authoritative inspection only, such as reading token metadata for logging or selecting a verification key before calling `verify()`. Any claim value read from `decode()` — including `sub`, `roles`, `scopes`, `iss`, `aud`, and `exp` — must be treated as attacker-controlled until `verify()` succeeds. Never branch on `decode()` output to allow or deny a request, and never expose decoded claims to downstream code as if they were verified.
+
 ## Public API Overview
 
 ### Core Classes
@@ -187,7 +199,8 @@ The root `@fluojs/jwt` import surface is safe to load before selecting a runtime
 - `JwtVerifierOptions`: Configuration for algorithms, keys, and validation policy.
 - `SignOptions` and `VerifyOptions`: Per-call signing and verification overrides.
 - `JwtClaims`, `JwtSigner`, `JwtVerifier`, `JwtKeyEntry`, `JwtAlgorithm`: Public signing and verification contracts.
-- `RefreshTokenOptions`, `RefreshTokenStore`, `RefreshTokenRecord`, `RefreshTokenConsumeInput`, `RefreshTokenRotateInput`, and `RefreshTokenConsumeResult`: Refresh-token storage, rotation, and replay-detection contracts.
+- `RefreshTokenOptions`, `RefreshTokenStore`, `RefreshTokenRecord`, `RefreshTokenConsumeInput`, `RefreshTokenRotateInput`, and `RefreshTokenConsumeResult`: Refresh-token storage, rotation, family-scoped revocation, and replay-detection contracts. `RefreshTokenStore.revokeByFamily(...)` is optional for compatibility with subject-revocation stores.
+- `JwtPlatformStatusSnapshot` and `JwtStatusAdapterInput`: Status snapshot and adapter input types exported with the platform diagnostic helpers.
 
 ### Errors and diagnostics
 - `JwtVerificationError`, `JwtInvalidTokenError`, `JwtExpiredTokenError`, `JwtConfigurationError`: Typed JWT failures.

package/dist/module.js

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ export class JwtModule {
       provide: JWT_OPTIONS,
       scope: 'singleton',
       useValue: options
-    }, Boolean(options.refreshToken), Boolean(options.refreshToken), 'singleton', false, options.global ?? false);
+    }, true, true, options.refreshToken ? 'singleton' : 'transient', false, options.global ?? false);
   }
   static forRootAsync(options) {
     return this.createModule({

package/dist/refresh/refresh-token.d.ts

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ export interface RefreshTokenStore {
     find(tokenId: string): Promise<RefreshTokenRecord | undefined>;
     revoke(tokenId: string): Promise<void>;
     revokeBySubject(subject: string): Promise<void>;
+    revokeByFamily?(family: string): Promise<void>;
     consume?(input: RefreshTokenConsumeInput): Promise<RefreshTokenConsumeResult>;
     rotate?(input: RefreshTokenRotateInput): Promise<RefreshTokenConsumeResult>;
 }
@@ -80,6 +81,7 @@ export declare class RefreshTokenService {
     revokeAllForSubject(subject: string): Promise<void>;
     private issueRefreshTokenWithFamily;
     private consumeRefreshToken;
+    private revokeCompromisedFamily;
     private createRefreshTokenWithFamily;
     private verifyRefreshClaims;
 }

package/dist/refresh/refresh-token.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"refresh-token.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/refresh/refresh-token.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AACA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAC7D,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAGjE;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,iBAAiB;IAChC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,kBAAkB,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAC/C,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,kBAAkB,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;IAC/D,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IACvC,eAAe,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAChD,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAC/C,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,wBAAwB,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9E,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,uBAAuB,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC,CAAC;CAC7E;AAED;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,wBAAwB;IACvC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;CACX;AAED;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,uBAAwB,SAAQ,wBAAwB;IACvE,WAAW,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC;CACjC;AAED;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,yBAAyB,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG,cAAc,GAAG,SAAS,GAAG,WAAW,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;AAEvH;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,kBAAkB;IACjC,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACX,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;IAChB,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACd,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;CACjB;AAED;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,mBAAmB;IAClC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACzB,mBAAmB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC7B,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IAClB,KAAK,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC;CAC1B;AAED;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,wBAAgB,4BAA4B,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,GAAG,SAAS,GAAG,mBAAmB,CA6B1G;AAQD;;GAEG;AACH,qBAAa,mBAAmB;IAK5B,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM;IACvB,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ;IAL3B,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,CAAsB;gBAG5C,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EACX,MAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB,EACxB,QAAQ,EAAE,kBAAkB;IAKzC,iBAAiB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;IAOnD,kBAAkB,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC;QAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;KAAE,CAAC;IA0EhG,kBAAkB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;IAIlD,mBAAmB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;YAI3C,2BAA2B;YAQ3B,mBAAmB;YAUnB,uBAAuB;YASvB,4BAA4B;YA+B5B,mBAAmB;CA4BlC"}

package/dist/refresh/refresh-token.js

@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ export class RefreshTokenService {
         };
       }
       if (consumeResult === 'already_used') {
-        await this.options.store.revokeBySubject(claims.sub);
+        await this.revokeCompromisedFamily(claims.sub, claims.family);
         throw new JwtInvalidTokenError('Refresh token reuse detected.');
       }
       if (consumeResult === 'expired') {
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ export class RefreshTokenService {
       throw new JwtExpiredTokenError('Refresh token has expired.');
     }
     if (record.used) {
-      await this.options.store.revokeBySubject(record.subject);
+      await this.revokeCompromisedFamily(record.subject, record.family);
       throw new JwtInvalidTokenError('Refresh token reuse detected.');
     }
     const accessToken = await this.signer.signAccessToken({
@@ -157,6 +157,13 @@ export class RefreshTokenService {
     }
     return this.options.store.consume(input);
   }
+  async revokeCompromisedFamily(subject, family) {
+    if (this.options.store.revokeByFamily) {
+      await this.options.store.revokeByFamily(family);
+      return;
+    }
+    await this.options.store.revokeBySubject(subject);
+  }
   async createRefreshTokenWithFamily(subject, family) {
     const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
     const {

package/dist/signing/jwks.d.ts

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ export declare class JwksClient {
     private readonly requestTimeoutMs;
     private readonly cacheMaxEntries;
     private readonly cache;
+    private readonly activeFetchControllers;
     private lifecycleGeneration;
     constructor(uri: string, cacheTtl?: number, requestTimeoutMs?: number, cacheMaxEntries?: number);
     /**

package/dist/signing/jwks.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"jwks.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/signing/jwks.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAiC7C;;GAEG;AACH,qBAAa,UAAU;IAKnB,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG;IACpB,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ;IACzB,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,gBAAgB;IACjC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,eAAe;IAPlC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,CAA4D;IAClF,OAAO,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAK;gBAGb,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,EACX,QAAQ,GAAE,MAAgB,EAC1B,gBAAgB,GAAE,MAAc,EAChC,eAAe,GAAE,MAAuC;IAO3E;;;;;OAKG;IACH,OAAO,IAAI,IAAI;IAKf,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY;IAId,aAAa,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;IA2CpD,OAAO,CAAC,wBAAwB;IAQhC,OAAO,CAAC,uBAAuB;YAYjB,SAAS;CAsCxB"}
+{"version":3,"file":"jwks.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/signing/jwks.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAiC7C;;GAEG;AACH,qBAAa,UAAU;IAMnB,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG;IACpB,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ;IACzB,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,gBAAgB;IACjC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,eAAe;IARlC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,CAA4D;IAClF,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAA8B;IACrE,OAAO,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAK;gBAGb,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,EACX,QAAQ,GAAE,MAAgB,EAC1B,gBAAgB,GAAE,MAAc,EAChC,eAAe,GAAE,MAAuC;IAO3E;;;;;OAKG;IACH,OAAO,IAAI,IAAI;IAWf,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY;IAId,aAAa,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;IA2CpD,OAAO,CAAC,wBAAwB;IAQhC,OAAO,CAAC,uBAAuB;YAYjB,SAAS;CAwDxB"}

package/dist/signing/jwks.js

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ function assertPositiveInteger(value, label) {
  */
 export class JwksClient {
   cache = new Map();
+  activeFetchControllers = new Set();
   lifecycleGeneration = 0;
   constructor(uri, cacheTtl = 600_000, requestTimeoutMs = 5_000, cacheMaxEntries = DEFAULT_JWKS_CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES) {
     this.uri = uri;
@@ -41,6 +42,10 @@ export class JwksClient {
   dispose() {
     this.lifecycleGeneration += 1;
     this.cache.clear();
+    for (const controller of this.activeFetchControllers) {
+      controller.abort();
+    }
+    this.activeFetchControllers.clear();
   }
   isAbortError(error) {
     return error instanceof Error && error.name === 'AbortError';
@@ -99,36 +104,51 @@ export class JwksClient {
     }
   }
   async fetchKeys() {
-    let response;
+    const fetchGeneration = this.lifecycleGeneration;
     const controller = new AbortController();
+    this.activeFetchControllers.add(controller);
+    let timedOut = false;
     const timeout = setTimeout(() => {
+      timedOut = true;
       controller.abort();
     }, this.requestTimeoutMs);
     timeout.unref?.();
     try {
-      response = await fetch(this.uri, {
+      const response = await fetch(this.uri, {
         signal: controller.signal
       });
+      if (!response.ok) {
+        throw new JwtConfigurationError(`JWKS endpoint returned HTTP ${response.status}.`);
+      }
+      let body;
+      try {
+        body = await response.json();
+      } catch (error) {
+        if (this.isAbortError(error)) {
+          throw error;
+        }
+        throw new JwtConfigurationError('JWKS endpoint did not return valid JSON.');
+      }
+      if (!Array.isArray(body.keys)) {
+        throw new JwtConfigurationError('JWKS endpoint did not return a keys array.');
+      }
+      return body.keys;
     } catch (error) {
+      if (error instanceof JwtConfigurationError) {
+        throw error;
+      }
       if (this.isAbortError(error)) {
-        throw new JwtConfigurationError(`JWKS fetch timed out after ${String(this.requestTimeoutMs)}ms.`);
+        if (timedOut) {
+          throw new JwtConfigurationError(`JWKS fetch timed out after ${String(this.requestTimeoutMs)}ms.`);
+        }
+        if (fetchGeneration !== this.lifecycleGeneration) {
+          throw new JwtConfigurationError('JWKS client was disposed while fetching keys.');
+        }
       }
       throw new JwtConfigurationError(`Failed to fetch JWKS from "${this.uri}".`);
     } finally {
       clearTimeout(timeout);
+      this.activeFetchControllers.delete(controller);
     }
-    if (!response.ok) {
-      throw new JwtConfigurationError(`JWKS endpoint returned HTTP ${response.status}.`);
-    }
-    let body;
-    try {
-      body = await response.json();
-    } catch {
-      throw new JwtConfigurationError('JWKS endpoint did not return valid JSON.');
-    }
-    if (!Array.isArray(body.keys)) {
-      throw new JwtConfigurationError('JWKS endpoint did not return a keys array.');
-    }
-    return body.keys;
   }
 }

package/package.json

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
     "signing",
     "verification"
   ],
-  "version": "1.0.3",
+  "version": "1.1.0",
   "private": false,
   "license": "MIT",
   "repository": {
@@ -36,9 +36,9 @@
     "dist"
   ],
   "dependencies": {
-    "@fluojs/core": "^1.0.3",
-    "@fluojs/di": "^1.1.0",
-    "@fluojs/runtime": "^1.1.8"
+    "@fluojs/core": "^1.1.0",
+    "@fluojs/di": "^2.0.0",
+    "@fluojs/runtime": "^2.0.1"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "vitest": "^3.2.4"